Mesjid Islam Haram esh Sharif dan El Aqsa Di Yerusalem

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Mesjid Islam Haram esh Sharif dan  El Aqsa   Di Yerusalem

The History OF Temple Mount (Haram esh Sharif) with Dome of the Rock and El Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem

Temple Mount (Haram esh Sharif) with Dome of the Rock and El Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, Israel Photo

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Stepping on to the Temple Mount (in Arabic Haram esh-Sharif  the “Noble Sanctuary”), the site of Solomon’s Temple and the Second Temple.
Now the site of both the El-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
[antiquity-strewn area in front of the Museum of Islamic Art]
2006-032
[The Temple Mount is a vast esplanade constructed atop huge archways. Beneath the deck of the mount are mostly unaccessible catacombs and the rock outcropping believed to be the site of where: Abraham was asked to sacrifice Isaac, the site of the Holy of Holies of Solomon’s Temple and later where Muhammad left the Earth on his Night Journey (the one and only possible reference to Jerusalem in the Koran, and then, not by name).] 
The El-Aqsa mosque itself was “closed to all non-Muslims, on this day,
pending negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities.”  Damn politics!
2006-033
[Shown here are four of the seven facade bays of entry. Twice in history, this building was razed to the ground by earthquakes.  It’s present form dates to the 11th Century.] 
So we head across the Temple Mount to the Dome of the Rock.
2006-034
[One of the first and greatest achievements of Islamic architecture. Built in 688-691, The Dome of the Rock has become more a shrine and a symbol of the city than a mosque.  The dome was originally made of copper, but is now covered with gold leaf, thanks to King Hussein of Jordan.  Beneath the dome, the drum is decorated with verses from the Koran telling of the Night Journey.  Leading up to the dome in all directions are eight sets of stairs topped by a set of archways. Each set of stairs and archways (called qanatir) are unique in size and length and date from different periods.  Some column capitals were recycled from Roman-era buildings.] 
Joan and one of the Qanatirs leading up to the main entrance of the Dome.
This Qanatir is unique in that it’s stairs are carved out of the stone of the platform.
2006-035 
The place is HUGE!   But, “closed to all non-Muslims, on this day,
pending negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli authorities.”  Politics, damn!
2006-036 
The top band of mosaics contains passages from the Koran.
2006-037 
Everywhere on the grounds are little buildings.  This one is a public water fountain.  Behind the fountain can be seen the Cotton Merchant’s Gate, thru which non-Muslims are not allowed to pass (although it is the best way to get into the Jerusalem market).  We didn’t know the Muslim password for the day, so we were turned away and had to walk 35-minutes to the non-Muslim passage.
2006-038
[The Sabil of Qaitbey fountain was built on the order of the Mameluke sultan Qaitbey (1468-1498).  It has a carved stone dome, the only one of its kind in Israel.] 
Dome of the Prophet, a qanatir, Ashrafiyya Madrasa (Islamic Religious School) and minaret in the background.  From this minaret (one of four on the Temple Mount), the call to prayer can be heard five times daily throughout the entire Old City
(thanks to Bogen pre-amps, amps and dome-horned speakers).
2006-039 
Nowhere a sign of hostility.  People couldn’t have been nicer.
2006-040 
Another archway.
2006-041 
Another worshipper.
2006-042 
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Temple Mount

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Temple Mount
הַר הַבַּיִת, Har haBáyith
الحرم الشريف, al-Haram ash-Sharīf,
Temple mount.JPG
Elevation 740 m (2,428 ft)
Location
Temple Mount is located in Jerusalem

Temple Mount

Jerusalem

Range Judean
Coordinates 31°46′40.7″N 35°14′8.9″E / 31.777972°N 35.235806°E / 31.777972; 35.235806Coordinates: 31°46′40.7″N 35°14′8.9″E / 31.777972°N 35.235806°E / 31.777972; 35.235806
Geology
Type Limestone[1]

The Temple Mount, known in Hebrew (and in Judaism) as Har haBáyith (Hebrew: הַר הַבַּיִת‎) and in Arabic (and in Islam) as the Haram Ash-Sharif (Arabic: الحرم القدسي الشريف‎, al-haram al-qudsī ash-sharīf, Noble Sanctuary), is one of the most important religious sites in the Old City of Jerusalem.[citation needed] It has been used as a religious site for thousands of years. At least four religions are known to have used the Temple Mount: Judaism, Islam, Christianity, and Roman paganism.

Biblical scholars have often identified it with two biblical mountains of uncertain location: Mount Moriah where the binding of Isaac took place, and Mount Zion where the original Jebusite fortress stood; however, both interpretations are disputed.

Judaism regards the Temple Mount as the place where God chose the Divine Presence to rest (Isa 8:18); according to the rabbinic sages whose debates produced the Talmud, it was from here the world expanded into its present form and where God gathered the dust used to create the first man, Adam. The site is the location of Abraham’s binding of Isaac, and of two Jewish Temples. According to the Bible the site should function as the center of all national life—a governmental, judicial and, of course, religious center (Deut 12:5-26; 14:23-25; 15:20; 16:2-16; 17:8-10; 26: 2; 31: 11; Isa 2: 2-5; Oba 1:21; Psa 48). During the Second Temple Period it functioned also as an economical center. From that location the word of God will come out to all nations, and that is the site where all prayers are focused. According to Jewish tradition and scripture (2 Chronicles 3:1-2), the first temple was built by Solomon the son of David in 957 BCE and destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BCE. The second was constructed under the auspices of Zerubbabel in 516 BCE and destroyed by the Roman Empire in 70 CE. Jewish tradition maintains it is here the Third and final Temple will also be built. The location is the holiest site in Judaism and is the place Jews turn towards during prayer. Due to its extreme sanctity, many Jews will not walk on the Mount itself, to avoid unintentionally entering the area where the Holy of Holies stood, since according to Rabbinical law, some aspect of the Divine Presence is still present at the site.[2] It was from the Holy of Holies that the High Priest communicated directly with God.

Among Sunni Muslims, the Mount is widely considered to be the third holiest site in Islam. Revered as the Noble Sanctuary (Bait-ul-Muqaddas) and the location of Muhammad‘s journey to Jerusalem and ascent to heaven, the site is also associated with Jewish biblical prophets who are also venerated in Islam.[citation needed] After the Muslim conquest of Jerusalem in 637 CE, Umayyad Caliphs commissioned the construction of the al-Aqsa Mosque and Dome of the Rock on the site.[3] The Dome was completed in 692 CE, making it one of the oldest extant Islamic structures in the world, after the Kaabah. The Al Aqsa Mosque rests on the far southern side of the Mount, facing Mecca. The Dome of the Rock currently sits in the middle, occupying or close to the area where the Bible mandates the Holy Temple be rebuilt.[4]

In light of the dual claims of both Judaism and Islam, it is one of the most contested religious sites in the world. Since the Crusades, the Muslim community of Jerusalem has managed the site as a Waqf, without interruption.[5] As part of the Old City, controlled by Israel since 1967, both Israel and the Palestinian Authority claim sovereignty over the site, which remains a major focal point of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[6] In an attempt to keep the status quo, the Israeli government enforces a controversial ban on prayer by non-Muslim visitors.

Contents

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[edit] Location and dimensions

Model of Jerusalem in the Late 2nd Temple Period. Note that the large flat expanse was a base for the temple located there

The Temple Mount forms the northern portion of a very narrow spur of hill that slopes sharply from north to south. Rising above the Kidron Valley to the east and Tyropoeon Valley to the west,[7] its peak reaches a height of 740 m (2,428 ft) above sea level.[8] In around 19 BCE, Herod the Great extended the Mount’s natural plateau by enclosing the area with four massive retaining walls and filling the voids. This artificial expansion resulted in a large flat expanse which today forms the eastern section of the Old City of Jerusalem. The trapezium shaped platform measures 488 m along the west, 470 m along the east, 315 m along the north and 280 m along the south, giving a total area of approximately 150,000 m2 (37 acres).[9] The northern wall of the Mount, together with the northern section of the western wall, is hidden behind residential buildings. The southern section of the western flank is revealed and contains what is known as the Western Wall. The retaining walls on these two sides descend many meters below ground level. A northern portion of the western wall may be seen from within the Western Wall Tunnel, which was excavated through buildings adjacent to the platform. On the southern and eastern sides the walls are visible almost to their full height. The platform itself is separated from the rest of the Old City by the Tyropoeon Valley, though this once deep valley is now largely hidden beneath later deposits, and is imperceptible in places. The platform can be reached via Bridge Street – a street in the Muslim Quarter at the level of the platform, actually sitting on a monumental bridge; the bridge is no longer externally visible due to the change in ground level, but it may be seen from beneath via the Western Wall Tunnel.

[edit] History

[edit] Israelite period

The hill is believed to have been inhabited since the 4th millennium BCE.

Assuming colocation with the biblical Mount Zion, its southern section would have been walled at the beginning of the 2nd millennium BCE, in around 1850 BCE, by Canaanites who established a settlement there (or in the vicinity) named Jebus.

Biblical scholars have also identified it with Mount Moriah where the binding of Isaac took place. According to the Hebrew Bible, Mount Moriah was originally a threshing-floor owned by Araunah, a Jebusite. The prophet Gad suggested the area to King David as a fitting place for the erection of an altar to YHWH, since it was there a destroying angel was standing when God stopped a great plague in Jerusalem.[10] David then bought the property from Araunah, for fifty pieces of silver, and erected the altar. YHWH instructed David to build a sanctuary on the site, outside the city walls on the northern edge of the hill. The building was to replace the Tabernacle, and serve as the Temple of the Israelites in Jerusalem.[11] The Temple Mount is an important part of Biblical archaeology.

[edit] Achaemenid Persian, Hasmonean periods, and Herod’s expansion

A stone (2.43×1 m) with Hebrew inscription “To the Trumpeting Place” excavated by Benjamin Mazar at the southern foot of the Temple Mount is believed to be a part of the Second Temple

Much of the Mount’s early history is synonymous with events pertaining to the Temple itself. After the destruction of Solomon’s Temple by Nebuchadnezzar II, construction of the Second Temple began under Cyrus in around 538 BCE, and completed in 516 BCE. Evidence of a Hasmonean expansion of the Temple Mount has been recovered by archaeologist Leen Ritmeyer. Around 19 BCE, Herod the Great further expanded the Mount and rebuilt the temple. The ambitious project, which involved the employment of 10,000 workers,[12] more than doubled the size of Temple Mount to approximately 36 acres (150,000 m2). Herod leveled the area by cutting away rock on the northwest side and raising the sloping ground to the south. He achieved this by constructing huge buttress walls and vaults, filling the necessary sections with earth and rubble.[13] A basilica (the Royal Stoa) was constructed on the southern end of the expanded platform, which provided a focus for the city’s commercial and legal transactions, and which was provided with separate access to the city below via the Robinson’s Arch overpass.[14] In addition to restoration of the Temple, its courtyards, and porticoes, Herod also built Antonia Fortress abutting the northwestern corner of the Temple Mount, and a rainwater reservoir, Birket Israel, in the northeast. As a result of the First Jewish-Roman War, the fortress was destroyed by Roman emperor Vespasian, in 70 CE, under the command of his son and imperial heir, Titus.

[edit] Middle Roman period

Stones from the walls of the Temple Mount thrown onto the street by Roman soldiers in 70 CE

The city of Aelia Capitolina was built in 130 CE by the Roman emperor Hadrian, and occupied by a Roman colony on the site of Jerusalem, which was still in ruins from the First Jewish Revolt in 70 CE.

Aelia came from Hadrian’s nomen gentile, Aelius, while Capitolina meant that the new city was dedicated to Jupiter Capitolinus, to whom a temple was built on the site of the former second Jewish temple, the Temple Mount.[15]

Hadrian had intended the construction of the new city as a gift to the Jews, but since he had constructed a giant statue of himself in front of the Temple of Jupiter and the Temple of Jupiter had a huge statue of Jupiter inside of it, there were now two enormous graven images on the Temple Mount. It was also the normal practice of the adherents of the Hellenic religion to sacrifice pigs before their deities. In addition to this, Hadrian issued a decree prohibiting the practice of circumcision. These three factors, the graven images, the sacrifice of pigs before the altar, and the prohibition of circumcision, constituted for non-Hellenized radical Zealot Jews a new abomination of desolation, and thus Bar Kochba launched the Third Jewish Revolt. After the Third Jewish Revolt failed, all Jews were forbidden on pain of death from entering the city.

[edit] Late Roman period

About 325 it is believed that Constantine‘s mother, St. Helena, built a small church on the Mount in the 4th century, calling it the Church of St. Cyrus and St. John, later on enlarged and called the Church of the Holy Wisdom. The church was later destroyed and on its ruins the Dome of the Rock was built.[16] Since it is known that Helena ordered the Temple of Venus to the west of the Temple Mount to be torn down to construct the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, presumably she also ordered the Temple of Jupiter on the Temple Mount to be torn down to construct the Church of St. Cyrus and St. John.

In 363, Emperor Julian, on his way to engage Persia, stopped at the ruins of the Second Temple in Jerusalem. Julian granted the Jews permission to begin rebuilding the Temple.[17] To Christians, the destroyed Temple was a symbol of Christianity’s triumph over Judaism, and Julian, was an opponent of Christianity.[17] Rebuilding work began, but was ended by the Galilee earthquake of 363.[17][18]

There are records of Jews continuing to offer sacrifices on the Foundation Stone after the destruction of the Temple and into the Byzantine period.[17]

[edit] Byzantine period

Archaeological evidence in the form of an elaborate mosaic floor similar to the one in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and multiple fragments of an elaborate marble Templon (chancel screen) prove that an elaborate Byzantine church or monastery or other public building stood on the Temple Mount in Byzantine times, presumably the aforementioned Holy Wisdom Church.[19]

[edit] Sassanid vassal state period

See Jewish revolt against Heraclius
See also Byzantine-Sassanid War of 602-628
In 610, the Sassanid Empire drove the Byzantine Empire out of the Middle East, giving the Jews control of Jerusalem for the first time in centuries. The Jews in Palestine were allowed to set up a vassal state under the Sassanid Empire called the Sassanid Jewish Commonewealth which lasted for five years. Jewish rabbis ordered the restart of animal sacrifice for the first time since the time of Second Temple and started to reconstruct the Jewish Temple. Shortly before the Byzantines took the area back five years later in 615, the Persians gave control to the Christian population, who tore down the partially built Jewish Temple edifice and turned it into a garbage dump,[20] which is what it was when the Caliph Omar took the city in the 630s.

[edit] Arabic period

Southwest qanatir of the Haram al Sharif

A model of the Haram-al-Sharif made in 1879 by Conrad Schlick. The model can be seen in the Bijbels Museum in Amsterdam

Upon the capture of Jerusalem by the victorious Caliph Omar, Omar immediately headed to the Temple Mount with his advisor, Ka’ab al-Ahbar, a formerly Jewish rabbi who had converted to Islam, in order to find the holy site of the “Furthest Mosque” or Al Masjid al Aqsa which was mentioned in the Quran and specified in the Hadiths of being in Jerusalem.Ka’ab al-Ahbar suggested to Caliph Omar to build the Dome of the Rock monument on the site that Ka’ab believed to be the Biblical Holy of the Holies, arguing that this site is where Mohammad ascended to heaven during the Isra and Mi’raj miracle. The actual construction of the Muslim monuments at the southeast corner, facing Mecca, near which the al-Aqsa Mosque were built 78 years later. The original building is now known to have been wooden and to have been constructed on the site of a Byzantine public building with an elaborate mosaic floor. (The Persian conquest that immediately preceded the Arab conquest makes it uncertain who destroyed the building.)[19]

In 691 an octagonal Islamic building topped by a dome was built by the Caliph Abd al-Malik around the rock, for a myriad of political, dynastic and religious reasons, built on local and Koranic traditions articulating the site’s holiness, a process in which textual and architectural narratives reinforced one another.[21] The shrine became known as the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat as-Sakhra قبة الصخرة). The dome itself was covered in gold in 1920. In 715 the Umayyads led by the Caliph al-Walid I, rebuilt the Temple’s nearby Chanuyot into a mosque (see illustrations and detailed drawing) which they named al-Masjid al-Aqsa المسجد الأقصى, the al-Aqsa Mosque or in translation “the furthest mosque”, corresponding to the Islamic belief of Muhammad’s miraculous nocturnal journey as recounted in the Qur’an and hadith. The term al-Haram al-Sharif الحرم الشريف (the Noble Sanctuary) refers to the whole area that surrounds that Rock as was called later by the Mamluks and Ottomans.[22]

For Muslims, the importance of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque makes Jerusalem the third-holiest city, after Mecca and Medina. The mosque and shrine are currently administered by a Waqf (an Islamic trust). The various inscriptions on the Dome walls and the artistic decorations imply on symbolic eschatological significance of the structure.

From the Arabic Conquest to the Crusades there seems to have been good relations between the Arab rulers and the Jewish minority. A Jewish synagogue was built on the Temple Mount. Its location has not been established, but it was destroyed by the Crusaders when they took the city and massacred the Jews and Muslims in 1099.

[edit] Ottoman period

Following the Ottoman conquest of Palestine in 1516, the Ottoman authorities continued the policy of prohibiting non-Muslims from setting foot on the Temple Mount until the early 19th-century, when non-Muslims were again permitted to visit the site.[17]

In 1867, a team from the Royal Engineers, led by Lieutenant Charles Warren and financed by the Palestine Exploration Fund (P.E.F.), discovered a series of underground tunnels near the Temple Mount. Warren secretly excavated some tunnels near the Temple Mount walls and was the first one to document their lower courses. Warren also conducted some small scale excavations inside the Temple Mount, by removing rubble that blocked passages leading from the Double Gate chamber.

[edit] British Mandate period

Between 1922 and 1924, the Dome of the Rock was restored by the Islamic Higher Council.[23]

[edit] Jordanian period

Jordan undertook two renovations of the Dome of the Rock, replacing the leaking, wooden dome with an aluminum dome in 1952, and, when the new dome leaked, carrying out a second restoration between 1959 and 1964.[23]

Neither Israeli Arabs nor Israeli Jews could visit their holy places in the Jordanian territories during this period.[24][25]

[edit] Israeli period

During the 1967 Six-Day War Israel captured the Temple Mount together with all of East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, who had controlled it since 1948. The Chief Rabbi of the Israeli Defense Forces, Shlomo Goren, led the soldiers in religious celebrations on the Temple Mount and at the Western Wall. The Israeli Chief Rabbinate also declared a religious holiday on the anniversary, called “Yom Yerushalayim” (Jerusalem Day), which also became a national holiday that commemorates the reunification of the city. Many Jews saw the capture of Jerusalem and the Temple Mount as a miraculous liberation of biblical-messianic proportion.[citation needed]

A few days after the war was over 200,000 Jews flocked to the Western Wall in the first mass Jewish pilgrimage near the mount since the destruction of Temple in 69 CE. However, the Israeli government subsequently left the Islamic waqf in control of the site. The site has become a flash-point between Israel and the Muslim world.

On October 8, 1990, Israeli forces patrolling the site blocked worshipers from accessing it. A tear gas canister was accidentally detonated among the female worshipers, which caused events to escalate.[26] Rocks were eventually thrown, while security forces fired rounds that ended up killing 20 people and injured around 140 more. An Israeli enquiry found Israeli forces at fault, but it also concluded that charges could not be brought against any particular individuals.[27]

Between 1992 and 1994, the Jordanian government undertook the unprecedented step of gilding the dome of the Dome of the Rock, covering it with 5000 gold plates, and restoring and reinforcing the structure. The Salah Eddin minbar was also restored. The project was paid for by King Hussein personally, at a cost of $8 million.[23]

The Second Palestinian Intifada is often cited as being sparked by a visit made to the Temple Mount by Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon. He toured the site, together with a Likud party delegation and a large number of Israeli riot police, on September 28, 2000. The visit was seen as a provocative gesture by many Palestinians, who gathered around the site. Demonstrations soon turned violent, with both rubber bullets and tear gas being used. This event is often cited as one of the catalysts of the Second Intifada.[28]

Also in this period, Palestinian authorities have begun excavations at the Temple Mount, damaging the structural integrity of the site; see below.

[edit] Management and access

Sign in Hebrew and English outside the Temple Mount stating what the Torah says about entering the area

An Islamic Waqf has managed the Temple Mount continuously since the Muslim reconquest of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187. On June 7, 1967, soon after Israel had taken control of the area during the Six-Day War, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol assured that “no harm whatsoever shall come to the places sacred to all religions”. Together with the extension of Israeli jurisdiction and administration over east Jerusalem, the Knesset passed the Preservation of the Holy Places Law,[29] ensuring protection of the Holy Places against desecration, as well as freedom of access thereto.[30] Israel agreed to leave administration of the site in the hands of the Waqf.

Although freedom of access was enshrined in the law, as a security measure, the Israeli government currently enforces a ban on non-Muslim prayer on the site. Non-Muslims who are observed praying on the site are subject to expulsion by the police.[31] At various times, when there is fear of Arab rioting upon the mount resulting in throwing stones from above towards the Western Wall Plaza, Israel has prevented Muslim men under 45 from praying in the compound, citing these concerns.[32] Sometimes such restrictions have coincided with Friday prayers during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.[33] Normally, West Bank Palestinians are allowed access to Jerusalem only during Islamic holidays, with access usually restricted to men over 35 and women of any age eligible for permits to enter the city.[34] Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, which because of Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem, hold Israeli permanent residency cards, and Israeli Arabs, are permitted unrestricted access to the Temple Mount.

[edit] Current features

An additional flat platform was built above the portion of the hill rising above the general level of the top of the Temple Mount, and this upper platform is the location of the Dome of the Rock; the rock in question is the bedrock at the peak of the hill, just breaching the floor level of the upper platform. Beneath the rock is a natural cave known as the Well of Souls, originally accessible only by a narrow hole in the rock itself, Crusaders hacked open an entrance to the cave from the south, by which it can now be entered. There is also a smaller domed building on the upper platform, slightly to the east of the Dome of the Rock, known as the Dome of the Chain — traditionally the location where a chain once rose to heaven. Several stairways rise to the upper platform from the lower; that at the northwest corner is believed by some archaeologists be part of a much wider monumental staircase, mostly hidden or destroyed, and dating from the Second Temple era.

The al-Kas ablution fountain for Muslim worshipers on the southern portion of the lower platform.

The lower platform – which constitutes most of the surface of the Temple Mount – has at its southern end the al-Aqsa Mosque, which takes up most of the width of the Mount. Gardens take up the eastern and most of the northern side of the platform; the far north of the platform houses an Islamic school.[35] The lower platform also houses a fountain (known as al-Kas), originally supplied with water via a long narrow aqueduct leading from pools at Bethlehem (colloquially known as Solomon’s Pools), but now supplied from Jerusalem’s water mains. There are several cisterns embedded in the lower platform, designed to collect rain water as a water supply. These have various forms and structures, seemingly built in different periods by different architects, ranging from vaulted chambers built in the gap between the bedrock and the platform, to chambers cut into the bedrock itself. Of these, the most notable are (numbering traditionally follows Wilson’s scheme[36]):

  • Cistern 1 (located under the northern side of the upper platform). There is a speculation that it had a function connected with the altar of the Second Temple (and possibly of the earlier Temple),[37] or with the bronze sea.
  • Cistern 5 (located under the south eastern corner of the upper platform) — a long and narrow chamber, with a strange anti-clockwise curved section at its north western corner, and containing within it a doorway currently blocked by earth. The cistern’s position and design is such that there has been speculation it had a function connected with the altar of the Second Temple (and possibly of the earlier Temple), or with the bronze sea. Charles Warren thought that the altar of burnt offerings was located at the north western end.[38]
  • Cistern 8 (located just north of the al-Aqsa Mosque) — known as the Great Sea, a large rock hewn cavern, the roof supported by pillars carved from the rock; the chamber is particularly cave-like and atmospheric,[39] and its maximum water capacity is several hundred thousand gallons.
  • Cistern 9 (located just south of cistern 8, and directly under the al-Aqsa Mosque) — known as the Well of the Leaf due to its leaf-shaped plan, also rock hewn.
  • Cistern 11 (located east of cistern 9) — a set of vaulted rooms forming a plan shaped like the letter E. Probably the largest cistern, it has the potential to house over 700,000 gallons of water.
  • Cistern 16/17 (located at the centre of the far northern end of the Temple Mount). Despite the currently narrow entrances, this cistern (17 and 16 are the same cistern) is a large vaulted chamber, which Warren described as looking like the inside of the cathedral at Cordoba (which was previously a mosque). Warren believed that it was almost certainly built for some other purpose, and was only adapted into a cistern at a later date; he suggested that it might have been part of a general vault supporting the northern side of the platform, in which case substantially more of the chamber exists than is used for a cistern.

The eastern set of Hulda gates.

Robinson’s Arch, situated on the southwestern flank, once supported a staircase that led to the Mount.

The walls of the platform contain several gateways, all currently blocked. In the east wall is the Golden Gate, through which legend states the Jewish Messiah would enter Jerusalem. On the southern face are the Hulda Gates — the triple gate (which has three arches) and the double gate (which has two arches, and is partly obscured by a Crusader building); these were the entrance and exit (respectively) to the Temple Mount from Ophel (the oldest part of Jerusalem), and the main access to the Mount for ordinary Jews. In the western face, near the southern corner, is the Barclay’s Gate – only half visible due to a building on the northern side. Also in the western face, hidden by later construction but visible via the recent Western Wall Tunnels, and only rediscovered by Warren, is Warren’s Gate; the function of these western gates is obscure, but many Jews view Warren’s Gate as particularly holy, due to its location due west of the Dome of the Rock. Traditional belief considers the Dome of the Rock to have earlier been the location at which the Holy of Holies was placed; numerous alternative opinions exist, based on study and calculations, such as those of Tuvia Sagiv.[40]

Warren was able to investigate the inside of these gates. Warren’s Gate and the Golden Gate simply head towards the centre of the Mount, fairly quickly giving access to the surface by steps.[41] Barclay’s Gate is similar, but abruptly turns south as it does so; the reason for this is currently unknown. The double and triple gates (the Huldah Gates) are more substantial; heading into the Mount for some distance they each finally have steps rising to the surface just north of the al-Aqsa Mosque.[42] The passageway for each is vaulted, and has two aisles (in the case of the triple gate, a third aisle exists for a brief distance beyond the gate); the eastern aisle of the double gates and western of the triple gates reach the surface, the other aisles terminating some way before the steps – Warren believed that one aisle of each original passage was extended when the al-Aqsa Mosque blocked the original surface exits.

East of and joined to the triple gate passageway is a large vaulted area, supporting the southeastern corner of the Temple Mount platform – which is substantially above the bedrock at this point – the vaulted chambers here are popularly referred to as King Solomon’s Stables.[43] They were used as stables by the Crusaders, but were built by Herod the Great – along with the platform they were built to support. In the process of investigating Cistern 10, Warren discovered tunnels that lay under the Triple Gate passageway.[44] These passages lead in erratic directions, some leading beyond the southern edge of the Temple Mount (they are at a depth below the base of the walls); their purpose is currently unknown – as is whether they predate the Temple Mount – a situation not helped by the fact that apart from Warren’s expedition no one else is known to have visited them.

The existing four minarets include three near the Western Wall and one near the northern wall. The first minaret was constructed on the southwest corner of the Temple Mount in 1278. The second was built in 1297 by order of a Mameluk king, the third by a governor of Jerusalem in 1329, and the last in 1367.

[edit] Alterations to antiquities and damage to existing structures

Due to the extreme political sensitivity of the site, no real archaeological excavations have even been conducted on the Temple Mount itself. Protests commonly occur whenever archaeologists conduct projects near the Mount. Aside from visual observation of surface features, most other archaeological knowledge of the site comes from the 19th century survey carried out by Charles Wilson and Charles Warren and others. This sensitivity has not prevented the Muslim Waqf from destroying archeological evidence on a number of occasions.[45][46][47][48]

After the Six-Day War of 1967, Israeli archeologists began a series of excavations near the site at the southern wall that uncovered finds from the Second Temple period through Roman, Umayyad and Crusader times.[49] Over the period 1970–88, a number of tunnels were excavated in the vicinity, including one that passed to the west of the Mount and became known as the Western Wall Tunnel, which was opened to the public in 1996.[50][51] The same year the Waqf began construction of a new mosque in the structures known since Crusader times as Solomon’s Stables. Many Israelis regarded this as a radical change of the status quo, which should not have been undertaken without first consulting the Israeli government. The project was done without attention to the possibility of disturbing historically significant archaeological material, with stone and ancient artifacts treated without regard to their preservation.[52]

In October 1999, the Islamic Waqf, and the Islamic Movement conducted an illegal[citation needed] dig which inflicted much archaeological damage. The earth from this operation, which has archeological wealth relevant to Jewish, Christian and Muslim history, was removed by heavy machinery and unceremoniously dumped by trucks into the nearby Kidron Valley. Although the archeological finds in the earth are already not in situ, this soil still contains great archeological potential. No archeological excavation was ever conducted on the Temple Mount, and this soil was the only archeological information that has ever been available to anyone. For this reason Israeli archaeologists Dr. Gabriel Barkay and Zachi Zweig established a unique project for sifting all the earth in this dump: the Temple Mount Antiquities Salvage Operation. Among finds uncovered in rubble removed from the Temple Mount were:

  • The imprint of a seal thought to have belonged to a priestly Jewish family mentioned in the Old Testament’s Book of Jeremiah.
  • More than 4300 coins from various periods. Many of them are from the Jewish revolt that preceded the destruction of the Second Temple by Roman legions in 70 CE emblazoned with the words “Freedom of Zion”
  • Arrowheads shot by Babylonian archers 2,500 years ago, and others launched by Roman siege machinery 500 years later.
  • Unique floor slabs of the ‘opus sectile‘ technique that were used to pave the Temple Mount courts. This is also mentioned in Josephus accounts and the Babylonian Talmud.

In late 2002, a bulge of about 700 mm was reported in the southern retaining wall part of the Temple Mount. A Jordanian team of engineers recommended replacing or resetting most of the stones in the affected area.[53] In February 2004, the eastern wall of the Mount was damaged by an earthquake. The damage threatened to topple sections of the wall into the area known as Solomon’s Stables.[54] A few days later, a portion of retaining wall, supporting the earthen ramp that led from the Western Wall plaza to the Gate of the Moors on the Temple Mount, collapsed.[55] In 2007 the Israel Antiquities Authority started work on the construction of a temporary wooden pedestrian pathway to replace the Mugrabi Gate ramp after a landslide in 2005 made it unsafe and in danger of collapse.[56] The works sparked condemnation from Arab leaders.[57]

In July 2007 the Muslim religious trust which administers the Mount began digging a 400-metre-long, 1.5-metre-deep trench[58] from the northern side of the Temple Mount compound to the Dome of the Rock[59] in order to replace 40-year-old[60] electric cables in the area. Israeli archaeologists accused the waqf of a deliberate act of cultural vandalism.[59]

Southern Wall of Temple Mount, southwestern corner.

Israelis allege that Palestinians are deliberately removing significant amounts of archaeological evidence about the Jewish past of the site and claim to have found significant artifacts in the fill removed by bulldozers and trucks from the Temple Mount. Muslims allege that the Israelis are deliberately damaging the remains of Islamic-era buildings found in their excavations.[61] Since the Waqf is granted almost full autonomy on the Islamic holy sites, Israeli archaeologists have been prevented from inspecting the area; although they have conducted several excavations around the Temple Mount.

[edit] Religious attitudes

This section needs additional citations for verification. (December 2009)

[edit] In Judaism

Presumed to be The Foundation Stone, or a large part of it

Jewish connection and veneration to the site arguably stems from the fact that it contains the Foundation Stone which, according to the rabbis of the Talmud, was the spot from where the world was created and expanded into its current form.[62][63] It was subsequently the Holy of Holies of the Temple, the Most Holy Place in Judaism.[17] Jewish tradition names it as the location for a number of important events which occurred in the Bible, including the Binding of Isaac, Jacob‘s dream, and the prayer of Isaac and Rebekah.[64] Similarly, when the Bible recounts that King David purchased a threshing floor owned by Araunah the Jebusite,[65] tradition locates it as being on this mount. An early Jewish text, the Genesis Rabba, states that this site is one of three about which the nations of the world cannot taunt Israel and say “you have stolen them,” since it was purchased “for its full price” by David.[66] David wanted to construct a sanctuary there, but this was left to his son Solomon, who completed the task in c. 950 BCE with the construction of the First Temple.

In 1217, Spanish Rabbi Judah al-Harizi found the sight of the Muslim structures on the mount profoundly disturbing. “What torment to see our holy courts converted into an alien temple!” he wrote.[67]

Due to religious restrictions on entering the most sacred areas of the Temple Mount (see following section), the Western Wall, a retaining wall for the Temple Mount and remnant of the Second Temple structure, is considered by some rabbinical authorities the holiest accessible site for Jews to pray. Jewish texts record that the Mount will be the site of the Third Temple, which will be rebuilt with the coming of the Jewish Messiah.

[edit] Jewish religious law concerning entry to the site

During Temple times, entry to the Mount was limited by a complex set of purity laws. Maimonides wrote that it was only permitted to enter the site to fulfill a religious precept. After the destruction of the Temple there was discussion as to whether the site, bereft of the Temple, still maintained its holiness or not. Jewish codifiers accepted the opinion of Maimonides who ruled that the holiness of the Temple sanctified the site for eternity and consequently the restrictions on entry to the site are still currently in force.[17] While secular Jews ascend freely, the question of whether ascending is permitted is a matter some debate among religious authorities, with a majority holding that it is permitted to ascend to the Temple Mount, but not to step on the site of the inner courtyards of the ancient Temple.[17] The question then becomes whether the site can be ascertained accurately.[17] A second complex legal debate centers around the precise divine punishment for stepping onto these forbidden spots.

There is debate over whether reports that Maimonides himself ascended the Mount are reliable.[68] One such report[69] claims he did so on Thursday, October 21, 1165, during the Crusader period. Some early scholars however, claim that entry onto certain areas of the Mount are permitted. It appears that Radbaz also entered the Mount and advised others how to do this. He permits entry from all the gates into the 135×135 cubits of the Women’s Courtyard in the east, since the biblical prohibition only applies to the 187×135 cubits of the Temple in the west.[70] There are also Christian and Islamic sources which indicate that Jews accessed the site,[71] but these visits may have been made under duress.[72]

1978 sign warning against entry to the Mount

[edit] Opinions of contemporary rabbis concerning entry to the site

In August 1967 after Israel’s capture of the Mount, the Chief Rabbis of Israel, Isser Yehuda Unterman and Yitzhak Nissim, together with other leading rabbis, asserted that “For generations we have warned against and refrained from entering any part of the Temple Mount.”[73] A recent study of this rabbinical ruling suggests that it was both “unprecedented” and possibly prompted by governmental pressure on the rabbis, as well as “brilliant” in preventing Muslim-Jewish friction on the Mount.[17][74]

Rabbinical consensus in the post-1967 period in the Religious Zionist stream of Orthodox Judaism held that it is forbidden for Jews to enter any part of the Temple Mount,[75] and in January 2005 a declaration was signed confirming the 1967 decision.[76]

Nearly all Haredi rabbis are also of the opinion that the Mount is off limits to Jews and non-Jews alike.[77] Their opinions against entering the Temple Mount are based on the danger of entering the hallowed area of the Temple courtyard and the impossibility of fulfilling the ritual requirement of cleansing oneself with the ashes of a red heifer.[78][79] The boundaries of the areas which are completely forbidden, while having large portions in common, are delineated differently by various rabbinic authorities.

However, there is a growing body of Modern Orthodox and national religious rabbis who encourage visits to certain parts of the Mount, which they believe are permitted according to most medieval rabbinical authorities.[17] These rabbis include: Shlomo Goren (former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Chaim David Halevi (former Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv and Yaffo); Dov Lior (Rabbi of Kiryat Arba); Yosef Elboim; Yisrael Ariel; She’ar Yashuv Cohen (Chief Rabbi of Haifa); Yuval Sherlo (rosh yeshiva of the hesder yeshiva of Petah Tikva); Meir Kahane. One of them, Shlomo Goren, states that it is possible that Jews are even allowed to enter the heart of the Dome of the Rock, according to Jewish Law of Conquest.[80] These authorities demand an attitude of veneration on the part of Jews ascending the Temple Mount, ablution in a mikveh prior to the ascent, and the wearing of non-leather shoes.[17] Some rabbinic authorities are now of the opinion that it is imperative for Jews to ascend in order to halt the ongoing process of Islamization of the Temple Mount. Maimonides, perhaps the greatest codifier of Jewish Law, wrote in Laws of the Chosen House ch 7 Law 15 “One may bring a dead body in to the (lower sanctified areas of the) Temple Mount and there is no need to say that the ritually impure (from the dead) may enter there, because the dead body itself can enter”. One who is ritually impure through direct or in-direct contact of the dead cannot walk in the higher sanctified areas. For those who are visibly Jewish, they have no choice, but to follow this peripheral route as it has become unofficially part of the status quo on the Mount. Many of these recent opinions rely on archaeological evidence.[17]

The law committee of the Masorti movement in Israel has issued two responsa (a body of written decisions and rulings given by legal scholars) on the subject, both holding that Jews may visit the permitted sections of the Temple Mount. One responsa allows such visits, another encourages them.

[edit] In Islam

Facade of the Al-Aqsa Mosque

In Islam, the Mount is called al-haram al-qudsī ash-sharīf, meaning the Noble Sanctuary. Muslims view the site as being one of the earliest and most noteworthy places of worship of God. For a few years in the early stages of Islam, Muhammad instructed his followers to face the Mount during prayer, as the Jews did.

The site is also important as being the site of the “Farthest Mosque” (mentioned in the Qur’an as the location of Muhammad’s miraculous Night Journey) to heaven.:

“Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-Haram (the Sacred Mosque) to al-Masjid al-Aqsa (the Further Mosque), whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing.” Quran 17:1 [81]

The hadith, a collection of the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad, confirm that the location of the Al-Aqsa mosque is indeed in Jerusalem:

“When the people of Quraish did not believe me (i.e. the story of my Night Journey), I stood up in Al-Hijr and Allah displayed Jerusalem in front of me, and I began describing Jerusalem to them while I was looking at it.” Sahih Bukhari: Volume 5, Book 58, Number 226. [82]

Muslim interpretations of the Qur’an agree that the Mount is the site of a Temple built by Sulayman, considered a prophet in Islam, that was later destroyed.[83]

After the construction, Muslims believe, the temple was used for the worship of one God by many prophets of Islam, including Jesus.[84][85][86] Other Muslim scholars have used the Torah (called Tawrat in Arabic) to expand on the details of the temple.[87]

[edit] In Christianity

The Mount has significance in Christianity due to the role the Temple played in the life of Jesus. During the Crusades, the Dome of the Rock was given to the Augustinians, who turned it into a church, and the Al-Aqsa Mosque became the royal palace of Baldwin I of Jerusalem in 1104. The Knights Templar, who believed the Dome of the Rock was the site of the Temple of Solomon, gave it the name “Templum Domini” and set up their headquarters in the Al-Aqsa Mosque adjacent to the Dome for much of the 12th century.

Though some Christians believe that the Temple will be reconstructed before, or concurrent with, the Second Coming of Jesus (also see dispensationalism), the Temple Mount is largely unimportant to the beliefs and worship of most Christians. To wit, the New Testament recounts a story of a Samaritan woman asking Jesus about the appropriate place to worship, Jerusalem or the Samaritan holy place at Mt. Gerazim, to which Jesus replies, “Woman, believe me, the hour is coming when neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem will you worship the Father. You worship what you do not know; we worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews. But the hour is coming, and is now here, when the true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit and in truth, for the Father is seeking such people to worship him. God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.”(John 4:21-24)

The place is of some importance to Eastern Christians because there was a fully consecrated church on that spot during the Byzantine period. According to Eastern Church canons, once a church has been fully consecrated, it cannot ever serve as anything other than a church. Of course, this is just one example of the thousands of churches that were either destroyed, or converted to mosques, during the long decline of the Eastern Roman Empire. The most notable example is the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul.

[edit] Recent events

March 2005
Allah inscription: The word “Allah“, in approximately a foot-tall Arabic script, was found newly carved into the ancient stones, an act viewed by Jews as vandalism. The carving was attributed to a team of Jordanian engineers and Palestinian laborers in charge of strengthening that section of the wall. The discovery caused outrage among Israeli archaeologists and many Jews were angered by the inscription at Judaism’s holiest site.[88]
October 2006
Synagogue proposal: Uri Ariel, a member of the Knesset from the National Union party (a right wing opposition party) ascended to the mount,[89] and said that he is preparing a plan where a synagogue will be built on the mount. His proposed synagogue would not be built instead of the mosques but in a separate area in accordance with rulings of ‘prominent rabbis.’ He said he believed that this will be correcting a historical injustice and that it is an opportunity for the Muslim world to prove that it is tolerant to all faiths.[90]
October 2006
Minaret proposal: Plans are mooted to build a new minaret on the mount, the first of its kind for 600 years.[91] King Abdullah II of Jordan announced a competition to design a fifth minaret for the walls of the Temple Mount complex. He said it would “reflect the Islamic significance and sanctity of the mosque”. The scheme, estimated to cost $300,000, is for a seven-sided tower – after the seven-pointed Hashemite star – and at 42 metres (138 ft), it would be 3.5 metres (11 ft) taller than the next-largest minaret. The minaret would be constructed on the eastern wall of the Temple Mount near the Golden Gate.
February 2007
Mugrabi Gate ramp reconstruction: Repairs to an earthen ramp leading to the Mugrabi Gate sparked Arab protests.
May 2007
Right-wing Jews ascend the Mount: A group of right-wing Religious Zionist rabbis entered the Temple Mount.[92] This elicited widespread criticism from other religious Jews and from secular Israelis, accusing the rabbis of provoking the Arabs. An editorial in the newspaper Haaretz accused the rabbis of ‘knowingly and irresponsibly bringing a burning torch closer to the most flammable hill in the Middle East,’ and noted that rabbinical consensus in both the Haredi and the Religious Zionist worlds forbids Jews from entering the Temple Mount.[93] On May 16, Rabbi Avraham Shapiro, former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel and rosh yeshiva of the Mercaz HaRav yeshiva, reiterated his opinion that it is forbidden for Jews to enter the Temple Mount.[94] The Litvish Haredi newspaper Yated Ne’eman, which is controlled by leading Litvish Haredi rabbis including Rabbi Yosef Sholom Eliashiv and Rabbi Nissim Karelitz, accused the rabbis of transgressing a decree punishable by ‘death through the hands of heaven.’[79]
July 2007
Temple Mount cable replacement: The Waqf began digging a ditch from the northern side of the Temple Mount compound to the Dome of the Rock as a prelude to infrastructure work in the area. Although the dig was approved by the police, it generated protests from archaeologists.
October 2009
Clashes: Palestinian protesters gathered at the site after rumours that an extreme Israeli group would harm the site, which the Israeli government denied.[95] Israeli police assembled at the Temple Mount complex to disperse Palestinian protesters who were throwing stones at them. The police used stun grenades on the protesters, of which 15 were later arrested, including the Palestinian President’s adviser on Jerusalem affairs.[96][97] 18 Palestinians and 3 police officers were injured.[98]
July 2010
A public opinion poll in Israel showed that 50% of Israelis believe that the Temple should be rebuilt. The poll was conducted by channel 99, the government owned Knesset channel, in advance of the 9th day of the Hebrew month of Av on which Jews commemorate the destruction of both the first and second Temples that both stood at this site.[99]
July 2010
Knesset Member Danny Danon visited the Temple Mount in accordance with rabbinical views of Jewish Law on the 9th of the Hebrew Month of Av, which commemorates the destruction of both the First and Second Temples in Jerusalem. The Knesset Member condemned the conditions imposed by Muslims upon religious Jews at the site and vowed to work to better conditions.[citation needed]

[edit] Panorama

Panorama of the Temple Mount, seen from the Mount of Olives

[edit] See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Temple Mount

[edit] References

  1. ^ New Jerusalem Finds Point to the Temple Mount
  2. ^ Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Avoda (Divine Service): The laws of the Temple in Jerusalem, chapter 14, rule 16
  3. ^ Nicolle, David (1994). Yarmuk AD 636: The Muslim Conquest of Syria. Osprey Publishing.
  4. ^ Rizwi Faizer (1998). “The Shape of the Holy: Early Islamic Jerusalem”. Rizwi’s Bibliography for Medieval Islam. Archived from the original on 2002-02-10. http://web.archive.org/web/20020210164811/http://us.geocities.com/rfaizer/reviews/book9.html
  5. ^ Haram al-Sharif, ArchNet
  6. ^ Israeli Police Storm Disputed Jerusalem Holy Site
  7. ^ Gonen (2003), pp. 9-11
  8. ^ Lundquist (2007), p. 103
  9. ^ Finkelstein, Horbury, Davies & Sturdy (1999), p. 43
  10. ^ II Sam. xxiv. 16 et seq.; I Chron. xxi. 15 et seq.
  11. ^ “Moriah”. Easton’s Bible Dictionary. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/easton/ebd2.html?term=Moriah. Retrieved July 14, 2008. 
  12. ^ Gonen (2003), p. 69
  13. ^ Negev (2005), p. 265
  14. ^ Mazar (1975), pp. 124-126, 132
  15. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica 11th Edition
  16. ^ Wilkinson, Jerusalem Pilgrims Before the Crusades, p. 204
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m “Entering the Temple Mount – in Halacha and Jewish History,” Gedalia Meyer and Henoch Messner, PDF available at [1], VOl 10, Summer 2010, Hakirah.
  18. ^ See “Julian and the Jews 361-363 CE” and “Julian the Apostate and the Holy Temple”.
  19. ^ a b Was the Aksa Mosque built over the remains of a Byzantine church?[dead link], By ETGAR LEFKOVITS, Jerusalem Post, November 16, 2008]
  20. ^ Karmi, Ghada (1997). Jerusalem Today: What Future for the Peace Process?. Garnet & Ithaca Press. p. 116. ISBN 0-86372-226-1
  21. ^ The Dome of the Rock as Palimpsest, Necipoglu, Muqarnas 2008
  22. ^ Oleg Grabar, The Haram ak-Sharif: An essay in interpretation, BRIIFS vol. 2 no 2 (Autumn 2000).</ref name=MeyerMessner>”Entering the Temple Mount – in Halacha and Jewish History,” Gedalia Meyer and Henoch Messner, PDF available at [2], VOl 10, Summer 2010, Hakirah.
  23. ^ a b c “Hashemite Restorations of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem”, Jordanian government website.
  24. ^ Martin Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996, p254.
  25. ^ Israeli, Raphael (2002). “Introduction: Everyday Life in Divided Jerusalem”. Jerusalem Divided: The Armistice Regime, 1947–1967. Jerusalem: Routledge. p. 23. ISBN 0-7146-5266-0
  26. ^ “RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS (REVISED) AL-HARAM AL-SHARIF, JERUSALEM MONDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1990″. UN. October 8, 1990. http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C6AA06BDFB5B5453052566DB0055512F. Retrieved April 12, 2012. 
  27. ^ “Judge Blames Israeli Police In Killing Of Palestinians”. Sun Sentinel. July 19, 1991. http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1991-07-19/news/9101260807_1_criminal-charges-killings-ezra-kama. Retrieved April 12, 2012. 
  28. ^ “2000: ‘Provocative’ mosque visit sparks riots”. BBC. April 12, 2012. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/28/newsid_3687000/3687762.stm. Retrieved April 12, 2012. 
  29. ^ Preservation of the Holy Places Law, 1967.
  30. ^ Jerusalem – The Legal and Political Background, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel.
  31. ^ Nadav Shragai, Three Jews expelled from Temple Mount for praying.
  32. ^Heavy security around al-Aqsa,” Al Jazeera English, October 5, 2009.
  33. ^PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 16 – 29 SEPTEMBER 2009“, UNITED NATIONS Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory.
  34. ^ http://news.yahoo.com/palestinians-flock-jerusalem-israeli-restrictions-eased-152403694.html
  35. ^ Photograph of the northern wall area
  36. ^ Wilson’s map of the features under the Temple Mount
  37. ^ Kaufman, Asher (May 23, 1991). “The Temple Site” (Abstract). The Jerusalem Post: p. 13. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/99716364.html?dids=99716364:99716364&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=May+12%2C+1991&author=Asher+Kaufman&pub=Jerusalem+Post&edition=&startpage=13&desc=THE+TEMPLE+SITE. Retrieved March 4, 2007. “The most important findings of the superposition of the Second Temple on the Temple area are that the Dome of the Rock was not built on the site of the Temple, and that the Temple was taper-shaped on the western side, a form hitherto unknown to the scholars.” 
  38. ^ “Researcher says found location of the Holy Temple”. Ynetnews. February 9, 2007. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3362927,00.html. Retrieved March 4, 2007. “Archaeology Professor Joseph Patrich uncovered a large water cistern that points, in his opinion, to the exact location of the altar and sanctuary on the Temple Mount. According to his findings, the rock on which the Dome of the Rock is built is outside the confines of the Temple.” 
  39. ^ Under the Temple Mount
  40. ^ Tuvia Sagiv, Determination of the location of the Temple
  41. ^ Photograph of the inside of the Golden Gate
  42. ^ image of the double gate passage
  43. ^ Photograph of King Solomon’s Stables
  44. ^ Photograph of one of the chambers under the Triple Gate passageway
  45. ^ See “The Washington Post, Opinion Columns, July 17, 2000 Protect the Temple Mount by Hershel Shanks
  46. ^ Policeman Assaulted Trying to Stop Illegal Temple Mount Dig – Jewish World – Israel News – Arutz Sheva
  47. ^ Jerusalem’s Temple Mount Flap
  48. ^ Waqf Temple Mount excavation raises archaeologists’ protests – Haaretz – Israel News
  49. ^ Jacqueline Schaalje, Special: The Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
  50. ^ Violent clashes at key Jerusalem mosque on ‘day of anger’, timesonline, accessdate=5 May 2009
  51. ^ Mayor halts Temple Mount dig, BBC, accessdate = 5 May 2009
  52. ^ Temple Mount destruction stirred archaeologist to action, February 8, 2005 | by Michael McCormack, Baptist Press [3]
  53. ^ Esther Hecht, Battle of the Bulge
  54. ^ Jerusalem Post
  55. ^ On-the-Spot Report from the Kotel Women´s Section Construction
  56. ^ Fendel, Hillel (February 7, 2007). “Jerusalem Arabs Riot, Kassams Fired, After Old City Excavations”. Arutz Sheva. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=121064. Retrieved February 7, 2007. 
  57. ^ Weiss, Efrat (February 7, 2007). “Syria slams Jerusalem works”. Yedioth Ahronoth. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3362024,00.html. Retrieved February 7, 2007. “Israeli excavation works near the al-Aqsa mosque in the holy city of Jerusalem have led to a dangerous rise in Middle East tensions and could derail revival of Arab-Israeli peace talks… what Israel is doing in its practices and attacks against our sacred Muslim sites in Jerusalem and al-Aqsa is a blatant violation that is not acceptable under any pretext” 
  58. ^ Fendel, Hillel (September 9, 2007). “Silence in the Face of Continued Temple Mount Destruction”. Arutz Sheva. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/123622. Retrieved 2007-09-07. 
  59. ^ a b Rapoport, Meron (July 7, 2007). “Waqf Temple Mount excavation raises archaeologists’ protests”. Haaretz. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/880761.html. Retrieved 2007-07-11. 
  60. ^ Teible, Amy (August 31, 2007). “Jerusalem Holy Site Dig Questioned”. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6887208,00.html. Retrieved 2007-09-07. [dead link]
  61. ^ Al-Ahram: “Revoking the death warrant”
  62. ^ Babylonian Talmud Yoma 54b
  63. ^ http://www.torah.org/features/israelmatters/eye.html#
  64. ^ Toledot 25:21
  65. ^ 2 Samuel 24:18–25
  66. ^ Genesis Rabba 79.7: “And he bought the parcel of ground, where he had spread his tent…for a hundred pieces of money.” Rav Yudan son of Shimon said: ‘This is one of the three places where the non-Jews cannot deceive the Jewish People by saying that they stole it from them, and these are the places: Ma’arat HaMachpela, the Temple and Joseph’s burial place. Ma’arat HaMachpela because it is written: ‘And Abraham hearkened unto Ephron; and Abraham weighed to Ephron the silver,’ (Genesis, 23:16); the Temple because it is written: ‘So David gave to Ornan for the place,’ (I Chronicles, 21:26); and Joseph’s burial place because it is written: ‘And he bought the parcel of ground…Jacob bought Shechem.’ (Genesis, 33:19).” See also: Kook, Abraham Issac, Moadei Hare’iya, pp. 413–415.
  67. ^ Karen Armstrong (29 April 1997). Jerusalem: one city, three faiths. Ballantine Books. p. 229. http://books.google.com/books?id=v5_ZAAAAMAAJ. Retrieved 25 May 2011. 
  68. ^ Sefer ha-Charedim Mitzvat Tshuva, Chapter 3; Shu”t Minchas Yitzchok, vol. 6
  69. ^ Hebrew language site
  70. ^ Shaarei Teshuvah, Orach Chaim 561:1; cf. Teshuvoth Radbaz 691
  71. ^ Moshe Sharon. “Islam on the Temple Mount” Biblical Archaeology Review July/August 2006. p. 36–47, 68. “Immediately after its construction, five Jewish families from Jerusalem were employed to clean the Dome of the Rock and to prepare wicks for its lamps”
  72. ^ The Kaf hachaim (Orach Chaim 94:1:4 citing Radvaz Vol. 2; Ch. 648) mentions a case of a Jew who was forced onto the Temple Mount.
  73. ^ Lapidoth, Ruth E.; Moshe Hirsch (1994). The Jerusalem Question and Its Resolution: Selected Documents. Jerusalem: Martinus Nijhoff. p. 542. ISBN 0-7923-2893-0
  74. ^ Hassner, Ron E., “War on Sacred Grounds,” Cornell University Press (2009), pp.113-133
  75. ^ Rabbis who support this opinion include: Mordechai Eliyahu, former Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel; Zalman Baruch Melamed, rosh yeshiva of the Beit El yeshiva; Eliezer Waldenberg, former rabbinical judge in the Rabbinical Supreme Court of the State of Israel; Avraham Yitzchak Kook, Chief Rabbi of Palestine (Mikdash-Build (Vol. I, No. 26)); Avigdor Nebenzahl, Rabbi of the Old City of Jerusalem.
  76. ^ These rabbis include: Rabbis Yona Metzger (Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Shlomo Amar (Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Ovadia Yosef (spiritual leader of Sefardi Haredi Judaism and of the Shas party, and former Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron (former Sefardi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Shmuel Rabinowitz (rabbi of the Western Wall); Avraham Shapiro (former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel); Shlomo Aviner (rosh yeshiva of Ateret Cohanim); Yisrael Meir Lau (former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel and current Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv). Source: Leading rabbis rule Temple Mount is off-limits to Jews
  77. ^ These rabbis include: Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky (Thoughts on the 28th of Iyar – Yom Yerushalayim); Yosef Sholom Eliashiv (Rabbi Eliashiv: Don’t go to Temple Mount)
  78. ^ Yoel Cohen, The political role of the Israeli Chief Rabbinate in the Temple Mount question
  79. ^ a b Yated Ne’eman article
  80. ^ Haaretz
  81. ^ http://www.qurandislam.com/coran/trans/?currSura=17&currAya=1&currTrans=tafsir_en_sahih
  82. ^ http://haditsbukharionline.blogspot.ca/2010/11/merits-of-helpers-in-madinah-ansaar.html
  83. ^ “The Farthest Mosque must refer to the site of the Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem on the hill of Moriah, at or near which stands the Dome of the Rock… it was a sacred place to both Jews and Christians… The chief dates in connection with the Temple in Jerusalem are: It was finished by Solomon about 1004 BCE; destroyed by the Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar about 586 BCE; rebuilt under Ezra and Nehemiah about 515 BCE; turned into a heathen idol temple by one of Alexander the Great‘s successors, Antiochus Epiphanes, 167 BCE; restored by Herod, 17 BCE to 29; and completely razed to the ground by the Emperor Titus in 70. These ups and downs are among the greater signs in religious history.” (Yusuf Ali, Commentary on the Koran, 2168.
  84. ^ “The city of Jerusalem was chosen at the command of Allah by Prophet David in the tenth century BCE. After him his son Prophet Solomon built a mosque in Jerusalem according to the revelation that he received from Allah. For several centuries this mosque was used for the worship of Allah by many Prophets and Messengers of Allah. It was destroyed by the Babylonians in the year 586 BCE., but it was soon rebuilt and was rededicated to the worship of Allah in 516 BCE. It continued afterwards for several centuries until the time of Prophet Jesus. After he departed this world, it was destroyed by the Romans in the year 70 CE.” (Siddiqi, Dr. Muzammil. Status of Al-Aqsa Mosque, IslamOnline, May 21, 2007. Retrieved July 12, 2007.)
  85. ^ “Early Muslims regarded the building and destruction of the Temple of Solomon as a major historical and religious event, and accounts of the Temple are offered by many of the early Muslim historians and geographers (including Ibn Qutayba, Ibn al-Faqih, Mas’udi, Muhallabi, and Biruni). Fantastic tales of Solomon’s construction of the Temple also appear in the Qisas al-anbiya’, the medieval compendia of Muslim legends about the pre-Islamic prophets.” (Kramer, Martin. The Temples of Jerusalem in Islam, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2000. Retrieved November 21, 2007.)
    • “While there is no scientific evidence that Solomon’s Temple existed, all believers in any of the Abrahamic faiths perforce must accept that it did.” (Khalidi, Rashid. Transforming the Face of the Holy City: Political Messages in the Built Topography of Jerusalem, Bir Zeit University, November 12, 1998.)
  86. ^ A Brief Guide to al-Haram al-Sharif, a booklet published in 1925 (and earlier) by the “Supreme Moslem Council”, a body established by the British government to administer waqfs and headed by Hajj Amin al-Husayni during the British Mandate period, states on page 4: “The site is one of the oldest in the world. Its sanctity dates from the earliest (perhaps from pre-historic) times. Its identity with the site of Solomon’s Temple is beyond dispute. This, too, is the spot, according to universal belief, on which ‘David built there an altar unto the Lord, and offered burnt offerings and peace offerings.'(2 Samuel 24:25)”
  87. ^
    • “The Rock was in the time of Solomon the son of David 12 cubits high and there was a dome over it…It is written in the Tawrat [Bible]: ‘Be happy Jerusalem,’ which is Bayt al-Maqdis and the Rock which is called Haykal.” al-Wasati, Fada’il al Bayt al-Muqaddas, ed. Izhak Hasson (Jerusalem, 1979) pp. 72ff.
  88. ^ “Arabs Vandalize Judaism’s Holiest Site”. Arutz Sheva. March 31, 2005. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/79391. Retrieved July 11, 2007. 
  89. ^ Rightist MK Ariel visits Temple Mount as thousands throng Wall
  90. ^ Wagner, Matthew (October 10, 2006). Rabbis split on Temple Mount synagogue plan. The Jerusalem Post.
  91. ^ The Times, October 14, 2006
  92. ^ Ynetnews
  93. ^ Haaretz
  94. ^ Sela, Neta (May 16, 2007). “Rabbi Shapira forbids visiting temple Mount”. Ynet. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3400750,00.html. Retrieved May 17, 2007. 
  95. ^ Kyzer, Liel (October 25, 2009). Israel Police battle Arab rioters on Temple Mount; PA official arrested. Haaretz.
  96. ^ Arrests at holy site in Jerusalem. BBC News. October 25, 2009.
  97. ^ Jerusalem holy site stormed. The Straits Times. October 25, 2009.
  98. ^ Clashes erupt at Aqsa compound. Al Jazeera. October 25, 2009.
  99. ^ Israel National News 15 July, 2010

[edit] Bibliography

Books

 

Israeli Police, taking five.  (remember them)
2006-043 
Dome of the Chain.  Stands at the approximate center of the Temple Mount (or, the center of the world, according to one story).  The 13th-century interior tiling surpasses even that of the Dome of the Rock.  But, on this day it was being used by lots of shrouded ladies and little children, so we didn’t venture “inside” to have a look-see.
2006-044 
Looking east from the Dome of the Chain towards the Mount of Olives.
The Russian Orthodox Church at Gethsemane.  (lower left)
2006-045 
Looking north to some more arches.
2006-046 
Guess what?
2006-047 
Guess Who?
2006-048

 

Koleksi Perang Vietnam Yang Dahsyat Tahun 1970

The Driwan’s  Cybermuseum

                    

(Museum Duniamaya Dr Iwan)

                    Please Enter

                   

              DVWC SHOWROOM

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 Perang Vietnam dan Dokumen Sejarah Pos 1969-1975

THE VIETNAM WAR 1.970

C.VIETNAM WAR

1.970..

. Kelompok Tentara Australia di Nui Dat di Phuoc Tuy provinsi awiting dukungan helikopter untuk Operasi Puckapunyal sekitar tahun 1970, selama Perang Vietnam. Sumber: The Daily Telegraph

COMBAT MEDIC VIETNAM WAR 1.970

Viet Nam Perang Protes, 1970 UCSF fakultas, mahasiswa, dan staf protes invasi AS Kamboja, Mei 1970.

Vietnam War

Iconic image … Australian soldiers group at Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy province awiting helicopter support for Operation Puckapunyal circa 1970, during the Vietnam War. Source: The Daily Telegraph

                   

The Vietnam War Document

       and

 

    

Postal History

       1969-1975

 

Part

THE VIETNAM WAR 1970

Vietnam War - Map

C.VIETNAM  WAR 1970

 

COMBAT MEDIC VIETNAM WAR 1970

 
 
 The connection between the war in Vietnam and Iraq.  Combat Medic Vietnam 1970.  More than 2 million Vietnamese people died in the attack on Vietnam by the US.  Estimates of deaths are between 2 million and 4 million people.  Photo: Mike Hastie Vietnam Veteran
  
Viet Nam War Protest, 1970
UCSF faculty, students, and staff protest the US invasion of Cambodia, May 1970.

 Information From David J.Graham

I was a member of MACV Advisory Team 14 on Phu Quoc for about 6 months in 1970, before being moved to MAVC HQ Tan Son Nhut under Col Thornton Ireland.

I have been trying to locate or find out the fate of certain of my team members, particularly one SSG John Shaffrey who was reassigned to a Dog Unit near Pleiku in 1971.

Is there anywhere you can suggest searching? Or perhaps do you know of a site with more info or photos?

Finally, I want to thank you for posting the picture above.

It is the only trace I can find of Team 14 on the web (so far!)

I would also be interested in hearing from any other members of Team 14, MACV PMG 1971, The 41st MP Detachment, St Louis 1971 or The 291st MP Co, Redstone Arsenal 1969.

Thanks again!

Informasi Dari David J.Graham

Saya adalah anggota Tim Penasehat MACV 14 di Phu Quoc selama sekitar 6 bulan pada tahun 1970, sebelum dipindahkan ke MAVC HQ Tan Son Nhut di bawah Kolonel Thornton Irlandia.

Saya telah mencoba untuk mencari atau mengetahui nasib tertentu anggota tim saya, terutama yang SSG John Shaffrey yang ditugaskan ke Satuan Anjing dekat Pleiku pada tahun 1971.

Apakah ada di mana saja Anda dapat menyarankan mencari? Atau mungkin Anda tahu dari sebuah situs dengan info lebih lanjut atau foto?

Akhirnya,Saya ingin mengucapkan terima kasih untuk posting gambar di atas.

Ini adalah satu-satunya jejak saya dapat menemukan Tim 14 di web (sejauh ini!)

Saya juga akan tertarik untuk mendengar dari setiap anggota lain dari Tim 14, MACV PMG 1971, The Detasemen MP 41, St Louis 1971 atau MP 291 co, Redstone Arsenal 1969. Terima kasih lagi!

Januari 1970

(A) 1 Januari 1970 Operasi Cuu Long

—————————————- —————————————-

Setelah mengakhiri Operasi QUYET THANG, yang ARVN IV Korps meluncurkan kampanye Corps-lebar baru di IV CTZ bernama Operasi CUU PANJANG.

The 1st ARVN Divisi Operasi dimulai SON LAM 249 dan 250 di Quang Tri Propinsi.

The 41 ARVN Resimen dari Divisi 22d dimulai Operasi NGUYEN HUE/41/1 di Provinsi Binh Dinh.

Anggota Resimen ARVN 5th menemukan delapan mayat, ternyata warga sipil yang tewas sekitar satu minggu sebelumnya. Semua korban telah tangan terikat di belakang punggung mereka dan sebagian besar memiliki tengkorak retak.

Dua jam setelah gencatan senjata berakhir Tahun Baru, sebuah elemen dari Brigade 1, Divisi Infanteri ke-25 melibatkan 50 musuh 10 km sebelah barat laut dari Go Dau Ha di Provinsi Tay Ninh. Hasil adalah 16 musuh tewas dan tidak ada korban yang ramah. __________________

(B) Trinh Duc info:

“Awal tahun 1970 saya disergap bersama dengan delapan orang lain dalam kliring hutan. Sembilan dari kita berjalan file tunggal di seluruh sayuran diajukan bahwa desa telah diukir dari hutan, dalam perjalanan dari satu dusun ke yang lain, itu adalah berawan ninght.

Bulan sebagian ditutupi dan tidak ada yang bisa melihat banyak. Aku tahu aku harus mengambil jalur di sekitar kliring, menjaga ke hutan, tapi saya berada di terlalu banyak terburu-buru.

Menjelang tengah clearinh yang ada rumpun pisang sebagai trees.Just aku menarik bahkan dengan mereka.

Saya menyadari ada beberapa bentuk di trees.They melihat saya di persis sama cepat, dan instictively saya rata dengan tanah. Tepat pada saat itu tambang Claymore api dari di jalan di belakang saya, instan explotions.the besar mereka berhenti aku merangkak kembali di sepanjang jalan tepat di atas mana mereka telah pergi.

Seperti yang saya merangkak saya merasa beberapa mayat, kemudian menggeliat turun di sudut kanan toard hutan. Penembakan yang terjadi di sekitar. ” g=”At least two bullets hit my backpack before I got to the tree line>” j=”Setidaknya dua peluru menghantam ransel saya sebelum saya sampai ke garis pohon> “>Setidaknya dua peluru menghantam ransel saya sebelum saya sampai ke garis pohon>

Aku harus meninggalkan mayat ada di lapangan. Aku terus berfikir bagaimana demoralisasi itu akan untuk petani. “

 January 1970

(a)January 1, 1970

 Operation Cuu Long

  • After terminating Operation QUYET THANG, the ARVN IV Corps launches a new Corps-wide campaign in IV CTZ named Operation CUU LONG.
  • The 1st ARVN Division begins Operations LAM SON 249 and 250 in Quang Tri Province.
  • The 41st ARVN Regiment of the 22d Division begins Operation NGUYEN HUE/41/1 in Binh Dinh Province.
  • Members of the 5th ARVN Regiment find eight bodies, apparently civilians who had been killed approximately one week earlier. All victims had hands tied behind their backs and most had fractured skulls.
  • Two hours after the New Year truce ends, an element of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division engages 50 enemy 10 km northwest of Go Dau Ha in Tay Ninh Province. Results are 16 enemy killed and no friendly casualties.

__________________

 (b)Trinh Duc info:

“Early in 1970 I was ambushed along with eight others in jungle clearing. The nine of us were walking single file across a vegetable filed that the Villagers had carved out of the jungle, on our way from one hamlet to another ,It was a cloudy ninght. The moon was partially covered over and no one could see much. I knew I should have taken the line around the clearing,keeping to the jungle,but I was in too much of a hurry.Toward the middle of the clearinh there was a clump of banana trees.Just as I pulled even with them. I realized there were some  shapes in the trees.They saw me at exactly the same instant,and instictively I flattened to the ground. Just at that moment claymore mines fire off on the path behind me,huge explotions.the instant they stopped I crawled back along the path right over where they had gone off. As i crawled I felt some of the bodies,then squirmed off at a right angle toard the jungle. Firing was going on all around. At least two bullets hit my backpack before I got to the tree line>I had to leave the bodies there in the field. I kept thingking how demoralizing it would be for the peasant.”

(3) 2 Januari 1970

————————————————– ——————————

Zona ARVN 44 Taktis khusus dimulai Operasi CUU LONG/44/01 di Chau Doc Provinsi.

The 2nd ARVN Divisi Operasi dimulai QUYET THANG 45, 54 dan 63 di Tin Quang Ngai Quang dan Provinsi. Sipil penebang sengaja perjalanan musuh Claymore mine 3 km sebelah barat daya dari Hoi An di Provinsi Quang Nam. Tujuh warga sipil tewas dan 21 terluka.

Sebuah elemen dari Divisi Marinir 1 mengamati 25 musuh dengan senjata bergerak ke barat 15 km sebelah barat daya dari An Hoa di Quang Nam Province.

Artileri dipecat dalam reaksi, menewaskan 20. AS infanteri komandan kompi yang dibebastugaskan dari jabatannya setelah sappers musuh menyelinap melalui posisi malam defensif unit yang menewaskan 8 orang dan melukai 5.

__________________

 (3)January 2, 1970


  • The 44th ARVN Special Tactical Zone begins Operation CUU LONG/44/01 in Chau Doc Province.
  • The 2nd ARVN Division begins Operations QUYET THANG 45, 54 and 63 in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.
  • Civilian woodcutters accidentally trip enemy claymore mine 3 km southwest of Hoi An in Quang Nam Province. Seven civilians are killed and 21 wounded.
  • An elements of the 1st Marine Division observes 25 enemy with weapons moving west 15 km southwest of An Hoa in Quang Nam Province. Artillery is fired in reaction, killing 20.
  • US infantry company commander is relieved of his command after enemy sappers slipped through his unit’s night defensive positions killing 8 and wounding 5.

__________________

(4) Jan.4th.1970

Operasi Cliff Dweller

————————————————– ——————————

Brigade 1, Divisi Infanteri ke-25 dengan 4-9 Inf, 3-22 Inf dan Co A, 2-34 Arm dimulai Operasi CLIFF Dweller IV untuk membersihkan lereng Nui Ba Den digunakan oleh musuh sebagai area pementasan untuk serangan terhadap Tay Ninh Kota.

Brigade 1, Divisi Infanteri ke-4 dimulai Operasi THRUST WAYNE di utara Provinsi Binh Dinh.

Operasi WAYNE BREAKER berakhir. Operasi dimulai 18 Oktober 69 di daerah Khe An bawah kontrol dari Brigade 1, Divisi Infanteri ke-4.

Hasil adalah 154 musuh tewas, 7 ditahan, 1 US KIA dan 9 US WIA. Sebuah serangan mortir VC di sebuah kamp pengungsi dekat An Hoa, Quang Nam Province membunuh 12 warga sipil dan 72 luka lainnya

. __________________

(4)Jan.4th.1970

Operation Cliff  Dweller

 

  • The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division with 4-9 Inf, 3-22 Inf and Co A, 2-34 Arm begins Operation CLIFF DWELLER IV to clear the slopes of Nui Ba Den used by the enemy as a staging area for attacks on Tay Ninh City.
  • The 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division begins Operation WAYNE THRUST in northern Binh Dinh Province.
  • Operation WAYNE BREAKER terminates. Operation was initiated 18 Oct 69 in the An Khe area under control of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Results are 154 enemy killed, 7 detained, 1 US KIA and 9 US WIA.
  • A VC mortar attack on a refugee camp near An Hoa, Quang Nam Province kills 12 civilians and wounds 72 others.

__________________

(5) 6 Januari 1970

————————————————– ——————————

ROK Kavaleri Resimen (Buruk Bagus CRid) dimulai Operasi DOK 7Q SU RI di Provinsi Binh Dinh.

ROK 26 Resimen (Buruk Bagus CRid) dimulai Operasi JANG BI 1 di Provinsi Binh Dinh.

Sebuah elemen dari Marinir 7 di posisi defensif malam 10 km sebelah tenggara dari An Hoa di Quang Nam Province menerima lebih dari 200 putaran mortir 82mm dan serangan darat oleh jumlah yang tidak diketahui musuh.

Marinir membalas tembakan dengan senjata organik dan artileri pendukung. Sappers menembus perimeter dan jijik.

Hasil adalah 39 musuh tewas, 13 US KIA dan 63 US WIA.

Sebuah kekuatan musuh ukuran tidak diketahui bergerak oleh unsur-unsur dari Brigade 1, 1st Kavaleri Divisi 12 km sebelah timur laut dari Tay Ninh Kota dengan dukungan dari helikopter tempur dan Wings 3d dan 35 Fighter Taktis. Hasil adalah 37 musuh tewas, 1 US KIA dan 6 US WIA.
__________________

(5)January 6, 1970


  • The ROK Cavalry Regiment (CRID) begins Operation DOK SU RI 7Q in Binh Dinh Province.
  • The ROK 26th Regiment (CRID) begins Operation JANG BI 1 in Binh Dinh Province.
  • An element of the 7th Marines in night defensive positions 10 miles southeast of An Hoa in Quang Nam Province receives more than 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and a ground attack by unknown number of enemy. The Marines return fire with organic weapons and supporting artillery. Sappers penetrate the perimeter and are repulsed. Results are 39 enemy killed, 13 US KIA and 63 US WIA.
  • An enemy force of unknown size is engaged by elements of the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division 12 km northeast of Tay Ninh City with support from helicopter gunships and the 3d and 35th Tactical Fighter Wings. Results are 37 enemy killed, 1 US KIA and 6 US WIA.

__________________

 

(6)January, 10(6) 10 Januari 1970
Sampul pos gratis dari The Airforce VNAF dengan gambar  pesawat temput  dan penutup roket, mengirim dari “KBC 4652 LDPT” VNAF 4 Divisi Phong Dinh, untuk Dinh Vu Jadi 332-1 “3319 KBC” pusat Cam Ranh Pelatihan Naval dengan CDS Quan Buu 1970/01/10. dan merah KBC 4652 lingkaran ganda dicap.

1971-aut)th 1970

The Airforce VNAF free postal airoplane and rocket cover,  send from “KBC 4652 LDPT”VNAF 4th Division Phong Dinh, to Dinh Vu So 332-1 “KBC 3319” Cam Ranh Naval Training center with CDS Quan Buu 10.1.1970. and red KBC 4652 double circle stamped . At the top of cover handwritten “ Thu Ta The Ve Bien Nhatrang mien Cac nay”(what the meaning ?).

 _____________________________________________________________ (Gratis udara-roket VNAF 4th Air Divisi penutup, postally digunakan dengan merah KBC 4652 dan Black Quan Buu dicap 1972/10/01 dari KBC 4652 (Phong Dinh Angkatan Udara) LDPT (?) Ke CTTT chong Thu literaly berarti Building Gouverment, Tao Tac harfiah berarti Building & Construc-tion, CTTT berarti Corps of Engineers, Ve Bien Nha Trang mien Cac Truong, Dinh Vu sro 332-1 (?), KBC 3319 (Naval Training center Cam Rahn) .

Sisi belakang penutup pensil ditulis Nhan Ngay (tiba) 17,01-1970. satu minggu setelah tanggal pos auth dicap), dan surat fron jenis pengirim yang sama untuk “Huyen Trin Qui” dari Phong Dinh 1970/02/20.

 

Inside the letter in Vietnamese language:

   

              Con Tho ngay 31.12.69

                                                Chu Ngen

Hom nay tap nhan dtuoc Tho Qui, tep Lay Lam Ngung, Vi Qui dta chon dtuoc nganh Hai Phoa theo tap nghi thi Qui se La chanh thuc La nguoi lungcua dai duong.

Vi qui Se dti tau bien Luc Qui nang Khoa nganh hai Phai Xem xen, voi nganh Bom dtau cua nganh H.Q.vey,Khi Ban dtuoc dti tau Bien Bau se dtuoc dti tat ca cac tinh cua V,N.

Tap lat tiet La dta mot Phen tinh nguyen dti nganh Xa thu, De Lau nguoi hung o Giang Nghung tap o toai nguyen dtuoc, vi tap dta La RQ ma o dtuoc tren Trei Anh Ban dtuoc, nhung Ban dti hoi Pkao Eoi Chung Cuoi o co vo dto vi no so Ban thut Sap Nha dto Q suen tap cang quen luc qui dti co gei Lai cho thieu Ba lo noi o?———.

Can dtoi voi tap thi o co nhung noi o co thi o dtuoc ngoi nhung nguo: Qui biet Ra con tiet nhiem nhung tap dtem tu choi vi  tap ho mat cam ve van dte am uong vay le lat ra nhung au o tap cung xen xen voi ban ma thu.

Con phep thi Bi cap roi tai du ky roi nen o duoc ve cuoi thu tep cung chuc qui dtuoc nhiem mai mang ve  suc khoc nan nay tap cung nhu qui au tet tai dton vi cung nhu noel vua roi nhung C.T.cung Vui vui dto ban.

Thoi tap xin tau dtung biet va mong tho qui dtien neu Ban co dti dtan coi tap o mai ta dta chi cu.

                                                            Thau ly

                                    Tap luc nay ngheo quc qui vi

                  _____________________________________________________________

 

(Free  airmail –rocket VNAF 4th Air Division  cover, postally used with red KBC 4652 and Black Quan Buu stamped 10.1.1972  from KBC 4652(Phong Dinh Air Force)  L.D.P.T (?)  to CTTT Chong Thu literaly mean Gouverment Building,Tao Tac literally mean Building & Construc-tion, CTTT means Corps of Engineers , Ve Bien Nha Trang mien Cac Truong, Dinh Vu Sro 332-1(?),KBC 3319(Naval Training center Cam Rahn).

Huyen Trin Qui penutup adalah koleksi terbaik untuk menunjukkan karena banyak variasi selama perang 1969 sampai

The back side of the cover pencil written nhan ngay (arrive) 17.01-1970. one week after postal date stamped auth), and the type letter fron the same sender to “Huyen Trin Qui” from Phong Dinh 20.2.1970. Huyen Trin Qui covers were the best collection for showed because many variations during the war 1969 until 1971-aut)

read more click

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The Sample Of Driwan E=book IN CD-ROM:” Dai Nippon Occupation Eastren Indonesia Area 1942-1945″

This is is the sample Od Dr Iwan CD-rom without illustration and not edited, the complete Cd with illustration exist but only for premium member please subscribed via comment

The Dai Nippon War In Indonesia

Book Three

The dai Nippon Occupation Eastren Area of Indonesia

 

Created By

Dr Iwan suwandy.MHA

Private Limited E-book In CD-rom Edition

Special for Sebior Collectors

Copyright @ 2012

While in Tokyo

 Major-General Kawaguchi

was informed that the enemy strength in British Borneo was estimated at approximately 1,000 regular soldiers (mostly Indians) and 2,500 native volunteers, with a probable further

5,600 Dutch soldiers in Dutch Borneo.

 Intelligence sources reported that the entire island was covered with dense jungle with only a few poor roads near the river mouths. The only means of transportation was possible by water. Information in regard to weather and terrain was very scant and not very reliable and there was only one small scale map of the island available.

 

Immediately upon his return to

Canton

 from Tokyo, the Detachment commander proceeded to

 

Sanya,

Hainan Island,

to attend a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Direct Escort Fleet commander in order to reach an agreement on co-operative measures in the event of war.

 

 

It was decided that the first Japanese landings would be made at aerawk in

Miri

and

Serian

in order to capture vital oilfields and airfields in these towns. Part of the force would remain in this area to reestablish Miri oilfield while the main body would advance and capture the Kuching airfield. All units of the Kawaguchi Detachment had to receive special training in landing under cover of darkness and in jungle fighting, and naturally they also had to change their equipment and would have to be given special survival and field sanitation training.

On 20 November 1941,

 The Kawaguchi’s Brigade was activated in Tokyo (Japan), and placed under

 the direct command of the Southern Army.

It was commanded by

Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi

 

 and it was composed mainly of

 the following Japanese units stationed at Canton, southern China, which had been previously

 under the command of the Japanese  18th Infantry Division:

Order of Battle for Japanese forces
Sarawak, December 1941
Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi(commander) 
35thInfantry Brigade Headquarters 
124th Infantry Regiment
one platoon of the 12th Engineer Regiment
a unit from the 18th Division Signal Unit
a unit from the 18th Division Medical Unit
4th Field Hospital, 18th Division
a unit from the 11th Water Supply and Purification Unit

In addition, the following units from Japan and Manchuria were to be used to reinforce the Detachment:

33rd Field AA Battalion
one company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment
(minus two platoons)
2nd Independent Engineer Company
80th Independent Radio Platoon
37th Fixed Radio Unit
a unit from the Oil Drilling Section of the 21st Field Ordnance Depot
1st Field Well Drilling Company
2nd Field Well Drilling Company
3rd Field Well Drilling Company
4th Field Well Drilling Company
48th Anchorage Headquarters
118th Land Duty Company

 

 
 

Top of Form

(Satoru Nibo) Satoshi Nibo. 05 5 (1916) Taisho,

 

born as the eldest son of eight siblings in a village Naoki Ijuin Gujo Hioki, Kagoshima Prefecture. July 13 (1938) Showa, commissioned second lieutenant. August 2002 (1939) Showa,

 

as a member of the inaugural class and graduated from the Army Nakano School serving as secret warrior training school.

Nibo was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Army General Staff, at the end of 16 (1941) Showa, had been stationed in Batavia (now Jakarta, Indonesia)

in the identity of the reporter agency alliance. Cover for reporters,

 

 in fact, an investigation of the oil situation Jambi and Palembang in Sumatra was the large oil fields were mission.

Earlier, at the behest of the secret mission, Nibo joined the team, “Japan and the Netherlands sign trade meeting” secondary. October 2004 (1941) to Showa September 2003 (1940) Showa,

 

between the Netherlands orchid sum to put colonial Indonesia, the Japanese government envisaged to secure oil aims to negotiate import mining of petroleum and petroleum sent over the secondary, “Japan and the Netherlands sign trade meeting.” As its second attendant,

 

Nibo, joined together with those from other schools Nakano. Japanese Army, that 15 years (1940) before the war Showa had been contemplated to secure oil resources in the south may already be implying.

