KOLEKSI SEJARAH INDONESIA
Dr Iwan Suwandy , MHA
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Indonesian History Collections 1941
Dr Iwan Suwandy,MHA
Private Limited edions Special fpr senior collectors
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Prolog Dai Nippon War 1942-1945
Empire of Japan
The imperial flag
The God Emperor,
Hirohito / Emperor Shōwa
裕仁 / 昭和天皇
imperial guard officer manching with emperor showa in the imperial palace (1937)
Emperor Shōwa (Hirohito) on his horse Shirayuki (japan 1941)
Imperial Japanese Army
Dai-Nippon Teikoku Rikugun
Flag of the Imperial Japanese Army
Chief of Army General Staff,
Field Marshal Count Yamagata Aritomo
Total Active Personnel:
Active Infantry: 36,000 Men(Regular)
Active Cavalry: 3,000 Men(Regular)
Active Field Artillery: 1,000 men, 100 Field Artillery
Total Reserve Personnel:
Total Reserve Infantry: 360,000 Men(Regular)
Total Reserve Cavalry: (Regular)
Total Reserve Field Artillery:
During the Meiji Restoration, the military forces loyal to the Emperor were samurai drawn primarily from the loyalist feudal domains of Satsuma and Chōshū. After the successful overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and establishment of the new Meiji government modeled on European lines, a more formal military, loyal to the central government rather than individual domains, was recognized as a necessity to preserve Japan’s independence from western imperialism.
This obsession to study and use European technology and knowledge and harness it to make a powerful Japanese State that is capable of resisting Western Imperialism, but also to enact a new Asian Imperialism, Japanese dominated of course. To accomplish this the Imperial Japanese Army was established under the direct control of the Emperor and loyal only to him as he is the ruler of Heaven. With the abolition of the daimyos and the establishment of the Prefectures, the country as well as the army became more and more centralized.
The army also modernized, relying on foreign support for the training and preparation of a modern and western army. The French had been critical in the development of the Imperial Japanese Army, and have been retained for their services for the Emperor. However, following the French defeat at the hands of the Prussians the Emperor had begun to study and copy elements of the Prussian military system, particularly the establishment of the Army General Staff.
The Imperial Japanese Army is a largely infantry fighting force, with men drawn from six military districts of Akita, Tokyo, Nagano, Osaka,Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Infantry is organized into regiments of 3,000 men divided into five hundred men battalions. Cavalry is divided into regiments of 1,000 men which is further divided into four squadrons of 250 men. Artillery is organized into batteries of 100 men and 10 field guns.
Order of Battle
Imperial Guard, Tokyo Military District: 9,000 Men
Commander: General Ōyama Iwao
Central Command: Tokyo
– Konoe Hohei Rentai No. 1; 3,000 Men, Gatling Guns
– Konoe Hohei Rentai No. 2; 3,000 Men, Gatling Guns
– Konoe Keiryuukihe No. 1; 1,000 Men
– Keiryuukihe No. 1; 1,000 Men
– Keiryuukihe No. 2; 1,000 men
soldier of the japanese army imperial guard (tokyo 1940)
officer of the japanese army imperial guard (tokyo 1940)
officer of the 2nd Guards Division of the imperial guards (tokyo 1943)
Akita Military District: 6,000 Men
Commander: Mj. General Arisugawa Taruhito
Central Command: Akita
– Hohei Rentai No. 1; 3,000 Men
– Hohei Rentai No. 2; 3,000 Men
Nagano Military District: 6,000 Men
Commander: Mj. General Ozawa Takeo
Central Command: Nagano
– Hohei Rentai No. 3; 3,000 Men
– Hohei Rentai No. 4; 3,000 Men
Osaka Military District: 6,000 Men
Commander: Mj. General Godo Toshiharu
Central Command: Osaka
– Hohei Rentai No. 5; 3,000 Men
– Hohei Rentai No. 6; 3,000 Men
Hiroshima Military District: 6,000 Men
Commander: Mj. General Kajiyama Denbe
Central Command: Hiroshima
– Hohei Rentai No. 7; 3,000 Men
– Hohei Rentai No. 8; 3,000 Men
Nagasaki Military District: 6,000 Men
Commander: Mj. General Takamura Eikichi
Central Command: Nagasaki
– Hohei Rentai No. 9; 3,000 Men
– Hohei Rentai No. 10; 3,000 Men
Imperial Artillery Corps: 1,000 Men, 50 Men
Commander: Mj. General Uoya Kazushige
Central Command: Tokyo
– Houhei Daitai No. 1; 500 Men, 50 Artillery
– Houhei Daitai No. 2; 500 Men, 50 Artillery
Imperial Japanese Navy
Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kaigun
Flag of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Naval Lord of the Ministry of the Military, Admiral Viscount Nakamuta Kuranosuke
Naval Warship Composition:
Central Battery: 1
Armored Corvette: 4
Armored Ram: 1
The Imperial Japanese Navy, like its Army counter part, was a result of the Meiji Restoration. Elements of the former Shogunate navy, as well as individual daimyo warships were requisitioned and were made part of the navy. Centralization played a key role, hoping to avoid further Western Imperialism the Meiji Restoration has made an effort to expand and modernize the Navy.