The negotiating team of the “business meeting Dutch East Indies day” from Lt. Col. agency of Fuji Nakasuji an expert in aircraft fuel lieutenant 智

 

Nibo who is a graduate of the school Nakano Army, Lieutenant Yoshio round, the Navy had been added.

 

The prelude to the war

The island of Borneo is a land of primeval jungle. The coasts are fringed with mangrove and swamp, and over nine-tenths of the interior is covered with thick evergreen forests.

In 1941

 the population was small – that of the whole island was estimated at less than three million – and there were less than a dozen settlements large enough to be called towns. There were few roads and only one short railway; communication was by the many waterways or by narrow jungle paths. Much of the interior was unexplored, or very inadequately known. It was rich in oil and other raw materials.

The island was partly Dutch and partly British. British Borneo lay along its northern seaboard and comprised the two states of British North Borneo and Sarawak, the small protected State of Brunei, and the Crown Colony of Labuan Island.

Borneo occupies a position of great strategic importance in the south-west Pacific. It lies across the main sea routes from the north to Malaya and Sumatra on the one hand, and Celebes and Java on the other.

Strongly held, it could have been one of the main bastions in the defence of the Malay barrier, but neither the Dutch nor the British had the necessary resources to defend it.

The available forces had to be concentrated further south for the defence of Singapore and Java, and all that could be spared for Borneo and the outlying Dutch islands were small detachments at important points which it was hoped might prove a deterrent to attack.

To gain control of the oilfields, to guard the flank of their advance on Malaya and to facilitate their eventual attack on Sumatra and western Java, the Japanese decided, as a subsidiary operation to their Malayan campaign, to seize British Borneo. This operation was launched by Southern Army eight days after the initial attack on Malaya.

The oilfields in British Borneo lay in two groups: one at Miri close to the northern boundary of Sarawak, and the other thirty-two miles north, at Seria in the State of Brunei. The crude oil was pumped from both fields to a refinery at Lutong on the coast, from which loading lines ran out to sea.

Landings were possible all along the thirty miles of beach between Miri and Lutong and there was, with the forces available, no possibility of defending the oilfields against determined attacks. Plans had therefore been made for the destruction of the oil installations.

Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, decided it would be prudent to honor the 1888 defence agreement with Sarawak. Consequently, in late 1940, he ordered the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, a heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery, and a detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) to proceed to Kuching (British North Borneo).

In December 1940

a company of 2/15th Punjab was sent to Miri for the protection of the demolition parties, and

in May 1941

the rest of 2/15th Punjab was sent there to provide a garrison. This lone battalion consisted of approximately 1,050 soldiers under the command of Major C.M. Lane.

 

For the defence of Sarawak region, it was deployed as follows:

At Miri was deployed a force of 2 officers, and 98 other ranks:
• 1 Infantry Company from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
• 6″ Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery Battery
• 1 Platoon of Royal Engineers
These troops were entrusted with the destruction of Miri Oil Fields. It was to be known as the Miri Detachment.

At Kuching was deployed a force of 1 officer, and 52 other ranks:
• 6 Platoons of infantry from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
These troops were to conduct a delaying action at the Bukit Stabar Airfield outside of Kuching. They were to be known as the Kuching Detachment. The other troops from the 2/15 Punjab were to be deployed piecemeal at the other airfield and oil facilities in Sarawak.

In addition, the Brooke Government mobilized the Sarawak Rangers. This force consisted of 1,515 troops who were primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen trained in the art of jungle warfare led by the European Civil Servants of the Brooke Regime. British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane who commanded the battalion was placed in charge of all forces in Sarawak, which included the native Volunteer Corps, Coastal Marine Service, the armed police and a body of native troops known as the Sarawak Rangers. Collectively, this force of 2,565 troops was known as “SARFOR” (Sarawak Force).

In August 1941

 a partial denial scheme, which reduced the output of oil by seventy per cent, was put into effect. It was also decided that no attempt should be made to defend British North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan, and

 

 the Governor of North Borneo, Mr. Robert Smith,

 was informed that the Volunteers and police were to be used solely for the maintenance of internal security. It was however decided to defend Kuching because of its airfield, and because its occupation by the enemy would give access to the important Dutch airfield at Singkawang II, sixty miles to the southwest and only some 350 miles from Singapore.

Order of Battle for British forces
Sarawak, December 1941
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane (commander)
2nd Battalion of 15th Punjab Regiment
heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery
detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers)
Sarawak Rangers
Coastal Marine Service
plus other native troops

The country between Kuching and the sea is roadless, but is intersected by a number of winding waterways which flow through mangrove swamps to the sea. There are two main approaches to the town: the first by the Sarawak River, which is navigable by vessels up to sixteen foot draught; and the second by the Santubong River, which will take vessels up to twelve foot draught. The roads from Kuching run east to Pending, north-west to Matang, and south to Serian a distance of forty miles from Kuching. The airfield lay seven miles south of the town on the Serian road. At the airfield a road branched off to the west; after crossing the Sarawak River at Batu Kitang, where there was a vehicular ferry, it terminated at Krokong fifteen miles short of the Dutch frontier.

There were two plans of defence that were proposed- Plan A and Plan B.
Plan A called for a mobile defence. The objective was to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield as long as possible. Further delaying actions were also to be conducted so as to allow for the proper execution of the denial schemes. If enemy resistance was such that it could not be delayed, then the airfield would be destroyed and the entire force would retreat into the mountains and jungles in small parties and fight as a guerrilla force for as long as possible. Unfortunately, at

the Anglo-Dutch Military Conference

 

 

during September 1941 held in Kuching,

it was pointed out that Plan A could not be carried out if the Japanese landed 3,000 to 5,000 men with air and sea support. J.L. Noakes, the defeatist Sarawak Secretary for Defence, had continued to argue the inadequacy of SARFOR and that it had no hope against the Japanese if they landed in force. His idea was to take a ‘wait and see’ attitude and continue to appeal to Singapore for more troops and equipment. In the event that this was not forthcoming, Sarawak should surrender so as to prevent any bloodshed. Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, was completely against this defeatist talk and vehemently argued that Sarawak should put up a fight, a fight to maintain the honor of the Brooke Raj. At the end it was decided that the town could not be defended against the weight of attack which was to be expected, and the plan was reluctantly changed to one of static defence of the airfield.

During late November 1941, Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, GOC Malaya Command, took a 2-day tour of Sarawak to assess the adequacy of its defence preparations. He summarized the situation as follows: “Nobody could pretend that this was a satisfactory situation, but at least it would make the enemy deploy a larger force to capture Sarawak than would have been necessary if it had not been defended at all and that, I think, is the true way to look at it…the best I could do was to promise to send them a few anti-aircraft guns and too tell them of the arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were due at Singapore in a few days…not that I expected anit-aircraft guns to be of much practical value. But I felt that the moral effect of their presence there would more than counterbalance some slight dispersion of force”.

As a result of Percival’s assessment of Sarawak’s defences, an alternative plan of action was proposed, Plan B. This was based on static defence. All available troops and supplies were to be concentrated within a 5.5 kilometer perimeter of the Bukit Stabar Airfield to ensure that its destruction was not interfered with. The rationale for Plan B was presented by Brooke-Popham as follows: “The only place which it was decided to hold was Kuching, the reason for this being not only that there was a modern airfield at this location, but that its occupation by the enemy might give access to the Dutch airfields in Borneo, furthermore, it would also give the enemy access to Singapore. Being only some 350 miles from said place”.

Further orders were issued by Vyner Brooke that all the Civil Servants not assigned to the Sarawak Rangers were to remain at their posts. No thought must be given to the abandonment of the native population by any European officer of the Brooke Raj.

 

 

December 8, 2004 (1941) Showa.

 

 Outbreak (Pacific War) World War II. Similar to other Japanese, “reporter” agency alliance Nibo who was in Batavia, was transferred to internment sites located in Australia Rabudai cargo ship arrested in Dutch authorities.

 

However, due to the exchange detainees, Mon 1942 (1942) 9,

In 1950

 

Lieutenant Nibo he said from the fact that after the negotiations, have visited the zone oil in Sumatra, already conceived for securing the oil resources of the Dutch East Indies and had sprouted inside the army

from the stage of the decade, 1950.

 

After returning home, Lieutenant Colonel Nakasuji wrote the “southern oilfield restoration Development Report”. Later, this report, “World War II to decipher in the complete defeat of oil” —- that is textbook oilfield operations after the occupation of the south of the Japanese military (Author Satoshi Iwama, Asahi Shinsho, and published in 2007), the involvement of Nibo wrote in this way with respect.

Reference blog

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』(6)を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_20.html

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』(5)を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_18.html

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』(4)を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_16.html

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』(3)を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_12.html

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』(2)を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_11.html

新穂智少佐が残した『西部ニューギニア横断記』を動画で見る Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201101/article_8.html

西部ニューギニアに瞑る新穂智少佐が残した手記 Catatan Mayor Satoru Niiho
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201012/article_31.html

太平洋戦争開戦69年。西部ニューギニアに瞑る新穂智少佐が残した手記
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/201012/article_9.html

テーマ「大東亜戦争」のブログ記事
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/theme/43f9afaef5.html

テーマ「パプア州」のブログ記事
http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/theme/42c3391253.html

 

On December 8, 1941

Han Samethini was conscripted into

the KNIL 6th Infantry Battalion in Balikpapan in 1941

KNIL ID Card

This was the core unit of the town’s 1,100 man garrison

.Balikpapan  BPM management

hurriedly arranged evacuation of the employees’ families to Java.

Embracing Anna and Margie one last time before they departed, Han could only hope they would be safe at his mother’s house in Surabaya

Trajectory of the Japanese army Papua

Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua

 

 

The AASC element commanded by Capt J.R. Burns had been cobbled together with transport, supply, bakery and butchery elements totalling 40 members in Sydney in July, moved to Darwin and dispatched to Ambon

on 14 December 1941.

The main supplies and ammunition stocks were held at Laha Airfield, defended by two infantry companies, while immediate stocks, bakery and butchery were initially positioned at Galala.

the Malaya and Borneo operations northeast of Natoma Island from 15 to 17 December 1942

The Support Force consisted of

Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita

Rear-Admiral Takeo Kuritawith

 the cruisers Kumano and

 Suzuya

and the destroyers Fubuki

 

and

Sagiri.

Distant cover for the Malaya and Borneo

operations northeast of Natuma Island

 

operations northeast of Natuma Island from 15 to 17 December 1942

 is provided by

Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondowith

the heavy cruisers Atago and

Takao,

the battleships Haruna and

 Kongo and

 the destroyers Ikazuchi,

 Inazuma,

 

Asashio,

 Oshio,

 Michishio

and Arashio. To protect westwards,

the Japanese submarines I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66 are stationed in the passage between Natuma Island and northwest Borneo.

The convoy at first proceeded toward the southwest but, during the night, it changed course to the southeast and made directly for Miri.

About this time the Left Flank Unit aboard IJN

transport ship Hiyoshi Maru separated from the main body and proceeded toward Seria.

 

The Japanese invasion plan called for a landing to be made at

Miri city centre

Miri

and Serian

to capture the oil fields.

A large force would then be left behind to initiate repairs to these oil facilities, while the rest of the force would then make their way to capture

 Kuching

 

and

 

its nearby airfield.

(Dr Iwan ever visit Kuching,Serian,Miri,Brunei,Labuan Island and Kota Kinibalu(before North Borneo) read the adventure of Dr Iwan)

Japanese destroyer Fubuki.
The destroyer took part in the British Borneo Operation, December 1941, as part of Support Force
.

(2)Japanese aircraft sank

the HMS Repulse and

Prince of Wales,

eliminating the only Allied capital ships in the region.

The invasion of Luzon commenced the same day. In both Malaya and the Philippines, Japan’s tough, superbly trained armies quickly overcame forward defenses and swept south towards Singapore and Manila. Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day.

Japanese infantry storms ashore in the Natuna Islands, west of Borneo
Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

The Japanese offensive in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies

Map of Borneo with arrows indicating the locations of Tarakan, Samarinda, and Balikpapan
(Click map to enlarge)
Following their rapid thrusts against the British and the Americans, the Japanese launched a great, three-pronged offensive against the Netherlands East Indies. The invasion of Borneo began on the night of

December 16th/1941

In Malaya

there was no clear demarcation between the first and second phase. There the Japanese, driving in two columns down the east and west coasts of the peninsula, continued to advance without halt.

troops of the japanese army 5th infantry division landing on a beach in malaya (december 1941)

troops of the japanese army 5th infantry division landing on a beach in malaya (december 1941)

 

japanese soldiers using boats for transports (malaya 1942

 

Combining amphibious encirclement with frontal assault, General Yamashita was able to force the stubborn British defenders back time after time

japanese soldiers of the 5th division trying to move a truck stuck in the mud (malaya 1942)

The first force, 2/21 Bn Group designated Gull Force, was landed

 on 17 December 1941

to protect RAAF aircraft at Ambon; the aircraft were eventually withdrawn but not their

supposed protectors.

heavily camouflaged Toyota KB Truck and a type 97 tankette moving on a poorly pavemented road of malaya (1942)

art work showing tanks of the japanese army 6th Tank Regiment commanded by tank commander Colonel Kawamura attacking the british in malaya 1942

japanese soldier using a Type 97 light machine gun above a transport truck (malaya 1942)

Type 11 37 mm Infantry Gun crew on a hiden position (malaya 1942)

 

North Borneo,

Miri Serawak at the border of Brunei,

 

 

 

Serian serawak.

commander of the 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe giving orders to his troops before landing (Borneo, december 1941)

west borneo

Singkawang

 

Read more info

The Invasion of British Borneo in 1942

The following article is taken from the British Official History book:
The War Against Japan – Volume I – The Loss of Singapore (Chapter XIII) by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby,
the Japanese Monograph No.26: Borneo Operations 1941-1945, USAFFE 1958 and
from numerous additional information kindly provided by
Allan Alsleben, Henry Klom, Tim Hayes, Coen van Galen, Pierre-Emmanuel Bernaudin and Graham Donaldson.

The Invasion of British Borneo 1942

The Brooke Government which had already heard of

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (on 7 December 1941)

quickly ordered the complete and total destruction of the oil fields and airfields at Miri and Seria. Orders for the demolition of the refinery at Lutong and the denial of the oilwells reached the officer commanding at Miri

on the morning of the 8th December,

 and by the evening of the same day the task was completed. On the following day the landing ground there was made unfit for use, and on the 13th the Punjabis and the oil officials left by sea for Kuching. The destruction of the oilfields had been completed none too soon.

 

 
(Japanese troops advancing through Malaya)

Throughout much of World War II,  British Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak were under Japanese occupation.

The Japanese Empire commenced the Pacific War with the invasion of Kota Bahru in Kelantan

on 8 December 1941 at 00:25,

 about 90 minutes before the Attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii at 07:48 on 7 December Hawaii time, or 01:48 on 8 December Malayan time.

They then invaded the island of Borneo in mid December 1941, landing on the west coast near Miri in Sarawak; invasion was completed by 23 January 1942 when they landed at Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo on the east coast. During the occupation an estimated 100,000 people were killed.

Defence in Sarawak and North Borneo

The main objectives were the oilfields at Miri in Sarawak region and Seria in Brunei. The oil was refined at Tutong near Miri. Despite rich oil supplies, the Sarawak region had no air or sea forces to defend it.

Only in late 1940 did Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham order the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, a heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery, and a detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) to be positioned at Kuching. They numbered about 1,050 men. In addition, the Brooke White Rajah government also organised the Sarawak Rangers. This force consisted of 1,515 men who were primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen. Altogether these forces were commanded by British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane and was known as “SARFOR” (Sarawak Force).

After having heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor, on 8 December 1941, the Brooke government instructed that the oilfields at Miri and Seria and refinery at Lutong be quickly demolished.

Japanese landing and the battle

The main Japanese force, led by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, consisted of units from Canton, southern China:

  • 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters
  • 124th Infantry Regiment from Japanese 18th Division
  • 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force
  • 4th Naval Construction Unit
  • 1 platoon of the 12th Engineer Regiment
  • 1 unit from the 18th Division Signal Unit
  • 1 unit from the 18th Division Medical Unit
  • 4th Field Hospital, 18th Division
  • 1 unit from the 11th Water Supply and Purification Unit
 
(The Japanese landing off the west coast of British North Borneo, 1942)

The Japanese forces intended to capture Miri and Seria, while the rest would capture Kuching and nearby airfields. The convoy proceeded without being detected and,

at dawn on 15 December 1941,

 two landing units secured Miri and Seria with only very little resistance from British forces. A few hours later, Lutong was captured as well.

Meanwhile, on 31 December 1941,

the force under Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe moved northward to occupy Brunei, Labuan Island, and Jesselton (now called Kota Kinabalu). On 18 January 1942, using small fishing boats, the Japanese landed at Sandakan, the seat of government of British North Borneo.

The North Borneo Armed Constabulary, with only 650 men, hardly provided any resistance to slow down the Japanese invasion.

After securing the oilfields, on 22 December,

 the main Japanese forces moved westwards to Kuching. The Japanese airforce bombed Singkawang airfield to prevent a Dutch attack. After a battle between the Japanese fleet and a Dutch submarine, the fleet approached

the mouth of the Santubong river on 23 December.

The convoy arrived off Cape Sipang and the troops in twenty transport ships, commanded by Colonel Akinosuke Oka, landed at 04:00, 24 December. Although 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment resisted the attack, they soon became out-numbered and retreated up the river. By the afternoon, Kuching was in the hands of Japanese forces.

At about 16:40 on 25 December,

 the Japanese troops successfully captured Kuching airfield. The Punjab regiment retreated through the jungle to the Singkawang area. After Singkawang was secured as well on 29 December, the rest of the British and Dutch troops retreated further into the jungle southward trying to reach Sampit and Pangkalanbun, where a Dutch airfield at Kotawaringin was located. South and central Kalimantan were taken by the Japanese Navy following attacks from east and west. After ten weeks in the jungle-covered mountains, the Allied troops surrendered on 1 April 1942. Lastly, Sarawak fell into the hands of The Empire of Sun.

 
(Hinomaru Yosegaki – Japanese WWII Good Luck Flag)

 

  The map of the Dutch East Indies 1941-1942

 

 

On 1 January 1942,

 two infantry platoons commanded by a company commander landed on Labuan Island, capturing the British Resident, Hugh Humphrey who later recalled: “I was repeatedly hit by a Japanese officer with his sword (in its scabbard) and exhibited for 24 hours to the public in an improvised cage, on the grounds that, before the Japanese arrived, I had sabotaged the war effort of the Imperial Japanese Forces by destroying stocks of aviation fuel on the island”. [1] On 8 January, Kawaguchi proceeded to Jesselton and having occupied that town and Beaufort, where he disarmed the small police unit. Using ten small fishing boats, two infantry companies (minus two platoons), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe, captured Sandakan, the seat of government of British North Borneo, and rescued the 600 interned Japanese citizens.

 On the morning of the 19th January,

 the Governor Robert Smith surrendered the State and, refusing to carry on the administration under Japanese control, was interned with his staff. This unit then captured Tawau and Lahad Datu on the 24th and 31st respectively. This time they freed a further 1,500 Japanese citizens. The Japanese forces suffered no combat casualties during this operations.

 

The convoy which left Miri

on the 22nd of December

 was escorted by the cruiser Yura, the destroyers Murakumo, Shirakumo and Usugumo, the minesweepers W 3 and W 6 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru. Covering Force was consisted of cruisers Kinu, Kumano and Suzuya, with the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri.

West of Covering Force was the 2nd Division of the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Mikuma and Mogami) with destroyer Hatsuyuki. It was sighted and reported to Air Headquarters, Far East, by Dutch reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 23rd, when it was about 150 miles from Kuching.

At 11.40 that morning

twenty-four Japanese aircraft bombed Singkawang II airfield, so damaging the runways that a Dutch striking force which had been ordered to attack the convoy was unable to take off with a bomb load.

 Despite the critical situation the Dutch authorities urged the transfer of their aircraft to Sumatra.

 Air Headquarters, Far East, agreed

 and during the afternoon of the 24th

 the aircraft were flown to Palembang.

The convoy did not however escape unscathed.

On the evening of the 23rd

 it was first attacked by Dutch submarine K-XIV (Lt.Cdr. C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld) sank two enemy ships and damaged two others,

and the following night of 23/24 December 1942

 another Dutch submarine K-XVI (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Jarman) torpedoed the IJN destroyer Sagiri (1,750 tons) near Kuching, Sarawak.

Their own torpedoes caught on fire and the ship simply blew up, killing immediately 121 officers and men.

The IJN destroyer Shirakumo and minesweeper W 3 rescued 120 survivors. The K-XVI was herself sunk by Japanese submarine I-66 (Cdr. Yoshitome) on her way back to Soerabaja.

Five Bristol Blenheims of 34th (B) RAF Squadron from Singapore, at almost extreme range, bombed the ships at anchor the same evening, but did little damage.

The convoy was seen at 6 p.m. on the 23rd

approaching the mouth of the Santubong River. Two hours later Colonel Lane received orders from Singapore to destroy the airfield.

 It was too late to change back to mobile defence and, as there seemed to him no point in attempting to defend a useless airfield, he asked General Percival for permission to withdraw as soon as possible into Dutch north-west Borneo.

While awaiting a reply Lane concentrated his battalion at the airfield, with forward detachments in the Pending area east of the town and on the roads to the north of it, 18-pounder gun and 3-inch mortar detachments covering the river approaches, and a Punjabi gunboat platoon, working with the Sarawak Rangers and the Coastal Marine Service, patrolling north of Kuching.

The convoy proceeded westward, arriving at a point, east of Cape Sipang

at 0300 on the 24th. At 0120,

the IJN transport Nichiran Maru with Colonel Akinosuke Oka arrived at the prearranged anchorage off the mouth of the Santubong River.

 At 0400,

the unit aboard the IJN transport Nichiran Maru, commanded by Colonel A. Oka, completed its transfer to landing barges and proceeding west of Cape Sipang.

At about 9 a.m.

 twenty enemy landing craft were observed approaching the shore.

The small Punjabi gunboat platoon, hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew up the river without loss.

 At 11 a.m.

as they neared the town the landing craft were engaged by the gun and mortar detachments, who sank four before themselves being surrounded and killed. During the afternoon three more craft were sunk by gunfire, but the remainder were able to land their troops on both sides of the river,

and by 4.30 p.m.

 the town was in Japanese hands.

Meanwhile Lane had been instructed by Percival to hold the Japanese for as long as possible and then act in the best interests of west Borneo as a whole.

Since the capture of the town threatened to cut off the forward troops, Lane ordered them to withdraw to the airfield.

The Japanese followed up

and before dark

made contact with the airfield defences.

Throughout the night

sporadic firing went on as they felt their way round the perimeter.

 Major-General Kawaguchi received a report from his intelligence officer that there was approximately 400-500 British troops in the vicinity of the Kuching airfield.

December,25th.1941

As Christmas Day dawned,

firing temporarily ceased and advantage was taken of the lull to send the hospital detachment with the women and children on ahead into Dutch Borneo.

During the morning

 the Japanese encircling movement continued, and a company was sent to hold the ferry crossing at Batu Kitang so as to keep the road clear for escape.

A general withdrawal into Dutch Borneo was ordered to start at dusk, but heavy firing was heard to the north of Batu Kitang shortly after noon and, fearing that his line of retreat would be cut, Lane decided on immediate withdrawal.

The enemy, reinforced by the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF, soon aware of his intention, launched a full-scale attack on the two Punjabi companies forming the rearguard.

Of these two companies only one platoon succeeded in rejoining the main body. The remainder, totaling four British officers and some 230 Indian troops, were cut off and either killed or captured.

 At about 1640 on the 25th,

the Japanese troops completely secured the Kuching airfield. The Japanese losses during this operation (including those at sea) were about 100 killed and 100 wounded. The rest of the battalion reached Batu Kitang without loss to find the village deserted and the ferry unattended.

They had great difficulty in crossing the river, but by dark all except the covering force were over. Most of the transport had to be left behind.

. From the 26th

‘Sarfor’ ceased to exist as a combined Indian and State Force, and the Punjabis, much reduced in strength, carried on alone

 

 December,27th.1941

Following the capture of Kuching airfield, the Detachment commander ordered Colonel Oka to secure the strategic area around Kuching with the main force of the 124th Infantry Regiment, while he with one infantry battalion (excluding two companies)

 left Kuching on the 27th and returned back to Miri.

The main body made its way to Krokong. There the road ended, and the remaining vehicles and heavy equipment had to be abandoned. There, too, the Sarawak State Forces, in view of their agreement to serve only in Sarawak, were released to return to their homes

 

 

December,31st.1941

Renewed Japanese attacks threatened to cut off the covering force, but it managed to make good its escape to the southward, and after a march of about sixty miles through dense jungle with little food or water

 rejoined the battalion at Singkawang II airfield on the 31st.

.

On the morning of the 27th

the column crossed the border into Dutch Borneo and two days later arrived at Singkawang II airfield where there was a garrison of 750 Dutch troops.

 

It was realized at Headquarters, Malaya Command, that the Punjabis would be urgently in need of food and ammunition.

On the 30th December

 

 

japanese navy paratroopers attacking the dutch troops in Longoan airfield (january 1942)

ship’s crane.

commander of the 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe giving orders to his troops before landing (Borneo, december 1941)

 

 Finally between 0510 and 0610

 the Right Flank Unit completed its landing, while the Left Flank Unit landed about 0440. The Right Flank Unit quickly captured the government buildings and the post office at Miri as well as the surrounding district with plantations.

In the meantime, the Left Flank Unit landed on the west coast near Serian and occupied the large copra plantations, the Serian oilfields, and the strategic sector north of Serian to prepare for an attack against Brunei. There was offered very little resistance by the British forces, and during the morning on the 16th, the two units secured the oilfield at Serian and oilfields and airfield at Miri. The main body of the Kawaguchi Detachment found only about 50 members of the police unit defending Miri. They surrendred with very little fighting. Two companies of the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF landed on the coast near Lutong and within two and a half hours captured the important Lutong oil refinery. It then proceeded to occupy and secure the Miri airfield without meeting any resistance.

Part of the Detachment was immediately assigned the mission of restoring the oilfields at Miri and Seria, while, after 17 December, the main body of the Detachment prepared for the next operation – the landing at Kuching. The Japanese troops suffered only 40 casualties between 16 and 23 December, most were drownings as a result of Japanese amphibious operations.

News of the landing did not reach Air Headquarters, Far East,

 until 9 p.m. on the 16th.

Reconnaissance aircraft from Singkawang II were ordered to investigate

at daylight on the December,17th.

New Airbase in Singkawang: Ki-43 of the 77th

Singkawang:

 Up and running; an AIR HQ is on it’s way and will unload tommorow, so it will soon be VERY up and running! But I already have planes, 2 Base Forces there

Photo Taken at our New Airbase in Singkawang: Ki-43 of the 77th Sentai:

In the meantime, the word of the invasion had also reached Tarakan Island on the eastern coast of Borneo, where the three Dornier flying boats of Naval Air Group GVT-7 (Marine Luchtvaart Dienst) were immediately prepared for attack. These three aircraft, (with registrations X-32, X-33 and X-34) were Dornier Do-24K’s, capable of carrying a payload of 1,200 kg.

 Japanese attacked in the early morning of December 17th.1941

 The flying boat X-34 (Luitenant ter Zee 3e klasse A. Baarschers) never made it to Miri. He had to made an emergency landing in the jungle, while it was heading for the Japanese invasion fleet near Miri

DECEMBER 17th, 1941:
After the reconnaissance report from 2 Vl.G.I,

Dutch Air Headquarters ordered 1 Vl.G.I, which operated from Samarinda II airbase, to attack the same target.

In the early afternoon

three flights (Flight Commanders Beckman, Butner and Vrijburg) flew to Miri. When they reached the target area, they observed a burning Japanese warship.

 Though the crews thought that this must have been the result of 2 Vl.G.I’s earlier attack, P.C. Boer credits this damaged ship to the Dorniers of Naval Air Group GVT-7, since we already saw that van den Broek’s crews claimed no hits during their first raid.

The first two flights (Beckman and Butner) bombarded the ships with no results (“far from near misses”) but were attacked by Mitsubishi F1M fighters.

One of the crews of the third flight claimed a hit on a Japanese transport but this Glenn was also attacked by F1M floatplanes, one of which was shot down.

The last plane to attack the Japanese fleet was the Glenn Martin of the Flight Commander of the third flight (Vrijburg).No Japanese fighters and AA fire this time, so Vrijburg took his time to drop his two 1000 pounders on a large destroyer.

They could not again find the ship after the attack and claimed it as destroyed, which was not confirmed by Air Headquarters by the way.

In late 1941,

 a total of 24 Hurricane Mk IIB´s in crates on route to Singapore for the Royal Air Force were rerouted to Tjililitan (Java) for use by tbe Dutch East Indies Air Force.

DECEMBER 18th, 1941:


Two flights of 2 Vl.G.I (Flight Commanders Theunissen and Cooke) repeated the attack in the early morning of this day. The weather was excellent and so were the bombing results.

The first flight (Theunissen) to attack scored two hits on a large transport which, according to Japanese records, was badly damaged but did not sink.

 Again the Glenn Martins were intercepted by F1M floatplanes but the air gunners shot down one of them. The second flight (Cooke) hit a “cruiser” and the belly gunners of the Glenns observed it as it went down.

Cooke’s flight was also attacked by Japanese fighters and this time the Glenn Martin M571, flown by Lieutenant Groeneveld, was shot down. Groeneveld and his crew bailed out and eventually ended up at Long Nawang (Borneo) where they were executed by Japanese troops in August 1942.

 P.C. Boer credits Cooke’s flight with the sinking of IJN destroyer Shinonome since this attack was made near Lutong (4 24’N – 114 00’0) whereas the Dorniers made their attack near Seria (20 miles north-east of Miri).

The 1 Vl.G.I also tried to attack the Japanese fleet again later that day, but by now the weather conditions had changed completely. Only two planes managed to reach the target area but were unable to locate the ships.

[2] This is the article written by Allan Nevitt “Fleeting Glory: The Fubukis of DesDiv 12″ at Nihon Kaigun. There are more errors in this article, in the passages about later operations by this division.

This work was delayed

Dutch naval aircraft attacked the ships at anchor later that day and

again on the 18th December 1941

, but without effect.

 On the 19th December 1941

 the Dutch flying boat X-32 from Tarakan Island


IJN destroyer Shinonome

sank the Japanese destroyer Shinonome (Cdr. Hiroshi Sasagawa)

 of 1,950 tons off Miri, while another flying boat X-33 damaged a transport ship.

The destroyer could not take the pounding and went down with her entire crew of 228 officers and men. Kuching realized that its turn was soon to come and work went on day and night to complete the airfield defences.

.

Read more info

Who sank IJN destroyer Shinonome, December 1941?

The IJN destroyer Shinonome (1,950 tons) was a powerful ship, completed in 1927 as one of the Fubuki Class fleet destroyers. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, she was under command of Commander Hiroshi Sasagawa. His ship had been assigned to Destroyer Division 12 under the command of Commander Nobuki Ogawa, which was initially deployed as escort for the valuable troop transports steaming towards the virtually unprotected shores of the Malaya Peninsula. On December 16, she left Cam Ranh Bay (French Indochina) for Miri, British North Borneo, together with the other two ships of Destroyer Division 12, the IJN destroyers Shirakumo and Murakumo, the light cruiser Yura, the seaplane depot ship Kamikawa Maru, a few sub-chasers and two minesweepers. In addition, a cover force (Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita) with two heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya, a light cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Fubuki were sent out as reinforcement. The invasion fleet reached Miri in the night of 15 and 16 December 1941, where the troops went ashore almost unopposed. The 2,500 men of the Kawaguchi Detachment were able to capture Miri and Lutong without much fighting.

IJN destroyer Shinonome

The next day proved to be far less comfortable for the Japanese invasion force. In the early morning of December 17, 1941 a flight of 2 Vl.G.I, operating from Singkawang II airbase, found several Japanese ships near Miri. That same morning the 1st “Patrouille” (Flight Commander Van den Broek) of 2 Vl.G.I attacked these ships from 4,500 meters but claimed no hits. The crews reported heavy AA fire and two of the Glenn Martin bombers returned slightly damaged [1].

In the meantime, the word of the invasion had also reached Tarakan Island on the eastern coast of Borneo, where the three Dornier flying boats of Naval Air Group GVT-7 (Marine Luchtvaart Dienst) were immediately prepared for attack. These three aircraft, (with registrations X-32, X-33 and X-34) were Dornier Do-24K’s, capable of carrying a payload of 1,200 kg.

 They attacked in the early morning of December 17.

 The flying boat X-34 (Luitenant ter Zee 3e klasse A. Baarschers) never made it to Miri. He had to made an emergency landing in the jungle, while it was heading for the Japanese invasion fleet near Miri.

He later reached, together with two of his crew members, a refugee camp at Long Nawang, only to be massacred there by Japanese troops in August 1942.

The other two flying boats X-33 and X-32 were able to attack the fleet. The X-33 (Officier-Vlieger 2e klasse J.G. Petschi) attacked a Japanese transport ship without succes, while X-32 (Officier-Vlieger 2e klasse B. Sjerp – unit commander) did far better.

He dropped 5 bombs of 200 kg each, scoring two hits on a IJN destroyer Shinonome and a near miss. The latter apparently did most of the damage, as the target was immediately rent by a thunderous explosion, and fires broke out aboard. A few minutes later, when the smoke cleared, the waves closed over the Shinonome, who had disappeared beneath the surface, taking below its captain, Commander Hiroshi Sasagawa, and the entire crew of 228 men.

Dornier Do-24K

After the war, a committee was formed to assess the casualties the Allied naval and airforces had inflicted on the Japanese Navy and merchant navy during the war. They reached a remarkable conclusion regarding Shinonome’s loss. This warship was supposedly sunk by a Dutch mine. Although the author has little doubt about the true cause of the sinking, it is interesting to see how the committee reached this conclusion.

 

 In 1998, an article was posted on the Nihon Kaigun website, narrating the history of Destroyer Division 12 during its short career [2]. The passage about the Shinonome mentions that the Commander of Destroyer Division 12, Commander Nobuki Ogawa, thought she had been lost to a mine or an internal explosion. He nor anyone else had apparently observed the air attack by the flying boats. The Assessment Committee adopted this theory, and never gave other possibilities much thought. There may be a few reasons why the Imperial Japanese Navy thought a mine was responsible:

- There were no survivors of IJN destroyer Shinonome to account for her loss.
- The stormy weather prevented the Dutch aircraft from being sighted, and therefore caused the confusion.

I put in a few hours of research to try to find out if there were any mines in the vicinity, but I am pretty sure there were none in the area. The Dutch minelayer Prins van Oranje made a sortie to British Borneo to pick up Japanese inhabitants, but there is no record of any mine being laid. The same goes for the British Royal Navy in Singapore, which restricted her operations to the waters of Malaya.


Note This article was written by JAN VISSER (The Netherlands). Much thanks also goes to BERT KOSSEN (the Netherlands).
[1] The description of this event according to P.C. Boer’s excellent book “De Luchtstrijd rond Borneo”:

on the December 19th

 by a raid on the town by fifteen Japanese bombers which set fire to a large petrol store but otherwise did little material damage. A large part of the native population however fled from the town, and labour, which had been difficult to obtain before, became almost unprocurable

 

 

On the 22nd December1941

 the main body (two battalions) of the Japanese invasion force re-embarked at Miri and left for Kuching, leaving one battalion to secure all British Borneo outside Sarawak.

Although after the occupation of Miri the Detachment commander, Major-General Kawaguchi, was unable to obtain any additional information in regard to the enemy’s strength or disposition, he did learn that there is one small railway on the western coast and no roads through the jungle. Consequently, an attack on north Borneo would have to be made from landing barges.

The first signs of the increased tempo of Japanese operations in the Netherlands Indies came very quickly.

Then, on 22 December, 1941

General Homma put the bulk of his 14th Army ashore at Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila.

japamese army officer Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga shaking hands with raiders of the Kaoru Special Attack Corps before leaving to a mission against a USAAF landing strip on Leyte (oct 1944)

Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga giving sake wine to soldier of the Kaoru Special Attack Corps before leaving to a mission against a USAAF landing strip on Leyte (oct 1944)

The remainder landed two days later at Lamon Bay, south of the capital, to form the southern arm of a giant pincer movement converging on Manila. But Homma quickly discovered he was dealing with a determined and able foe.

MacArthur did not, as Homma and Imperial General Headquarters expected, stay to fight it out on the central plain of Luzon. Instead he put into effect the long-standing ORANGE plan and withdrew his forces to the Bataan Peninsula in a skillful and dangerous double retrograde movement, made in two weeks under the most difficult circumstances and constant pressure. At the same time he proclaimed Manila an open city and transferred his headquarters to Corregidor. Thus, when Homma,

On returning back to Miri on 28 December1941,

Major-General Kawaguchi ordered Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe to advance on the 31st by landing barges to Brunei with one infantry battalion and there to collect small boats to be used for the attack on north Borneo.

The Japanese soldiers of the Watanabe Force, however, discovered that the British had already destroyed all big ships in the harbour, so that only small native boats remained.

 

The ABDACOM Interlude

While the American and British heads of state with their military staffs were in Washington establishing the strategic basis and the organization for the conduct of the war, the Japanese Army and Navy had continued their drive into Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific with unabated vigor.

Operations during the first phase of their plan for seizing the southern area had been remarkably successful and

.

 In the last week of December1941,

 Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, and Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, 2d Fleet commander, jointly recommended advancing the schedule of operations against Sumatra and Borneo, thus making possible the invasion of Java a month earlier than planned.

 At Japanese  Imperial General Headquarters

 the Terauchi-Kondo proposal met a favorable reception, for it would not only speed operations in the south and keep the enemy off balance but it would also make available at an earlier date the troops needed in Manchuria if the Soviet Union should enter the war — a danger that continued to haunt the Japanese. Early in January, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters approved the recommendation and advanced the timetable for the seizure of the southern area.29

 

Late in December 1941

the Japanese had gained control of British Borneo and the South China Sea approaches to the Malay Barrier.

January,1st.1942

JAPANESE PRISONERS,

 captured on Bataan, being led blindfolded to headquarters for questioning. On 1 January 1942 the Japanese entered Manila and the U.S, troops withdrew toward Bataan. Army supplies were either moved to Bataan and Corregidor or destroyed. The remaining forces on Bataan, including some 15,000 U.S. troops, totaled about 80,000 men. The food, housing, and sanitation problems were greatly increased by the presence of over 20,000 civilian refugees. All troops were placed on half-rations

 

 

 

 

On January 2th, 1942

, the Philippine capital of Manila was occupied by the japanese

 

 

 

 

 

January 1942

primarily to show whether one could be drawn “which would leave the Supreme Commander with enough power to improve the situation and still not give him power to destroy national interests or to exploit one theater without due consideration to another.”16

The task was a difficult one and the results were not entirely satisfactory, the British Chiefs objecting on the ground that the limitations placed on the commander were too heavy. It was sent to the Allied planners, therefore, for further study and a revised draft was prepared. This one, with slight modifications, proved acceptable and was finally approved, though with some reluctance, by all the governments involved on 10 January 1942.17

The new command Wavell was to head was to be known as ABDACOM, for the initials of the national forces involved (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) and included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines. The inclusion of the Philippines in Wavell’s command was a formal gesture and one Wavell himself wished to avoid.18 Significantly, neither China nor Australia was included in the ABDA area. (Map 2) As much for political as military reasons the former was organized as a separate theater commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, but independent of Allied control.

 The Australians, though they protested their omission from the discussions in Washington and their lack of representation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, accepted the terms of the directive and permitted their troops in the ABDA area to become a part of Wavell’s command. USAFIA (U.S. Army Forces in Australia), however, was not included in the new command on the ground that its primary responsibility was to MacArthur and its main task to support the defense of the Philippines. Soon after Wavell assumed command, when it became apparent that only limited aid could be sent to the Philippines, the mission of USAFIA was broadened to include the support of operations in the ABDA area. And the northwest portion of Australia was also added to ABDACOM at General Wavell’s request.19

The staff of the new command, it was understood, would represent all the nations concerned. The American and British Chiefs of Staff did not attempt to name Wavell’s staff, but they did seek to guard against the preponderance of one nationality in his headquarters. Thus, they stipulated that his deputy and the commander of the naval forces would be Americans, and that a British officer would command the air forces and a Dutch officer the ground forces.

The problem of protecting the interests of each nation represented in ABDACOM without unduly restricting the commander was resolved by limiting Wavell’s authority to the “effective coordination of forces.” He was given command of all forces “afloat, ashore,
MAP 2: The ABDACOM Area

and in the air,” but was permitted to exercise that control only through subordinate commanders whom he could not relieve and who had the right to appeal to their governments if they considered their orders and national interests to be in conflict. Though he could assign missions to his forces, form task forces for specific operations, and appoint their commanders, he was prohibited from altering the tactical organization of the national forces in his command, using their supplies, or controlling their communications with the home government. And in matters of logistics and administration he could exercise only the most general control.

The severe limitations placed on General Wavell’s authority were in marked contrast to the heavy responsibilities laid upon him by the chiefs in Washington. Not only was he given the task of maintaining “as many key positions as possible” under the strategic objectives already outlined (that is, to hold the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia), a formidable enough undertaking in itself, but he was also enjoined “to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan.” “The first essential,” the Chiefs told him, “is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment.” With the lesson of the first Japanese successes still fresh in mind, they cautioned Wavell against dispersing his air forces or using them in piecemeal fashion.20

These instructions, with their emphasis on offensive operations, were probably motivated by an understandable reluctance in Washington to dedicate a command to defensive action, but there was a clear realization that the forces in the theater were then and for some time would be hard pressed even to hold their own. And even as these instructions were being written the enemy was moving swiftly and in force toward those “key positions” Wavell was to hold.

Having established the ABDA area and appointed General Wavell its commander, the American and British staffs in Washington had still to settle the problem of reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific, for it was obvious with each passing day that the situation there was rapidly worsening. This problem brought the assembled planners up against the hard fact, which was to plague them throughout the war, that there were not enough ships to do all the jobs required. They had earlier in the conference agreed ‘that American troops would be sent to Iceland and northern Ireland, and that landings might be made in North Africa later in the year. The shipping requirements for these operations alone were so great that the North Atlantic sailings were approved only on the understanding that they would be discontinued “if other considerations intervened.”21 The necessity for speeding up the schedule of reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific created an additional and immediate demand for the ships already allocated to the North Atlantic projects and led to a re-examination of the entire shipping shortage.

The debate over Atlantic versus Pacific priority on shipping was precipitated

(ibid American Army In WW II)

 

 

 

Both left Davao at the same time, 9 January 1942.

The first landed at Tarakan on 11 January and, after overcoming slight resistance from the Dutch defenders aided by American B-17’s based near Surabaya, took that town the same day.

 The second force, reinforced by about 330 naval paratroopers and supported by the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho and three heavy cruisers, took Menado at the same time.

The seizure of these two points completed the Japanese control of

 the Celebes Sea

And

 the northern approaches to Makassar Strait.

 Through that strait lay one of the routes to Java.30

 

 

 

 

JANUARY 1942

amazing story of Louis Rapmund.

Louis Rapmund

During one of my many late night internet searches I found his name in two obscure articles published in a New Guinea journal in the late 1940s. Rapmund was a Dutch NEI (Netherlands East Indies) officer who worked in western New Guinea facilitating the recovery of Indian, Papuan, and Dutch nationals who had been held by the Japanese. Rapmund assisted Nellist and Rounsaville Teams (of the Alamo Scouts) on their famous mission to liberate a Dutch governor and his family, along with 40 Javanese and twelve French civilians from an internee camp at Cape Oransbari

Last photo of the Rapmund Family – Madang 1940

“The last time I saw my father was in 1942 in Java,” said Louise. “He was literally running out the back door of our house as the Japanese were coming in the front door.

They were looking for him. This has helped heal a wound in my soul that festered for over sixty years. I loved my father. He was a wonderful man.”

Over the next week Louise gathered what photos she could find of her father and sent them to me for the ASA Photo Archive.

As the photos attest, Louis Rapmund was a striking figure; a handsome young man struck down in the prime of his life in a brutal war. But now thanks to modern technology, the undying love of a daughter, and the generosity of a total stranger, the words he penned a lifetime ago have helped bring others a little closer.

Louise & husband

until by 10 January

General Yamashita  stood at the gates of Kuala Lumpur, on the west coast of Malaya, which his 5th Division captured the next day.

 

 His eastern column meanwhile had advanced to within 100 miles of Singapore. By the middle of the month, he had united his  two columns and was preparing to attack the single line the gallant defenders had formed before the plain which constitutes the southern tip of the peninsula.28

January,12th.1942

the battle of manado

 

commander of the 1st Yokosuka SNLF paratroopers during the japanese invasion of the dutch east indies, in january 1942 during

the battle of manado January 1942

 commander Horiuchi was tasked to conquer the Longoan airfield, 09:00 hours

January 12th, 1942,

334 Japanese paratroopers were dropped on and around the airfield, Having heard the dropping dutch commander Captain van den Berg ordered the two remaining Overvalwagens (armoured car) to attack the airfield. Although the Japanese paratroopers suffered heavy casualties, they succeeded to capture the Langoan airfield. Enraged by the heavy losses, the Japanese executed a large number of KNIL POW’s

 

 

It was at this juncture, on 10 January,

 that General Wavell reached Batavia, capital of the Netherlands Indies, located on the northwest coast of Java. Already there or soon to arrive were his deputy, General Brett, and the commanders of his ground and naval force, Lt. Gen. H. ter Poorten and Admiral Hart. In the absence of Air Marshal Sir Richard E. C. Peirse, General Brereton was appointed deputy commander of the air forces. On the 15th, General Wavell formally assumed command of the ABDA area (ABDACOM) with headquarters at Lembang, inland from the capital and about ten miles north of Bandoeng.31 (Chart 2)

From the start it was apparent that the defense of the ABDA area, even in the unlikely event that the promised reinforcements arrived in time, had little chance of success. Already the Japanese had taken Hong Kong, isolated the Philippines, landed in Borneo and the Celebes, and were making rapid progress down the Malay Peninsula.

 To oppose their advance Wavell had, in addition to the British forces fighting a losing battle in Malaya and the American forces in the Philippines, two Dutch divisions in Java and small Dutch garrisons elsewhere in the Indies; a naval force — including the U.S. Asiatic Fleet — of heavy and 8 light cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 36 submarines; and an air force of 4 fighter and 6 bomber squadrons, including the remnants of the Far East Air Force, plus 250 more planes in Burma and Malaya. With these meager forces General Wavell could only try to hold back the Japanese tide while waiting for reinforcements which never came.32

The urgent need for reinforcements was only one of Wavell’s problems. Keeping the peace within his own small international headquarters, unraveling the confused command relationships between his forces, and reconciling conflicting national interests and strategic concepts were others almost as serious. Even so minor a matter as the location of the headquarters could not be settled amicably and it was only after he had overridden the strong objections of his naval commanders that Wavell established his headquarters at Lembang.33

The relationship between Wavell and MacArthur, though it created no difficulties, illustrated the confused situation in ABDACOM. In addition to the task of holding the Malay Barrier, Wavell had also been instructed to re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippine garrison. Before assuming command, he objected to this assignment and proposed that the islands be excluded from the ABDA area. President Roosevelt, without consulting his military advisers, approved this suggestion to avoid any delay in Wavell’s assumption of command. When General Marshall learned of this action he saw

 

on 11 January,

 the Japanese moved on to Kendari

 

 

 

 

 

Tarakan is an island off the east coast of Borneo.

 

The island is about 303 square kilometers and consists largely of swamps and hills covered with impenetrable jungle.

 

 

One of the main objectives of Japan during the Second World War, these oil wells to get.

 

End landed Japanese troops on 11 January 1942

 

on the coast of Tarakan defeated and there a small garrison of the Indian army during a two-day battle in which half the garrison was slain.

 

 Although the oil fields were destroyed by the Dutch troops before the landing of the Japanese took the Japanese were able to produce oil quickly recover.

 

 

And

 then Japanese troops landing Tarakan,

They managed to get through barbed wire, to destroy all machine-gun nests and killing almost all Dutch commanding officers with knives.

They soon captured the first and second row of barracks.

At daybreak the Dutch garrison commander, Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal, discovered that front line is weak and that all further resistance would be useless.

 He dispatched a messenger, under a flag of truce, with an offer to surrender.

Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto, commander of the Right Wing Unit, immediately wired the commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment, informing him of the enemy’s surrender.

After the Dutch troops finally surrendered, the 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force advanced rapidly to the Tarakan airfield and occupied it

by the morning of January 12th.

 

 During this advance the unit was bombed by Dutch bombers from Samarinda II airfield and 18 Japanese soldiers were killed. At 1200 hours one infantry company dispatched from the Right Wing Unit also

Japanese troops occupied the village of Djoewata

 with a Dutch coastal battery located there at the north end of the island.

During this first fightings Japanese managed to capture a group of about 30 KNIL soldiers. When this group refused to tell them how to get to the main city of the island, they were all stabbed to death with Japanese rifles. Only one men survived this massacre. He managed to drag himself to a hospital where he recovered. The Left Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

The Left Wing Unit landed at the prearranged point at 0300

On January, the 11th

1942

and advanced west into the jungle toward the rear of the Dutch coastal battery which it was supposed to destroy. Due to the dense jungle and the steep terrain, the unit was able to advance only 100 meters per hour. After losing its way several times, the unit finally came out in the rear of the Dutch coastal battery around 1700 on the 12th. The Sakaguchi Detachment Headquarters had lost track of the movements of the Left Wing Unit and there had been no report from the officer who was sent out to contact the unit.

 Therefore, at midnight on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel Namekata from the artillery unit was ordered to land with one infantry company with the mission of capturing the Dutch coastal battery, which was the main objective of the Left Wing Unit. At approximately 0200 on the 12th Lieutenant Colonel Namekata’s unit landed at the same point as had the Left Wing unit, proceeded along the coast and by daybreka reached a position in front of the battery. Initially, it was planned that the Detachment Headquarters was to land in the same area as the Right Wing Unit, immediately after the area was secured and than proceed by land to city of Tarakan. However, because Right Wing Unit had lost it way the Headquarter could not land as scheduled. On the 12th, upon learning of the Dutch forces to surrender, the Headquarter arranged with the Navy to land on Tarakan Island.

On the 12th,

 the following message was received by the Naval Forces: “Although the enemy has offered to surrender, it is feared that the coastal battery located at the south end of the island is not aware of this and it would be dangerous to proceed to the Tarakan pier, therefore held up your sailing”. In spite of this message, the warning was ignored and the movement went on as planned. When the six minesweepers entered the bay, they were fired on by the Dutch coastal battery and two minsweepers W 13 and W 14 were hit by 4.7 inch grenades and sank with most of its crew.

This were Japanese only naval losses in this action.

 The naval commander later promised amnesty for the guncrews and based on this promise the Dutch Island Commander managed to persuade the guncrews to surrender. The Japanese Army Commander on the other hand was to brutal to have the prisoners turned over to him. So he ordered to tie the men into small groups of three. Some time later they were thrown into the water where all 219 Dutch soldiers drowned.

The commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment,

 Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi,

 left his ship at about noon on the 12th and landed at

the mouth of Amal RiverTarakan

 arriving at the office of the British Petroleum Manufacturor at sunset.

On the morning of 13th, he accepted the enemy commander and formally accepted his surrender. Mopping-up the island was completed on the 13th. On the 14th, the entire Sakaguchi Detachment boarded the ships and left the island. Their new objective was Balikpapan All prisoners of war were executed by the Japanese in retaliation for the destruction of the oil installations; an event that was repeated later in Balikpapan. The Japanese soldier on guard on Tarakan Island, 1942. The photo was taken shortly after the Japanese occupied the island

a Dutch possession, fell on

January 12th 1942

after a brief but vicious struggle, the Japanese killing most of the Dutch officers at close quarters with knives. Tarakan in hand,

Battle of Tarakan

Part of World War II Date

11 January 1942

Location Tarakan Island, Netherlands East Indies Result Decisive Japanese Victory Combatants Empire of Japan Kingdom of the Netherlands Commanders Major General Shizuo Sakaguchi Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal Strength Over 6,600 Over 1,300 Casualties 255 killed All killed in battle or executed after surrendering

156: Tarakan Island – Dortmund Amateur Wargamers – Best of Show award

the Japanese commander, General Sakaguchi, prepared to move against his next objective, Balikpapan.

He sent two captured Dutch officers as envoys to Lt. Colonel C. van den Hoogenband, the Balikpapan garrison commander.

They delivered a written ultimatum demanding surrender.

The message included a warning:

When the Balikpapan garrison destroys the natural resources and oil installations at Balikpapan and the surrounding country, all commanding officers, their Dutch soldiers and other Dutchmen related to them will be killed without exception. [2]
Undaunted, Hoogenband ordered the oil facilities to be put to the torch. Samethini took part in this operation, the resulting fires and explosions sending thick pillars of black smoke into the sky.

General Sakaguchi’s ultimatum

Smoke rises from burning oil facilities at Balikpapan (January 1942)Photo Source: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

 

The remaining troops of the Indian army were executed in 1942 as punishment for the destruction of the oil fields.

 

 

 

 

 Now, in the first week of January, the 16th

 Army, which had been given the 38th Division to accelerate its drive into the Indies, completed its preparations for the advance. At Davao in the southern Philippines it organized two task forces, one to take the important oil center of Tarakan in northern Borneo, and the other Menado in the Celebes.

 Both left Davao at the same time, 9 January 1942.

The first landed at Tarakan on 11 January and, after overcoming slight resistance from the Dutch defenders aided by American B-17’s based near Surabaya, took that town the same day. The second force, reinforced by about 330 naval paratroopers and supported by the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho and three heavy cruisers, took Menado at the same time.

The seizure of these two points completed the Japanese control of

 the Celebes Sea

And

 the northern approaches to Makassar Strait.

 Through that strait lay one of the routes to Java.30

in the first week of January 1942

Japanese Forces  opened the second phase.

The objectives of this phase of the plan included the seizure of the Bismarck Archipelago and Malay Peninsula; the capture of Singapore; and, in preparation for the final assault on Java, heart of the Indies, the acquisition of air and naval bases in southern Sumatra, Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, Amboina, and Timor.

 The occupation of Java itself and of northern Sumatra was scheduled for the third phase, after which the Japanese would complete their operations in Burma and consolidate their position in the conquered area.

So rapidly had their forces moved and so light had been resistance that even before the end of the year Japanese commanders in the field were urging their superiors in Tokyo to speed the timetable of conquest

It is the Imperial Army officer was drawn to follow the style of “Yamato-e painting” by Japan during the Meiji restoration painting


[War paintings] 03 war paintings


February 14, 1942,

 just before the fall of Singapore, the Malay Peninsula took off aboard the Russian transport aircraft and transport aircraft Hyakushiki expression of Teishin flying squadron of the 2nd Regiment 329 Teishin 悌団 first drop troops army, (and between linear this formation flight and squadron 64 squadron 59 squadron combat flight Kato Hayabusa is responsible, from the Captain Kato is shot down two aircraft during Operation Hurricane RAF)

Operation Hurricane RAF)

At 11:30,

 the unit head machines drop on both sides east and west of the airport that is 10 km north Palembang, carrying the operational commander Colonel Kume was crash-land in the wetlands.

 

Despite reaching the airfield while gathered sequentially, our members defend the airfield only grenade pistols and not available to the ammunition, firearms that dropped another heavy bomber Type 97 of the squadron 98th flight, members of the Many carry war with the Dutch troops.

 

Became a battleground approximately 500 Allied armored troops arrived from Palembang city further, I was drop troops securing the airfield before 21:00.

15 pm the next day,

 

 entered the conquered city to cooperate with the first 悌団悌団 second drop to the southern city of Palembang wetlands. 14 days to arrive in Bangka flagship division and the 38th Army as originally planned. Advance team is on the 18th mainstay invaded Palembang city on the 15th of the next day, I had completed a strategy to secure play area. In 329 personnel, 39 people killed, damage of drop troops were injured 48 people.

 

 

 

 

Work was drawn to the theme of this strategy

Drops to Palembang soldier God “Goro Tsuruta

Feeling that war paintings, I am the most favorite work これぞ.
We are drawn to the early days of World War II was still bitch (laughs), it is better then bright spirited. There was much I want to decorate reproductions (!)

But Mr. TOYO says that “pundit” shadow of German friend, “there are too many parachute (` · ω · ‘) smartly “
Well I wish you do not have a dream … though it is certainly true (laughs)

I’m not fooled … fake says

Tsuruta artist has said of this composition.
Process to jump’m a mono “This is difficult. From an airplane, process that opened the parachute, process got off the ground, processing was transferred to combat, but I want everyone to this, the angle of the screen a piece of all this in the rabbit if movie Nde I can not be resolved in … “

After the war, Goro Tsuruta 1942, we worked on war paintings painter actively chosen to dispatch the south as an elevated suspended cooperation with Foujita war. Or said, “what you want to draw and I wonder what it’s all about the painter we do not draw it in the thinker,” he, and but …

Was conducted prior to the capture of Palembang Army, Tsuruta Goro is also the theme of strategy by drop Menado (first special naval brigade Office guardian Yokosuka) Naval forces drop.
“Parachute” Navy

Tsurutaartistin productionin the studio


[War paintings] 02 war paintings
Picture of the last image is added after major corrections by the author himself after being returned from the military, the title was changed as well. Infrared light was shed on the recent survey it, the picture was named “Mars” before the modification has been emerged.

war paintings
“China Zhi shield” voice fall Kobayakawa

The hope that it will be greater than or influence began to … I think about the last decade Mirifigu, August began to think about the war in the past in Japan. In particular I have experienced from the earthquake and nuclear accident · · ·. And at the same time look back on your life, will want redirecting to study the history of Japan (in Japan? Especially) have time to think of such a thing with it … Hey, What is that even castor much inevitable with age maybe? (Laughs)

I wanted to learn more about war paintings of Japan can be seen unexpectedly the “war paintings of suicidal Foujita” Sunday Museum new last month, was broadcast on NHK on the 26th, there was interest from the previous. A war paintings referred to here is the painting that was intended was completed after returning to cover while served and volunteered their celebrated painter of the time, or being asked to the military, to carry forward national prestige-enhancement fight. Work group was born there was a suit excellent work big time, masterpieces by painters to represent the Japanese art world.

However, I have never in spite of suit masterpieces by artists representing the Japanese art world, allowing its value as was the propaganda of war of aggression and after the war is no longer allowed, was released on a large scale so far . Work of the whole body of the genius artists, we keep hidden in a shitty reason is really annoying. If Foujita left the great works of world-class as well as anything in particular point, I discard the result Japan · · · Shimai been Owasa the responsibility of the art world war cooperation.

Well, the work of painters were going to draw a picture of war, and carry forward national prestige is the diversity that rendering technology personalities and artists, such as such as those devoted to realism at all is reflected, or those of a similar theme does not seem show. Among them, the military has refused to work while receiving the work is excellent and there is.

One of them is this.

As you can see, the cherry blossoms and petals studded with countless looked like the background of the dark, it can be seen that the atmosphere was totally different before correction.

This painting is a work in 1943, served in the forces, while overlapping coverage to Tensen into Burma from Thailand, was completed in the next 19 years. It is likely something that is expected and the workmanship Gagyo so far, was commissioned as a special order from the War Department of the imperial inspection yet.

By the author of being subjected to imperial inspection, I think Is not drew in the sense that praise that die Junjiru the national polity and the emperor, it seems could not intended to show a “corpse” to His Majesty the military (divisional commander and his men of the 16th Division Army saw the work, and it was standing at attention before saluting the picture though).

Does seems voice fall Kobayakawa have submitted this work with commitment and confidence, cover the flower background in proprietary technique Japanese painting called “debauch” even after they rejected the work from the Department of the Army, the title because there is a section that had been waiting to see the light of day again this work several times while changing. But it is said that there was a resolution to the war, and he was arrested as a war criminal … such.

Other works fall Kobayakawa voice

The versatility of the author works glimpse.
Aki Kobayakawa voice went to mainland China after the Manchurian Incident in 1934, there was also one of the pioneer of the painter who served. From the texture of the surface, or oil? It is a work which I think

.

The Molucca Sea approach to the Malay Barrier fell into Japanese hands as a result of amphibious hops and naval-air engagements in which the Allies fought a desperate but losing battle. From Menado, which they had taken

on 15 February 1942

In the campaign, which concluded with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, Yamashita’s 30,000 front-line soldiers and 200 tanks fought against a poorly equiped force with no armored force, Yamashita’s force captured 130,000 British, Indian and Australian troops, the largest surrender of British-led personnel in history

 

 

officer of the 5th infantry division sergeant saito leading his man (singapore, 1942)

 

The Japanese Campaign and Victory 8 December 1941 – 15 February 1942: Lieutenant-General Percival and his party carry the Union Jack on their way to surrender Singapore to the Japanese.

 

 

The Japanese landing off the west coast of British North Borneo, 1942

 

Now, in the first week of January, the 16th

 Army, which had been given the 38th Division to accelerate its drive into the Indies, completed its preparations for the advance. At Davao in the southern Philippines it organized two task forces, one to take the important oil center of Tarakan in northern Borneo, and the other Menado in the Celebes.

 

The Japanese assault on 23 January

was in sufficient strength to break resistance by the end of the day, the garrison falling back to the south without any pre-arranged escape or reassembly plan.

The attackers, intending Rabaul as a main base for operations in the South West Pacific, were thorough in pursuit and elimination of the fugitives, culminating in the execution of about 150 prisoners in the Tol Plantation area.

Of this group, Dvr W.D. Collins of 2/10 Fd Amb was shot twice and left for dead, but survived to join a 160-man escaping group organised by 2/22 Bn company commander Maj W.T. Owen, who got them to the vessel Laurabada organised by District Officer J.K. McCarthy and back to Townsville.

A previous similar sized group led by another company commander Capt E.S. Appel included Sgt A.L. Frazer and Dvr J.C. Ross of the AASC Detachment, getting back to Cairns on another of McCarthy’s vessels the Lakatoi36. A total of over 400 escaped out a force of 1,400 which had become another dismal sacrifice of penny-packeted forces whose function had evaporated before they were attacked, but were left to inevitable defeat for political purposes on Wavell’s principle of not giving up territory without a fight, regardless of the profitless losses involved.

 
on the January,24th.1942

 The landings had been made only after a battle with U.S. naval forces — their first of the war — in which the American destroyers won a tactical victory but failed to stop the enemy. The Japanese took Balikpapan easily but failed to capture the oil refineries there. These, the Dutch had already gutted.

. Only a day before, another Japanese force had sailed through the Molucca Sea to land at Makassar on the southwest tip of Celebes Island, facing Makassar Strait. By 10 February that strait and the north shore of the Java Sea were under Japanese control

The Island Garrisons

After the collapse in Malaya and the Philippines the only real forward area of resistance which could be contemplated was centred on Java, where the American, British, Dutch and Australian (ABDA) Command was created under Wavell, based on a cruiser naval force, two Dutch divisions and an assortment of allied army and air units. It had been envisaged that 7th and 6th Divisions now returning from the Middle East would form a pivotal element of this force, but the speed of events in Malaya left the Australian component of this force, designated Blackforce and placed as usual under British command, at the less than brigade strength of 2/3 MG Bn, 2/2 Pioneer Bn and other elements.

 Included was the bulk of 2/105 GT Coy under Capt C. Howitt returning from the Middle East which, with units of other arms,

was reprieved from landing at Palembang for airfield defence duties,

only to be disembarked instead in Java

on 18 February 1942.

 2/3 Res MT Coy was also added to the force after its withdrawal from Singapore,

 its organisation being adjusted to create a supply column for the Force. 2/105 GT Coy was used initially to defend Batavia’s Kemajoran Airfield and provide transport detachments for ambulance duties then, reinforced from 2/3 MT Coy and other units,

 

it also established a 70 vehicle troop carrying group for the reaction element of the Force concentrated at Buitzenorg.

 

 

 The Japanese landed

from 28 February onwards

 

Growing likelihood of a Japanese thrust to the south had led a year earlier, in February 1941,

to plans being prepared to establish garrisons at Ambon, Timor and Rabaul for airfield defence. They were ill conceived, manned and supported, as the protests of the field commanders and events demonstrated 33, but like the decision to sacrifice Blackforce, were also essentially political decisions, made on an inadequate military appreciation and comprehension of the risk-effectiveness tradeoff.

At least these mistakes might have provided lessons for later defensive actions, yet they were not taken in the following operations in Papua, where remote commanders and staffs in Australia not only had little or no understanding of conditions in the combat area, but also made no effort to see and understand them until the crisis was over.

 

A Japanese landing on the north of the island eventuated

on 30 January 1942,

 then a second landing at Baguala Bay the following day outflanked Dutch defences there, so the AASC element and its stocks from Galala, under Capt S.A. Rose, were moved to Kudamati to join the B Echelon of 2/21 Bn.

 

 

 

 

In the following Japanese attack the position held out and was bypassed, but as the rest of the battalion on the Laitimor Peninsula surrendered

 on 3 February,

 those elements in the Kudimati position had no alternative but to follow suit.

At Laha, attacks had begun

on 31 January,

 with the force holding out until 2 February.

 The AASC element there was more actively engaged in the defensive fight – a tribute to one Dvr Doolan who was reputed to have successfully ambushed three truckloads of Japanese appears in Chapter 20; Capt Burns and other members were missing at the end of it. After the surrender in both areas, half of the AASC detachment was taken prisoner, the remainder being battle casualties or beheaded by the Japanese after capture 34.

Map 8: Ambon 1941-42

A parallel Sparrow Force, comprising 2/40 Bn Group, was dispatched to Timor to protect the airfield used to stage aircraft to Java.

A parallel Sparrow Force, comprising 2/40 Bn Group, was dispatched to Timor to protect the airfield used to stage aircraft to Java.

The force landed at Koepang on 14 December 1941 and a detachment based on 2/2nd Independent Company was then sent north to Dili in Portuguese Timor.

 

The AASC Sparrow Section comprised a 42-strong supply and transport detachment formed in Sydney in July 1941 by Capt J.F. Read, moved to the Northern Territory, and embarked for Timor on 7 December ‘with much enthusiasm’ after three and a half months of fatigue duties and training at Darwin and Noonomah. In view of the precariousness of the defensive positions Read was obliged to effect a supply plan based on a series of dumps, the establishment of which occupied the detachment until the invasion.

 Following their quick success at Ambon, the Japanese moved on to Timor, landing at Koepang and Dili on 20 February 1942. While 2/2 Indep Coy extricated itself inland, the landing force in the south trapped 2/40 Inf Bn against a blocking force of paratroops and, cut off from its supply base and short of ammunition, it was forced to surrender.

Map 9: Timor 1941-42

After this surrender, newly arrived Sparrow Force commander Brig W.C.D. Veale moved his headquarters north towards Portuguese Timor with a guard of AASC members and walking casualties.

 On 1 March 1942,

 after receiving advice of a Japanese approach, he ordered every man for himself, Read distributed the remaining rations, and the 250-strong survivors broke up into small parties, some seeking escape by sea, others overland to the north.

The senselessness of the order was eventually realised after contact with 2/2 lndep Coy in Portuguese Timor, and the remnants were concentrated on the border.

The fittest, including the remaining AASC members, organised as K (Koepang) Platoon under 2/2 Indep Coy’s Lieut C. Doig, were used to patrol south to cover that flank. Capt Read became supply officer, organising food supply and distribution at Mape.

 

 Veale decided that K Platoon should join 2/2 lndep Coy and it was put into a week of commando training at Mape in early May, the sub-unit being renamed D Platoon to complement the existing A, B, C Platoons, and coincidentally recognise their acceptance into the unit, rather than as the stragglers from Koepang.

With this changed status came commitment to operations: commanded first by Lieut D.K. Turton, 2/2 Indep Coy’s engineer officer, then by Doig. D Platoon was based in the Atsarbe area of the arc which the Company strung around the Japanese forces based on Dili. It saw continuous action, first three months of successful aggressive raids and ambushes,

 

 as the Dutch resistance crumbled then collapsed, Blackforce, supported and moved by 2/3 Res MT Coy and 2/105 GT Coy,

withdrew through Bandung towards Pameungpeuk

 on the south coast hoping for evacuation but without prospect of this or effective resistance, it was surrendered

on 9 March 32.

 

then from August

as reinforced Japanese took the initiative, in defensive operations culminating in their evacuation to Darwin on 11 December 1942 35.

 

 

Prisoner work party
Singapore March 1942

Prisoners at Changi were drafted into work parties on Singapore docks and clearing the battle area.

The Japanese guard lent his souvenired camera to photograph himself with WO2 S.G. Barber and Pte R.C. Holberton of 8 Div Amn Sub-Park, and an Indian forced labourer.

At this stage of reasonable work conditions and food the men were in fair condition. The real toll came with the drafts to Burma, Thailand, Borneo and Japan, Barber being included in D Force to Thailand.

Australian War Memorial P78/01/01

 

Rabaul Evacuation

Defence of Papua

Buildup of a military base in the Port Moresby area began

 in May 1940.

 Included in this was an embryo unit designated AASC Port Moresby, comprising a small supplies and transport element to support the small force allotted.

This grew after Japan’s attacks in the Pacific firstly to an HQ CAASC NG Force with 9 Coy, 141 GT Coy, NGF Base Depot and 13 Fd Bakery, then by a year later to a DDST on HQ NG Force and ADST Port Moresby, 2/2, 9, 25 Coys, 2/102, 2/105, 2/106, 141, 152 GT Coys, 1, 2 Pack Tpt Coys, 1, 2 Air Tpt Sup Pls, 2/1 MAC, 2/3 DID, 15 Sup Dep Coy, 2 BIPOD, 1 Bulk Pet Storage Coy, 2 Farm Coy, with HQ Comd 11 Div AASC and rear details of HQ Comd 3 Div AASC also in place by early 1943 37.

 

 

 

Japanse bezetting van Saparoea

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Japanse bezetting van Saparoea
Onderdeel van Azië in de Tweede Wereldoorlog
Fort Duurstede op Saparoea
Datum 8 december 1941augustus 1945
Locatie Nederlands-Indië
Resultaat Japanse bezetting
Strijdende partijen
 Nederland  JPN
Commandanten
Soldaat Jacob Litamahuputty
sergeant Petrus Leihitu,
Kapitein Yisida
Portaal    KNIL

De Japanse bezetting van Saparoea was de periode van 1942 tot 1945 waarin Saparoea, onderdeel van de Molukken, tijdens de Japanse bezetting van Nederlands-Indië door de Japanners was ingenomen.

Inhoud

 [verbergen

[bewerken] Inleiding

Wal en spietoren van Fort Duurstede

In juni 1942 vertrok het bataljon van de Japanse landmacht, dat Saparoea bezet had, per schip richting Ambon en bleven slechts enkele tientallen Japanse soldaten achter. Zij werkten vooral op het Toketaikantoor in Saparoea-stad en deden dienst bij de uitkijkpost te Itawaka. Daarnaast was nog een kleine Toketai-afdeling in Porto gevestigd. Kapitein Yisida voerde het bevel over de Japanners en was tevens hoofd van het burgerlijke bestuur, de Minseibu.

Er waren daarnaast nog 15 hulpsoldaten gehuisvest in Fort Duurstede; op het nabijgelegen Ambon bevond zich echter gedurende de gehele bezettingsperiode een macht van 5.000 tot 10.000 Japanse militairen – Ambon was nabij genoeg om binnen een dag een hele compagnie Saparoea te laten bezetten. Na de Japanse bezetting van Saparoea waren er aldus voor het verzet weinig mogelijkheden om de Japanners schade toe te brengen. De meeste bewoners leefden van landbouw of visserij of waren van het eiland weggetrokken om dienst te nemen in het Indische leger; er bestonden verder geen fabrieken, kazernes of spoorlijnen. Binnen de muren van Fort Duurstede was wel een radiostation, maar dat werd zwaar bewaakt.

Er was één verzetsgroep op het eiland actief: dat was de groep rond Jacob Litamahuputty; de belangrijkste doelstelling van deze groep was het voorbereiden van de komst van de geallieerden. De meeste handelingen van de groep waren aldus beperkt tot het verzamelen van inlichtingen en wapens. Een aantal leden van de groep kreeg van Litamahuputty de opdracht naar Haroekoe of Ambon te vertrekken om de legeringen en de stellingen van de Japanners nader te onderzoeken.

RAF Aircraftman William Mundy sailed from Gourock in Scotland on 3rd December 1941, bound for Kuala Lumpur, but as the Japanese made rapid advances through Malaya he was re-routed to Batavia.

 

He was captured at Garut, and later spending time at Glodok Prison (now demolished) and Tandjong Priok

 

After surviving Typhoid Fever he was shipped with 1000 other men to Ambon, to work on a Japanese airfield construction at Liang in the North East of the Island. More than two thirds of these men were destined to die in Ambon or on the Hellships, such as the Suez Maru and Maros Maru, used to transport them back to Java a year later.

 

William said “I think most people would ask why on earth I would want to go back to where I had such a traumatic experience. There are the war graves, where some of the 775 out of the 1,000 who didn’t survive are buried, and I would appreciate the opportunity to reflect on their sacrifice”.

 

“Visiting the graves would also provide an opportunity to thank Almighty God for his grace, mercy, love and preservation which brought me safely back to the UK”.

 

Mr Mundy’s friend died on the Maros Maru and is commemorated at Kranji.

By the time William left Liang in a sick draft for Batavia he had advanced Beri-Beri, and was blind from Pellagra and glare from the white coral airstrip

 “Visiting the graves would also provide an opportunity to thank Almighty God for his grace, mercy, love and preservation which brought me safely back to the UK”.

 

Source

. http://singaporeevacuation1942.blogspot.com/

 

[bewerken] Activiteiten van het verzet

Zie ook Molukse verzet tijdens de bezetting van Nederlands-Indië door Japan voor het hoofdartikel over deze strijd

Rede van Saparoea met Fort Duurstede

De groep van Litamahuputty probeerde ook informatie te verzamelen over de bezigheden van de Japanners op Saparoea zelf. De Japanners hadden aldaar een vier meter hoge wachtpost opgericht om van daar het prauwverkeer op Straat Ceram in de gaten te kunnen houden, wat de mogelijkheid tot verzetsactiviteiten van de groep enigszins beperkte tot het verzamelen van wapens en munitie; deze werden na de capitulatie van het Indische leger verzameld bij voormalige KNIL-militairen en gestolen uit Japanse barakken. Toen de Japanners in juni 1942 voor een groot deel weer vertrokken waren, kreeg de groep van Litamahuputty de kans om een wapendiefstal te plegen in het gouvernementsgebouw en wist een tiental karabijnen en munitie mee te nemen.

Litamahuputty werkte onder meer samen met sergeantPetrus Leihitu, die hij aan wapens hielp. Mannen van de groep van Leihitu braken met behulp van een kaart, hen verschaft door Litamahuputty, in een wachtlokaal van Fort Duurstede in en ontvreemden daar onder meer wapens. In de tweede helft van 1942 werden de omstandigheden steeds slechter; de bevolking van Saparoea werd steeds angstiger doordat de Japanners een netwerk van verraders hadden opgezet en in ieder dorp woonde wel een persoon die voor de vijand actief was. Niemand kon zich meer zonder risico voor eigen leven in de dorpen ophouden en het was alleen nog maar mogelijk het eiland te verlaten als men de juiste papieren had. Voor zover bekend vond er slechts tweemaal een landing van Nederlandse geheime agenten in dit gebied plaats; de eerste keer was in december 1942, toen een landing met behulp van een onderzeeboot aan de zuidkust van Ceram plaatsvond maar deze agenten werden binnen enkele dagen allen gearresteerd. Veel inwoners dachten, door allerlei geruchten beïnvloed, dat Julius Tahya, de “held van Tanimbar”, tot de bemanning had behoord. De tweede landing van Nederlandse agenten in dit gebied, op Saparoea zelf, vond in februari 1945 plaats.

Nadat de eerste Amerikaansebommenwerpers begin 1943 onderweg naar Ambon over Saparoea vlogen, werden tientallen mensen door de Japanners mishandeld omdat ze vuren zouden hebben gestookt en op die wijze signalen aan de vliegtuigen zouden hebben gegeven. In Saparoea-stad werd door het verzet een kantoor en een opslagplaats in brand gestoken. De bommenwerpers wierpen pamfletten boven Saparoea uit, waarin aan de bevolking werd opgeroepen de dorpen te verlaten. In de jaren van de Japanse bezetting werden steeds meer bewoners te werk gesteld bij de aanleg van vliegvelden in Lialang en Pelauw of ingezet bij de sago-productie op Ceram. De verzetsgroep verliep langzaam; een aantal leden was gearresteerd, een deel was gedwongen te werk gesteld en steeds minder mensen wilden het risico lopen de overgebleven leden in de bossen van voedsel te voorzien. Daarnaast werd de Japanse regering actiever in het opsporen en straffen van de leden van het verzet.

[bewerken] Maatregelen van het Japanse bestuur

De Japanners benoemden Azis, voorheen assistent-bestuursambtenaar, tot districtshoofd en Piet Warella, voorheen taxichauffeur, tot hoofd van de plaatselijke politie. Iedere maand werden op het eiland rechtszittingen gehouden, voorgezeten door de Makkasaarse rechter Sonda Daeng Mattajang. Op de nieuw opgerichte school, de Sempoerna, werd de leerlingen geleerd ieder eerste uur van de dag te buigen voor de Japanse vlag en Japanse liedjes te zingen. In 1943 ontmoette een verzetsgroep een Japanse patrouille, waarna een vuurgevecht ontstond en een der leden in Japanse handen viel. Hierna nam het tempo, waarin de Japanners het verzet oprolden, toe; er vonden diverse zoekacties, arrestaties en executies plaats. In veel huizen werden voorwerpen aangetroffen die het oude Nederlandse gezag hadden vertegenwoordigd, zoals foto’s van leden van het Koninklijk Huis, Nederlandse vlaggen en insignes van het KNIL. Een voormalige KNIL-militair werd met een zweep doodgeslagen nadat hij een portret van koningin Wilhelmina weigerde te verwijderen.

Later moesten alle bewoners van Oelat van 16 jaar en ouder voor het gouvernementsgebouw verschijnen, waarop de Japanners met een verrader langs de rijen liepen en op diens aanwijzigen een groot aantal personen arresteerden. Aldus voelden de leden van het resterende verzet zich gedwongen naar Ceram uit te wijken, alwaar zij naar korte tijd door omstandigheden werden gedwongen weer naar Saparoea terug te keren en aldaar de bergen in te vluchten, waar de leden uiteindelijk door de bezetter werden overvallen. Alleen Litamahuputty wist te ontkomen, waarna de Japanners ertoe overgingen zijn familieleden te arresteren en te martelen. Hierop gaf Litamahuputty zich aan en werd, samen met de rest van de gearresteerde personen, overgebracht naar de gevangenis te Saparoea-stad, alwaar hij verder ondervraagd en mishandeld werd. Met name Piet Warella, hoofd van de politie, was berucht door zijn hardhandige ondervragingsmethoden.

Om een afschrikwekkend voorbeeld te geven werd Litamahuputty vastgebonden aan een paal op het veld en verschrikkelijk mishandeld. In de loop van de maanden die volgden werd het grootste gedeelte van de gevangenen afgevoerd naar de Toketai in Amboina, waar zij werden verhoord en gemarteld. Een getuige verklaarde later dat Litamahuputty en zijn manschappen op een dusdanige wijze (door sergeant-majoor Yoshinori Komatsu) met een stuk hout werden afgeranseld dat zij om vergiffenis smeekten. De groep kwam op 22 februari 1944 voor de rechter; tegen 21 personen (waaronder Litamahuputty) werd de doodstraf uitgesproken en zij werden allen op 2 maart bij Amahoesoe geëxecuteerd.

[bewerken] Afbeeldingen

Jacob Litamahuputty, uiterst rechts

Fort Duurstede

Wal van Fort Duurstede

Raadhuis in een dorpje op Saparoea

Bronnen, noten en/of referenties

  • 1992. B. Immerzeel. Moluks verzet WO II. De rol van de Molukkers in het verzet in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Moluks Historisch Museum Sedjarah. Utrecht
  • 1993. B.R. Immerzeel en F. van Esch (redactie). Verzet in Nederlands-Indië tegen de Japanse bezetting 1942-1945. SDU. Den Haag
  • 1996. E. Melis (redactie). Verzet contra de Japanse bezetting van Nederlands-Indië tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. De geuzen van het Indisch verzet. 1942-1945. Comité Ancol

 

 

The force landed at Koepang

on 14 December 1941

and a detachment based on 2/2nd Independent Company was then sent north to Dili in Portuguese Timor.

The AASC Sparrow Section comprised a 42-strong supply and transport detachment formed in Sydney

in July 1941

by Capt J.F. Read, moved to the Northern Territory, and

 embarked for Timor on 7 December

 ‘with much enthusiasm’ after three and a half months of fatigue duties and training at Darwin and Noonomah. In view of the precariousness of the defensive positions Read was obliged to effect a supply plan based on a series of dumps, the establishment of which occupied the detachment until the invasion. Following their quick success at Ambon, the Japanese moved on to Timor,

December,17th.1941

The Australian battalion group of about 1100 men known as ‘Gull Force’ had arrived in Ambon on 17 December 1941 after a three-day trip from Darwin. The group comprised the 2/21st Battalion, which was part of the 23rd Brigade, 8th Australian Division, together with anti-tank, engineer, medical and other detachments.

 Their task was to join Netherlands East Indies troops – about 2500 men – to help defend the Bay of Ambon and two airfields at Laha and Liang. The Dutch commander, Lieutenant-Colonel J R L Kapitz, was senior to the Australian commander, Lieutenant-Colonel L N Roach, and took control of both forces, dispersing them into two groups.

One group was sent to defend the airfield at Laha on the west side of Ambon Bay and the others were deployed to the east of the bay, south of the town of Ambon.

1942

January.6th.1942

Both the Australian and the Dutch forces were inadequately prepared and under-equipped. Lieutenant-Colonel Roach, aware of the futility of their task, made repeated requests for reinforcements of both men and equipment from Australia, even suggesting that Gull Force should be evacuated from the island if it could not be reinforced.  

 Instead, lieutenant Colonel Roach was recalled to Australia and Lieutenant-Colonel John Scott, a 53-year-old Army Headquarters staff officer from Melbourne, replaced Roach as commanding officer of Gull Force in the middle of January.

Sunglasses made by an Australian POW in
Tan Tui camp on Ambon. They were made for
Private M J Gilbert, 2/21st Battalion AIF,
to protect his eyes from the glare when
he worked in sand-shovelling parties.

[AWM REL31317]

The first Japanese air attack on Ambon was on 6 January and by 24 January the Japanese were less than 1000 kilometres from the island.

The last of the Allied aircraft were withdrawn on 30 January.

 

 

 

January,30th.1942

Fall of AmbonviewThe Japanese attack on Ambon, January–February 1942.The Japanese landed on the island of Ambon on 30 January 1942. February,3rd.1942 After just four days of bitter fighting the under-equipped and poorly prepared Australian and Dutch forces on the island surrendered.The Japanese landed three battalions on Ambon during the night of 30-31 January.

The Australians lost contact with the Dutch who capitulated the next day on 1 February.   Scott, the Australian commander, surrendered two days later on 3 February.

 

The Japanese landed on the island of Ambon on 30 January 1942.

 

 

 

February,3rd.1942

After just four days of bitter fighting the under-equipped and poorly prepared Australian and Dutch forces on the island surrendered

The Japanese landed on the island of Ambon on 30 January 1942.

February,3rd.1942

After just four days of bitter fighting the under-equipped and poorly prepared Australian and Dutch forces on the island surrendered.

Some small groups of men escaped and made their way back to Australia but almost 800 surviving Australians became prisoners of war.

The Australians together with about 300 Dutch prisoners of war were put back into their barracks at Tan Tui, north of Ambon town.

February,15th.1942

Lieutenant Ian Jaffrey, 2/21st
Battalion, one of the POWs killed
when American aircraft bombed the
Japanese bomb dump next to the Ambon
POW camp, 15 February 1943.

 

 

 

 

 

 

February 6th.1942

The very high (over 75%) death rate on Ambon had been exacerbated when an American bomber dropped six bombs on the Japanese bomb dump right next to the Tan Tui POW camp. The dump ignited and exploded, killing six Australian officers, including the doctor, four other ranks and 27 Dutch women and children. A number of Dutch and Australian casualties died later.

After the Japanese surrender it was discovered that about 300 servicemen who had surrendered at Laha airfield had been killed in four separate massacres between 6 and 20 February 1942. Not one had survived.

The prisoners on Ambon and Hainan were subjected to some of the most brutal treatment experienced by POWs anywhere during World War II. Over three-quarters of the Australian prisoners there died in captivity.

 landing at Koepang and Dili on 20 February 1942.

 While 2/2 Indep Coy extricated itself inland, the landing force in the south trapped 2/40 Inf Bn against a blocking force of paratroops and, cut off from its supply base and short of ammunition, it was forced to surrender.

Map 9: Timor 1941-42

After this surrender, newly arrived Sparrow Force commander Brig W.C.D. Veale moved his headquarters north towards Portuguese Timor with a guard of AASC members and walking casualties. On 1 March, after receiving advice of a Japanese approach, he ordered every man for himself, Read distributed the remaining rations, and the 250-strong survivors broke up into small parties, some seeking escape by sea, others overland to the north. The senselessness of the order was eventually realised after contact with 2/2 lndep Coy in Portuguese Timor, and the remnants were concentrated on the border. The fittest, including the remaining AASC members, organised as K (Koepang) Platoon under 2/2 Indep Coy’s Lieut C. Doig, were used to patrol south to cover that flank. Capt Read became supply officer, organising food supply and distribution at Mape. Veale decided that K Platoon should join 2/2 lndep Coy and it was put into a week of commando training at Mape in early May, the sub-unit being renamed D Platoon to complement the existing A, B, C Platoons, and coincidentally recognise their acceptance into the unit, rather than as the stragglers from Koepang. With this changed status came commitment to operations: commanded first by Lieut D.K. Turton, 2/2 Indep Coy’s engineer officer, then by Doig. D Platoon was based in the Atsarbe area of the arc which the Company strung around the Japanese forces based on Dili. It saw continuous action, first three months of successful aggressive raids and ambushes, then from August as reinforced Japanese took the initiative, in defensive operations culminating in their evacuation to Darwin on 11 December 1942 35.

An initial 25-man supply and transport unit drawn from 8 Div Sup Coln and designated AASC Rabaul was lodged at Rabaul in May 1941 to support the 2/22 Bn group known as Lark Force; also included was the AASC transport element of the detachment of 2/10 Fd Amb. The prospects for this force were as bleak as those of the sister battalion groups at Ambon and Timor, however the opportunity for the type of resistance offered in the latter was negated by lack of preparation. Although the AASC detachment commander Lieut R.I. Allen proposed to HQ 8 MD at Port Moresby that he cache supplies and ammunition in the mountains it was ignored as ‘defeatist’, a tag which brought dismissal of the commander of the Ambon force; the only effort made was a late and too limited local one by the battalion second in command to move some part of the supply stocks at the airfield to the rear of the position.

The Japanese assault on 23 January was in sufficient strength to break resistance by the end of the day, the garrison falling back to the south without any pre-arranged escape or reassembly plan. The attackers, intending Rabaul as a main base for operations in the South West Pacific, were thorough in pursuit and elimination of the fugitives, culminating in the execution of about 150 prisoners in the Tol Plantation area. Of this group, Dvr W.D. Collins of 2/10 Fd Amb was shot twice and left for dead, but survived to join a 160-man escaping group organised by 2/22 Bn company commander Maj W.T. Owen, who got them to the vessel Laurabada organised by District Officer J.K. McCarthy and back to Townsville. A previous similar sized group led by another company commander Capt E.S. Appel included Sgt A.L. Frazer and Dvr J.C. Ross of the AASC Detachment, getting back to Cairns on another of McCarthy’s vessels the Lakatoi36. A total of over 400 escaped out a force of 1,400 which had become another dismal sacrifice of penny-packeted forces whose function had evaporated before they were attacked, but were left to inevitable defeat for political purposes on Wavell’s principle of not giving up territory without a fight, regardless of the profitless losses involved.

Rabaul Evacuation

Defence of Papua

Buildup of a military base in the Port Moresby area began in May 1940. Included in this was an embryo unit designated AASC Port Moresby, comprising a small supplies and transport element to support the small force allotted. This grew after Japan’s attacks in the Pacific firstly to an HQ CAASC NG Force with 9 Coy, 141 GT Coy, NGF Base Depot and 13 Fd Bakery, then by a year later to a DDST on HQ NG Force and ADST Port Moresby, 2/2, 9, 25 Coys, 2/102, 2/105, 2/106, 141, 152 GT Coys, 1, 2 Pack Tpt Coys, 1, 2 Air Tpt Sup Pls, 2/1 MAC, 2/3 DID, 15 Sup Dep Coy, 2 BIPOD, 1 Bulk Pet Storage Coy, 2 Farm Coy, with HQ Comd 11 Div AASC and rear details of HQ Comd 3 Div AASC also in place by early 1943 37.

The build up was a less than happy story during 1941 and 1942, until the imperative of Japanese landings at Lae and Salamaua on 7 March 1942, Finschhafen on 10 March and Gona on 31 July, followed by the thrust through Kokoda towards Port Moresby, forced a change from the tropical ennui of both Administration public service and base military command – the former replaced by the military Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, the latter by Headquarters New Guinea Force. The effect of the Japanese attempts on Port Moresby and Milne Bay was to galvanise Land Headquarters into pouring increasing supply, transport and construction effort into the bases in the all too familiar pattern of post-trauma oversupply. In consequence, while the force was starved of basic needs in the early critical period, over the following two years when the threat had subsided and operations moved to the north coast, an unnecessarily large component and installations were retained in a base which became progressively less used as ships resupplied direct to bases on the northern coast and islands.

The Japanese thrust from Buna made first contact with 39th Battalion on 23 July 1942 at Awala, pressing on through a strong rearguard action to take Kokoda and its only forward airfield on 10 August. From there the advance continued until, opposed by an effective brigade position at Imita Ridge and having outrun its supply line, the enemy force was stopped and then made a clean break in withdrawal on 27 September. Loss of the Kokoda airfield had earlier meant a similar crippling resupply situation for the two defending Militia battalions, then for the two AIF brigades rushed in piecemeal to stem the advance. While insertion of fresh units was necessary to replace exhausted and broken battalions, they simply added to the difficulties of maintenance over a single foot track through the mountains, so it was not until the defence was pressed back to the southern end of the Kokoda Track that it could receive reliable resupply, and the problem was inherited by the invaders.

The Track was 80 km from the roadhead at Ower’s Corner to Kokoda, but this was best measured as eight days walking time. Initial deployment of 39th Battalion forward of Kokoda was supported from supplies landed at Kokoda, then delivered forward by native carrier lines organised by ANGAU. In the withdrawal after loss of the airfield, when the three battalions of 21st Brigade were moved forward over the Track, the available carrier line capacity which could be recruited locally was completely inadequate for even rudimentary maintenance of the units. Expedients were tried at various stages of the route to provide alternatives. New Guinea (1st) Independent Light Horse Troop was put together by AASC horsemen mustering local horses and brumbies to cover the first leg, but could not negotiate the steep mountainsides and steps forward of Uberi. Attempts to air drop supplies and ammunition on to the dry lake beds at Myola were limited to mostly free drops by both shortage of parachutes and aircraft, and eliminated by withdrawal past the area. New Guinea Force Commander Maj Gen Morris, an ex-DST, in the early stages was given one or two aircraft on odd occasions, told that there were only 30 transport aircraft in Australia; asking for merely two on line, he might well have then asked what battles were going on in Australia which had priority over the defence of the Port Moresby base so desperately wanted by the Japanese 38.

During the withdrawal phase there was essentially no effective supply system, which did little credit to either the planning or the general and supplies and transport staffs. While Lieut Edwards of New Guinea Force AASC at Myola was doing his level best to control the supply situation forward, he was not informed of the incoming 21st Brigade and was demanding support for the existing two battalions only; as well much of the supplies sent by air from Port Moresby simply did not arrive at Myola, being either dropped in the wrong place or jettisoned without advice to New Guinea Force which consequently did not comprehend the seriousness of the shortages forward. To restore the position a 2/4 Coy detachment under Sgt Chesterman and Brigade AASC Officer Capt G.J. Hill were sent in to take control on 23 August.

Organisation and response along the Track behind them was even more chaotic: failure of these elements to show the initiative, inventiveness, and spirit of service at any price which was the usual hallmark of the AASC comes largely down to the fact that odd individuals were sent in, accompanied by an assortment of untrained helpers, and without a unit or headquarters controlling either their activities or the line of communication as a whole. Lieut H.T. Keinzle of ANGAU organised the carrier lines, a few supplies personnel organising the dumps established at the staging posts. This changed as a new attitude was instilled into the support structure by HQ 7 Div AASC taking control of the Track on 10 September which, together with its 2/4 Coy and other elements, began to give some form and reliability to the system. From Base Supply Depot Sogeri and Ilolo a platoon of 2/5 Coy delivered by 3 ton truck to Newton’s Depot, then by 2/4 Coy jeep to Ower’s Corner roadhead. From there to the valley floor .5 km was covered by flying fox, then 1.5 km by NG LH Tp, then carriers forward of Uberi. An officer of 7 Div AASC was located at each depot in the way stations along the Track, and members of 2/4 Coy augmented then replaced the New Guinea Force members who had been established to cope with two battalions and had to cope with two brigades.

Kokoda Track Supply Line

In October 1 Pack Tpt Coy arrived and operated from Ower’s to Imita, including establishing a flying fox over the flooded Goldie River. As the advance pressed on, carrier lines delivered bare essentials forward until dumps from air dropping could be established successively at Nauro, Menari, Efogi and Myola. Alola provided little capacity and it was necessary until Kokoda was retaken for infantry to supplement the carrier lines in getting supplies and ammunition from Myola forward. But when Kokoda was secured on 2 November, first air dropping then air landing allowed delivery of requirements direct and the Track was superseded as lifeline to the force, although the depots had to be maintained for several weeks until 600 sick and wounded at Myola had been evacuated. A depot was established at Kokoda and resupplied by air landing, but forward operations to the original contact point at Wairopi over the following fortnight had to be supported by carrier line supplemented by air drops to supply bases every few miles on the way, 2/4 coy eventually operating 16 depots simultaneously between Uberi and Wairopi. This sequence was repeated at Popondetta where development of an airfield enabled air landing of stores and subsequently, in improved terrain, 3 ton trucks along the Sanananda Track and jeeps on the Soputa-Jumbora track greatly curtailed the need for carriers. However operations forward still needed air supply, and with the primitive dropping methods used, the percentage of recoveries was variable and potential for damage ever present: every round of small arms ammunition had to be gauged in the chamber of a Bren gun by the AASC ground parties, before issue to ensure that they were undamaged, and other natures of ammunition inspected and repaired if possible 39.

As part of the defence of Papua a garrison based on 7th Brigade Group was located at Milne Bay in July 1942 to protect airfields being constructed there and to secure it from use as a base against Port Moresby. At increasing threat brought reinforcement by 18th Brigade and Headquarters C Force to command the garrison. On 25 August it was attacked by a Japanese marine assault force which advanced as far as the No 3 airfield at the head of the Bay before being driven off, the remnant evacuated by 7 September. Maintenance of the force was to be by the US Army Service of Supply, which in practice unloaded supplies direct to a depot operated by Maj H.C.Snell’s 25 Coy which then issued to all units, Australian and US, army and air force; ammunition and fuel were held in dispersed dumps, unaccounted for, unprotected and in unknown quantities. Formation of HQ AASC C Force commanded by Lieut-Col C.M. Walker ex-CAASC 1st Division, with 2/2 and 2/6 Coys provided the control and wherewithal to get this operating effectively in time for the battle, during which 25 Coy was included in the final defensive positions behind No 3 airstrip. At the end of the year C Force became 11th Division, its AASC headquarters redesignated HQ 11 Div AASC with Lieut-Col J. Talbot taking over as CAASC, but it was shortly removed to Port Moresby garrison and replaced by 5th Division. Thereafter the units grew to HQ Comd AASC 5 Div, 2/6 Coy, 1 and 2 Sup Dep Pls with 27 Coy (later redesignated 154 GT Coy) replacing 2/2 Coy. Milne Bay Base sub-Area units were expanded to 3 BSD, a section of 1 Fd Bch Pl, 2/2 Fd Bakery, 2 Bulk Pet Storage Coy, 3 BIPOD and detachment of 3 Pack Tpt Coy. This extended occupation resulted in extensive construction of roadways, a light railway for the BIPOD, and storage and accommodation facilities which reached a reasonable standard at about the same time as the significance of the base waned in 1944 40.

A second enemy assault seemed imminent in April 1943 but was forestalled by the naval battle of the Bismarck Sea. The area had meanwhile become a mounting base for offensive operations. A small supplies detachment supported deployment of 2/12 Bn and subsequently US forces on Goodenough Island, and further afield port facilities were established for the seaward support of the counter-offensive through Kokoda which flowed through to the recapture of Gona-Buna-Sanananda. A forward base including 5 BSD and detachments of 2/106 GT Coy, 3 BIPOD and 2/2 Fd Bakery had been set up at Oro Bay in November 1942 to support both the airfields at Dobodura and the US 32nd Division’s attempts on Buna; and after the latter’s capture by 18th Brigade, a port was established, cleared by 151 GT Coy, to support operations against Salamaua and later Lae. These bases were taken over by 11th Division in August 1943 as it relieved 7th Division at Dobodura. Lieut-Col E.L. Smith became CAASC the following month, having at his disposal for the Dobodura-Buna-Oro Bay areas 2 Air Maint Coy, 2/106, 158, 162 and 165 GT Coys, 23, 31 and 34 Sup Dep Coys, 3, 53 and 54 BIPOD Pls, a detachment of 2/2Fd Bakery and 66 MAC Pl 41.

Before this the continuing thrust of 7th Division from Kokoda to the coast had slowed then stopped in bitter fighting at Gona and the Sanananda Track. Gona was taken lO-December 1942, Sanananda not until 14 January 1943. After the US 32 Division’s failure at Buna, 18th Brigade from Milne Bay was brought in to finish the job by 2 January 1943; the price was the extinction of four brigades as a fighting force and their withdrawal to the Atherton Tableland for recuperation and rebuilding. These operations had continued to rely heavily on air support, which was progressively facilitated by establishment of the air base at Dobodura and increased availability of DC-3 aircraft; opening of coastwise support from Milne and Oro Bays also helped in the final stages against Buna and Sanananda 42. A new approach to resupply of forces had evolved from the Kokoda Track’s reactive, emergency nature of throwing in whatever could be found and using any and all expedients to maintain the forces involved. Thereafter geography still precluded any text book solutions and continued to demand initiative, expediency and use of all available resources and systems of supply and movement, but an operating pattern emerged which fitted the environment. Instead of the composite arrangement which was evolved for North Africa and Europe, the Tropical system accepted the almost total lack of roads and worked on a system of dumps from which delivery was made by truck, jeep, trailer train, air, water, animal and carrier transport.

The general grouping was therefore based on supply depot platoons to hold stocks and man dumps, and transport platoons for base and forward delivery work. To this was added air maintenance and pack transport units, with supply depot, transport and air maintenance company headquarters where required for control. Carrier lines were provided by ANGAU, riverine and coastwise transport by the Navy, RAE (Transportation) watercraft and AASC DUKWs. The spartan levels of support and reduced use of commodities and vehicle movement which were either required or possible in these operations had meant that a large part of divisional AASC units had no place and were employed in other areas on general tasks. This system was later to be recognised in the jungle division establishments with half the previous manpower, and employed with infinite variations to suit local requirements as operations moved on to retrieving New Guinea.

Reconquest of New Guinea

Map 10: New Guinea Offensives

With recapture of the Buna-Gona area the strategic objective of securing Papua from use as a base against Australia was effected, and the next phase was to secure airfields for use in operations against Japanese forces in the Philippines and Rabaul. The first move in the reconquest of New Guinea was the attempted thrust from Wau to Salamaua to tie up enemy forces. A small raiding group called Kanga Force was based at Wau in the Eastern Highlands in April 1942 to operate against Lae and Salamaua, but its depredations drew a countermove by the Japanese to Mubo. This caused the force to destroy the facilities, stores and vehicles at Wau and Bulolo, unnecessarily as it turned out, exacerbating future maintenance problems, particularly with the priority given to the parallel operations on the Kokoda Track.

Although there were airstrips at Wau and Bulolo, it was decided to attempt an alternate water-road crossing by driving a road through the divide from the Lakekamu riverhead in the south to Wau on the north side of the range. AASC support was controlled by DADST Bulldog L of C Area who had detachments of 15 Sup Pers Coy and 2 BIPOD to support the southern base. Detachments of 1 and 3 Pack Tpt Coys, which became increasingly surplus as the Kokoda operation concluded, were allotted as part of the construction workforce. The route finally consisted of small ships from Port Moresby to Terapo, rivercraft to Grim Point, tramline to Bulldog, and vehicle to Wau via Edie creek. The first jeeps left Wau on 23 August 1942 and, a similar convoy left Bulldog the following day, with a potential capacity of 8 tons per day by jeep and a development potential of 250 tons per day if upgraded to 3 ton vehicle level. However capture of the port of Lae the following month rendered this route irrelevant. Authorised by Blamey in December 1942 for completion in April 1943 when it would have been valuable in operations from Wau to Mubo, Salamaua and Lae 43, its continuation up to the time of the capture of Lae was an expensive waste of effort, and an indication of the excessive resources which had accumulated in the Port Moresby area.

Wau-Bulolo Road

From 14 January 1943 17th Brigade Group began to fly into Wau to match Japanese reinforcement of the Huon Gulf area. The enemy’s concern on the threat to Salamaua led to an attempt on Wau airfield, which was beaten off by flying troops in to the airfield in the thick of the battle. On the night of 29/30 January before these reinforcements arrived, when two resident battalions’ covering positions had been broken, all available forces including the transport detachment were formed in a tight perimeter around the airfield lifeline, reinforcements flying in the following morning. But by 6 February the attack was broken and 17th Brigade took up the offensive towards Mubo. Resupply remained dependent on air landing at Wau and Bulolo, air dropping to forward positions, and carrier lines for collection and distribution of air drops, so air superiority became of paramount importance in maintaining the aerial lifeline. There was, however, some limited scope for jeep traffic on the roads in the Bulolo valley, and some of the civilian vehicles damaged in the previous year’s scorched earth effort were recovered and put into operation. After a decision to threaten Salamaua to fix enemy forces there and so weaken Lae in preparation for its capture, Headquarters 3rd Division took over Kanga Force. Its buildup at Wau included an advanced HQ Comd 3 Div AASC under Lieut-Col L.C. Page, 1 Comp Pl of 2/2 Coy, detachment 152 GT Coy, 1 Sup Dep Coy, a section of 3 and all 4 Sup Dep Pl, and detachment 13 Fd Bking Pl; this was augmented as operations developed with 18 and 2/34 Sup Dep Pls. Rear HQ at Port Moresby controlled the remainder of the divisional AASC, sent forward reinforcements and assisted resupply movement 44.

When 15th Brigade arrived and entered the battle in early June there were two axes: Wau-Mubo-Komiatum and Bulolo-Misim-Bobdubi, with the additional liabilities of independent and other companies operating near the coast and along the Wampit River to the Markham at Nadzab, then a landing of 162nd (US) Regiment at Nassau Bay at the end of June. Maintenance of the units forward was based on FSDs and FADs resupplied by jeep towards Mubo and air drop at Missim, with forward deliveries by air drop and porter. The Markham area was supplied by air drop at Zenag, 3 Pack Tpt Coy delivering part of the way forward to carrier lines. All supplies were air lifted from Port Moresby until a trickle started to come over the Bulldog road in August, at which stage a partially successful attempt was made to release aircraft from air supply for the planned air assault at Nadzab, the eastern supply route switching largely to native carriers resupplied from watercraft landing at Tambu Bay after its capture by the US regiment. Rear HQ CAASC was established at Bulolo, with the forward HQ following the slow advance, and eventually transferring to Tambu. In this final phase DIDs located at an air dropping ground, with covered storage for supplies and ammunition, were established at Dobdubi for 15th Brigade and Komiatum for 29th Brigade (which had replaced the 17th), acting as bases for the final thrusts which captured Salamaua on 11 September 45.

The major operation in finally breaking the Japanese hold on New Guinea was the capture of Lae, held by XVIII Army, the conqueror of Malaya nearly two years earlier. This was to be followed inland by clearing the enemy from the Markham and Ramu Valleys and capturing Madang, and a parallel move around the coast to clear it of enemy and link with a US landing at Saidor to seal off any withdrawal. The plan for destruction of the enemy in Lae was for a triple thrust – one from 7th Division air landed at Nadzab, a second from a 9th Division amphibious landing to the east, while 3rd Division tied up as great a part the enemy force as possible by pressing at Salamaua. On 4 September 9th Division landed 20th and 26th Brigades on the coast 25 km east of Lae followed a day later by 24th Brigade; on 7 September 7th Division began air landing at Nadzab following capture and clearance of the airfield by US paratroops.

On the first day of 7th Division’s landing, part of 2/102 Comp Pl was inserted to open airhead depots as a base. 25th Brigade began the advance on Lae, drawing on these depots, until the rate of progress required the fly-in of 6 Sup Dep PI to establish depots every few kilometres, from which units drew. In the absence of unit or AASC transport these depots had to leapfrog each other to stay with the forward units and always keep a supply and ammunition point open for issues. A dozen jeeps and trailers of 153 GT Coy flown in on 8 September to keep these depots resupplied from the airhead were augmented over the following week with an additional 28, but many of these became dispersed on casualty evacuation and assisting the brigades forward. The heavy call on the drivers and vehicles for 24 hour operation was countered by establishing a maintenance squad which serviced and carried out necessary running repairs on each vehicle daily, releasing exhausted drivers for rest and also ensuring that vehicles did not suffer the same problem 46. The shortness of both the action and distances moved had allowed this shoestring of supplies and transport resources to get away with what might otherwise have been a large and slow build up which in turn would have slowed up the thrust as had happened in 7th Division’s advance to Kokoda and the coast a year before. This system lasted the ten days required, but then the main body of 2/2 Sup Dep Coy and 153 GT Coy had to be phased in for the following Markham and Ramu Valley operations.

Support of 7 Div assault on Lae

9th Division’s sea assault to the east had been almost copybook, an event enhanced by the lack of opposition. AASC units and supplies arrived at the main Red Beach on tank landing craft and ships from an hour and three quarters after the initial assault, the first vessels being unloaded rapidly, the later wave held up for lack of unloading manpower, as mechanical handling equipment was virtually non-existent. The advance of 24th Brigade along the shoreline towards Lae was hampered successively by the Buso, Burep, Busu and Bumbu rivers, which also posed a barrier for the following AASC units. Engineers bulldozed a track for a few kilometres from the landing beach, but forward of that the only immediate solution to stop resupply problems holding up the advance was use of landing craft drawing on 2/6 Sup Dep Coy dumps at Red Beach and delivering to the forward units along the coast. A complicating factor intruded when 26th Brigade was swung inland up the Burep and then west to the Busu, without the benefit of the coastwise resupply option. Initially 2/156 GT Coy allotted one platoon to clear the beach, a second to deliver to forward dumps and the third for forward distribution. As the front moved westwards supply depot platoons established issue points on the beaches close to the forward units, replenished nightly by landing craft from Red Beach, with inland deliveries made by jeep over rough tracks 47.

Support of 9 Div assault on Lae

7th Division was the first to enter Lae on 16 September, just ahead of 9th Division from the east, held back for a moment by artillery fire from the latter, while an element of 3rd Division also came up from Salamaua, but the trap failed, the enemy having broken clear north across the Finisterre Mountains before it closed. The unexpectedly rapid capture of Lae had two effects – it showed that there was an alternative to the long and debilitating slogging matches which had characterised the overland reduction of the Japanese coastal enclaves in the Gona-Buna and Salamaua areas, and it incited a series of further coastwise operations which retook the Huon Peninsula in five months and then pushed on to the Sepik River. The effect on logistics was profound. Firstly there was an introduction to amphibious landings, in which the American perception was of an over-casual Australian approach of fixing problems as they occurred and ignoring logistics, bringing sharp criticism from Macarthur’s staff 48. While the Australian staffs justified their approach as flexible and avoiding US over-centralisation, in the organised chaos of an opposed landing a high degree of pre-organisation was essential to minimise such fiascos as the failure to land 9mm ammunition for the Owen guns in the Finschhafen assault, a dangerous situation remedied only by a brigade headquarters standing that night in a clearing with torches pointing upwards to mark the area, and the ammunition raining down about them from Boomerang fighters. Without the experience and ultra-serious approach to detail of the US 7th Fleet and US Army Engineers Special Boat and Shore Regiments the landings could have faced real difficulties without the resources or time to remedy them which are often possible in land based operations. This experience stood in good stead for the later landings in Borneo.

The other effect was the use of landing craft and amphibians for resupply, from base sub-area to divisional maintenance area to forward distribution points, instead of the hitherto pervasive and fragile mix of air drop, carrier line and some motor tracks hewn out at enormous effort. While the forces operating in and from the Markham-Ramu valleys had to rely on the latter, the coastal fighting largely featured rapid advances and seaward outflanking movement, sustained by a plentiful array of landing craft allotted for the operational and logistic support of forces which were then the centre of activity in the Southwest Pacific. However this plenty was transitory. Departure of the airborne troops which had brought an undreamed of fleet of 300 DC-3 aircraft into the area, and the onwards roll of the amphibious effort to the US Marine and Army landings through the Marshalls and Marianas, in the Solomons, Aitape, New Britain, Manus, and Dutch New Guinea, then on to Morotai and the Philippines, took with them this array of support, leaving the Australian divisions much as they had been in late 1942 until RAE water transport units could be raised, equipped and brought on site. Paucity of landing craft and aircraft available for logistic support of their operations once again became a significant factor in the pace of advance in the final campaigns in 1945.

Six days after the fall of Lae 9th Division’s 20th Brigade was landed east of Finschhafen. It was another assault landing, taking with it two weeks of stocks and expecting to be resupplied from day 5. Unloading was to be manual, infantry soldiers being detailed to provide 200 men for each of the three LSTs allotted for carriage of stores. An innovation to maintain control of the beachhead missing earlier at Red Beach was a Military Landing Officer with a control staff, which was further developed for the Borneo operations into a Beach Group. The assault wave before dawn on 21 September went well to the left of the designated Scarlet Beach, consequently the follow up waves landing in the correct place faced unexpected opposition. HQ CAASC representative Maj A.J. Overell arrived at 0600 hours, just as the beach was secured, the LCTs arriving at 0700 and being sent off within two hours to avoid air attack, one still partly loaded with the stocks of 9mm ammunition mentioned earlier. 27 Sup Dep PI established food, fuel and ammunition dumps at the beach while a detachment of 2/156 GT Coy provided the transport for beach clearance and delivery forward, though this had to be restricted to jeep traffic owing to the bad condition of the tracks. The beach area continued to be subject to bombing with consequent casualties and loss of stocks, while drivers along the tracks received the attention of snipers as they delivered replenishment to the advancing infantry units.

Increasing enemy resistance made it obvious that the brigade which had landed had bitten off more than it could chew, and the remainder of 9th Division was progressively called forward: Finschhafen fell on 2 October 1943. A divisional maintenance area with an Advanced HQ Comd 9 Div AASC was established on the outskirts of Selankaua plantation, and the Advanced Supply, Petrol and Ammunition Depots set up by 27 Sup Dep Pl were resupplied daily from Lae by landing craft across the beach, local issue points being established to service divisional troops, and forward ones for the brigades. The transport available could barely cope with the beach clearance, much less forward delivery, so half of 2/156 Coy was brought in 2½ ton GMCs releasing the overworked jeeps for forward distribution tasks. Nine DUKWs were used for inter-beach work, though Japanese aircraft and over-enthusiastic US pilots looking for enemy barges resulted in casualties and losses to the amphibians and their crews.

As the myth of the ‘pushover’ against 350 enemy propounded by Macarthur’s headquarters dissipated against the reality of the Japanese 20th Division moving into the Sattelberg-Wareo area, depots were established by 2/6 Sup Dep Coy at Heldsbach for 20th Brigade while the issue points at Scarlet Beach served 24th Brigade. After 26th Brigade was landed in response to the enemy attacks towards Scarlet Beach and advanced along the Sattelberg track, further depots were established forward in support. The area continued to receive frequent air attack, one directly on the headquarters and depots at Selankaua. By 25 November Sattelberg had been taken, clearance of the area north was commenced, and the recently introduced 4th Brigade, then relieved by 20th Brigade, struck north for Sio, supported by beach-hopping depots of 2/6 Sup Dep coy, moved and replenished by the US 532 Engineer shore and Boat Regiment as it had done throughout the campaign. Finschhafen Base Sub-Area including 2/104 GT Coy, a detachment of 2 Air Maint Coy, 23 Sup Dep Coy, 56 BIPOD Pl, and 4 Fd Baking Coy, took over the advanced depots from 2/6 Sup Dep Coy, releasing it to its proper forward support role. Sio fell on 15 January 1944. During this whole period the vehicle drivers worked round the clock, two or three in turn to a vehicle, clearing from beach and airfield to depot, forward deliveries, casualty evacuation and assisting units which were without transport of their own. By mid January 9 Div AASC, like the Division itself, was worn down and ready for relief and refitment 49.

At Sio 5th Division relieved the 9th and drove on to Saidor making contact with the sea-Ianded 126th US Regiment on 10 February 1944. As part of the 5th Division’s relief of 9th Division, HQ Comd 5 Div AASC under Lieut-Col R.D. Summerfield moved to Kelanoa on 27 January 1944, 4 Sup Dep Coy and 2 Sup Dep Pl arriving the day after; he also took command of the existing 241 and 242 Sup Dep PIs operating beach FSD and FAD at Kelanoa and providing beach depots forward to Sio West, and 39 Ind Tpt Pl operating eight DUKWs, 13 3-tonners and 25 jeeps at those locations. Significant problems were inherited from 9th Division and perpetuated by 5th Division in the propensity of the general staff to place AASC detachments under command of the brigades in whose areas they were located, so without the control and backup of the divisional AASC headquarters. There had been a marked fall off in standards: no ammunition examiners had been available at the FADs and stocks were in unknown condition – ADOS 5 Div’s response to the CAASC’s request for six examiners to classify all stocks was to provide one; no provision had been made for workshop support and after a DUKW foundered at sea, the better-late-than-never response was to allot a mechanic to each amphibian, courtesy CAEME 5th Division, to catch up with the backlog; and supplies commodities were badly unbalanced so restocking had to be undertaken.

The maintenance system continued to be a product of the operating environment, in which supplies were delivered by barge from Finschhafen Base Sub-Area to Kelanoa for two consecutive days, and on the third direct to the forward maintenance area operated by 241 Sup Dep Pl at Butu-Butu; a section of 4 Fd Bky located at Kelanoa supplied both local and forward beachheads. From hereon it was a repeat of the previous operations from Finschhafen, 8th Brigade’s infantry advancing along the coast, 2 Sup Dep Pl and jeep/DUKW detachments of 39 Indep Tpt Pl opening coast-hopping depots, on whose arrival depended the next stage of the advance as much as enemy resistance. From Saidor, Madang lay ahead as a 5th Division task, but this had by now been pre-empted by the parallel advance of 7th and then 11th Divisions through the Markham and Ramu Valleys 50.

Support of Coastal Operations

7th Division’s drive up the Markham did not have the luxury of water transport to skirt untrafficable supply routes, relying substantially on air transport and carrier lines. The general arrangement was for 2/102 Comp Pl to set up the airhead depots and 2/2 Sup Dep Coy with its 5, 6, 7, 9,  10 Sup Dep Pls operating the forward issue depots in support of the brigades and other groups and forces. 2/153 GT Coy was internally reorganised from three to four platoons, succumbing to the usual theory of divisional staffs that brigades were entitled to their own transport and supplies elements under command and an extra one was therefore required for divisional troops. Here as elsewhere they ignored the constantly re-demonstrated lesson that, unless the CAASC was given control and allowed to switch resources to the areas of greatest priority, and work to an overall maintenance and movement plan, each group had its own puddle which was alternately over-, then underemployed and there was no pool with which to respond to real areas of need and crisis. At least there was a justification for some devolution of vehicles in this campaign as brigades were without their own transport and so AASC transport detachments were flown in to forward operational bases to support them as the fighting flowed along the river valleys.

During the drive on Lae from the Nadzab, some other lesser commitments were supported by 7 Div AASC – the Papuan Infantry Battalion at Sangan resupplied by carrier line and air drop; Bena Bena Force, earlier established to keep the enemy from the Southern Highlands, came under command of 7th Division and was supplied through Garoka airstrip; Wampit Force, a 3rd Division battalion on the south of the Markham with its own 3 Div AASC element, was replenished from Nadzab by collapsible boat with an outboard motor; and a detachment of 2/102 Comp Pl formed a depot at Boana supporting a flank protection battalion. After the Markham operation got into stride following Lae’s occupation, a depot set up by 6 Sup Dep Pl at Kaiapit dropping ground supported first 2/2 Cav Cdo Coy then 21st Brigade. As the advance pressed up the valley, 6 Sup Dep Pl moved forward after it as Kaiapit airstrip was opened, turning the depot over to a detachment of 2/102 Comp Pl and an element of 2/153 GT Coy which was able to get jeeps and trailers some way forward on the flat valley floor through the kunai grass. There was not, however, enough capacity to stretch forward to Gusap, and air drops were necessary until 5 Sup Dep Pl set up a depot as soon as the airfield allowed air landing.

Air supply having become a mainstay of a sizeable part of the Markham requirement, 3 Air Maint Coy took over the depot and forwarding task at Nadzab, then 7 Sup Dep Pl took on Kaiapit, releasing 1/102 to go forward to take over Gusap. The pattern then settled into 5 and 6 Sup Dep Pls moving with each brigade down the Ramu valley, operating depots at dropping grounds and moving resupply by jeep and carrier to their forward depots for issue to the brigades in the now familiar leapfrogging technique. Dumpu was reached on 5 October, and this temporarily replaced Gusap as the forward base until it was moved two weeks later to Bebei. Rear depots were progressively closed down, the supply units brought forward, and as operations became more scattered, more forward depots were opened at Kumbarum and Guy’s Post for operations at Shaggy Ridge, captured on 22 January 1944, and Yogia and Evapia Rivers for final clearance operations in the Ramu valley 51.

Relief of 7th Division by 11th Division, begun before Christmas, was completed by 21 February, and the advance across the Finisterre Range began, taking Bogadjim on 13 April and culminating in the occupation of a deserted Madang on the 24th. The area was then taken over by 5th Division, which sent 8th Brigade west to Alexishafen and Hansa Bay, patrolling forward to the mouth of the Sepik River by 13 July 1944, with all Japanese formations having been withdrawn to the Wewak area. 5th Division’s maintenance area was established at Madang by 4 Sup Dep Coy and part of 158 GT Coy, 241 Sup Dep Pl opening a depot at Singor in support of 4th Brigade, and 242 Sup Dep Pl similarly at Alexishafen. At the end of the operation, 5th Division’ AASC was strung out across half of the north coast of New Guinea, from Finschhafen to the Sepik 52 and, in the piecemeal style of operations, had used three supply depot platoons and a transport platoon to carry the brunt of the forward support of operations. In the absence of roads along the coast, the use of landing craft and 39 Pl’s DUKWs had solved a resupply problem to which the only alternative would have been air dropping. This coastwise support had been by courtesy of the US Engineers – the RAE’s transportation service was not to make its presence felt in numbers for another year after the move of US resources northwards left a vacuum and a sense of urgency to get that service into effective use.

Support of Markham-Ramu

While Australian forces were clearing the central area of New Guinea, and after their own capture of Saidor, the US forces had made a further series of amphibious landings at Aitape, Hollandia, Biak, Sasapor and Morotai in the west and in an arc Manus-New Britain-North Solomons in the north and east. When these operations had achieved the objectives of securing airfields for operations to the north, and neutralisation of enemy troop concentrations was achieved, the strategic rationale for further operations in these areas ceased to exist. The remaining substantial enemy forces were isolated, struggling for survival and no threat to the airfields, but there followed a series of Australian campaigns, costly in resources and lives, in first reconquering the remainder of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, and then the islands to the north and west, for which there was no valid place in Macarthur’s strategic plan for the Philippines road to Tokyo 53.

Map 10: New Guinea Offensives

Although 6th, 7th and 9th Australian Divisions were originally earmarked for the Philippines, the undesirability of mixed supply lines and US political resistance to a foreign troops involvement in liberating its colony, encouraged Macarthur to arrange for 6th Division to garrison the Aitape airfields, 5th Division to take over New Britain and 3rd Division Bougainville, so relieving twice as many American divisions for the invasion. These three divisions were themselves considerably stronger than the assessed requirement for garrison task, but were required by Macarthur as face saving for the large US forces replaced, and as a way of committing Australian divisions from alternatives of disbandment or being inserted into US operations; coincidently the result was the positioning of sufficient strength to undertake operations greater than simple containment of bypassed forces. In determining the posture of the troops in this arrangement Blamey passed over the options of passive defence or an all out offensive against enemy strongholds in favour of ‘obtaining information, probing the enemy’s positions and carrying out offensive operations with small forces with a view to seeking out and destroying the enemy where found’. It became increasingly difficult to distinguish the operations which developed under this latter option from those of the second rejected alternative, and the necessity and utility of this expenditure of lives and material resources has been the subject of considerable debate and criticism 54.

Part of these operations became the last phase of the reconquest of New Guinea in 6th Division’s two pronged move from Aitape inland along the Toricelli Mountains and along the coast towards Wewak, beginning with deep patrolling from 1 December 1944. The buildup of 3rd Base Sub-Area at Aitape had commenced in mid-October before the division arrived, and included 126 GT Coy, 3 MAC Pl, 5 Port Det, 22 Sup Dep Coy with 63, 92, 119, 2/160 Sup Dep Pls, 5, 14 and a section of 7 Fd Bky Pls, 1 Indep Farm Pl and 52, 63, 69 BIPOD Pls. With no port at Aitape ships were unloaded to landing craft and amphibians, then across the open beach. During the monsoon season, to avoid being beached, the landing craft had to carry a 2½ ton truck aboard which received a load and drove off as soon as the shore was reached, culling the normal payload of the craft by 80 per cent. Difficulties in landing men, equipment and stores and an adequate margin of supplies persisted until the weather improved in April.

The Divisional AASC under Lieut-Col J. Talbot comprised HQ Comd 6 Div AASC, 2/5 Sup Dep Coy with 2/20-25, 2/35 and 2/188 Sup Dep Pls, 2/3 GT Coy with a 2½ ton GMCs and 2/155 GT Coy with jeeps and trailers. Its operations were varied by the two different lines of communication: one along the coast and foothills where the old German Road provided some trafficway, although interrupted by creeks and rivers at regular intervals; the other along and over the mountains where extension of the advance soon moved beyond the capacity of carrier lines. Maintenance along the coast followed the usual pattern of using supply depot platoons to establish dumps at road, air and beach heads, with jeep and tractor-trailer trains operating forward and native carriers bridging the gap to and within units.

On the inland route 17th Brigade could be supplied only by air, and with initially one then two Dakota aircraft which also had to meet operationally urgent demands on the coast axis, this provided bare support for even limited activities. The rear air supply function was carried out by 2/160 and 2/188 Sup Dep Pls until the belated arrival of 12 Air Maint Pl in March 1945, while at the receiving end supply depot platoon detachments and native carriers cleared the dropping grounds, distributed to sub-units and recovered scarce parachutes back to Aitape. Along the coast route 19th Brigade led the patrolling battle, relieved on 25 December across the Danmap River by 16th Brigade supported by 2/21, 2/22 and 2/23 Sup Dep Pls, which established a series of leapfrogging bases, initially at Dogreto Bay by landing craft and road, with 2/3 and two sections of 2/2 Tpt Pls from 2/155 GT Coy delivering forward to units, carrier lines bridging the gaps until jeep tracks were pushed through. 16th Brigade took over again in April, supported by 2/25 and 2/35 Sup Dep Pls and 2/155 GT Coy elements which had to operate on 12-14 hour shifts to move the tonnages required forward. CAASC 6th Division was convinced that GMCs could operate just as effectively as the jeeps in the prevailing conditions, and deliver a much greater payload, but 2/3 GT Coy was fully committed to barge unloading and getting supplies to the forward depots. Requests for relief to 1st Corps did not bring trucks, rather the arrival of 2/96 Tpt Pl with more jeeps! Limited engineer support meant that bridging of water crossings was slow and flooding destroyed bridges often before they were even completed. This, combined with the low capacity of the divisional transport and the need to use the same truck-on-landing craft system at forward beaches as at Aitape, meant that any significant operations were curtailed to that limited resupply capacity.

Support of Aitape-Wewak

Requests to 1st Corps for heavy transport, landing craft or aircraft to support a major thrust on either front were refused through unavailability, and with wet weather hampering air and road movement even further, the advance slowed in line with its limited supplies, particularly ammunition. The airfields at But and Dagua were not secured until 17 and 22 March, when at least air landing enabled higher payloads and reduction of the frequent losses of parachute drops falling into Japanese lines or lost in the jungle or into the sea; but no inland airfield was available until one was opened near Maprik on 14 May.

After the capture of Dagua ten LCTs and six Fairmile launches were allotted for a drive on Wewak, enabling the build up of adequate supplies, fuel and ammunition and reliable resupply. A ground and amphibious assault took Wewak, Boram and Moem on 11, 17 and 22 May. The plan was that this should have completed the campaign and allowed the objective of reducing forces in the area to one brigade; in fact the remaining Japanese who had withdrawn into the mountains were presented with an extended target in the string of airfields and the administrative areas of garrisons which had to be established right along the coast between Aitape and Wewak, and 17th Brigade still faced further resistance east of Maprik. This dispersion meant a concomitant administrative task of maintaining this extended network, so the Division was ultimately committed until the end of the war to more costly defensive operations than would have been incurred in staying originally at Aitape and reducing the garrison to one brigade.

The centre of gravity was now shifting to Wewak. To avoid reshipping through Aitape, 3rd Base Sub-Area helped man forward supplies, ammunition and petrol depots at Cape Wom, which then received direct shipments from cargo and tanker ships; the divisional FSD and FAD then distributed to units in the area. Air maintenance of 17th Brigade in the Toricellis was also moved to Wewak, 12 Air Maint Pl setting up at Boram airstrip in July, 2/30 Sup Dep Pl receiving and issuing the airdrops then air landings when Hayfield airstrip was opened near Maprik; 2/3 Tpt Pl was flown in to distribute forward. Similarly the transport effort was divided between the two centres, with 2/155 GT Coy progressively centring on Wewak 55. The period had been extremely testing on the units as they were caught in a situation where the divisional commander had wanted to drive on to take Wewak, while the higher command vacillated, withholding the necessary air and watercraft resources which would have facilitated the effort, but not giving clear orders to stop. The result was that the Divisional AASC, and the engineer construction and watercraft efforts as well, had been driven to extreme lengths to support a drawn out advance when they were manned and equipped only for a garrison role. The question of clear objectives, and of following them, had also arisen during the parallel deployments in Bougainville and New Britain.

The Island Campaigns

Operations in the North Solomons were conducted by 2nd Corps based at the American enclave at Torokina from November 1944, using 3rd Division and two independent brigades, 11th and 23rd. The specific purpose was to relieve the US Army garrisons protecting airfields at Torokina on Bougainville and the Outer Islands – Green Islands, Emirau, Mono and Munda, and the Treasury Islands, however Blamey‘s direction of this mission extended operations towards the progressive elimination of the enemy rather than the containment policy and practice adopted by the Americans. Initially 23rd Brigade took over the Outer Islands and 3rd Division and 11th Brigade the perimeter around the base at Torokina. Ignoring the tacit truce between the US and Japanese forces, where each kept to its base areas, 7th Brigade was advanced north east along the Numa Numa Trail, then handing over to 11th Brigade. Operations on Bougainville thereafter split into three sectors: 23rd Brigade was brought in from the Outer Islands relieving 11th Brigade in the east towards Numa Numa; 11th Brigade was allotted offensive activity to the north, later relieved by 23rd Brigade; and 3rd Division was pushed south towards Buin with successively 29th, 7th and 15th Brigades56.

Support was centred on 4th Base Sub-Area at Torokina which inherited substantial supply, refrigeration, fuel storage, port and road facilities set up under the generous resources available to an American base. The units deployed from October 1944, fortuitously in before the brigades to be supported, included 129 and 133 GT Coys, HQ 2 BSD, 30 Sup Dep Coy with 45, 136, 146, 226 and 237 Sup Dep Pls, 13 Fd Baking Coy, 53 and 54 BIPOD Pls, 6 and 7 Indep Farm Pls and 1 Marine Food Sup Pl. The supply units held reserve and maintenance stocks, distributing to the three sectors on Bougainville and the Outer Islands under the direction of DDST 2nd Corps. As no air maintenance unit had been allotted to the campaign, an ad hoc air maintenance platoon was made up from 121 Sup Dep Coy and 23rd Brigade’s 40 Tpt Pl. The transport system was essentially 2½ ton vehicles on roads to units near Torokina, jeep and trailer on tracks further on, then jeep trailer trains drawn by tractor in the less trafficable tracks; alternatively water transport was used as substitute or supplement for coastwise movement, air drops for inland movement; from jeep, water and airhead native carriers bridged any gap to units.

The infantry battalions, then companies in the Outer Islands, being simply static protective troops with no authorised operations, had supply detachments and 30 days stock replenished from Torokina by sea. In the Eastern Sector towards Numa Numa 222 Sup Dep Pl established a DID 22 km inland in the mountains from which native carriers operated up to the crest of the range at Barges HilI and forward, then later jeeps and trailers of a platoon of 158 GT Coy were hauled up the range to operate the link forward of it; air drop met operationally urgent needs. The sector was taken over briefly by 11th Brigade, 223 Sup Dep Pl relieving 222; 23rd Brigade then took over the area and 244 Sup Dep Pl the DID; a light railway was installed from the roadhead to Barges Hill, replacing the native carrier link to the jeep track forward.

In the Northern Sector 11th Brigade moved north along the coast to clear the Soraken and Bonis Peninsulas. Small ships from Torokina delivered to a series of 222 Sup Dep Pl DIDs established progressively forward, culminating in establishing an FSD at Freddie Beach at the base of the Soraken Peninsula, from which landing craft delivered to a 223 Sup Dep Pl DID at Ratsua on the Bonis Peninsula, 76 Tpt Pl jeeps and carriers delivering forward. By June 1945 with the enemy bottled up on the Bonis Peninsula and operations static, 23rd Brigade took over, supported by its 243 and 244 Sup Dep Pls and 40 Tpt Pl.

In the Southern Sector a road was built parallel to the coast along the axis of 3rd Division’s southward advance, a divisional maintenance area being established at Toko, maintained by landing craft from Torokina to transit facilities at Motupena, then trucked over a rough and sandy road to Toko. This maintenance area was hardly an inspired move, both in concept and in location. 3rd Division understandably wanted to divorce itself from the base at Torokina, but setting up a base, as opposed to a forward headquarters, in an isolated and restricted patch of jungle on a surf beach caused unnecessary double handling and over-use of resources by splitting the available supplies units – building up to HQ 131 GT Coy, parts of 54, 66, 67 Tpt Pls, 131 Wksp Pl and 3 Sup Dep Pl at Motupena, with HQ 152 GT Coy, 53, 54,56 Tpt Pls, 152 Wksp Pl plus 224 Sup Dep Pl and 11 Fd Baking Pl at Toko. Each held and moved substantial overlapping and therefore unnecessary stocks of food, fuel and ammunition: the very valid technique developed early in New Guinea of setting up dumps wherever required was progressively extended to putting them everywhere, and stocking them as if the base area were two weeks rather than a day away. 227 Sup Dep Pl had remained at Torokina to man the Perimeter DID for the left-out-of-battle elements of 3rd Division, so 11th Brigade’s 223 Sup Dep Pl was brought in to take over Motupena DID, relieving 19 for employment forward. The remaining supply depot platoons – 4, 18, 19 –  operated forward, supplying the brigades from a series of DIDs which were leapfrogged behind the advance of the roadhead, the trucks of 152 GT Coy and coastwise craft replenishing them; sections of the transport platoons’ jeeps and trailers and native carriers moved in front of roadhead to the brigade unit echelons; and air drops resupplied detached elements, delivered high priority stores and filled in when weather disrupted road movement, averaging a high five sorties a day which indicated that some problems in the routine system were being covered as emergency deliveries 57.

Support of Bougainville

After hostilities ceased 2nd Corps still faced about 30,000 enemy, having engaged in an arduous, expensive campaign plagued by shortages of watercraft and adverse terrain and weather. An infrastructure had to be established to support an inconclusive and unnecessary result, requiring a large investment in supply, transport and construction units, which themselves created their own overheads. The other quite satisfactory option adopted by the US forces had been to fulfil their mission by a defensive perimeter around Torokina and in the Outer Islands, on an interior and therefore very economical support system, but opportunity and an oversupply of combat units drove 2nd Corps into offensive action, in something of a parallel to Palestine in World War 1. Macarthur would not countenance the embarrassment of Blamey’s proposal for Australian brigades or battalions replacing his American divisions, so with the excessive and confident force available, offensive operations were an option, and the urge to apply a large offensive military machine to the purpose for which it was designed won out. It was a repeat of the Aitape-Wewak operation, and of one also going on more tentatively in New Britain 58.

When 5th Division took over from the US division garrisoning the western half of New Britain it inherited and broke a similar tacit non-aggression stance as had been in effect at Aitape and Torokina. Its directive was active defence, but while there was forward offensive movement which the US forces had found quite unnecessary, the ultimate folly of assaulting Rabaul was avoided. The first elements of 5th Division landed on 5 November 1944 at Jacquinot Bay to establish a new base, 14 Sup Dep Pl accompanying the first battalion group to land in a disorganised and fortunately unopposed landing, for which RAAF’s ‘maximum effort’ was one bomber, arriving late. Lodgement of 5th Base Sub-Area a week later built up to 165 GT Coy, 31 Sup Dep Coy, 68 BIPOD Pl and 10 Fd Baking Pl plus a section of 8 Fd Baking Pl, 2 Indep Farm Pl, 4 Marine Food Sup Pl and a section of 5 MAC Pl. The divisional AASC under Lieut Col E.L. Smith eventually built up to HQ Comd 5 Div AASC, 4 Sup Dep Coy with 1, 2, 14, 15, 250, 251 Sup Dep Pls; 154 GT Coy of 52, 55, 88 Tpt Pls and 154 Wksp Pl. This build up, slowed by the same shortage of shipping and landing craft which followed the departure of US forces from the other garrisons at Aitape and Torokina, was not completed until February 1945. A battalion group had also relieved a US garrison on the north side of the island at Cape Hoskins on 8 November, accompanied by A Sec 14 Sup Dep Pl, augmented later by a detachment of 55 Tpt Pl.

Formation of a new base produced an overload on the Advanced Supply Depot operated by 31 Sup Dep Coy, and it was necessary during the build up phase to attach two divisional supply depot platoons to augment it. Forward maintenance of 6th Brigade on the south coast towards Wide Bay meant that, with no roads in the area, all resupply had to be by landing craft. With this brigade isolated, CAASC placed 14 and 15 Sup Dep PIs and Det 55 Tpt Pl under brigade command; on 13th Brigade relieving 6th Brigade, 250 and 251 Sup Dep Pls and detachment 88 Tpt Pl similarly relieved their predecessors. A similar relief of 36 Bn at open Bay/Hoskins saw 2 Sup Dep Pl and a section of 88 Tpt Pl take over there, the previous detachments returning to Jacquinot Bay. As an unusual variation, maintenance of that area had not been a 5th Division or 5 Base Sub-Area responsibility, replenishment coming directly from Lae.

A significant change in the transport scene occurred with the mid-February opening of a road from base to division and forward brigade. As had been found in the other later campaigns, 2½ or 3 ton general service trucks could handle such roads as well as jeeps and trailers, and were infinitely more productive: it was only on very narrow tracks that jeeps were necessary, and in very bad going even those had to be replaced by tractors pulling trains of jeep trailers. The Jungle scale for transport platoons meant jeeps and trailers, and 154 GT Coy was Jungle. With the new road plus the withdrawal of most of the landing craft in March over to Aitape for the drive on Wewak, the demand for vehicle transport had escalated to a level where jeeps could not cope. Early output figures had shown that, while the percentage of 3 ton vehicles used was 7.5 per cent, they had in fact moved half the tonnage lifted. Fortunately most of the platoons had been converted to Jungle scale after arrival at Jacquinot Bay, and the 3 ton vehicles were still available to be taken back into service. It was a lesson learned, but it had been learned earlier on several occasions in New Guinea, and the blind following of establishments should neither have been proposed nor implemented 59.

A lesson which was recognised in this campaign, though not implemented in the remaining ones, was that opening divisional FSDs and FADs in proximity to depots run by base sub-areas just because divisional AASCs were supposed to operate them was wasteful, doctrinaire nonsense. The whole ethos of the jungle organisation and method of operation was to run on spartan lines and tailor each solution to the actual problem, but wooden headed staffs, both service and general, persisted in repeating what they had learned elsewhere rather than thinking the problem through. This duplication of facilities was a problem at Gallipoli forty years before, and it died hard. The unfortunate fact is that logistics is not among the courses conducted at Australian Army schools and few officers understand logistics, using rote learning or repetition of their limited earlier experience to guide their actions. What experience did carry over from this war largely died out in the postwar years and this particular wheel had to be reinvented after several years of misapplication in another theatre over twenty years later.

Operations in New Britain moved on spasmodically, the ‘offensive spirit’ directive urging commanders forward, orders to stay away from Rabaul and deliberately restricted resources holding them back. A transport and a supply depot platoon were rotated through forwardsupport duty at Tol Plantation as the line was stabilised at the neck of the Gazelle Peninsula until the war closed. It was as well that adventurism was held in check, as the estimated 30,000 enemy facing the two-brigade Australian division turned out to be three times greater, comprising the equivalent of five divisions, and pressure had begun to mount as the advance had threatened what they had regarded as their sanctuary 60.

Further around the Island chain, part of Morotai had been retaken by a US Army amphibious landing as one of the potential bases for operations against the Philippines. As it now became the base for Australian operations in Borneo and possible further ones in Java or Malaya, the island became the home for an uncomfortable cluster of static and transiting headquarters –  those of Blamey’s Advanced Allied Land Force which Macarthur no longer recognised other than for Australian units, 1st Corps, 7th Division, 9th Division, the beach groups and 1st Base Sub-Area. The latter command included HQ Comd 1 BSA AASC with 2/102, 2/105 GT Coys, 50 Tpt Pl (DUKWs), 6 BSD, 4 Bulk Pet Storage Coy, 51, 65 BIPOD Pls, 2/1 Field Bakery and 1 Ref Plant Op PI 61. Of six planned amphibious assaults three were finally confirmed: Oboe One (Tarakan), Oboe Six (North Borneo) and Oboe Two (Balikpapan). While there was a substantial obligation and justification to regain the territory and liberate the population in Australia’s territories in New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and the North Solomons as the Americans were doing in their Philippines colony, the landings planned against the bypassed Japanese forces in Borneo were not nearly so well justified, leaning rather on a desire to give two Australian divisions the active task denied by their exclusion from the invasion of the Philippines.

From an Australian logistics viewpoint they represented the most ambitious commitment in the South West Pacific since the attack on Lae: the AASC troops were not as numerically great as those assembled for mobile operations for the Australian Corps in the Middle East but they had finally not been committed to operations. For the Borneo operations supplies and transport support was split between three echelons – the normal divisional AASC units which at supplemented jungle scale now comprised two general transport companies and a supply depot company, plus the division’s slice of specialist corps troops; a beach group which received the maintenance and buildup supplies until the base units could be established; and a base sub-area which also absorbed the beach group transport, rations, ammunition and fuel supply units into its structure when it could be landed.

The Oboe One assault at Tarakan by 26th Brigade Group of 9th Division was launched on 1 May 1945, with the primary mission of securing an airfield to support the later Oboe landings 62. It was the smallest of the Oboe operations and something of a test bed for the larger ones to follow: divisional troops comprised the Brigade Group’s HQ 1 Air Maint Coy which also doubled as HQ AASC Oboe One commanded by Maj C.W.W. Perry, 11Air Maint Pl, 51 Tpt Pl and 246 Sup Dep Pl with additional 9th Division units 2/30, 2/31 Sup Dep Pls, 2/15 and detachment 2/18 Tpt Pls; the 2nd Beach Group’s 2/108 GT Coy, 235 Sup Dep Pl and 58 BIPOD Pl; and 1st Base Sub-Area 2/3 Fd Bking Pl, 64 BIPOD Pl, two sections of 2/2 MAC and detachment 4 Bulk Pet Storage Coy which were phased in after the landing had been stabilised. HQ AASC came ashore on the second day and established itself in the 2nd Beach Group area. Unloading was hampered by the beach approaches, LSTs initially remaining offshore with their cargo having to be lightered ashore rather than beaching and being unloaded directly over the beach. The Beach Group supplies and transport got ashore by Day 2, and on Day 3 half of the brigade supply depot and transport platoons were established; all units were ashore and stores unloading completed within two weeks. In addition to the poor beach approaches, the operation was significantly hampered by RAAF vehicles in both a quantity which showed that there was no concept of living hard in serious operational situations, and in overloading, poor waterproofing and driving which resulted in obstruction of landing and exit points. Resistance had ended by 22 June, but the difficulty experienced in reconstituting the badly damaged airfield precluded its use during either of the succeeding Oboe operations, so this operation proved to be little more than a costly rehearsal for those later landings 63.

Support of Tarakan

Oboe Six landed the remainder of 9th Division from 10 June at Brunei Bay, Labuan and Muara Islands. Brunei Town fell on 13 June, Labuan and Muara 15 June, Seria oilfield and the mainland one at Lutong were captured a week later. Divisional troops under CAASC Lieut-Col J.H. Mclennan comprised HQ Comd 9 Div AASC, 2/142, 2/156 GT Coys each of three platoons, the first of 2½ ton, the second ½ ton trucks, and 2/6 Sup Dep Coy of six platoons; 1st Beach Group including 2/166 GT Coy, 2/240 Sup Dep Pl and 57 BIPOD Pl; and 8th Base Sub-Area including 2/102, 2/106 GT Coys, the latter being equipped with DUKWs, 2/26 Sup Dep Coy, 13, 15 Fd Bking Pls, 62 BIPOD Pl, 4 Bulk Pet Storage Pl and 1 Port Det. The divisional troops were regrouped to tailor them to each landing force, each brigade group having a composite company in direct support for the landing to ensure the unity of control of the supply and transport duality in the early confused part of the operation. Three hours after the 24th Brigade Group assault wave hit the beach at Labuan 2/156 GT Coy landed with 2/28 Sup Dep Pl to open the AP, Sup P and PP for the brigade. Seven hours later 2/142 GT Coy with its transport platoons was landing to support divisional troops. 2/6 Sup Dep Coy’s landing with 20th Brigade Group on Brunei was delayed until the second day, but the build up flowed after that. In the follow up waves, the bakeries were in production on Day 5, bulk storage tanks and vehicle refuelling, road tanker and watercraft filling points were operational on Days 11 to 13. Then followed a long period of consolidation as the area roads, accommodation and port facilities were developed for what proved to be an extended occupation 64.

This was the first operation where DUKWs were in numbers and given a pivotal as opposed to a supplementary task. They operated continuously and reliably in unloading ships, notably 1,300 tons by 26 DUKWs from one ship in 18 hours, including air alerts and other delays, so that ‘the discharge programme would have been in a sorry state without them’. As side tasks they were used for floating ambulances, refuelling flying boats, mail deliveries, towing pontoons, moving patrols along the coast, ferries, beach recovery, mobile cranes and dumping dangerous ordnance at sea. They were hindered badly by poor Military Police control of traffic circuits and, as were the other transport companies, by low priority RAAF vehicles landed far too early, poorly waterproofed and driven, which drowned or bogged, obstructing beaches and exits, as had previously happened at Tarakan. But by the fourth day when the landing craft had been cleared and cargo ships began unloading, the unit settled down to a steady 24 hour clearance of about 1,200 tons a day with a capacity of 2,000 if the Engineer docks operating companies unloading the ships had been up to it, and were interrupted only by an enemy party’s suicide attack on its position on Day 12 65.

The scattered nature of the operation, with several subsidiary landings and operations, meant a dispersal of the divisional resources. As had happened in earlier operations under the basic tropical scale of a supply depot company and one or more general transport companies, the need to operate dispersed areas led to each company headquarters controlling a mixed group of supplies and transport units: the age old nexus between the sinews of war and their means of delivery was hard to put down. Nor was the concept of segregation of GMC and jeep transport into different companies any more viable, here or elsewhere. Each area generally needed its slice of food, fuel and ammunition units, and needed a mix of vehicles, to cope with the different tasks which arose. The divisional AASC was regrouped so that HQ 2/6 Sup Dep Coy with two transport and two supply depot platoons operated AP, Sup P and PP at six locations for 20th Brigade Group on the mainland; HQ 2/156 GT Coy did the same in four locations for 24th Brigade Group on Labuan Island, and operated a local railway; HQ 2/142 GT Coy with six transport and two workshop platoons served divisional troops, resupply loading and watercraft unloading at Labuan, while two supply depot platoons originally with this company were reallotted directly under HQ CAASC to operate divisional troops delivery points. The composite system for divisional units, suitably adjusted for the particular task in hand, had naturally reasserted itself, just as it had in the first 1902 establishments for the upcoming AASC, again in 1941 and now in 1945. It remained in place until memory of the experiences of this war was overtaken by inexperienced tidy minds and peacetime expediency in 1972 when another ‘new’ solution discarded the accumulated wisdom of the centuries.

Support of Brunei-Labuan

The last, largest and the riskiest operation was Oboe Two involving the full 7th Division in landing at Balikpapan on 1 July 1945. With the Division were HQ Comd 7 Div AASC, 2/6, 2/153 GT Coys and 2/2 Sup Dep Coy; 2nd Beach Group included 2/108 GT Coy, 235 Sup Dep Pl and 58 BIPOD Pl; 7 Base Sub-Area included 2/21Tpt Pl (amph), 2/3 Amph Vehicle Increment, 2/25 Tpt Pl, 2/4 MAC Pl, 3 Sup Dep Coy, 20, 46 Fd Bking Pls, 66 BIPOD PI, C Det 4 Bulk Pet Storage Coy and 2 Port Det. Missing from the lineup was 1 Trk Amph Veh Pl, part of 1 Trk Amph Sqn which had been trained for these amphibious operations but withdrawn as the Americans did not want strangers mixed in with their two amphibious tractor battalions which were to provide the tracked amphibians required for the assault. CAASC Lieut-Col H.D. Murphie landed one hour after the first wave, but was preceded by 235 and 11 Sup Dep Pls from 2nd Beach Group and 7th Base Sub-Area, in 13 minutes after the assault to get the FSD ready to receive the initial stocking and meet any early demands. The brigades came ashore with their own reserves, but half of 2/7 Sup Dep was on the beach 80 minutes after the assault to support divisional troops, forty minutes later 2/10 Sup Dep Pl arrived to set up for 25th Brigade, and an hour later half of 2/34 Sup Dep Pl landed to support 21st Brigade. The remainder of the units staged in, usually preceded by their reconnaissance parties, a lesson well learnt from Oboe Six 66.

Demands on transport were well below capacity. From 2/153 GT Coy, equipped with jeeps and trailers, 2/7, 2/8, 2/9 Tpt Pls were attached one to each brigade, one being held for divisional reserve. They were landed loaded with ammunition and unit stores, and were used for ambulance, reconnaissance, radio carriers and supplementing unit transport. A vehicle from 2/7 Tpt Pl landed seven minutes into the assault was believed to be the first ashore in the operation. Advanced HQ 2/6 GT Coy landed after an hour to prepare for its first unit, 2/10 Tpt Pl equipped with 2½ ton GMCs, in less than two hours later. The remainder came in progressively over the following four days, hauling ammunition to the guns, water to units, assisting in beach clearance and then into the general maintenance of the division, with vehicles on 24 hour days and drivers 12 hour shifts in the early stages. 2/108 GT Coy with 2½ ton GMCs loaded with ammunition landed with the immediate task of ammunition resupply, but was not over-committed for its subsequent beach clearance task, a result of slow ship unloading, poor beach and periods of rough weather resulting in low and spasmodic landings of cargo, varying from 600 to 2,000 tons on various days. The company’s DUKWs of 2/21 Tpt Pl landed carrying the guns and ammunition of the field regiments (this book’s cover illustration), arriving 38 minutes after the first assault landing, the guns coming into action as they were unloaded. Their primary ship to shore task was largely redirected to bridging the gap between landing craft which could not get past a sand bar 30 metres from the beach; it also extended to carrying Auster aircraft ashore, river ferrying in substitution for a blown bridge, river patrols and reconnaissance, coastwise support of forces, and ferrying Macarthur ashore when a landing craft could not get through the surf 67.

Support of Balikpapan

This largest of the amphibious operations achieved its main objective of securing the airfields and oil resources. The next possible phases were a landing on Java and invasion of Japan, but the latter’s surrender to avoid further nuclear attack on 16 August 1945 brought an end to hostilities. It did not, however, end the tasks of the deployed Australian forces numbering 157,000, which still had 344,000 Japanese and their auxiliaries under arms in their areas, from Borneo to the Solomons, to be brought under control and then repatriated. There was also the transition to civil government, fairly straightforward in the Australian and British territories, but a problem in the Netherlands East Indies, where a Nationalist declaration of independence for Indonesia on 17 August left the inhabitants unconvinced that they should return to Dutch rule. Forces not only had to remain in their end-of-war positions, but also extend to other areas to maintain order, concentrate the Japanese forces and supervise transfer to civil authority. A further logistics factor was the shortage of shipping with which to repatriate the Australian forces for demobilisation. These commitments and slow return of forces home required AASC elements to remain in support into 1946. The other factor was the return of the remnants of 20,000 Australian prisoners of war of the Japanese, whose anticipated condition required special arrangements 68.

Prisoners of War

The early German and Japanese runaway successes ensured that large numbers of Australian soldiers found themselves prisoners of war, and AASC members were no exception to this. Indeed the number of AASC captured was swollen by three command decisions – the priority of evacuation in the Greece-Crete evacuations, the premature surrender of undefeated troops in Singapore, and the commitment of forces to a hopeless defence of Java, and to a lesser extent the island garrisons. The story of these prisoners is in two parts: one of a belligerent which conformed in a substantial degree to the Geneva conventions, and the other which not only did not, but regarded prisoners with contempt and used them as expendable chattel slaves. When the casualty lists of World Wars 1 and 2 are compared, and it is remembered that the fewer AASC numbers in the first conflict was balanced by the majority being within gunfire range for most of the time, the death rate is very disproportionate. The simple answer lies in the large numbers of prisoners of the Japanese who met needless deaths in flagrant disregard of the usage of war observed by civilised peoples.

AASC prisoners from Greece, Crete and the Middle East found themselves in a variety of camps throughout Axis-occupied Europe. Many had the combination of ingenuity and luck to find their way back to friendly lines without being captured, such as Maj F.W. Maclean of HQ 6 Div AASC who commandeered a caique to get from Greece to Crete, and Dvr J.L. Smith of 6 Div AASC who was in a party which sailed a barge from Crete to Egypt. Some of the captured who became escapologists joined resistance forces: Sgt R.S. Turner, left behind at Corinth, was captured, escaped in transit near Lamia and, hiding out for 18 months with the help of Greek patriots, joined the guerrillas and then the Allied Military Mission at the end of the war; Pte L. Saywell, escaping from the camp at Pardubice, joined the Czech partisans, was killed in action at the very end of the war and was awarded the Czech Military Cross. Others made their way through occupied territory to freedom: Dvrs C.W. Croucher and K.H. Griffin of 6 Div AASC were recaptured after an escape from Austria, tunnelled out again and made it to Gibraltar. Those who did not escape were held in a wide range of camps in Germany, Austria and Italy, however the capitulation of the latter in September 1943 gave many the opportunity for escape to neutral Switzerland, Capt H.J. Kroger of 6 Div AASC becoming Senior Australian Officer in the Swiss holding camps while awaiting repatriation. Many prisoners were allotted to work camps throughout the Axis countries for road and rail works, factories, farms and forestry where their treatment varied from adequate to severe, depending on the taskmasters. Access to the International Red Cross allowed by Germany and Italy was an additional factor in both maintaining some reasonable standard of treatment and in providing food and comfort parcels to augment the subsistence levels provided by the captors; the later deterioration in these levels was a function of increasing shortages suffered by the whole Axis population rather than calculated maltreatment of the prisoners 69.

Those AASC members who fell into the clutches of the Japanese had quite different treatment. Whilst a few were executed after capture at Ambon and Rabaul, the remainder faced more protracted abuses. The main group of nearly 2,000, from 8 Div AASC, the Ammunition Sub-Park and the supplies and medical transport elements on Singapore Island, was initially herded with the other 50,000 prisoners into the Changi area, the Australian forces occupying Selarang Barracks; the second large group of nearly 700 from 2/3 Res MT Coy and part of 2/105 GT Coy caught in Java was eventually concentrated in the Bicycle Camp at Batavia; a few remained in Ambon, Timor and Rabaul from which most were moved later to the main concentration areas.

On Singapore the RASC set up a base supply depot to issue to all of the captive formations, of which the AASC provided a small element; 8 and 9 Sup Pers Sects established a DID to receive bulk and issue to AIF units while 1 Fd Bky baked bread. CAASC 8 Div Lieut-Col Byrne was responsible for food, an AIF canteen and purchase of hospital supplements, and distribution of Red Cross foodstuffs and firewood; these were, however, progressively transferred to HQ AIF’s direct control as AASC officers and members were progressively included in work groups requisitioned by the Japanese. After the initial period when the Japanese left their prisoners to their own devices, about 1,000 AASC members were absorbed into the work parties throughout the island on clearance of war damage, the wharves, warehouses and salvage, under the command of Maj J.H. Parry of 2 Coy and Maj R.V. Glasgow of 8 Div Amn Sub- Park. Those groups returned to Changi at the end of the year but by then depletion of the numbers had already commenced in a series of ‘forces’ sent abroad, formed from the POW population at large, in which AASC provided its proportionate one eighth of the AIF representation. First was the 3,000 man A Force, including 450 AASC members with Senior Supply Officer Maj F.J. Campbell, sent to Burma in May 1942 for airfield construction at Victoria Point, Mergui and Tavoy, where conditions and work were tolerable. Next B Force including 308 AASC under Maj J.B.J. Lawler of 1 Coy in July left for airfield work at Sandakan in North Borneo; and an initial group of 33 men under Lieut G.F. Hamilton in August to Japan 70.

A significant change came to the work party scene in Singapore after the early months. Hitherto they had provided the opportunity for a break from the Changi environment, the opportunity to earn work pay from their captors, and on the side acquire any food or useful property which they might be able to get away with, but from hereon the drafts were headed for the Thai-Burma railway and Borneo. In October 1942 A Force had been augmented by two other forces from Java via Changi, one of which was Blackforce commanded by Lieut-Col C.M. Black with his 2/3 Res MT Coy and 2/105 GT Coy. The entire group was directed to the Burma section of the railway, and the increasing work quotas and casualties from overwork, diet, exposure, brutality and disease began to take their toll, minimised only by the dedication of A Force commander Brig A.L. Varley of 22nd Brigade and his medical staff in ameliorating some of the worst excesses; but the over-age men of the reserve motor transport, expected to suffer particularly severely in these adverse conditionsm held their own with thir younger co-prisoners. The other major group to the railway from Changi was F Force, committed to the Thai section in April 1943, one of whose four AIF battalions was commanded by Maj J.H. Parry and comprised AASC members and others. Committed piecemeal with other smaller forces on the Thai section, and without an Australian leader of Varley’s calibre, these groups suffered severely, the most effective intervention coming from such medical leaders as Maj Bruce Hunt.

While Capt A. Mull in A Force had found the odds of escape stacked against him, being shot when intercepted by hostile locals north of Moulmein, those in B Force in Borneo found an apparently more conducive environment. Shortly after arrival at Sandakan, six AASC members got away – LcpI H.R. Thackson and Pte M.J. Carr of 1 Coy and Dvrs E.A. Allen, M.E. Jacka, N.A. Shelley and T.I. Harrington of 8 Div Amn Sub-Park, only to be caught and sent to the horrors of Outram Road prison in Singapore for a four year sentence. E Force with Lieut M.J.K. Potter and 25 other 8 Div Amn Sub-Park members plus 15 from 2/2, 2/3, 2/4 Res MT Coys and 2/3 MAC arrived in April. Sgt R.W. Butler joined an escape party which made its way to the Philippines where he joined the guerrilla movement and was killed in action, an honourable death which was denied to most of his fellows, who were brought to death or murdered in the infamous death marches in the closing stages of the war. WO2 C.Y. Watson of 8 Div AASC commanded the first Australian group of 350 on this march to Ranau at the end of January 1945 but when the second party arrived they found only five had survived systematic starvation. Two AASC members of the later group made their escape from the final tragedy – WO2 W.H. Stipcewich of 8 Div AASC and Pte H. Reither of 2/4 Res MT Coy, warned of impending massacre by a friendly guard after 9th Division’s landing; Stipcewich survived, one of six out of nearly two thousand Australians.

Prisoners of Japan

As well as the initial group sent to Japan in 1942, two other major ones containing some AASC members arrived in 1943 – G Force commanded by Maj R.V. Glasgow of 8 Div Amn Sub-Park in April and J Force under CAASC Lieut-Col Byrne in May. These groups provided labour in mines, shipyards, oil drilling and other industrial work, on below-subsistence rations and subject to the usual brutality. Others were scattered in small numbers throughout the Islands, Capt S.A. Rose the surviving AASC officer from Ambon and the remainder of that force being subjected to calculated attrition leading to 75 percent mortality 71. The large numbers of AASC deaths in World War 2, compared with the lesser numbers from the continuing intense fighting in World War 1, are substantially the result of this cowardly and barbaric abuse of defenceless men. While succeeding generations of Japanese cannot be held responsible for the sub-human behaviour of the perpetrators, it was a widespread aggravated act which cannot be forgiven – being without acknowledgement, apology or prospect of reparation. It must remain a national blot to be erased by ongoing responsible civilised behaviour.

Evacuation of Recovered Prisoners

Occupation of Japan

For some time after the Japanese surrender it seemed as though the Australian forces might not, as happened after World War 1, participate in the occupation forces. Protracted negotiations with a reluctant US Command saw a decision that a Commonwealth presence in Japan was necessary ‘to represent the British Commonwealth prestige in the eyes of their allies and the Japanese’ and ‘to demonstrate to the Japanese their democratic ways of life and living standards’ – lofty objectives indeed, and unfortunately the latter not always lived up to. Although the contingent was to be known as British Commonwealth Occupation Force, the United Kingdom forces were initially committed to reclaiming their prestige in their occupied territories and protectorates, so Australia took an initial leading role – 34th Brigade and supporting troops were concentrated at Morotai, arriving in Japan in the late winter of 1946 by which time the US forces were well and truly entrenched.

HQ 34th Brigade, accompanied by HQ 168 GT Coy, 122 Tpt Pl and 168 Wksp Pl, arrived at the designated British Commonwealth Base area in the devastated naval base of Kure on 13 February, commencing unloading of their own transport ship immediately and so beginning seven months of twenty-four hour shift operation. The follow up elements, 256 Sup Dep PL, 20 Fd Bch Pl and Det 6 MAC were in the base three weeks later, to be followed shortly after by further units raised at Bathurst: HQ CAASC BCOF, HQ 169 GT Coy, 123 and 124 GT Pls, 169 Wksp Pl, 257 and 258 Sup Dep Pls to service the other concentrations of Australian forces. DDST Col H.M. Frencham and staff were part of HQ BCOF on Ita Jima Island near Kure. The original company was progressively built up with 119, 120, 121Tpt Pls, and the supply organisation by HQ 41 ASD, 252-255, 257 and 258 Sup Dep Pls, 47 Fd Bky, 6 Refrig Plant Op Pl, 78 BIPOD Pl and 8 Port Det; RASC and RIASC units supplemented this group, although these were withdrawn with the UK forces two years later. A succession of commanders of this grouping began with CAASCs Lt Cols C.E. Jones and R. Durance, then CRAASCs Lt Cols W.L. Day, H. Fairclough and B.J. McNevin72

 

On January 22th.1942

the Balikpapan ‘s Dai Nippon invasion force was sighted heading south through the Makassar Strait.

The Dutch air force attacked the convoy continuously during daylight, but its antiquated Martin B-10 bombers inflicted little damage. In the predawn hours of the 24th the Japanese landed 5,500 soldiers in two separate groups. The bulk of Sakaguchi’s 56th Regimental Group came ashore north of town. A detached battalion, the Surprise Attack Unit commanded by Major Kaneuchi, landed south of Balikpapan. Guided by Indonesian fifth columnists, the latter force proceeded to the village of Banubaru, cutting off the Dutch line of retreat. Having learned from hard experience at Tarakan, where Dutch coastal artillery had sunk two warships, the Japanese were avoiding the big guns defending Balikpapan.

In the event, the Dutch did not attempt to hold their positions. Hoogenband had received orders to withdraw inland after completing sabotage operations. He led an infantry column out of town, along the road to Banubaru. The Dutch ran into the advancing main body of Kaneuchi’s Surprise Attack Unit, and the Japanese promptly gave battle. Han fought as part of a machine gun crew, feeding the ammunition belt into the weapon as the gunner mowed down the leading edge of the oncoming enemy. The KNIL troops were defeated and the Dutch force broke up. With no other alternatives but death or capture, Samethini joined a group of survivors heading north into the jungle towards their only hope of escape, the airfield at Samarinda. [3]

on the January, 24th,1942

 the same day they landed at Balikpapan. Amboina Island was occupied a week later by a strong force which overcame the small Dutch and Australian garrison with little difficulty. By the end of the month the Japanese controlled the Molucca Sea and were in position to cut the line between Java and Australia and to breach the east flank of the Malay Barrier.

On the western flank of the barrier, the Japanese had early secured the South China Sea approaches and

Offshore it had been a different story.

At approximately 20.00 hours (8 pm) on the 24th,

 American destroyers of Des Div 59 attacked the invasion convoy, sinking four troop transports and an escort vessel. The next day two more transports were claimed, one by Dutch and American bombers, the other by a Dutch submarine. This was the largest naval action since the start of the Pacific War, but the brief Allied tactical victory could not change the outcome of events on land.