field marshal Shunroku Hata (left) and staff officers on a japanese navy ship deck (china 1939)
The Meiji Government has put every effort into the build up of a modern navy, many ships were purchased from outside countries due to Japan’s limited natural resources. The Navy is governed by the Ministry of the Military, specifically the Naval Lord. The Navy has been seen as the primary tool to extend Japanese Influence, and has been effectively used against Korea and Taiwan
The Japanese Imperial Forces
is the chief military force for Japan.
It is divided into the Japanese Imperial Army (home defense), Japanese Imperial Navy (training), and the Imperial Japanese Air Force (elite). The army owns three companies for use within the military.
It is led by Dai Nippon Minister of Defense Dokomo
The Japanese Imperial Forces is commanded directly by the Minister of Defense who reports directly to the President.
The military is organized into three divisions.
The first, the Japanese Imperial Army,
is a defense force, made up primarily of immobile citizens who are grounded due to political duties.
Japanese General.Anami Korechika
Commander 2nd Guard Regiment.
The second is the Japanese Imperial Navy,
the largest division, which consists of soldiers who have not achieved Field Marshal rank or been promoted to the elite squads.
The third is the Japanese Imperial Airforce
General Takeo Yasuda
Takeo Yasuda was a general in the Imperial Japanese Army. While serving as director of the Army’s Aviation Technology Research Institute during World War II, he was a key figure in scientific and technological development for the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force, most notably his involvement in the early development of a Japanese atomic bomb during the early stages of the war.
The Imperial Japanese Air Force consists of the country’s strongest and most active soldiers. Both the JIN and IJAF are mobile units capable of moving throughout the world and operating in the interests of the Japanese people and its allies. Each division is split into six-person squads, which are led by a Chusa who is responsible for distributing weapons and evaluating soldier readiness. Some squads are led by higher ranked Chujos and Shosos. The head of the military has the rank of Gensui.
The military operates a Q5 weapons factory under the JIA, and a Q1 weapons company as part of the JIN. The JIA also owns a Q1 defense system builder, which is currently inoperable. Gifting for the military is done in collaboration with the Japanese Interior Service, which runs a Q1 gift company.
Dai Nippon Teikoku Rikugun propaganda poster
Lieutenant-General Hitoshi Imamura
Lieutenant-General Hitoshi Imamura
Lieutenant-General Hitoshi Imamura was a chief of Army General Staff operations section during 1931-32 and after that a liason to 9th Division in “Shanghai Incident”, fighting early 1932
He was made then for regimental commander, promoted to Major-General and made for brigade commander in 1935
He became a deputy chief-of-staff, Kwantung Army, Manchuria 1936 and a Commandant of Infantry School in 1937.
Soon promoted to rank of Lt-General, given a command of 5th Division in China and held that command in years 1938-40. He was Inspector General of Military Education during 1940-1941 (Note This was an extremely powerful position in the Army hierarchy because this office approved all officer postings, up to and including choice of Army Minister).
Became a Commander 16th Army in November 1941,
led that Army in Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942 and personally landed on Java Island.
While in Tokyo
was informed that the enemy strength in British Borneo was estimated at approximately 1,000 regular soldiers (mostly Indians) and 2,500 native volunteers, with a probable further
5,600 Dutch soldiers in Dutch Borneo.
Intelligence sources reported that the entire island was covered with dense jungle with only a few poor roads near the river mouths. The only means of transportation was possible by water. Information in regard to weather and terrain was very scant and not very reliable and there was only one small scale map of the island available.