Over the next several days, Han and his companions hacked their way through a tangled wilderness teeming with malarial mosquitoes. Pursued and repeatedly attacked, they reached Samarinda and boarded a plane for Java. As the transport winged over Borneo’s deep green forests and muddy brown rivers, Han might have gazed out the window and reflected on this land of opportunity that had so suddenly become a place of death and defeat. But he was not a man to dwell on regrets. Surely Anna and Margie were alive and waiting for him in Surabaya. That mattered more than anything. [4]

On that day, they took their captives to the nearby sea shore:

Even eight patients from the local hospital were among the group of 78 victims marched to a beach near the old Klandasan Fortress. Two of the victims were then beheaded on the beach, the other 76 forced into the sea…all were shot one by one, their bodies left to drift with the tide. [5]

The only way out: Samarinda II airfield, Borneo
(Allied air recce photo taken in 1944)

on the 25th January

 

The women and children were sent on by road to Pontianak on the coast, whence they escaped by ship on the 25th January,

only four days before the Japanese occupied the town. Lane placed his battalion under Dutch command for the defence of the airfield and the surrounding area.

There followed a breathing space while the Japanese prepared for their next advance, though clashes took place between patrols near the border.

The Japanese troops in Singkawang, 1942.
The man with the moustache on the right is Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi
.

1942

Envelope, ca 1942,

 10¢ on 12½¢ South Celebes Naval Occupation anchor resurcharge entire (Bulterman 238), pristine mint, Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $1,500 – 2,000.

1942, stampless cover from Makassar to Nagoya, Japan, large-size, with Dutch VELDPOSTCENSUUR (Field Post Censor) seal, red DINES POS handstamp and Makassar cds on front, Makassar backstamp, Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

1942, local Pontianak cover, franked on the reverse with Japan 2s, 1s and 5s Showa definitives, indistinct red censor’s stamp on the front, Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Japanese planned to attack the airfield from the north, and also from the west by a force landed on the coast. This attack was held up by bad weather for nearly a week, but on the 24th January five companies advanced along the road from the Dutch border, and

 

 by the 25th had reached a village two and a half miles north-east of the airfield. Having destroyed the stores and barracks, the defenders launched an attack

Meanwhile three Japanese companies had left Kuching in small craft during the night of the 25th

 

on the 26th which was repulsed.

That evening a counter-attack succeeded in turning their flank and

early on the 27th

 the order was given to evacuate the airfield. A Dutch tank was used to hold a crossroads for a while. During the withdrawal two Punjabi platoons were surrounded but, refusing to surrender, they fought on under their Indian officer until late in the afternoon.

 It was only when their ammunition was expended and the enemy was attacking in overwhelming numbers that the gallant little party laid down its arms. Japanese reports have since given their casualties at the hands of these two platoons as between 400 and 500 killed or wounded.

Of the seventy Punjabis engaged only three escaped. The remainder were never seen again; there is evidence to show that they were brutally put to death by the infuriated Japanese.

On the evening of the 27th January

the remnants of the Punjabis crossed the Sungei Sambas and took up a position on the high ground at Ledo, fifteen miles south-west of the airfield.

and by daybreak on the 27th

 had landed at Pemangkat due west of the airfield. Striking north-east and south and meeting with little opposition, they quickly captured the coastal villages and moved towards Bengkajang, thus threatening to surround the Allied force at Ledo.

After the fighting at Singkawang II airfield the British-Dutch forces retreated to Sanggau. There this force was split and the Dutch troops went to Sintang, while the British-Indian troops went to Nanga Pinoh.

On the 29th,

after a series of rearguard actions, the Punjabis withdrew to Ngabang and two days later to Nanga Pinoh.

 By this time further resistance was useless,

.

 

2.February 1942

February,1st.1942

the Japanese occupied the Pontianak town

A formation of Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” Japanese medium bombers.
This type flew missions against Surabaya from Kendari, Celebes.

“There was chaos everywhere….”
Japanese bombs fall on Surabaya (February 1942)

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

and on the 4th February 1942

the Punjabis with Dutch agreement set out in two columns for Sampit and Pangkalanboeoen on the south coast. The British tried to get out of Borneo by going south. Their aim was to find a radio station at Sampit (or if that failed at Pangkalanboen) in order to get contact with Java Island or to reach one of the harbours in the south of Borneo.

The force at Nanga Pinoh was split in three parts: A (Sikh), B (PM) Company and part of Staff (Hindu) Company under command of Major Milligan formed the western column, which took the shorter route, C (Khattack), D (Jat) and part of Staff (Hindu) Company under command of Lieutenant Colonel Ross-Thompson formed the eastern column, which took the longer route and the blitzparty. The blitzparty consisted of 2 officers and 4 men and it was their task to go as fast as possible to Sampit in order to get contact with Java Island

February. 6th, 1942

Sydney Morning Herald (February 6, 1942)
National Library of Australia
Japan’s fearsome Zero fighter planes inflicted heavy casualties on the Dutch and Allied interceptors, and the city was soon without effective air defense:

The following week a few more air raids are directed on fortifications outside Surabaya, but the scattered pillboxes and gun emplacements are perfectly camouflaged and no direct hit is suffered. The enemy aircraft, unchallenged since the last Dutch plane was downed, fly low over the dense swamp vegetation in an effort to draw fire and so pinpoint our gun positions. But the order by the fort commander is clear: repulse enemy landings on the beaches and nothing else. Do not shoot at aircraft, do not even shake a fist at them lest they spot you. Keep your head low and swear if you must, but all all events stay out of sight. What kind of war is this? [10]
By the middle of February, Singapore had surrendered,

Read more

THE BATTLE FOR SINGAPORE 

The True Story of Britain’s Greatest Military Disaster 

Peter Thompson –

General Arthur Percival, ill-fated British commanding officer in Singapore, Olga and Maisie Prout, the brave sisters who defied the Japanese during the occupation of the island colony and Captain William ‘Bill’ Drower, the man the Japanese couldn’t kill. Their dramatic stories are told in The Battle for Singapore

the bulk of the American army in the Philippines was bottled up on the Bataan Peninsula,

and the Japanese had taken Palembang in southern Sumatra.

The enemy was now on Java’s doorstep. Getting 24 hours’ leave, Frank entered Surabaya to find the town “swarming with British and Australian soldiers.” There were also American air and artillery units on Java.

 These hastily collected reinforcements, belatedly shipped to the East Indies without adequate arms or supplies, were too little, too late

The following week a few more air raids are directed on fortifications outside Surabaya, but the scattered pillboxes and gun emplacements are perfectly camouflaged and no direct hit is suffered. The enemy aircraft, unchallenged since the last Dutch plane was downed, fly low over the dense swamp vegetation in an effort to draw fire and so pinpoint our gun positions. But the order by the fort commander is clear: repulse enemy landings on the beaches and nothing else. Do not shoot at aircraft, do not even shake a fist at them lest they spot you. Keep your head low and swear if you must, but all all events stay out of sight. What kind of war is this? [10]

(ibid Frank semethini)

on 8th February 1942,

 without waiting for the fall of Singapore, launched their attack on southern Sumatra. From Camranh Bay in Indochina came a strong naval force to support the transports headed for Palembang with its airfield and oil refinery. On the 14th about 700 paratroopers were dropped in the Palembang area, but achieved only a limited success against the Dutch and British defenders. At the end of the day Allied troops were still in control, but next morning, when the main Japanese force landed upshore and began to move toward Palembang, they withdrew. Two days later, the Japanese were in control of southern Sumatra, leaving the northern part of the island to the conquerors of Singapore. Only the Straits of Sunda now separated the Japanese from their main objective, Java.45

Shortly before midnight of 8 February,

 under cover of an extremely heavy artillery bombardment, the Japanese began to cross the straits.

By the morning of the February. 9th,

they had established a firm position on the island and were pouring reinforcements into the lodgment area. From there the Japanese spread over the island, infiltrating the defender’s lines and isolating them into small pockets of resistance.

 

 

From Balikpapan, the Japanese moved on to Bandjermasin, along the southeast coast of Borneo, which they took on

On 9 Feb 1942,

The day before the Japanese entered the island, he reported he could leave immediately on a cargo ship; however he was instructed to stay at his post as Australia’s most senior civilian official otherwise Canberra “would be deprived of independent information and effect on morale would be bad’. 

 

Of the adventures of the two columns on their long journey through the almost unexplored jungles and swamps of southern Borneo much might be written. Travelling by forest track and by raft and boat on treacherous rivers, short of food and clothing, and constantly exposed to tropical heat and rain they finally reached the coast. The blitzparty arrived at Sampit on

 14th February 1942,

On the February. 15th

 General Percival, with his water, food, and ammunition gone, decided that further resistance was impossible. That afternoon, he met Yamashita at the Ford Motor Factory and formally surrendered his command, an act which symbolized the end of British imperial power in the Far East.43

 

 

 

On 15 Feb,1942

After the British surrender(in Singapore),

 he and two colleagues escaped on a small boat to Sumatra where they were intercepted and forced to land on Bangka island. 

 At Muntock, Bowden tried to explain his diplomatic status but was then beaten by Japanese guards and taken outside. According to later reports, was shot after being forced to dig his own grave.

MEANTIME ON JAVA, AUSTRALIA’S TRADE COMMISSIONER to the Dutch-controlled East Indies, Herbert Anton Peterson, moved his office from Batavia (now Jakarta) to Bandung as the Japanese navy won sea battles in the Sunda Straits and Java Sea.

His wife was safely back in Australia but he had already lost one son in airborne operations and another was a POW in Italy.

 

 

.

(3)FEBRUARY,15TH. 1942

On Sunday the 15th of February we received the bad news over the radio that Singapore had fallen into Japanese hands. Indeed, that was a very sad Sunday. Who had ever thought that Singapore could fall? Were the Japanese so much stronger than the Allies? And then there was the Battle of the Java Sea from 27 February to 1 March 1942. The Dutch warships Ruyter and Java were hit by Japanese torpedoes; they sunk with a huge loss of life. The Allies lost this battle..

.Jungle and Indian Ocean

Soon it was the New Year.

 We had no more Japanese visitors. There were not many Dutch or other Europeans outside of camps.

 In Malang there was already a camp for men called Marine Camp. And another camp, we were told, called De Wijk, prepared to house women and children. Taking a long, last walk through the rubber plantations and jungle, my father and I beheld the Indian Ocean. My father looked at me and said, “I have to ask you something, you are almost 16 so you are old enough. I want you to look after Mama and your sisters when I have to leave Sumber Sewa. Will you promise me that?” I remonstrated, but he insisted and I agreed.

And so, at the beginning of February 1942, my father received a phone call ordering him to leave our home in Sumber Sewu within six days and report to the Marine Camp in Malang. This would be a fateful separation. By now, most Dutch men were internees.

A Japanese visitor

.

On Sunday the 15th of February

we received the bad news over the radio that Singapore had fallen into Japanese hands. Indeed, that was a very sad Sunday. Who had ever thought that Singapore could fall?

Were the Japanese so much stronger than the Allies?

BATTLE OF BADOENG STRAIT

Allied ships were in two groups. The first were Dutch cruisers DE RUYTER, JAVA, Dutch destroyers PIET HEIN and the American JOHN D FORD, and POPE. Dutch destroyer BANCKERT was part of the force, but ran aground at the mouth of Tjilatjap harbour and could not proceed.

The second group was Dutch cruiser TROMP from Surabaya and American destroyers STEWART, PARROTT, JOHN D EDWARDS and PILLSBURY from Ratai Bay.

STEWART was damaged by Japanese gunfire, with one enlisted man killed and the executive officer LT C B Smiley and one enlisted man wounded. JOHN D EDWARDS had one enlisted man wounded. PIET HEIN (Lt Cdr J M L I Chompff) was lost with all but 33 of her crew and TROMP was badly damaged

F4-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942
F5-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942

I can see now why the pilots came from VLG-IV, All other fighter pilots were either in Borneo or Malay so it stands to reason these planes were attached to this flightgroup.

If we have those squadrons we can hold the DEI at last

B.t.w. I think in patch 1.5 the update path for the Dutch should include the Hurricanes. Somehow I think this is already the case.

Oh yeah, they will really really really (not!) make the difference! lol, will add some flavour though. In aircombat reports instead of own losses 100%, Japanese losses nil, I might actually see, own losses 99%, Japanese losses: 1 damaged (lightly)

True about the updates, I am sure they would have gotten some… eventually… if we held on to some more of the DEI, if we had a few more escaped pilots, if we weren´t incorporated into the RAF or RAAF, and if we had beggedddddd for it long enough.. lol.. if… if… if. (hmm… we might even have gotten 320th squadron transfereed to the pacific… should i ask if they can……. naww… better not

Well then here is my wish list..

Fokker G1
Fokker Fokker DXXI

With these two we can start making plans to invade Japan

 I believe that a total of four squadrons were sent to Singapore/Malaya. An agreement had been reached pre-war between the Dutch and the British in Singapore under which Dutch units were to reinforce the defenses of Singapore (and Malaya). This agreement provided for the assignment of three squadrons of bombers and 1 squadron of fighters to British command, as well as the deployment of Dutch submarines along the coast of Malaya. The Dutch air units sent to Singapore/Malaya included all three squadrons of III-Group and the Brewster Fighters of 2-VLG-V. However, 2-VLG-III (with Martins) was withdrawn quite early for additional training in night bombing (about the 15th of December) and was not present when the remaining air units were withdrawn from the Malayan peninsula to Singapore.

The build up was a less than happy story

 during 1941 and 1942,

until the imperative of Japanese landings at Lae and Salamaua

 on 7 March 1942,

 Finschhafen on 10 March

AT 09:00 ON 8 MAR,

 THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Allied forces, Ter Poorten, announced the surrender of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in Java. On 12 Mar, the senior British, Australian and American commanders were summoned to Bandung where the formal instrument of surrender was signed in the presence of the Japanese commander in the area, Lieutenant-General Masao Maruyama, who promised them the rights of the Geneva Convention for the protection of prisoners of war.

Other Australians captured on Timor (from 2/40th Infantry Battalion, a component of Sparrow Force) were transferred to Java and Singapore, and then to Thailand, Japan and elsewhere. Australian troops were imprisoned in several camps in Java, particularly Bandung camp, under Lieutenant Colonel E. E. “Weary” Dunlop. In October 1942 this group and others were moved to Makasura, near Batavia. In January 1943, as part of the 900-strong Dunlop Force (under Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop) the prisoners were transported from Java to Konyu, Thailand.

By the end of March,

the vast area of sea and land from New Guinea and northwest Australia to central Burma, which had formed ABDACOM, was under Japanese control. Only to the north, in the Philippines, where American and Filipino troops still stood fast, had the Japanese failed to meet their timetable of conquest.

On 31st March 1942

a Japanese ship arrived at Pangkalanboen (or Koemai).

Retreat into the jungle-covered mountains was considered, but the bitter experience of the past few weeks had made it clear that troops could not long survive the trying climatic conditions. The order to surrender was therefore given

2.April 1942

1) April,1st 1942

a) on 1st April 1942

all arms were surrendered. At Kotawaringin airfield was stationed a small Dutch force (ca. 250 men).

This garrison was never engaged in any fighting and they probably laid down their arms on the same day the British did.

In the ten weeks since leaving Kuching 2/15th Punjab had fought many actions, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, and had traveled under most adverse conditions over 800 miles through extremely difficult country.

They had carried with them their light automatics, rifles and ammunition. As

 General Percival

 has said, it was ‘a feat of endurance which assuredly will rank high in the annals of warfare. It says much for the morale of this fine battalion that it remained a formed and disciplined body to the end.’

Read more

General Arthur Percival, ill-fated British commanding officer in Singapore, Olga and Maisie Prout, the brave sisters who defied the Japanese during the occupation of the island colony and Captain William ‘Bill’ Drower, the man the Japanese couldn’t kill. Their dramatic stories are told in The Battle for Singapore

 

 

 

With recapture of the Buna-Gona area the strategic objective of securing Papua from use as a base against Australia was effected, and the next phase was to secure airfields for use in operations against Japanese forces in the Philippines and Rabaul.

The first move in the reconquest of New Guinea was the attempted thrust from Wau to Salamaua to tie up enemy forces. A small raiding group called Kanga Force was based at Wau in the Eastern Highlands

in April 1942

 to operate against Lae and Salamaua, but its depredations drew a countermove by the Japanese to Mubo. This caused the force to destroy the facilities, stores and vehicles at Wau and Bulolo, unnecessarily as it turned out, exacerbating future maintenance problems, particularly with the priority given to the parallel operations on the Kokoda Track.

Although there were airstrips at Wau and Bulolo, it was decided to attempt an alternate water-road crossing by driving a road through the divide from the Lakekamu riverhead in the south to Wau on the north side of the range.

AASC support was controlled by DADST Bulldog L of C Area who had detachments of 15 Sup Pers Coy and 2 BIPOD to support the southern base.

Detachments of 1 and 3 Pack Tpt Coys, which became increasingly surplus as the Kokoda operation concluded, were allotted as part of the construction workforce.

The route finally consisted of small ships from Port Moresby to Terapo, rivercraft to Grim Point, tramline to Bulldog, and vehicle to Wau via Edie creek.

May,12th.1942

1942, card from Pontianak to Soerabaja (Bulterman 208a), a 3½¢ Pontianak large anchor naval occupation card, showing large anchor in violet used to Soerabaja cancelled by pontianak 12.6.21 cds, Very Fine.
Estimate $1,000 – 1,500

 

NEW GUINEA

PART OF A TASK FORCE HITTING THE BEACH at Aitape. 22 April (top). Reinforcements moving inland to their bivouac area (bottom). This landing was one of three made that day on the northern coast of New Guinea. Earlier, the U.S. Navy pounded enemy bases in the western Carolines and western New Guinea to prevent the Japanese from launching attacks against these landing forces.

and Gona on 31 July,

 followed by the thrust through Kokoda towards Port Moresby, forced a change from the tropical ennui of both Administration public service and base military command – the former replaced by the military Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit, the latter by Headquarters New Guinea Force.

The effect of the Japanese attempts on Port Moresby and Milne Bay was to galvanise Land Headquarters into pouring increasing supply, transport and construction effort into the bases in the all too familiar pattern of post-trauma oversupply.

 In consequence, while the force was starved of basic needs in the early critical period, over the following two years when the threat had subsided and operations moved to the north coast, an unnecessarily large component and installations were retained in a base which became progressively less used as ships resupplied direct to bases on the northern coast and islands.

 

The Japanese thrust from Buna made first contact with 39th Battalion on 23 July 1942 at Awala,

GREEN ISLAND

ALLIED FORCES LANDING ON GREEN ISLAND from LST’s. While the fighting continued in New Guinea, the Allies occupied Green and Emirau Islands, completing the encirclement of the once powerful Japanese base at Rabaul.

 

 

 

 

NEW GUINEA

MEDIUM TANKS AND THEIR CREWS pause in their drive toward the airstrip during the first day ashore. Tank in the foreground is temporarily out of use. The landing at Aitape was designed to engage the enemy in the area and provide air support for the troops at Hollandia.

CAPTURED ENEMY SOLDIER BEING QUESTIONED
at Aitape. The operation there gave the Allies another airstrip.

REMAINS OF A LIGHTNING FIGHTER PLANE P-38 which crashed during a landing (top), and a Flying Fortress B-17 which crashed when its right wheel gave way on an airstrip at Aitape (bottom). Since spare parts to maintain aircraft were difficult to obtain, maintenance men would strip crashed and crippled planes of usable parts almost before the engines cooled.

(pics coming soon)

ENEMY OIL DUMP ABLAZE from preinvasion naval fire as troops (top) and tanks (bottom) make their way inland from one of the invasion bases at Hollan-dia, 22 April. Forces invaded Hollandia, landing at Tanahmerah Bay and 25 miles to the east at Humbolt Bay. Simultaneous landings were made at Aitape, 90 miles east of Hollandia.

HOLLANDIA AREA NEW GUINEA, looking west from Humboldt Bay across Jautefa Bay to Lake Sentani, center background. The lake is approximately eight air miles inland; the three airfields were about fifteen air miles inland, north of the lake.

TROOPS MOVING INLAND on 22 April found the way through the swampy areas near Hollandia difficult (top). The men exercised much caution as they penetrated the jungle toward the Hollandia airstrips (bottom). The landings were virtually unopposed since the enemy had taken to the hills.

LAKE SEtNTANI NEAR HOLLANDIA.
Men in a “Buffalo,” LVT(A) (2), are firing a machine gun at enemy riflemen hidden in the bushes (top); troops wade through knee-deep water, 27 April (bottom). Despite the dense jungle and lack of overland communications, satisfactory progress was made. The three airfields at Hollandia were taken within five days of the landings.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS ON A BEACH NEAR HOLLANDIA. Trucks lined up along the water’s edge have just been unloaded from the LST in the background (top) ; a conveyor being used to help unload supplies (bottom). As soon as the airstrips were in full operation and the port facilities at Hollandia developed, U.S. forces were ready for further attacks at points along the northwestern coast of New Guinea.

155-MM. HOWITZER M1918 firing on Japanese positions. Only slight opposition was encountered when a regimental combat team debarked on 17 May at Arare just east of a major enemy supply and staging point at Sarmi.

MAIN ROAD AT ARARE being used to transport supplies, 24 May. On 18 May, with artillery support from the mainland, near-by Wakde Island was assaulted. The next day the large airfield there was taken at a cost of about a hundred U.S. casualties.

BIAK ISLAND

TROOPS ON BIAK ISLAND. While the positions on Wakde and in the Arare area were being consolidated, other units assaulted Biak, about 200 miles to the west, on 27 May. Only slight opposition was met during the first day ashore; on the second day the advance inland was stopped by heavy enemy fire. On 29 May the enemy counterattacked and a bitter battle ensued.

ADVANCING INLAND ON BIAK; note cave beneath footbridge. Biak was assaulted to broaden the front for air deployment.

CAVES ON BIAK, which constituted the major Japanese strong points, were north of the airfield. The enemy, entrenched in other caves commanding the coastal road to the airstrips, launched attacks on U.S. troops, thus retarding the advances.

INFANTRYMAN READING AN ISSUE OF YANK MAGAZINE, just a few feet away from an enemy casualty. The Japanese attempt to reinforce his units on Biak was repulsed by U.S. air and naval forces and by 20 June the ground forces had captured the three airfields on the island.

NOEMFOOR ISLAND

COMMAND POST SET UP ON D DAY, 2 JULY, near Kamiri airstrip on No-emfoor Island. Note camouflaged walkie-talkie, SCR 300. The troops went ashore at points where reefs and other natural obstacles made the landings hazardous.

INFANTRYMEN CROSS THE KAM1RI AIRSTRIP, keeping low to avoid enemy fire (top); 60-mm. mortar emplacement near the airstrip, 2 July (bottom) . Prior to the landings on Noemfoor, Japanese airfields near by were effectively neutralized by aerial bombardment.

AIRDROP AT KAMIRI STRIP. The invasion lorccs on Noemfoor were reinforced by a parachute infantry regiment which dropped directly onto the airstrip.

A PARATROOPER HANGING SUSPENDED FROM A TREE in which his parachute was caught during the drop at Noemfoor. All three airfields here were captured by the night oi 6 July.

NEW GUINEA

WATER SPLASH FROM A DEPTH CHARGE dropped off the coast near Cape Sansapor, 30 July 1944. An amphibious force carried out a landing near Cape Sansapor on the Vogelkop Peninsula in western New Guinea on the same day

INFANTRYMEN MOVING ALONG THE BEACH at Cape Sansapor on 31 July; portion of LST in right background. The landings here were unopposed and the construction of new airfields began at once. By this move a large number of the enemy were bypassed and forced to begin an immediate withdrawal to the southwest coast.

CAPE SANSAPOR; note jetty projecting out from shore. The landing here was the last made by U.S. forces on the shores of New Guinea.

END OF AN A-20. The Douglas light bomber, caught by Japanese flak off the coast of New Guinea near Karas Island, goes out of control (top) and explodes (bottom).

 

pressing on through a strong rearguard action to take Kokoda and its only forward airfield

on 10 August

. The first jeeps left Wau on 23 August 1942

and, a similar convoy left Bulldog the following day, with a potential capacity of 8 tons per day by jeep and a development potential of 250 tons per day if upgraded to 3 ton vehicle level. However capture of the port of Lae the following month rendered this route irrelevant. Authorised by Blamey in December 1942 for completion in April 1943 when it would have been valuable in operations from Wau to Mubo, Salamaua and Lae 43, its continuation up to the time of the capture of Lae was an expensive waste of effort, and an indication of the excessive resources which had accumulated in the Port Moresby area.

Wau-Bulolo Road

From 14 January 1943

17th Brigade Group began to fly into Wau to match Japanese reinforcement of the Huon Gulf area. The enemy’s concern on the threat to Salamaua led to an attempt on Wau airfield, which was beaten off by flying troops in to the airfield in the thick of the battle. On the night of 29/30 January before these reinforcements arrived, when two resident battalions’ covering positions had been broken, all available forces including the transport detachment were formed in a tight perimeter around the airfield lifeline, reinforcements flying in the following morning. But by 6 February the attack was broken and 17th Brigade took up the offensive towards Mubo. Resupply remained dependent on air landing at Wau and Bulolo, air dropping to forward positions, and carrier lines for collection and distribution of air drops, so air superiority became of paramount importance in maintaining the aerial lifeline. There was, however, some limited scope for jeep traffic on the roads in the Bulolo valley, and some of the civilian vehicles damaged in the previous year’s scorched earth effort were recovered and put into operation. After a decision to threaten Salamaua to fix enemy forces there and so weaken Lae in preparation for its capture, Headquarters 3rd Division took over Kanga Force. Its buildup at Wau included an advanced HQ Comd 3 Div AASC under Lieut-Col L.C. Page, 1 Comp Pl of 2/2 Coy, detachment 152 GT Coy, 1 Sup Dep Coy, a section of 3 and all 4 Sup Dep Pl, and detachment 13 Fd Bking Pl; this was augmented as operations developed with 18 and 2/34 Sup Dep Pls. Rear HQ at Port Moresby controlled the remainder of the divisional AASC, sent forward reinforcements and assisted resupply movement 44.

When 15th Brigade arrived and entered the battle in early June there were two axes: Wau-Mubo-Komiatum and Bulolo-Misim-Bobdubi, with the additional liabilities of independent and other companies operating near the coast and along the Wampit River to the Markham at Nadzab, then a landing of 162nd (US) Regiment at Nassau Bay at the end of June. Maintenance of the units forward was based on FSDs and FADs resupplied by jeep towards Mubo and air drop at Missim, with forward deliveries by air drop and porter. The Markham area was supplied by air drop at Zenag, 3 Pack Tpt Coy delivering part of the way forward to carrier lines.

All supplies were air lifted from Port Moresby until a trickle started to come over the Bulldog road in August, at which stage a partially successful attempt was made to release aircraft from air supply for the planned air assault at Nadzab, the eastern supply route switching largely to native carriers resupplied from watercraft landing at Tambu Bay after its capture by the US regiment. Rear HQ CAASC was established at Bulolo, with the forward HQ following the slow advance, and eventually transferring to Tambu. In this final phase DIDs located at an air dropping ground, with covered storage for supplies and ammunition, were established at Dobdubi for 15th Brigade and Komiatum for 29th Brigade (which had replaced the 17th), acting as bases for the final thrusts which captured Salamaua

on 11 September 45.

The major operation in finally breaking the Japanese hold on New Guinea was the capture of Lae, held by XVIII Army, the conqueror of Malaya nearly two years earlier.

This was to be followed inland by clearing the enemy from the Markham and Ramu Valleys and capturing Madang, and a parallel move around the coast to clear it of enemy and link with a US landing at Saidor to seal off any withdrawal. The plan for destruction of the enemy in Lae was for a triple thrust – one from 7th Division air landed at Nadzab, a second from a 9th Division amphibious landing to the east, while 3rd Division tied up as great a part the enemy force as possible by pressing at Salamaua. On 4 September 9th Division landed 20th and 26th Brigades on the coast 25 km east of Lae followed a day later by 24th Brigade; on 7 September 7th Division began air landing at Nadzab following capture and clearance of the airfield by US paratroops.

On the first day of 7th Division’s landing, part of 2/102 Comp Pl was inserted to open airhead depots as a base. 25th Brigade began the advance on Lae, drawing on these depots, until the rate of progress required the fly-in of 6 Sup Dep PI to establish depots every few kilometres, from which units drew. In the absence of unit or AASC transport these depots had to leapfrog each other to stay with the forward units and always keep a supply and ammunition point open for issues. A dozen jeeps and trailers of 153 GT Coy flown in on 8 September to keep these depots resupplied from the airhead were augmented over the following week with an additional 28, but many of these became dispersed on casualty evacuation and assisting the brigades forward. The heavy call on the drivers and vehicles for 24 hour operation was countered by establishing a maintenance squad which serviced and carried out necessary running repairs on each vehicle daily, releasing exhausted drivers for rest and also ensuring that vehicles did not suffer the same problem 46. The shortness of both the action and distances moved had allowed this shoestring of supplies and transport resources to get away with what might otherwise have been a large and slow build up which in turn would have slowed up the thrust as had happened in 7th Division’s advance to Kokoda and the coast a year before. This system lasted the ten days required, but then the main body of 2/2 Sup Dep Coy and 153 GT Coy had to be phased in for the following Markham and Ramu Valley operations.

Support of 7 Div assault on Lae

9th Division’s sea assault to the east had been almost copybook, an event enhanced by the lack of opposition. AASC units and supplies arrived at the main Red Beach on tank landing craft and ships from an hour and three quarters after the initial assault, the first vessels being unloaded rapidly, the later wave held up for lack of unloading manpower, as mechanical handling equipment was virtually non-existent. The advance of 24th Brigade along the shoreline towards Lae was hampered successively by the Buso, Burep, Busu and Bumbu rivers, which also posed a barrier for the following AASC units. Engineers bulldozed a track for a few kilometres from the landing beach, but forward of that the only immediate solution to stop resupply problems holding up the advance was use of landing craft drawing on 2/6 Sup Dep Coy dumps at Red Beach and delivering to the forward units along the coast. A complicating factor intruded when 26th Brigade was swung inland up the Burep and then west to the Busu, without the benefit of the coastwise resupply option. Initially 2/156 GT Coy allotted one platoon to clear the beach, a second to deliver to forward dumps and the third for forward distribution. As the front moved westwards supply depot platoons established issue points on the beaches close to the forward units, replenished nightly by landing craft from Red Beach, with inland deliveries made by jeep over rough tracks 47.

Support of 9 Div assault on Lae

7th Division was the first to enter Lae

on 16 September,

just ahead of 9th Division from the east, held back for a moment by artillery fire from the latter, while an element of 3rd Division also came up from Salamaua, but the trap failed, the enemy having broken clear north across the Finisterre Mountains before it closed. The unexpectedly rapid capture of Lae had two effects – it showed that there was an alternative to the long and debilitating slogging matches which had characterised the overland reduction of the Japanese coastal enclaves in the Gona-Buna and Salamaua areas, and it incited a series of further coastwise operations which retook the Huon Peninsula in five months and then pushed on to the Sepik River. The effect on logistics was profound.

Firstly there was an introduction to amphibious landings, in which the American perception was of an over-casual Australian approach of fixing problems as they occurred and ignoring logistics, bringing sharp criticism from Macarthur’s staff 48. While the Australian staffs justified their approach as flexible and avoiding US over-centralisation, in the organised chaos of an opposed landing a high degree of pre-organisation was essential to minimise such fiascos as the failure to land 9mm ammunition for the Owen guns in the Finschhafen assault, a dangerous situation remedied only by a brigade headquarters standing that night in a clearing with torches pointing upwards to mark the area, and the ammunition raining down about them from Boomerang fighters. Without the experience and ultra-serious approach to detail of the US 7th Fleet and US Army Engineers Special Boat and Shore Regiments the landings could have faced real difficulties without the resources or time to remedy them which are often possible in land based operations. This experience stood in good stead for the later landings in Borneo.

The other effect was the use of landing craft and amphibians for resupply, from base sub-area to divisional maintenance area to forward distribution points, instead of the hitherto pervasive and fragile mix of air drop, carrier line and some motor tracks hewn out at enormous effort. While the forces operating in and from the Markham-Ramu valleys had to rely on the latter, the coastal fighting largely featured rapid advances and seaward outflanking movement, sustained by a plentiful array of landing craft allotted for the operational and logistic support of forces which were then the centre of activity in the Southwest Pacific.

 However this plenty was transitory. Departure of the airborne troops which had brought an undreamed of fleet of 300 DC-3 aircraft into the area, and the onwards roll of the amphibious effort to the US Marine and Army landings through the Marshalls and Marianas, in the Solomons, Aitape, New Britain, Manus, and Dutch New Guinea, then on to Morotai and the Philippines, took with them this array of support, leaving the Australian divisions much as they had been in late 1942 until RAE water transport units could be raised, equipped and brought on site. Paucity of landing craft and aircraft available for logistic support of their operations once again became a significant factor in the pace of advance in the final campaigns in 1945.

Six days after the fall of Lae 9th Division’s 20th Brigade was landed east of Finschhafen. It was another assault landing, taking with it two weeks of stocks and expecting to be resupplied from day 5. Unloading was to be manual, infantry soldiers being detailed to provide 200 men for each of the three LSTs allotted for carriage of stores. An innovation to maintain control of the beachhead missing earlier at Red Beach was a Military Landing Officer with a control staff, which was further developed for the Borneo operations into a Beach Group. The assault wave before dawn on 21 September went well to the left of the designated Scarlet Beach, consequently the follow up waves landing in the correct place faced unexpected opposition. HQ CAASC representative Maj A.J. Overell arrived at 0600 hours, just as the beach was secured, the LCTs arriving at 0700 and being sent off within two hours to avoid air attack, one still partly loaded with the stocks of 9mm ammunition mentioned earlier. 27 Sup Dep PI established food, fuel and ammunition dumps at the beach while a detachment of 2/156 GT Coy provided the transport for beach clearance and delivery forward, though this had to be restricted to jeep traffic owing to the bad condition of the tracks. The beach area continued to be subject to bombing with consequent casualties and loss of stocks, while drivers along the tracks received the attention of snipers as they delivered replenishment to the advancing infantry units.

Increasing enemy resistance made it obvious that the brigade which had landed had bitten off more than it could chew, and the remainder of 9th Division was progressively called forward: Finschhafen fell on 2 October 1943. A divisional maintenance area with an Advanced HQ Comd 9 Div AASC was established on the outskirts of Selankaua plantation, and the Advanced Supply, Petrol and Ammunition Depots set up by 27 Sup Dep Pl were resupplied daily from Lae by landing craft across the beach, local issue points being established to service divisional troops, and forward ones for the brigades. The transport available could barely cope with the beach clearance, much less forward delivery, so half of 2/156 Coy was brought in 2½ ton GMCs releasing the overworked jeeps for forward distribution tasks. Nine DUKWs were used for inter-beach work, though Japanese aircraft and over-enthusiastic US pilots looking for enemy barges resulted in casualties and losses to the amphibians and their crews.

As the myth of the ‘pushover’ against 350 enemy propounded by Macarthur’s headquarters dissipated against the reality of the Japanese 20th Division moving into the Sattelberg-Wareo area, depots were established by 2/6 Sup Dep Coy at Heldsbach for 20th Brigade while the issue points at Scarlet Beach served 24th Brigade. After 26th Brigade was landed in response to the enemy attacks towards Scarlet Beach and advanced along the Sattelberg track, further depots were established forward in support. The area continued to receive frequent air attack, one directly on the headquarters and depots at Selankaua. By 25 November Sattelberg had been taken, clearance of the area north was commenced, and the recently introduced 4th Brigade, then relieved by 20th Brigade, struck north for Sio, supported by beach-hopping depots of 2/6 Sup Dep coy, moved and replenished by the US 532 Engineer shore and Boat Regiment as it had done throughout the campaign. Finschhafen Base Sub-Area including 2/104 GT Coy, a detachment of 2 Air Maint Coy, 23 Sup Dep Coy, 56 BIPOD Pl, and 4 Fd Baking Coy, took over the advanced depots from 2/6 Sup Dep Coy, releasing it to its proper forward support role. Sio fell on 15 January 1944. During this whole period the vehicle drivers worked round the clock, two or three in turn to a vehicle, clearing from beach and airfield to depot, forward deliveries, casualty evacuation and assisting units which were without transport of their own. By mid January 9 Div AASC, like the Division itself, was worn down and ready for relief and refitment 49.

At Sio 5th Division relieved the 9th and drove on to Saidor making contact with the sea-Ianded 126th US Regiment on 10 February 1944. As part of the 5th Division’s relief of 9th Division, HQ Comd 5 Div AASC under Lieut-Col R.D. Summerfield moved to Kelanoa on 27 January 1944, 4 Sup Dep Coy and 2 Sup Dep Pl arriving the day after; he also took command of the existing 241 and 242 Sup Dep PIs operating beach FSD and FAD at Kelanoa and providing beach depots forward to Sio West, and 39 Ind Tpt Pl operating eight DUKWs, 13 3-tonners and 25 jeeps at those locations. Significant problems were inherited from 9th Division and perpetuated by 5th Division in the propensity of the general staff to place AASC detachments under command of the brigades in whose areas they were located, so without the control and backup of the divisional AASC headquarters. There had been a marked fall off in standards: no ammunition examiners had been available at the FADs and stocks were in unknown condition – ADOS 5 Div’s response to the CAASC’s request for six examiners to classify all stocks was to provide one; no provision had been made for workshop support and after a DUKW foundered at sea, the better-late-than-never response was to allot a mechanic to each amphibian, courtesy CAEME 5th Division, to catch up with the backlog; and supplies commodities were badly unbalanced so restocking had to be undertaken.

The maintenance system continued to be a product of the operating environment, in which supplies were delivered by barge from Finschhafen Base Sub-Area to Kelanoa for two consecutive days, and on the third direct to the forward maintenance area operated by 241 Sup Dep Pl at Butu-Butu; a section of 4 Fd Bky located at Kelanoa supplied both local and forward beachheads. From hereon it was a repeat of the previous operations from Finschhafen, 8th Brigade’s infantry advancing along the coast, 2 Sup Dep Pl and jeep/DUKW detachments of 39 Indep Tpt Pl opening coast-hopping depots, on whose arrival depended the next stage of the advance as much as enemy resistance. From Saidor, Madang lay ahead as a 5th Division task, but this had by now been pre-empted by the parallel advance of 7th and then 11th Divisions through the Markham and Ramu Valleys 50.

Support of Coastal Operations

7th Division’s drive up the Markham did not have the luxury of water transport to skirt untrafficable supply routes, relying substantially on air transport and carrier lines. The general arrangement was for 2/102 Comp Pl to set up the airhead depots and 2/2 Sup Dep Coy with its 5, 6, 7, 9,  10 Sup Dep Pls operating the forward issue depots in support of the brigades and other groups and forces. 2/153 GT Coy was internally reorganised from three to four platoons, succumbing to the usual theory of divisional staffs that brigades were entitled to their own transport and supplies elements under command and an extra one was therefore required for divisional troops. Here as elsewhere they ignored the constantly re-demonstrated lesson that, unless the CAASC was given control and allowed to switch resources to the areas of greatest priority, and work to an overall maintenance and movement plan, each group had its own puddle which was alternately over-, then underemployed and there was no pool with which to respond to real areas of need and crisis. At least there was a justification for some devolution of vehicles in this campaign as brigades were without their own transport and so AASC transport detachments were flown in to forward operational bases to support them as the fighting flowed along the river valleys.

During the drive on Lae from the Nadzab, some other lesser commitments were supported by 7 Div AASC – the Papuan Infantry Battalion at Sangan resupplied by carrier line and air drop; Bena Bena Force, earlier established to keep the enemy from the Southern Highlands, came under command of 7th Division and was supplied through Garoka airstrip; Wampit Force, a 3rd Division battalion on the south of the Markham with its own 3 Div AASC element, was replenished from Nadzab by collapsible boat with an outboard motor; and a detachment of 2/102 Comp Pl formed a depot at Boana supporting a flank protection battalion. After the Markham operation got into stride following Lae’s occupation, a depot set up by 6 Sup Dep Pl at Kaiapit dropping ground supported first 2/2 Cav Cdo Coy then 21st Brigade. As the advance pressed up the valley, 6 Sup Dep Pl moved forward after it as Kaiapit airstrip was opened, turning the depot over to a detachment of 2/102 Comp Pl and an element of 2/153 GT Coy which was able to get jeeps and trailers some way forward on the flat valley floor through the kunai grass. There was not, however, enough capacity to stretch forward to Gusap, and air drops were necessary until 5 Sup Dep Pl set up a depot as soon as the airfield allowed air landing.

Air supply having become a mainstay of a sizeable part of the Markham requirement, 3 Air Maint Coy took over the depot and forwarding task at Nadzab, then 7 Sup Dep Pl took on Kaiapit, releasing 1/102 to go forward to take over Gusap. The pattern then settled into 5 and 6 Sup Dep Pls moving with each brigade down the Ramu valley, operating depots at dropping grounds and moving resupply by jeep and carrier to their forward depots for issue to the brigades in the now familiar leapfrogging technique. Dumpu was reached on 5 October, and this temporarily replaced Gusap as the forward base until it was moved two weeks later to Bebei. Rear depots were progressively closed down, the supply units brought forward, and as operations became more scattered, more forward depots were opened at Kumbarum and Guy’s Post for operations at Shaggy Ridge, captured on 22 January 1944, and Yogia and Evapia Rivers for final clearance operations in the Ramu valley 51.

Relief of 7th Division by 11th Division, begun before Christmas, was completed by 21 February, and the advance across the Finisterre Range began, taking Bogadjim on 13 April and culminating in the occupation of a deserted Madang on the 24th. The area was then taken over by 5th Division, which sent 8th Brigade west to Alexishafen and Hansa Bay, patrolling forward to the mouth of the Sepik River by 13 July 1944, with all Japanese formations having been withdrawn to the Wewak area. 5th Division’s maintenance area was established at Madang by 4 Sup Dep Coy and part of 158 GT Coy, 241 Sup Dep Pl opening a depot at Singor in support of 4th Brigade, and 242 Sup Dep Pl similarly at Alexishafen. At the end of the operation, 5th Division’ AASC was strung out across half of the north coast of New Guinea, from Finschhafen to the Sepik 52 and, in the piecemeal style of operations, had used three supply depot platoons and a transport platoon to carry the brunt of the forward support of operations. In the absence of roads along the coast, the use of landing craft and 39 Pl’s DUKWs had solved a resupply problem to which the only alternative would have been air dropping. This coastwise support had been by courtesy of the US Engineers – the RAE’s transportation service was not to make its presence felt in numbers for another year after the move of US resources northwards left a vacuum and a sense of urgency to get that service into effective use.

Support of Markham-Ramu

While Australian forces were clearing the central area of New Guinea, and after their own capture of Saidor, the US forces had made a further series of amphibious landings at Aitape, Hollandia, Biak, Sasapor and Morotai in the west and in an arc Manus-New Britain-North Solomons in the north and east. When these operations had achieved the objectives of securing airfields for operations to the north, and neutralisation of enemy troop concentrations was achieved, the strategic rationale for further operations in these areas ceased to exist. The remaining substantial enemy forces were isolated, struggling for survival and no threat to the airfields, but there followed a series of Australian campaigns, costly in resources and lives, in first reconquering the remainder of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, and then the islands to the north and west, for which there was no valid place in Macarthur’s strategic plan for the Philippines road to Tokyo 53.

Map 10: New Guinea Offensives

Although 6th, 7th and 9th Australian Divisions were originally earmarked for the Philippines, the undesirability of mixed supply lines and US political resistance to a foreign troops involvement in liberating its colony, encouraged Macarthur to arrange for 6th Division to garrison the Aitape airfields, 5th Division to take over New Britain and 3rd Division Bougainville, so relieving twice as many American divisions for the invasion. These three divisions were themselves considerably stronger than the assessed requirement for garrison task, but were required by Macarthur as face saving for the large US forces replaced, and as a way of committing Australian divisions from alternatives of disbandment or being inserted into US operations; coincidently the result was the positioning of sufficient strength to undertake operations greater than simple containment of bypassed forces. In determining the posture of the troops in this arrangement Blamey passed over the options of passive defence or an all out offensive against enemy strongholds in favour of ‘obtaining information, probing the enemy’s positions and carrying out offensive operations with small forces with a view to seeking out and destroying the enemy where found’. It became increasingly difficult to distinguish the operations which developed under this latter option from those of the second rejected alternative, and the necessity and utility of this expenditure of lives and material resources has been the subject of considerable debate and criticism 54.

 

MOROTAI ISLAND

LCI’S UNLOADING ASSAULT FORCES offshore at Morotai, northwest of Vogelkop Peninsula. The southern tip of Morotai Island was selected as the site for one of the last air bases needed before invading the Philippines. D Day for this operation was 15 September, the same day that the invasion of Peleliu in the Palau group took

 

 

 

September 18th, 1942

AN AUSTRALIAN AIRFIELD,

18 September 1942.

 An Australian sentry is on guard near a Flying Fortress in right foreground as soldiers await planes to go to New Guinea (top) ; troops boarding a C-47 transport plane for New Guinea (bottom). During the last days of September 1942 the Allies launched a counterattack in Papua, New Guinea, thus starting the Papua Campaign- American troops for this action were sent to Port Moresby from Australia, partly by plane and partly by boat.

From there the advance continued until, opposed by an effective brigade position at Imita Ridge and having outrun its supply line, the enemy force was stopped and then made a clean break in withdrawal on 27 September.

Loss of the Kokoda airfield had earlier meant a similar crippling resupply situation for the two defending Militia battalions, then for the two AIF brigades rushed in piecemeal to stem the advance.

While insertion of fresh units was necessary to replace exhausted and broken battalions, they simply added to the difficulties of maintenance over a single foot track through the mountains, so it was not until the defence was pressed back to the southern end of the Kokoda Track that it could receive reliable resupply, and the problem was inherited by the invaders.

The Track was 80 km from the roadhead at Ower’s Corner to Kokoda, but this was best measured as eight days walking time. Initial deployment of 39th Battalion forward of Kokoda was supported from supplies landed at Kokoda, then delivered forward by native carrier lines organised by ANGAU.

In the withdrawal after loss of the airfield, when the three battalions of 21st Brigade were moved forward over the Track, the available carrier line capacity which could be recruited locally was completely inadequate for even rudimentary maintenance of the units.

Expedients were tried at various stages of the route to provide alternatives. New Guinea (1st) Independent Light Horse Troop was put together by AASC horsemen mustering local horses and brumbies to cover the first leg, but could not negotiate the steep mountainsides and steps forward of Uberi.

Attempts to air drop supplies and ammunition on to the dry lake beds at Myola were limited to mostly free drops by both shortage of parachutes and aircraft, and eliminated by withdrawal past the area. New Guinea Force Commander Maj Gen Morris, an ex-DST,

 

in the early stages was given one or two aircraft on odd occasions, told that there were only 30 transport aircraft in Australia; asking for merely two on line, he might well have then asked what battles were going on in Australia which had priority over the defence of the Port Moresby base so desperately wanted by the Japanese 38.

During the withdrawal phase there was essentially no effective supply system, which did little credit to either the planning or the general and supplies and transport staffs.

While Lieut Edwards of New Guinea Force AASC at Myola was doing his level best to control the supply situation forward, he was not informed of the incoming 21st Brigade and was demanding support for the existing two battalions only; as well much of the supplies sent by air from Port Moresby simply did not arrive at Myola, being either dropped in the wrong place or jettisoned without advice to New Guinea Force which consequently did not comprehend the seriousness of the shortages forward.

To restore the position a 2/4 Coy detachment under Sgt Chesterman and Brigade AASC Officer Capt G.J. Hill were sent in to take control on 23 August.

Organisation and response along the Track behind them was even more chaotic: failure of these elements to show the initiative, inventiveness, and spirit of service at any price which was the usual hallmark of the AASC comes largely down to the fact that odd individuals were sent in, accompanied by an assortment of untrained helpers, and without a unit or headquarters controlling either their activities or the line of communication as a whole.

Lieut H.T. Keinzle of ANGAU organised the carrier lines, a few supplies personnel organising the dumps established at the staging posts. This changed as a new attitude was instilled into the support structure by HQ 7 Div AASC taking control of the Track on 10 September which, together with its 2/4 Coy and other elements, began to give some form and reliability to the system.

 

 From Base Supply Depot Sogeri and Ilolo a platoon of 2/5 Coy delivered by 3 ton truck to Newton’s Depot, then by 2/4 Coy jeep to Ower’s Corner roadhead. From there to the valley floor .5 km was covered by flying fox, then 1.5 km by NG LH Tp, then carriers forward of Uberi. An officer of 7 Div AASC was located at each depot in the way stations along the Track, and members of 2/4 Coy augmented then replaced the New Guinea Force members who had been established to cope with two battalions and had to cope with two brigades

September 28th, 1942

Info from New Guinea(now west Papua)

MEN WADING ACROSS THE SAMBOGA,

near Doborlurn, New Cuinea. The enemy fell back in weight of attack

 28 September 1942

Dai Nippon warfare which it put to good use in the Owen Stanley Range in Papua.

Japanese advances force the Australians back over the Owen Stanley Range

From Port Moresby and back over the Owen Stanley Mountain range

a fighting retreat over the Owen Stanley Ranges for the next two months,

30 Squadron RAAF in flight over the Owen Stanley range, New Guinea,

the Owen Stanley Mountain range. (AP Photo) 21. November 5, 1942

Australian forces in the Owen Stanley Range of Papua New Guinea

jungle-enclosed pathway across the Owen Stanley Range

 Australians laboriously made their way over steep mountain trails ol

the Owen Stanley Range

The spectacular, rugged and relentless Owen Stanley Ranges

The main body of troops during the withdrawal across the Owen Stanley Range.

 

Owen Stanley Ranges, New Guinea. C. 1942

situated beneath Mt Yule along the Owen Stanley Range.

North of the Goldie River / Owen Stanley Mountains

 

Australian  were forced to fight while withdrawing over the Owen Stanley Range.

troops near Myola during the withdrawl across the Owen Stanley Ranges.

.

towards Buna with the intention of crossing the Owen Stanley Ranges

 

Eora Creek was the site of the largest battle on the Owen Stanley Ranges

Begin the climb over the awesome Owen Stanley Range.

96 km Kokoda Track,

that crosses the unforgiving Owen Stanley Range,

The Complete Kokoda Campaign Itinerary

Our Adventure Kokoda Campaign Trek Itinerary includes all the significent battlesites, fire-support bases and logistic areas along the original wartime trail. We allow a sensible 10 days for the journey to ensure our trekkers obtain full benefit from their Kokoda experience.

Following is a generic itinerary for our Kokoda Campaign Treks between Kokoda and Owers Corner. We also schedule treks in the opposite direction from Owers Corner to Kokoda.

Wartime Kokoda

Kokoda Campaign Trek Itinerary

Day 1

Check-in at departure airport for your flight to Port Moresby as per your itinerary.

You will be met at Jacksons International airport by Adventure Kokoda staff who will accompany you to the Sogeri Lodge and check you in. You will then receive your backpacks/daypacks. Your trek leader will assist with ‘fitting’ your backpack and gear for the trek.

Our PNG staff will then give you a brief lesson in Pidgin English to assist you with basic greetings and questions for villagers along the trail.

Your Australian trek leader will provide a safety briefing and provide an insight into the Koiari/Orokaiva cultures along the track. After dinner he will brief you on the strategic situation in New Guinea in 1942 and an overview of the Kokoda campaign.

Day 2

Fly to Kokoda on an Adventure Kokoda charter flight. You will meet your PNG trek guides andcarriers at the Kokoda airfield then trek to the Kokoda plateau for an inspection of the monuments, memorials,the Kokoda WarMuseum and the Australian defensive position on the Kokoda plateau where the gallant 39th Militia Battalion first met the Japanese army on 27 July 1942.

Your trek leader will give a battlesite briefing which will set the scene for the remainder of your trek. Follow the footsteps of the diggers through the old rubber plantation to Kovello village for a traditional ‘fuzzy-wuzzy angel – sing-sing’ welcome – trek onto your campsite at the village of Hoi.

Day 3

Begin the climb over the awesome Owen Stanley Range. We leave the eco-track and follow the signal wire along the original wartime track to Deniki where the first battle after the Australian withdrawal from Kokoda took place.

This part of the trek is pretty much as it was in 1942 as we are the only trekking company to use it – it was mapped by Charlie Lynn with the local landowners in January 2010. Old army signal wire lies in the scrub beside the track, insulaters are still on many of the trees, we see our first weapon pits and an Australian snipers position.

We climb through the jungle to the Isurava battlesite which was re-discovered by Charlie Lynn in 1995 after a search with old army maps and a modern GPS. The Australian government has since built a solemn memorial on the site which was opened by
PNG’s Grand Chief and Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare and Australia’s Prime Minister, John Howard, on the 60th anniversary of the battle for Isurava in August 2002. Camp at the battlesite.

Day 4

We conduct a Dawn Service at Isurava. Our PNG guides and carriers are involved in the service and sing moving songs in their local language.

The trek leader then provides a detailed historical account of the epic battle from both a strategic and tactical viewpoint.

We then inspect the area where Private Bruce Kingsbury was killed – he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross – the highest award for bravery in the Commonwealth and the first to ever be awarded on Australian territory.

After breakfast we trek to the ‘ground of tactical importance’ at the top of the battlesite position. You will receive another briefing by trek leader. After this there is a steep descent to Rear Creek then trek to the rock where Regimental Doctors operated on wounded soldiers as they tried to make their escape from the area.

Our trek continues through the old village site of Alola then continue to the new village for morning tea. We then leave the eco-track again and trek down into the Yodda Valley to a couple of rugged crossings at Eora Creek. After a wilderness lunch follow a steep bush-track to a spectacular waterfall below Abuari village. Continue the climb to your campsite in the village on the eastern side of the range which was defended by the 53rd Militia Battalion and 2/16th AIF Battalion in August 1942.

Whilst the traverse is rugged and difficult the rewards of camping in a more traditional village ‘off the beaten track’ are well worth the effort. It is a significant historical area because the Japanese breakthrough in this area placed the defensive position at Isurava in jeopardy and was a major consideration in the decision to begin a fighting withdrawal that was to last until the troops reached Brigade Hill.

The Orokaiva in Abuari are shy but most hospitable in their welcome to ourgroups. The feast they prepare is one of the highlights of the trek. They are wonderful hosts and we spend a most enjoyable night at our campsite in their village.

Day 5

After our morning briefing we follow ‘Japs Track’ down the range to Eora Creek. This is still ‘off the beaten track’ and gives trekkers a good feel for the challenge facing our diggers during this phase of the campaign. It is a spectacular section of the track with breathtaking views across the Yodda Valley to the Western ranges.

Eora Creek was a pivotal battlesite during both the withdrawal inAugust/September 1942 and later during the advance in October.

The 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions fought heroically to buy time for our wounded diggers to make their way back up the mountain to their rear. Some could not make it because of their wounds and were given morphine and a rifle! The situation was so desperate they had to be abandoned. A detailed briefing on the situation that existed in 1942 is given on this piece of sacred ground.

During the advance a few months later the Australians took four days to fight their way across the creek and capture the high ground occupied by the Japanese. This was the first time the Australians encountered any Japanese resistance since they were ordered to withdraw from Ioriabaiwa Ridge. The Japanese were fanatical – and they were starving. They were ordered to fight to the death for their Emperor. The desperation was such they cannibalised those who were killed. All the horrors of jungle war were evident in this battle. Your trek leader will provide a detailed briefing on the battle which includes an inspection of the Japanese position which still has live ammunition and foxholes overlooking the Australian position.

We then trek up a steep ridge that was fiercely defended by the Australians during their fighting withdrawal – the weapon pits they fought from remain as a haunting reminder of their sacrifice. You trek leader will provide a battlesite briefing on a delaying defensive position rediscovered by Charlie Lynn in 1993.

The track descends down to a wildnerness campsite on on the banks of the raging Eora Creek at Templeton’s Crossing.

Day 6

We leave the congested eco-track and follow the wartime track taken by the 39th Infantry Battalion during their advance to Kokoda in July 1942. The nature of the terrain through almost impenetrable jungle gives us a feel for the difficulties the Australians had in dislodging the Japanese defenders from the area in October 1942.

We continue our climb in the vicinity of Mt Bellamy and reach the highest point of our trek.The area that takes us about a day to trek through took the Australians 13 days to fight through in October 1942. It was a bloody campaign involving hand-to-hand combat and courageous bayonet charges. Because the Japanese had been ordered to die for their Emporer they had to be killed in well camoflaged weapon pits. Many an Australian forward scout lost his life in the search for these pits.

We cross the main eco-track south of the Kokoda Gap and pick up the Bert Kienzle track that takes us to the edge of Lake Myola. Captain Bert Kienzle was a plantation owner from Kokoda. He, along with another Australian, David Marsh, organised PNG carriers (later to be knows as ‘Fuzzy-Wuzzy Angels’ to delivers supplies to our troops and help evacuate our wounded.

Your trek leader will provide a detailed briefing on the logistic aspects of the Kokoda campaign and the significance of Lake Myola during the advance and withdrawal phases of the Kokoda campaign.

Trek to your campsite at ‘Bombers Camp’.

Day 7

Optional trek across the lake to the downed US P40 Kittyhawk aircraft then continue across the lake to connect to the track leading to Lake Myola 2 – the main fire support base for the protection of the logistic units at Myola 1 – inspect an abandoned Australian mortar position which contains live mortars and grenades. This position was discovered by Charlie Lynn in 2006 and is a significant site because of the protection it afforded the main logistic base at Myola 1. Care should be exercised as most of the grenades are live and unstable. Your trek leader will provide a detailed battlesite briefing at the site. Continue your trek through the moss forest to Tovovo lookout over the Efogi valley – spectacular views over Naduri, Kagi, Efogi and Brigade Hill – which is the most populated area of the track. Your trek leader will provide a detailed briefing at the mortar position.

Continue to Naduri Village – meet Ovoru Indiki, one of the few surviving ‘fuzzy-wuzzy angels’. Ovoru was in Port Moresby when the Japanese first bombed the city. He did not understand what was going on and he fled to the bush in fear. Over the next couple of days Ovoru made his way back to his village – only moving at night because of fear. He told his people what had happened and they began to make arrangements to ‘go bush’. Lieutenant Bert Kniezle of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit eventually came tothe village and enlisted Ovoru and the other men inthe village to help the Australians. Ovoru then spent the next three months carrying supplies forward to our troops and carrying our wounded backacross the track. It is a great honour to meet the few remaining carriers such as Ovoru during the trek.

Your trek leader will provide a detailed briefing on the history of the wartime carriers.

Trek to Kagi village – the forming-up place for the Japanese attack on Brigade Hill – 6000 fanatical Japanes soldiers prepared to attack 1000 Australian defenders in what was to be the biggest battle of the Kokoda campaign – the Japanese referred to it as the ‘battle of the Owen Stanley Range’ - the Australians refer to it as the ‘battle for Brigade Hill’ – follow the wartime track to Efoge Creek then climb to our campsite at Efogi village

Day 8

Pick up the wartime track and climb to Mission Ridge which became known as ‘Butcher’s Ridge’ because of the carnage that occurred during the battle of Brigade Hill on 7 September 1942.

Inspect the defensive position held by the 2/27th Battalion – continue to the crest of Brigade Hill – inspect positions held by the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions during the battle of Brigade Hill. Inspect a former Australian gravesite – a haunting reminder of the war.

Your trek leader will provide a detailed battlesite briefing and service on the area of the gravesite. This site was discovered in April 1992 when the landowner, Siosi Liomi, led Charlie Lynn to a ‘special place’ that had been reclaimed by the jungle over the previous 50 years. The site was cleared and the gravesites were revealed. It was a significant discovery and is now one of the most visited sites on the track.

Follow the wartime track down across down to Loni village on the original Kokoda Trail. Continue down to Vabuyavi River then climb to Menari village. This is where Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner conducted his first battalion parade with his ‘ragged bloody heroes’ of the 39th Battalion after the battle of Isurava. Wartime photographer, Damien Parer, captured the parade which is one of the defining photos of the campaign.

Climb the Ladavi Saddle and descend to our campsite on the pristine Aguologo River.

Day 9

Follow track to the Nauro swamp area -cross the Brown River – climb to the campsite at the village of Nauro. The village of Nauro has only recently been moved to the current location on the Maguli Range. It was previously on the Nauro River with a good airfield but some say fear of sorcery caused the villagers to move up the mountain.

Climb the mighty Maguli Range to the top at Mogolonumu – follow track south – inspect Japanese delaying defensive position with weapon pits and communication trenches. Your trek leader will give a briefing at this point – continue down to your campsite on Ofi Creek

Day 10

Steep climb up Ioribaiwa Ridge – battlesite briefing at the point where the Japanese were finally stopped – inspect weapon pits on the position then leave the eco-track and follow the wartime track down to Matama Creek. Ffollow the creek to the base of Imita Ridge then climb to Imita Gap. The Australians were ordered that there was to be no withdrawal past Imita Ridge and they were die there if necessary – a very easy decision for an armchair strategist in faraway Brisbane to give!

Climb Imita Ridge to the gap. Your trek leader will provide a battlesite briefing on the defensive position established at Imita Ridge.

Leave the eco-tourist track and inspect the position along the rockface to the east and climb to the eastern edge of the perimeter. Follow the wartime track to the South-West via the golden staircase’. This was re-discovered by Charlie Lynn on a special reconnaisance with local landowners in November 2007. This section of the track has massive rock formations not seen anywhere else along the track.

Proceed to ‘Charlie’s Camp ‘that was established during the reconnaisance in search of the ‘golden staircase in 2007..

Day 11

Continue on the original wartime track to the abandoned village site of Uberi and reconnect with the eco-tourist track. Wade across the Goldie River and climb to Owers Corner. Your trek leader will conduct a battlesite briefing over a well-earned cold beer and fresh sandwiches. Board vehicles for a visit to Bomana War Cemetery.

Bomana War Cemetery

During the 1940s our servicemen who were killed in action in New Guinea were concentrated in three major war cemeteries at Port Moresby (Bomana), at Rabaul (Bita Paka), and at Lae.

Those who died fighting in Papua and Bougainville are buried in the Port Moresby (Bomana) War Cemetery. Among the 3280 burials are the remains of 700 unidentified servicemen including those of 438 British Royal Artillerymen, prisoners of the Japanese from Singapore who died in captivity in the Solomon Islands.

Bomana lies 19 kilometres north of Port Moresby. It was started in 1942 by the Australian Army and is the only one of the Papua New Guinea cemeteries to contain white marble headstones and a Stone of Remembrance.

Simple wrought iron gates open to a grassed forecourt inclosed by a bank of colourful tropical shrubs and trees. A short flight of steps rises from the forecourt to the Stone of Remembrance; beyond, on gently rising ground, lie the graves, and above them, dominating the setting, rises the cross of sacrifice.

A rotunda of cylindrical pillars stands on a hill above and behind the cemetery. This is the Memorial to the Missing, which commemorates the men of the Australian Army (including Papua and New Guinea local forces), the Australian Merchant Navy, and the Royal Australian Air Force who lost their lives and have no known grave.

Click here for a list names on the honour roll at Bomana.

Check back into your hotel – presentation dinner in the evening.

Day 12

Half day tour of Port Moresby* including Koki Markets, Ela Beach, downtown CBD, National Parliament, National Museum, and PNG Art warehouse which contains the largest collection of artifacts in the country. Check in for flight from Port Moresby to Brisbane and Sydney.

Military History

The Kokoda campaign featured some of the most desperate land battles ever fought in defence of Australia during the Pacific war. Battle honours featuring the names Kokoda, Deniki, Isurava, Brigade Hil, Myola, Menari, Ioribaiwa Ridge, Imita Ridge, Templeton’s Crossing and Eora Creek are emblazoned over unit banners on our annual Anzac Day marches.

The historical/battlefield aspects of the campaign are a major feature of Adventure Kokoda treks. Charlie Lynn, a Vietnam Veteran and former army major with 21 years service, has conducted leadership and survival training courses in remote areas of Australia and has more than 50 treks over the Trail since 1991. He is arguably the most experienced Kokoda trek leader on the Trail today.

Culture

Papua New Guinea is one of the world’s last adventures – it has been referred to as a ‘Parliament of the Thousand Tribes’, a‘ Land of a Thousand Cultures’ and the ‘Land of the Unexpected. More than 750 languages have been identified on the rugged tropical island. The people who live along the Kokoda Trail are Koiari and Orokaiva – sons and grandsons of the famous ‘fuzzy-wuzzy angels’. Our guides and porters come from these villages.

Charlie Lynn has established a special relationship with these people over the past 18 years. During this time he has delivered sporting equipment to all villages along the track, donated significant quantities of school supplies to village schools, sponsored university students to conduct research on learning methods, assisted in bringing a young village child to Australia for major surgery, evacuated injured villagers to Port Moresby for urgent treatment and established the Network Kokoda Foundation.

As a result of this relationship he has been made an ‘honourary chief of the Orokaiva people’ - his groups are warmly welcomed into each village and presented with tropical fruits, local vegetables and’ sing-sings’.

Marion Frith of the Canberra Times captures the feeling in an article she wrote in 1992:

“That afternoon we reach our nirvana – the village of Naduri. It is the home of our guides and we arrive to a hero’s welcome. Les leads us triumphantly in and we are met by village elders – the original wartime “fuzzy-wuzzy angels” who carried the injured diggers out against all odds down dangerous narrow mountain tracks. A feast of food and flowers is laid out for us: mandarins, sugarcane, baked and steamed taro, pumpkin tops, potatoes, spinach.

“We fall quiet as these old men stand tall and proud. Charlie seizes the moment, the women and children are banked up around, and in a gesture that cuts across cultures and through language barriers he recites the poem that immortalised these angels. The old men beam, and our army of trekkers wipe away tears.

“It is as if we have arrived. Somewhere, anywhere. Our guides sit with us, their families join us, and the village and its people become imprinted in our hearts. Another woman and I join the evening church service and are entranced as the pastor, his face illuminated by a hurricane lamp, recites the prayers in pidgin and the children’s voices rise in harmony so sweet we never want it to end.

” We are silent as we get up form the rough-hewn pew. At that moment we have experienced life at its most perfect, superb in its simplicity, and suddenly we realise that the walk was worth it, if only to find this. Peace and joy are tangible, if fleeting, qualities and we know that where we are going to, where we have come from, we will probably never find it again. We want to seal the village in barbed wire and never let the world touch it”.

Environment

Osmar White, in his book‘Parliament of a Thousand Tribes’described the terrain:

“New Guinea is young country born in comparatively recent times as a result of a gigantic wrinkling of the earth’s crust which buckled and smashed the bed rocks of ancient, vanished oceans and piled them on top of each other in a series of central ranges, of which the highest peaks rise more than 16,000 feet above sea level. These mountains were formed in much the same way as the Himalayas and the Andes. The ranges are not continuous. They are closely spaced, parallel cordilleras running mainly from north-west to south-east and together they form the backbone of the ‘dragon’ all the way from its thin neck in West Irian to its stumpy tail in Australian New Guinea.”

According to the former chief botanist of the Port Moresby Botanic Gardens, Mr Justin Tschenko, who accompanied one of Charlie Lynn’s treks, there are more varieties of orchids along the Kokoda Trail than anywhere else in the world. Add to this an endless variety of palms trees, fern colonies, moss colonies, towering trees with giant buttress roots, spectacular waterfalls, crystal clear mountain creeks and rolling mountain ranges as far as the eye can see and one can only begin to imagine the awesome beauty of the remote Owen Stanley Ranges.

Today it is hard to imagine this beautiful environment was the scene of one of the most desperate military campaigns fought in the South West Pacific. During these desperate days the Trail was describes thus by Sir Kingsley Norris:

“Imagine an area of approximately one hundred miles long. Crumple and fold this into a series of ridges, each rising higher and higher until seven thousand feet is reached, then declining in ridges to three thousand feet. Cover this thickly with jungle, short trees and tall trees, tangled with great, entwining savage vines. Through an oppression of this density, cut a little native track, two or three feet wide, up the ridges, over the spurs, round gorges and down across swiftly-flowing, happy mountain streams. Where the track clambers up the mountain sides, cut steps – big steps, little steps, steep steps – or clear the soil from the tree roots.”

“Every few miles, bring the track through a small patch of sunlit kunai grass, or an old deserted native garden, and every seven or ten miles, build a group of dilapidated grass huts – as staging shelters – generally set in a foul, offensive clearing. Every now and then, leave beside the track dumps of discarded, putrifying food, occasional dead bodies and human foulings. In the morning, flicker the sunlight through the tall trees, flutter green and blue and purple and white butterflies lazily through the air, and hid birds of deep-throated song, or harsh cockatoos, in the foliage.”

“About midday, and through the night, pour water over the forest, so that the steps become broken, and a continual yellow stream flows downwards, and the few level areas become pools and puddles of putrid black mud. In the high ridges above Myola, drip this water day and night over the track through a foetid forest grotesque with moss and glowing phosphorescent fungi. Such is the track which a prominent politician publicly described as ‘being almost impassable for motor vehicles,’ and such is the route for ten days to be covered from Ilolo to Deniki.”

The Trail is probably centuries old – a main highway over the range – and in the usual manner of native pads, follows no established principles. It climbs the highest ridges, plunges down into the deepest ravines, and ascends the longest spurs. Between Uberi and the crest of the range, the track climbs more than 20,000 feet, although is has an altitude of 7,000 feet at its highest point. For every one thousand feet of altitude gained, the track drops six hundred feet to the foot of the next ascent.

Marion Frith describes the feeling at the end of her journey:

“As we clamber aboard the truck that has come to take us to the airport we have no doubt we are now invincible. We have plummeted to our worst lows and soared to our greatest heights. There is nothing physically or emotionally we cannot endure. We had set off as 34 individuals, half of us Australians and half of us Papuan villagers. When we part we are friends – an indivisible and strong unit for whom farewells come hard.

“If the spirit of Kokoda is strength in adversity, courage and mateship that spirit has been seeded in us all. We cross in a brief 20 minutes what has taken us eight gruelling days. And like all those who crossed it before us, who left their souls in the mud and the heat and the terrifying jungle, few will ever go back.

“Charlie, of course, is the exception. He will continue to pluck other ordinary humans from their comfortable lives and help them blossom into indefatigables, drawing on the greatness that lies largely unchallenged within us all. For the rest of us though, Kokoda will become just one humbling week in our lifetime: albeit our whole lifetimes lived in just one unforgettably humbling week“.

 

starting their drive over the rugged Owen Stanley mountains.

Kokoda Campaign – soldiers of the 39th battalion

Made a start with the French hussars to finish off the first regiment.  But got waylaid with the prospect of another WWII skirmish game of Disposable Heroes.  As I said in a previous post about DH & A Coffin for Seven Brothers,  the group wanted to do a campaign and were keen to do Kokoda 1942.  Very ambitious.  There will be a series of encounters, growing in size, that marked the desperate fight between the Australians of the 2nd AIF and the hitherto victorious Japanese.

The first of them is the heroic Captain Templeton and his company who first opposed the Japanese after they had landed and were starting their drive over the rugged Owen Stanley mountains. He was up against nearly 2,000 Japanese veterans of the Yokoyama Advance Force, the advance guard of the Nankai Shitai – the main force of 10,000 veterans.  The Yokoyama Advance Force was an amalgum of 2,000 elites drawn from the Tsukamoto Bttn of the veteran 144th Regt., the 15th Engineers (also combat troops) and a company of shock troops, the Sasebo Special Naval Landing Party.

For most of the fight along the track, the Australians never had more than a few battalions (at the time one full-strength militia brigade: the 30th consisting of the 39th, 53rd & 49th, but although officered by experienced regulars – mostly WWI veterans – they had no battle experience.)  They were armed mostly with old WWI Lee Enfields and clapped out Lewis guns but had also just been issued with the formidable Brens, which they learned how to operate ‘on the job’!  By this time most of the 39th Bttn had arrived at Kokoda Mission but because of the conditions and narrowness of the track, they could only deploy one company at a time, so that the fighting was generally done at the company, platoon or section level. 

My contribution to this valiant but tiny force is an Australian Bren gun squad, which I happened to have acquired some years ago and had to rapidly paint and base in time for the first game this weekend.  They are in what was a mixture of their uniforms from the Middle East and light grey tropical issue shirts.  They weren’t able to change for weeks so their uniforms literally rotted off and were only then replaced by tropical greens.

 
The physical conditions they fought in were some of the toughest of WWII.  Imagine the tropical heat of Guadalcanal, together with the incessant rain, and then add some of the most rugged terrain imaginable – an endless series of razorbacks that rise up to 14,000 feet, intersected by deep ravines and fast-flowing rivers that could turn into raging torrents with the heavy rain.  The Japanese had the bold strategy of landing on the northern coast of New Guinea and then taking Port Moresby via the back door – the series of goat-trails linked by native villages perched in small valleys in the mountains, which collectively became known as the Kokoda Track.  This took the Allies by surprise as MacArthur thought it militarily impossible!

 
One of my Bren gunners above is still in his North African battledress which is totally wrong for the scenario but he’s such a nice figure, I thought’ what the heck’ – I can always do with an extra Bren – next to a Vickers, the heaviest weapon the Australians possessed.

I was fortunate to have grown up in New Guinea and even walked a part of the track as a Boy Scout (OK – it was the very last bit – but it still counts!)  Our soldiers were legends to us even then – everybody knew the story of Kokoda.   The unbelievable heat and humidity , the clouds of flies and mozzies and being soaked to the skin all the time and at night, being in the mountains, its bloody cold.

It is exhausting just to walk a few hours when you’re young and fit.  These guys carried everything they needed including their weapons and ammo and marched for days on end just to get where they needed to be.   I am awed by what they achieved.   It was men like these, citizen soldiers and volunteers all, who inflicted the first defeat of Japanese land forces in WWII.

 
The campaign starts with the first serious encounter at Oiva on the northern side of the Owen Stanleys.  Templeton and his men, already exhausted after over a week trekking over the mountains, have laid a series of ambushes of the Japanese advance parties.  Ambush, then fall back to the next position and repeat.  After days of vicious fighting trying to hold the Japanese off – by this time he was encountering battalion-sized forces coming against him – his tiny force, with ‘walking’ wounded and everyone sick with malaria, dengue fever and dysentery, were by now in desperate need of reinforcement.   Finally the numbers began to tell and with the Japanese advancing rapidly, Templeton was faced with no choice but to dig in.

This is the first battle of the campaign we are going to game this weekend.  In the historical one, the gallant and respected Templeton was killed.  Hopefully we can repeat history without that disastrous outcome.  We shall see

October 1942

On 25 October 1942,

 about 500 of the Australian and Dutch prisoners were sent to Hainan, an island in the South China Sea off the coast of mainland China. Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, they left Ambon in the Taiko Maru and arrived in the Bay of Sama on Hainan Island on 4 November. The next day they sailed up the coast to a camp at Bakli Bay.

The Japanese government had recognised Hainan Island’s potential and planned to use the POWs to build roads and viaducts in order to develop agriculture and industry on the island. The prisoners were forced to do hard manual labour under difficult and brutal conditions with a completely inadequate diet.

.

 

NOVEMBER 1942

 

MEN CROSSING AN IMPROVISED FOOTBRIDGE,

15 November.

AERIAL VIEW OF THE TERRAIN NEAR DOBODURA.

The rugged terrain of Papua includes the high Owen Stanley Range, jungles, and impassable, malaria-infected swampy areas as well as coconut plantations and open helds ot coarse, shoulder-high kunai grass encountered near Buna.

Only one rough and steep trail existed over the range from the Port Moresby area to the front, taking from 18 to 28 days to traverse on foot; however, American troops and supplies flown over the range made the trip in about 45 minutes.

 

MEN BOARDING THE ARMY TRANSPORT GEORGE TAYLOR

in Rrisbaine, Australia,

for New Guinea on 15 November.

The Papua Campaign and the almost simultaneous action on Guadalcanal were the first victorious operations of US ground forces against the Japanese

 

-1943
The three types stamps Japanese occupation stamps were published

: separate series for Java (army), Sumatra (army), and the ‘Great Eastern’ (navy).

The imprint stamps and later the final occupation stamps of Malacca are also spared because as mentioned North Sumatra since long been dropped.

Examples of definitive stamps of Java, Sumatra, Big East, Malacca (​​see the differences with the Japanese characters).

 

  • The city Bandjar Massin and regions in Borneo in 1943:

    • a 5 sen and 10 sen revenue stamp
    .

Bedenk dat het Indonesische regime na 1950 vele eilanden en streken een andere naam heeft gegeven en bovendien de spelling heeft veranderd. Zo heet Borneo  tegenwoordig Kalimantan en Celebes nu Sulawesi. Raadpleeg dus een klassieke Nederlands-Indië landkaart

Borneo

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Flores

Dai Nippon Gunsei kitte cover to Surabaya and manokwari overprint postcard ant the forn of  JR van Niewkerk Dai Nippon Postal History Book

Look the mint ungummed at

http://www.prangko.nl/index.php?catnr=02.02.04#thumb

Er bestaan maar drie speciaal gemaakte noodzegels (uiterst schaars), alle in marinegebied:

  • Het eiland Flores in 1943: een 10 sen zegel, gedrukt in de missie-drukkerij aldaar

 

Postal stationer  Card, 1943,

 3½¢ Japanese flag and military chop, for Moluccas and Lesser Sunda Islands (J.S.C.A. 8NS3), pristine mint, a lovely and scarce card, Very Fine.
Estimate $1,000 – 1,500
.

 

 

 

1943, card from Bandjermasin to Japan (J.S.C.A. 11NS1. Bulterman 201), 3½¢ on 2s Bandjermasin naval occupation postal card surcharge, cancelled by bold strike in red-violet, “Bandjermasin 18.6.11″ cds, with front showing violet censor chip, fresh and Very Fine, rare.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000
.

February,1943

Japanese bomb dump next to the Ambon POW camp, 15 February 1943.

THE LAHA AIRFIELD EXECUTIONS (February 9, 1943)

 

 

 

THE LAHA AIRFIELD EXECUTIONS 

(February 9, 1943)

Two graves, about five metres apart, were dug in a wooded area near the village of Tawiri adjacent to Laha airstrip on Ambon Island,the defence of which had cost 309 Australian lives.

The graves were circular in shape, six metres in diameter and three metres deep. Soon after 6pm, a group of Australian and Dutch prisoners of war, their arms tied securely behind them, were brought to the site.

The first prisoner was made to kneel at the edge of the grave and the execution, by samurai beheading, was carried out by a Warrant Officer Kakutaro Sasaki. The next four beheadings were the privilege of eager crew-members of a Japanese mine-sweeper sunk a few days previously by an enemy mine in Ambon Bay.

This could only be considered as an act of reprisal for the loss of their ship. As dusk descended, and the beheadings continued, battery torches were used to light up the back of the necks of each successive victim.

The same macabre drama was being enacted at the other round grave where men of a Dutch mortar unit were being systematically decapitated. On this unforgettable evening, 55 Australian and 30 Dutch soldiers were murdered.

 

Details of this atrocity came to light during the interrogation of civilian interpreter, Suburo Yoshizaki, who was attached to the Kure No.1 Special Navy Landing Party, at that time stationed on Ambon.

 A few days later, on February 24,

in the same wooded area, another bizarre execution ceremony took place. Around the graves stood about 30 naval personnel who had volunteered for this grisly task, many of them carrying swords which they had borrowed.

 

 

When some of the young prisoners were dragged to the edge of the grave shouting desperately and begging for their lives, shouts of jubilation came from those marines witnessing the executions. In this mass murder, which ended at 1.30am the following morning, the headless bodies of 227 Allied prisoners filled the two large graves. Witness to this second massacre was Warrant Officer Keigo Kanamoto, Commanding Officer of the Kure No.1 Repair and Construction Unit.

(The remains of those murdered were later disinterred and reburied in the Australian War Cemetery at Tantoei).

The face of a sadisitic “Jap” has a certain enhancement in its twisted ”gotcha’ expression, like little else one would ever expect to see. Having been a ‘victim’ of such sado smirking by a Japanese sicko, I gave a hard punch to the face and rendered the b*****d ‘out-cold’. I then slapped him awake and said, “That was from all the POW’s of WW2 that you killed and made suffer !”

Source

http://dickiebo.wordpress.com/2011/07/03/lest-we-forget-5/

1943

 

During the Japanese occupation

 

 brought about 600 workers from Java to the island, they also forced about 300 Javanese women to work as “comfort women”, after having lured them with false promises of well-paid jobs in the garment industry among others.

 

The value of Tarakan as a military object took off at the approach of the Allied forces in the area

1943, registered cover from Balikpapan to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11N5), franked with strip of 4 of General Issue 10c. Some wear to stamps at left, otherwise Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

1943, cover from Menado to Japan, franked with Japan 1s Showa definitive,with violet 3rd Postal Rate kanji handstamp below; violet Nagoya, Japan backstamp. Cover worn and torn (been through the war, so to speak), still quite a scarce item, Very Good.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

Two Postally Used Dai Nippon naval area postal stationer card in 1943

 

 

March,.13th.1943

Sketch Map of Tan Toey Prisoners of War Camp, Amboina Island,

Former camp of the Australian troops, built by the Netherlanders, now used by the Japanese as a prisoner-of-war camp…” from Allied Geographical Section, Southwest Pacific Area. Area Study of Ambon Island, Terrain Study No. 45, Map 13 dated March 13, 1943

Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

1943, stampless registered cover from Menado to Nagoya, Japan, with several censor’s handstamps, one registry label torn off and minor cover soiling, Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

1943, post card from Makassar to Bandung (J.S.C.A. 4N10, 4N12), franked with Netherlands Indies 1c and 2½c with Celebes Naval overprint, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000
.

1943, censored cover from Pamangkat to Pontianak (J.S.C.A. 1NS11. Bulterman 215), a 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued entire with Pontianak naval occupation chop, tied by Pamangkat cds to censored entire to Pontianak, fresh and Very Fine, rare.
Estimate $5,000 – 7,500.