Immediately upon his return to
from Tokyo, the Detachment commander proceeded to
to attend a conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Direct Escort Fleet commander in order to reach an agreement on co-operative measures in the event of war.
It was decided that the first Japanese landings would be made at aerawk in
in order to capture vital oilfields and airfields in these towns. Part of the force would remain in this area to reestablish Miri oilfield while the main body would advance and capture the Kuching airfield. All units of the Kawaguchi Detachment had to receive special training in landing under cover of darkness and in jungle fighting, and naturally they also had to change their equipment and would have to be given special survival and field sanitation training.
General Tomoyuki Yamashita
General Tomoyuki Yamashita was a general of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II. He was most famous for conquering the British colonies of Malaya and Singapore, earning the nickname “The Tiger of Malaya”.
THE CHRONOLOGY COLLECTIONS 1941
1941 cover London GB to D.van Velden Prins Hendrik School 7 A Vrijmetselars weg Batavia ‘Batavia, Netherlands East India’ with oval ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVAL CENSORSHIP / CENSORED / HNMS h/s. From ‘Dutch Naval HQ’. PC 90 OBE label with CENSUUR label over tied by d/r. CENSUUR 5 p/m
Sencored Cover from Koloniale bank Soerabaia with 15c wihelmina and 10c Konijnenberg Wilhelmina 1941 staps, Soerabaja Airmail to Lipton Limited Melbourne, Australia. Netherlands Indies Censor tape
1941 Air Mail cover with HONG KONG p/m to USA [$3 50 cents RATE] with boxed NOT OPENED/ BY/ CENSOR h/s. and boxed ’28’ censor to rear. Soiled to rear. Ref: 227
1941 cover from CEYLON to USA with d/r. COLUMBO p/m. and 30 OBC label. Underpaid with d/r. COLUMBO / REDIRECTIONS p/m. Surface fault.
Sencored cover from Ned Indie Red Cross Tjikini 65 Batavia with 35c Wilhelmina 1941 Batavia Centrum Airmail to International Red Cross Geneva, Switzerland. Netherlands Indies Censor.
Secored cover from Mr Annamalai 121 Hoofweg Bindjei with 15c Wilhelmina 1941 to Viraichilai, India. India Censor
Sencored Cover from Toeban(east java) with 3c Rice Field 1941 red gecensurreed 22 choped to Albuquerque Civil council 1743 Sunshine building Albuquerque New mexico North America, N.M. Netherlands Indies Censor.
Sencored Cover from Batavia with 80c Wilhelmina 1941 ,Batavia Airmail via Australia to Hotchkiss, Colorado USA . Netherlands Indies Censor.The rejection end June 1941
by the Indies Gouvernment and the oil-embargo from the United States in August 1941 were explained in Japan as a conspiracy of what at that time were called the ABCD-countries (the Americans, the British, the Chinese and the Dutch).
This caused the daring plan to, with an attack on Pearl Harbor, eliminatin in one blow the entire American fleet in the Pacific, after which the passage would be free to Malakka, Singapore, the oil-rich Netherlands Indies, the Philipines and even Australia.
Sencored covered from Bandoeng CDS 7.8.41 on 80c Konijnenberg Wilhelmina 1941 stamps, Bandoeng Trans Pacific Airmail to Wellesley, Mass. Forwarded to Bethany Beach, Delaware. Netherlands Indies Censor. Inscribed By KNILM Trans Tasman Avin. P.A.A. and onward Airtransmission.
On 6 November 1941,
Yamashita was put in command of the Twenty-Fifth Army.
On 20 November 1941,
The Kawaguchi’s Brigade was activated in Tokyo (Japan), and placed under
the direct command of the Southern Army.
It was commanded by
and it was composed mainly of
the following Japanese units stationed at Canton, southern China, which had been previously
under the command of the Japanese 18th Infantry Division:
Order of Battle for Japanese forces
35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters
124th Infantry Regiment
one platoon of the 12th Engineer Regiment
a unit from the 18th Division Signal Unit
a unit from the 18th Division Medical Unit
4th Field Hospital, 18th Division
a unit from the 11th Water Supply and Purification Unit
In addition, the following units from Japan and Manchuria were to be used to reinforce the Detachment:
33rd Field AA Battalion
one company of the 26th Independent Engineer Regiment
2nd Independent Engineer Company
80th Independent Radio Platoon
37th Fixed Radio Unit
a unit from the Oil Drilling Section of the 21st Field Ordnance Depot
1st Field Well Drilling Company
2nd Field Well Drilling Company
3rd Field Well Drilling Company
4th Field Well Drilling Company
48th Anchorage Headquarters
118th Land Duty Company
A Dutch East Indie Karbouw 3 1/2 cent with Return card Had paid( Briefkaart Met betaal Antwort) had sent from Yen Shiu Yui c.o Dr Liauw Thiam Soe ,Kenongo Air Toeloeng Agoengm CDS Toeloeng Agoeng 27-11-1941(ten days before Peral Harbor attacked) to The Book Store Bing Sin Kepoeteran Street Soerabia, with massage :
after receiving this letter, please sir let me know (information () perhaps there are regulation’s book of contract, the lending auction, huurkoop (sale and purchase), and other commisie How much does it cost to write a letter of agreement? Or tuay Sir give description of other books like diatas.dan kemungkinyajuga
After making the ACC (approved ) i will send postwesel (postal money order) OI am waiting Other news of my master and I send thank you very much .
Yen Yi Shiu (S.Y.Yen)
setelah menerima surat ini ,harap tuan memberi kabar(informasi() barang kali masih ada tersedia buku-bukuperaturan contract,hutang-piutang lelang, huurkoop(jual beli), commisie dan lain-lain.peraturan menulis surat perjanjian Berapakah harganya? Atau tuab berikan keterangan buku-buku lain seperti diatas.dan kemungkinyajuga
Stelah ACC(disetujui( akan saya kirimkan postwesel(postal money order )Lain Tiadam kabar tuan saya tunggu dan banyak terima kasih saya haturkan.
Yen shiu Yi(S.Y.Yen)
In the front of the postcard handwritten Note:
1,. If I am not mistaken the price is approximately 3 guldem and the other two guilders,
2,DDO (reply) 9-12-1941
(two days after Pearl Harbor attack)
Bussiness correspondence books 2. guilders
to the publisher 2.25 guilders
True price of 4.25 guilders
Understanding book 2.15 guilders
1,.Kalau saya tidak keliru harganya lebih kurang 3 guldem dan lainya 2 gulden,
Ddo(dibalas) 9-12-041(dua hari setelah serngan Pearl Harbor)
Buku korespondensi Dagang 2 gulden
Dengan penerbit 2,25 gulden
Harga sejati 4,25 gulden
Buku pengertia 2,15 guldem
Surabaya City in 1941
Soerabaja (Surabaya) Stadswacht in 1941
The surabaya city wtch in 1941
On the opposite bank of the river lies Chinatown and the Red Bridge, where that forever industrious race live in a confusion of narrow lanes and alleys. Two-storeyed shophouses vividly splashed with crisscross symbols, the wail of Chinese music from an open fronted cafe where, in passing by, a glimpse is seen of deftly manipulated chopsticks picking food from hand-cupped rice bowls. In the air a mixture of typical smells of the Orient: gums and spice, with an occasional whiff of gutter stink and incense. The klaxon hooting and ringing of bicycle bells, the noise of the always congested traffic on the street, until dusk falls and the office front door is slammed shut.
Tulung Agung City in 1941
Read more about surabayas(Semethini)
Photo Source: flickr.com
The river they call Brantas. Winding its way through Surabaya, the merry town of the Thirties, in the Netherlands East Indies.
Entering the town in the suburb of Darmo, it flows for a while by a rolling green vista of well-kept gardens and lawns sweeping down from the terraces of residences where the prominent live. Dignity and firm security displayed in robust granite ballustrade and stained-glass doors and windows at the front.
The boulevards and avenues respectably quiet and undisturbed. A stillness accentuated by the rustle of the wind in tall casuarina trees along the riverbank, and the distant jangle of the tram. A mile further down, the Brantas enters the Gubeng district, passing by fenced-in backyards of dwellings of lesser status, the boarding houses and private hotels. A street vendor calls monotonously. The clip-clop of the horse of a hire-surrey is momentarily drowned in the low-humming swoosh of a motor car.
With measured intervals a gong is struck before a cottage near the corner, announcing the forthcoming public auction of the departing householder’s furniture and other possessions.