1943, card from Menado to Soerabaja (J.S.C.A. 4NS1. Bulterman 242b), a 3½¢ Menado postal card, cancelled by Menado cds, with overprint showing anchor overprint blotted out by orange-red ball and black bar, violet censor chop, Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

 

 

 

April 1943

April,23th.1943

Soon institution “God” led by Maj. Nibo is to embark in earnest on tools pacification to residents of area Horanjia, April 22, 2007 (1944) Showa,

 

Allied came in tactics stepping stone from New Guinea east, Horanjia landed. Authority “God” has lost the retreat is to step into a large wetland jungles, rivers and large Manberamo trackless taiga. And, more than 500km in straight-line distance to the mouth, strategic anabasis harsh tactics. It was also a line adventure worthy to be called just a geographical expedition.

 

 

It was an honor to host lunch at the Singapore Cricket Club with William Mundy 91, his son Bryan and avid historian Andrew Glynn who was escorting William and Bryan who were out in the region from England. William’s story was that with the RAF he sailed from England bound for Kuala Lumpur in 1941 but as the city had been taken his ship was diverted to Java. Some 3 weeks after disembarking he was captured at Garoet and his subsequent camps were Boei Gllodok and Tandjong Priok in Batavia (Jakarta).

 

Trajectory of the Japanese army Papua

Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua

上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(3) 第 上杉重邦軍医大尉が日本から

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

after April 2, 1943,

the military district eighth Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura (enter the area of ​​operations of) and became its rear base. Captain and Family Federal Heavy reserved

 

Read the story

日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画No.3) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua

上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(22) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部上杉重邦軍医少佐(戦死時大尉)の戦没地に関する考察を21回にわたり連載してきた。現時点で入手可能な記録を読み解き、幾つかの想定シナリオに基づいてその疑問に迫った。しかしながら、満足できる結論を導き出せないでいる。今号をもって、第一シリーズを終了する。上杉少佐並びにご遺族に申し訳ない気持ちで一杯だ。 上杉重邦軍医大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 0 / コメント 0 2012/09/03 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(21) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部連合軍上陸時(昭和19(1944)年4月22日)、ホランジア地区とセンタニ湖周辺にいたおよそ1万5千の日本軍将兵。ホランジアに限っても、把握できているだけでもおよそ2,700名が同地で戦死している。それらの部隊名は、建築勤務第52中隊(617名)、野戦高射砲第68大隊(674名)、海軍第90警備隊(217名)、海軍第9艦隊司令部(233名)、海軍第27特別根拠地隊(652名)、海軍第7警備隊(287名)などだ。 上杉重邦軍医大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 1 / コメント 0 2012/08/31 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(20) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部上杉重邦軍医大尉が、連合軍ホランジア上陸時(昭和19(1944)年4月22日)以降、センタニ湖北岸のコヤブにあった第113兵站病院(通称陣之内兵站病院)へ、何らかの事由で出かけていた可能性は否定できない。第14飛行団司令部が置かれたセンタニ飛行場群付近にいなければ、稲田正純第6飛行師団長心得による「サルミ転進」命令に基づいて第14飛行団長の恩田謙蔵大佐以下のおおよそ500名が第一梯団としてセンタニを発った段階で、それに加われなかった。敢えて悲観的に想像すれば、上杉大尉が、第113兵站病院で入… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 2 / コメント 0 2012/08/30 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(19) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部連合軍がホランジア(現パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ)に上陸した昭和19(1944)年4月22日。日本を発つ段階での赴任先である第14飛行団司令部附けであれば、おそらくセンタニ飛行場群付近にいたであろう上杉重邦軍医大尉。しかし、同地の戦局が歴史的急変を告げる最中、瞬時に生まれた多数の負傷者救命活動の中、上杉大尉が、センタニ地区を離れて、ホランジアに上陸してきた敵軍により近い、第113兵站病院が位置した、センタニ湖東部のコヤブ村北西へ派遣されたことも十分考えられる。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 3 / コメント 0 2012/08/28 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(18) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部『恩田部隊473名(戦闘操縦者を主とし、飛行団司令部を含む)は、ゲニム(注:ゲニェム)に向って行軍を開始した。サルミまでは当然、海岸線を行けば、距離も近く、行軍も楽ではあるが、タナメラ海岸にも敵が上陸しているので、いったん奥地に向い迂回して海岸線に出ようというわけである。二十四日の昼間は、センタニ湖の北岸斜面の林の中で休み、夜になってから、ススキのような草が長く茂っている草原を抜けて、ようやく遮蔽のできるジャングル地帯にたどり着いた。上空には敵機が自由に飛び回り、ちょっとでも部隊の気配を認め… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 4 / コメント 0 2012/08/27 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(17) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部生きていて長命であったのならば、上杉重国軍医大尉は、昨日8月25日、102歳の誕生日を迎えていたはずだ。34歳の誕生日まであとわずか2週間。岡山医科大学を卒業し日本陸軍軍医となった上杉は、祖国に妻ビワ子と三人の娘を残し、“南涯”の西部ニューギニアでこの世に別れを告げた。長女の一江は今でも父の足跡を探し続けている。父の終焉の地、そしてその過程を探る“歴史の旅”は、一江にとってやはり“戦後の旅”そのものであった。 上杉重邦軍医大尉と妻のビワ子 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 5 / コメント 0 2012/08/26 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(16) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部上杉重邦軍医大尉が、昭和19(1944)年4月末時点で、おそらくホランジア・センタニ飛行場群地域にいたことは、あてはまらない情報の消去法によって導かれる結論だ。フンボルト湾、そしてタナメラ湾の東西両方向から同地へ“向こう見ず作戦(Operation Reckless)”と呼ばれる上陸を完遂した連合国軍。同地にいた約1万5千の将兵は、どのように同地を追われたのか。 上杉重邦軍医大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 6 / コメント 0 2012/08/25 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(15) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部終戦のほぼ一年前、昭和19(1944)年8月10日、「ホランジア(現パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ)方面で戦死」とされている第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部附け軍医の上杉重邦大尉。戦後、一途に父親に関する情報収集に努めてきた、現在広島都市学園大学で公衆衛生看護学の教授を務める瀬野尾一江さん。韓国併合の年、時代が大正に移る二年前、明治43(1910)年8月25日生まれた父親。生きていれば明後日、102歳の誕生日を祝福されていたはずだ。 上杉重邦軍医大尉の長女・一江(昭和16年頃の撮影か。当時中尉の… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 7 / コメント 0 2012/08/23 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(14) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部すでに書いたが、三好正之軍医中尉の第36師団(雪部隊)第224連隊従軍記を描いた『戦場の聴診器』(中田整一著・2008年9月15日初版・幻戯書房)によれば、三好中尉は昭和19年1月末、秋津丸で広島の宇品港発。2月20日、マニラ着。3月19日、マニラから軍用機で出発。ミンダナオ島のダバオ、スラウェシ島のメナドを経由してマルク諸島のアンボンへ。アンボンからは重爆撃機呑龍に便乗して3月21日、ホランジア到着。そして3月24日、軍用機でホランジアからワクデ島を経由してサルミの第36師団へ着任。マニラ… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 8 / コメント 0 2012/08/22 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(13) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部『小学6年生か中学1年生の頃だったと思いますが、家にあった父からの葉書を読みました。どこから送ったのか、いつ日本に着いたのか今では分かりません。というのも、その後、火事に遭って焼けてしまったのです。でも軍事郵便の消印がなかったことははっきり覚えています。ですから、きっと誰かに託して日本に届いたものと思います』—上杉重邦軍医大尉の長女である瀬野尾一江が述懐する。 第14飛行団司令部附け軍医・上杉重邦大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 9 / コメント 0 2012/08/21 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(12) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部軍医大尉という地位、しかも当時西部ニューギニアの主力航空戦闘部隊であった第14飛行団司令部附け軍医としての赴任だったことを考慮すれば、上杉重邦大尉の戦没地が「ホランジア方面」と記されたことは腑に落ちない。仮に、航空機搭乗中の事故もしくは戦闘による撃墜などにあったのであれば、それはその墜落地点が明確に特定できなくとも、少なくとも、搭乗機や日時に関する情報は明白に記録されているはずだ。 第14飛行団司令部附け軍医・上杉重邦大尉と家族。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 10 / コメント 0 2012/08/20 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(11) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部上杉大尉は明治43(1910)年8月25日広島県生まれ。日華事変(盧溝橋事件)が起きた翌年、国家総動員法が成立した昭和13(1938)年3月、岡山医科大学を卒業。同年6月3日、広島県尾道生まれのビワ子と結婚。同年10月10日、軍医候補生として歩兵第39連隊(姫路編成)補充隊(衛生軍曹)に入営。同年11月12日、衛生曹長に進級、見習士官となる。 第14飛行団司令部附け軍医・上杉重邦大尉と家族。手前に幼い長女の一江 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 11 / コメント 0 2012/08/19 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(10) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部戦死の日時や場所については、通常、生存している所属部隊の上官、もしくは最も高位の上官が記すのが常だ。ただ終戦にあたり、あるいは外地からの復員の際に、記録書類の焼却や没収があり、戦死公報に必ずしも正確な日付や戦没地名が書かれているとは限らない。 第14飛行団司令部附け軍医・上杉重邦大尉と妻のビワ子さん …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 12 / コメント 0 2012/08/18 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(9) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部2012年8月15日の第67回目の終戦記念日。そして今日8月17日、インドネシア共和国は第67回目の独立記念日を迎えた。インドネシアの“ムルデカ(独立)”と日本軍進駐との関係については、日本側に日本軍の存在意義を見出そうとする見解が少なくない。特に「ジャワの極楽」と謳われた、ジャワ島で終戦を迎えた旧日本兵にその傾向が強いように見える。スマトラ島やジャワ島の旧日本軍将兵の幾多が、インドネシアの独立戦争に参加したことはまぎれもない事実だ。しかし、それは大東亜戦争の一側面であって総てではない。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 3 / トラックバック 13 / コメント 0 2012/08/17 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(8) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部67回目の終戦記念日が過ぎた。2012年8月15日は、背景の理由はどうであれ、隣国との歴史観の相違があらためて思い知らされた日でもあった。民主党政権の2閣僚が靖国神社に参拝したその日、竹島(韓国名独島)に同国大統領として初上陸し、天皇の訪韓条件について言及した韓国の李明博大統領が「戦時の女性人権問題として人類の普遍的価値と、正しい歴史に反する行為だ。日本の責任ある措置を求める」と従軍慰安婦問題について述べた。そして香港の団体「保釣行動委員会」の抗議船の乗組員が、中国の領有権を主張して尖閣諸島… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 2 / トラックバック 14 / コメント 0 2012/08/16 00:00
戦後67年・西部ニューギニアに瞑る数万の将兵 Prajurit Jepang di Papua今日、第67回目の終戦記念日を迎える。東日本大震災から1年と5ヶ月。昨日の“皆様の半国営放送”は、福島原発の警戒区域で保護されたペットが、飼い主がやってくるのを待っているとのニュースを流していた。猫や犬の“動物の権利”(Animal rights)には関心があるようだが、この世界最大規模のマスコミ特殊法人は、過去の人権には無関心なようだ。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 16 / コメント 0 2012/08/15 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(7) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部極めて貧弱なホランジア(現ジャヤプラ)地上守備兵力。そしてセンタニ飛行場群で空襲によって多くの戦闘機や爆撃機を一瞬にして失った日本軍。赤子を弄ぶかのような連合軍による空爆と上陸作戦。“向こう見ず作戦(Operation Reckless)”と名付けられたものの、結果的には“やり放題作戦”と表現してもいいほどの圧倒的な連合軍の優勢。 上杉重邦軍医大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 17 / コメント 0 2012/08/14 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(6) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部 昭和19(1944)年3月末のホランジア(現ジャヤプラ)飛行場における第4航空軍(寺本熊市中将)が被った空襲被害・戦力喪失は、想定外の致命的な規模であった。このため、東京の大本営はその責任を問う形で、航空戦指導者の大規模な更迭を行った。 上杉重邦軍医大尉 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 17 / コメント 0 2012/08/13 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(5) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部上杉重邦軍医大尉がホランジア(現西部ニューギニア・パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ)に着任したと推定される昭和19(1944)年1月~2月は、同方面の戦局が急速に悪化をたどる初期段階だった。元々、ホランジアは南方軍(寺内寿一元帥陸軍大将)の作戦地域に指定されていたが、南太平洋域の戦闘激化に伴って、昭和18年4月2日以降、第8方面軍(今村均中将 )の作戦地域に入り、その後方基地となった。 上杉重邦大尉と家族。 …続きを見る
Where is the land of Major War surgeon Uesugi heavy? Headquarters 14th Division team flying flight 6 (5)
January-February 2007 (1944) Showa
 is estimated Captain surgeon heavy Uesugi has arrived in Hollandia (Jayapura capital of the province of New Guinea Papua western present), the early stages of the war situation towards the same will follow the rapidly deteriorating was. Originally, Hollandia would have been specified in the area of ​​operations troops south of the (army general Marshal Toshikazu Terauchi), with the intensified fighting in South Pacific sector, or after April 2, 1943, the military district eighth Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura (enter the area of ​​operations of) and became its rear base. Captain and Family Federal Heavy reservedブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 19 / コメント 0
2012/08/11 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(4) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部前号で記述したが、三好中尉や池見(羽生)少尉の二人の軍医が、昭和19(1944)年初頭に、各々およそ一ヵ月間を要して西部ニューギニアに到着しているケースから推察して、上杉重邦軍医大尉の場合もおそらく同程度の時を経てホランジアに着任できていただろうと考えられる。つまり、例えば昭和18年12月中旬に広島を発ったとすると、翌19年1月中旬~2月初旬頃までには到着していたのではないか。その頃のホランジア周辺情勢は以下のような情勢だった。 上杉重邦大尉と家族。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 20 / コメント 0 2012/08/10 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(3) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部 上杉重邦軍医大尉が日本からニューギニアに旅立った昭和18(1943)年末。実は、上杉が着任する予定の第14飛行団(真第9135部隊)の団長である徳永賢治大佐は、すでにホランジアにいた(『戦史叢書 西部ニューギニア方面陸軍航空作戦』防衛庁防衛研修所戦史室著に記述)。 上杉重邦大尉と妻のビワ子さん …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 20 / コメント 0 2012/08/09 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか?(2) 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部昭和18(1943)年12月13日、第14飛行団司令部附けとなり、妻と三人の娘を日本に残し西部ニューギニアに向った上杉重邦軍医大尉。広島から軍用機でホランジア(現ジャヤプラ)を目指したとされる。ホランジアに到着したのかどうかは確認材料がない。当時、第14飛行団(真第9135部隊・徳永賢治大佐)は第4航空軍(寺本熊市中将)の第6飛行師団(板花義一中将)の隷下にあった。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 21 / コメント 0 2012/08/08 00:00
上杉重邦軍医少佐の戦没地はどこか? 第6飛行師団第14飛行団司令部終戦記念日が近づくと、思い出す人がいる。過去数年間にわたり消息を追いかけてきたが、今年も確定的な情報を入手することはできなかった。 上杉重邦少佐(中尉時代の昭和16年夏頃の撮影と思われる) …続きを見る Where is the land of Major War surgeon Uesugi heavy? Headquarters 14th Division team flying flight sixth
Armistice Day is approaching, there are people who remember. Has been chasing the news over the past several years, I was not able to obtain a definitive information this year. More … (which have presumably taken the summer of 1941, the Age of lieutenant) Major Federal Heavy Uesugi

ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 23 / コメント 0
2012/08/07 00:00
パプア州センタニ湖フェスティバル来る6月19~30日開催 FDS Papua 2012第5回センタニ湖フェスティバル(FDS=Festival Danau Sentani・Lake Sentani Festival)が来る6月19~30日、パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ(Jayapura)西方郊外のセンタニ(Sentani)地区で開催される。センタニは、B737型機クラスが頻繁に離着陸する、州都ジャヤプラの空の玄関口。過去の開催期間は5日間だったが、今回は12日間に延長された。会場はこれまで通り、ジャヤプラ県東センタニ地区のカルコテ(Kawasan Wisata Kalkothe… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 / トラックバック / コメント 2012/06/06 00:00
アスマット・アガッツからの最新画像 Foto2 Agats, Asmat, Papuaインドネシア最東端のパプア州。その南西部にアスマット(Asmat)と呼ばれる地域がある。アスマットとは“真実の人間”、“我々は木だ”を意味する。人間は木から生まれて木に還るという哲学が生きている世界だ。それ故、人が亡くなると、親族らは故人を木彫に刻む。こうして世界的に有名な原始美術・アスマット彫刻(Patung/Ukiran Asmat)が生まれた。 県都アガッツでは毎年『アスマット文化祭』が開催され、世界のコレクターが垂涎するアスマット彫刻が披露される。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 / トラックバック / コメント 2012/06/02 00:00
マックさんが案内するパプア&西パプア州(2) Tur Papua bersama Mac 二度ほど掲載したが、パプア州の中央高地で旅行業を営むマック君について、今度は動画で紹介したい。ヤリ(Yali)民族出身のデマイアヌス・マック・ワサゲ(Demaianus “Mac” Wasage)さん。去る3月中旬、29歳になったばかりのマック君は、ヤリモ県(Kabupaten Yalimo)の県都アパハプシリ(Apahapsili)近くのホロンドゥ(Holondu)村生まれ。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 / トラックバック / コメント 2012/05/21 00:00
マックさんが案内するパプア&西パプア州 Tur Papua bersama Mac既報(2012年4月26日付)だが、もう一度インドネシア最東端のパプア州(Provinsi Papua)の中央高地で旅行会社を経営する、ヤリ(Yali)民族出身のデマイアヌス・マック・ワサゲ君(Demaianus “Mac” Wasage)について書いてみたい。去る3月中旬、29歳になったばかりのマック君は、ヤリモ県(Kabupaten Yalimo)の県都アパハプシリ(Apahapsili)近くのホロンドゥ(Holondu)村生まれ。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 1 / コメント 0 2012/05/13 00:00
センタニ湖祭り・日本人客を日本語で無料案内 FDS PJC sambut turis Jepang ちょっと完璧ではない日本語だが、たいしたことではない。2006年、姉妹県である山形県が招聘し、一年間、山形短期大学で日本語に触れた。昨年一ヵ月間、埼玉県の浦和で、筆者がその創設の志を疑問視する国際交流基金が招聘した日本語教師プログラムに参加。その日本語力で公開した“呼びかけ”が以下のFB(フェースブック)上の記述。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 5 / コメント 0 2012/05/12 00:00
パプア州センタニ湖フェスティバル来る6月19~30日開催 FDS Papua 2012第5回センタニ湖フェスティバル(FDS=Festival Danau Sentani・Lake Sentani Festival)が来る6月19~30日、パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ(Jayapura)西方郊外のセンタニ(Sentani)地区で開催される。過去の開催期間は5日間だったが、今回は12日間に延長された。会場はこれまで通り、ジャヤプラ県東センタニ地区のカルコテ(Kawasan Wisata Kalkothe)エリア。ジャヤプ県(Kabupaten Jayapura)の伝統文化を中心に… …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 2 / コメント 0 2012/05/06 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット9 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 2 / コメント 0 2012/05/01 00:00
パプア州センタニ湖フェスティバル来る6月19~30日開催 FDS Papua 2012 第5回センタニ湖フェスティバル(FDS=Festival Danau Sentani・Lake Sentani Festival)が来る6月19~30日、パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ(Jayapura)西方郊外のセンタニ(Sentani)地区で開催される。過去の開催期間は5日間だったが、今回は12日間に延長された。会場はこれまで通り、ジャヤプラ県東センタニ地区のカルコテ(Kawasan Wisata Kalkothe)エリア。ジャヤプ県(Kabupaten Jayapura)の伝統文化を中続きを見る
FDS Papua 2012 held on 19-30 June Lake Sentani Festival coming in Papua
  Sun June 19-30 (FDS = Festival Danau Sentani ·
 Lake Sentani Festival) is coming, will be held in the district (Sentani) Jayapura Sentani on the outskirts of the capital of the province of West Papua (Jayapura) Lake Sentani Festival 5th. Holding period in the past was the five days, this time was extended to 12 days. Hall pass so far, Karukote province east of Jayapura Sentani district (Kawasan Wisata Kalkothe) area. See more …… in the traditional culture of the province Jayapu (Kabupaten Jayapura)ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 3 / コメント 0
2012/04/30 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット8 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見る Raja Ampat 8 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth last paradise earth
  (Kab.Raja Ampat) Raja Anpatto province of West Papua.
 World War II era, but the area thousands of Japanese soldiers were once stationed. Many soldiers lost their lives, such as young and Salawati, Waigeo Island. Now, the former battlefield has become world-renowned diving spot. Raja Ampat boasts a sea of biodiversity in the world. This is what the county government aerial footage Raja Ampat has collaborated with French TV, for the purpose of tourism promotion, the right to re-use that was observed (GBI) Indonesia Culture Palace

ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 3 / コメント 0

2012/04/29 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット7 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るKab.Raja Ampat) Raja Anpatto province of West Papua. World War II era, but the area thousands of Japanese soldiers were once stationed. Many soldiers lost their lives, such as young and Salawati, Waigeo Island. Now, the former battlefield has become world-renowned diving spot. Raja Ampat boasts a sea of biodiversity in the world. This is what the county government aerial footage Raja Ampat has collaborated with French TV, for the purpose of tourism promotion, the right to re-use that was observed (GBI) Indonesia Culture Palace
ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 4 / コメント 0
2012/04/27 00:00
パプア人青年が案内するパプアツアー Trek Papua Tours & Travel筆者は西部ニューギニアが大好きだ。その昔、オランダ海外植民地から国連管理を経てインドネシアに併合されると「Irian Barat」と呼ばれ、やがて「Irian Jaya」とその名を変え、そして今日の「パプア州」と「西パプア州」と展開を遂げた。世界第二位の巨島ニューギニアの、東経141度を境とする西半分のエリア。先の大戦中には、日本軍が東南のメラウケ地域を除き軍事占領した場所だ。 …続きを見るI would love to western New Guinea. In the old days, “West Papua” and “Papua” of today is called “Irian Barat” is annexed to Indonesia after the administration United Nations from overseas colony Netherlands, and changed its name and “Irian Jaya” soon I have achieved and deployment. Areas that border the western half of New Guinea 141 degree 巨島 the world’s second-largest, east longitude. During World War II, the Japanese army was a place except for the military occupation of Southeast Merauke region
ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 2 / コメント 0
2012/04/26 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット6 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 5 / コメント 0 2012/04/25 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット5 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 6 / コメント 0 2012/04/23 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット4 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 7 / コメント 0 2012/04/21 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット3 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 8 / コメント 0 2012/04/16 00:00
パプアの日本語教育頑張る Belajar Bahasa Jepang di Tanah Papua昨年(2011)7~9月に再々来日し、埼玉県浦和市で日本語教育研修に参加した、パプア州の州都ジャヤプラ(Jayapura)で日本語教師を務めるダンチェ・ナウィパ(Dance Nawipa, S.Pd)さん。来日中、ダンチェさんはインドネシア文化宮(GBI)で行なわれた二度の「インドネシア理解講座」の講師役に。 日本語技能コンテストに出場した女子高生 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 4 / コメント 0 2012/04/15 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット2 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 9 / コメント 0 2012/04/14 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパット1 Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth西パプア州のラジャ・アンパット県(Kab.Raja Ampat)。かつて太平洋戦争の時代、何千人もの日本軍兵士が駐留したエリアだ。ワイゲオ島、そしてサラワチ島などで多くの兵が若い命を落とした。かつての戦場は今、世界的に知られるダイビングスポットとなった。世界一の生物多様性を誇るラジャアンパットの海。これはラジャアンパット県政府がフランスのTVと共同制作した空撮映像で、観光プロモーションを目的に、インドネシア文化宮(GBI)にその再使用権が認められたものである。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 10 / コメント 0 2012/04/12 00:00
地球最後の楽園ラジャアンパットの海Raja Ampat Last Paradise on Earth2012年4月6~8日、東京・池袋で開催されたマリンダイビングフェア(Marine Diving Fair 2012)。インドネシア各地から参加したデレゲーションの中に、西パプア州(Provinsi Papua Barat)のラジャ・アンパット県(Kabupaten Raja Ampat)が派遣したチームがいた。9年前に誕生した同県は“地球最後の楽園(The Last Paradise on Erath”を謳い、マリンスポーツとマリンリゾートの新天地として積極的なPR活動を続けている。 … …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 11 / コメント 0 2012/04/11 00:00
日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画:総集編) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua 2011年10月22日、ジャカルタ時間の午後19:05(日本時間21:05)、メトロTVはドキュメンタリープログラムの『Metro Files』で「Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua(日本軍パプアの軌跡)」を放送した。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 2 / トラックバック 0 / コメント 0 2012/01/03 00:00
日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画No.5) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua2011年10月22日、ジャカルタ時間の午後19:05(日本時間21:05)、メトロTVはドキュメンタリープログラムの『Metro Files』で「Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua(日本軍パプアの軌跡)」を放送した。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 1 / コメント 0 2012/01/02 00:00
日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画No.4) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua 2011年10月22日、ジャカルタ時間の午後19:05(日本時間21:05)、メトロTVはドキュメンタリープログラムの『Metro Files』で「Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua(日本軍パプアの軌跡)」を放送した。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 2 / コメント 0 2011/12/31 00:00
日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画No.3) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua 2011年10月22日、ジャカルタ時間の午後19:05(日本時間21:05)、メトロTVはドキュメンタリープログラムの『Metro Files』で「Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua(日本軍パプアの軌跡)」を放送した。 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 3 / コメント 0 2011/12/30 00:00
日本軍パプアの軌跡(動画No.2) Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua 2011年10月22日、ジャカルタ時間の午後19:05(日本時間21:05)、メトロTVはドキュメンタリープログラムの『Metro Files』で「Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua(日本軍パプアの軌跡)」を放送した。 …続きを見る
October 22, 2011, (21:05 Japan time), Metro TV was broadcast in the “Metro Files” documentary program “Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua (Papua trajectory of the Japanese army)” 19:05 pm Jakarta timeブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 4 / コメント 0
2011/12/29 00:00
Trajectory of the Japanese army Papua Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua (No.1 video)
  October 22, 2011, (21:05 Japan time), Metro TV was broadcast in the “Metro Files” documentary program “Jejak Militer Jepang di Papua (Papua trajectory of the Japanese army)” 19:05 pm Jakarta time
. See more …ブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 5 / コメント 0
2011/12/28 00:00
再録『GBIニュース』1999.6.2 インタビューシリーズ【イリアンジャヤ】(5) 大川誠一の『GBIニュース』  1999年6月2 Berita GBI(2 Juni 1999) J.B.ウエナス氏インタビューシリーズ【イリアンジャヤ】(5) 『ジャヤウイジャヤ元県知事J.B.ウエナス氏が語る21世紀のイリアンジャヤ中央高地 …続きを見るブログ気持玉 0 / トラックバック 71 / コメント 0 2011/12/05 00:00
再録『GBIニュース』1999.5.30 インタビューシリーズ【イリアンジャヤ】(4)
See Mr. (1 Juni 1999) Agus Augustine Akigatto-Kosai-1 Berita GBI Mon … More 6 “GBI news” Seiichi Okawa 1999ブログ気持玉 1 / トラックバック 65 /
 

http://grahabudayaindonesia.at.webry.info/theme/42c3391253.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In April 1943

 he was taken to Ambon where,

as one of 1000 men , he was marched across Ambon to build the camp and an airfield out of coral at Liang camp.

 

When returned to Java for 5-6 weeks he should have then been sent to the Thai-Burma railway but being unwell the MO on board arranged for William and another POW to be transferred to Changi hospital where he remained for 6 months. He tells the story how being an avid bee keeper in England he managed to set up a bee hive in Changi prison that produced a small amount of honey every 2 weeks which was used by the hospital as a form of dressing. After Changi William was transferred to Kranji in Singapore to dig tunnels in the granite hillside for the Japanese but the surrender came before they were ever used. William was in the region with a group from the Java Far East Prisoners of War Club 1942 and it was terrific to see him in Singapore spritely and fit!

Source:

http://singaporeevacuation1942.blogspot.com/

 

 

 

 

September,4th.1943

1943, cover from Balikpapan to Borneo (Bulterman 207), a 10¢ on 12½¢ Bandjermasin anchor on revalued entire, violet anchor overprint, cancelled by Balikpapan 4.9.03 cds, used to Borneo. Violet boxed chop and 2 red personal chips, minor scuff on face, F-VF, rare.
Estimate $8,000 – 12,000.

 

 

 

 

 

November,1943

 

 

Nibo is returning. Although he was an instructor at the school for a while Nakano,

 

November 18 (1943) Showa,

 

via Ambon Horanjia of western New Guinea to the (now Jayapura).

 

Second Army subordinate to the current Manokwari (Toyoshima Fusataro Lieutenant General), (at the time) has organized a “divine institution” in Horanjia Nibo captain was at the behest of the chief engineer as work under the direct control of General Staff Corps.

 

Commencing on the date of 23 November 2006 (1943) Showa,

 

 activity recording tool of pacification of approximately half a year

 

1944

Early in 1944,

40 of the Australians were sent to work at the Japanese garrison at Hoban, north of Bakli Bay on Hainan. While out on a work party one morning, they were fired on by Chinese guerrillas, some of several thousand nationalist and communist guerillas still operating against the Japanese on the island.

Nine Australian POWs were killed, three were wounded and ten others were captured by the guerillas but were never recovered.

1944, cover from Bandjermasin, Southern Borneo to Tokyo, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11N5), franked with pair and single General Issue 10c, with bank handstamp at left, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

Where is the land of Major War surgeon Uesugi heavy?

Headquarters 14th Division team flying flight 6 (5)
January-February 2007 (1944) Showa

 is estimated Captain surgeon heavy Uesugi has arrived in Hollandia (Jayapura capital of the province of New Guinea Papua western present),

 the early stages of the war situation towards the same will follow the rapidly deteriorating was.

Originally, Hollandia would have been specified in the area of ​​operations troops south of the (army general Marshal Toshikazu Terauchi), with the intensified fighting in South Pacific sector, or

 

During the year 1944

 

it was known  Tarakan to produce 350,000 barrels per month.

 

The last Japanese tanker left Tarakan in July 1944

 

and heavy Allied attacks later that year destroyed the oil production and infrastructure

1944, registered cover from Balikpapan to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11N9), franked with General Issue 30c, with two Roman-character and one kanji Balikpapan postmarks, Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

RAID ON JAPANESE OIL-PRODUCING FACILITIES IN BALIKPAPAN,

Borneo, October 1944.

Aircraft, returning to their base, are B-24’s. While preparations were being made for the invasion of the Philippines, U.S. Air Forces early in October neutralized enemy air strength on Mindanao, attacked Japanese shipping throughout the Netherlands East Indies, and conducted heavy raids on the oil-producing facilities in BorneoCelebes MolluccaBali and Eastren NuantaraWest Papua(New Guanea)

Part of these operations

 became the last phase of the reconquest of New Guinea in 6th Division’s two pronged move from Aitape inland along the Toricelli Mountains and along the coast towards Wewak, beginning with deep patrolling

from 1 December 1944.

The buildup of 3rd Base Sub-Area at Aitape had commenced in mid-October before the division arrived, and included 126 GT Coy, 3 MAC Pl, 5 Port Det, 22 Sup Dep Coy with 63, 92, 119, 2/160 Sup Dep Pls, 5, 14 and a section of 7 Fd Bky Pls, 1 Indep Farm Pl and 52, 63, 69 BIPOD Pls. With no port at Aitape ships were unloaded to landing craft and amphibians, then across the open beach.

During the monsoon season, to avoid being beached, the landing craft had to carry a 2½ ton truck aboard which received a load and drove off as soon as the shore was reached, culling the normal payload of the craft by 80 per cent. Difficulties in landing men, equipment and stores and an adequate margin of supplies persisted until the weather improved in April.

The Divisional AASC under Lieut-Col J. Talbot comprised HQ Comd 6 Div AASC, 2/5 Sup Dep Coy with 2/20-25, 2/35 and 2/188 Sup Dep Pls, 2/3 GT Coy with a 2½ ton GMCs and 2/155 GT Coy with jeeps and trailers. Its operations were varied by the two different lines of communication: one along the coast and foothills where the old German Road provided some trafficway, although interrupted by creeks and rivers at regular intervals; the other along and over the mountains where extension of the advance soon moved beyond the capacity of carrier lines.

Maintenance along the coast followed the usual pattern of using supply depot platoons to establish dumps at road, air and beach heads, with jeep and tractor-trailer trains operating forward and native carriers bridging the gap to and within units.

Along the coast route 19th Brigade led the patrolling battle, relieved

on 25 December

across the Danmap River by 16th Brigade supported by 2/21, 2/22 and 2/23 Sup Dep Pls, which established a series of leapfrogging bases,

initially at Dogreto Bay by landing craft and road, with 2/3 and two sections of 2/2 Tpt Pls from 2/155 GT Coy delivering forward to units, carrier lines bridging the gaps until jeep tracks were pushed through. 16th Brigade took over again

 

 

1945

Battle of Borneo (1945)
• Expedition to the Southern and Eastern Division of Borneo in 1859
• Operations instructions no 99, Tarakan Island, March 1945

  • JapaneseEmpirein early 1945

Australian infantry on a destroyed oil at Tank Hill on Tarakan in 1945

 

 

 

 

 

Survivors of Gull Force were evacuated from Ambon to the Australian POW Reception Group camp in Morotai on RAN corvettes .

[AWM 115765]

By 1945

the survivors were all starving. Worse still, Scott was an unpopular senior officer who was unable to command the respect of his troops.

 

 His unpopularity increased when he organised Japanese rather than Australian discipline for men who violated Australian army regulations

On the inland route 17th Brigade could be supplied only by air, and with initially one then two Dakota aircraft which also had to meet operationally urgent demands on the coast axis, this provided bare support for even limited activities. The rear air supply function was carried out by 2/160 and 2/188 Sup Dep Pls until the belated arrival of 12 Air Maint Pl

in March 1945,

while at the receiving end supply depot platoon detachments and native carriers cleared the dropping grounds, distributed to sub-units and recovered scarce parachutes back to Aitape.

 

 

April,12th.1945

Map of theJapanese positionson Tarakanin 1945

Vice Admiral Forrest B. Royal, Lieutenant-General Leslie Morshead and Air Marshal William Bostock during consultations on the landing at Tarakan on 12 April 1945

Soldiers of the Australian battalion 2/48ste look at a part of the convoy that brings them to Tarakan

Map of the movements of the Allied troops on Tarakan

Engineers from the company field 2/13de rest out after the enemy reinforcements on the beach to have cleared

Second group of 2/48ste infantry battalion leaves  the Manoora

Tarakanairstriptwo weeks afterthe Alliedintake

Alliedpatrol ina remote cornerofTarakan

 

in April,

supported by 2/25 and 2/35 Sup Dep Pls and 2/155 GT Coy elements which had to operate on 12-14 hour shifts to move the tonnages required forward. CAASC 6th Division was convinced that GMCs could operate just as effectively as the jeeps in the prevailing conditions, and deliver a much greater payload, but 2/3 GT Coy was fully committed to barge unloading and getting supplies to the forward depots.

Requests for relief to 1st Corps did not bring trucks, rather the arrival of 2/96 Tpt Pl with more jeeps! Limited engineer support meant that bridging of water crossings was slow and flooding destroyed bridges often before they were even completed. This, combined with the low capacity of the divisional transport and the need to use the same truck-on-landing craft system at forward beaches as at Aitape, meant that any significant operations were curtailed to that limited resupply capacity.

 

Support of Aitape-Wewak

Requests to 1st Corps for heavy transport, landing craft or aircraft to support a major thrust on either front were refused through unavailability, and with wet weather hampering air and road movement even further, the advance slowed in line with its limited supplies, particularly ammunition.

The airfields at But and Dagua were not secured until

17 and 22 March,

 

 

when at least air landing enabled higher payloads and reduction of the frequent losses of parachute drops falling into Japanese lines or lost in the jungle or into the sea; but no inland airfield was available until one was opened near Maprik

on 14 May.

After the capture of Dagua ten LCTs and six Fairmile launches were allotted for a drive on Wewak, enabling the build up of adequate supplies, fuel and ammunition and reliable resupply. A ground and amphibious assault took Wewak, Boram and Moem

on 11, 17 and 22 May.

The plan was that this should have completed the campaign and allowed the objective of reducing forces in the area to one brigade; in fact the remaining Japanese who had withdrawn into the mountains were presented with an extended target in the string of airfields and the administrative areas of garrisons which had to be established right along the coast between Aitape and Wewak, and 17th Brigade still faced further resistance east of Maprik.

This dispersion meant a concomitant administrative task of maintaining this extended network, so the Division was ultimately committed until the end of the war to more costly defensive operations than would have been incurred in staying originally at Aitape and reducing the garrison to one brigade.

The centre of gravity was now shifting to Wewak. To avoid reshipping through Aitape, 3rd Base Sub-Area helped man forward supplies, ammunition and petrol depots at Cape Wom, which then received direct shipments from cargo and tanker ships; the divisional FSD and FAD then distributed to units in the area. Air maintenance of 17th Brigade in the Toricellis was also moved to Wewak, 12 Air Maint Pl setting up at Boram airstrip

 

 

1944

 
       

Japanese Occupation of Netherlands East Indies,1944 (ca.) large commercial cover used to Pontianak, West Borneo,
 franked with Japanese occupation of Dutch Indies 1g Dove & Flag (Scott N37) and Unoverprinted Japan 50 sen Showa tied by ‘Makassar’ undated postmark. Japanese Naval Censor’s violet cachet with red oval chop. Rare commercial usage of the key high-value of the pictorial set.
Estimate HK$ 2,000 – 3,000.
 
Realized HK$ 26,000

 

 
       
Japanese Occupation of Netherlands East Indies, 1944 (ca.) Underpaid 3½c Flag postal card used to Bandjermasin, East Borneo, canceled by ‘Langowan’ undated postmark. Various handstamps including Postage Due boxed cachet with ’15’ written in red ink. Some wear but a highly attractive usage with extensive handwritten message covering both sides.
Estimate HK$ 1,500 – 2,000.
 
Realized HK$ 3,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

until 06 June 2007 (1944) Showa.

 

It does not remain a mere soldier magazine key area, in the diary. It also said the contents of stunning natural history depicting the lives of residents of ethnic groups from the local perspective of cultural anthropology.

Drumhead court-martial sentenced to death by the military court in the Netherlands. Sentence enforcement is March 3 1949.

 

It was the young age of 33 leaving a wife and children to their country. Currently, 4,200 km south almost true about his wife and children will live from Yokohama.  

 

Late Major  Satoshi Nibo shut on the island of New Guinea,

 

which crossed the equator. 65 years after the war. But now not clear even the location of the cemetery.

 

Major Nibo that of dying for one’s country to become a professional Japanese homeland. Ito wrote Sadatoshi former instructor Nakano school. “Major Nibo Ji had left a suicide note immortal all ages. Mirrors secret warrior. Crystals Nakano soul” and. (“Secret war of Nakano School”).

 (Quoted from “by Sadatoshi Ito” secret war of Nakano School “) Satoshi Nibo
 

  Satoshi Nibo was labeled “Symbol crossing western New Guinea.” Anthropological record that can be called natural history magazine key area rather than soldiers. The cover signature creation using Toshiro and some are not Nibo Nibo Ji, the name of the brothers.
 

 Illustration drawn by many that Mr. Nibo has been inserted into the “key crossing western New Guinea”
 

 

Satoshi Nibo was labeled “Symbol crossing western New Guinea.” Anthropological record that can be called natural history magazine key area rather than soldiers. The cover signature creation using Toshiro and some are not Nibo Nibo Ji, the names of his brothers

 

Illustration drawn by many that Mr. Nibo has been inserted into the “key crossing western New Guinea”

(Quoted from “Wing New Guinea grandfather did not even shoot a gun shot” by Mr. Fukatsu faith had been a divine institution yuan) Horanjia of “divine institution” behavior in the vicinity of the route (Jayapura, capital of Papua province now).

(Quoted from “Mandl Papuan troops and crocodile” Akira Tokuno) deployment diagram of pacification engineering battalion of Japanese troops during World War II, was deployed to the western part of New Guinea. Led the institution “God” is Major Nibo

 

.

 

 

1945

 

 

The Battle of Tarakan in 1945

was the first stage in the Borneo campaign of the allied troops in the south-western Pacific Area during World War II.

This began with a massive amphibious landing by Australian forces on 1 May 1945.

The code name of the operation was Oboe Wan. Although the operation was successfully awarded by the Allied forces triumphed over the Japanese it has also been generally agreed that the results of this operation, the high cost is not justified

 

 

Australian troops approaching Tarakan

 

The bombings were probably also responsible for the deaths of a few hundred people on the island. As oil production declined was also the Japanese garrison on Tarakan reduced, one of the two infantry battalions (the 454ste independent infantry battalion) was moved to Balikpapan.

 

This battalion was destroyed by the Australian seventh division during the Battle of Balikpapan in 1945

Source

Wiki dutch

 

Read more about  Tarakan war

 

Top of Form

Burial of soldiers killed in Tarakan
The main target of the Allied attack on Tarakan (codenamed Oeboe One) was the airport so it could be used to provide air support for the landings at Brunei, Labuan and Balikpapan. Another goal was to conquer the oil fields of Tarakan and back into production as a source of oil for the Allied forces on the battlefield.
The headquarters of the Ninth Division and the 26th Brigade were responsible for the strategic planning of the attack on Tarakan. This was early in March began when both units Morotai had reached, and this preparation was completed on 24 April. The work was delayed due to the poor working conditions and difficulties in communication with the headquarters of General MacArthur in Leyte.
The Allied plan was assumed that the conquest would soon expire. The surgery would be a short fight at the airport contents followed by a consolidation phase, during which the airport and the port would be suitable for supplying the Allied forces. The developers of the plan had not reckoned with heavy fighting in the interior of Tarakan and there was no strategy for the conquest of territories outside the airport, the city of Tarakan and the coastal areas. They did, however, correctly recognized that the Japanese main line of defense would set up in an area other than on the beach and that they would not be able to a large-scale attack to resist.
The Allied plan was also assumed that Tarakan within a few days after the landing would be transformed into a major military base. In an earlier version of the Allied strategy was assumed that the 26th Brigade Group and supporting beach group would be ready to Tarakan to leave around the 21th of May and the RAF units the island could leave around mid-June, after previously still support given to the landing Palikpapan.
They possessed much knowledge about Tarakan and his Japanese defenders. This knowledge came from many sources, including SIGINT, reconnaissance, where photos were taken and Dutch officers of the Indian Army. Tarakan was the first object of the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) from November 1944. The only difficulty was to a large-scale organization in the conquest of a small island as Tarakan to set up, so that this organization could contribute little to the final strategy to be followed.
[Edit] Geography

 

.
[edit] Allied troops

 

Top of Form

Allied plane lands at the airport of Tarakan
Tarakan has a triangular shape and is 3 kilometers from the coast of Borneo located. The island is about 24 kilometers long (from the northernmost to the southernmost point) and in the northern area about 18 miles wide. The small island Sandau is approximately 0.80 kilometers from the coast of western Tarakan. Almost the entire coastline of Tarakan consists of swamp and in 1945 there were mangrove forests in the northern part of the island, which is 1.6 to 2.4 kilometers inland walked. These forests were on the coast of the southern part of the island narrows. The land within the marsh strip (central Tarakan) consisted of steep hills (more than 30 meters high), covered with a dense jungle. Tarakan is three degrees of the equator and has a tropical climate. The maximum temperature during the greater part of the day is about 25 degrees C, and the humidity is continuously more than 90%.

In 1945

Tarakan city’s main town on the island. This town was about 1.8 kilometers inland and was separated from the southwest coast by smaller hills covered with low vegetation. Four piers were used to oil tankers to load and were connected to the city by three roads. The airport of Tarakan was about 1.6 kilometers northwest of the city of Tarakan. There were two oil fields, one was Sesanip Oilfield, which was located on the northeast corner of the airport, the greater Djoeata or Juata Oilfield was 4.8 miles to the north. The village Djoeata lay on the northwest coast of Tarakan and was connected to the Djoeata oilfield by a path.
[edit] Allied troops

Top of Form

Allied plane lands at the airport of Tarakan


Tarakan has a triangular shape and is 3 kilometers from the coast of Borneo located. The island is about 24 kilometers long (from the northernmost to the southernmost point) and in the northern area about 18 miles wide. The small island Sandau is approximately 0.80 kilometers from the coast of western Tarakan. Almost the entire coastline of Tarakan consists of swamp and in 1945 there were mangrove forests in the northern part of the island, which is 1.6 to 2.4 kilometers inland walked. These forests were on the coast of the southern part of the island narrows. The land within the marsh strip (central Tarakan) consisted of steep hills (more than 30 meters high), covered with a dense jungle. Tarakan is three degrees of the equator and has a tropical climate. The maximum temperature during the greater part of the day is about 25 degrees C, and the humidity is continuously more than 90%.
In 1945 Tarakan city’s main town on the island. This town was about 1.8 kilometers inland and was separated from the southwest coast by smaller hills covered with low vegetation. Four piers were used to oil tankers to load and were connected to the city by three roads. The airport of Tarakan was about 1.6 kilometers northwest of the city of Tarakan. There were two oil fields, one was Sesanip Oilfield, which was located on the northeast corner of the airport, the greater Djoeata or Juata Oilfield was 4.8 miles to the north. The village Djoeata lay on the northwest coast of Tarakan and was connected to the Djoeata oilfield by a path.
[edit] Allied troops

 

 

 

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Allied troops on Tarakan


The allied forces responsible for the capture of Tarakan, were composed around the very experienced Australian 26th Brigade, consisting of 12,000 soldiers. The 26th Brigade was formed in 1940 and had already been in the fire in North Africa and New Guinea. The infantry consisted 2/23ste, the 2/24ste and 2/48ste battalion, also with war experience. These battalions were complemented by the 2/4de command squadron and 2/3rd pioneer battalion as infantry fought in this battle. The brigade group had further 2/7de field regiment armed with 24 25 pounders, a squadron of the regiment 2/9de armed with 18 Matilda tanks, a company of the 2/2de machine gun battalion, the 53th antiaircraft division and two engineer squadrons. These combat units were supported by a large number of logistics and medical units, including the 2nd beach group. Although the number of men of the 26th brigade group was much larger than the total number of Japanese defenders Terakan was thought this is necessary, given previous experiences from had noted that the war would be difficult if the Japanese would withdraw into the interior of Tarakan.
The 26th Brigade Group was supported by Allied air and naval units. The air units were from the Australian First Tactical Air Force and the Thirteenth Air Force and consisted, from bomb and combat squadrons. The naval power was partly derived from the United States Seventh Fleet and consisted among others of various warships and transport ships of the Royal Australian Navy. Because the main target during the attack on Tarakan airport was there were too many ground troops of the Royal Australian Air Force presence, including the No. 61 Wing RAAF, the number 1 and number 8 Airfield Construction Squadrons.

The power that landed on Tarakan coexisted aforementioned units from more than 1,000 American and Dutch troops and the American troops were from the genius of the United States Army, they manned the LCM’s and LCVP’s.

 

The 727ste Amphibian Tractor Battalion controlled the LVT and the United States Navy Seabees helped aboard landing ships for tanks. The Dutch troops consisted of a Malayan company, commanded by Dutch officers and diplomatic unity. Major Tokoi led the total Japanese defense of Tarakan, although cooperation between the army and navy was bad.
[Edit] Japanese troops

 

 

 

Top of Form

Allied troops on Tarakan


At the time of the Allied landings on Tarakan was the Japanese army of 2,200 men of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy. The largest unit was the 740-strong 455ste independent infantry battalion, which was commanded by Major Tadai Tokoi. 150 men of the supporting forces were also at Tarakan.

 

 

The contribution of the Navy to the garrison of Tarakan consisted of 980 sailors and was commanded by Kaoru Kaharu. The main naval unit was the 600-strong 2nd Naval Garrison Force. This naval unit was specially trained to fight as infantry and opera

 

ted several artillery pieces on the coast. Of the 350 civilian workers from the oil industry was also expected that they would fight alongside when an Allied attack would take place. The Japanese force was further from 50 Indonesians who had their own unit.

 

The Japanese troops were concentrated around Lingkas, the main port of Tarakan and the only place that was suitable for landing troops.

 

 

The defenders had spent months strengthening their positions and laying mines. In the final raid the Japanese restricted mainly to the fanatically defending the fixed defensive positions. They carried no major offensives against and most offensive actions were limited to small groups soldiers who tried to infiltrate the Australian lines.

 

 

 

 

Preliminary operations

 

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Commands on the beach


The Japanese forces on Tarakan was alerted to the impending Allied invasion in April before the Allies their bombardment prior to the invasion of the island had begun. The commander of the island received a radio message in which he was warned for an early attack, and the commander of the oil depot was commissioned the oil wells on 15 April destroy. It is possible that this warning was the result of a leak in the Chinese representative of the army in Australia or that the leak was in the headquarters of MacArthur. Eventually it had no effect on the ensuing battle, because the Japanese had taken measures to fight for months to maintain, furthermore, they knew very well that there is a large allied force was assembled at Morotai to Borneo to attack.
Before the final major attack on Tarakan and Borneo, from 12 to 29 April 1945, the Japanese garrison there bombed and shelled by the Allied navy. The RAAF and USAAF also did air raids on Japanese bases in China, Indochina and the NEI for the Japanese air units to stop moving. These attacks destroyed all Japanese aircraft in the area around Tarakan. The intensity of the bombing was greater during the five days before the landing took place. The attacks were aimed at the adjacent areas of the site, at Linkas, where the landing would take place, and were intended for the Japanese defensive force reduction. The oil storage tanks at Linkas were a major target because it was feared that the oil would be used as fuel in the fight against the allied forces. The bombing also forced the original inhabitants of Tarakan to the interior to escape.

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Tank on Taragan


The attack power for Tarakan gathered in the months of March and April 1945 at Morotai, the 26th brigade group was from Australia to Morotai transported by the United States Army transports, arrived in early April and began preparations for the amphibious landing.

 

Due to a shortage of shipping facilities, all units ordered for embarkation

 

 

 

 

 

 

on 20 April

 

all unnecessary vehicles in Morotai behind. The commander of the 1st Tactical Air Force did not listen to this advice but was still forced to follow his superior, Air Marshal William Bostock.

 

 

 

Most units were on the 22th april

 

 boarded and the remaining troops were still several days landing exercises. A small convoy of ships that the order had Sadau the island, off the coast of Tarakan, conquer, departed on 26 April of Morotai and the main body (150 vessels) followed the next day.
Because they were forced to deal first with the mines that were placed around Tarakan and because there are too many obstacles were placed on the beach of Linkas was a surprise attack excluded.

 

A group of the United States Navy minesweepers and destroyers came

 

 on April 27 at Tarakan

 

 and began mining, most were originally laid by the allied forces. This work was completed on 1 May and resulted in damage to two minesweepers. On 28 April, two USN PT boats at Tarakan and illuminated the coast at night to prevent the Japanese therein to repairs could begin. The PT boats were also 7 smaller Japanese ships that were anchored to Linkas and spent 6 of 7 to sink.


On 30 April,

the landing on the island Sadau instead of 2/4de Australian Commando Squadron, 57th Field Regiment 2/7de battery and the genius to support the release of the landing beaches. The uninhabited island was quickly captured. The landing on the island Sadau was the first time that Australian soldiers had landed on non-Australian territory in the Pacific since late in the year 1941 (Australian participation in the New Guinea campaign from 1942 was limited to part of the Australian New Guinea).

 

 The only Allied losses during this operation was the loss of the USS Jenkins, which was damaged by jumping from a mine, while the ship landing supported.

The task of the seashore to clean obstacles was entrusted to the company 2/13de field, including wiring, steel rails and wooden objects had to be cleared.

 

 On April 30, at 11.00,

 

went by engineers and LVT landing craft to Tarakan to do their job. They were supported by the artillery of the island Sadau, Allied warships and aircraft. It did its job under Japanese fire but failed to remove all obstacles out of the way. There were no losses.
 

Battle
 Landing

 

Top of Form

Trucks will be brought ashore


The main invasion force arrived at Tarakan in the early hours of May 1 Accompanied by a fierce fire and shelling from the ships made it 2/23 and 2/48ste battalion amphibious landing about 8 hours. There was no resistance offered to the beach and the men of the two battalions had only minor injuries by clearing obstructions on the beach. The following night was the frontline both along the beach and into the interior expanded.

 

The remaining troops of the 26th Brigade Group, including the squadron with matilda II tanks, landed later on May 1

 

The Allied losses were lower than previously expected, 11 men were slain and 35 wounded. The faint Japanese resistance was caused by the heavy bombing prior to the landing, that the defenders of Tarakan had forced the heavy defenses Lingkas leave.

 

While the landing troops successfully established a beachhead was the actual landing delayed by the poor conditions of the landing ground. Many of the Australian vehicles sank into the soft mud of the beach and 7 Linkas landing ships for tanks stranded because their commander the coastline misjudged.

 

 

The narrow strip of land that it was passable made sure there was a stoppage of vehicles and result was that not one piece of artillery regiment of the 2/7de field operations could be made until the afternoon after landing. This block was even worse because the land forces of the RAAF on 1 May landed with all motor vehicles. The 7 landing ships for tanks could pass

 

on May 13

 

from their position freed.

 

After the beachhead was secured yanked the 26th brigade group Taragan eastern to the town and to the airport.

 

The Australians faced Japanese who are determined to halt the advance. The task of conquering the airport was assigned to the battalion 2/24ste. The first attack on the airport would take place on the night of May 2 but was delayed when the Japanese explosives left off and the airport was not finally conquered until May 5 While the 26th Brigade Group Airport conquered the Japanese were still masters of the interior.

 

During the first week of the 7000 Indonesian invasion drew refugees by the Australian line, which was a larger number than expected and this group, many in very poor condition, flooded the Dutch civil service. Despite the shock and dismay caused by the Allied bombing and invasion saw most Indonesians the Australians as liberators. Hundreds of them later worked as laborers and porters for the Allied troops.

General Thomas Blamey, commander of Australian troops, made an inspection tour to Tarakan on May 8 During a meeting with Whitehead, he decreed that the 26th brigade group of the island is now needed to further investigate, now most of the operations had ended.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Battle in the interior

 

 

Top of Form

Hills of Tarakan


To further ensure the island and the runway of the airport against attacks was the 26th brigade group dislodge the Japanese from the heavily forested hills around Tarakan. About 1,700 men had been in positions in the north and south of the island buried, these positions were protected by booby traps and landmines. Since the attacks of these positions much infantry force would require the Australian made use of the available artillery and air support to the losses within acceptable limits.

 

The Australian tanks were only limited support to the infantry because the marshes, the jungle and the steep hills that prevented. Their movements were restricted to the already beaten path. Their role was thus limited to supporting fire from infantry attacks.

The 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion and the NEI Company were appointed to the southeastern side of Tarakan to purify, the pioneers moved on May 7, east of Tarakan City but came fierce Japanese resistance.

 

 

 

 

 

 As of 10 May,

we stopped at the point Helen, which was defended by 200 men Japanese troops.

 

 

 

 

On 12 May,

Corporal Jack Mackey slain, after he completely only three Japanese machine gun nests had conquered. He posthumously received the Victoria Cross for his actions. During the battle for Helen B-24 Liberator bombers were deployed to air support, P-38 Lightning Lockheed threw immediately after the napalm bombing down. This strategic combination was very effective and was later used as standard by Australian troops there air support was needed. The Japanese troops were forced to leave Helen

 

on May 14

after a loss of about 100 deaths. The 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion reached the east coast of Tarakan on May 16 It had a loss of 20 killed and 36 wounded ago, now had the NEI-company the rest of southern Tarakan insured and not encountered a lot of resistance during this action.

 

The U.S. and Australian Navy continued to support the invasion, even after the landing was accomplished. USN PT boats left at least 12 small boats at Tarakan and the rivers to the coast of Borneo sinking between 1 and 10 May They took note interpreters during patrols natives questioned about the movements of the Japanese enemy. The Japanese battery on the north east coast of Tarakan on 23 May destroyed by Douglas A. Munro.

The Japanese garrison was destroyed and the survivors sought refuge in the hills and moved

 

on June 14

to the north. On the same day left 112 Chinese and Indonesian laborers by the Japanese occupied territory with a note from a Japanese officer, in which he requested that people be treated well. Radio Tokyo while the news spread that Tarakan on 15 June had fallen was the last Japanese resistance was observed on 19 June but Whitehead declared the island until safely

on June 21.

Restoration

 

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Mathilde II on Tarakan


While the infantry of the 26th brigade group against the Japanese in the hills moisture were engineers from the Royal Australian Air Force (the number 61 Airfield Construction Wing) deployed to the airport from Tarakan again operational.

 

 The runway was badly damaged by the bombing that had taken place for the landing and was in a swampy area, causing more difficulties. Recovery lasted eight weeks and not a week, as expected. Steel plates was used as a mat; waste material are today still in the parking lot of the airport of Tarakan.


The restored runway was opened on 28 June,

 

it was too late to have a role to play in the landing in Brunei or Labuan or during the Battle of Balikpapan (1945). The number 78 Wing RAAF was stationed at the airport from 28 June and flew to support troops in Balikpapan until the end of the war.
Attempts to oil resources and the infrastructure around it to repair were delayed by the serious damage it, this complex was only after the war back into production.

 Dutch share in the struggle
In Australia (26th) Brigade was the second company of the first (and only) infantry battalion KNIL classified. This company was a lightly armed infantry skirmisher company. They consisted of about 160 men and was composed as follows:
• KNIL soldiers from Australia (Camp CASINO);
• A platoon of volunteers from Suriname;
• Not long before KNIL liberated prisoner of war;
• Some European KNIL artillery from Curacao;
• Some Engelandvaarders.

The battle lasted until 22 July,

 the share of the KNIL company consisted of patrolling the flanks in connection platoon, which on 4 May, 10 May and 26 May were fierce battles. The Allied losses amounted to casualties: 11 officers, including First Lieutenant C. the Gooyer, deputy commander of the KNIL company and 146 others, including 5 KNIL soldiers, over 400 allied soldiers were injured, including five volunteers from Suriname.

 Japanese after the battle
At the end of the organized resistance divided the remaining Japanese in small groups, to the north and east of the island moved. Many of them tried to cross the street to attract Tarakan separated from the mainland but they were intercepted by the navy patrols. Allied troops also searched Boenjoe Japanese on the island, a few kilometers northeast of Tarakan. During the first week of July, there was food shortage and Japanese groups tried to return to their old positions in the center of Tarakan. As the famine grew increasingly gave Japanese surrender. Australian troops were patrolling and search for Japanese until the end of the war, in those days there were every day slain or Japanese or gifts that are over and after the war gave another 300 Japanese surrender.

 

 These actions cost the 26th brigade group a number of deaths and injuries (36) between 21 June and 15 August.

Top of Form

Landing on Tarakan
The 26th brigade group remained as an occupying force on Tarakan until 27 December 1945,

 

 although most units have been disbanded for October. The headquarters of the brigade group returned to Australia in 1946 and that same year was disbanded (Brisbane, January 1946).
The oilfields of Tarakan were quickly repaired and put into production. Engineers and other technical personnel arrived soon after the invasion and the first oil well was restored on 27 June. In October produced the oil wells all 8,000 barrels per day and provided also work on the indigenous population.

The allied troops found that the battle had been fought with skill and professionalism. Samuel Eliot Morison wrote about the operations: altogether this was a very well Conducted amphibious operation All which attained its objectives with minimum loss. Get Tarakan showed the importance of a combined effort, in particular the need for the infantry to cooperate with and support by tanks, artillery and engineers during the war in the jungle.

Despite the judgment of Morison were the losses of the 26th brigade group than in comparable landings during the Borneo campaign. The brigade had more than twice as many people than the other two brigades of the 9th Division during their operations in North Borneo and 23 times more deaths than the 7th Division in Balikpapan. The losses of the 26th brigade group are partly attributable to the fact that one could not pull back in garrison, which was possible in North Borneo and Balikpapan.
The value of the operations of the airborne troops was greatly reduced because they could not make use of the airport on the island. The erroneous assumption that the airport could be repaired quickly was a major mistake. The operations of the RAAF on Tarakan is subject to criticism. An important point which played here was that the morale of the units was poor, including through the Morotaimuiterij.
The Australian operations on Tarakan thus remain controversial. There is still debate about whether these large scale action is necessary in the context of a planned operation to Japan to attack and also the Dutch East Indies to liberate what is already on the agenda for 1946. The judgment of the Australian historian Gavin Long that the cost of the battle for Tarakan achievements not justified in accordance with the general opinion about this fight.

 

Top of Form

Forces


[Edit] Ground Troops
• Australian 26th Brigade
o 2/23de Infantry Battalion
o 2/24de infantry battalion
o 2/48de infantry battalion
o 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion (fought as infantry)
o 2/4de cavalry squadron command
o C Squadron, 2/9de armed regiment
o D Company, 2/2de machine gun battalion
o 2/7de Field Regiment (25 pounder guns)
o 53rd Composite Anti-Aircraft Regiment
o 2/13de Field Company
o 2nd Field Company
o 2/12de ambulance
• 2 the beach group
o 2/2de Pioneer battalion
o Other units:
 2/11de
§ Field Company
 2nd beach
§ group
 Royal Australian Navy Beach
§ Commandos
 second medical corps of
§ the Australian Army
Indian Army
• 2nd Company, 1st Battalion
U.S. Army
• Composite Company, 727de amphibious tractor battalion
• Company, 593de genius boat – and coastal battalion
[Edit] Air Units
• No. 77 Wing RAAF
o No. 76 Squadron RAAF (Kitty Hawk) (from 15 May)
o No. 22 Squadron RAAF] (Beaufighter) (from 4 June)
o No. 30 Squadron RAAF (Beaufighter) (from 4 June)
o No. 31 Squadron RAAF (Beaufighter)
• Number 78 Wing RAAF (fighter)
o No. 75 Squadron RAAF (Kitty Hawk)
o No. 78 Squadron RAAF (Kitty Hawk)
o No. 80 Squadron RAAF (Kitty Hawk)
o No. 452 Squadron RAAF (Spitfire)
• No. 82 Wing RAAF
o No. 21 Squadron RAAF
o No. 23 Squadron RAAF (B-24)
o No. 24 Squadron RAAF (B-24)
• 18th Fighter Group USAAF (Mindoro island, Zamboang (from 4 May)
o 12th Fighter Squadron (P-38)
o 44th Fighter Squadron (P-38)
o 70th Fighter Squadron (P-38)
• 347th Fighter Group USAAF (Palawan Island)
o 67th Fighter Squadron (P-38)
o 68th Fighter Squadron (P-38)
o 339ste Fighter Squadron (P-38)
• 42th Bombardment Group USAAF (Palawan Island)
o 69th Bombardment Squadron (B-25)
o 70th Bombardment Squadron (B-25)
o 75th Bombardment Squadron (B-25)
o 100th Bombardment Squadron (B-25)
o 390th Bombardment Squadron (B-25)
• 5th Bombardment Group USAAF (Samar Island)
o 23th Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 31th Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 72th Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 394ste Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
• 307de Bombardment Group USAAF (Morotai Island)
o 370th Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 371st Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 372nd Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
o 424ste Bombardment Squadron (B-24)
• 868ste Squadron USAAF (LA B-24)
• Fleet Air Wing 17 U.S. Navy (Palawan Island)
o Patrol Bombing Squadron 128 (VPB-128) (PV-1 Ventura)
o Patrol Bombing Squadron 106 (VPB-106) (PB4Y-2 Privateer) (from 3 May)
o Patrol Bombing Squadron 111 (VPB-111) (PB4Y-2 Privateer)
o Patrol Bombing Squadron 109 (VPB-109) (PB4Y-2 Privateer with Bat Bombs) to 6 May)
• RAAF ground forces on Tarakan during the campaign
o No. 16 Air Observation Post Flight (4 Auster light aircraft)
o Number 61 Operational Base Unit
o Number 61 Airfield Construction Wing
 Number 1 Airfield
§ Construction Squadron
 Number 8 Airfield
§ Construction Squadron
o Number 2 Aerodrome Security Squadron
o Number 114 Mobile Fighter Control Unit
[Edit] Marine units
• Coverage Group 74.3
o Light cruisers: USS Phoenix, USS Boise, HMAS Hobart
o Destroyers: USS Taylor, USS Nicholas, USS O’Bannon, USS Fletcher, USS Jenkins, HMAS Warramunga
• Attack Group 78.1:
o flagship USS Rocky Mount
o Landing Ships: Including: 2 LSI (HMAS Manoora and HMAS Westralia), 1 AKA (USS Titania), 1 LSD (USS Rushmore), 21 LST, 12 LCI, 4 LSM, 12 LCT

o Support: 6 LC], 4 LCI (R), 2 LCI (M), 2 LCI (D) with four units decommissioning
o Protection: Destroyers: U.S. ships Waller, Bailey, Bancroft, Philip, Drayton, Smith, Caldwell, frigates: HMAS Burdekin, Barcoo, Hawkesbury, eskorten the destroyers USS Formoe, Charles E. Brannon, 1 Motorized Torpedo Boat (MTB) tender (USS Wachapreague), 21 MTBs
o Landing craft Control Unit: 1 PC, 1 LCI (L), 2 LCS
o minesweeping unit: 1 APD, 11 YMS
o Service unit: 1 AGS, 1 AN, 1 ATR, 1 ATO, 4 LCI (L) equipped for fire fighting and salvage
[Edit] Japanese units
• Army and Navy Headquarters
o 455de independent infantry battalion
 1st
§ Company
 2nd Company
§
 3rd Company
§
§ 4th Company
 Machine
§ Company
o 2nd naval power monitoring
 1st
§ Company
 2nd Company
§
 Air Defence
§ company

Soldiers of the battalion 2/24ste posing with captured Japanese flags and swords in July 1945

 

 in July 1945 ,

2/30 Sup Dep Pl receiving and issuing the airdrops then air landings when Hayfield airstrip was opened near Maprik; 2/3 Tpt Pl was flown in to distribute forward. Similarly the transport effort was divided between the two centres, with 2/155 GT Coy progressively centring on Wewak 55.

The period had been extremely testing on the units as they were caught in a situation where the divisional commander had wanted to drive on to take Wewak,

while the higher command vacillated, withholding the necessary air and watercraft resources which would have facilitated the effort, but not giving clear orders to stop.

The result was that the Divisional AASC, and the engineer construction and watercraft efforts as well, had been driven to extreme lengths to support a drawn out advance when they were manned and equipped only for a garrison role. The question of clear objectives, and of following them, had also arisen during the parallel deployments in Bougainville and New Britain

Source

http://books.historia.com.au/equal-to-the-task_v1-raasc/e1-p3_real/e1-c15_w2.html

 

 

 

 

 

 

After the Japanese occupation

 

members 5,000 original inhabitants of Tarakan under Japanese domination.

 

The large numbers of Japanese soldiers on the island brought about a shortage of food and many residents members therefore malnutrition.

 

.

 

 

 

Survivors Sandakan 1945

 

Australian War Memorial xxxxxxx

Returning prisoners from Ambon
Morotai August 1945

The few survivors from Gull Force were repatriated to the Advanced Base at Morotai on HMAS Glenelg. Ambulances from 2/4 MAC Pl met them at the wharf and transferred them to hospital.

Other returnees to Morotai included members of the half of 2/105 Coy who had been landed and lost in Java, met by their old unit now serving on Morotai.

Unit reports on their final roll of members record ‘Safe’ against those who were returned. The numbers were all too few.

Australian War Memorial 002965

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

At the end of Au http://books.historia.com.au/equal-to-the-task_v1-raasc/e1-p3_real/e1-c15_w2.htmlgust 1945,

 Americans liberated the POWs from Hainan. On Ambon the surviving Australian POWs waited another four weeks to be rescued by the Royal Australian Navy corvettes, HMAS Cootamundra, Glenelg, Latrobe and Junee

Peter Bernardos In ambon 1945

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Molluca Bonaire

1945

  1. Bonaire. Het interneringskamp voor vijandelijke buitenlanders en subversieve Nederlandse elementen wordt dag en nacht streng bewaakt, alhoewel de kans om te ontsnappen van dit geisoleerde eiland zeer gering is. Een Nederlandse officier en een inlandse soldaat in een van de uitkijkposten

Bonaire. Na het uitbreken van de oorlog arresteerde de Nederlandse regering snel subversieve elementen en vijandige buitenlanders in Oost- en West-indië, waarvan een groot deel op Bonaire geínterneerd werd. Vanwege de geisoleerde ligging en prikkeldraadomheiningen is het zeer moeilijk hier vandaan te ontsnappen. Hoofdgebouw van het interneringskamp, bij de kust. Let op de cactus die tussen de hekken groeit

 

Prisoner of War

from Death in the Spice Islands, compiled by Amanda Johnston
http://www.cofepow.org.uk/pages/asia_haruku1.html

Heroes of Haruku There were many heroes in the Pelauw camp in Haruku whose day-to-day acts of brotherhood and compassion surely alleviated the suffering of their friends under these diabolical circumstances. The doctors, amongst them Dr. Buning, Dr. Springer, Dr. Philps and Dr. Bryan, saved many lives using the crudest of contrived instruments and effecting what cures they could in the absence of medicines or even vegetation to concoct alternative means of healing.

One of these heroes was not a doctor, but a botanist by training who went on to become a Professor of Botany at London University some years after the War (now an Emeritus Professor), and who was serving as a radio officer in the RAF when taken prisoner: Leslie Audus used his skills to manufacture yeast from ‘next to nothing’, providing the very sick, and eventually all the men, with a source of vitamin B, the absence of which in their scant diet was worsening their state of malnutrition and causing beriberi and pellagra as well as optic neurosis, the result of which could be irreversible blindness.

A good summary of his cultivation methods can be found in Dr. Richard Philps’ book, Prisoner Doctor as well as in his own definitive work on the Moluccas drafts – Spice Island Slaves. Without a doubt he saved many lives and the eyesight of many of the men by developing his cultures, and they were most fortunate indeed that he was in the Haruku draft where conditions were so appalling. He was only permitted to continue with his yeast-making activities because one of the by-products was alcohol, which was then commandeered by the Japanese guards.

Spice Island Slaves by Leslie J Audus The little-publicised story of Japanese prisoner-of-war camps in the Moluccan Archipelago (The Spice Islands) In Eastern Indonesia from May 1943 onwards is comprehensively recorded in this book. This chronological history has been compiled from contemporary diaries and records from a large number of British and Dutch sources, including those of the author.It is illustrated by 25 drawings of camp scenes and personalities, maps, camp lay-outs and graphs. In those slave-labour camps on the islands of HARUKU, AMBON (at Liang) and CERAM (at Amahai) and during the final disastrous attempts to return them to Java, half of the 4,110 servicemen (2,827 British and 1,283 Dutch) were to die from starvation, disease, brutal thrashings, execution and drownings.The multiplicity of the sources ensure that there are no significant gaps the story traced from from the initial assembly of the drafts in Java to the final piecemeal return of the living skeletons of survivors during the last year of the war. The tragic transit camp on the island of MUNA at the south-east corner of Sulawesi is fully covered.  

At the end of the war

 

 

Major  Satosi Nibo,

the war criminals who missed departure subordinates that U.S. forces had executed prisoners.

 

Refrain from military justice, Nibo, the author of “Key West Nyuginiya crossing” argument as a resource. Pentalogy.

 

Part of the testament of  Major Satoshi Nibo.

Do not underestimate what is required, such as for what I was sentenced to death as a war criminal. Dutch troops to the death penalty if the sum in the formal court unilaterally. I have come to get active for the Empire. Suicide note addressed to his wife, Mrs. Toshiko “—

 

 Iru contact with anti-dust.

I ended in the defeat of Japan Tensen in New Guinea “,

 

leaving their homeland when they are in the belly of the mother is still in you, the land of southern rain Kuroki father

 

“I have fought until the end in the belief of victory Empire. mother. are you in tough Naru emergency that the thing looked like my father, such as what could not and. Omou sorry that stands in front of the muzzle receive the death penalty at eight a.m. on the day after tomorrow. Dead not looking your face still and testament must not forget the kindness he was raised. “

 

Mother’s addressed to Mr. Zhong Ji child — not seen yet.

6748330671_620040122c.jpg

flickr.com

362 × 500 – Peter Bernados – Ambon 1945

 


Footnotes

1. Memos, Gerow for Marshall, 176 Dec 41, sub: Memo for President (not used); Stark for President, 3 Dec 41, no sub, both in WPD 4557.

2. Notes on mtg of newspaper correspondents with Gen Marshall, 15 Nov 41. The notes were made by the correspondents, one of whom supplied the author with his copy.

3. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1111; Mins, CofS Mtg, 10 Dec 41, WSCSA Conf II.

4. Telg, U.S. Ambassador, Chungking, 8 Dec 41, WPD 4389-42; Memo, Laughlin Currie for Pres, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4389-46; Rad, Magruder to Secy War, No. 95, 11 Dec 41, WPD Msg File. For full story of this incident, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), ch. II.

5. Rads, Roosevelt to Chiang, 12 and 14 Dec 41; to Stalin, 13 Dec 41; Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41; Stalin to Chiang, 12 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, pp. 50-52.

6. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Missions to China, p. 57; Rads, Marshall to Brett, no. 71, 15 Dec 41, and Brett to Marshall, 27 Dec 41, WPD 4389-54 and 58, and other related papers in this file.

7. Rads, Marshall to Brink, No. 59, 15 Dec 41; Marshall to MacArthur, same date, both in WPD 4544-31.

8. Rad, Brink to Marl, 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179; Ltr, Brink to Marshall, 25 Dec 41, sub: Singapore Conf, WPD 4544-31; Rad, Duff Cooper, British Chairman of the Conf, no addressee, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4402-137.

9. Rad, Brink to Marshall, 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179; comments by Brink on Singapore Conf, attached to Rpt of Conf, WPD 4544-31.

10. Memo, Maj Elmer J. Rogers, jr., for ACofS WPD, 22 Dec 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore Conf, WPD 4544-31.

11. The minutes of the ARCADIA conference are bound separately and, with the records of the conference, are filed in ABC 337, ARCADIA. For accounts of the work of the conference, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planing 1941-42, ch. V; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. I, pp. 45-72; Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), chs. 15-17; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, ch. XX.

12. ABC-4/CS1, 31 Dec 41. The original British version of the final phrase reads “must speedily follow.”

13. ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41; JPC Rpt, 28 Dec 41, sub: Supporting Measures for SWP, ABC-4.3; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jan 42, WPD 4639.

14. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 25 Dec 41; Memo for File by Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Noted of Chiefs of Staff Conf, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4639.

15. Gerow, notes on White House Conf, 26 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; mins of White House Conf, 26 Dec 41, WDSCA Conf I; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 457.

16. Mins, ARCADIA, 27 Dec 41.

17. ABC-4/5, Directive to Supreme Comdr in ABDA Area, 10 Jan 42. An earlier version of the directive can be found in the 30 December meeting of the conference, and the directive actually issued to Wavell is dated 2 January, the day after the President and Prime Minister approved it.

18. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 12 Jan 42, WPD 4639-14. For additional papers on this subject, see WPD 4639-19.

19. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, pp. 61-63; Rads, Marshall to Barnes, Nos. 206 and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42, both in WPD 4628-25; CCS 8, 24 Jan 42, sub: Inclusion of Darwin in ABDA, ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42).

20. ABC-4/5, Directive for the Supreme Commander, 2 Jan 42. A copy is printed in general Wavell’s account entitled “ABDACOM,” app. A, copy in OCMH.

21. Notes on White House Mtg, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs.

22. Mins, ARCADIA, 11 and 12 Jan 42; ann. 1 to 10th Mtg, 12 Jan 42; CofS Conf, 12 Jan 42, ABC 3376 ARCADIA; White House Conf, same date, OPD Reg. Docs.

23. JB 325, ser 729. For a full discussion of this subject, see Vernon E. Davis, Origins of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, vol. I, Organizational Development, ch. V, History of the JCS in World War II.

24. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg. 13 Jan 42; Post ARCADIA Collaboration, 10 Jan 42, an. Mins, ARCADIA, 10 Jun 42.

25. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg. 13 Jan 42.

26. ABC-4/CS 4, 14 Jan 42, sub: Post-ARCADIA Collaboration; Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 14 Jan 42, an. 2.

27. Davis, Origins of Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, I, p. 269.

28. 25th Army Opns in Malaya, Japanese Studies in World War II, 85; Despatch by Lt Gen A.E. Percival, Opns of Malaya Command, 8 Dec 41-15 Feb 42, Supplement to the London Gazette, February 20, 1948; Kirby, et.al., The Loss of Singapore, chs. XIV, XVII.

29. Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ (rev. ed.), Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 42-43.

30. Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies in World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in Invasion of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 17, pp. 18-20; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 280-281; Crave and Cate, AAF I, p. 380. The tenders were later converted into light carriers.

31. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 12 Jan 42; to Brereton, No. 52, same date, both in WPD Msg File; Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 1-2.

32. Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 16-18.

33. Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to War, 8 Dec 41 to 15 Feb 42, pp. 54-55, OCMH.

34. Rad, Wavell to British Chiefs of Staff, ABDA 48, 14 Jan 42; Memo, WPD for U.S. Secy CCS, 16 Jan 42, both in WPD 4619; Ltr, U.S. Secy CCS to Brig V. Dykes, 16 Jan 42, sub: Responsibility of Supreme Commander ABDA, ABC 381 SWPA (1-12-42).

35. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 11 Jan 42, WPD 4639-14.

36. Rad, WD to Brereton, No. 52, 12 Jan 42, WPD 4628-20; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, same date, WPD 4639-14.

37. Rads, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 7 and 12, 15 and 16 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Wavell to Marshall, ABDA 71, 16 Jan 42; Marshall to Wavell, No. 25, same date; both in WPD 4639-19.

38. Rads, Barnes to Marshall, No. 130, 29 Jan 42; No. 138, 31 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Marshall to Barnes, No. 206 and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42; Marshall to Brett, No. 48, 27 Jan 42, all in WPD 4628-25.

39. Hart, Narrative of Events, Passim; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), pp. 88-89; Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jan 42, sub: Comd in ABDA, WPD 4639-29; Rad, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 95, OPD Exec Files.

40. Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. III, pp. 17-20.

41. Ibid., pp. 20-22; Hart, Narrative of Events; Mins, CCS Mtg, 10 Feb 42.

42. Rads, Marshall to Brett, No. 73, 4 Feb 42, WPD 4628-27; Brett to Marshall, 3 Feb 42, AB 371 (2-3-42).

43. Percival, Opns in Malaya; 25th Army Opns in Malaya, Japanese Studies in World War II, 85, pp. 58-110; Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 32-42; Kirby, et.al., The Loss of Singapore, ch. XXIV.

44. Rads, Wavell to CCS, 13 Feb 42, CCOS 7; Wavell to CCS, 15 Feb 42, CCOS 8, OPD ABDA Msg File.

45. For accounts of these operations, see Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 52-67; Morison The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp.. 280-311; Craven and Cate, AAF, ch. I, ch X; Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies in World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in Invasion of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 17, pp. 18-20, 22-23, 26-27; Ambon and Timor Invasions, Japanese Studies in World War II, 30, pp. 1-15.

46. Rad, Wavell to Prime Minister and Dill, 16 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

47. Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Feb 42; Rads, CCS to ABDACOM, 17 and 21 Feb 42; ABDACOM to CCS, 19 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

48. For a full discussion of this matter, see Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, ser. I, vol. 4 “Australia in the War of 1939-1945″ (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 442-65. Churchill’s account of this incident is somewhat different. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 155-66.

49. Rad, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 19, 20 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

50. Rads, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 20 and 22, 21 and 22 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File; Marshall to Brett, No. 185, 21 Feb 42, WPD 4639-48; Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 Feb 42.

51. Rads, ABDACOM to CCS, COS 19 and 20, 22 and 23 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

52. Rad, H.J. Van Mook to Marshall, 22 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

53. Rad, Marshall to Van Mook, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4639-55; British COS to Joint Staff Mission, No. 76, 23 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 POA; Mins, CCS Mtg, 23 Feb 42; CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 23, 23 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

54. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1083, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4639-54.

55. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 359-63; Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 396-98.

56. For an exciting account of the battle, see Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 342-59. An analysis of the battle is contained in Rear Adm William A. Glassford, Narrative of Events in the SW Pacific, 14 Feb-5 Apr 42, WDCSA 210.72 (5-20-42) SPA.

57. Invasion of the NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 16; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 363-75; Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 397-98.

58. For an account of the campaign in Burma, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, chs. III and IV.

Tarakan war references

Top of Form

Sources, notes and / or references
• 1985. P. of flour, editor. Tanda kehormatan KNIL. Tribute to the KNIL. Prepared by the Foundation Erefilm KNIL.
• This article or an earlier version is (partially) translated from the English Wikipedia, which is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution / Share-falls. See this page for editing history.
• I AUSTRALIAN CORPS War in Asia and the Pacific. Volume 6. The Southern Area (Part I), Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London [1945?], 1980, “Report on Operations. Borneo Campaign (Appendix to Japanese Monograph No.. 26: Borneo Operations (1941-1945)) “ISBN 082403290X.
• Bulkley, Robert J. At Close Quarters. PT Boats in the United States Navy, Naval United States Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1962
• COATES, John An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001 ISBN 0195541197.
• Coombes, David Morshead: Hero of Tobruk and El Alamein, Oxford University Press, 2001 ISBN 0-19-551398-3.
• Coulthard-Clark, Chris The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001 ISBN 10987654321.
• Wesley Craven and James Cate (1953), The Army Air Forces in World War Two. Volume V: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
• GILL, G Herman Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1968
• HOPKINS, R.N.L. Australian Armour: A History of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps 1927-1972, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978 ISBN 0642994072.
• JOHNSTON, Mark That Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-1946, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2002 ISBN 1865086541.
• LONG, Gavin The Final Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1963
• LONG, Gavin The Six Years War. Australia in the 1939-45 War, Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973 ISBN 0642993750.
• Samuel Eliot Morison (1959), The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas 1944-1945. Little, Brown and Company, Boston.
• Odgers, George Air War Against Japan, 1943-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra [1957], 1968
• OGAWA, Itsu War in Asia and the Pacific. Volume 6. The Southern Area (Part I), Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London [1957], 1980, “Japanese Monograph No.. 26: Borneo Operations (1941-1945) ‘ISBN 082403290X.
• Rottman, Gordon L. World War II Pacific Island Guide. A Geo-Military Study, Greenwood Press, Westport, 2002 ISBN 0313313954.
• ROYAL NAVY Naval Staff History Second World War: War with Japan, Volume VI, The Advance to Japan, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1959 ISBN 0117728217.
• STANLEY, Peter Tarakan. An Australian Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1997 ISBN 1864482788.
• WILSON, David Always First: The RAAF Airfield Construction Squadrons 1942-1974, Air Power Studies Centre, Sydney, 1998 ISBN 0642265259.


Footnotes

1. 65th Brigade Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 3; 14th Army Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 39, 60-62, 73-76. Most of the material covered in this chapter is treated at greater length in Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, chs. XV-XXII. For the convenience of the researcher, footnote references are to the original sources rather than to the author’s earlier volume.

2. USAFFE Field Orders 1 and 2, 6 and 7 Jan 42 and GO 3, 7 Jan 42, copies on OCMH.

3. 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, apps. 3 and 20, p. 15.

4. 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 33, 38.

5. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, N o. 108, 23 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East.

6. United States of America vs. Masaharu Homma, pp. 3062-63, testimony of Homma; pp. 2450, 2457, 2576, testimony of Lt. Gen. Takaji Wachi and Col. Yoshio Nakajima, National Archives; 14th Army Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 116.

7. Rad, MacArthur to CG Bataan Service Comd, 6 Jan 42, AG 430 (25 Dec 41); Inventory of Rations, 3 Jan 42 AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42) both in Phil Rcds.

8. See Rpts of the QM Phil Dept in AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil Rcds.

9. Material on the prevalence of disease can be found in AG 440 (26 Jan 42) and AG 710 (24 Mar 42) Phil Rcds; Col Wibb E.W.. Cooper, Med Dept Activities in the Phil. ann. XIV or USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, copy in OCMH.

10. Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 32-33, 55, 57-61.

11. Col Harry A Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 18; Col Ray M. O’Day, Hist of 21st Div (PA), II, 39, both in OCMH.

12. Ltr Order, USAFFE to All Unit Comdrs, 15 Jan 42, sub: Msg from Gen MacArthur, copy in OCMH.

13. Ltr, MacArthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH. New York Times, December 21, 1941.

14. Col Richard C. Mallonée, Bataan Diary, II, 69, copy in OCMH.

15. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. See also hi messages of 27 December and 1 January to the Chiefs of Staff, in same file and in WPD 4639-2.

16. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 2 and 3, 1 Jan 42, WPD 4639-2.

17. Ibid.; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 42, AG 381 (17-41 Gen) Far East.

18. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Jan 42, WPD 4639-2.

19. Memo, Gerow for CofS, 3 Jan 42, sub: Relief of Phil, WPD 4639-3. There is no record of formal approval of this s. Both Stimson and Marshall noted it, but made no comment.

20. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 9, 4 Jan 42; AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, No. 671, 5 Jan 42; COMINCH to CINCAF, same date; MacArthur to Marshall, No. 26; COMINCH to CINCAF; Brett to Marshall, No. 485, all dated 9 Jan 42 and in WPD Msg File.

21. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 72, 17 Jan 42; Marshall to CG USAFIA, same date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, ABDA No. 26, same date, WPD 4560-9; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 949, same date, OCS 18136-196.

22. Rads, Brereton to TAG, 19 Jan 42; Marshall to Brereton, same date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East.

23. Rad, Brereton to Marshall, No. 88, 22 Jan 42; Barnes to TAG, No. 154, 2 Feb 42, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec 2A) Far East.

24. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 201, 4 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. This message, as well as many others from MacArthur, was forwarded to the President.

25. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil.

26. Rads, Rt. Mills to Marshall, Nos. 226 and 227, 8 Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File. The first part of the message is addressed to Roosevelt and signed Quezon; the second to Marshall signed MacArthur. Ltr, MacArthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH.

27. Rad, Roosevelt to MacArthur for Quezon, No. 1029, 9 Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File.

28. Rads, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb 42; Quezon to Roosevelt, No. 262, 12 Feb 42, both in OPD Exec Files.

29. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 297, 16 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil.

30. Rads, Hurley to Marshall, ABDACOM No. 2, 17 Feb 42, AG 381 (7-41 sec. 2B) Far East; 21 Feb 42, OPD 381 SWPA, sec. 1 case 21.

31. Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of USAFIA; Maj Richard M. Leighton and Elizabeth Bingham, Development of U.S. Supply Base in Australia, both in OCMH.

32. Rpt of QM Opns in Phil Campaign, ann. of USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 29-40, 69-70, and app. A, Rpt of Opns, Cebu Depot, OCMH.

33. Rad, Hurley and Brett for Marshall, 483, 4 Mar 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 3) Far East.

34. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 344, 22 Feb 42, WPD Ready Ref File, Phil.

35. Memos, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Feb 42, sub: Supply of U.S. Forces in Phil, OCS 18136-258; Marshall for Roosevelt, 24 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4560-26, Marshall for Roosevelt, 28 Feb 42; sub: Blockade Runners, OCS (18136-268. Vice Adm. Bernhard H. Bieri (ret.), then one of the naval planners, recalled later that he never heard of this plan to use World War I destroyers and doubted that it had been submitted to the Navy. Anyone familiar with the steaming characteristics of these 1,000-ton destroyers and with the distances in the Pacific, he wrote, “would have crossed it out as a practical operations.” Ltr, Beiri to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.

36. Messages dealing with these vessels can be found in AG 384.3 GHQ SWPA and in the Hist Br, OCT, SWPA, Phil Shipping.

37. Rpt, CTF 51 to CINCSWPA, 15 May 42; sub: Submarine Relief Activities, ser. FF6-4, A 16-3, copy in OCMH; Ltr, GHQ SWPA to CG US Air Service, 14 May 42, sub: Phil relief Shipments, AG4.3M.

38. Memo, Hurley for Marshall, 21 Feb 42, PD 381 SWPA, sec. 1, case 21.

39. Read Adm. Charles A. Moore, one of the Navy planners in February 1942, served on the panel that reviewed the present manuscript before publication. At that time, July 1959, he recalled that on several occasions he had mentioned to Secretary of State Cordell Hull the necessity for getting MacArthur out of the Philippines, and that it was Hull who finally went to the President with this suggestion. Notes of Panel meeting, 17 July 1959.

40. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, WDCSA 370.5 (3-17-42) Phil.

41. Rad, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb 42, OPD Exec Files.

42. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 14 Feb 42; MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 42, both in WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil.

43. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) l; Eisenhower Personal Notebook entry of 23 Feb 42, copy in OCMH.

44. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1078, 22 Feb 42, CofS folder entitled MacArthur’s Move to Australia.

45. Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), p. 64. in this connection, se Jonathan m. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1945), pp. 1-5.

46. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 358, 24 Feb 42; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1087, 25 Feb 42, both in WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil.

47. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 6 Mar 42, WDCSA 370.05 (2-17-42) Phil; Brett to Marshall, No. 760, 19 Mar 42, 371 (3-19-42); Rear Adm Francis W. Rockwell, Rpt on Gen MacArthur’s Evacuation, Office CNO, Naval Hist Div.

48. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 482, 14 Mar 42, WDCSA 370.05 (2-17-42) Phil.

49. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 5, 21 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files.

50. Rpt of Harbor Defense of Manila Bay, ann. VIII of USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 42.

51. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story, p. 2.

52. Rpt of Harbor Defense, pp. 32, 42ff.

53. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 55.

54. Rad, Marshall to USAFIA, No. 740, 18 Mar 42, OPD 381, Phil, sec 1, case 13. The correspondence between Beebe and MacArthur is filed in AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA.

55. Rads, Roosevelt to CG USAFFE, No. 1198; Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1204, both dated 19 Mar 42, o. 1203, 20 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files.

56. MacArthur had acquired this control on 3 January 1942. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Jan 42, WPD 3251-75.

57. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 3 Mar 42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA; Memo, Marshall for Pres, 22 Mar 42, sub: Comd in Phil; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 810, 22 Mar 42, both in OPD Exec Files.

58. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar 42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA.

* Jong A.P. de, Vlucht door de tijd; 75 jaar Nederlandse Luchtmacht, Unieboek B.V., 1988
* Hurricane, E. Bishop, Airlife Publishing Limited, 1986.

 

 

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The Dai Nippon Occupation Sumatra and Java in 1942-1945

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The Dai Nippon Occupations Sumatra

History Collections

1942-1945

 

Created by

Dr Iwan suwandy,MHA

Private Limited E-book In CD-rom Edition

Special For Senior Collectors

Copyright @ 2012

 

INTRODUCTION

By 13th February,

 the headquarters of the Group decided that a reconnaissance must be made to discover whether or not the Japanese intended to land on Sumatra.

The position in Singapore was known to be desperate, and it was felt that the enemy would assuredly attempt to extend the range of their conquests.

 A single Hudson from No. 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, accordingly took off in the afternoon and presently returned with the report that there was a concentration of Japanese shipping north of Banka Island.

 This seemed to show that an invasion of Sumatra was imminent. An unsuccessful night attack by Blenheims in darkness and rain was succeeded at first light on 14th February

by an offensive reconnaissance carried out by five Hudsons. They discovered between twenty-five and thirty transports, heavily escorted by naval vessels and fighter aircraft. The suspected invasion was on the way.

 

The five Hudsons, subsequently reinforced by all available bomber aircraft, delivered a series of attacks upon the convoy and achieved conspicuous success. Six transports were sunk or badly damaged for the loss of seven aircraft.

The squadrons engaged, Nos. 1 and 8 of the Royal Australian Air Force and Nos. 27, 62, 84 and 211 of the Royal air Force, fulfilled their tasks without fighter protection, for the Japanese had staged an attack by parachute troops on P.I, the fighter airfield at Palembang.

The attackers were able to cut the road to the south and west of the airfield and to overpower the meagre ground defences. Wing Commander Maguire, the Station Commander, at the head of twenty men, hastily collected, delivered a counterattack which held off the enemy long enough to make possible the evacuation of the wounded and the unarmed.

He was presently driven back into the area of the control tower, where he held out for some time, short of ammunition and with no food and water, until compelled to withdraw after destroying stocks of petrol and such aircraft as remained.

 

The fighters which should have accompanied the bomber force attacking the convoy belonged to No. 226 (Fighter) Group, formed

on 1st February

The Surrender:

Slowly being pushed back on February 13,

Percival was asked by his senior officers about surrendering. Rebuffing their request, he continued the fight.

The next day,

Japanese troops secured Alexandra Hospital

and massacred around 200 patients and staff.

Early on the morning of February 15,

the Japanese succeeded in breaking through Percival’s lines. This coupled with the exhaustion of the garrison’s anti-aircraft ammunition led

Percival to meet with his commanders

at Fort Canning. During the meeting, Percival proposed two options: an immediate strike at Bukit Timah to regain the supplies and water or surrendering.

Informed by his senior officers that no counterattack was possible, Percival saw little choice other than surrender.

Dispatching a messenger to Yamashita, Percival met with the Japanese commander at

the Ford Motor Factory later that day to discuss terms. T

he formal surrender was completed shortly after 5:15 that evening.

February 15, 1942 –

 Singapore surrenders, when food, water, ammunition, and gasoline are nearly gone. They were taken to the Ford Motor Company assembly plant on the outskirts of Singapore town. Here Lt. General A. E. Percival yielded to Lt. General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 25th Army.

820 British seaman were lost, while 2,081 were picked up by flotilla destroyers. Of the 88 Japanese planes, only four were shot down.

It is thought that the Naval Base was evacuated, just before the fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942. The Aquarius sailed on February 12/13, 1942 and sunk off the Sumatra coast north of Banka Island by air attack. Three survivors were picked up, but they also died shortly after. Unfortunately, the Aquarius never made its Darwin, Australia, destination. The Aquarius was launched on February 14, 1934, as the R.A.F.A. (Royal Air Force Auxilliary) “Aquarius,” and was an aircraft tender. It arrived originally in Singapore on May 28, 1934. There are many accounts of the Aquarius in various sources, and some accounts are about two U.S.A. ships also named Aquarius. There was a listing for an Aquarius as a U.S. Navy attack cargo ship (AKA 16) of the C2 type commissioned in 1943. However this ship is thought to have been 6094 tons and did not sink. It ended up in the Soviet Union in 1945. One account has the passengers of the ship at 1,000 and while the British vessel carried 60-70 persons. In both cases, it is stated that there were three survivors picked up, who then died shortly thereafter. One account says they were picked up by ML 310s. The same account has the the ship being sunk by a Japanese destroyer near Tjebia Island (off Sumatra) on February 15, 1942.

I originally thought that the Aquarius was the ship that my uncle died on when it sunk. Now I know that Alexander Malcolm died after the sinking of the SS Redang.. The SS Redang was registered in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Siam Steam Navigation Fleet, and was seized by the British government, and was then made part of the Singapore Strait Steamship Company. On February 12, 1942, this ship was attacked by two Japanese destroyers and sunk. Alexander Malcolm and his friend, Tommy Hand, died 50 miles from the Berhala Strait one of many casualties of World War II.

 

DEI troops survivors of the battle of Palembang (Sumatra) 15 Feb 1942 this troops would cease to exist after Battle of Java (march 1942)

they’re known as a KNIL in indonesia, people who try to get a better luck by joining the army rather than live as a poor farmer

on 15th February,

 the day on which the fortress of Singapore surrendered unconditionally, the greatest success up till then scored in the Far Eastern War had been achieved, and achieved by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force. The landing of the enemy at the mouth of the Palembang River had been completely arrested, thousands of his men had been killed or wounded, and his plan of invasion brought temporarily to naught. The action fought that day on the coast of Sumatra shows only too plainly what might have been accomplished on the coasts of Siam and Malaya had an adequate Air Force been available

Sad to say, this highly successful counter-measure had no sequel.

There were no troops or naval craft available to exploit the victory and the reaction of the Japanese was immediate and violent.

They made another parachute troop landing on Palembang airfield and in the neighbourhood of the town. It was successful and its success jeopardized the situation at P.II, the secret airfield, where stocks of food, ammunition and bombs were running very low. Orders were reluctantly given for a retreat to Java.

All aircraft were to fly; their ground staff were to go by ship and to embark at Oesthaven.

 Here occurred an administrative blunder which added to the difficulties of the Air Force and considerably reduced its further capacity for fighting.

The Dutch authorities at the port had already set on fire the bazaar and destroyed all equipment of a military kind.

A dark pall of smoke lay over the town, and beneath it the airmen striving to carry out their orders and to reach Java as quickly as possible found themselves faced with an obstacle created not by the enemy, but by the British Military Embarkation Officer.

He was one of those men to whom an order is as sacred and inflexible as are the Commandments of Sinai. All officers

and men of the ground staff were to be clear of the port by midnight, but they were to leave, so he ordained, without their motor transport or their equipment.

 In other words, they were to reach Java in a condition in which they would be quite unable to take any further part in operations.

To every remonstrance he returned the same answer: those were the orders. It says something for his personality that they were obeyed. No. 41 Air Stores Park left behind them spare Hurricane engines and other urgent stores; so did the Repair and Salvage Unit of No. 266 (Fighter) Wing, and the anti-aircraft guns and ammunition brought away with such difficulty from P.I and P.II were also abandoned.

This departure, in an atmosphere which can only be described as that of panic, was quite unnecessary, for two days later Group Captain Nicholetts at the head of fifty volunteers from No. 605 (Fighter) Squadron, returned to Oesthaven by sea from Batavia in H.M.S. Ballarat of the Royal Australian Navy and spent twelve hours loading the ship to the gunwales with such air force equipment as could by then still be salvaged.

 

With its Royal Dutch Shell oil refineries at nearby Pladju, the city of Palembang in southern Sumatra, Dutch East Indies was a major objective early in the Japanese campaign southwards.

The Allied defenses there consisted of two air groups located in Pangkalan Benteng airfield, also known as P1, and Prabumulih airfield, or P2.

 

The air forces there consisted of the Royal Air Force No. 225 Bomber Group (with two Royal Australian Air Force squadrons) with 40 Blenheim bombers and 35 Hudson light bombers and No. 226 Fighter Group with two squadrons of Hurricane fighters and a number of Hurricane and Buffalo fighters that carried wound from the earlier Malayan and Singapore campaigns.

A few American B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers were in Palembang in Jan 1942, but they were withdrawn to Java and Australia before the Japanese invasion.

The ground troops were led by the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Lieutenant Colonel L. N. W. Vogelesang, with 2,000 troops under his command in the Palembang area, organized in one South Sumatra Garrison Battalion and one home guard Landstorm company in reserve; there were other Dutch troops in other areas of southern Sumatra, but they lacked mobility and played no part in the subsequent Japanese invasion. A few Dutch navy officers were also present, with one minelayer (Pro Patria) and two patrol boats (P-38 and P-40) under their command.

On 13 Feb 1942,

 the Japanese invasion fleet approached southern Sumatra. While the Allied aircraft took off to attack the naval vessels, Japanese Army Ki-56 and Ki-21 transport planes delivered about 160-180 paratroopers and their supplies over P1 airfield and 90 troopers near the Pladju refineries, escorted by a large force of Ki-43 fighters.

The paratroopers failed to take P1 airfield, and another 60 paratroopers were dropped two hours as reinforcements. Those who landed at Pladju gained control of the entire industrial complex without damaging any equipment, though they were driven out after a Landstorm counterattack; the Dutch troops then began a demolition operation to destroy the oil refineries, setting equipment on fire.

By the next morning, unable to hold ground, the Japanese paratroopers advanced to the Musi, Salang, and Telang Rivers, and waited there for the main invasion force to arrive.

The main Japanese invasion force for southern Sumatra was under the command of Japanese Navy Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. The fleet consisted of the heavy cruiser Chokai, light cruiser Sendai, 8 destroyers, and 22 transports, which held the invasion force of Japanese Army 229th Infantry Regiment and one battalion from the 230th Infantry Regiment.

A covering force sailed in the distance, which was consisted of the carrier Ryujo, four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. The invasion fleet was first engaged by British river boat HMS Li Wo, which engaged the much larger Japanese ships with its lone 100-millimeter gun; Li Wo eventually was damaged beyond repair, and rammed into the nearest Japanese transport before being sunk.

 Meanwhile, an Allied fleet consisted of Dutch cruisers De Ruyter, Java, and Tromp, British cruisers Exeter and Hobart, and 10 destroyers attempted to intercept the invasion fleet, but the fleet gave up after being attacked by aircraft from Ryujo and nearby ground bases. As the Japanese landing forces sailed up the river leading up to Palembang, British aircraft based in Sumatra attacked, sinking the transport Otawa Maru.

While the invasion started, an episode of massacre took place nearby.

On 12 Feb

, 330 soldiers, nurses, and civilians commandeered the vessel SS Vyner Brooke and attempted to escape from Singapore.

 

 On 14 Feb,

 the freighter was found by Japanese aircraft off the Bangka Island off southeastern Sumatra, sinking her with three bomb hits. The 90-some survivors of the sinking and the Japanese aircraft strafing made it to Bangka Island’s Radji Beach. In the evening of 14 Feb, all but one civilian women left the group for a local village with their children, leaving the men on the beach with the Australian military nurses.

Shortly after, Japanese soldiers discovered those on the beach, and massacred the men with bayonets. The nurses were marched into the ocean, and when they reached waist-deep water, they were fired upon with rifles. Nurse Vivian Bullwinkel, British Army Private Pat Kingsley, and several other survivors hid in the nearby jungle for several days; Kingsley later died from his bayonet wound. They were eventually found and placed into a prisoners of war camp. Bullwinkel survived the brutal camp treatment and gave evidence against the Japanese at the 1947 war crimes trial in Tokyo.

On 15 Feb,

it was decided that southern Sumatra, with its weak defenses, was to be abandoned. All of the aircraft and some of the personnel were sent to Java, where the Dutch East Indies seat of government was located; remaining personnel were transferred to India. The aerial evacuation was completed by the evening of 16 Feb, while the evacuation by sea did not complete until 20 Feb.

With southern Sumatra evacuated, the 8,000 Dutch reserve troops and 1,200 para-military policemen in northern Sumatra were practically stranded. Lacking adequate transportation, the Dutch were dispersed in small groups. On 8 Mar, they received word of Dutch commander-in-chief General Hein ter Pooten’s surrender in Java on 8 Mar; however, most of them chose to disobey the surrender order.

On 28 Feb 1942,

a sizeable Japanese force set sail from Singapore for northern Sumatra; the force consisted of 27 transports, three cruisers, ten destroyers, and various other smaller vessels, divided in four groups. On 12 Mar, Operation T was launched with landings at Baloeng Bay on Sabang Island, Cape Pedro near Kotaradja airfield, and Iri. The second landing took place at Tandjoengtiram, where the four battalions landed to secure a beach head for the landing of tanks, air groups, and the divisional headquarters. All landings were nearly unopposed as the Dutch lacked the resources to do so.

.

Dutch East Indies Campaign, Sumatra Timeline

23 Jan 1942 Japanese bombers attacked Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies for the first time.
7 Feb 1942 Japanese aircraft attacked Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, destroying 34 RAF aircraft.
11 Feb 1942 The Japanese invasion fleet for Sumatra, Dutch East Indies departed Cam Ranh Bay, French Indo-China.
14 Feb 1942 360 paratroopers of Japanese 1st Airborne Division landed at Pangkalanbenteng airfield near Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies; in response, ABDA command sent 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers to transport troops to Palembang; Dutch destroyer HNLMS Van Ghent in this force ran aground on the next day and would be scuttled. Meanwhile, the British ship Vyner Brooke, escaping from Singapore with 300 on board, was bombed off Sumatra; around 100 survivors, including 22 Australian nurses, reach shore on Banka island; the men were marched away by the Japanese and bayoneted and shot, the wounded were bayoneted where they laid, and the nurses were herded into the sea and machine gunned; one, Sister Vivian Bulwinkel, was wounded but survived to tell of the atrocity; she died in 2000, aged 85.

 

Dutch East Indies Campaign, Sumatra

13 Feb 1942 – 28 Mar 1942Contributor:C. Peter Chen15 Feb 1942 100 additional Japanese paratroopers arrived at Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, helping with the securing oil refineries and other facilities. 200 kilometers to the south, British troop transport Ocrades arrives at Oosthaven with 3,400 Australian troops, but the ship would continue on to Java without disembarking the troops. North of Palembang, Japanese troops disembarked at the mouth of the Musi River; the British RAF interfered by attacking the landing with over 50 aircraft, sinking 20 landing craft and killing 100 Japanese. Finally, in the Bangka Strait, Japanese naval gunfire sank British tug HMS Yin Ping; 50 were killed, 25 survived.
17 Feb 1942 Japanese carrier aircraft from Ryujo sank Dutch destroyer HMNS Van Nes, escorting Dutch troopship Sloet van Beele, in the Bangka Strait; 69 were killed, 60 survived.
12 Mar 1942 On Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, Japanese troops landed at Sabang at 0235 hours, Koetaradja at 0330 hours, Idi at 0540, and Laboehanroekoe at 0700 hours. They would capture the airfield at Medan in the morning.
28 Mar 1942 Dutch Major General Roelof T. Overakker surrendered his 2,000 troops at Blangkedjeren, marking the end of resistance on Sumatra, Dutch East Indies.

 

Photographs

 

 

Information from Dai Nippon Club Netherland

 

 

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Indische en buitenlandse zegels
Op Sumatra is een grote verscheidenheid aan zegels en opdrukken gebruikt. In het begin zijn zegels zonder opdruk gebruikt, met uitzondering van zegels die de beeltenis van de koningin droegen, die waren niet toegestaan. Japanse postzegels mochten in alle bezette gebieden gebruikt worden, we komen ze dan ook veel tegen.Vanaf eind september 1942 tot medio april 1943 vormde Sumatra een administratieve eenheid met Malakka, waardoor we veel Japanse bezettingszegels van Malakka tegenkomen. Ook zegels uit andere bezette gebieden, zoals Mandsjoerije komen af en toe voor, meestal met gelegenheidsafstempelingen. De afstempeling bepaalt waar en wanneer de zegels gebruikt zijn.
 
 

 

Lokale en regionale opdrukken
Als snel komen in 1942 de eerste instructies om vooroorlogse postzegels van een opdruk te voorzien. Dit werd zowel lokaal als regionaal gedaan, waardoor meer dan 50 verschillende opdrukken ontstaan. Vele lokale opdrukken kunnen nog verder onderverdeeld worden, zoals de kruisopdrukken van Midden Sumatra, waarvan meer dan 20 subtypen bestaan.Het is bijzonder dat zelfs twee Nederlandse postzegels overdrukt zijn. De grotere postkantoren hadden een voorraad Nederlandse postzegels van 5 en 12½ cent, die meegezonden konden worden naar Nederland om retourpost te frankeren. Als gevolg van de instructie om alle voorradige zegels te overdrukken zijn op sommige postkantoren, zoals bijvoorbeeld Pajakombo, ook Nederlandse zegels overdrukt.
 
 

 

Algemene opdrukken
Eind 1942, begin 1943 zijn semi-algemene opdrukken uitgegeven. Deze zegels werden voorzien van een opdruk Dai Nippon (Groot Japan) of Dai Nippon Yubin (Groot Japan Post). Op 29 april 1943 verschenen zegels van 3½ en 10 cent uit een definitieve serie. Deze werden op 1 augustus 1944 gevolgd door nog 10 waarden. Op 1 januari 1944 verscheen een algemene T-opdruk. De semi-algemene en de T-opdrukken zijn ook aangebracht op zegels die al een opdruk hadden.

Original content © 2009 Dai Nippon. All rights reserved. Contact the Webmaster with any technical problems or comments.

 

 
Vooroorlogse postwaardestukken en opdrukken
In het begin van de bezetting werden vooroorlogse postwaardestukken zonder opdruk gewoon doorgebruikt, vooral briefkaarten. Vrij snel werden op Sumatra en in het marine gebied postwaardestukken voorzien van opdrukken, meestal dezelfde als bij de postzegels. Niet alleen briefkaarten, maar ook allerlei andere postwaardestukken, zoals internationale brief- en antwoordkaarten, enveloppen, postbladen en verhuiskaarten.
 
 

 

De eerste gedrukte postwaardestukken uit de bezetting
De eerste uitgifte van een nieuwe briefkaart vond in juni 1942 plaats op Celebes. De bekende Dai Nippon briefkaarten van Java verschenen in september 1942 en in mei 1943 kwam een nieuwe briefkaart op Sumatra in omloop. Eind 1943 verscheen er voor Java en Sumatra een gezamelijke uitgifte, een nieuwe 3½ cent Dai Nippon briefkaart in een kleiner formaat om papier te besparen.
 
 

 

Andere nieuwe uitgiften
Op Sumatra zijn er daarna geen nieuwe postwaardestukken meer verschenen, wel op Java en in het marine gebied, zoals een nieuwe verhuiskaart op Java en een definitieve kaart voor het gehele marine gebied.
 
 

 

Tariefsverhogingen
Op 1 juli 1944 werd in het marine gebied het tarief voor een briefkaart verhoogd naar 4 cent. Dit resulteerde in een verscheidenheid aan regionale uitgiften. Een jaar later, op 1 juli 1945, werd het tarief op Java verhoogd naar 5 cent en kwamen ook hier nieuwe kaarten in omloop. Op Sumatra werd het tarief pas op 15 augustus 1945, de dag van de Japanse capitulatie, verhoogd naar 7 cent. Hier zijn geen nieuwe kaarten uitgegeven.
 
 

 

Postwaardestukken van Malakka gebruikt in Indië
In de Riouw en Lingga archipel en op de Anambas Eilanden werden postwaardestukken van Malakka gebruikt, zoals bij de postzegels. Het tarief voor een briefkaart was hier 2 cent, wat later verhoogd werd naar 4 cent. Hier werden ook postwaardestukken gebruikt die we niet uit Nederlands-Indië kennen, zoals de aangetekende enveloppe. Het tarief hiervoor bedroeg 15 cent, tijdens de oorlog werd het verhoogd naar 23 cent.
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 

 

Dai nippon Occupation Indonesia Postal History courtecy Dai Nippon Club Netherland

 

Algemeen
Het innen van rechten tijdens de Japanse bezetting en de Republikeinse periode ging op dezelfde manier als voor de oorlog. In het algemeen moesten de rechten betaald worden door diegene waarvoor het stuk werd opgemaakt. Dit werd gedaan door fiscaalzegels op de daarvoor bestemde documenten te plakken, zoals plakzegels, loonzegels, handelszegels, enz.
 
 

 

Plakzegels
Plakzegels zijn vooral gebruikt voor de rechten op kwitanties, polissen van verzekeringen, hypotheekakten, wissels, huurcontracten, enz., waarbij het transactiebedrag meer dan f10.00 bedroeg.In het begin zijn vooroorlogse plakzegels doorgebruikt, al snel werden ze overdrukt, meestal met dezelfde opdrukken als de postzegels. Na verloop van tijd werden nieuwe plakzegels enz. in de Maleise en/of Japanse taal gedrukt. Tijdens de Republikeinse periode zijn evenals tijdens de Japanse bezetting zegels zonder opdruk doorgebruikt, vervolgens van een opdruk voorzien en uiteindelijk zijn nieuwe plakzegels enz. gedrukt.
 
 

 

Loonzegels
Loonbelasting was verschuldigd over de lonen die verantwoord werden op speciale loonlijsten. De verschuldigde belasting bedroeg 4% van de lonen die aan werknemers betaald werden en 2% van de lonen van huishoudelijk personeel. De formulieren en loonzegels waren evenals plakzegels op het postkantoor verkrijgbaar. De zegels bestonden uit twee delen, de linker helft werd op de originele loonlijst geplakt, de rechter op een kopie daarvan.
 
 

 

Gezegeld papier
Gezegeld papier werd gebruikt voor notariële akten, uittreksels van overheidsbesluiten, zoals benoemingen en loonsverhogingen, uittreksels uit de burgerlijke stand en registratie van hypotheken bij het kadaster. Het recht werd berekend naar de grootte van het papier. Vooroorlogs gezegeld papier werd doorgebruikt, later voorzien van een opdruk en uiteindelijk werd nieuw papier gedrukt. Tijdens de Republikeinse periode is evenals tijdens de Japanse bezetting het papier zonder opdruk doorgebruikt en vervolgens van een opdruk voorzien. Nieuw papier is niet gedrukt.
 
 

 

Andere belastingen
Andere belastingen, rechten en vergunningen zoals, gemeentebelasting, verkeersbelasting, slachtvergunningen en tabaksbelasting moesten ook voldaan worden

 

Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia fiscal revenue collections courtecy Dai Nippon Club Nertherland

 

 

 

 
 

 

a map of Japanese occupied Sumatra with the postmarked province

 

and the Japanese had taken Palembang in southern Sumatra.

Likely this was one of the Hurricanes flown by the 64th Sentai. Photo was taken at Palembang in 1942, after the airfield was occupied by Kato’s group; those are Japanese ground crews lounging beneath the captured plane. The type is Hurricane IIB

The group was under the command of then-Major Kato Tateo, probably the most famous of the Japanese army’s fighter pilots.

On January 16,

 

on 23rd January

an attack on Palembang by twenty-seven Japanese bombers showed that the main airfield in Sumatra, P.I, could not be adequately protected.

January,27th.1942

Japanese bombers attacked Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies for the first time

 

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  6.    

Since the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941,

Japan and then trying to control natural resources, especially petroleum by attacking and controlling the occupied Dutch East Indies, including Indonesia, which was then known as the best producer of petroleum (Sumatra) where the oil produced can be directly used as fuel ships without having to go through the distillation process first.

 

Beginning in February 1942,

 

Japan started to invade the territory of Sumatra and began putting his patrol boats around the Java Sea, having previously managed to control some areas in Kalimantan and Sulawesi.

 

Then the Japanese overran the oil city of Palembang as a very valuable time

  • on February 13, 1942.

 

The next day, February 14, 1942

 

 history records the sinking British ship HMS Li Wo by the Japanese navy when the ship was evacuating troops from Java (another source notes that the ship HMS Li Wo was on his way from Singapore to Batavia when ditengeelamkan).

 

February 1942 closed with the outbreak of War of the Java Sea, where the Allied navy joined in ABDACOM (American-British-Dutch-Australian Command) was defeated by the Japanese navy. Dutch East Indies government surrendered unconditionally and surrender its colonies of Indonesia to Japan through Kalijati Agreement on March 8, 1942.

 

February,7th.1942

Japanese aircraft attacked Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, destroying 34 RAF aircraft

February,11th.1942

The Japanese invasion fleet for Sumatra, Dutch East Indies departed Cam Ranh Bay, French Indo-China

February,14th.1942

360 paratroopers of Japanese 1st Airborne Division landed at Pangkalanbenteng airfield near Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies; in response, ABDA command sent 5 cruisers and 11 destroyers to transport troops to Palembang; Dutch destroyer HNLMS Van Ghent in this force ran aground on the next day and would be scuttled. Meanwhile, the British ship Vyner Brooke, escaping from Singapore with 300 on board, was bombed off Sumatra; around 100 survivors, including 22 Australian nurses, reach shore on Banka island; the men were marched away by the Japanese and bayoneted and shot, the wounded were bayoneted where they laid, and the nurses were herded into the sea and machine gunned; one, Sister Vivian Bulwinkel, was wounded but survived to tell of the atrocity; she died in 2000, aged 85.

   
   
   
   

14th February 1942,

HMS Li-Wo in action 14 Feb 1942 North of Banka Straits

 

HMS Li-Wo in action 14 Feb 1942 North of Banka Straits

The Sinking of HMS ‘Li-Wo’

Introduction

On Wednesday 6th March 2002 I visited my niece in Cardiff. Quite casually, she handed me an A4 brown envelope saying that her grandfather (and my father) had given it to her a few years before he died. Inside, I found a 24 page photocopied letter, penned by my father, to the Imperial War Museum about the sinking of HMS ‘Li Wo’.

I have reproduced the letter below exactly as it was written.

Moyra Jones 7th March 2002


The Director

Imperial War Museum

Lambeth Rd

London S.E.1

Sunday 30/8/64

 

Dear Sir,

On the 14th August, this year, I visited London with my Daughter and Nephew, and took them to The Imperial War Museum.

It was a surprise, and a proud moment, and a sad one, when I saw the scale Model of H.M.S. “Li-Woo” (sic), as I am one of the few survivors of the short but epic action, North of the Banka Straits, on Sat 14th February 1942.

I feel that I must write to you, correcting much of the information about the Ship and the action that took place, between H.M.S “Li-Woo”, and a Japanese convoy and Japanese Naval Escorts.

I commented to one of the Attendants on duty, that the facts were wrong, and was advised by him, to see the Records in the Records Department, of which I did.

Which of course, after seeing them, decided to write to you, hoping most sincerely, that you will investigate most fully, the facts I intend to give.

Before I give any account, I wish to make it perfectly clear, that I seek no glory, I seek no financial gain, and I seek no publicity.

My object and reason is purely and simply this.

Ever since 5-30 P.M. Saturday 14th 1942. I have honoured and admired the memory of the Bravest Man I ever knew.

Lt. Wilkinson V.C. R.N.

This is the first time I have written to anyone about this action, as until that visit to the Imperial War Museum, I was always under the impression that the true real facts were fully known.

I wonder how many of the gun’s crew, who composed of “Prince of Wales”, and “Repulse” survivors were interviewed? Or interrogated over this action? I also wish to add, that I was never asked for an account of the action after the war had ended, and the reason why I was unable to give an account during my 3 1/2 years as a Japanese P.O.W. was simply this:-

When I was first taken P.O.W. the survivors of the “Li-Woo” were in a tempory P.O.W. Camp at Muntok, in Banka Island, with Army, Navy, R.A.F. personel, and with many civilians, of which there were many children.

I was only at that Camp, which had no real British Military Administration for a week at the most, when I escaped with Lt. Col. Daly of Dal Force Malaya, Lt. Eno, Army, Sgt. Ken Wharton, Australian Army, only to be eventually betrayed by Natives, and handed over to the Japanese, when we landed at Java.

During my captivity, the Japs never knew that we were recaptured P.O.W.s.

I deemed that discretion was the better of Valour.

I could not mention the “Li-Woo” action North of the Banka Straits, without giving myself away that I was an escaped P.O.W.

The punishment was death.

Also we were mixed with many Dutch, and Dutch Eurasians, many of the Eurasians were Pro-Jap, and would give away their own Mother.

Here now is the facts as I know them, nothing added, nothing exaggerated.

After being sunk on the “Prince of Wales” I was sent up into Malaya with:-

C.P.O. Rogers “Repulse”

Ldg/Smn Adly(sic) “Repulse”

Ldg/Smn Bennett “Repulse”

Ldg Smn Countant “Prince of Wales”.

I need not bother you about details, as it is non revelant to the “Li-Woo”, except this.

After returning to Singapore from Malaya, we were detailed to patrol the Jahore Straits in small boats. We operated from a small village opposite Paula Ubin Island.

We were recalled from there to the Orange Hotel, Thursday afternoon 12th Feb 1942.

We were then detailed to go aboard the “Li-Woo” to sail for Java.

On arrival aboard, we were detailed as Guns Crew, being that the others were Torpedo ratings, and C.P.O Rogers, a Rangetaker, I was appointed Gun Layer.

My Guns crew consisted of C.P.O Rogers, Ldg/Smn Adley, Bennett Countant, and two stoker ratings who were with us in the Jahore Straits Patrol.

We left Singapore Harbour late Thursday night Feb 12th 1942 only to drop anchor outside the Harbour.

On Friday 13th Feb 1942 we sailed for Java with the “Fu Woo” a sister ship. We were attacked many times by aircraft, and came through.

On Sat 14th Feb 1942 we dropped anchor close inshore, we were informed that we were anchoring for a while, trusting to luck that we would not be spotted by enemy aircraft, as the Captain intended to go through the 80 miles of the Banka Straits in darkness.

We were spotted by a Jap seaplane just had we got under way again.

Between 4-30. 5-0 P.M we sighted smoke on the horizon off the Port Bow. It was a convoy.

Lt Wilkingson (sic) asked if anyone could recognise if any of the warships were Jap.

Informed him that I had served two years on the China Station, 1936-1938 and was familiar with Jap warships.

He told me to come to the bridge, and then handed me his telescope.

I saw one Jap light cruiser and two Jap destroyers, without looking for any more, I told him they were Japanese.

He then asked me if I had any doubt, I told him “none whatever”.

The convoy was about 10 mile away, and I was told to report back to the gun.

Captain Wilkingson’s words to us was this:-

“A Jap convoy is ahead, I am going to attack it, we will take as many of those Jap Bastards, as possible, with us.

Those words I will never forget, they have always been fixed clearly in my mind.

I returned to the gun, AND I CHECKED THE AMMUNITION, AND REPORTED IT FROM THE GUN, TO CAPTAIN WILKINGSON.

My report to him was this.

SIX SEM-ARMOUR PIERCING SHELLS.

FOUR GRAZE FUSE SHELLS.

THREE A.A. SHELLS.

He replied :- “Gunlayer, is that all the ammunition you have”?

I answered :- “Yes Sir”, thirteen shells in all, plus three practice shell.”

How or why 13 practice shells came into it, I don’t know, all I can assume is this.

Possibly, it was because for most of the crew, it was their first taste of action, and I know the effect it has on many.

Admitted there was thrteen shells, but they were 6. S.A.P. 4 GRAZE FUSE and 3. A.A.

I do not class a practice shell as shell for action.

Do you think that I can ever forget that moment.

The hopelessness of knowing that I had only six shells that could do any damage, and realising that two shells would probably be wasted before we found the range and target.

The “Li Woo’s” Gunnery Officer joined us, Captain Wilkinson’s name is the only one I remember.

The Gunnery Officer was Ginger headed, I believe he was a New Zealander.

I had a hurried conference with him, and said to him :-

“Look Sir, I have only six shells that can do any damage, four that can do harm if we fire at the super structure as anti personel shells, then our last hope is to set the A.A. shells at Fuse 2 and hope for the best.”

I also pointed out, that unless we were lucky with our first shot, as all we had was “Gunlayers Control”, “Gunlayers Firing”, with no range Finder and no Inclanometre to help, we might waste two shells at least, before we were on target, should we use the practice shells as our ranging shots?”

He paused for a moment, then replied: “it might be a good idea, but then again it might not, as if we can get in close enough, and we find our target, it is a wasted effort.” I received the order to load with S.A.P.

Approx. half an hour later we engaged the enemy.

Our selected target was a transport of between four to five thousand tons.

At an estimated range of four thousand yards, deflection six left, we opened fire.

The first shell was over target.

I ordered, “Fixed Sight, Rapid Salvos.” I know that at least three of our remaining five S.A.P. shells, were bang on target, as fire broke out on her immediately.

Soon she was blazing furiously. In less than two minutes our ammunition was expended.

Captain Wilkinson selected another target, the ship nearest to him, about 800 tons and deliberately rammed and sank it.

We were now among the Jap convoy, helpless, drifting, and no ammo.

I will never forget another hero of this action, a man unknown, unsung, unpraised.

An R.A.F. sargeant who manned the Vickers Lewis Gun, from the time the ship left Singapore, to when the “Li Woo” sank.

It was his deadly accurate fire, that wipe (sic) out the four man gun’s crew aboard the Jap transport we rammed.

The enemy’s gun was about 30 to 40 M.Metre. It was this gun that caused our first casualties.

I myself was wounded in the chest. The R.A.F. Sargent then swept the bridge and decks with his deadly fire, killing many.

He then opened up on another transport about 200 yards away.

The Jap convoy cleared away from us, and we came under fire from the Jap warships.

It was a fearful experience as it took the Japs five to ten minutes to find our range, their gunnery was lousy, and the noise of their shells whistling overhead, always expecting the next one to land inboard, knowing that we had to just sit there and take it, and and the helplessness of not being able to do anything about it.

When they eventually found our range, it was all over.

The “Li-Woo” listed to Starboard and sank stern first.

When we survivors were swimming in the water, the Japs transports closed in. I myself was on one of two rafts which for safety we had tied together. The transports came towards us, and picked up their own survivors, we were then under the impression when they came slowly at us that they were going to pick us up as well.

But we were in for a shock. They came right at us and deliberately rammed us but we realise just before, what their intentions were, and hastily dived into the sea.

With my own eyes, and there are times when the memory of it is most vivid, I saw that transport go among a group of survivors, and mamouver amongst them with churning screws, killing at least a dozen.

It was only the sudden darkness that saved us.

We succeeded in regaining the rafts, and all night we could see the transport we set on fire blazing fiercely.

The following afternoon,

Sunday 15th Feb

 we were picked up by other survivors who were in a boat, with a sail and oars.

It was badly holed, and the gunwales was four inches above the water.

It was only its buoyancy tanks keeping it afloat.

Just after sunrise on Monday

100 additional Japanese paratroopers arrived at Palembang, Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, helping with the securing oil refineries and other facilities. 200 kilometers to the south, British troop transport Ocrades arrives at Oosthaven with 3,400 Australian troops, but the ship would continue on to Java without disembarking the troops. North of Palembang, Japanese troops disembarked at the mouth of the Musi River; the British RAF interfered by attacking the landing with over 50 aircraft, sinking 20 landing craft and killing 100 Japanese. Finally, in the Bangka Strait, Japanese naval gunfire sank British tug HMS Yin Ping; 50 were killed, 25 survived17 Feb 1942

 

16th Feb, 1942,

we were washed ashore.

My shipmate C.P.O Rogers was in the sailing boat.

We seemed to separate in groups, just aimlessly walking around the Island, there were four of us in the group I was in, C.P.O Rogers was one of them.

Late that afternoon we ran into a Jap patrol and was taken prisioner.

A few days later I met L/Smn Adley, and Bennett, they also had run into a Jap patrol, but were not so fortunate as we were.

The Jap patrol opened fire on them, L/Smn Adley was shot in the arm, and Ldg/ Smn Bennett was bayonetted.

That is my story, nothing added, nothing exaggerated.

My one intention, and the only reason why I have written this down, is that the facts should be known, in fact must be known to all, the courage and bravery, and the great achievement accomplished by Lt. Wilkingson V.C. of H.M.S Li-Woo, on Saturday 14th February 1942, against tremendous odds.

I was on the gun deck, during the short journey from Singapore to the end of the “Li-Woo”.

I was the Gunlayer. I will state most emphatically, that to the best of my knowledge, there was no member of the “Li-Woo s” original crew, a member of that gun’s crew.

How can a practise shell cause a transport vessel to burst into flames?

Sunday afternoon we could see her, an abandoned, floating, blackened wreck, smoking slightly.

Do you think it possible?

I will willingly travel to London and undergo any interrogation you wish to put me through. But please, I beg of you, please see that “Lt. Wilkingson V.C. gets the credit that is due to him.

Is this too much to ask, for a man who made the Supreme Sacrifice, and who won the Highest Award that his Country could bestow upon him?

It was my intention after seeing the model of the “Li-Woo” to get in touch with C.P.O. Rogers. I believe that he resides at Bristol, but for the time being, I have decided against it, so that you can have the opportunity to check my story, without any collusion between C.P.O. Rogers or any one else, with me.

I swear to you on oath, that since the war ended, I have not seen or communicated with any of the “Li-Woo” survivors.

There is a lot more details, small ones, that I can give you, but, my aim is, as I have stated previously, Let “Lt Wilkingson V.C. have the just credit due to him, and the facts put right.

Yours sincerely,

T.H. Parsons

E/34 Room

Chace Guildhouse

London Rd

Coventry.

Late Leading Seaman T.H.PARSONS

D/JX.143539

P.S AFTER READING MY STORY WOULD YOU PLEASE PASS ON TO NAVAL RECORDS.


Follow up

HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SWLA 0AA

01-219 4166

From:

The Rt Hon. James Callaghan, MP. 8th January 1986

 

Dear Mr Parsons,

Thank you for your letter with the account of your service in the Far East during the last war. First, allow me to congratulate you on the determination and courage you showed throughout the period.

I will readily take up the matter up with the Ministry of Defence in order to secure a statement from the Admiralty that you took part in the “Li-Wo” action but will not do so until you have been to see me in Cardiff on 18th January, at the offices of the GMBATU, 17 Newport Road, between 10.00 and 11.00 a.m.

I shall look forward to seeing you then, when we can discuss any additional points that need to be put forward.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed Jim Callaghan)


 

This is to certify

that

LEADING SEAMAN THOMAS HENRY PARSONS D/JX 143539

On the 14th February 1942

took part in the action when his Majesty’s Patrol Ship

LI-WO whilst on patrol duty off Singapore, gallantly

engaged the superior forces of the enemy, inflicting

significant damage on a convoy of troopships before being

sunk by a Japanese cruiser. The heroism and self sacrifice

of the many who died and the few who survived were in the

highest traditions of the Royal Navy.

George Younger

20th February 1986 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

 

 

 

February 15, 1942.

Battle of Singapore, British Surrender. Lt.-Gen. Yamashita (seated, centre) thumps the table with his fist to emphasize his terms — unconditional surrender. Lt.-Gen. Percival sits between his officers, his clenched hand to his mouth. (Photo from Imperial War Museum)

February,17th.1942

Japanese carrier aircraft from Ryujo sank Dutch destroyer HMNS Van Nes, escorting Dutch troopship Sloet van Beele, in the Bangka Strait; 69 were killed, 60 survived

By 18th February,

 the evacuation from Sumatra to Java of air force pilots and ground staff had been completed and more than 10,000 men belonging to different units, and in a great state of confusion, had arrived in the island.

To add to the difficulties of the situation, the civilians in Java, who up till the landing of the Japanese on Singapore Island had shown calmness and confidence, now began to give way to despair and were soon crowding on to any vessel they could find which would take them away from a country they regarded as lost.

The confusion brought about by the mass of outgoing refugees and incoming reinforcements is more easily imagined than described, and the scenes enacted a few days before in Singapore were reproduced on an even larger scale in Batavia. Equipment, motor transport, abandoned cars, goods of every size, description and quality, littered its choked quays, and still troops and air force ground staff poured in, hungry, disorganized and, for the moment, useless. Inevitably their spirits and discipline suffered, and the climax was reached when it became necessary to disband one half-trained unit.

These few were the only men for whom the burden proved insupportable. The rest rose gallantly to their hopeless task and under the stimulus of Air Vice-Marshal Maltby and Air Commodore W. E. Staton, overcame the chaotic circumstances of their lot and in less than twelve days were ready to renew a hopeless contest.

The fighter strength available had, by the 18th, been reduced to twenty-five Hurricanes, of which eighteen were serviceable.

The bomber and reconnaissance squadrons were in equally desperate case. At Semplak airfield, twelve Hudsons, and at Kalidjati, six Blenheims, sought to sustain the war. Behind them, No. 153 Maintenance Unit and No. 81 Repair and Salvage Unit, together with No. 41 Air Stores Park, did what they could to provide and maintain a ground organization. On 19th February all the Blenheims available, to the number of five, attacked Japanese shipping at Palembang in Sumatra, and this attack was repeated

 on the 20th and 21st,

a 10,000 ton ship being set on fire.

On the 19th and 22ndFebruary 1942

 the Japanese delivered two ripostes at Semplak which proved fatal. Of the dwindling force of bomber aircraft, fifteen were destroyed. Yet even after this crushing blow the Air Force still had some sting

 left. On 23rd February,

 three Blenheims claimed to have sunk a Japanese submarine off the coast.

By then the hopes originally entertained by Wavell and the Chiefs of Staff in London of building up the strength of the Allies in Java had been abandoned; Supreme Allied Headquarters had left the island and handed over to the Dutch Command, to which henceforward the remains of the Air Force looked for guidance and orders.

They came from General ter Poorten, who had as his Chief of Air Staff, Major General van Oyen. Under the swiftly developing menace of invasion, these officers, with Maltby and General H. D. W. Sitwell, made what preparations they could to maintain the defence. Despite the encouraging messages which they received about this time from the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Air and the Chief of the Air Staff, Maltby and Sitwell knew that no help from the outside could be expected for a long time.

General ter Poorten had under him some 25,000 regular troops backed up by a poorly armed militia numbering 40,000. Sitwell could count only upon a small number of British troops, two Australian infantry battalions, four squadrons of light tanks and three antiaircraft regiments, of which the 21st Light accounted for some thirty Japanese aircraft before the end came. On the sea, Admiral Dorman commanded a small mixed force of which the main units were a British, an Australian, an American and two Dutch cruisers.

No breathing space for the organization of these inadequate and ill-armed forces was afforded by the enemy.

 

On 26th February,

 a Japanese convoy, numbering more than fifty transports with a strong naval escort, was discovered by air reconnaissance to be moving through the Macassar Strait southwards towards the Java Sea.

On the next day, Admiral Dorman put out to meet it. Hopelessly outgunned and outnumbered he fought a most gallant action and lost his entire fleet, a sacrifice which secured a respite of twenty-four hours. Subsequent to the naval battle the Air Force attacked twenty-eight ships of the convoy eventually found north of Rembang

by No. 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force,

 being close to the runway, were taken off under fire and reached a nearby airfield at Andir. Kalidjati had fallen; a small ground defence party composed of Army and Air Force officers and men, ably supported by the local Dutch defence force, fought with great gallantry to defend it and died to the last man.

Their efforts were, however, of no avail, for they had been surprised by the swift move of the Japanese who, after landing at Eretanwetan in the early hours of that morning, had encountered no opposition on the ground either on the beaches or at the various strong points covering the river crossings.

The fact was that by then conditions in Java were too confused and desperate to make further defence anything but local and spasmodic.

Nevertheless the Air Force struggled on for a few more days. Nos. 232 and 605 (Fighter) Squadrons had remained in action from

the 17th to 27th February

 doing their utmost to conduct the air defence of Batavia. The normal odds which they were required to meet were about ten to one and they had little warning of the approach of enemy aircraft.

Their task would have been eased and might, perhaps, have been successfully accomplished had they received as reinforcements the P.40 fighters carried on the U.S. aircraft carrier Langley.

 After considerable delays this ship had been ordered to sail for the Javanese port of Tjilitjap. She set out on what was a forlorn hope and as soon as she came within range of Japanese bomber and torpedo aircraft based on Kendari in the Celebes, she was attacked and sunk.

By noon on 28th February

the total strength of the fighters was less than that of a single squadron, but still the hopeless fight continued. It was decided to retain No. 232 Squadron, under the command of Squadron Leader Brooker, since all its pilots and ground staff had volunteered to remain in Java. Vacancies were filled by volunteers from No. 605 and on 1st March the reconstructed squadron, in the company of ten Dutch Kittyhawks and six Dutch Buffalos, all that remained of a most gallant and skilled Air Force which had been in constant action

on the night of the 28th February.

 It was in this action, in which a small force of American Fortresses took part, that Squadron Leader Wilkins, the outstanding commander of No. 36 Squadron, was killed. The squadron claimed to have sunk eight ships; the Americans, seven.

Feb-March, 1942: HMAS BURNIE – last ship to leave Sumatra, second last to leave Java. Photostream acquisition.

4238. Built at Mort’s Dock, Balmain [Sydney] on the British Admiralty’s account, and commissioned on April 10, 1941, HMAS BURNIE had been one of the small and gallant band of RAN corvettes that remained behind to pick up rearguards and stragglers as the Dutch East Indies fell to the advancing might of Japan in early 1942.

With powerful Japanese units all around them, they and a group of Dutch ships, including the minesweeper ABRAHAM CRIJNSSEN see pic Nos 985-6], had run the gauntlet of the circling enemy to safely reach Australia, an escape that the sloop HMAS YARRA and two her convoy charges [see preceding entry] had tragically failed to make. Pic NO. 985, showing ABRAHAM CRIJNSSEN disguising herself with vegeatation as an island, is here:

www.flickr.com/photos/41311545@N05/4327771396/

From Feb. 18-20, 1942

during the evacuation of Sumatra, HMAS BURNIE had stood off Oosthaven where, after laying demolition charges, she had embarked the rearguards and taken them to Tanjong Priok. She was the last Allied ship to leave Sumatra. On the way out at Java Head she and HMAS BENDIGO rescued survivors from the torpedoed Dutch ship BOERO and carried them to Tjilatjap.

Subsequently, with Commodore John Collins, RAN, and the former captain of HMS PRINCE OF WALES, Captain Leonard Bell, RN, embarked, BURNIE was also, with HMAS BALLARAT, one of the last two ships to get out of Java [see preceding entries]. BALLARAT had turned back to scuttle the small and unserviceable British minesweeper HMS GEMAS that had turned up just as they were leaving Harbour, and embarked her crew. Thus BALLARAT became to last ship to leave Java.

BURNIE was later with the British pacific Fleet at Okinawa. After the war, moving to Royal Navy control in 1946, she was sold to the Royal Netherlands Navy, and was re-named CERAM. She was finally decommissioned in 1958.

a Dutch ship called the SS Rooseboom that sailed from Padang on the island of Java 

on 26th February 1942,

 bound for Columbo in what was then Ceylon. Padang was, at that time, the last port on the official escape route for Allied troops and civilians from Singapore and Malaya. 

 

 

Dai Nippon Syonanto(Singapore) Postalhistory

including Sumatra area(1942-1943)

Singapore Postal History(Sumatra under Dai Nippon center Singapore)

 

 

 

 

March 1942

 

THE CAMPAIGN IN JAVA AND SUMATRA, FEBRUARY – MARCH 1942

On 1 March 1942 at 11.35pm the Rooseboom was steaming west of Sumatra

 

On 1 March 1942 at 11.35pm

 the Rooseboom was steaming west of Sumatra when it was spotted by the Japanese submarine I-59 and torpedoed. It capsized and sank rapidly leaving one life boat (designed to hold 28) and 135 people in the water. 80 people were in the lifeboat the rest clung to flotsam or floated in the sea. Two of these survivors, one of whom was a Corporal Walter Gibson, were picked up nine days later by the Dutch freighter Palopo. Until the end of the Second World War they were assumed to be the only survivors. Sadly, Robert Kingshott did not survive and his body was never recovered. The reason that I mention Walter Gibson, is that he wrote an account of his survival which demonstrates the conditions he, and others, endured in the days following the sinking.

 

According to Gibson in and around the lifeboat were an estimated 135 survivors, many with injuries, including Gibson himself who was in the lifeboat due to those injuries. By the time the boat had drifted for more than 1,000 miles, to ground on a coral reef, less than 100 miles from Padang, Rooseboom’s starting point, only five of its 80 passengers remained alive, and one of those drowned in the surf while trying to land.

 

In Gibson’s account the ordeal that followed the sinking showed the worst of human nature under some of the most extreme conditions. On the first night many of those in the water drowned or gave up. Some twenty men built a raft from flotsam and towed it behind the boat. The raft slowly sank and all twenty perished three days later. In the first few days discipline collapsed men and women went mad with thirst, some drinking sea water which sent them into hallucinations. Many threw themselves overboard rather than face further suffering, and a gang of five renegade soldiers positioned themselves in the bows and at night systematically pushed the weaker survivors overboard to make the meagre rations go further. Gibson claims to have organized an attack on the renegades with a group of others who rushed them and pushed them en masse into the sea. Brigadier Paris died, hallucinating before he fell into his final coma. The Dutch captain was killed by one of his own engineers. Towards the end Gibson realized that all who remained alive were himself, another white man, a Chinese girl named Doris Lin (who turned out to be a secret agent for the British) and four Javanese seamen. That night the Javanese attacked the other white man and started to eat him alive. Later the oldest Javanese died.

 

The lifeboat eventually landed on Sipora, an island off Sumatra and only 100 miles from Padang, where the Rooseboom started its journey 30 days earlier. One of the Javanese seaman drowned in the surf whilst the other two disappeared into the jungle and have never been found. After a period of being treated by some of the local population Doris Lin and Gibson were discovered by a Japanese patrol. Gibson was returned to Padang as a prisoner of war while Lin was shot as a spy soon afterwards. 

 

It is not clear at what point Robert died, but I would hope that his death was quick and as painless as possible.

 

Robert was my 5th cousin once removed

Soyrce: Jan Brian Kingshot

On the 1st March 1942 she was scuttled on the coast of Madura oppositeon march ist at the coast madura

By 1st March1942,

 the position became clear enough after the confusion of the previous two days. The convoy which No. 36 Squadron had attacked was one of three all making for Java. What remained of the Blenheims and Hudsons after the bombing of Semplak, took off from Kalidjati whither they had been transferred, and did their best to interfere with the Japanese landing at Eretanwetan, some eighty miles from Batavia.

They went in again and again, some pilots being able to make three sorties, and accounted for at least three and possibly eight ships, but they could not prevent the landing.

By dawn on 1st March

the bomber crews, who had operated almost without a break for thirty-six hours, were approaching the limit of endurance.

 Hardly had they dispersed, however, to seek the rest which had at last been given them, when the Dutch squadrons sharing their airfield left without notice.

The Dutch aircraft had just disappeared into the clear morning air when a squadron of Japanese light tanks, supported by lorry-borne infantry, made their appearance.

 The exhausted pilots of No. 84 Squadron, who had by then reached their billets eight miles away, had no time to return to their aircraft, which were in consequence all destroyed or captured; but the last four Hudsons possessed



THE CAMPAIGN IN JAVA AND SUMATRA, FEBRUARY – MARCH 1942

 

beside the Royal Air Force, attacked the Japanese, who were engaged on two new landings begun that night at Eretanwetan.

 Despite intense anti-aircraft fire, twelve Hurricanes went in low and inflicted heavy losses on Japanese troops in barges and set on fire six small sloops and three tanks. They also caused a certain number of casualties and a certain amount of damage to the Japanese troops going ashore at another point on the west coast of Java.

Though the Royal Air Force could hamper the landings and increase their cost in terms of casualties, they could not prevent them, and the next day saw the Hurricanes pinned to their airfield at Tjililitan, whence they were withdrawn with some difficulty to Andir, near Bandoeng. During the withdrawal they maintained a running fight with Japanese fighters.

The last remnants of the Air Force maintained the fight for another three days, attacking the newly captured airfield at Kalidjati

Robert is recorded as dying “at sea”

 on 2nd March 1942.

Robert William George Kingshott was a Warrant Officer Class II with 7 Coast Regiment, Royal Artillery. His service number was 840146.

 

 

on the nights of the 3rd, 4th and 5th March.

These assaults were made by the remaining Vildebeests of No. 36 (Torpedo Bomber) Squadron, of which only two were serviceable when the end came. On the morning of the 6th, they were ordered to seek the dubious safety of Burma, but both crashed in Sumatra and were lost. At the same time the gallant remnant of No. 1 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, took its three remaining Hudsons to Australia.

In Java, as in Malaya, the attitude of the local white population contributed in no small measure to the swift and overwhelming disaster. The feelings of the Dutch in Java can best be described as those of confused despair.

The island on which they lived and from which they drew the source of their great wealth had been at peace for many generations.

Now, the prospect of the destruction by fire and high explosive of all that had been built up and handed on to them from the past stared them in the face and their hearts misgave them. If any great show of resistance were to be made, Surabaya and Bandoeng would burn.

Why then make it, when the chances of success were infinitesimal? When it is remembered that the chief Far Eastern bastion of an ally far stronger than they were had fallen after a bare fortnight’s siege, their attitude is understandable.

 It was, however, responsible for the grim scenes which were enacted during the last few hours of resistance. ‘I was in command that morning’, records an officer of the Royal Air Force writing of the events of the last day, ‘of a big convoy with all the remaining spare arms, ammunition and such-like equipment of the Royal Air Force in Java. We practically had to fight our way through the mess to prevent the lorries being forcibly stopped, and get them, according to our orders, up on to the hill roads where we understood—poor mutts—that at last we would have another go at the Nips’.

The surrender of Java was thus a foregone conclusion as soon as the Japanese had set firm foot upon the island.

Nevertheless it took place in circumstances which, to say the least of it, showed little consideration towards the armed forces, ill-armed and ill-prepared though they were.

On 5th March,

 ter Poorten convened a conference in Bandoeng which was attended, amongst others, by Maltby and the Army Commander, Sitwell. At this meeting, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief painted a picture of the situation which could not  have been more gloomy.

 Bandoeng, he said, might fall at any moment, and if its outer defences were pierced, he did not propose to defend the town.

 The native Indonesians were very hostile to the Dutch and this hostility made it quite impossible to retire to the hills and there carry on a guerilla war. Nevertheless, though he himself was prepared to surrender, he would, he said, issue orders to the local Dutch commanders to maintain the fight.

He had, he averred, instructed his troops not only to do so, but also to disregard any order which he might be compelled to issue calling upon them to lay down their arms.

 In the event, when discussing the final terms of surrender with General Maruyama, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, the Dutch Commander subsequently withdrew this order to disobey orders.

The attitude of ter Poorten does not seem to have been shared by General Schilling, commanding at Batavia, who was prepared to emulate the selfless gallantry of Admiral Dorman, but who did not possess enough weight to influence the general situation.

 After some discussion, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief was induced to name an area north of Santosa as the spot where British forces should concentrate for a final stand, but he made no secret of his opinion that to do so would be folly or worse.

That grim evening, therefore, Maltby and Sitwell were brought face to face with the imminence of disaster. One slender hope remained. General Schilling, who had not been present at the conference, was understood to favour a retreat to the hills in south-west Java whither, it was said, he had already been able to transfer a certain quantity of stores and ammunition with the courageous intention of prolonging resistance.

Hardly had this faint flame been kindled, when it expired. Ter Poorten made any such move impossible by making Schilling responsible for the defence of Bandoeng while at the same time issuing orders that it was not to be defended, and forbidding any further fighting.

The two British officers took what counsel they could together. The surrender of some of those under their command, those for example at the airfield of Andir, was inevitable.

Andir was part of Bandoeng which had been declared an open town, and the officers and other ranks at Poerwokerta had neither rations nor arms. Their position was, in the circumstances, hopeless. For the rest, Santosa seemed to offer the only chance but, when reconnoitred, it was found to be quite unsuitable for defence and to be inhabited by Dutchmen who had obviously no intention of continuing the struggle.

Throughout this confused period, matters were further complicated by the efforts made to evacuate as many men of the Royal Air Force as could be got away. They left from Poerwokerta, priority of passage being accorded to aircrews and technical staff.

 

 By 5th March

seven out of twelve thousand had been taken off, but by then no more ships were available for they had all been sunk and about 2,500 of the air force awaiting evacuation were therefore left stranded in the transit camp.

In these attempts to send away as many skilled men as possible the Dutch gave but little help.

They could not be brought to realize that our airmen were quite unpractised as soldiers and would be of far greater value playing their part as trained members of an aircrew or as technicians on the ground, in some other theatre of war, than they would be trying, without arms or food, to stage a last stand.

Santosa being unsuitable, about 8,000 mixed English and Australian forces, of whom some 1,300 belonged to the Royal Air Force, were concentrated at Garoet; here, too, the Dutch District Civil Administrator, Koffman, proved unsympathetic.

 He feared what he described as ‘a massacre of the whites’ if any guerrilla warfare were attempted, and made no effort to collect supplies or to give any aid to the British forces which had so inconveniently arrived in his district. They were by then in a sorry plight and by then, too, the last embers of resistance in the air had expired.

 

 By 7th March,

 only two undamaged Hurricanes were left and on that day these, the last representatives of a fighter force which, during the campaign in Sumatra and Java, had accounted for about forty aircraft, their own losses amounting to half as much again, were destroyed.

On the next day, 8th, Match 1942

came the inevitable climax. About 9 a.m., to their great astonishment, the British commanders received a translation of a broadcast, made an hour previously by ter Poorten, in which he said that all organized resistance in Java had ceased, and that the troops under his command were no longer to continue the fight.

The Dutch land forces, in striking contrast to their Navy and Air Force, had capitulated almost without a struggle. They felt themselves to be no match for the Japanese.

This broadcast revoked all previous decisions and was ter Poorten’s final word. Maltby and Sitwell were placed in an impossible position.

 A decision of decisive import had been taken and promulgated without reference to them.

If, however, they decided to disregard it, their troops, should they continue the struggle, would, under international law, be subject to summary execution when captured. They had few arms, and what there were, were in the hands of men untrained to them; they were surrounded by a hostile native populace, with little food and, for drinking, they had nothing but contaminated water.

 In such conditions and with medicine-chests empty, they were in no state to carry on the fight. Moreover their whereabouts and intentions were well known to the enemy.

 In these circumstances, the two commanders had no alternative but to comply with the Dutch Commander-in-Chief’s order to surrender. Four days later they negotiated terms with the Japanese commander in Bandoeng, Lieutenant General Maruyama. He undertook to treat all prisoners in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929.

How they subsequently fared can be gathered from a description of the arrival in Batavia two years later of a contingent which had been sent to one of the numerous islands of the Malayan archipelago, there to work on airfields.

 It has been set down by a squadron leader, once a Member of Parliament, who survived the horrors of Java, horrors which were repeated in Malaya, in Siam, in Korea, in Japan—anywhere where the Japanese were in control of unarmed and defenceless men—and is one of the few printable pages of a diary kept intermittently during his captivity and hidden from his gaolers:

Of all the sights thatI would like to forget [he writes]I think I would put first some of these returning island drafts being driven into Batavia . . . Imagine a series of barbed wire compounds in the dark with ourselves a gathering furtive stream of all races East and West, in every kind of clothing or none; here an old tunic in rags with a pair of cut down pyjama trousers, there a blanketed shivering malaria case or someone with night-blindness groping along with a stick, blundering over gypsy bundles of still sleeping prisoners.

 At the side runs a camp road with one high floodlight and all of us waiting to see if any of our friends have made the grade and returned.

At last a long procession of stooping figures creeps down the road with jabbering Nips cracking at their shins with a rifle or the flat of a sword. Most of them half naked, and they leading those going blind with pellagra.

Others shambling along with their feet bound up in lousy rags over tropical sores (not our little things an inch across but real horrors), legs swollen up or half paralysed with beri-beri, enormous eyes fallen into yellow crumpled faces like aged gnomes.

 And then a search—God knows what for after months in a desert and weeks at sea. Some Jap would rush up and down hurling anything any of them still possessed all over the place, while as sure as the clock, the dreadful hopeless rain would begin again like a lunatic helplessly fouling his bed.

 Everything swilling into the filthy racing storm gutters; men trying to reach out and rescue a bit of kit and being picked up and hurled bodily back into the ranks; others clutching hold of a wife’s photo or suchlike souvenir of home, small hope for the Nips always liked pinching and being obscene about a woman’s picture.

And at last after two or three hours when everyone was soaking and shivering with cold, the dreary, hunted column would crawl down the road out of the patch of light where the great atlas moths disputed with the bats, away into an isolation compound, with no light, no food, no knowledge of where to find a tap or latrine, with wet bedding or none at all.

The Nips would disappear laughing and cackling back to bed, we faded away to our floor space and all was quiet again; and the evening or the morning was the eight or nine hundredth day and God no doubt saw that it was good.

In few respects does a nation show itself in its true colours more clearly than in its treatment of enemies who have the misfortune to fall into its hands.

 To describe as bestial the behaviour of the Japanese towards their prisoners of war of whatever race or rank is an insult to the animal world.

Of the thousands of Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force officers and airmen who fell into Japanese hands in Malaya, Sumatra, Java and later Burma, 3,462 only were found alive, after due retribution had fallen from the skies above Hiroshima upon the sons of Nippon.

Not by any means all the Air Force was captured in Java. Some, as has been related, were successfully taken by ship to Australia, and a small number to Ceylon. By a combination of good fortune and stern courage a still smaller number escaped.

 Of these, the most remarkable was Wing Commander J. R. Jeudwine, commanding No. 84 Squadron, which it will be recalled lost the last of its Blenheims at the capture of Kalidjati.

Such pilots and ground staff as remained had been sent to the port of Tjilitjap, there to be taken by ship to Australia.

 No ship, however, was forthcoming; the port was in flames, and the ‘Scorpion’, the only seaworthy vessel to be found, was a ship’s lifeboat capable of holding at most twelve.

To try to avoid capture by taking to the woods and jungles near the shore there to await rescue by submarine offered a slender chance.

To seek that help in an open boat seemed certain death. Jeudwine and ten others chose this course and boarded the ‘Scorpion’. Flying Officer C. P. L. Streatfield alone knew the elements of sailing; Pilot Officer S. G. Turner could handle a sextant and was chosen as navigator; the remainder of the crew was made up of another officer and seven Australian sergeants.

On the evening of 7th March,

they put to sea, bound for Australia which the navigator calculated would take sixteen days. It took forty-seven. Through all that time they never lost heart, though as day after day passed in blazing sun or torrential rain, the chances of reaching land grew smaller and smaller.

They played games, held competitions, but found ‘that the mental exercise made us very hungry and that talking and arguing brought on thirst’. Saturday night at sea was kept religiously, a ration of liquor being issued, which was found on closer investigation to be a patent cough cure.

 Their worst experience was the visit paid to them by a young whale, about twice the size of the ‘Scorpion’, who came to rest lying in a curve with its tail under the boat.

 ‘Eventually it made off, and when we had regained the power of movement, we passed round a bottle of Australian “3 Star” Brandy . . . after which we did not care if we saw elephants, pink or otherwise, flying over us in tight formation’. At long last, they sighted land near Frazer Islet, were found by a Catalina flying boat of the United States Navy, and taken to Perth. An American submarine sent at once to Java found no sign of their comrades.

Such men as these typify the spirit of the less fortunate who had fought to the end in circumstances which, from the very beginning, made victory impossible, and even prolonged defence out of the question. It was through no fault of theirs that they did not accomplish more.

The straits to which they were reduced, flying unsuitable aircraft in the worst conditions, were soon reproduced on the same scale farther north. How the Air Force fared in the first campaign of Burma must now be told

8th March 1942

Status of land still owned Sultanate fortress, but the de facto held by the Dutch government. Because of the strong Dutch influence the Sultanate party can not do much in overcoming the problem of possession of the fort. Until finally the Japanese Army troops occupied the fort in 1942 after the Dutch surrendered to the Japanese with marked with kalijati Agreement in March 1942 in West Java.

March,12th.1942

On Sumatra, Dutch East Indies, Japanese troops landed at Sabang at 0235 hours, Koetaradja at 0330 hours, Idi at 0540, and Laboehanroekoe at 0700 hours. They would capture the airfield at Medan in the morning

 

 

 

 

16th March 1942

 

 

 

 

The postal service in Singapore re-opened on 16th March 1942,

Japanese Occupation of Malaya

a display by Susan McEwen  17th January 2009

Susan’s display comprised three rounds, with a great deal of interest during the viewing. Some pictures of the display below are followed by some notes from Susan with scans and notes about five items.

 

 

Introduction.

A display of this subject needs to start with an expression of our respect to those who endured the occupation, and lived through that difficult time.  Philatelically it was a time of Overprints, provisional postmarks and a lack of documentation which means we have to rely on the material for information.  Work by previous collectors is much appreciated and acknowledged.

Approach for the display:

Topics of interest to me, which hopefully hang together to tell the story of the Occupation.  Covering the stamp, postal history, postal stationery and Revenues of the occupation.

A full report will appear in the May edition of the Newsletter.

Meanwhile here are a few scans and notes relating to them.

1.      The postal service in Singapore re-opened on 16th March 1942, this card shows Double frame chops to convert it to Occupation use, posted 17th March  2nd day.

2.      Cover to show issued Single frame chop stamps and a ‘Request’ stamp, the 6c red. The Japanese would convert on request some, but not all, pre-occupation stamps to Japanese use by handstamping them with SFC, at a charge of the face value of the stamp.  Surely only philatelists would bother to have stamps converted in this way, someone just wanting to post a letter could buy a stamp at face value, rather than take his own stamps for converting.

3.      Photo postcard, endorsed on the back ‘Parade through Market Street Bentong, Pahang’  can anyone confirm the location ?

 

4.      Straits stamps converted to Occupation use with Single frame chops, in red, used at Medan in the  Japanese Occupied East Indies.  Initially the Sumatra part of DEI was administered from Singapore,  later  when Sumatra had its own postal administration Japanese-Malayan stamps were still accepted.

5.      Most of the post during the occupation was within the peninsular of Malaya.  This cover is from Singapore (CDS SYONAN 17.5.17)to Sarawak.  The note ‘In Romanise’ means the letter is written in Romanised Malay, not Jawi, and is information for the censor.

. Digest of operations

17th – 19th March 1942

Preparations for the assault on Batavia continue. Several BB taskforces have bombarded the port, causing widespread damage on military facilities. Collateral damage is minimal, due to selective targeting. The worlds leading battleship – the Yamato – has joined in the attacks.

Teloekbetoeng on nearby Sumatra was also bombarded by several taskforces. CA’s Mogami and Chokai report excellent gunnery and considerable damage to the colonial defenders.

Pomala in the Celebes fell on the 18th. A starving Dutch occupying force readily laid down their arms.

On the Kokoda track near Port Moresby, a large detachment of Australian troops surrendered early in the afternoon on March 19th. The remainder of the Port Moresby brigade have been located nearby and are likely to be rounded up shortly.

Headline Japan Times:-

YAMATO PREPARES FOR SEA TRIALS AT KURE! DESTINATION RESTRICTED BUT CHURCHILL AND ROOSEVELT BEWARE!

March,22th 1942

By 22 Mar,

 the Japanese had routed many Dutch resistance pockets, while Muslim uprisings, sparked by the Japanese invasion, seriously hampered Dutch efforts. The Muslim rebels were threatening civilian evacuation columns at every opportunity, while providing every piece of intelligence they gathered to the Japanese. Morale soon plummeted, and desertions became more frequent across all resistance groups.

 

 

 

22 March 1942

A military spokesman for Southeast Asia Command announced this evening that Batavia, last significant Allied stronghold in the Dutch East Indies, has fallen to the Japanese.

 Under constant air, sea and land bombardment for the last two weeks the postition of the defenders had been adjudged all but hopeless and had been anticipated as likely to occur at any time. “The troops fought on inspite of having no reasonable expectation of relief or rescue and thereby imposed a decisive delay in the enemy’s timetable of conquest.”

The garrison of slightly under 20,000 was composed of mostly Dutch forces but contained small contingents of British and Australian troops. Well over 100,000 enemy troops were involved in the final assault.

A small taste of what is to come saw Allied heavy bombers based in India smashing at a Japanese column advancing in North Burma and at their main supply base in Mandalay.

At Mandalay several enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and numerous supply dumps were seen to explode and burn furiously.

The enemy column hit the previous day lost a large number of tanks to the bombers. Neither attack was seriously opposed in the air by Japanese aircraft.

At sea two days ago, Allied ships damaged a Japanese submarine approxiamately 100 miles WSW of Ceylon. A large oil slick was observed before contact was broken off.

Operations between 20th to 22nd March 1942

BATAVIA FALLS! JAVA JOINS THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE!

Java

After several further BB bombardments, elements from a numer of elite infantry divisions stormed Batavia

on the morning of the 22nd.

Facing only light resistance, first the Chinese then the European districts were taken within several hours. By early afternoon, the Dutch high command signalled a request for cessation of hostilities. It is estimated that well over twenty thousand prisoners of war have been taken. However it is understood that leading members of ABDA had alreadly fled the beleaguered enclave.

Kokoda trial

All remaining Port Moresby garrison units have been rounded up, after only minor skirmishes.

China

Several Chinese divisions were routed

on the 21st March.

 These units were thought to be fleeing Nanning, however after a short battle some 60 miles to the NW of the city, they were last observed retreating back to the city, in some disorder.

Announcements

With the fall of Java, Batavia is to be renamed Jakarta
Furthermore Singapore is to be renamed Syonan (Light of the South)

Heavy armour enters Jakarta (formerly Batavia)

This was the last known photo of him before taken prison March 1942!

Gerrit Hendrik Schuppers
I am trying to reconstruct the war history of my father. My father is Dutch, was a KNIL-soldier/gunner, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (= Royal Netherlands Indies Army), 2nd Bat. Field Artillery. Before the Japs came, he rotated from Tjimahi/Bandung, to many other places at Java and Sumatra before taken POW. Please contact me.
His name: Schuppers, Gerrit Hendrik, born 6th September 1921. He died last 12th December 2004 and took most of the secrets with. His KNIL (army) number that time: 96406.Thanks to Wes Injerd and Henk Beekhuis for their translations to my fathers camp-card, in short here-after my fathers ‘war-history’ for sure known now.


Below is a picture of my father taken before leaving Holland 1940. The other one, taken at Pangkalansusu/Sumatra, New Years Day 1941. This was the last known photo of him before taken prison March 1942!

1) 11th March 1942 taken POW at Java (presumably Madura) at Camp C or III (administration no: 8480)
2) Date unknown: to POW Darmo at Surabaya/Java (administration no: ?)
3) April 6th , 1943: transported to POW-camp Djengi (Also spelled as Changi or Chengi) at Singapore (administration no.?)
4) April 14th , 1943: transport by train from Singapore to Thailand
5) April 21st , 1943: Arrived at Thailand Camp 6 Burma Railroad (administration no: 8329)
6) Date unknown: back to Djengi at Singapore again (administration no: ?)
7) June 5th , 1944: embarked MV TEIA MARU (ex Aramis) for Moji / Japan
8) June 18th , 1944 arrival at Fukuoka #12 Miyata; the Dutch group for this camp represented 100 men of which one officer, the 1st Lt. Horstman.
9) August 15th , 1945 renamed to #F-9B), administration no: 31500 and released
10) September 20th , 1945: turned over to Capt. Griffin at Nagasaki-Port and repatriated by USNS ??? (Aircraft Carrier?) to Okinawa (medical checks)
11) September ??, 1945: left for Manila by USNS or HMS ?? to the 5th Replacement Camp
12) November 29th , 1945: 5600 KNIL-troops reunited and ordered by the Dutch Government to leave Manila for Balikpapan / Borneo by HMS ?? (British Aircraft Carrier?) and a battalion of Marines left Manilla for Makassar.Is there anyone who can tell me more at the notices #1, 2, 6, 10, 11 and 12?


Manila Replacement Camp 11 Nov 1945

Click for larger picture

Click for larger picture

 

March,23th 1942

Maru was the ex-Van Waerwijck, scutlled in March 1942 at Tandjong Priok

 

March,26th 1942

 

 

 

The Malayan inspection– Lieutenant Colonel Shizuo Saeki (left of officer with walking stick) takes questions from the observation group with inquires about the breakthrough.

 

South front inspection schedule—March 9th Tokyo,March 13th Hong Kong,March 19th Bangkok,March 20th Kuala Lumpur,March 21st Singapore,March 24th Sumatra,March 26th Singapore,April 1st Manila,April 4th Clark Airfield,April 7th Tokyo

 

.

March,28th.1942

Dutch Major General Roelof T. Overakker surrendered his 2,000 troops at Blangkedjeren, marking the end of resistance on Sumatra, Dutch East Indies

 

 

 

On 28 Mar,

 Major General R. T. Overakker surrendered at Blangkedjeren, finally marking the end of resistance on Sumatra.

A small number of guerrilla groups continued fighting for the following year, but they were generally ineffective in the face of a resourceful occupation force.

Sources: Armchair Reader World War II, Wikipedia

 

April  1942

 

Kamp Sabang. Nie Nie Nie Nie Belawan. Sannn Sannn Sannn Sannn Bangkinang

May 1942

May 17th 1942

 

CDS SYONAN 17.5.17)

Most of the post during the occupation was within the peninsular of Malaya.  This cover is from Singapore (CDS SYONAN 17.5.17)to Sarawak.  The note ‘In Romanise’ means the letter is written in Romanised Malay, not Jawi, and is information for the censor.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

July ,2nd . 1942

 

2.7.1942

 Fragment Dai nippon overprint  west sumatra cross early on Kon 10 cent used CDS Sidjoendjoeng.2.7.42

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

July,17th.1942

 

1942 (July 17), censored cover from Medan to Koetaradja (J.S.C.A. 2SS3. Bulterman 22a), a 7½¢ letter sheet with Aceh Star overprint, thin star type, with stamp imprint tied by “Si() 17.7.15″ cds, along with Meden 23.7.15 transit, plus brown censor tape across top and violet boxed handstamp, forwarded to Koetaradja. Fresh and Very Fine, rare.
Estimate $2,500 – 3,500.