At the upper-town railway station, a hissing of spurting steam, a mournful hoot and clanging engine. On the sharply curving street leading to the Gubeng bridge, tyres screech beside tram wheels grinding in their rail grooves.
Under the bridge oddly shaped clusters of garbage and flotsam riding the quietly moving water halt, revolving slowly. Then, still turning lazily, they resume their trip, passing close to the reed banks of the park with its lotus pond and canna beds, and the silvery, glinting gossamer of water sprinklers. Magpies scamper on the sun-dappled grass under the sycamores.
Photo Source: Moesson
Photo Source: Surabaya Memory/Petra Christian University
Further down, the river flows by lofty palm fringed driveways to stately offices of authority and government – frowning, rigid and aloof in marble and colonnade. The Dutch tricolour flies proudly from the mast. Further down again, the river, sluggish and muddy now, passes by the agitated hustle and bustle of William’s Quay in downtown Surabaya. Domain of merchants, brokers and bankers, money-making amidst clattering typewriters, ringing telephones and buzzing ceiling fans. At the door the name of the company is richly embossed on copper plate, leaving an impression of infallibility and trustworthiness.
Photo Source: Surabaya Memory/Petra Christian University
Photo Source: Surabaya Tempo Dulu
On the opposite bank of the river lies Chinatown and the Red Bridge, where that forever industrious race live in a confusion of narrow lanes and alleys. Two-storeyed shophouses vividly splashed with crisscross symbols, the wail of Chinese music from an open fronted cafe where, in passing by, a glimpse is seen of deftly manipulated chopsticks picking food from hand-cupped rice bowls. In the air a mixture of typical smells of the Orient: gums and spice, with an occasional whiff of gutter stink and incense. The klaxon hooting and ringing of bicycle bells, the noise of the always congested traffic on the street, until dusk falls and the office front door is slammed shut.
Finally the river reaches its estuary with the bobbing masts of gaily adorned native sailing craft from Madura and Makassar, the river water casting dancing reflections of light on the slender prows, moored in clusters along the ancient quay and its mossy dents, notches and century-old, corrosion-bated mooring rings.
Nimble-footed coolies walk rhythmically on narrow, swaying gangplanks, heavy baskets with dried fish and copra on neck and shoulders, the corded ridges of their deep brown backs dripping with sweat. A flock of sparrows peck madly at rice grains spilled on the quay. On a small, barnacle-rimmed jetty a native woman squats, beating her wash on a flat stone. Her shoulders, back and bottom, in the faded sarong hitched under the armpits, flow out in the contours of a guitar. Flitting black streaks of swallows skim the river that now finally, languidly delivers its water into the sea in gradually deepening colours of blue and green. Out in the Roads of Surabaya, on the slowly rising and falling swell, white-dotted with seagulls, a towering ocean liner growls, drowning out the clang of busily spinning winches and long-necked cranes on the wharves. Below the storm warning mast on the harbour master’s office roof, a tugboat hoots an answer, her screws eagerly churning the brackish water. The dockyards and quay of Surabaya where shirt-drenching heat shimmers as a glistening pool on the tacky-hot bitumen. Where ships come from all over the world, each containing an atmosphere typical of her home port.
Photo Source: malang.endonesa.net
Visible and invisible little things in master and crew that make up the Briton, Norwegian, Dutchman and Greek. The world of big shipping. After work, one may be invited to come on board again for a quiet beer while listening to tales of Liverpool, Piraeus, Oslo and Vancouver.
Day is done, darkness has fallen, the worst of the heat gone. Pastel-coloured lampshades shine gently through a filigree of potted plants and shrubs. In the warm, scented evening we read and talk out in front on the open porch. A thin spiral of grey smoke eddies up from a coil of mosquito repellent burning on a saucer on the floor. A wide-eyed brown kitten stalks, with great display of fuss, an imaginary prey between the magnolias. Back in the house the clock ding-dongs through soft radio music. The light circle of the porch lamp does not quite reach the dark hibiscus hedge at the front gate, where a lone cricket chirps incessantly. It is Saturday evening, after dinner time. All the news is read, all events of the day discussed, bemoaned or laughed about.