Dainippon occupation Koetaradja

Briefkaart Japanse bezetting met ovaal handstempel 75 sen,

c. 1942, censored cover from Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan, franked with Japan 10s Showa definitive, Sumatra censor’s stamp below. Cover wrinkles, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

1942,  Official free port stampless air letter from Sumatra to Tokyo, Japan, with two light strikes of blue bilingual DINES handstamp, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

August 1942

 

August ,3th. 1942

 

3.8.1942.

Oof cover Dai nippon emergency overprint Lampong Hinomaru red ball , type 1 during Sumatra under DN Singapore administration(April 1st 1942-1943), very rare, Ihave sold one postally used cover with this stamps to bulterman that put in his catalogue

 

 

Envelope, 1942 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued Lampong entire (Bulterman 118b. J.S.C.A. 10SS13), a splendid mint entire, showing Lampong in violet, ball and medium size “5” in red violet, plus  postmaster chief postmark overprint “LTT” in black with manuscript “10 sen”. Fresh and Very Fine, rare.
Estimate $3,000 – 4,000.

 

 

Envelope, 1942 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued Lampong entire (J.S.C.A. 10SS13. Bulterman 116b var), a splendid mint entire showing lampong, LTT and a large “5” all in black with manuscript “10 sen”, but with “ball” overprint in unlisted red color, pristine, Very Fine, rare.
Estimate $3,000 – 4,000.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

December  1942

 

 

 

11

22 april 2009, 7:00 uur – Philip Levert van Postzegelvereniging Haarlemmermeer

Voor serieus sparen van Indische bezettingszegels is een catalogus onmisbaar, bijvoorbeeld die van de vereniging Dai Nippon. De bondsbibliotheek heeft literatuur, het Postmuseum beschikt over een paar uitgebreide verzamelingen. Japanners noemen hun land Nippon, tijdens de bezetting was het woord Japan verboden. Het Japanse (Nipponse) bestuur over Nederlands-Indië duurde van maart 1942 tot september 1945.

Begintoestand

Eerst iets over het toenmalige Ned.Indië. Ned.Indië – nu Indonesië – is enorm uitgestrekt. Viervijfde van de inwoners woont echter op de belangrijke eilanden Java en Sumatra, veruit de meesten op het dicht bevolkte Java. Dat waren in 1941 miljoenen inheemsen (6% daarvan Chinezen), 100.000 Hollanders en ca. 200.000 Indo’s. Nederland had in Ned.Indië miljarden geïnvesteerd in o.a. landbouwcultures, mijnbouw en infrastruktuur. Het Ned.Indische leger, het KNIL, telde in 1941 60.000 man waarvan 3/4 inheemsen. Het was niet georganiseerd om een buitenlandse agressor het hoofd te bieden. Ook de marine was veel te zwak en Nederland was in 1940 door Nazi-Duitsland bezet. Met Java als centrum was Ned. Indië een zeer ontwikkeld gebied.

In 1939 reden bijvoorbeeld op Java 100.000 auto’s rond, weinig minder dan in Nederland. Het wegen- en spoorwegnet waren in betere toestand dan nu, misschien had het gewone volk het toen ook beter dan nu. Bij het bestuur waren maar een handvol Nederlanders betrokken welke de topfuncties bezetten. Indonesiërs – toen inheemsen genoemd – met hogere studie-opleiding op topfuncties waren er ook. Daar had je echter maar weinig van. Op de Indische posterijen was niets aan te merken. Een brief deed er meestal korter over dan in het huidige Indonesië. De post werd bijna alleen gebruikt door  Chinezen en Hollanders want het gros der inheemsen was destijds analfabeet. Dit is te zien als je de oplagecijfers van postzegels vergelijkt met die van Nederland.

De Japanse inval

Begin 1942, kort na Pearl Harbour werd Nederlands-Indië binnen enkele weken door een Japanse overmacht van circa 160.000 man veroverd. De strijd kostte enige duizenden doden, waaronder 2550 Nederlanders. Moeilijke tijden braken aan. De Hollanders en een deel van de Indo’s werden van hun bezit beroofd en geïnterneerd  in zogenaamde Jappenkampen, vrouwen en kinderen apart van mannen en jongens. KNIL-militairen en vele burgergevangenen werden afgevoerd naar verre landen zoals Japan, Malakka en Siam (Thailand) waar ze slavenarbeid moesten verrichten, o.a. aan de beruchte Birmaspoorweg.

Vrouwen, kinderen en een klein aantal mannen bleven achter in kampen in Nederlands-Indië, bijna alle op Java en Sumatra. Als bekend was de toestand in de Jappenkampen ten hemel schreiend, een deel van de geïnterneerden heeft de transporten en de kamptijd daarom niet overleefd. Buiten de kampen was het ook slecht. Zeker een miljoen inheemsen werd dank zij Japans wanbeheer slachtoffer van ziekte en voedselgebrek. De Jap echter organiseerde inheemse anti-westerse strijdgroepen om de wind er bij het volk onder te houden. Deze vormden de basis van het latere Indonesische leger, de TNI. Onder Japans militair gezag werd ook een inheems marionettenbewind geïnstalleerd met Ir Soekarno als spreekbuis.

In augustus 1945 capituleerde Japan voor de Amerikaanse overmacht en de atoombommen. Ned.Indië was toen nog steeds bezet behalve Nieuw Guinea en enige kustplaatsen op Borneo. Ook nog in Japanse handen waren Malakka, Singapore, Siam (Thailand), Frans Indo China (Vietnam), Hongkong, Korea en grote delen van China.

De Amerikanen bleven ver weg, de Engelsen vanuit Birma en India gaven prioriteit aan de bevrijding van hun eigen gebieden. Pas september-october 1945 verschenen kleine Engels/Engels Indische troepeneenheden langzaam aan op de belangrijke eilanden Java en Sumatra. Zij zorgden voor ontwapening en afvoer van de Japanners, en bescherming en evacuatie van de Jappenkampen waar vrouwen en kinderen belaagd werden door bendes jonge Indonesiërs.

Op Java kwamen zo Engels-Indische enclaves in Batavia (Djakarta), Semarang, Bandoeng, Soerabaja, op Sumatra in Palembang, Belawan-Medan. Over de tijd na de Japanse bezetting zie een volgend artikel.

Toestand onder de Jap

De Japanse bezetter ontsloeg in 1942 direct de meeste Nederlanders, met een vertraging van enige maanden werden deze in kampen geïnterneerd. Hun bestuursfuncties werden bezet door onbekwame Japanse militairen want jammer maar helaas: het schip Tayo Maru met enige honderden speciaal voor Indië opgeleide Japanners was mei 1942 door de Amerikanen getorpedeerd.

Een (maakwerk-) brief vermoedelijk uit Medan (Sumatra), gefrankeerd met bezettingszegels van staten op Malakka, met propagandastempel, zonder datumstempel.

Van de post mochten kampbewoners geen gebruik maken, post van buiten mochten ze niet ontvangen. Ook buiten het kamp was het uitkijken. Wie een privé-brief verstuurde of ontving was eigenlijk al verdacht. De brief mocht alleen in de Maleise taal geschreven zijn. Of de geadresseerde de brief of kaart zou ontvangen en daar blij mee moest zijn was zeer de vraag. Op veel plaatsten mochten alleen maar briefkaarten verstuurd worden. De Japanse Gestapo, Kempei Tai geheten, steunde op een groot aantal fantasierijke inheemse verklikkers, niemand was te vertrouwen.

Deze Kempei Tai sloeg willekeurig toe met vaak marteling of dood als gevolg. Overigens maakte de als bevrijder ingehaalde Jap zich bij niet-collaborerende inheemsen al snel diep gehaat door wanbeleid en ranselcultuur: de Japanse generaal sloeg de kolonel, de kolonel de kapitein enzovoort terwijl geslagen worden voor Indonesiërs een dodelijke belediging is. Als bekend kregen de Hollanders in de Jappenkampen regelmatig slaag met stokken, zwepen of geweerkolven: buiten het kamp/werkgebied werd volstaan met de vuist of de vlakke hand. Kinderen daarentegen werden nooit geslagen.

Niet-militaire post tussen de eilanden onderling hield door oorlogsomstandigheden bijna op te bestaan. Hollandse postgebruikers waren er niet meer. Gevolg: poststukken en echt gebruikte postzegels uit de Japanse tijd zijn nu nog wel te krijgen, maar toch redelijk schaars. De Japanners voerden direct hun jaartelling (1942 werd 2602) en hun tijd (1½ uur vooruit) in. Ook werd Nederlands-Indisch geld vervangen door bezettingsbiljetten. Er ontstond een enorme inflatie. In augustus 1945 had het geld nog maar een duizendste van de waarde in 1942 maar de posttarieven veranderden nauwelijks. Het eerste bezettingsgeld had een Hollandse tekst (zie afbeelding), in 1944 werd het vervangen door biljetten in roepia-waardes met Maleise tekst.

Bestuursorganisatie onder de Jap

Het enorme eilandenrijk werd bestuurlijk in aparte militaire zones gesplitst:

  • Java, Sumatra en enige eilanden bij Sumatra: legerdistrikt, bestuurd vanuit Batavia (Djakarta). Lange tijd viel Noord Sumatra onder Engels-Malakka, landmachtcommando Singapore.
  • De vele eilanden oost en noord van Java: marinedistrikt, bestuurd vanuit Singapore.

Beide zones vielen onder een hogere autoriteit waar ook Malakka, Siam, Burma, enzovoort onder ressorteerde: commando Zuid. Samenwerking tussen de zones was er niet.

De postzegels

In Nederlands Indië waren aanwezig de Kreislerseries karbouw en Wilhelmina met en zonder watermerk, no 272 (NVPH Ned.Indiënummers) 5 c cijfer, de Konijnenbergserie Wilhelmina 274-289, restbestanden Moehamadijah 293-297, Danserserie 298-303, ‘Bijzondere Vluchten’zegel LP 18, en portzegels 23-28, 30-33, 35, 39, 40. Deze werden doorgebruikt, vanaf juli 1942 voorzien van een opdruk (‘chop’).

‘Chop’zegels in mijn bezit met ‘Dai Nippon’ briefkaart, stempeldatum onleesbaar.

De Japanners hadden trouwens koerserende zegels van Japan meegenomen welke gebruikt bekend zijn in Nederlands Indië: uiteraard durfde de posterijen daarmee gefrankeerde post niet te weigeren. In de begintijd werden dus Nederlands-Indische zegels zonder chop gewoon doorgebruikt.

 Deze gebruikte zegels zijn te herkennen als de jaaropgave in de balk door het rondstempel leesbaar is: 02 of 03 of 04 of 05, weergevende de Japanse jaartelling 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605. Ze zijn schaars en aan de prijs, vooral voor plaatsen buiten Java. Het kan dus lonen uw gestempelde Nederlands-Indië-doubletten nader te bekijken, je weet maar nooit.

De zegels met chop zijn een chaotisch verzamelgebied: complimenten voor het uitzoekwerk van de Dai Nippon Vereniging. Afhankelijk van tijd en plaats werden opdrukzegels gefabriceerd per provincie, per distrikt of per postkantoor. Afgezien daarvan heb je diverse types en variaties want vele (niet alle) werden met de hand aangebracht. Zie de Dai Nippon catalogus. Die onderscheidt chops van de marinegebieden Noord, West en Zuid-Oost Borneo, Celebes, Noord Celebes, Samarin

da, Ambon, Lombok. Voor legergebied Sumatra, ingedeeld in hoofdstukken ‘general’, ‘semi general’, ‘local’ en ‘provincial’, zijn vele postkantoren te vinden plus de provincies Atjeh, Tapanoeli, Riau, Jambi, Palembang, Lampung, Banka/Billiton, Benkoelen en de Oostkust. De opdrukken kunnen zijn een kruis, ster of andere figuur  (belangrijk was de afbeelding van Wilhelmina onherkenbaar te maken), teksten in Japanse lettertekens al of niet in kastje, en in marinegebied (bijna) altijd een anker, verschillend per eiland of postkantoor.

Een (maakwerk-) brief uit Soerabaja (Java), gefrankeerd met twee definitieve Java-bezettingszegels en enige Ned.Indische zegels met en zonder chop. Let op de stempeldatum 6-7-05: 6 juli 2605 oftewel 6 juli 1945, vijf weken voor de Japanse capitulatie.

Om het spannend te maken bestaan er ook zegels met meerdere opdrukken (in Dai Nippon catalogus ‘simplified’ niet gecatalogiseerd). Leuk zijn de briefkaarten, dezelfde als vroeger maar ‘Nederlands-Indië’ is op de ingedrukte karbouwenzegel door ‘Dai Nippon’ vervangen, zie afbeelding. Tevens is een Japanse tekst toegevoegd welke de vroegere Hollandstalige tekst vervangt.  De verzamelaar moet voor dit verzamelgebied helaas bedacht zijn op naoorlogs maakwerk en vervalsingen terwijl echtheidcertificaten niet bestaan.

.

Stamps,and other are like Djambi NIPPON MA, SOUTH SUMATRA POSTMASTER

 

Krijgsgevangenen

 

 


Degenen die krijgsgevangen zijn gemaakt worden in aparte kampen ondergebracht en gedwongen om onmenselijk zware dwangarbeid te verrichten. Zeer berucht zijn de Birma-spoorlijn, de Pakan Baroe-spoorlijn en de mijnen in Japan. Velen komen hier om door uitputting, ondervoeding, mishandeling of ziekte.

Dai nippon IPL(IP Lengkong postmaterOf Palembang)

overprint

Postmaster MN overprint

Tjpoeroep  postmaster overprint

Loeboeklingau postmaster Arifin overprint

Dai Nippon Arifin postmaster ringsingnet overprint

Dai Nippon Loeboeklingau postmaster  Arifin ringsignet r overprint on adresskaart of postpakket send to padang in 1943

Liwa overprint

1943

Postal Card, 1943, 3½¢ black (Bulterman 25), overprinted “Gun Sei Bu A Ti E Shu Si Bu No In” in violet, unused, fresh, Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.(fake ?)

January 1943

January,17th.1943

 

1943, card from Sipirok to Atjeh (Bulterman 136), a clean 3½¢ Tapanoeli Japanese Flag postal card, cancelled by Sipirok 18.1.7.10 cds, violet boxed chop, fresh and Very Fine.
Estimate $1,000 – 1,500.

February 1943

February,2nd.1943

DEI Military Postcard used during Dai Nippon Occupation Aceh, the dutch briefcard  overprint handwritten in dai Nippon languagua postcard send from  CDS showa katakana Tapaktuasn  3.2.18 to Koetaradja Atjeh.

Atjeh “Star” overprints, franked by various adhesives overprinted by the Atjeh “star” occupation chops. Includes 3 cards with Netherlands Indies 3½¢ stamp, but with different color or size chips, including a usage on a feldpost card. Nice specialist group, F-VF.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

February 1943,although there was no special notes for an incident that occurred  on February 14, but there are some historical events that occurred in this month and it is important to note.

 

 Beginning with the Japanese effort to master the eastern region of Indonesia, by sending additional troops to Tanimbar, Kai Islands, and West Irian.

 

Japan’s defeat in the Solomon Islands in February 1943 made the Americans back in charge of the Pacific region.

 

This defeat made many changes to the policy of Japan in Indonesia, especially in military policy.

 

Throughout 1943, Japan many Japanese built up the army (like Heiho, Giyugun, and Defenders of the Homeland or MAP) as a form of anticipation of an attack of the Allies to Indonesia later.

March 1943

March,2nd. 1943

 

 

2.3.1943.

Fragment cover palembang Dai Nippon square overprint, used CDS 18.3.2,this time sumatra still under Singapore Dai nippon Military adminsitration, al Sumatra area had got permission to overprint the Dutch East Indie stamps with Ryal Head picture, but also the other deffinitive,but different in Java no emergency ovpt because different military administration.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

March,6th.1943

 

1943, registered censored cover from Bangoen-Poerba (J.S.C.A. 14S11) (now Bangunpurba on Sumatra), franked with two unoverprinted Netherlands Indies 2½c plus Japan 25s Showa, Pematang-Siantar backstamp, Fine to Very Fine, unusual mixed franking. J.S.C.A. 15,000 yen ++ (HK$ 1,450).
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

March,5th. 1943

 

 

5.3.1943

Off cover  Japan homeland stamp used at medan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

march,13th. 1943

 

 

 

One year anniversary  great east Asia War issued at Atjeh in march,13th. 1943

これは、日本占領地スマトラのアチェ州で発行された、東亜戦争一周年を記念し

Fragment one years nniversary dai Nippon occupation Sumatra issued at Medan in march 13th.1943

 

 

March,14th.1943

1943, registered cover from Benkoelen to Nagoya, Japan, a 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued Bengkulu framed “Dai Nippon” entire, with additional 10¢ (pair) adhesives added, each cancelled by 19.4.14 cds’s. Front also shows dual censor chops and Benkoelen registration label, fresh and F-VF, a great Rarity, unlisted used in both Bulterman and the JSCA, a show piece.
Estimate $7,500 – 10,000

 

 

March,14.1943

 

Kempetei Freeport stempless propaganda pictorial  ajo menjang kolonisasi postcard from lampong to klakah

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

March,30.1944

 

 

1943, cover from Djambi, Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 13S1//13S11, 11S2 etc), franked with Netherlands Indies  kon Dai Nippon T overprint machinal (for all Sumatra issued) and non queen unoverprinted 1c, 4c and 5c, plus dai nippon yubin overprinted 5c, 10c, 15c and 17½c; Syonan transit and two Sumatra censor backstamps, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.)date 30.3.04)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

April 1943

 

April,5th.1943

Postally used  sencored Dai Nippon overprint hinomaru of Tapanoeli on DEI Karbouw 31/2 cent [postal stationer sent from CDS Sipirok  18,4,5k to Meulaboh (Atjeh)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

May 1943

Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia

March,17th. 1943

 

17.3.1943

Rejoined fragment with the photocopy Japanese postal stationer 2c,overprint Dai nippon added 1 1/2 cent , used CDS  Boekittingi 18.3.17.

March,19th.1943

1943, newspaper sent from Padang, Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 13S1), the Japanese-language Sumatora Shimbun (“Sumatra Newspaper”) of Wednesday, March 15, 1943, complete and entire, franked with Dai Nippon yubin westcoast over[rint on  Netherlands Indies 1c definitive tied (on wrapper and on newspaper) byPadang cds, violet Sumatra censor’s handstamp on the wrapper; Padang vertical 2-line backstamp on the wrapper. Only minor wear and aging, Fine to Very Fine overall.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

April,26th.1943

1943, newspaper sent from Padang, Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 13S1), the Japanese-language Sumatora Shimbun (“Sumatra Newspaper”) of Friday, April 26, 1943, complete and entire, franked with Netherlands Indies 1c definitive tied (on wrapper and on newspaper) byPadang cds, violet Sumatra censor’s handstamp on the wrapper; Padang vertical 2-line backstamp on the wrapper. Only minor wear and aging, Fine to Very Fine overall.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

 

 

March,28th. 1943

 

28.3.1943

Violet Dai nippon est sumatra overprint Postcard staioner 31/2 cent DEI , postally used from CDS Tarutung.

postally used Black Dai Nipponin box  overprint east sumatra on Postcard Stationer DEI 31/2 cent

 

Rare DN overprint Hinomaru Tapanuli

 

 

Dai Nippon syonanto (Malayan) Stamps used and found In Sumatra

Red Dai Nippon(DN0 overprint in frame type 2 (single frame) on straits 1 cent, very rare and never seen used postally cover at Sumatra, the different color overprint like black,green and brown very rare and never seen used at sumatra, please report. The collections below @copyright Dr iwan s. and just found two postally cover with commemorative postmark used at Syonanto(Singapore) will put under Dai nippon Singapore postmark.

1942. DN in frame type 2 red overprint straits 5 c, very rare postally cover if used at Sumatra

1942.DN in frame type 2 red overprint straits 8 cent, very rare postally used at Sumatra

DN in frame type 2 red overprint on Straits 15 cent, very rare postally used cover at sumatra.

DN overprint on single frame (type 1) on Negeri Sembilan 30c used in Sumatra, very rare postal cover (wh have that item please report)

Red Dai Nippon 2602 Penang overprint on straits 8c, this stamps very rare used postally cover at Sumatra (never seen ,please report )

1942. DN 2602 Malaya overprin Negeri sembilan 8c and 20c , very rare if used oncover at Sumatra.

Very rare Red Dai Nippon overprin type 2 single frame on straits 2c used CDS PRIAMAN ( the late bigger eartquake location 2009), only one report,who have on postal cover please report.

9.8.1942. DN overprint Perak 8 cent used Syonanto(Singapore) , rare used postally cover at Sumatra

1943 commerative stamps one years the fall of Singapore on Japan Toyo stamps 4c overprint + 2c

1943. Used strip two Commemorative one years the fall of Singapore by Bai Nippon Armed Forces, overprint Japan Toyo stamps 2 cent added 1 cent, the other series green 4c+2c

Clear Syonanto(Singapore) postal CDS on DN Malaya 2 cents overprint Perak 10 cent

2.8.2603(1943) Dai Nippon Malaya overprint on Perak 1c used in Malaya(city please identify), and not clear postal CDS on Perak 10c and 8 c issued at Singapore

1944-1955. Sideways Dai nippon Malaya overprin Negeri sembilan stamp 3c issued at syonato(Singapore) as the center of DN Malaya Military administration 1942-1945

19.1.1945 Dai Nippon Malaya overprint Negeri sembilan stamp , red on 2cent, black on 3c and 6 cent used in Syonanto(singapore, please correction )

 

 

 

 

 

April 1943

 

April,16th. 1943

 

16.4.1943

.Small Dai Nippon west Sumatra overprint, postally used postcard cds Medan 18.4.16

(18 syowa was  1943)

 

 

 

 

 

April,16th. 1943

 

Japanese Occupation of Netherlands East Indies, 1943 (April 16) registered cover to Sumatra, franked with Japan 30s Showa tied by ‘Galang’ cds. Japanese Censor’s red boxed cachet with blue pencil annotation. Dutch Indies style ‘Censuur 32′ backstamp (April 17) and indistinct ‘Pematang-Siantar’ arrival backstamp

 

 

 

May 1943

 

June 1943

June.8th.1943

Sencored Dai Nippon postal stationer 31/2 cent send from CDS Palembang  18.5.8 to manggala Lampong

 

 

 

 

 

 

June 1943

 

Dai Nippon Postalstatione r with IPL (Ip Lengkong postmaster Initial) without Frame type bigger  Palembang Overprint on DEI Karbour 31/2 cent send from CDS Palembang 18(1943).6(june).3 to Manggala Lampong

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

June,9th,1943

 

 card from Palembang to Tokyo, Japan (Bulterman 165b), a 3½¢ black card, canceled Palembang 8.6.9.1 and censored. Since Showa year 16 is 1941, year date can not be correct. Clean and Very Fine.
Estimate $1,000 – 1,500.

 

June,10th.1943

 

1943 (June 10), cover from Pematanji to Perlanaan (J.S.C.A. 15S7), franked with General Issue 10c tied by Pematanji postmark, neat Perlanaan receiver at left, red Pematanji censor’s handstamp, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

June,15.1943

The same Sencored Dain Nippon sumatera postal stationer 31/2 sen send from CDS Palembang 18(1943).6(june) 15to Mangala Lampong in 1945

 

Read the letter at the back of post card

 

 

 

 

 

July  1943

 

1943 (July 12), cover from Kotanapan to Pontianak (Bulterman 142), a 7½¢ Tapanuli letter sheet with red Japanese flag and framed, violet “Dai Nippon”, cancelled by Kotanopan 18.7.12 cds, with black instructional chop. (hinomaru)Exceptionally fresh and clean, Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $1,500 – 2,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

August 1943

August,17th 1943

(CDS Medan 18.8.17)

 

Straits stamps converted to Occupation use with Single frame chops, in red, used at Medan in the  Japanese Occupied East Indies.  Initially the Sumatra part of DEI was administered from Singapore,  later  when Sumatra had its own postal administration Japanese-Malayan stamps were still accepted

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

August,24th 1943

 

 

24.8.1943

Fragment Dai nippon acheh star overprint used at Koetaraja(now bandar Aceh)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

August,27th 1943

Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1943 (Aug. 27)

cover to Pontianak, franked with Japanese Occupation of Perak 10c ‘Dai Nippon 2602 Malaya’ overprint (Scott N20) tied by ‘Medan Sumatra East Coast’ cds. Censor’s violet boxed cachet with orange oval chop.

 

 

 
       

 

August,28th.1943

 

1943, card from Padang Pandjang  to Medan (J.S.C.A. 14SS1. Bulterman 146), a 1½¢ on 2s Horsemen postal card for the West Coast, tied by Boekittingi g 18.8.28 cds, along with red censor chip and partial violet chips, light fold through center, otherwise Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $1,500 – 2,000.

 

 

September  1943

 

September,8th.1943

 

Japanese Occupation Riau Archiphelago which under Dai Nippon Malaya command at Syoananto(Singapore) until 1945 that is why they used dai Nippon Ma;laya stamps look Dai Nippon club collections below

Center

Fragment cover CDS Tandjong Pinang 8.9.2603, also left 5.7.2604(1944) dan left tandjongbalai karimeun29.9.3

 

Omdat zowel Sumatra als Malakka onder het bestuur van het 25ste leger met als hoofdkwartier Singapore viel, werden zij eind september 1942 administratief samengevoegd. Niet alleen het eiland Sumatra, maar ook alle Indische eilanden die onder Singapore gelegen zijn. Hiervan zijn de Riouw en Lingga archipel en de Anambas en Natuna eilanden de voornaamste. In april 1943 werd de administratieve eenheid verbroken, maar de hierboven genoemde eilanden bleven administratief onder Singapore.

 

Daarom zijn hier Japanse bezettingszegels van Malakka gebruikt. Dit zijn zeldzaamheden en kunnen alleen aan het poststempel herkend worden

 

 

Tandjong Batoe 2604.2.24 and  Dabosingkep 2.3.2603

Courtecy Dai Nippon club Netherland.

 

 
Postwaardestukken van Malakka gebruikt in Indië
In de Riouw en Lingga archipel en op de Anambas Eilanden werden postwaardestukken van Malakka gebruikt, zoals bij de postzegels. Het tarief voor een briefkaart was hier 2 cent, wat later verhoogd werd naar 4 cent. Hier werden ook postwaardestukken gebruikt die we niet uit Nederlands-Indië kennen, zoals de aangetekende enveloppe. Het tarief hiervoor bedroeg 15 cent, tijdens de oorlog werd het verhoogd naar 23 cent.

 

 

Othe Sumatra postal used stationer and cover courtecy Dai Nippon club Netherland

 

 

Many falsification during this era, that is why many study and discussion about that, like in Dai Nippon Club announcement below in 2012

Falsificaten project Een project om vervalsingen van opdrukken uit de Japanse bezetting te beschrijven is van start gegaan. De eerste opdruk die onder de loep genomen wordt is de Atjeh ster. Hebt u informatie over verschillende typen steropdrukken en/of vervalsingen, neem dan contact op met R.G. Ackerstaff, Jan van Goyenlaan 1, 3401 NM IJsselstein, email rob@ackerstaff.com.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

September,29th. 1943

Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1943 (Sept. 29)

Send from Mr Oesman oebis marchnat  Lai Besar (big) streat  Kotanopan south Tapanuli CDS in dai nippon katakana char Kotanopan sumatora tapanuli 17.8.29 cover to Mr M.Joenoes Dalyus Toko Intan(diamond shop) Gadji Djafri street  Pontianak, franked with Japanese Occupation of Perak 10c ‘Dai Nippon 2602 Malaya’ overprint (Scott N20) tied by ‘Kotanopan Sumatra Tapanari’ cds. Censor’s violet boxed cachet at left

 

 

 
       

 

 

October   1943

October,17th. 1943

 

 

Rare Dai nippon Bangka overprint on DEI kon 10 cent , used CDS Soegai Liat Banka island  18.10.17.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

October,26th. 1943

 

Japanese Occupation of Netherlands East Indies, 1943 (Oct. 26)

registered stampless cover from Tandjong Karang to Singapore, with ‘DINES’ boxed handstamp in blue, registration label tied by ‘Tandjong Karang’ cds. Censor’s cachet in blue with oval chop in orange. Singapore ‘Syonan’ backstamp (Nov. 5).

 

 

 


October,26th. 1943

Japanese Occupation of Netherlands East Indies, 1943 (Oct. 26) registered cover from Tandjong Karang to Singapore, franked with 10c, 20c Dutch Indies with ‘Lampong’ bilingual handstamps tied by ‘Tandjong Karang’ cds with additional strike tying registration label. Censor’s cachet in blue with oval chop in orange. Singapore ‘Syonan’ backstamp (Nov. 5)

 

October,29th.1943

1943 (Oct 29), registered censored cover from Djambi to Nagoya, Japan, a splendid, highly attractive cover, franked by 11 adhesives, 9 of which bear large type Dai Ni Hon Yubin overprints in violet for use in Jambi. A stunning, visually attractive large size cover, Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

November   1943

 

November,8th. 1943

 

 
Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1943 (Nov. 8)

 Cover fron CDS Tandjoeng balei Karimoen Riau island  to Johore Baru , franked with two Japanese Occupation of Malaya 2c Fruit pairs (Scott N30) tied by Dutch Indies style ‘Tandjongbalei Karimon’ cds. Censor’s violet boxed cachet and oval chop route 33

 

 

\

 

November,18th. 1943

 

Palembang Dai Nippon square overprin used cds Prabumoelih (King moved) the oil city south Sumatra ,my son work at Indonesia Oil company Pertamina sumatra center explortaion & production center.

Palembang Dai Nipponsquare overprint also used in other south sumatra , used CDS Pagaralam south sumatra.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

November,22th.1943

1943, card to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 14SS1. Bulterman 146), a 1½¢ on 2s Horseman postal card for the West Coast, cancelled by 18.11.22 cds, violet censor chip, fresh and Very Fine, scarce.
Estimate $1,500 – 2,000

 

 

December 1943

December,1st.1943

 

Very rare 1943 (Dec 1), cover from Palembang to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 7SS1. Bulterman 69), a 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued postal entire with IP Lengkong ring signet ring, franked with additional 5¢ (2) and 10¢ Netherlands Indies adhesives, each bearing signet strikes in blue or red, to registered, censored cover used to Japan. Fresh and Very fine, a tremendous rarity and major exhibition piece, choice.
Estimate $30,000 – 40,000.

MA on DEI Port  40 and 20 cent on document  1943

Telegraphic money order or daftar pembayaran langanan post

(provenance Dr iwan suwandy 1972)

Decemmber.12th.1943

1943, registered cover from Padang to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 4SS3. Bulterman 149), a 10¢ on 12½¢ revalued West Coast entire with Sumatra cross and large “Dai Nippon” chop, franked additionally by unoverprinted 20¢ and overprinted 10¢ Netherlands Indies adhesives, all tied by Padang 18.10.12 cds’s. Front also shows red censor chop and partial censor tape along with padang registration label, with reverse showing Singapore receiver, F-VF, a rare and attractive entire.
Estimate $4,000 – 6,000

 

 

 

 

December ,23th. 1943

Dai Nippon Bold west sumatra Dai nippon Yubin overpint on lettersheet 71/2 cent (restored) cds Padang 23.12.1944.to Simatra sinbun(newspaper) Medan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

December ,26th. 1943

 

26.12.1943

Rare Dai Nippon Lampong ovpt. on DEI Kon 10 cent CDS Telok Betong

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

December ,27th. 1943

 

 

CDS Palembang 18.12.27

Dai Nippon Postmaster Initial overprint on DEI Kon 10 cent, IPL(I.Piet lengkong) postmaster palembang first from his sihnet ring and then five type of IPL , the other Post office also issue the Ring signet or handsign overprint from all post office at south Sumatra-look at Dainippon occupation Sumatra catalogue, the guinined overprint very rare on postally used cover (please report)

 

 

 

 

 

 

December,30th.1943

 

 

Money order send from CDS showa 18.12.30(30.12.1943) to Sigli used Dai Nippon Overprint Dai Nippon laya 2602 on Malaya Perak stamps 2×10 cent

これは、太平洋戦争中の1943年12月、スマトラのアチェ州(地震・津波の被害が最も

 

 

 

 

December  1943

 

 

The photocopy of Straits postal stationer used at Bintan riouw Island, this area still under Singapore center DN military admin. from 1942 -1945 different from another sumatra island only until April 1st 1943 center move to Bukittingi(Didik collection)

 

 

1944, cover from Djambi, Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 13S1, 13S14, 13S15), franked with unoverprinted Netherlands Indies 1c, 4c and 5c definitives, tied by DJAMBI postmark; violet Djambi censor’s handstamp below and lengthy vertical 3-line censor’s handstamp in the center, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

1944, registered cover from Djambi to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11S61, 11S64), franked with Netherlands Indies overprinted 20c and 40c definitives, tied by Djambi 31.3.44 cds’s, boxed red “Kakitome” (registered) handstamp alongside, violet censor’s handstamp below; Syonan transit and two censor’s backstamps. Cover a bit wrinkled and worn, about Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000
.

1944, registered cover from Tapatoean to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11S61), franked with pair Netherlands Indies 20c definitive with printed 1-line “Sumatra” overprint, Medan censor’s handstamp alongside. Cover wrinkled and worn, about Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 
1944, newspaper, sent from Padang, Sumatra to Shizuoka, Japan, the Japanese-language Sumatora Shimbun (“Sumatra Newspaper”) of Wednesday, Jan. 16, 1944, complete and entire, franked with unoverprinted Japan 1s Showa definitive tied (on the wrapper and on the newspaper) by Padang, Sumatra cds, Bukin-Tinggi censor’s handstamp below. A bit worn (as would be expected), Fine to Very Fine overall.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

1944, registered cover from Senlimeuni to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 11S66), a large-size adversity cover made from a Dutch receipt form, franked with Netherlands Indies 10c block of 4 with 1-line Sumatra overprint, faint violet Sumatra censor’s handstamp at left and several Japanese-language Senlimeuni cds’s (“Surimun” in Japanese). Cover worn (as expected), about Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

1944

January,19th.1944

1944, registered censored cover from Natal tapanoeli , franked with pair each of Japan 7s and 8s Showa definitives; Pematang Siantar , Sumatra East Coast backstamp. Cover wrinkles and small edge tears, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

(may be fake,many Switzerland cover exist E Strechutsen because did not  not open and closed by sencored label ?)

 

 

January,25th.1944

1944, card from  Tandjong Pandan billiton(Belitung) island Pantian to Palembang (J.S.C.A. 9SS1. Bulterman 33), a 3½¢ postal card with red Banka and Belitung chop, tied by Tand() 19.1.29  tandjong Pandan cds, along with red boxed chop, used to Palembang, F-VF.
Estimate $1,000 – 1,500.

 

 

March 1944

March.2nd .1944

c. 1942, picture post card from Baremban to Fukui-Ken, Japan, franked with unoverprinted Netherlands Indies 1c and 3c, red censor’s handstamp alongside; back has sketch of Japanese soldiers outside Manila, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

March.23th.1944

 

1943, registered cover from Padang 19.3.23 , Sumatra to Nagoya, Japan (J.S.C.A. 4S75-76, 4S161-162), large-size, franked with 5 overprinted Netherlands Indies definitives, violet censor’s handstamp below, numerous Padang cds’s and Sumatra “New Life” commemorative cancels (S11); reverse bears Syonan transit and violet straight line Padang Central P.O. Japanese backstamp. Some cover wear, Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

June  1944

 

Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1944 (June 26)

cover to Japan franked with 4c Tin Dredger pair (Scott N3), tied by Malayan-style ‘Tandjongpinang’ cds. Censor’s violet boxed cachet and Tokyo stamp dealer’s red circular receiving handstamp. Minor flap damage not affecting stamps or markings

 

 

 

 

September,9th.1944

The stamp is a 1943 definitive issue for the Japanese Occupation of Sumatra.

Tebing Tinggi (Deli) is a town on Sumatra (as distinct from Tebing Tinggi the island).

The date on the cancel looks like 19.9.21 which doesn’t make sense unless the Japanese used a different calendar, like “in the year of the reign of emperor …”

I would appreciate any information I can get on the cancel, the rectangular Japanese stamp, and the rest of the typewritten text (I can’t even tell names from titles or address elements).

The Japanese chop reads ‘Sumatra – [illegible personal seal]/Censored’. The date 19.9.21 probably translates to 21 September 1944 (19th year of the Showa Era).

Dr Iwan note

This dai Nippon showa date read from back 21.8.19(1944) on Postcard,note cover because cover must sencored labe,the square only for postcard

 

 

October  1944

 Japan homeland definitif stamp used at Batusangkar west sumatra. 6.10.1944

November  1944

November,7th.1944

1934, wrapper used from CDS Koetaradja 19.11.7  Atjeh (J.S.C.A. 13S1) to sabang , franked with unoverprinted Netherlands Indies 1c definitive tied by Sumatra town cancel; publisher’s purple handstamp below, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

 

Fragment

 18-11-04

 Djambi Nippon  MA overprint on DEI revenue 40 cent block four

 

 
       

 

 

 

1944, post card from Atjeh to Koeteradja (J.S.C.A. 2S44), franked with Netherlands Indies 3½c with Atjeh star over tapaktoan print, violet Koeteradja censor’s handstamp at right, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1945

Dai Nippon Sabang camp

Sabang: De in de loop der tijden gevangen genomen TNI militairen, zijn ondergebracht in verschillende interneringskampen. Hoewel zij buiten de kampen natuurlijk geen vrije beweging hebben, genieten zij in de kampen een grote bewegingsvrijheid en hebben zij een eigen organisatie met eigen bakkerij, cantine, etc.

1945

Sabang: De in de loop der tijden gevangen genomen TNI militairen, zijn ondergebracht in verschillende interneringskampen. In de kampen genieten deze geinterneerden een grote bewegingsvrijheid. Met kaartspelen korten de gewezen leiders en officieren van de republikeinse strijdorganisaties de

 

 

 

Three postal history of Aceh

1.The homemade cover free stamp(stampless) to the tiho hoin(justice court) at Bireun and sencore chope have sencored

2,The Dai nippon Postal stationer card sumatra send from Teuku Taungoh Gunseibu Syoin(Dai Nippon Military Office of Koetardja city) CDS  Koetaradjia 20.1.18 means January,18th 1945 to Tiho Hoin(Justice court) at Bireun

3.Dai Nippon Postcard Karbouw 3 ½ cent CDS  20.7.4 means july 4th 1945 to sjaefamaoen lhoseumawe at Biruen with sencore handchoped

 

1945, cover from Bukit Tinggi to Malacca (J.S.C.A. 15S7), franked with General Issue 10c, tied by Bukit Tinggi, Sumatra cds, Sumatra censor number 5’s handstamp at left and Bukit Tinggi censor’s handstamp on censor etiquette on the reverse. Stamp damaged at bottom and cover worn in places, otherwise Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000.

 

February,20th.1945

Postally used Dai Nippon sumatra postal stationersent from M Jaiani Kokusai Denkin Kyoku  cds showa Boekittinggi 20.2.12(12.2.1945) to Mr choo Kwai Low 8 North Bridge road Syonan(Singapore)

 

March.7th.1945

c. 1944, censored cover from Bukit Tinggi 20.3.7 to Malacca (J.S.C.A. 15S7), franked with General Issue 10c; reverse shows fancy censor’s etiquette with handstamp as the one on front, Fine to Very Fine.
Estimate $2,000 – 3,000

ご報告が遅くなりましたが、先月25日、本のメルマガ第439号が配信となりました。僕の連載「日豪戦争」では、今回は日本降伏の話を書きましたが、そのなかから、まずは、こんなモノを持ってきました。(画像はクリックで拡大されます)

        

 これは、1945年9月2日、降伏文書調印の日に東京湾に停泊していたオーストラリア海軍のシュロップシャー艦内の郵便局から差し出されたカバーです。

 連合国側が対日戦争の戦後処理に関する基本方針を決めたのは、1943年11月、ローズヴェルト、チャーチル、蒋介石の3者によるカイロ会談だったことは良く知られています。

 カイロ会談の内容は、同年12月1日、日本の無条件降伏要求と降伏後の日本領土の縮小などをうたった「カイロ宣言」として発表され、米英ソのテヘラン会談、ヤルタ会談を経て、ポツダム宣言の基礎となりましたが、この重要な会談に際して、オーストラリア代表は参加していません。

 1941年12月に日本と米英蘭との戦争が勃発したことを受けて、1942年1月1日付で発せられた「連合国宣言」には、最終的に26ヵ国が署名しましたが、その序列は米英中ソの4ヵ国を主要国とし、それ以外の国は同格としてアルファベット順になっていました。オーストラリアは、アルファベット順では最初の国となったものの、あくまでも“その他大勢”の一員でしかなく、連合国全体の意思決定に関与できるメンバーとはみなされていません。

 しかし、ダーウィン空襲など国土が直接の攻撃を受け、日本軍との戦闘で多大な犠牲を払ってきたオーストラリアは、対日戦争に関しては、米英中ソの後、オーストラリアまでが主要国であり、アルファベット順のベルギー以下が同格であるとひそかに自負していました。

 したがって、カイロ宣言の決定(その内容に対する賛否は別として)に自分たちが関与できなかったことについて、大いに不満です。

 そこで、オーストラリアは、1944年、ニュージーランドとともにキャンベラ協定(第一次世界大戦時に編成されたオーストラリア・ニュージーランド軍団 :Australian and New Zealand Army Corpsにちなみ、オーストラリア・ニュージーランド合同の軍事組織を意味する“アンザック協定”とよばれることもある)を締結。独自に、対日戦の戦後処理や南ならびに南西太平洋での安全保障、南太平洋政策での両国の協同をニュージーランドと約しています。主要国の決定に無条件で唯々諾々と従うわけではないとのアピールでした。

 その後も、ヤルタ会談やポツダム会談などにオーストラリアが直接関与することはありませんでしたが、そうしている間にも連合国による日本包囲網は次第に狭められていき、日本の敗戦を既定方針として日本占領の具体的な計画が策定されるようになります。

 その過程において、1945年7月、オーストラリア海軍のコルヴェット艦ゴーラーならびに駆逐艦のネイピア、ネパール、ニザーム、ノーマン、キベロン、クイックマーチが日本近海に派遣されました。

 8月15日正午、昭和天皇が玉音放送で国民に対して「終戦」を告げ、降伏の意思を明らかにした日本に対しては連合国の軍隊が進駐することになりますが、英国およびオーストラリア海軍の人員は米国第3艦隊上陸部隊の一員という形式を取って、日本海軍の横須賀鎮守府を接収するとともに、連合軍の東京上陸を補佐する任務を与えられ、8月30日、横須賀に上陸します。マッカーサーがコーンパイプを咥えて篤次の飛行場に降り立った、まさにその日でした。

 9月2日、日本と連合国との降伏文書が米戦艦ミズーリ上で調印され、オーストラリアからは豪州軍総司令のトマス・ブレイミーが署名しました。

 ちなみに、ブレイミーは、戦時中、部下に対して「諸君らが闘っているのは奇妙な人種である。人間と猿の中間にあると言っていい。文明存続のために我々は最後まで戦いぬかねばならない。日本人を根絶しなければならない。」と訓示していた人物です。オーストラリア国家を代表して“ジャップ”の降伏を受理したことは、さぞや痛快な出来事だったんでしょうな。

 降伏文書調印の当日、湾内に停泊していた連合国の艦船は258隻にも上ったそうですが、オーストラリア海軍からは、上述の艦船に加え、重巡洋艦のシュロップシャーとホバート、駆逐艦のバターン、セスノック、イプスウィッチなどが湾内に停泊していました。今回ご紹介のカバーは、そのうちのシュロップシャーから差し出されたものです。

 シュロップシャーはもともとは英国海軍の重巡洋艦として1926年2月に起工し、1928年7月に進水、1929年9月に就役し、地中海艦隊に所属していました。第2次大戦が勃発すると、大西洋やインド洋で活動していましたが、1942年8月、第一次ソロモン海戦でオーストラリア海軍の重巡洋艦キャンベラが撃沈されたため、その不足を補うため、同年12月、英国海軍を退役し、翌1943年4月、オーストラリア海軍に移管されています。

 オーストラリア海軍への移管後は、1943年12月のダイレクター作戦(ニューブリテン島・アラウェ上陸作戦)ならびにグロスター岬上陸作戦、1944年3月のアドミラルティ諸島の戦い、同4月のニューギニア・ホーランディアならびにアイタペ上陸作戦、同5月のビアク島上陸作戦、同7月のアイタペの戦いおよびサンサポール上陸作戦、同9月のモロタイ島上陸作戦、同年10月のレイテ沖海戦以降のフィリピンの戦いなど、日豪戦争の主要な戦いに参加しました。

 降伏文書調印の当日、シュロップシャーの艦内郵便局では、“TOKYO BAY/JAPAN”の文字が入った日付印と、降伏文書調印を祝う“Official Signing Of Japanese Surrender(日本降伏の公式調印)”の文字の入った記念スタンプが使われています。

 こうした記念印の類は、降伏文書調印の場となった米戦艦ミズーリ号をはじめさまざまな艦船でさまざまなタイプのものが使われていますが、オーストラリア海軍に関しては、シュロップシャーのほかホバート、ワラムンガでも使われました。

 なお、シュロップシャーは降伏文書の調印後もしばらく日本にとどまっていましたが、1945年11月18日、シドニーに向けて日本を出港しています

 

 

 

 

Literature

 

 

From dai Nippon Club Netherland

CATALOGI – Japanse bezetting Nederlands-Indië en Republiek
 
Auteur / uitgever Titel Prijs (euro’s)
Dai Nippon Catalogue of the postage stamps of the Netherlands East Indies under Japanese occupation 1942-1945. Engels, 276 pagina’s, kleur, 2001. 35,00
 
Dai Nippon Catalogue of the postage stamps of the Republic of Indonesia, 17 August 1945 – 27 December 1949. Engels, 345 pagina’s, kleur, 2005. 35,00
 
Dai Nippon Catalogue Vienna & Philadelphia printings and sub areas of the Republic of Indonesia. Engels, 290 pagina’s, kleur, 2003. 35,00
 
Dai Nippon Catalogue / Handbook Revenues Netherlands Indies Japanese occupation 1942-1945 and Republic of Indonesia Administration 1945-1949. Engels, 474 pagina’s, 2008. 65,00
 
Saros Katalog Prangko Indonesia. Indonesisch/Engels, 340 pagina’s, kleur, 2009. 49,50
 
 
BOEKEN – Japanse bezetting Nederlands-Indië en Republiek
 
Auteur / uitgever Titel Prijs (euro’s)
G.J. Bessels Postwaardestukken gedrukt door de Koninklijke Drukkerijen N.V.
G. Kolff & Co. te Batavia. Nederlands, 458 pagina’s, full colour, 2011.
75,00
 
G.J. Bessels NICA Timor NICA Soemba Medan porten / Medan postage due. Nederlands/Engels, 97 pagina’s, 2004. 25,00
 
N.F. Hedeman &
R. Boekema
Dai Nippon in South East Asia. Engels, 186 pagina’s, 1948. 14,00
 
R. Boekema Auction catalogue, Dutch East Indies 1941-1945. Engels, 480 pagina’s, 1975. 27,50
 
Ch. Boissevain &
L.B.Vosse
Zijn stempel gedrukt, een beschrijving van de Ricardo collectie. Nederlands/Engels, 118 pagina’s, 1997. 11,50
 
J.R. van Nieuwkerk The Postal History of the Lesser Sunda Islands, Moluccas, and New Guinea during the Japanese Occupation and Immediate Aftermath 1942-1946. Engels, 496 pagina’s, kleur, 2008. 85,00
 
 
ARTIKELEN – Japanse bezetting Nederlands-Indië en Republiek
 
Auteur / uitgever Titel Prijs (euro’s)
Y. Aoki A different view of the Nongkodjadjar cover. Reprint from Japanese Philately. Engels, 5 pagina’s. 0,60
 
A.V.P.I. Periodieke Publicatie no.3. Nederlands, 28 pagina’s. 4,50
 
R. Boekema De cirkelvormige opdruk van Ambon. Nederlands, 25 pagina’s. 4,50
 
W. Bruijnesteijn v. C Republiek Indonesië, de boekdruk-opdrukken van 1945. Nederlands, 15 pagina’s. 1,15
 
M. Hardjasudarma Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in Japanese occupied Netherlands Indies. Engels, 15 pagina’s. 1,80
 
M. Hardjasudarma The Rising Sun over Insulinde. Engels, 8 pagina’s. 0,95
 
M. Hardjasudarma Republik Indonesia: the war of independence 1945-1949. Engels, 14 pagina’s. 1,70
 
R. Hausman Typering van de ankeropdrukken van Bali, Lombok en de Kleine Soenda Eilanden. Verkrijgbaar in het Nederlands en Engels,19 pagina’s. 2,30
 
R. Hausman Datering tijdens de Japanse bezetting. Nederlands, 3 pagina’s. 0,35
 
R. Hausman,
L. Kuiper, &
B. Hiegentlich
The “Gouvernement Nippon” overprint: another Ampenan (Lombok) initiative. Kopie uit Japanese Philately. Engels, 19 pagina’s. 2,30
 
R. Hausman &
B. Hiegentlich
The “Smoking typewriter” of Ambon postmaster The Tiong Hao. Kopie uit Japanese Philately. Engels, 20 pagina’s. 2,40
 
J. Jeffries Stamps of South Moluccas fact or fantasy? and Stamps of Permesta. Engels, 8 pagina’s. 0,95
 
L. Kuiper Japanese occupation stamps of Dutch East India. Engels, 22 pagina’s. 2,60
 
D.G. Piket De filatelistische nalatenschap van de Japanse bezetting van Nederlands-Indië. Nederlands, 14 pagina’s. 1,70
 
H. Ramkema Function chops and emergency issues in the Navy area of the Japanese occupation of Dutch East Indies. Engels, 6 pagina’s. 0,70
 
A. Ryantori Rp. 2.50 overprint on 1946 president Soekarno is no longer a mystery. Engels, 9 pagina’s. 1,10
 
H.J. Verschuur De noodportzegels van Medan. Nederlands, 16 pagina’s. 4,50
 
 

 

Theend @copyright 2012

The sample Of Dr Iwan Cd-rom”The Indonesian Independence Revolution And War History Collections”

THE COMPLETE CD WITH ILLUSTRATIONS EXIST BUT ONLY FOR PREMIUM MEMBER SORRY cTHIS SAMPLE WITHOUT ILLUSTRATION CONTOH iNFO INI KHUSUS UNTUK PARA FILATELIS INDONESIA UNTUK JADI BAHAN KAJIAN LEBIH LANJUT SILAHKAN MEMBERI KOMENTAR.SEBAGIAN INFO SAYA AMBIL DARI FB

khusus saya tujukan info ini untuk teman saya Susilo ricard,Prof dr Eko Prasetyo, Goenawan Bogor dan Rasjid siagian

‘THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT REVOLUTION AND WAR 1945-1950″

CREATED BY

Dr Iwan suwandy,MHA

Limited pruvate E-BOOK in CD ROM Edition

Copyright@2012

kotak rokok masa perang kemrdekaan di sumatra,salah satu koleksi langka yang ditampilkan dalam buku saya

SEKALI MERDEKA TETAP MERDEKA

 Independent day august,17th.1945

 

 

” Saudara-saudara sekalian.

saudara-saudara hadir disini untuk menyaksikan suatu peristiwa maha penting dalah sejarah kita.

Berpuluh-puluh tahun kita bangsa indonesia telah bejuang untuk kemerdekaan tanah air kita. Bahkan beratus-rqatus tahun !

Gelombang aksi kita untuk mencapai kemerdekaan kita itu ada naik dan turunnya,tetapi jiwa kita tetap menujuu ke arah cita-cita.

Juga didalm zanman Jepang , usaha kita untuk mencapai kemerdekaan nasional tidak berhenti-henti. di dalam zaman Jepang itu,tampaknya saja kita menyandarkan diri kepada mereka, tetapi pada hakekatnya tetap kita menyusun tenaga sendiri, tetap kita percaya kepada kekuatan sendiri.

Sekarang tibalah saatnya kita benar-benar mengambil nasib bangsa dn nasib tanah air didalam tangan kita sendiri.

Hanya bangsa yang berani mengambil nasib dalam tangan sendiri, akan dapt berdiri dengan kuatnya.

Maka,kami tadi malam telah menadakan musyawarah dengan pemuka-pemuka rakyat Indonesia dari seluru Indonesia .

Permusyawaratan ity seiiya sekata berpendapat,bahwa sekaranglah datang saatnya untuk menyatakan kemerdekaan itu.

Saudara-saudara dengan ini,kami menyatakan kebulatan tekat itu.

Dengarlah proklamasi kami.

PROKLAMASI

Kami bangsa Indonesia dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Hal-hal yang mengenai pemindahan kekuasaan dan lain-lain diselenggarakan dengan cara seksama dan dalam tempo sesingkat-singkatnya.

 

Jakarta,17 Agustus 1945

Atan nama Bangsa Indonesia

Soekarno -Hatta

Singkat,hanya dua kalimat,tidak sampai 30 kata.

Kata-kata sederhana dipilih dengan cermat,netral,tidak emosional,tidak menghasut,suatu pemberitahuan yang tidak menyinggung siapapun.

Ditujukan kepada bangsa sendiri dan kepada seluruh dunia.Bahwa,mulai saat ini,Indonesia bangsa merdeka.

Pemindahan kekuasaan dan bukan pengambilalihan kekuasaan dari siapapun. Diselenggarakan dengan cara seksama maksunya teratur dan bukan semerawutan.Dalam tempo yang sesingkat=singkatnya artinya sebelum siapapun datang atau datang kembali untuk meniadakan kemerdekaan kita.Disusul dengan kata-kata penutup yang juga singkat dan tenang,tapi jelas.

Demikianlah saudara-saudar .Kita sekarang telah merdeka.Kita sekarang telah merdeka.

Tidak ada satu ikatan lagi yang mengikat tanah air kita dan bangsa kita.Mulai saat ini kita menyusun Negara kita.Negara Merdeka.

Negara Republik Indonesia.Merdeka,kekal,dan abadi. Insyaalah Tuhan memberkahi kemerdekaan itu(diturunkan dari himpunan Peraturan Perundangan-Undangan RI ,1989 Jakrta.penusun dan penerbit PT Ichtiar Baru-van Hoeve)

After that Latief Hendranigrat with Peta Uniform mengerek(up) the Red and white flag with penghormatan (honour to ) .The Indonesian national anthem sing spontanously together without derigent(conductor0 .

The ceremony simple without protocoler, dihadiri only by hundreds people,with their ordinary shirt,without pasukan kehormatan(Honouraly ),without music corps,without radio journalist and without reception because that time Ramadhan month(puasa,feast) every bodies proud  and many cries.

No Dai nippon Kempetai attack ,although the Banteng Movement(Barisan banteng) Had already exist to protect command by Dr Muwardi and Sudiro with young man militan included the Medical Doctor student  in the command of Piet Mamahit and Suraryo whic send from their headquaters(Markas) at Prapatan 10 street

 

The Informations above always seeden in Indonesia exhibition,but the complete info in CD-ROM many unpublished info and illustrations exist.

Because too many of my frined still didn’t bought the original complete CD-ROM due to the many problem , I will show the list of Info part July-August 1945

Especially for my new friend Dr Eko Prasetyo manado,and Mr Richard susilo Tokyo

I hope after read this Informations they will bought the limited E-BOOK in CD-ROM

RTHE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENT RECVOLUTION AND WAR 1945-1950

Let read carefully

1.July 1945

Dalam konferensi tanggal 21-23 Juli 1945

 masalah pendirian kembali CPN tidak lagi didiskusikan. Perdebatann yang agak sengit berkisar pada masalah pertanggung-jawaban, mencari siapa yang salah dan masalah-masalah pribadi.

Akhirnya dilakukan pemilihan pimpinan Partai dengan hasil pengikut De Groot mendapat mayoritas. De Groot berhasil bertahan berkat oposisi yang tampil compang-camping dan tidak taktis serta manuvernya yang cekatan dan menyakinkan.

 

Dalam hubungan di Belanda pendapat Roestam tidak sesuai dengan suasana “De Waarheid” dan juga PI yang diwakili oleh Setiadjit yang pada tahun 1944 duduk dalam Indische Commissie untuk perjuangan bersama yang dalam bulan Maret 1945 mengeluarkan pernyataan “Voor de bevrijding van Indonesie” (untuk Kemerdekaan Indonesia).

Ini merupakan pernyataan persetujuannya untuk bergabung dengan sukarela dalam suatu “vernieuwd gemenebest (persemakmuran bersama yang diperbaharui) dan akhirnya menyerukan agar “bekerja dengan sukarela” untuk memerdekaakan Indonesia dan bahkan menolak pengiriman “tentara milisi”.

 

Bagi de Groot dan kawan-kawan yang ingin menyebarluaskan gambaran tentang Gerakan De Waarheid/CPN yang moderat secara nasional,

 

 

 

visi Roestam Effendi

 tidak bisa diterima sama sekali

 

 

 

 World War II in the Pacific
General George C. Marshall
at Potsdam Conference July 1945
:

At the Potsdam Conference July 1945
General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, agreed to transfer Java and nearby islands to the British Southeast Asia command raising the anger of General McArthur who planned the restoration of the Dutch government.

 
 
 

Potsdam, Germany July 1945
Those present are (from left to right):
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee;
U.S. President Harry S. Truman;
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.

 

(Seated, left to right):
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee;
U.S. President Harry S. Truman;
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.
Standing (left ot right):
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, Truman’s
Chief of Staff; British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin;
U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes;
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov

   
  The Potsdam Conference
July 17-August 2, 1945

was held at Cecilienhof, the home of Crown Prince Wilhelm Hohenzolern, in Potsdam, Germany.August 2, 1945. The participants were the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Stalin, Churchill, and Truman—as well as Attlee,
who replaced Churchill after the Labour Party’s defeat of the Conservatives in the 1945 general election—
had gathered to decide how to administer the defeated Nazi Germany, which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier, on May 8 (V-E Day).
The goals of the conference also included the establishment of post-war order, peace treaties
issues, and countering the effects of war

 
 

July 1945

UK PM Clement Attlee, US President Harry S. Truman and USSR General Secretary Joseph Stalin
at the Potsdam Conference deciding the world’s fate

 

General McArthur’s reaction:

“After the Borneo campaign, I had planned to proceed with the Australian troops
to Java and to retake the Netherlands East Indies. Then, as in New Guinea, restoration
of Dutch government would have brought the return of orderly adninistration and law.
But for reasons I have never been able to discover, the proposed movement was vetoed
by Washington – even in the face of my assurances that its full success was certain at minor cost

 

(2)In July 1945 

Daan Mogot graduated from PETA

During the Japanese occupation, Daan Mogot entered the military organization formed by native Japanese in Java, the Defenders of the Homeland or PETA. The year was 1942, he became a member of PETA’s first generation. Daan Mogot actual age has not been determined eligible by the Japanese of 18 years. At that time he was 14 years old.

Because of his accomplishments, he was appointed manager of PETA members in Bali, then moved in Jakarta. When I was in Bali, he got two true friends of Kemal Idris and Zulkifli Lubis.

Those from Japan Seinen Dojo instructor was appointed as a Assistant Instructor. Therefore, training will be given to them much lighter than had ever received training at the Dojo in Tangerang Seinen. Education and training can be accomplished through four generations. The first batch started in December 1943 and the fourth generation, the last completed month of July 1945, before the Japanese surrender to the Allies on August 15, 1945.

There are 50 people taken from the first batch of trainees to attend educational “guerilla warfare” under the command of Captain Yanagawa. Among those who participated a special exercise that is Daan Mogot, Kemal Idris, Zulkifli Lubis, Kusno Wibowo, Sabirin Mukhtar, Syatibi and Effendi. The type of exercise is given, among others, how to maintain a dove, because birds that can be used for communication devices. In addition they are trained how to use a good weapon to face the opponent.

After the 50th person inducted into the officer, they no longer served as an Assistant Instructor, but a shodancho.

Once inducted into PETA officers, each officer returned to his native region. In Bali, Daan Mogot, Zulkifli Lubis and Kemal Idris, along with several other officers set up PETA and PETA train candidates in there.

The reason Japan founded PETA in Bali because Bali is considered a defense areas and landing sites.

For that power is prepared, especially in the Nagara and Klungkung. Japan gives credence to the Daan Mogot train in Tabanan, Kemal Idris in the Nagara and Zulkifli Lubis in Klungkung.

 Although the three friends separated their posts, but they always make contact, either discuss matters relating to training as well as about the fate of people who are suffering under the soles of the invaders.

Specific training activities when it is preparing to face an enemy attack the defense on the beach. During the year the shodancho in Bali is doing well. The next year they should be separated.

 Four people shodancho should go back to Java, while Daan Mogot, Zulkifli Lubis, and Kemal Idris, who stayed.

 They act as instructors PETA, provide training to prospective officers until they are proficient in various fields of the army.

Daan Mogot is famous in the history of the revolution time of war to maintain the independence of Indonesia in fighting in the forest-Serpong, Tangerang Banten Lengkong, when the Military Academy Midshipman Tangerang he leads try to seize weapons from the Japanese army on 25 January 1946.

Ironically, while he struggled to maintain the independence of Indonesia even willingly fall on the battlefield, his father was killed by robbers who thinks “people Manado” (Minahasa people) as londoh-londoh (minions) the Netherlands.

One time, Major Daan Mogot meet with his cousin Alex Kawilarang. Wearing a green cap, he was down on his motorcycle. 17-year-old youth was later picked up by Alex on the roadside, and he showed the face of joy. A warm meeting place.

Then they chatted in the house. Daan Mogot told me that he now lives in New Asem Jalan, riding on the family Singgih. Immediately disambungnya story of the struggle. About the attacks in Pondok Gede.

 He is also a story about his father who had just killed, is not known with certainty by whom. “A lot of true anarchy going on here,” said Alex. “Indeed, it is a must Torang clean up. Therefore, the weapon must be in the hands of Torang pe “continued Daan. He said again to Alex, “Torang, people of Manado, do not do the absurd. Caution, caution! Torang must actually demonstrate, at the side where we are. “

Then Daan also talked about his thoughts on a college to educate the youth who want to become soldiers, who later turned out to happen, is the establishment of “military academy” (military academy) on November 18, 1945 in Tangerang.

As a sponsor realization of the idea of ​​establishing a military academy school, then on 18 November 1945 he was appointed as Director of the Military Academy Tangerang (MAT) at the time he was 17 years old.

Actually in Yogyakarta also stand Military Academy Yogya (Yogya MA) almost simultaneously, which is dated 5 November 1945. The idea of ​​establishing a military academy is indeed like that be imagined by Daan Mogot.

 

 

 (c)In July 1945,

 

 Sudirman and several other officers maps that include the category of “dangerous” were called to Bogor on the grounds will receive further training.

Only then there is the impression that Japan intends to capture them. Even if they were in Bogor “Advanced Training” was canceled, because the single

 

(1)DAI NIPPON OCCUPATION JAVA’S  JULY 1945 CALENDER

THE  DAI NIPPON MILITARY OCCUPATION JAVA’S CALENDER COLLECTION , JULY  2605 (1945) with few days of August , THE LAST MONTH BEFORE SURRENDER TO THE ALLIED ARMED FORCES, AND THE BACK OF THIS CALENDER A NOTE HANDWRITTEN Married 16/7-1941 no.124 at Soerabaja.

On this Japanese callender,tehre were  the first day of August until 11th August , especially the day of  US “H”Bomb were thrown , Monday ,6th, at  Hirosima and thirsday, 9th, at Nagasaki

(, if some have the other month,  August until December ‘s Calender please show us-auth).

 

(2)In July 1945 

Daan Mogot graduated from PETA

During the Japanese occupation, Daan Mogot entered the military organization formed by native Japanese in Java, the Defenders of the Homeland or PETA. The year was 1942, he became a member of PETA’s first generation. Daan Mogot actual age has not been determined eligible by the Japanese of 18 years. At that time he was 14 years old.

Because of his accomplishments, he was appointed manager of PETA members in Bali, then moved in Jakarta. When I was in Bali, he got two true friends of Kemal Idris and Zulkifli Lubis.

Those from Japan Seinen Dojo instructor was appointed as a Assistant Instructor. Therefore, training will be given to them much lighter than had ever received training at the Dojo in Tangerang Seinen. Education and training can be accomplished through four generations. The first batch started in December 1943 and the fourth generation, the last completed month of July 1945, before the Japanese surrender to the Allies on August 15, 1945.

There are 50 people taken from the first batch of trainees to attend educational “guerilla warfare” under the command of Captain Yanagawa. Among those who participated a special exercise that is Daan Mogot, Kemal Idris, Zulkifli Lubis, Kusno Wibowo, Sabirin Mukhtar, Syatibi and Effendi. The type of exercise is given, among others, how to maintain a dove, because birds that can be used for communication devices. In addition they are trained how to use a good weapon to face the opponent.

After the 50th person inducted into the officer, they no longer served as an Assistant Instructor, but a shodancho.

Once inducted into PETA officers, each officer returned to his native region. In Bali, Daan Mogot, Zulkifli Lubis and Kemal Idris, along with several other officers set up PETA and PETA train candidates in there. The reason Japan founded PETA in Bali because Bali is considered a defense areas and landing sites. For that power is prepared, especially in the Nagara and Klungkung. Japan gives credence to the Daan Mogot train in Tabanan, Kemal Idris in the Nagara and Zulkifli Lubis in Klungkung. Although the three friends separated their posts, but they always make contact, either discuss matters relating to training as well as about the fate of people who are suffering under the soles of the invaders. Specific training activities when it is preparing to face an enemy attack the defense on the beach. During the year the shodancho in Bali is doing well. The next year they should be separated. Four people shodancho should go back to Java, while Daan Mogot, Zulkifli Lubis, and Kemal Idris, who stayed. They act as instructors PETA, provide training to prospective officers until they are proficient in various fields of the army.

Daan Mogot is famous in the history of the revolution time of war to maintain the independence of Indonesia in fighting in the forest-Serpong, Tangerang Banten Lengkong, when the Military Academy Midshipman Tangerang he leads try to seize weapons from the Japanese army on 25 January 1946.

Ironically, while he struggled to maintain the independence of Indonesia even willingly fall on the battlefield, his father was killed by robbers who thinks “people Manado” (Minahasa people) as londoh-londoh (minions) the Netherlands.

One time, Major Daan Mogot meet with his cousin Alex Kawilarang. Wearing a green cap, he was down on his motorcycle. 17-year-old youth was later picked up by Alex on the roadside, and he showed the face of joy. A warm meeting place. Then they chatted in the house. Daan Mogot told me that he now lives in New Asem Jalan, riding on the family Singgih. Immediately disambungnya story of the struggle. About the attacks in Pondok Gede. He is also a story about his father who had just killed, is not known with certainty by whom. “A lot of true anarchy going on here,” said Alex. “Indeed, it is a must Torang clean up. Therefore, the weapon must be in the hands of Torang pe “continued Daan. He said again to Alex, “Torang, people of Manado, do not do the absurd. Caution, caution! Torang must actually demonstrate, at the side where we are. “

Then Daan also talked about his thoughts on a college to educate the youth who want to become soldiers, who later turned out to happen, is the establishment of “military academy” (military academy) on November 18, 1945 in Tangerang.

As a sponsor realization of the idea of ​​establishing a military academy school, then on 18 November 1945 he was appointed as Director of the Military Academy Tangerang (MAT) at the time he was 17 years old. Actually in Yogyakarta also stand Military Academy Yogya (Yogya MA) almost simultaneously, which is dated 5 November 1945. The idea of ​​establishing a military academy is indeed like that be imagined by Daan Mogot.

 

 (c)In July 1945,

 Sudirman and several other officers maps that include the category of “dangerous” were called to Bogor on the grounds will receive further training. Only then there is the impression that Japan intends to capture them. Even if they were in Bogor “Advanced Training” was canceled, because the single August 14, 1945 the Japanese had surrendered to the allies. After that Soedirman and his friends returned to the propagators and respectively. At the time of the Proclamation of Independence of Indonesia voiced, Sudirman was in Kroja

 

 

AUGUST 1945

 

a.Early August 1945:
The Shimoda detachment of the First Special Attack Force (12 Kairyu type midgets) receives a report about the sighting of an American submarine shelling Mikimoto lighthouse, off Shimoda harbor. A Kairyu is diespatched to intercept the submarine, but fails to locate it.

August 14, 1945

the Japanese had surrendered to the allies. After that Soedirman and his friends returned to the propagators and respectively.

 

August ,6th.1945:

At 0815, Colonel (later Brig Gen) Paul W. Tibbetts’ B-29 “Superfortress”, nicknamed “ENOLA GAY”, of the 509th Composite Group, drops the 15-kiloton yield “Little Boy” uranium atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

 

Colonel Tibbetts with B-29 ENOLA GAY

That same day, following TG 35.3′s bombardment of Kushimoto, four Kaitens are deployed from Otsujima base to Tanabe to be attached to the Sixth Special Attack Unit.

August,8th. 1945:
Moscow declares that from 9 August 1945, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan.

 August ,9th.1945:
At 1101, Major (later Brig Gen, ANG) Charles W. Sweeney’s B-29 “BOCKSCAR”, of the 509th Composite Group’s 393rd Bomb Squadron, drops the 21-kiloton yield “Fat Man” plutonium atomic bomb, on Nagasaki. [4]

That same day, carrying out Stalin’s pledge at Yalta, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, CINC, Soviet Far East Forces, launches Operation “August Storm”, the invasion of Japanese-held Manchuria (Manchukuo). The attack is made by three Soviet army groups (“fronts”) comprising 80 divisions of 1.5 million men. In less than two weeks, the Soviets defeat General Yamada Otsuzo’s depleted and ill-equipped Kwantung Army of over 600,000 men. [5]

August,10th. 1945:
Japan offers to surrender to the Allies, if Emperor Hirohito (Showa) is allowed to remain the nominal head of state.

 August,12th. 1945:
The United States announces it will accept the Japanese surrender and that the emperor can remain in a ceremonial capacity.

Shikoku, Kochi Prefecture. That same evening, the Suzaki kaiten detachment of the Eighth Special Attack Unit receives a report about the sighting of an enemy task force off Shionomisaki, Wakayama Prefecture. Based on that information the local IJA commander expects a landing at Tosa Bay the next morning. Two kaitens are immediately dispatched to Tosa Bay and sortie at 0600 the next morning, but fail to locate the enemy and return by 1000.

 August,13th. 1945:
Tokyo. At an evening conference attended by General Umezu Yoshijiro, Chief of the Army General Staff and Admiral Toyoda Soemu (33), (former CO of HYUGA), Chief of the Navy General Staff , the Vice Chief of the NGS, wild-eyed Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro (40)(former XO of KAGA) proposes “that if we are willing to sacrifice 20 million Japanese lives in special attacks (kamikaze), victory can still be achieved!”

August,14th. 1945:
Tokyo. At 1020, the emperor convenes a conference of his most senior military officers. Field Marshall Hata, freshly arrived from Hiroshima, expresses no confidence in Japan continuing the war over appeals from such strong-willed, arrogant personalities as Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime and Fleet Admiral Nagano Osami who exhibit a dull-witted state of denial. The emperor dismisses their protestations for protracted carnage.

The emperor notes that with the Soviet entry into the Pacific War and the enemy’s use of atomic weapons, not even Onishi’s Special Attack forces can stop them. He requests that his senior officers cooperate with him to end the war. Later, the Japanese announce that the emperor has decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration’s terms and end the War, effective the following day.

That same day, 167 B-29s of the 20th Air Force from Saipan bomb Hikari Naval Arsenal, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The raid is supported by North American P-51 “Mustang” fighters from Iwo Jima, attacking various targets in the same area until 1040 in the morning. 71.8 percent of the arsenal’s total roof area is destroyed. 738 workers, mostly mobilized middle school students, die in the attacks.

 

Emperor Hirohito Reads an Imperial Rescrip

The Dai Nippon Soldier hear the announcement

 

the allied forces very happy after hear the announcement

 


Dutch prisoners just after release from a Japanese concentration camp, 1945.Imperial Palace, Tokyo. At noon, the emperor announces Japan’s surrender that is broadcast by radio all over the Japanese Empire.

Port Arthur, Manchuria. Lost to Japan in 1905, the Soviet Navy Flag flies again on 22 August

August,15th.1945

 

 

The rare money order fragment send to Serang CDS 15.8.05 ,and  the date on the  money order 2605,

 

 

 

 

 

.August,17th. 1945

 

 

Proclamation of Indonesian Independence

Declaration event

 

Sukarno, accompanied by Mohammad Hatta (right), proclaiming the independence of Indonesia.

.


Provisional guards for President Sukarno, Jakarta, 1945.

 

 

PRANGKO DEFINIT dAI NIPPON SUMATRA DIGUNAKAN DIKANTOR POS pADANG DENGAN STEMPEL DAI NIPPON HURUF KANJI pA-DA-N(G) DENGAN TANGGAL SHOWA 20.8.17 YANG BERARTI 17 AGUSTUS 1945, SAYANG SUDAH DICOPOT DARI SAMPUL, SUART DIKIRIM SAAT KEMERDEKAN INDONESIA DI PROKLAMASI DI jAKARTA, INI KOLEKSI SANGAT HISTORIS, SAAT PROKLAMASI KANTOR POS PADANG MASIH DIKUASAI DAI NIPPON. koleksi ini juga ditampilkan dalam buku Indonesia Independdent revolution and War

 

At the time of the Proclamation of Independence of Indonesia voiced, Sudirman was in Kroja

 

 August,18th. 1945:

Ini koleksi kartupos milter jepang yang digunakan dengan prangko pendudkan jepand jawa dikirim dari Djatinegara ke magelang stempelpos 18 agustus 1945.ternyata satu hari setelah proklamasi kemerdekaan kantor pos jatinegara masih dikuasai Dai Nippon

 

 

 

 September,2nd. 1945:

Formal Surrender Ceremonies:

September,15th. 1945:

Cessation of Hostilities:

Surrender(National Archives)

 

B. The chronology of Indonesian Independence Proclamation

a.SUNDAY-AUGUST.12th.1945

__________________________________

On this Japanese callender,tehre were  the first day of August until 11th August , especially the day of  US “H”Bomb were thrown , Monday ,6th, at  Hirosima and thirsday, 9th, at Nagasaki

 

C John Lennon Remembrance in Words for the 60th Anniversary of Hiroshima
     
 
The first atomic bomb
Imagine there’s no Heaven
It’s easy if you try
No hell below us
Above us only sky
Imagine all the people
Living for todayImagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion too
Imagine all the people
Living life in peaceYou may say that I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you’ll join us
And the world will be as oneImagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
A brotherhood of man
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the worldYou may say that I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you’ll join us
And the world will live as one– Lyrics to “Imagine” by
John Lennon, 1971.
 
A-bomb goes off on Hiroshima
   
 
A watch that survived the blast which stopped at precisely 8:15
 
Devastation in Hiroshima….
   
 
One day after the bomb blast
 
Boy with burned back
   
 
A woman whose face is disfigured from the blast. Later, when the rain would fall, some of the mobile survivors would actually drink the rain water which was poisonous with radiation.
 
Young Japanese boy suffers from radiation burns
   
 
Japanese female whose face is totally disfigured from heat and radiation.
 
Another burn casualty from the A-bomb
May Man have learned from the lessons never to repeat again the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki…

 

 

 

 

 

Translate Indonesia:

Manusia mungkin telah belajar dari pelajaran untuk tidak mengulangi lagi

tragedi Hiroshima dan Nagasaki

Bayangkan ada Surga
Sangat mudah jika Anda mencoba
Tidak ada neraka di bawah kita
Di atas kita hanya angkasa
Bayangkan semua orang

Hidup untukBayangan Hari ini

tidak ada negara
Hal ini tidak sulit untuk dilakukan
Tidak ada yang membunuh atau mati
Dan tidak ada agama juga
Bayangkan semua orang
Hidup dalam Damai Kamu  mungkin mengatakan bahwa saya adalah seorang pemimpi
Tapi aku bukan satu-satunya
Saya harap suatu hari nanti Anda akan bergabung dengan kami
Dan dunia akan menjadi seperti satu bayangan tidak memiliki harta
Aku ingin tahu apakah Anda dapat
Tidak perlu untuk keserakahan atau kelaparan
Sebuah persaudaraan manusia
Bayangkan semua orang
Berbagi semua dunia kamu dapat mengatakan bahwa saya adalah seorang pemimpi
Tapi aku bukan satu-satunya
Saya harap suatu hari nanti Anda akan bergabung dengan kami
Dan dunia akan hidup sebagai salah satu-lirikuntuk “Bayangkan”

oleh
John Lennon, 1971

 

John lennon Record Imagine 1971 Collections

 

 
 
 
 
Target Hiroshima Nagasaki
Dead/Missing 70,000-80,000 35,000-40,000
Wounded 70,000 40,000
Population Density 35,000 per sq mile 65,000 per sq mile
Total Casualties 140,000-150,000 75,000-80,000
Area Destroyed 4.7 sq mile 1.8 sq mile
Attacking Platform 1 B-29 1 B-29
Weapon(s) ‘Tall Boy’ 15 kT
(15,000 tons of TNT)
‘Fat Man’ 21 kT
(21,000 tons of TNT)    
     
  “Ground Zero” at Hiroshima. The A-bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945.JAPAN – The 509th CG B-29 takes off from North Field, Tinian at 0245 hours. At two-minute intervals, 2 observation B-29′s follow. At 0815 hours local, an atomic bomb is released over Hiroshima from 31,600 ft; it explodes 50 seconds later. More than 80% of the city’s buildings are destroyed and over 71,000 people are killed. The B-29 lands on Tinian at 1458 hours followed within the hour by the 2 observation aircraft.– Source: Air War Pacific Chronology: America’s Air War Against Japan in East Asia and the Pacific 1941-1945″ by Eric Hammel, (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Press, 1988, ISBN 0-935553-26-6)  
     
     
     
       
The atomic bomb used to flatten Nagasaki…  
 
     
   
           
Today, Japan does not forget the loss of life and destruction through nuclear weapons…
 
Hiroshima’s A-bomb dome is a constant daily reminder of the consequences of a nuclear bomb
 
A young woman rings the bell on the 60th Anniversary of Hiroshima
 
Japanese visitors at Peace Memorial Park
 
Japanese Youth Rally– they file in a field declaring “Stop Nuclear DU Weapons.”  The hut by the two vans at the top had musicians providing “live” entertainment.

B.THE V. ESBENSEN’S CATALOGUE 1980 OF INDONESIA STRUGGLE FOR INDPENDENCE POSTAL HISTORY COLLECTIONS 1945-19450

After the official end of the war on 15.8.45 the Japanese(Dai Nippon) were instructed to maintain Government service until Allied Forces arrived.Therefore the Dai Nippon Occupation Postal services continue operating after 15.8.45.TGhe Republic Postal services was officially inaugurated on Sumatra sometime during October 1945(the earliest date is note known).

The affect of the change of postal administration started to appear during the first week of November 1945.Thus for the purpose of postal history,the Japanese Occupation postal service ended during October 1945. But the cgange from one postal administration to the next was gradual and the effects of the occupation lasted for about three years.Japanese occupation stamp without Republican overprint were sold at some post offices as late as January or February 1948.The date on which Japanese occupation stamps because invaluid is not know,but it was probably about mid-1948.

Giving exact information about 1945-1949 postal history odf the Republic is practically imposible because nearly all official records were destroyed prior to 1950 and philatelist did not do any serious research inti this postal history while it was still fresh.(Dr Iwan have starting in 1956 until now,and in 1985 had communication and echange info with Mr V.Esbesensen during he stayed at Canada,but in 1994 he moved to Singapore,but he did not want to met Mr Suwito Harsono,and one year after that he was pass away)

It appears that the Republic collected Japanese Occupation stamps at a number of central points.These stamps were then overprinted with Republican overprint and redistributed.However,many stamps without republican overprint also appear to have been redistributed.Thus one can find stamps of Bangka-Billiton Dai Nippon overprint were used in Tapanoeli or middle Sumatra,stamps of overprint Dai Nippon Palembang used in the East Coast province etc.How stamps of Bangka-Billiton came into Republican hands is not clear because the Republic did not control Bnagka-Billiton.

The situation in Java almost same with Sumatra,but in java the Dutch East Indie stamps without queen potriat like dancer stamps never overpr8int by dai Nippon ,also the postal stationer karbouw 31/2 cent,different in Sumatra all kind of DEI stamps were overprint in every province and redidency.

According to a post office circular Dutch east Indies and Japanese Occupation stamps remained valid after the postal service were taken over by the Republic,but the Nederlanda indies and Japanese characters were supposed to be crossed out .

As aresult many different crude overprints were used to cross out the words.It is believed,but cannot be proved.taht most of these overprints were applied to stocks of mint stamps at local post offices before the stamps were sold to the publ8ic(Dr Iwan have the unused stamps sample ).

But in some case it is imposisible to prove wheter an overprint was applied by the postal services(my friend,retires postman told Dr Iwan that the postman used parker ink ),  was applied by the postal services or by a private person.But at that time few people would have bought stamp to keep at home and street mail boxes were probably none existent.Thus the stamps pn most non-phillatelic items would have been purchased and applied when these iyems were brought into a post officed to be mailed.