Photo Source: Zoo Leven Wij in Indie
A drive is then suggested and agreed upon. Soon we have joined the long line of motor cars out on the road for a little cruise to the entertainment district of Surabaya and on to the harbour for an hour of cool, refreshing sea breeze. The hood of the car is let down to make the most of the cool evening air. The motor sings, the wheels fly with a soft burr. Tall arc lights are caught in a dull shine moving along the gleaming body of our car. Everyone is in a lighthearted mood of Saturday evening, the whole night in front and all the free Sunday after that. When we enter Palm Lane we spot a burst of red neon on the left side. That’s the “Tabarin” bar and dancing establishment, closed now, its opening time of ten o’clock catering to the after-theatre and supper folk. Opposite is the “Shanghai” restaurant, adorned with strings of pastel-coloured Chinese lamps on the open terrace. Munching and drinking people served by wooden-faced Indonesian waiters deftly balancing trays laden with delicacies. At the front of the restaurant a few native boys carrying boxes with cigarettes loiter about. They will be there the whole night. On the corner of Palm Lane and Simpang Road, the Maxim Cinema blazes in floodlights, flanked by a file of Fiat Balilla taxis waiting for the end of the first session. The traffic signal switches to red, halting our car with a silent throb of its motor. We are facing the whitewashed facade and marble floors of the Simpang Club, select and suave, its members restricted to a better salaried class of people. Cozy little lampshades glow on small wicker tables on patios in front, where gentlemen with their lady companions are seated, sipping an aperitif or after-dinner coffee and liqueur. Blue cigar smoke and, now and then, a quiet sparkle of jewelry. Tyres crunch on the gravelled drive to the carpeted club entrance. The solid snap of an expensive automobile’s door. New guests have arrived.
The signal flashes to green. Our route goes by the park. In the distance strings of orange lights adorn the bandstand from which come muffled snatches of drums and clashing cymbals. We drive through the Tunjungan now with its numerous bars, hotels and theatres. The brilliant shop windows of the newly opened Japanese department store Tjijoda, and the more soberly illuminated facade of Whiteway Laidlaw. High above in the night air, the jumble of multi-coloured neon advertising, motionless or in running flashes. Further down the road, Town Hall Gardens with trees full of red, white and blue lights. Something must be on again there in Town Hall Gardens, where the small-income man finds diversion in word, music and dance. Perhaps a jubilee or congress of sorts, doubtlessly celebrated with endless speeches and a boring play. Then, to top it off, a ball with the inevitable Hawaiian band with its guitars twanging sweet melodies of moonlight and dreams come true in Waikiki and Honolulu. Girls, some in rather garish coloured dress, will try to follow the astonishingly complicated dance maneuvers of their escorts in suits of every taste and shade.
Entering downtown, the night seems here deeper and still, with myriads of tiny moths circling the globes of tall lamp posts on William’s Quay and Red Bridge, strangely quiet and deserted at this hour. An oil wick flutters in the small cabin of a native barge on the dark river. Glowing pinpoints light up and darken again in the porticoes and doorways of the locked up business houses along the quay, where Madurese wharf labourers are smoking their favourite cheroots of clove-saturated tobacco rolled in maize leaf. Proud and independent, spending the night outdoors on a bed of jute bags, anywhere they may fancy, rather than having to return dutifully to the one and same address.
Finally we reach the Heads and the car is brought to a halt. At the mouth of the Brantas the last ferry boat from Madura eases along her berth with a deep throb of her engines, her green and red lights shining through billows of swirling steam. High above, invisible in the darkness, a night bird cries for its mate. Far out in the Roads a yellow beacon winks slowly with measured intervals across a sea which lies there serene and peaceful. The Western Fairway, between two citadels armed to the teeth, Fort Menari and Fort Piring, their big guns rendering suicidal any attempt to enter the harbour by an aggressor, whoever it may be.
Another car pulls up near where we are. For a while we hear the intonation of its passengers filter through the mild sea breeze. They laugh a little, then fall silent. So pleasingly quiet it is here.
This town, this beloved Surabaya, twinkling its lights, breathing under the stars.  
On the porch, back home, the mosquito repellent has collapsed into a brittle whitish coil of ash. The air is chilly. Inside now, perhaps to a game of cards or to bed. Tomorrow is another day.
Photo Source: Frank Samethini Collection
Another day breaks through in Surabaya, where generations of carefully planned colonisation have left a stamp of prosperity, peace and unshakable security. This town with its unforgettable memories of leaving school, first job, first pay envelope. That terrific feeling of young manhood, when life seems at its best, exciting, promising. The homecoming on Saturdays from work, with all that long, free weekend waiting; the girls, the big soccer match. The ups taken for granted, the downs shrugged off, in the Golden Indies of pre-war time.