(Dr Iwan will discussed about the rare philatelic items based on V.Esbensen Catalogue 1980 and other Dai Nippon Club catalogue,the discussion only in the specialist full illustration CD-ROM Only because the common philatelist very difficult to understand if they did not know about the Dai Nippon Occupation Java and Suamtra postal hisyory 1941-1945, for that Dr Iwan asked sorry in the common cheapest CD-ROM this infoo did not exist)

August .14th 1945

(1)14 August 1945:
Tokyo. At 1020, the emperor convenes a conference of his most senior military officers. Field Marshall Hata, freshly arrived from Hiroshima, expresses no confidence in Japan continuing the war over appeals from such strong-willed, arrogant personalities as Field Marshal Sugiyama Hajime and Fleet Admiral Nagano Osami who exhibit a dull-witted state of denial. The emperor dismisses their protestations for protracted carnage.

The emperor notes that with the Soviet entry into the Pacific War and the enemy’s use of atomic weapons, not even Onishi’s Special Attack forces can stop them. He requests that his senior officers cooperate with him to end the war. Later, the Japanese announce that the emperor has decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration’s terms and end the War, effective the following day. 

That same day, 167 B-29s of the 20th Air Force from Saipan bomb Hikari Naval Arsenal, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The raid is supported by North American P-51 “Mustang” fighters from Iwo Jima, attacking various targets in the same area until 1040 in the morning. 71.8 percent of the arsenal’s total roof area is destroyed. 738 workers, mostly mobilized middle school students, die in the attacks. 

Emp eror Hirohito Reads an Imperial Rescript

The Dai Nippon Soldier hear the announcement

the allied forces very happy after hear the announcement 

15 August 1945: Cessation of Hostilities:
Imperial Palace, Tokyo. At noon, the emperor announces Japan’s surrender that is broadcast by radio all over the Japanese Empire.

Port Arthur, Manchuria. Lost to Japan in 1905, the Soviet Navy Flag flies again on 22 August  

Sunday august,12th.1945

When Sukarno,Hatta and Dr R went to Dalat via Singapore  by flight  they stop at singapore

 

Sukarno ,hatta and dr Radjiman flight from Saigon to Singapor at taiping arport

Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, who later became the President and Vice-President of Indonesia, respectively, landed at Taiping airport on 12 August 1945, for a meeting with Dr. Burhanuddin Helmi and Ibrahim Yaacob who were leaders of Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS) to talk about the possibility of uniting Malaya with Indonesia (the concept of Indonesia Raya) when the latter achieved independence.

The meeting was arranged by Japanese army officers during World War 2.

Source:Archives: taiping

Monday, August 13th 1945

1)After returning from Dalat to Saigon,we heard that Russia had attacked Manchuria, and thus the blows against Japan were complete,coming from all direction(ibid yazni,page 117)

-Tuesday, August .14th .1945

August,14th.1945

Sukarno,Hatta and Dr Radjiman  Wedijodiningrat were invited by the highest command Japanese Military in east Asia to Dalat (Indochina)

a)to recieved  the decision of  Japanese Government about Indonesia Independence. In the official meeting ,General Terauchi

said :”Depand on your masters to decide when Indodesia will Independent”( Hatta,Legend and reality around Proclamation 17 Agustus,Mimbar Indonesia 17 Agustus 1951,no 32/33)

b) On the 12th of August ( which happened to coincide with may birthday) MARSHAL TERAUCHI told us in Dalat (300 km from Saigon) the decision of the Japanese Government to give up the question of Indonesia’s Independence to the Committee for Preparation of Indonesian Independence.

He said : “It is you gentlemen who are to carry this out, and it is entirely up to you to decide its execution”.

Sukarno then asked :”It is right if we do it a week from now ?

“It is up to you gentlemen” Answered Terauchi.

(Yasni Z,Bung Hatta Anwers,1981,page 116)

Field Marshal Terauchi

(1) ,who waswn’t Indonesian’s  friend ,Independence was forced by the government in Tokyo (gogle,internet).

(2)the vintage photo of Field Marshal Terauchi and his room with Sukarno’s  photo (P,google,internet)

The vintage  photo of Indonesian Proclamators

(1) Sukarno and Hatta during that time.

 

(2) I haven’t found the photo of Dr Radjiman

e) The Vintage picture postcard of Dalat and Saigon cochinchina

(   Emperor Bodai’s palace were in Dalat and used by Marskal Terauchi as Dai Nippon East Asia Command administrations Building, and Saigon after vietnam liberation change name to be Ho Chi Minh City-read the Vietnam Document and Postal History-auth)

1) when back from Dalat to Jakarta (Via Saigon and Singapore-auth),

(1) the three delegations meet with Mr Teuku Hassan,Dr Amir and Mr Abbas  , the member of PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan) or the committee for the Preparation of Independence from Sumatra, which will departed with us to Djakarta.They have heard that Russian have anounced the War to Japan and  in-vasion Mansjuria(Manchuria), After the discussion we have conclution that the Japanese were falling down  willn’t in month and we must proclaimed Indonesia Independence fastly. ( they don’t know about the US “H”Bomb auth)(Ibid,Hatta,1951)

(2 In the morning of August 14 , before we were to be flown back to Jakarta on a bomber, we met Dr Amir. He asked whether it was true that Russian had attacked Japan in Manchuria ? I said tjat it was right.Then Dr Amir said :” then it won’t be much longer”

I said ,”That’s right.We are not counting in months anymore bur a most in just weeks . Psychollogy Japan had already lost, being attacked from the south and the North”(ibid Yasni ,p-117,1985)

(3)So the three of us (Sukarno,Hatta and Radjiman) started home for Indonesia. In Singapore, we recieved an invitation from the Commander of the Japanese army there) . Delegates from North Sumatra (Dr Amir,Abbas and Hassan) were invited to a party by a lower level of the Japanese army leadership. We were invited by a higher level. It looked as though the Japanese were afraid for us to meet (ibid,Yasni,p 117,1984)

(2 )Sukarno annouced that  Independence will be fastly  in Kemayoran airpot.

(a)After came back at Jakarta, in Kemayoran airport (Kemayoran now the Jakarta Fair area, and Sukarno Hatta international airport in Cengkareng Tangerang-auth), sukarno have said in he front of many peoples “ In before I have said that our Independence  before the “Jagung”  berbuah”or seeds…., now I can concluded that. Independence before “Jagung” were flowered)”  (ibid Hatta,1951)

(b) When we arrived at Kemayoran airpot in Jakarta, we were met by the Gunseikan.

Without going home first, we were taken to the Palace to meet the Gunseikan. We were welcomed with a happy face and clear laughter by the Gunsereikan , and had dinner  with high –ranked  Japanese authoritied, there were even a toast and congratulation over “Indonesia Independence” (Yasni,p-117,1984)

(3) Emperor Hirohito asked the Dai Nippon Military  surrendered to allied Army(D) 

(4) Sjahrir Told Hatta that Japanese have aksed peace to Allied Armed Forces and suggest Sukarno annouced via radio Indonesia Independence.

(a)In the afternoon 14th Agustus , Sjahrir came to told me that Japanese have asked peace to Allied, and he asked how about our Independence ? I have aswered our Independence was on our hands.

The Sjahrir’s opinion,that the Indonesia Indepen-dence proclamation  willn’t by the commitee of preparation Indonesian Independecde because the allied Army will said that the  birth of Republic of Indonesia  was made by the Japanese. Better only Sukarno  himself annouced as the  leader under the people’s named via Radio.(ibid,Hatta,1951)

(b) This party was over around 1.30 in the afternoon. Only then did we go home.At Home I found Syahrir waiting. “How was it?”he said .

I said that the japanese had given the matter up to us.  Then Syahrir said that it would be better if the proclamation of Independence  were not made by the Committee for the Preparationb of Independence, because Japan had already surrendered, whilst the Committee were made by Japan. It would be better if the proclamation were made just by Bung Karno.

I said , would he want to do that, because, after all, he was the Chairman of that Committee. I phoned Bung Karno tight away. I asked :”You weren’t asleep yet?”.Bung Karno answered :”No,not yet” Then I said :”Something important has come up, Syahrir and I would like to come now for a few minutes”. Bung karno said :”Alright,please comenow”

Syahrir and I went there immedietely. Bung Karno was waiting for us. Syahrir then suggested that Bung Karno himself should make the proclamation. Sukarno said that, however things might be, it would not be right for him to seize the opportunity himself in this matter without acting together with the Committee.

Syahrir said that with the regard to this matter, Bung Karno should act as leader of the people, while the Committee was made by Japan.

Again Bung Karno said that no matter how things might be, we had cooperated with the Japanese for quite a long time.

Bung Karno also said at that time that he did not yet know for certain and was not yet convinced that the Japanese had surrendered already, as Syahrir said.

“All right then , tommorow,together with Bung Hatta, I’ll go yo the Gunseikanbu to make inquiries; that won’t be too late ,will it?” Bung karno said. Said Syahrir ,”No,that won’t be too late”.(Yasni,1984,p-118)

AUGUST 15th 1945

Money order fragment,destination postal circulaire stamped CDS Serang 20.8.05

 

(2) Although Dai Nippon was officially surrendered, the Dai Nippon Military Administration still exist in Indonesia

(,they have waited to give the power to Allied army, but the allied army very late came to Indonesia, that is way the Japanese Military Administration still exist until The British Army under allied army came. The unique and postal  history collection will proved that situation-auth)

1.In 15th August,

(a)the Japanese have asked” Peace” to Allied Armed forces( they didn.t like  to say “Surrendered”,may be they ashamed and still had the power -auth), that is way we dicided

(b) to invited the member of PPPK (Indonesia Independence prepatory Committee) to have the meeting at 10.00 morning in the Sanyo Office at Pejambon 2.

 

(c) Indonesia Indepence Proclamation must be announce as fast as we could, the Indonesia National Basic Law (UUD) must be “Mufakat” without any discussed  and the Indonesia Governerment at Central and Regional area must be done in several days only.

(d) The PPKI’s members from regional area must came back to their area with bring the complete instructions from the Indonesia Independence Government. If they back latetly,may be the Japanese will banned them backhome because the Japanese have the powered from the Allied Army( Jurukuasa  underpower.)

(e) That True Japanese had aggreed Indonesian Independence, but may be the allied army will asked the Japanese army to liquidatied Indonesia and will tried to gave back to Dutch East Indie Government.

(f) Organized revolution must exist, then Indonesion Independence could resisted with all Indonesian people’s struggled. Depend on this ,then I am “menentang” or against the Youngman,Peta and peoples’s “Merebut Kekuasaan” or Fight the Power theory, that suggested in the afternoon by in memoriam Subianto and subadio, the Parlemen’s member now.

(g)The fight of Power must be after the Independence Proclamation by Bung karno via Radio.To the two Men I said that I like Revulution, but against the “Putsch”or Rebellion.The Young men didn’t sustified to this explenation but latter they have said that that were true and Subianto have done my special tasked until he was died in Serpong. (ibid Hatta,1951)

2.The following morning (15th August 1945)

we went to the Gunseikanbu,( Dai nippon Military Administration Headquaters , the present Pertamina building-auth). There was nobody there. Except for a single Lieutenant by the name of Nomura, If I’m not mistaken.

Everybody had been summoned to the Gunserei-kanbu .I thought, the Japanese had indeed already surrendered.

Subardjo, assistant to  Admiral Tadashi Maeda,

 

who was also with us at the time suggested that we go straight away to Admiral Maeda. Which we did, and we met Maeda.(in 1946 Maera was arrested by the Allied army,in 1946 bring backhome to japan as ther retired Navy, and in 1976 he had gave Indonesia Narariya Star Medal  by Indonesian Gverment, and in 1977 he was pass away-info from samsi jacobalis book,2000)

Bung karno asked whether the rumours were true, the Japan had surrendered .Maeda was silent , for sevela minutes he did not anwer and his head was bowed. I pinched Bung Karno and whispered :”It looks as if the rumours are true”

In the end , Maeda drew a long breath and said :” According to Allied broadcasts,yes.But we have not yet recieved any instruction at all from Tokyo. It is those instructions  from Tokyo that are decive”(He didn’t told that The Tenno Haika Hirohito asked the Military to Surrender –auth)

After that we took leave from Maeda. As you know, Bung Karno was Chairman of The Preparatory Commi-tee, I was the Vice Chairmain, and for daily activity Siebardjo assited us. I told Soebardjo to call a meeting of all members of the Prepatory Committee for the morning of 16th August 1945 at Pejambon (now Foreign affair Ministry office-auth) Soebardjo called all the members by phone: they were all staying in the Hotel Des Indes.

(d)In the afternoon of 15th August 1945

Two people came to my house, Soebianto (margono’s son) and soebadio. Both urged me to influence Soekarno to be willing to make the proclamation on behalf ofthe leaders of the people. Not on behalf of the Prepatory Committee, because ita was made by Japan.

I said that this depneded on Soekarno himself. I wondered whether he would want to do what or not. But I was afraid he would not want to, because he was the Chairman of that committee. If be stepped foward alone, he woulkd be usurping other people’s right. Maybe he wouldnot want to do that.

Soebianto and Soebadio continued to press me and said :” If you pres him, of course Bung Karno will do it.”I said :” On what grounds would I press him? He,myself, the member of the Committee, all have worked together with the Japanese, but if there somebody who will make the proclamation who ever never cooperated with the Japanese, it be best for him just vto do it.

We continue to argue, at the end those two people said : “Well, in arevolutionary period, Bung Hatta cannot be brought in.” I answered :” That is not how it is. I am now preparing a revolution. The revolution has not begun yet. We are preparing for it. I don not want to make a Putsch as Hitler did in Germany, which failed . If we act , we must succeed” then the two went away.

It shloud also be said here,that on the night of 15 august, in preparation fdor the meetinmg of the Prepatory Committee next morning in 16 August, I typed out the opening of the Constitution to be used as the text for proclamation.

While I was typing, Soebardjo came in, it was about eight o’clock at night.He said,”Bung Karno is being  attacked by the youth. We should go there together “. So I went in Soebardjo’s car because my driver was not there.Wikana talked a lot. Wikana insisted that the proclamation should be made the same night (The night of August 15th).Soekarno sait it could not de done because it was only tomorrow (August 16th) that we were going to have a meeting. Wikana said, we do not want the proclamation made by the Prepatory Committee is rgarded as made by Japan. I said, if the Prepatory Committee is regarded as made by Japan,Bung Karno and I, and also many other leaders, have been cooperatin with the Japanese for a long time.So if things are like this, it is neccessary to look for somebody to make the proclamation, chosen from among who have never cooperated with the Japanese.

And we will back them up.  But the youth still wanted Bung karno to do it. At the time Wikana said,that, if by twelve midninght Bung karno had not proclaimed the Indepnedence of Indonesia the on the following morning(16 August 1945) there would be bloodshed.Then Bung karno became angry.He stood up straight away and went up to Wikana, and, pointing to his neck, Bung karno said :” Here is my neck. You needn’t wait till tomorrow. Take me down and finishe me off this very night.”

“ Oh,that’s not what I mean,Bung” said Wikana.”Then ,what do you mean ?”.”The people and our youth will rebel and will start killing the Ambonese here”, said Wikana.

Then I put in ,:”Why  the Ambonese? You want to start a revolution, why do it by killing your own people , you want to kill innocent people? He answered :’ Well, the Ambonese are considered to be NICA (Netherlands Indische Civil Agency-auth) , aqccomplices of the Dutch”. I said :” That’s only what people think. For some time already, they have worked together with us, and now you want tokill them? What sort of way is that ?”

TEMPERS WERE RUNNING HIGH, the I SUGGESTED TO Bung Karno that the four of us should talk inside. These four were Bung karno, myself,Dr Boentaran and soebardjo. For fifteen minutes we talked in another room at Pegansaan Timur, I suggested to Bung Karno that he should tell thoise young people to find someone from among themselves who had never cooperated with Japanese to make the proclamation, and we would state we would(shall?) back them up to the full. Let them makes the proclamation.

After about fifteen minutes we came out again and Bung Karno firmly told them so.In turned out that they still wanted Bung Karno to make the proclamation. Not a single one of them was ready or dared do it.

“To nignt we will not come to an agreement. It is useless”’said Bung Karno,”I am determined to go on with the meeting of the Preparatory Commitee tomorrow. Then proceed with the proclamation of Independence. If you do not agree, that’sis your business.I’m not going to take their right for myself. There’s no use in your pressing me, just go home first, and we’ll stop here”(ibid Yasni,1984).

Thursday-AUGUST 16th 1945

1)SUKARNO AND HATTA , IN THIS MORNING AT 4.00 PM carried off  BY SUKARNI CS TO RENGASDENGKLOK .

(1)Vintage Hatta’s version in 1951

At 16 August 1945 ,10.00 morning, all members of PPKI  and several femous man with pers were presented in Pedjambon 2 building, but who weren’t present were…

…..the invitator, Sukarno and Hatta, because they at 4.00 morning they were carried out to Rengasdengklok by Sukarni cs.

Their  reason have told by Sukarni  for bring us,  because Sukarno didn.t proclaimed the Indonesia Indepenced like what their will or  preffered , then the Youngmen , PETA(ex Dainippon defend Homeland army) and peoples will “bertindak” done themself.

In Jakarta will be an Revolution to fight the power from Japanese, that is way Bung karno and us must be flee to Rengasdengklok to administratived the Indonesia Independent Government there.

When heared that , in the front of my face(mind) that the Disasters will happened  to Indonesia, the mad actions of the younmen willn’t succeeded .This  Rebellion will killed the Indonesian Revolution.

At this day , the Hot blood youngmen could not relized their own theory. Rebellion didn’t happened , outside Jakarta theren’t preparations aanymore. The Japanese have ready with their completed war machined to welcome all will be happaned.

In Rengasdengklok weren’t any meeting. There we workless “mengangur” Lost worked one day to saw from far the vision without based with reality.But, if there a place in Indonesia that realy be the fight of the power was at Rengasdengklok. The Rengasdengklok’s PETA have arrested  theJapanese’s  Wedana(Village’s Chief and two or three Japanese”Sakura” who adminstratived the Rice. The Jakarta’s  Syotyokan(Mayor)this day have came to Rengasdengklok to check the Rice stock, he also arrested “coup d’etats .

For Who and under the whomed’s  name the PETA fight the power there? For  and under the name of Indonesian Independence?  Indonesian Independence wasn,t birth this day and There wasn,t exist Indonesia Revolusioner Government.

In the afternoon Mr Subardjo have came as the Gunseibu’s envoy to bring us Home and Sukarni didn’t against that. In the night we came back to Djakarta also with Sutardjo and Sukarn and the Peta asked what about the Wedana, we said released him. At this nignh the the chief of Revolutiuon , will be started, and came back to the hand of Sukarno-Hatta (ibid Hatta,1951)

(2)Later Version By Hatta in 1984

At four o’clock in the morning, after my last meal before sunrise ( this during the Moslem fasting month). Soekarni came to my house with somebody from PETA ( I don’t remenbmber his name anymore) to fetch me.

Soekarni said :”I,m asking you to came with us”. “Where to?” I said.”Out of town” he said.”What are we going out of town for ?”I said again. Soekarni anwered : “ Well, we are going to free Indonesia and continue the Goverment from there, out of town”

”What government, it hasn’t been formed ye t.Independence hasn’t been proclaimed yet, only tomorrow morning. What gouvernment are you talking about?”

“Well that is how it is.This is the decision of the youth. Bung Karno and you aare going to be taken out of town, independence will proclaimed there “ said Soekarni.

I answer ,:” Oh,that’s how it is. What you are trying to do is the same as Hitler’s abortive Putsch in Munich,that is,trying to seize power without any backbone and mature planning” I laso said :” We were gpoing to proclaim our independence and you’re going to make a failure of it”

Soekarni said again :” Well,in any case ,just come with us,Bung. If you don’t come. Bung karno won’t want to come either”

From my house I was tkaen to Bung Karno’shouse. From there Bung Karno, Fatmawati, Guntur, all of us, were taken to the border of Krawang in the direction of Rengasdengklok. Near krawang before turning off to Rengasdengklok, the car stopped. We were removed into a pick-up vehicle. The milk for baby Guntur was left behind in the previous car, which was sent back to Jakarta. Perhaps the reason was to prevent people from knowing where they had taken us. With that pick-up finally arrived in Rengasdengklok.

We were put in the office of the Daidan ( a lower administrative unit of PETA) . We were ordered to sit there. The house was two-storied, upstair seemed to be their bedrooms. We sat there together . Then the Wedana of Rengasdengklok was brought there.He was startled to see us there.

After sitting there for an hour, we were told to move to another house not far away.It seemd to be the house of a Chinese, a landowner herer. We were guarded by a young man with a bambooo spear. Until close to tweleve noon nothing happened . Then I called the guard and asked him to call Soekarni. I said :” The man who brought us here, his name is soekarni,” He still didn’t know. I told him to ask the daidan.

The guard went away, Of course, he should not have left us. But Bung Karno and I told him to go, so he went. Miltarily of course, he was in fact being indisciplinary. Not long after that the guard came back with Soekarni. We asked him :”How is it, have you stated your revolution ? This morning you said that the people would attack.Have the people attacked jakarta yet ?”

He said , there had been no contact with Jakarta,yet. Bung Karno and I told him tophone Jakarta, to contact his headquaters and asked them whether it had taken place or whether it had failed or was it just talk and there had been no realization at all

He went . We waited for a long time. It almost an hour, and still he had not comeback. I thought,  nothing was happenening.

About two o’clock in the afternoon he came back at last and said that he tried to contact Jakarta; it was very difficult to make contacct at first, but at least he had done so,he said.

“And what has happened ? have the people attacked Jakarta ?” .”No,there’s been no attack”,he said.”This morning you said that the people were going to attack and disarm the Japanese, therefore you brought us here. Now,itseems , nothing has happened. So,you’ve failed.” I said.”That is not sure yet.” H e replied.

Thus , we just waited and waited as we had done since morning. All that Bung Karno and I did was to take turns with Fatmawati holding Guntur and trying to quieten him.

 

Guntur with Sukarno and Fatmawati

 

He kept on crying because there was no milk. Fatmawati couldnot feed him and there was no canned milk because it had been left in the car had been sent back to Jakarta that morning.

When it was my turn to be holding Guntur on my lap, he uninated. My trouser were wet and I had no change.So I could not say mt prayers, wheas it was fasting month. Only aound one in the afternoon was atin of milk brought and only then  did Guntur become quiet.

That evening toward six o’clock,Soebardjo came from Jakarta looking for us. He negotiated with the Daidan to take us  back to Jakarta.

First the daidan refused. Soebardjo pointed out “What is the use of detaining Bung karno and Bung Hatta here ? Nothing is happening in Jakarta. It is absolutely queit there. The meeeting this morning was cancelled because you brought Bung Karno and Bung Hatta here. Why must it be like this ?”

When we were to be taken back to Jakarta , i asked jokingly,”Better if we spent the night here, it is ill-time now,” Fatmawati(Soekarno’s wife)protested :”No, the tin of milk for Guntur which the guard brought is finished. Guntur will suffer and will cry again.At least we started for Jakarta.

In the end we were ready again to go back to Jakarta.

Soekarni also went with us.

Funny things happaned also on our way ack. Soekarno,myself and Soebardjo sat in the back in the car, while Soekarni sat in front next to the driver. Fatmawati and Guntur together with Soetardjo were in another car.

On our way to Jakarta before we passed Krawqang, we saw smoke in the distance, said Soekarni :” Now then the people have started to burn down the properties of the Chinese.” Bung Karno told the driver to goon, then to stop for a while when we told the driver to have a look. Laten on, he said it was only the people burning rice straw. We all doubled up with laughter. Soekarni did look slightly embarrassed.

When we reached jakarta, Soetardjo accompanied Fatmawati and Guntur home to 56 pegangsaan street (now Proklamasi street)with their own car ,

Bung Karno and myself ,Soebardjo and soekarni went to my place with our car.

I immediately asked Soebardjo to phone Hotel de Indess  to CALL A MEETING THAT SAME NIGHT OF MEMBERS OF THE PREPATORY COMMITTEE AT MIDNIGHT AT HOTEL das INDES to continue the meeting which had not taken place that morning.look at the picture of Hotel Des Indes  below

 

Those at Hotel des Indes said by phone that for some time past the Japanese has instructed the hotel management sot to allow meetings to be held after ten at night.

Soebardho suggested we try to ask MAEDA’S AGREEMENT TO HOLD THE MEEETING AT HIS HOUSE. We AGREED WITH Soebardjo suggestion.Maeda answered by phone:”He would with pleasure put his house at our disposal for the meeting and he was happy to hear that the two of us had returned to Jakarta. All 21 members were invited to hold that  MIDNIGHT MEETING.

Each of us wanted to go home first since there were still a few hours to go before midnight.”What about me?” asked Soekarni.”You go home too”I said. “But,I can’t go like this, in my PETA uniform”. “Why are you afraid. You took tke risk,you dared make a revolution, why should you be afraid of being arrested by the Japanese?”. In the end i lent him a few clothes, which happened to fiyt. Perhaps a bit tight, but he went home in those cloth. Going back to Jakaeta he was in PETA uniform, although he had no right to them because he was not a member of PETA.

Then there was a telephone call from Miyoshi, my laisson man at the Gunseikanbu, saying that the Sumobucho wanted to see me. I told Miyoshi that we would come around 10. p.m. . After taking bath I phoned Bung Karno to fetch me to go to Maeda’s and the Gunseikan at 10 p.m.

First we went to Maeda’s house and accompanied by Maeda too, we went to the house of the Sumabucho. (Read Dai Nippon Military adminstration Java about the Dai Nippon official goverment-auth) .

Maeda was delighted we were back and shook hands with us. The Sumobucho did not allow the holding of meeting any longer. “What can we do? We have surrendered to the Allies and now we are just tools of the Allies. The Allies instructed us to guard the status quo no changes are to be made anymore.

We immediately answered rather harshy :”You are a Samurai. General Terauchi at Dalat left it to us. What about your oath and your promise as a Samutai to us ?” “We are in a different position now”, he said. “You alway stalk, about your Samurai spirit. Show it to us no”,We retorted.

Bung karno and I indeed used rather harsh words and apparentley Miyoshi refined it translation a little, but eventually, we didn’t achieve anything.

Bung Karno said again :” So, if our youth takes action,will your army shoot them ?” The Sumobucho said :” Yes, we are forced to. Thoses are the Allied instructions, there is nothing esle to be done.”

Maeda went home earlier. He seemed bored by that endless talk. In the end, after about one hour, we also left the house of the Sumobucho and returned to Maeda’s house.Maeda just laughed, saying that the Sumobucho had no standpoint. At the beginning we were five people gathered there, that is,Bung Karno

 

 

, myself(Bung Hatta)

 

, Soebardjo

 

, Sayuti Melik and Soekarni.

We agreed ten to write the text odf the proclamation. I said that the text had been prpared since last night, was at my place. It wasn’t quite ready; I was typing it, when I was taken to Bung Karno’s house.

Bung karno said that we should make just a short text ,” Bung Hatta knows better Indonesian than I do. Think about it and write it down” said Bung Karno.

To think and write at the same time is rather difficult. I’ll think out the sentences and Bung Karno write them down” I said.

Then I spoke the sentences of the draft proclamation, and Bung Karno wrote them down on paper. The two main sentences that i dictated were,” We, the Indonesian peopke, hereby proclaim the Independence of Indonesia. The tranfer of power and the like, matters relating there to will be carried out carefully and in the shortest possible time”

Bung Karno slowly read the text of the proclamation. Tree time he read it. Ultimately everybody agreed unanimously, everybody accepted it happily. Everybody shouter :”Agrreed”.

Then I asked the all saying:” So this is an important document for the history of our nation.Let us all who are present here sign this document . Just as when George Washington made his proclamation, evereybody present signed the document .” Nobody answere. Dilence. Then Soekarni said:” It is not good if all of us sign the document. Soekarno-Hatta is sufficient on behalf of all the people of Indonesia

Everybody was happy. I was rather annoyed, because they were given an opportunity to make history, but didn’it want to take it (may be they were affraid to Japanese ????-auth ,what your comment?). So, it seem they only looked like tigers from the outside. Iapparently they were brave, but in fact they were not).

The meeting was ended, everybody was happy. Maeda

came down from his room upstairs. He shook hands with everybody present. We ordered the btext of the proclamation to be retyped, multiplied and broadcast.

Thus, only that night had the Sunobucho told us that since tweleve noon that day instruction had been recieved by Japan from the Allies that the status quo was not to be changed, and therefore the holding of meetings could not be approved. But Maeda not only gave permission , but even put his house at our disposal for that historic meeting. I think the reason Maeda did that was HIS CONSCIENCE AS SAMURAI SOLDIER HE FELT BOUND BY Japan’s promise, and (perhaps) he felt he was going to punished by the Allies anyway, so it was better to help the wishes of the Indonesian ppeople to reach the treshold of their ieals.

That is my private guess. So, the meeting which was to be held in the morning 0f 16th August 1945 was cancelled which we had been carried off to Rengasdengklok, and it was not true the Japanese prevent it.

It is necessary to note here, which I learnt afterwards, that threre was a proposal by Soekarni which he conveyed through Soebardjo, to add five more names to participate in the signing of the text of the proclamation, but Soebardji did not mention this during the early morning meetin in August 17. Maybe it was because Soekarni had said that night it was enough for just two people to sign it (ibid Yasni,1984).

 

and then typing by Sayuti Melik

(In the originnal text, Soekarno writting some off Hatta dictated were stripped and changed from”Af-voi vo q(not clear) change to”Penjerahan”(recapitulation) and then change to”pemindahan”, the word “ dioesahakan’ change to “diselenggarakan” Djakarta 17-8-’05 Wakil2 bangsa Indonesia. This text of Proclamation’s concept than Type by Sayuti Melik with change Djakarta hari 17 Boelan 8 tahoen 05 (japanese year 2605 or 1945) , atas nama bangsa Indonesia(On behalf of Indonesian people ) Soekarno- Hatta, this original concept informed on the merdeka magazine during six moth Independent “Merdeka” by the owner B.M.Diah, and many years keep by him and then after many years he gave back to president Soeharto and now keep in MONAS monument Jakarta-auth)

(3)Other version were written by the Youngmen like Adam Malik,Sukarni,etc but didn’t listed here.

 

AUGUST,17.1945)Batavia, 17th/1945Photo: ABC Press

“Better to the hell than to becolonized again” was painted on a streetcar in Jakarta on 17 August 1945. This is the day of the Proclamasi, the day Sukarno plants the red and white flag in front of his home in Jakarta and proclaims the independent Republic of Indonesia. Two days after the surrender of Japan the situation is chaotic, and the Dutch government is not even inclined to consider acknowledging the republic.

The Indonesians will have to endure two wars and wait for more than four years until sovereignty is officially granted, on 29 December 1949.

______________________________________

DURING AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE PROCLAMATION

IN 17th AUGUST 1945.

A.Samsi Jacobalis ,2000,books info :

In the early moning Chaerul saleh bring  The copy of Indonesian independent proclamotion direct from Maeda house, and the documen gave to Eri sadewo at Prapatan 10 for copying and disebarluaskan after the ceremony at Eat pegangsaan styreet (private documantation by DR.Rushdy Hussein)

Mamahit had met Dr Muwardi the leader of Barisan banteng,he told hi  that Bung Karno this morning still sleep and did’t wat absudr(tak mau diganggu0 becaus eafter backhome fro m maeda house early in the morning his Malaria kambuh(exist again) . He will dibangunkan(call from sleep) about 9 o’clock for preparing himself to read the proclamation(mengucapkan proklamasi).

During proclamation only PPKI member,pejuang and old potiticia generation ,also the memeber of Prapatan 10 and student who live outside asrama ,with peoples. Sayhrir,Chaerul saleh.Sukarni and Adam malik didnot join the proclamation ceremony, Adam Malik in his book said that he didn’t joint (hadir)  because waiting the moment (kesempatan) in Domei for send telegraph about proclamation abroad(menirim berita proklamasi keluar negeri dari kantor berita jepang Domei).

During proclamation ceremony by Bung Karno in the front of his house at Pegangsaan street, the Studet at prapatan 10 jakarta also read the copy of Indonesian Independet Proclamation by Eri Sudewo as  the ceromy Inspectuer (inspektur upacara) ,The command of ceremony salamun,the up of flag Muhardewo.

Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 merupakan tonggak bagi kemerdekaan Indonesia. Proses proklamasi yang berjalan cepat dan agak mendadak mengakibatkan reaksi yang beragam di kalangan masyarakat, pun demikian di kalangan kepolisian.

B.Info Of Indonesian Independent proclamation

(1)From Kuala tungkal Jambi

. August 17, 1945 Proclamation of Independence and Public Speech Kuala Tungkal

Head Office Telegraph Kuala Tungkal H. M. Kurchi / Madiah Syahbandar Kuala Tungkal, always follow the developments within and outside the country through radio broadcasts are heard in secret so as not known by the Japanese authorities. RI heard the news of the proclamation of independence by H. M. Kurchi on August 17, 1945, and then circulated(disebarluaskannya) to community leaders and youth. On August 20, 1945 a number of youth, among others, M. Kasim, Tuhirang Duladji at 07.00 am and flying the red and white flag at the port of Kuala Tungkal, which is then followed by a flag-raising by people in their homes.

(2)The Proclamation of Indonesian Independence

(Indonesian: Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or simply Proklamasi)

was read at 10.00 a.m. on Friday, August 17, 1945. The declaration marked the start of the diplomatic and armed-resistance of the Indonesian National Revolution, fighting against the forces of the Netherlands until the latter officially acknowledged Indonesia’s independence in 1949. In 2005, the Netherlands declared that they had decided to accept 17 August 1945 as Indonesia’s independence date[1]

Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, who were appointed President and Vice-president, respectively, were the document’s signatories.

Declaration event

Sukarno, accompanied by Mohammad Hatta (right), proclaiming the independence of Indonesia.

The draft was prepared only a few hours earlier, on the night of August 16, by Sukarno, Hatta, and Soebardjo, at Rear-Admiral Maeda (Minoru) Tadashi’s house, Miyako-Doori 1, Jakarta (now the “Museum of the Declaration of Independence“, JL. Imam Bonjol I, Jakarta).

The original Indonesian Declaration of Independence was typed by Sayuti Melik.[2][3] Maeda himself was sleeping in his room upstairs. He was agreeable to the idea of Indonesia‘s independence, and had lent his house for the drafting of the declaration. Marshal Terauchi, the highest-ranking Japanese leader in South East Asia and son of Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake, was however against Indonesia’s independence, scheduled for August 24.

While the formal preparation of the declaration, and the official independence itself for that matter, had been carefully planned a few months earlier, the actual declaration date was brought forward almost inadvertently as a consequence of the Japanese unconditional surrender to the Allies on August 15 following the Nagasaki atomic bombing.

The historic event was triggered by a plot, led by a few more radical youth activists such as Adam Malik and Chairul Saleh, that put pressure on Soekarno and Hatta to proclaim independence immediately. The declaration was to be signed by the 27 members of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) symbolically representing the new nation’s diversity.

The particular act was apparently inspired by a similar spirit of the United States Declaration of Independence. However, the idea was heavily turned down by the radical activists mentioned earlier, arguing that the committee was too closely associated with then soon to be defunct Japanese occupation rule, thus creating a potential credibility issue.

Instead, the radical activists demanded that the signatures of six of them were to be put on the document. All parties involved in the historical moment finally agreed on a compromise solution which only included Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta as the co-signers ‘in the name of the nation of Indonesia’

Soekarno had initially wanted the declaration to be read at Ikada Plain, the large open field in the centre of Jakarta, but due to unfounded widespread apprehension over the possibility of Japanese sabotage, the venue was changed to Soekarno’s house at Pegangsaan Timur 56. In fact there was no concrete evidence for the growing suspicions, as the Japanese had already surrendered to the Allies, and the Japanese high command in Indonesia had given their permission for the nation’s independence. The declaration of independence passed without a hitch.

Draft

Indonesian

PROKLAMASI

Kami, bangsa Indonesia, dengan ini menjatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Hal-hal jang mengenai pemindahan kekoeasaan,d.l.l., diselenggarakan dengan tjara saksama dan dalam tempoh yang sesingkat-singkatnja

Djakarta (Jakarta), 17-8-45

Wakil-Wakil Bangsa Indonesia

Amendments

Three amendments were made to the draft, as follows:

  • “tempoh“: changed to “tempo“, both meaning “time period”.
  • 17-8-45: changed to “hari 17, boelan 8, tahoen 05″ (“day 17, month 8, year 05″ of the Japanese sumera calendar); the number “05″ is the short form for 2605.
  • “Wakil-Wakil Bangsa Indonesia” (Representatives of the people of Indonesian nation): changed to “Atas nama bangsa Indonesia” (“in the name of the nation of Indonesia”).

Final text

The original Indonesian Declaration of Independence

The monument commemorating the Indonesian Declaration of Independence

PROKLAMASI

Kami, bangsa Indonesia, dengan ini menjatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Hal-hal jang mengenai pemindahan kekoeasaan d.l.l., diselenggarakan dengan tjara saksama dan dalam tempo jang sesingkat-singkatnja.

Djakarta, hari 17 boelan 8 tahoen 05Atas nama bangsa Indonesia,

Soekarno/Hatta.

English translation

An English translation published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as of October 1948 included the entire speech as read by Sukarno. It incorporated remarks made immediately prior to and after the actual proclamation. George McTurnan Kahin, a historian on Indonesia, believed that they were omitted from publication in Indonesia either due to Japanese control of media outlets or fear of provoking a harsh Japanese response.[4]

PROCLAMATION

WE THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA HEREBY DECLARE THE INDEPENDENCE OF
INDONESIA. MATTERS WHICH CONCERN THE TRANSFER OF POWER AND
OTHER THINGS WILL BE EXECUTED BY CAREFUL MEANS AND IN THE
SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

DJAKARTA, 17 AUGUST 1945

IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA

SOEKARNO—HATTA

THE CHRONOLOGIC HISTORIC COLLECTIONS

B.Hatta Version

____________________________________________________

SATURDAY, AUGUST. 17th. 1945

________________________________________________

a)Proclamation Preparationed

1) Hatta’s version

(1) vintage version  (ibid,Hatta.1951)

At midnight(r early morning 17th August 1945-auth) , after the meeting with Sumobutjo where the Japanese have been the caretaker under the allied, there were the meeting with all the members of Independence prepatory Committee, the  delegation of Youngmen and people .

In the meeting  depend on the youngmen suggestion have the” round”(all said yes-auth) conclusion that the Indonesia Independent proclamation only sign by Sukarno-Hatta under the name of Indonesia’s nation.(Hatta didn’t told where and how the Independence declaration was produced, may be for the security. The detailed were told later in 1984 –auth.)

(2)later version (ibid,Yusni,1984)

I phoned Bung karno to fetch me to go to Maeda’s and the  Gunseikan at 10.00 PM (August 16th 1945). First we went to Maeda’s house, amd, accompanied by Maeda too, we went to the House of the Sumobucho (where the Gunsereikan, the hignest Dai Nippon military ‘s chief in Java, who know ? please give us information? –auth

The Sumobucho did not allow the holding of meetings any longer.(HE SAID)”‘WHAT CAN WE DO ?We have surrendered to the Allies and now we are just tools of the Allies. The Allies instructed us to guard the status quo, no changes are to be made anymore.”

We also left the house of the Sumobucho  and returned to Maeda’s house. At the beginning we were five people gather there. We agreed then to write the text of the proclamation. Etc read above!LOOK AT THE PHOTO OF BUNG KARNO AND BUNG HATTA IN BUNG KARNO HOUSE JUST BEFORE PROCLAMATIONS *ill.017

Later on, just before the meeting broke up, I asked for food of my before-dawn meal from Maeda. Before I went home in Soekarno’s car, we agreed to meet again at 10.00 a.m. that morning at Pegangsaan Timur , Soekarno,s house , to hold the ceremony of reading the text of the proclamation.

(This was the new information after 43 years independend  in 1984,that only five people in the meeting, and what about the member of Prepatory Committee as told in 1951 ?Hatta din’t mentioned in 1984?-who  have the factual collection about this, please momment- auth)

(3) Other version

Many version depend on the writers, (I haven’t written in this blocked, if someone need please tell us in the comment, and we will write in special topic-auth)

2)Proclamation ceremony

(1)vintage Hatta version

17 Agustus 1945 , 10.00 o,clock (Indonesia time )

the text of Indonesian Independence was proclaimed  to all the people (in the front of Sukarno house,East  Pengasaan street, the house was burned and now become the Pola Buildings and in the the locations was build Proclamation Sukarno-Hatta statue, the lattest locations was moved from the first location –look at the pictured postcard.(MANY MYSTERIOUS GUEST DURING BUNG KARNO READ THE TEXT WITH BUNG HATTA BESIDE HIM, because later many of that mysterious guest behind Bung Hatta were disapeared with black coloue, also the guest behind Bung Karno only Bu Fatmawati Sukarno dan Larief were said, who know the other mysterious gueast plese give info,look carefully the  mysterious guest from the three version  picture from the same photos below:

and compare with the Proclamation statue,the Bung Hatta Position not like  the really during proclamation,he look Bung Karno , look carefully  below:

Hatta didn’t mantioned who read the Text of proclamation Sukarno or another people in  vintage and later version, also in another version by Moerdijanto(1952) “ Ir Sukarno and Drs Moh Hatta , on behalf of Indonesia nation, proclaimed Independence of all Indonesia. After read the proclamation text etc…”  ? please comment and show us your factual collection related to this historic moment, one information  have found , please read (2)- auth)

(2)Merdeka magazine’s version (17 Feb.1946)

The Narasion left of the Proclamation photo( the photo was cutted and the two ladies beside Fatmawati and two men with PETA uniform didn.t seen and not got quality repro.uth) :Your excellency, PJM(Paduka Yang Mulia),Presiden Ir. Soekarno , between  M.Hatta and Colonel Abdul Latief Hendradiningrat (wrong , because that moment he haven’t choose as President snd Abdul latief ex PETA ,didn’t rank Colonel-auth), Proclaimed on Behalf of all peoples(Indonesia) Indonesia Independence.

(3)Vintage  Proclamations day ‘s collections

(a) Document history collection

(1)Until this day I haven’t found the original document related with the text of Indonesia  Independence Proclamations , only Repro photos of Proclamations ceremony  and the Sukarno handwritten ‘s concept WITHOUT SIGN in Merdeka Magazine (feb.1946)

(2) I have seen before a Java characnewspaper date August,17th,2605. without the informations of Proclamation and only the information of the Indonesia Independence preparation Committee. ( if someone have the original document/photos  about the cremony and  the text of Indonesia Independence Proclamation please contact us-auth)

(3) The original photo’s repro of  Indonesia Independence proclamations ,  Sukarno in Complete  White dress with “Kopiah”Cap, was holding bigger paper, not small Independece proclamation’s text, biside him at the left Hatta in white complete Dress and he put his hand back , without “Kopiah”Cap and at the right Abdoel latief Hendraningrat with PETA uniform, was holding Samurai.

They were standing in the front of the House and the vintage  loudspeaker was used.

In the back of repro photo,Violet  Handstamped “Foto Departemen Penerangan,Sumber”Foto Deppen” harus disebutkan jika foto dipakai untuk publikasi apapun. Kode negatip:”(the Photo of Indonesia “Penerangan”Departemen, source “Foto Deppen” must said if the photo was used for publication. Negative Code:

), Biside the stamped, three pen’s handwritten : 3 , R 83-4442 and  ½ Hal. In the biggest photo  we could seen Fatmawati (Sukarno wife, Hatta alone stilln’t married, and ten people , (Who were them ? please comment, because in small photo in another magazine Fatmawati didn’t seen and only five people with civil dress  behind sayuti Melik and  added three men with PETA uniform in the back of Hatta-auth) (page).(D)

in the front of Sukarno House, we can see Hatta  without cap and Soekarno with cap in the right side, and  Abdoel latief Hendradiningrat with PETA uniform and  two youngmen with civil dress (? Who) one  holding  the flag at left, and the other one in the center to pull the string to up the flag , also we can see Fatmawati(Sukarno’s wife who had made the flag)  from behind  Fatmawati with kebaya ,selen-dang on hair and  long stripdesign ‘s wear , and, beside her,  two another women with kebaya dress withoutt selendang on their hairs (who ?), and the leftside were seen  one  civillian’s youngmen (who ?).( who know the persons in the photo, please comment)

(5) The Situation before Independence proclamation ceremony at Pegangsaan Timur (D.Bassa,Merdeka Magazine,Jakarta, 17 February 1946)

In looked at the situation during Independence proclamation at East Pegangsaan , and at that memorable time, the writer was in the center of thousand youngmens.

Long before the ceremony, the sukarno’s house were different than anotther day, everybody who passed in the front of me that time with the meaning of that will be opened the new page of history.

In the front (beranda) and in the center o the house were exist many peoples , included envoys from other indonesian island ( outside Java-auth)  , the member of Independence Preparation Commitee, the other day(16 August)  they haved meeting to choose President and Vice-president Republic of Indonesia( The writer wrong , he didn’t know that the meetinh had cancelled because Sukarno-Hatta bring out to Rengasdengklok by Sukarni and Wikana-auth)

I couldn’t caculated how many youngmen and “Pelopor” guard(Barisan) which still came at this day. (Hatta later’s  information,” There were also rumours that it was(The Independence proclamation-auth) going to be read at Ikada Stadium (now was change to Market).

Therefore, may people went to Ikada, so that only about 100 people were present at the ceremony at Pegangsaan Timur; not many, but it was quite solemn, although it was short and concise.Ibid Yusni,1984,p-129)

Bung Karno and Bung Hatta Had came from the place (“Somewhere”? I think Sukarno stayed in that house because the Independence  Proclamation in the varanda at front of his house-auth) with Their Ex guard from PETA (? WHO) and the Independent Proclamation will fastly done (soon). My Heart Became “quiet” (easy) and “steady” (peace), although before feeled ‘sanctions’ (doubtness), The Independence will annouced “soon”.

The preparations of ceremony were done, the ceremony command’s(R.A.Abdoel Latif Hendraningrat)  words that asked all the participants : Famous men, youngmen and gilrs, the member of “Pelopor” (Barisan Pelopor) etc, to stand with “teratur” and must look atPresident and vice-president (the writers  haved written this article sixt month later, that is way he used the rank that time-aut)

 the ceremony with “Tertib” as still heared in my ear when write this article. He have said :”The People of Independence State must know how to honoured their “Leaders” (the writers used word President and vice prisident, he made the wrong statement again, that time Sukarno-Hatta only the National leaders-auth )

Everybody have done like the Young Opsir’s said . “The Indonesian Leaders Sukarno Hatta” in the front of the youngmen,students and Pelopor which stood in the bigger  “perkarangan” outside of the house were under the undrawned word’s feelling ( tak dapat dilukiskan dengan kata-kata), but deep in my heart I had feeled “Inocent (Kesoetjian) and happiness(kebahagiaan)”

After 55 years,this day,august.18th.2011, someone in Metro television  Jakarta told that he ,name Ilyas Karim still alive now) had “mengibarkan” the Red and white flag during Indonesia Independence Proclamation look the illustration below,a young man with short trouser in the center of the picture beside Abdul Latief Hendranigrat  (with PETA army dress and samurai  sword),also one young man hold the flag still donnot know who,why the man told now? very difficilut to confirmDr Iwan note.

This is the rare picture I have just found,we can see many people in the front of flag pole.who is the women with jilbab who pick the flag an 12 women behind her ,who?and at theother side many young people.who? still more research need,please the family tell me.

(6)Situation during Independence’s Proclamation ceremony (ibid,Basa.D,1946)

The text of Indonesia Independence Proclamation was readed by Dr Moewardi, the  Ceremonial,s Chief, and after that readed together ( by all the participants included Sukarna and Hatta, many years everybody have wrong that Sukarno had read the text, because in 1950 The Radio of Republic  Indonesia (RRI) have produced the record Indonesia National Song”Indonesia Raya” arranged by Indonesian National Police’s band command by in memoriam  R.Sudjasmin with the sound of Sukarno who read the proclamarion text, I have that record. Every morning the RRI have played this record as the started’s song before the beginning of the program -auth)

R.Soewirjo on the behalf of Jakarta city ‘s people, also gave “sambutan”’s word , “We, Indonesian People have choosed our  way to confrontated the difficult situation of this time, that we have dicided as the best and right moment  to proclaimed our  Independence at this day.(Later  he became the first Mayor of Jakarta-auth)

The Ceremonial’s participant have more attantioned when Hatta have came in the front of Microphone  and told about the meaning of Indonesia Independence text.

Soekarno have made the ceremonial’s participant into the  melanchollied’s felling(terharu),  when he said :” After many centuries all of  the people of Indonesia had fighted (became to be reality-auth)  , the duty and loaded (beban)  as the people of Independence’s state have became more heavy.

Sukarno said :”All the people,  at long time  in their heart have the believed  that  the Independence of any nation must be found by the power of their own nation.Sukarno also said “The enemy willn’t declined the “Red-White” Indonesia national’s flag before stepped up the dead-bodies of 70 millions Indonesia People bodies. We only like to see the Red-white flag inclined but not declined . Lets we guarded and  took care the flag still “berkibar”,fleed, until the end of the century  ”

The ceremony were closed with “Soempah Kesetiaan” The loyalty’s of the people and sung the Indonesia  national’s Song “Indonesia Raja” ( the tradition now that the National Song only Sing with or without Band during the inclination of the Flag ,

Only two photos exist taken By Frans mendur until now

From the front

And from the backside of Flag Pole(this photo not many published,may be someone in the picture had the political problem?

 

Photographer Frans Mendur (also Frans Mendoer)

 The writer have said the Song have sung at the end of ceremony after the inclination of the flag,I think that true , because if we look at the historic’s photo by Mendur ‘s brother every bodie’s mouth especially Sukarno and Hatta still closed not sung/open , if   some one have another information please comment-auth.)

The Bung Karno Introduction Said in Indonesia language :

Gentlemen All.I . has, anda-saudara brothers present here to witness an all-important event in our history.
Decades of our nation to independence Indonesia has stragulle our homeland. Rqatus hundreds and even years!
Wave action we are to achieve our independence there were ups and downs, but our souls remain to toward ideals.
Also in   Japan, era,  our efforts to achieve national independence did not halt. in the Japanese era, it seems we rely on them, but in essence we are still preparing its own power, we still believe in the own power .Sekarang it is time we really take the fate of the nation’s homeland dn fate in our own hands.
Only a nation that dared to take fate in own hands, will stand with the strong DAPT.
So, last night we had menadakan deliberations with leaders of the people of Indonesia Indonesia legendary eluruh. Deliberative ity seiiya one word opinion, that now comes the time to declare independence.
Brothers with this, we declare our unanimity embroidery iyu.Dengarlah proclamation.

PROCLAMATION
We the people of Indonesia hereby declare the independence of Indonesia.
The things about the transfer of power and others carried out by carefully and within shortest possible time.

Jakarta, August 17, 1945
Indonesia on behalf of the Nation
Soekarno-Hatta
Brief, only two sentences, not to 30 kata.Kata-simple words carefully chosen, neutral, unemotional, not incite, a notification that does not offend siapapun.Ditujukan to our own people and to all dunia.Bahwa, starting today, Indonesia merdeka.Pemindahan the takeover of power and not from anyone. Organized by regularly and not careful maksunya semerawutan.Dalam tempo shortest = brevity means that before any data or come back to destroy the independence kita.Disusul with words that also cover a brief and quiet, but clear.
So brothers and saudar. We have now been merdeka.Tidak merdeka.Kita now there’s one more ties that bind our land and our nation is currently preparing kita.Mulai State kita.Negara Merdeka.Negara Indonesia.Merdeka Republic, eternal, and immutable . God bless Insyaalah independence (derived from the set of Regulations-Regulations Invitation RI, 1989 Jakrta.penusun and publisher of the New Ichtiar PT-van Hoeve)
After That Latif Hendranigrat with Uniform Map hoist (up) the Red and white flags with honor (honor to). The Indonesian national anthem sing together without derigent spontanously (conductor0.
The simple ceremony without protocoler, Hundreds attended only by people, with ordinary Their shirts, without honor troops (Honouraly), without music corps, without a radio journalist and becaus ethat time without reception of Ramadan month (fasting, Feast) bodies every proud and many cries . No Dai nippon Kempeitai attack, although the Bull Movement (Barisan bull) Had already exist to protect the command by Dr. Muwardi and Sudiro with Youngman militants included the Medicla Doctoral student in the command of Piet Mamahit and Suraryo whic send from Their headquaters (Headquarters) at Prapatan 10 street

Original info:

” Saudara-saudara sekalian.Saya telah ,inda saudara-saudar hadir disini untuk menyaksikan suatu peristiwa maha penting dalah sejarah kita.

Berpuluh-puluh tahun kita bangsa indonesia telah bejuang untuk kemerdekaan tanah air kita. Bahkan beratus-rqatus tahun !

Gelombang aksi kita untuk mencapai kemerdekaan kita itu ada naik dan turunnya,tetapi jiwa kita tetap menujuu ke arah cita-cita.

Juga didalm zanman Jepang , usaha kita untuk mencapai kemerdekaan nasional tidak berhenti-henti. di dalam zaman Jepang itu,tampaknya saja kita menyandarkan diri kepada mereka, tetapi pada hakekatnya tetap kita menyusun tenaga sendiri, tetap kita percaya kepada kekuatan sendiri.Sekarang tibalah saatnya kita benar-benar mengambil nasib bangsa dn nasib tanah air didalam tangan kita sendiri.

Hanya bangsa yang berani mengambil nasib dalam tangan sendiri, akan dapt berdiri dengan kuatnya.

Maka,kami tadi malam telah menadakan musyawarah dengan pemuka-pemuka rakyat Indonesia daris eluruh Indonesia .Permusyawaratan ity seiiya sekata berpendapat,bahwa sekaranglah datang saatnya untuk menyatakan kemerdekaan itu.

Saudara-saudara dengan ini,kami menyatakan kebulatan tekat iyu.Dengarlah proklamasi kami.

PROKLAMASI

Kami bangsa Indonesia dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaan Indonesia.

Hal-hal yang mengenai pemindahan kekuasaan dan lain-lain diselenggarakan dengan cara seksama dan dalam tempo sesingkat-singkatnya.

 

Jakarta,17 Agustus 1945

Atan nama Bangsa Indonesia

Soekarno -Hatta

Singkat,hanya dua kalimat,tidak sampai 30 kata.Kata-kata sederhana dipilih dengan cermat,netral,tidak emosional,tidak menghasut,suatu pemberitahuan yang tidak menyinggung siapapun.Ditujukan kepada bangsa sendiri dan kepada seluruh dunia.Bahwa,mulai saat ini,Indonesia bangsa merdeka.Pemindahan kekuasaan dan bukan pengambilalihan kekuasaan dari siapapun. Diselenggarakan dengan cara seksama maksunya teratur dan bukan semerawutan.Dalam tempo yang sesingkat=singkatnya artinya sebelum siapapun data atau datang kembali untuk meniadakan kemerdekaan kita.Disusul dengan kata-kata penutup yang juga singkat dan tenang,tapi jelas.

Demikianlah saudara-saudar .Kita sekarang telah merdeka.Kita sekarang telah merdeka.Tidak ada satu ikatan lagi yang mengikat tanah air kita dan bangsa kita.Mulai saat ini kita menyusun Negara kita.Negara Merdeka.Negara Republik Indonesia.Merdeka,kekal,dan abadi. Insyaalah Tuhan memberkahi kemerdekaan itu(diturunkan dari himpunan Peraturan Perundangan-Undangan RI ,1989 Jakrta.penusun dan penerbit PT Ichtiar Baru-van Hoeve)

After that Latief Hendranigrat with Peta Uniform mengerek(up) the Red and white flag with penghormatan (honour to ) .The Indonesian national anthem sing spontanously together without derigent(conductor0

The ceremony simple without protocoler, dihadiri only by hundreds people,

with their ordinary shirt,without pasukan kehormatan(Honouraly ),

Why rthis photo was cutting?and the women with head cup disappeared who is she?

without music corps,without radio journalist and without reception becaus ethat time Ramadhan month(puasa,feast) every bodies proud and many cries.No Dai nippon Kempetai attack ,although the Banteng Movement(Barisan banteng) Had already exist to protect command by Dr Muwardi and Sudiro with youngman militan included the Medicla Doctor student  in the command of Piet Mamahit and Suraryo whic send from their headquaters(Markas) at Prapatan 10 street

3)AFTER PROCLAMATION CEREMONY

After the proclamation of independence 17/8-1945, the youth Jakarta moves to spread the news of the proclamation. Not only the villages in Jakarta, but the various corners of the country. “Better dead than colonized again,” the expression of the people to maintain independence. The situation 63 years ago got hotter when NICA troops allied with the free ride back to Indonesia.
All villages in Jakarta was established fortifications of barbed wire and bamboo spears. So if there are soldiers who entered the village NICA then heard a voice of command: Siaaap. Because of that era is also called the ‘time ready’.

Considering the event has been going 63 years, and have rarely experienced it, let us remind you again how the atrocity NICA soldiers during the revolution. They opened fire on people who look suspicious. To that end, President Sukarno announced so people do not leave the house after eight o’clock. Records in the National Archives of just eight thousand people have been killed between September and December 1945.
 Youths in the village of Kwitang aged 12 -18 years, participated as a student army even if it means carrying bamboo spears.
Many of them breathed her last the bullet NICA. At that time the mother-village kampong setting up soup kitchens for the fighters. Unknown in terms of corruption until they are willing to defend the homeland menymbangkan possessions they have.
Among the most feared fighters Dutch Betawi KH Nur Ali was from Bekasi. Until the Dutch courage to give a great gift for anyone who can catch it live or die. Betawi hero, Imam Syafi’ie collect the thugs Pasar Senen be a scary force the Netherlands. They operate in various neighborhoods in Jakarta

a) VINTAGE VERSION(ibid Hatta,1951)

The youngmen, Student, the Communication official and the writer”wartawan”  of Japanese Domei  announced the text of Indonesian Independence proclamations to all Indonesia.

b) Later Version (ibid Yusni,1984)

Among those present at that midnight meeting were also people from the Japanese news agency Domei in Jakarta. They succeeded in sending the news abroad that very same morning. The outside world was soon informed about this important event.

When they broadcast the news, the announcer’s booth was locked from the inside, to prevent the possibility of disturbance from the Japanese guard.

c)Samsi Jacobalis version(2000):

The Student ‘s attampt to sedn the new about proclamtion abroad trough Dai nippon Doemi radio not succeded. Suyono Martosewoyo which alway stayed at Dr Abdulrahman Saleh house , now that at that house there were the illegal radio broadcast  and with the permission of the owner that radio broadcast , Bung Karno and Bung Hatta were invited to Medical doctor Faculty Campus at Salemba street  for repeat the reading of Indonesian Independent Proclamatiomn  snf speaking(oration) through that illegal radio broadcasting, the instrument were bring to Physiology Laboratorium,where the attampt radio broadcasting had been trail by the student.Also exist Dr Abdulrachman Saleh,Mr Subarjo,Dr Buntaran,Mr Iwan Kusumasumatri,Wangsawijaya Bung hatta secretary,Suyono Martosewoyo .

d) Other Version

Many version have written, but all of the informations without   the factual documents ( that is way willn’t list in this infomation sheets , the factual documens and photos still needed, please comment-auth)

THE POSTAL HISTORY

 During Indonesia Independence

Proclamation day

AUGUST,17th,1945

During Indonesian Independence day Dai Nippon still had power at Postal office ,given by the British allied Forces until they came to Indonesia,

To proved thi situation ,until this day Dr Iwan only have two postally history collections:’

(1)                   Off cover, Dai Nippon  sumatra Definitive stamp,cds Padangin ahow date 20.8.17(17.8.1945)

(2)                 Money order fragment,dai Nippon java stamp CDS Malang 17.8.45

August,18th.1948

(a)The rare dai nippon Postal card, used with add Dai Nippon Java stamp  send from CDS Djatinegara  18.8.45 to Magelang

The next day on August 18, 1945. Japan dissolve Map and stripped of their weapons, then they are sent home to their respective homelands. After the announcement of the formation of BKR, Soedirman trying to gather them back and gather strength People’s Security Agency (BKR). Together with Mr. Resident Banyumas. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo and several other figures, Soedirman a coup d’etat from the hands of Japan peacefully. Japanese Army Battalion Commander Major Yuda pretty much handed weapons. Therefore BKR Banyumas an entity that has a complete weapon

original info:

Pada bulan Juli 1945, Soedirman dan beberapa orang perwira Peta lainnya yang termasuk kategori “berbahaya” dipanggil ke Bogor dengan alasan akan mendapat latihan lanjutan. Hanya kemudian ada kesan bahwa Jepang berniat untuk menawan mereka. Sekalipun mereka sudah berada di Bogor “Pelatihan Lanjutan” dibatalkan, karena tunggal 14 Agustus 1945 Jepang sudah menyerah kepada sekutu. Sesudah itu Soedirman dan kawan-kawannya kembali lagi ke dai dan masing-masing. Pada saat Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia dikumandangkan, Soedirman berada di Kroya.

Esok harinya tanggal 18 Agustus 1945. Jepang membubarkan Peta dan senjata mereka dilucuti, selanjutnya mereka disuruh pulang ke kampung halaman masing-masing. Setelah pengumuman pembentukan BKR, Soedirman berusaha mengumpulkan mereka kembali dan menghimpun kekuatan Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR). Bersama Residen Banyumas Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo dan beberapa tokoh lainnya, Soedirman melakukan perebutan kekuasaan dari tangan Jepang secara damai. Komandan Batalyon Tentara Jepang Mayor Yuda menyerahkan senjata cukup banyak. Karena itu BKR Banyumas merupakan kesatuan yang memiliki senjata terlengkap.

Agustus,19th.1945

Ingkang Sinuwun Kanjeng Sultan Hamengku Buwono Senopati Ing Ngalaga Abdurrahman Sayidin Panatagama Kalifatullah ingkang kaping IX ing Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat,

pada kedudukannya dengan kepercayaan bahwa Sri Paduka Kanjeng Sultan akan mencurahkan segala pikiran,tenaga,jiwa dan raga untuk keselamatan daerah Yogyakarta sebagai bagian Republik Indonesia.

Jakarta 19 Agustus 1945
Jogja berdiri dibelakang Negara Indonesia,… bahkan ketika Belanda masuk lagi ke Indonesia… dan terpaksa Republik ini harus memindahkan Ibukotanya dari Jakarta ke Jogjakarta…. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX tidak segan-segan membantu …!!! Segala gaji pemerintahan, penyiapan gedung untuk menjalankan roda pemerintahan… dikeluarkan dari ‘kocek pribadi’ Kanjeng Sultan …!!!

Peti-peti duit emas dan gulden… dikeluarkan oleh Kanjeng Sultan… dan Bung Hatta mengetahui sekitar 5 Juta Gulden telah dikeluarkan Kanjeng Sultan …. dan ia pernah menanyakan apakah perlu diganti… ???

Sampai akhir hayatnya… Kanjeng Sultan HB IX… tidak pernah menjawab… seolah mengerti betul akan “sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe” …!!! Ntaaagh apa jadinya,… jika saat itu Kanjeng Sultan HB IX tidak fully support untuk Ibu Pertiwi ini …. ???

Ada kisah menarik tentang Kanjeng Sultan HB IX setelah pasca Indonesia merdeka… seorang wanita tua pedagang beras sudah biasa ‘nebeng’ jika ada kendaraan yang lewat …!!! Ketika asyik menunggu… kemudian ada Jeep Willys yang lewat… si wanita tua itu menyuruh sang supir… untuk menaikkan karung-karung berasnya… !!! Setelah itu, wanita tua itu nebeng… dan sampai ditempat yang dituju… meminta lagi sang supir untuk menurunkan karung berasnya … !!! Sang supir kembali menurunkan karung-karung beras permintaan wanita tua itu… !!! Kemudian setelah seluruh karung beras diturunkan… wanita tua itu memberikan duit Rp. 1,- namun supir itu menolak… dan langsung melanjutkan perjalanan …!!! Wanita tua itu

Sukarno addressed the youth of Jakarta on Ikada field (now part of Merdeka Square) on 19 August 1945 to inform them on Indonesia’s proclamation of independence

Pada tanggal 19 Agustus 1945 anggota-anggota polisi di markas Tokubetsu Keisatsu Tai Semarang menurunkan bendera Hinomaru dan menggantinya dengan Sang Saka Merah Putih secara lancar dan tertib.

August,20th.1945

The postally used dai Nippon Shiokuio Haikyu Humiai private  card send from CDS Semarang 20.8.05  to Bajoeran with dai Nippon Java stamp.Dai Nippon still had power at Semarang Post office

(during dai Nippon occupation,all Dai Nippon office must paid if send letter,except the military post and the postal office,different with Dutch and NRI free _Beabs Bea _Vrij Post)

The letter about Coconut Oil distribution.special for the “pegawai negeri”Civil employee. Price f 0,04 per liter from Syokoku Haikyu Kumia(dai Nippon basic need office like now BULOG- national logistic organization)

 

Note in the letter: attation! When You came please bring this Postcard

August,29th.1945

The very rare earliest Ryo Kano(port had paid) used on the postal used Sumatra 31/2 cent Card to increase the rate of stamps,this done because lack of stamps, and the official chopped with dai Nippon character overprint with blob violet ink ,only one ever seen,send from CDS in katakana dai Nippon Padang 20.8.29(August,29th.1945) to Padang Pandjang west Sumatra.

 

August,21th.1945

Beberapa hari setelah peristiwa pengibaran bendera  di semarang tanggal 19 agustus 1945 , para anggota markas kepolisian Surabaya mengadakan pertemuan yang dipimpin oleh IP.1 M. Jassin dan PIK.1 Soetardjo yang menghasilkan keputusan bahwa para anggota kepolisian bersedia untuk mempertahankan kemerdekaan Indonesia

AUGUST,21th,1945

Lintasan Kelahiran POLRI di Sumatera Barat

BirthtrajectoryPoliceinWestSumatra

Police were three friends who like to survive in the city of Padang facing the Allies / Dutch struggle for independence period of 1945-1946. Police Commissioner Johny Anwar, Inspector Pol. Amir Mahmud, Pemb. Inspector Pol. Boer Tamar (Photo: Collection / documentation Adrin Kahar)
 
August 17, 1945, from Jakarta Indonesia echoed the Declaration of Independence by Soekarno-Hatta on behalf of the people of Indonesia. People in West Sumatra is officially not yet able to receive clear information about independent, even though that time Indonesia has the atmosphere of “Dawn of Independence” as it has announced the establishment Investigation Agency Efforts Preparation of Independence (Dokuritsu Zyumbi Chosa Kai) in Jakarta (May 28, 1945 ). The atmosphere at that time still showed the Japanese military government rule, the prisoners of war are released. Units Gyu-gun and Heiho (paramilitary troops and the People’s Voluntary Army Japan) consisting of the sons of Indonesia has been disbanded and the weapons collected by the Japanese. The offices of civil administration and police continue running as usual but the leadership held by the Japanese have been uncertain.

In the town of Padang and surrounding areas in those days there were several police units, such as: West Sumatra Police Residency (Nishi Kaiganshu Keimubu), City Police Padang (Padang Si Keisatususho), Outer City Police Padang (Padang Si-gai Keisat susho) and Forces A Special Police (Tokubetsu Keisat sutai). Padang City Police Office is located in the center of town (now: Police face portion of Padang, Jl. Moh. Yamin). Padang Outer City Police Office on Jl. Teak (now: Police Police Hospital complex Sumatra) and Tokubetsu-tai-based complex in Belantung Catholic Seminary (now: Jos Soedarso complex, Jl. Sudirman). All police units are under the leadership of the Japanese people, except the Outer City Police Padang Indonesia have led people (Keishi Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo tongue).

 

On August 21, 1945,

 four police officers at the rank of Keishi (Police Commissioner) in West Sumatra, called by Keimubucho (Chief Constable of West Sumatra) and was told that the Greater East Asia War was stopped. Prompted by the Japanese police chief so that all the police weapons were collected. Demand-cho Keimubu it can not be accepted by police officers, instead they demand that the Japanese side immediately hand over the leadership offices to the Indonesian Police. Four Indonesian police officers are: Raden Soelaiman, Ahmadin Dt. Berbangso, Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo tongue and Soelaiman Effendi.

on 21 August 1945

It may be noted, that before the flag-raising event in the middle of the city of Padang, has been first hoisted at the headquarters of the Red White BPPI (Balai Pemuda Indonesia Illumination) jl. Mudik market on 21 August 1945

The certificate of the children iisued by dai Nippon Surakarta kooti jimmu kyoku(bagian pencatatan Jiwa)

August,23th.1945

The People’s Safety Agency (BKR), which was formed on August 23, 1945 set up his headquarters in Jalan Cilacap No. 5 for the residency of Jakarta, four days after its formation. Moefreini Moe’min, a former battalion syodancho of Jakarta I was appointed as chairman. A number of officers engaged in it is Singgih, Daan Yahya Kemal Idris, Daan Mogot, Islam Salim, Jopie Bolang, Oetardjo, Sadikin (Cikampek Regiment), Darsono (Cikampek Regiment), and others.

August,23th.1945

The unique scarce Dai Nippon Grogolsuntyo (lurah grogol Jakarta era dai nippon ) ‘s Poor certificate and did not had worked(workless)

August,24th.1945

pada tanggal 21 Agustus empat keishi (komisaris polisi di tingkat Karesidenan) di Padang, yaitu Ahmadin Datuk Berbangso, Kaharudin Datuk Rangkayo Basa, R. Suleiman, dan Sulaiman Effendi setelah mendengar kabar proklamasi telah dikumandangkan langsung memerintahkan anak buahnya untuk mengambil senjata agar tidak disalahgunakan oleh pihak Jepang.

Sedangkan Polisi di ibukota Jakarta lebih belakangan dalam menyatakan bergabung secara resmi kepada republik

The Dai Nippon revenue 15 cent  at Grabag on complete received Money (kwitansi)document for paying Tobacco 933 kg f 1866

August,27th.1945

Only weapons with bamboo spears capitalize the people of Indonesia in Jakarta ready to sacrifice lives to defend the newly proclaimed independence of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta.

 In the picture looks troops BKR (Rows of People’s Security) with bamboo spears on the shoulders of the middle line which is specifically formed on August 27, 1945 in order to face the troops NICA (Netherlands) who came to colonize Indonesia hitchhike back to the Allies (Britain).

on 23-8-1945

The NRI flag –rising in the Outer City Police Station Jalan Jati Padang on 23-8-1945

 


On August 28, 1945 night,

held more talks between the Indonesian side (Ahmadin, Kaharuddin and Soelaiman Effendi) with the Japanese (Keimubu / Police and Honbu / Government) in the way of the Rose (the former British Consulate building, next to the hotel Estuary now).

 

The conclusion that can be pointed out Japan that the Japanese would not surrender to government offices and the police to Indonesia without any provision granted by the Supreme Allied leaders in Singapore.

 

Before the meeting ended the Indonesian side also gave a statement: “Tomorrow we will fly the flag red and white, do not deter the Japanese side.”

 

Towards 22 o’clock hour,

 three police officers were leaving the place of negotiation and the way Rose was escorted by Kenpeitai (Japanese Military Police).

 

Arriving at the intersection of five end Kampong Java, appear motherly (Police Inspector) Bachtaruddin of Tokubetsutai with some young leaders in Padang has been waiting to find out the results of negotiations with the Japanese.

 

On that night

 Bachtaruddin given the task with the help of the youth mobilize the masses to be present to enliven the red and white flag raising will be done in the Office of Police on the morning of August 29, 1945.


At about 7:00 am on August 29, 1945

 along the north field Nanpo Hodo (now: Imam Bonjol field), from the side post office, front office and front office Police Syuchokan (now: Padang City Hall) visible members of the public lively, young and old, youth groups, including groups of students gathered to watch the ceremony raising / raising the flag on government buildings.


In the meantime the Japanese soldiers armed to the teeth to hold a guard-guard at the crowd around people, but no incidents occurred.

 

Raids flag in front of Padang Police

conducted by members of the police themselves, while raising the flag on the building Syuchokan carried out by young men and a post office in Padang flag was raised by a young man who is actually also PTT postal workers, telegraph and telephone in the city of Padang.(the leader of PTT was Mr Mas Soedibjo) .
After the  flag-raising ceremony in front of Padang City Police Office, on the morning of 29-8-1945 was also an important event is reported by telephone to all Police Regional Office of West Sumatra se, explained also that the leadership of the police was already in the hands of Indonesia.

Instructed the officials of the Indonesian police of the highest rank in the office of District Police to take over the leadership.

 

The night of 29-8-1945,

starting at 19:00 there was a meeting of senior police officers held at the Office of Police Padang Besar.

Tonight it was agreed that national ice structure and personnel of West Sumatra as follows:
1. Raden Soelaiman, as Chief Constable of West Sumatra, Padang and concurrently Chief of Police
2. Ahmadin Dt. Berbangso, as Deputy Chief Constable of West Sumatra;
3. Soelaiman Effendi, as the Head of Administration and concurrently Head of Strategy / Politics at the Office of Police of West Sumatra;
4. Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo tongues, as the inter-Area Police Officer Consolidation in West Sumatra.
To increase the cadre of middle-power in West Sumatra Police, recruited several youths graduate high school. Police armed cadres of the first of Padang, which are: Johny Anwar, Amir Mahmud, Syamsul Bahri, Syawaluddin, Moh. Anhar.

Original info:

Lintasan Kelahiran POLRI di Sumatera Barat 

Tiga sekawan POLRI yang betah bertahan dalam kota Padang menghadapi tentara Sekutu/Belanda, perjuangan kemerdekaan periode 1945-1946. Komisaris Polisi Johny Anwar, Inspektur Pol. Amir Mahmud, Pemb. Inspektur Pol. Boer Tamar (Foto: Koleksi/dokumentasi Adrin Kahar)

 

17 Agustus 1945, dari Jakarta dikumandangkan Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia oleh Soekarno-Hatta atas nama rakyat Indonesia. Rakyat di Sumatera Barat secara resmi belum dapat menerima informasi yang jelas tentang merdeka, sungguhpun masa itu Indonesia telah dalam suasana “Fajar Kemerdekaan” seperti yang telah diumumkan berdirinya Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Dokuritsu Zyumbi Chosa Kai) di Jakarta (28 Mei 1945). Suasana pada waktu itu memperlihatkan masih berkuasanya pemerintahan militer Jepang, para tawanan perangnya sudah dilepaskan. Kesatuan-kesatuan Gyu-gun dan Heiho (Lasykar Rakyat dan Tentara Sukarela Jepang) yang terdiri dari putera-putera Indonesia telah dibubarkan dan senjata-senjata dihimpun oleh pihak Jepang. Kantor-kantor pemerintahan sipil dan polisi tetap berjalan sebagaimana biasa tapi unsur pimpinan yang dipegang oleh Jepang sudah tidak menentu.

Dalam kota Padang dan sekitarnya pada masa itu terdapat beberapa unit kepolisian, seperti: Kepolisian Keresidenan Sumatera Barat (Nishi Kaiganshu Keimubu), Kantor Polisi Kota Padang (Padang Si Keisatususho), Kantor Polisi Padang Luar Kota (Padang Si-gai Keisat susho) dan Pasukan Istimewa Polisi (Tokubetsu Keisat sutai). Kantor Polisi Kota Padang berlokasi di pusat kota (sekarang: bahagian muka Polres Padang, Jl. Moh. Yamin). Kantor Polisi Padang Luar Kota di Jl. Jati (sekarang: kompleks Rumah Sakit POLRI Polda Sumbar) dan Tokubetsu-tai bermarkas di kompleks Seminari Katolik di Belantung (sekarang: kompleks Yos Soedarso, Jl. Sudirman). Semua unit-unit kepolisian tersebut dibawah pimpinan orang-orang Jepang, kecuali Polisi Padang Luar Kota mempunyai pimpinan orang Indonesia (Keishi Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo Basa).

Pada tanggal 21 Agustus 1945, empat orang perwira polisi yang berpangkat Keishi (Komisaris Polisi) di Sumatera Barat dipanggil oleh Keimubucho (Kepala Polisi Sumatera Barat) dan diberi tahu bahwa Perang Asia Timur Raya telah berhenti. Diminta oleh Kepala Polisi Jepang itu supaya semua senjata-senjata polisi dikumpulkan. Permintaan Keimubu-cho itu tidak dapat diterima oleh perwira-perwira polisi tersebut, malah mereka menuntut supaya pihak Jepang segera menyerahkan pimpinan kantor-kantor Polisi kepada orang Indonesia. Empat perwira polisi Indonesia itu adalah: Raden Soelaiman, Ahmadin Dt. Berbangso, Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo Basa dan Soelaiman Effendi.

Pada tanggal 28 Agustus 1945 malam, diadakan lagi perundingan antara pihak Indonesia (Ahmadin, Kaharuddin dan Soelaiman Effendi) dengan pihak Jepang (Keimubu/Kepolisian dan Honbu/Pemerintahan) di jalan Mawar (gedung bekas Konsulat Inggris, di sebelah hotel Muara sekarang). Kesimpulan yang dapat dikemukakan Jepang, bahwa pihak Jepang tidak akan menyerahkan kantor-kantor pemerintahan dan kepolisian kepada pihak Indonesia tanpa ada ketentuan yang diberikan oleh Pimpinan Tertinggi Tentara Sekutu di Singapura. Sebelum pertemuan diakhiri pihak Indonesia memberikan pernyataan pula: “Besok kami akan mengibarkan bendera merah putih, janganlah pihak Jepang menghalanginya”. Menjelang jam 22.00, tiga orang perwira polisi tersebut meninggalkan tempat berunding dan jalan Mawar dikawal oleh Kenpeitai (Polisi Tentara Jepang). Sesampai di persimpangan lima ujung Kampung Jawa, kelihatan Keibu (Inspektur Polisi) Bachtaruddin dari Tokubetsutai bersama beberapa orang pimpinan pemuda di Padang telah menunggu untuk mengetahui hasil perundingan dengan pihak Jepang.

Pada malam itu juga Bachtaruddin mendapat tugas dengan bantuan para pemuda-pemuda menge-rahkan massa rakyat untuk hadir meramaikan pengibaran bendera merah putih yang akan dilakukan di Kantor Besar Polisi pada esok pagi 29 Agustus 1945.

Kira-kira jam 07.00 pagi tanggal 29 Agustus 1945 di sepanjang jalan sebelah Utara lapangan Nanpo Hodo (sekarang: lapangan Imam Bonjol), dari samping kantor Pos, di muka kantor Polisi dan di muka kantor Syuchokan (sekarang: Balai Kota Padang) terlihat anggota masyarakat ramai, tua muda, pemuda-pemuda termasuk pelajar-pelajar berkelompok kelompok berkumpul ingin menyaksikan upacara pengibaran/penaikan bendera Merah Putih pada gedung-gedung pemerintah.

Dalam pada itu serdadu-serdadu Jepang bersenjata lengkap meng-adakan penjagaan-penjagaan di keliling keramaian rakyat, namun tidak ada terjadi insiden-insiden. Penggerekan bendera Merah Putih di muka Kantor Polisi Padang dilakukan oleh anggota Polisi sendiri, sedangkan penaikan bendera Merah Putih di gedung Syuchokan dilaksanakan oleh pemuda-pemuda dan yang di kantor Pos Padang bendera Merah Putih dinaikkan oleh pemuda PTT yang sebenarnya adalah juga pegawai pos, telegraf dan telepon di kota Padang. Dapat dicatat, bahwa sebelum terjadi peristiwa penaikan bendera Merah Putih di tengah kota Padang ini, telah lebih dahulu berkibar Merah Putih di markas BPPI (Balai Penerangan Pemuda Indonesia) jl. Pasar Mudik pada tanggal 21 Agustus 1945 dan di Kantor Polisi Padang Luar Kota Jalan Jati pada tanggal 23-8-1945.

 

Seselesainya upacara pengibaran bendera Merah Putih di muka Kantor Polisi Kota Padang, pada pagi 29-8-1945 itu juga peristiwa penting ini diberitakan dengan telepon kepada semua kantor Polisi Wilayah se Sumatera Barat, dijelaskan pula bahwa pimpinan kepolisian sudah berada di tangan orang Indonesia. Diinstruksikan kepada pejabat-pejabat polisi bangsa Indonesia yang tertinggi pangkatnya pada kantor Polisi Wilayah supaya mengambil alih pimpinan.

 

Malam tanggal 29-8-1945, dimulai jam 19.00 diadakan rapat para perwira senior polisi bertempat di Kantor Besar Polisi Kota Padang. Malam itu disepakati susunan dan personalia Polisi RI Sumatera Barat sebagai berikut:

  1. 1.      Raden Soelaiman, sebagai Kepala Polisi Sumatera Barat, merangkap Kepala Polisi Kota Padang
  2. 2.     Ahmadin Dt. Berbangso, sebagai Wakil Kepala Polisi Sumatera Barat;
  3. 3.     Soelaiman Effendi, sebagai Kepala Administrasi merangkap Kepala Siasat/Politik pada Kantor Besar Polisi Sumatera Barat;
  4. 4.     Kaharuddin Dt. Rangkayo Basa, sebagai Petugas Konsolidasi Kepolisian antar Wilayah di Sumatera Barat.

 

 

Untuk menambah tenaga kader menengah POLRI di Sumatera Barat, direkrut beberapa pemuda-pemuda tamatan sekolah menengah. Kader-kader POLRI angkatan pertama dari Padang ini, diantaranya adalah: Johny Anwar, Amir Mahmud, Syamsul Bahri, Syawaluddin, Moh. Anhar.

Dr iwan ever met KOMBES POL Johnny Anwar in 1963 during the winner of west sumatra lawn tennis Police open tournament at Padang,his daughter Windy anwar Dr iwan high school classmate at Don Bosco High School Padang.