Visible through the open porthole in the cabin, the Madura Straits in late afternoon. Wind blowing hard on a taut sail, flash of sunlight exploding soundlessly off a speedboat’s windscreen, the spray from her bow flaring out in a glittering transparent fan. The workday over, it is good to rest a while before going home. Even the buzz from the only surviving fly in the captain’s cabin, deftly darting away from his angry, slapping hand, seems to belong, to fit in the drowsy atmosphere of satisfaction. Conversation, in the beginning rather agitated, has settled to a bored monotone. The Old Man has been upset about a character called Hitler, who has been much in the news lately. The chap appears to be up to some mischief in Germany.
So what? That’s thousands of miles away, too far to bother about. It’s nice and cool here, and that’s a good drop of beer. The captain says that the people in Germany are drawing a blueprint for another big war. But lots of people say that is not so. Was not the Great War fought to end all wars? It’ll blow over in time, you’ll see. All one should be concerned about is having a good time. Why not? You’re young only once, so make the most of it. In another half-hour or so, home for a shower, dinner and later that redhead. Should be an interesting evening with that figure and temperament. And in two more weeks, holidays coming up. That little bungalow in the hills, walks through the coffee plantation, Mum pottering in the vegetable garden, a dip in the mountain stream at the back, great fun. How am I to know about what is to come? The terrible blow, the kick sending me reeling down the hill, rolling and tumbling over and over, until I finally hit the bottom and cannot sink lower any more.
 The Dutch names of the Surabaya landmarks and geography Frank mentions are:
William’s Quay = Willemskade
Red Bridge = Rode Brug (today called Jembatan Merah)
Palm Lane = Palmenlaan (today called Jalan Panglima Sudirman)
The Western Fairway = Het Westerwater
Photo Source: Surabaya Tempo Dulu
 Whiteway Laidlaw (Whiteway, Laidlaw & Co., Ltd.) was a Scottish firm that operated a chain of department stores throughout the Far East. This photo shows the Surabaya store as it appeared in the 1930s
The postally used Sencored sealed cover send from Indonesia Batavia may,31th.1941 30 to Japan(Kobe) before Dutch declared the war to dai nippon
Dai Nippon soldier in Vietnam
in May 1941
the rest of 2/15th Punjab was sent there to provide a garrison. This lone battalion consisted of approximately 1,050 soldiers under the command of Major C.M. Lane. For the defence of Sarawak region, it was deployed as follows:
At Miri was deployed a force of 2 officers, and 98 other ranks:
• 1 Infantry Company from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
• 6″ Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery Battery
• 1 Platoon of Royal Engineers
These troops were entrusted with the destruction of Miri Oil Fields. It was to be known as the Miri Detachment.
At Kuching was deployed a force of
1 officer, and 52 other ranks:
• 6 Platoons of infantry from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
These troops were to conduct a delaying action at the Bukit Stabar Airfield outside of Kuching.
They were to be known as the Kuching Detachment. The other troops from the 2/15 Punjab were to be deployed piecemeal at the other airfield and oil facilities in Sarawak.
In addition, the Brooke Government mobilized
the Sarawak Rangers.
This force consisted of 1,515 troops who were primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen trained in the art of jungle warfare led by the European Civil Servants of the Brooke Regime.
British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane
who commanded the battalion was placed in charge of all forces in Sarawak, which included the native Volunteer Corps, Coastal Marine Service, the armed police and a body of native troops known as the Sarawak Rangers. Collectively, this force of 2,565 troops was known as “SARFOR” (Sarawak Force)
1941 Air Mail cover HONG KONG to USA with d/r. VICTORIA p/m. and boxed NOT OPENED / BY / CENSOR h/s. Also boxed ’45’ censor h/s. to rear. Flap torn
1941 Air Mail cover from MALAYA to India [50 cent RATE] with d/r. PENANG p/m. and tri. PASSED FOR TRANSMISSION 26 h/s. Also 180C OPENED BY CENSOR label tied by tri. C 18 h/s. Opening edge fault.
1941 Air Mail cover from INDIA to GB and redirected to ‘c/o Colonel I McConville, c/o GPO, 7 Command Signal, Bletchingley’ with tied OBC label
1941 cover from MALAYA to Australia with d/r. KUALA LUMPAR p/m. and tri. PASSED FOR TRANSMISSION 107 h/s.
In August 1941
a partial denial scheme, which reduced the output of oil by seventy per cent, was put into effect. It was also decided that no attempt should be made to defend British North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan, and
the Governor of North Borneo, Mr. Robert Smith,
was informed that the Volunteers and police were to be used solely for the maintenance of internal security. It was however decided to defend Kuching because of its airfield, and because its occupation by the enemy would give access to the important Dutch airfield at Singkawang II, sixty miles to the southwest and only some 350 miles from Singapore.
Order of Battle for British forces
2nd Battalion of 15th Punjab Regiment
heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery
detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers)
Coastal Marine Service
plus other native troops
The country between Kuching and the sea is roadless, but is intersected by a number of winding waterways which flow through mangrove swamps to the sea. There are two main approaches to the town: the first by the Sarawak River, which is navigable by vessels up to sixteen foot draught; and the second by the Santubong River, which will take vessels up to twelve foot draught.
The roads from Kuching run east to
Pending, north-west to
Matang, and south to
Serian a distance of forty miles from Kuching.
The airfield lay seven miles south of the town on the Serian road.
At the airfield a road branched off to the west; after crossing
the Sarawak River at Batu Kitang,
where there was a vehicular ferry, it terminated
fifteen miles short of the Dutch frontier.
There were two plans of defence that were proposed- Plan A and Plan B.
Plan A called for a mobile defence.
The objective was to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield as long as possible. Further delaying actions were also to be conducted so as to allow for the proper execution of the denial schemes.
If enemy resistance was such that it could not be delayed, then the airfield would be destroyed and the entire force would retreat into the mountains and jungles in small parties and fight as a guerrilla force for as long as possible.
Unfortunately, atthe Anglo-Dutch Military Conference
during September 1941 held in Kuching,
it was pointed out that Plan A could not be carried out if the Japanese landed 3,000 to 5,000 men with air and sea support. J.L. Noakes, the defeatist Sarawak Secretary for Defence, had continued to argue the inadequacy of SARFOR and that it had no hope against the Japanese if they landed in force.
His idea was to take a ‘wait and see’ attitude and continue to appeal to Singapore for more troops and equipment.
In the event that this was not forthcoming, Sarawak should surrender so as to prevent any bloodshed. Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, was completely against this defeatist talk and vehemently argued that Sarawak should put up a fight, a fight to maintain the honor of the Brooke Raj. At the end it was decided that the town could not be defended against the weight of attack which was to be expected, and the plan was reluctantly changed to one of static defence of the airfield.
Rolf Blomberg Gallery
Rolf Blomberg was an ethnographic photographer whose priority was the pacific coexistence and mutual understanding with other human beings. Therefore, his photography lacks tension or aggression; instead, it shows ease and confidence
Bali in October 1941
1941 cover endorsed ‘Red Cross Postal Message Scheme’ from CEYLON to Switzerland with boxed PASSED CENSOR 7 COLOMBO h/s. and s/l. COUPON-REPONSE h/s. Also d/r. CEYLON BRANCH / BRCS cachet
1941 cover MALAYA to Australia with s/r. AUST FIELD PO No. 18 p/m. and tri. PASSED BY CENSOR No. 2991. From ‘Pte AR Hutton, E Coy, 2/20 Bn, AIF, Malaya’. Creased.
1941 (13 Nov) Air Mail cover from GB to Perak, Federated Malay States with boxed NO SERVICE / RETURN TO SENDER h/s. and d/r. LONDON receipt p/m. (9 July 42) Japanese campain launched in Dec. 1941 with fall of Singapore early Feb. 1942. Faults.
During late November 1941,
Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, GOC Malaya Command, took a 2-day tour of Sarawak to assess the adequacy of its defence preparations. He summarized the situation as follows: “Nobody could pretend that this was a satisfactory situation, but at least it would make the enemy deploy a larger force to capture Sarawak than would have been necessary if it had not been defended at all and that, I think, is the true way to look at it…the best I could do was to promise to send them a few anti-aircraft guns and too tell them of the arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were due at Singapore in a few days…not that I expected anit-aircraft guns to be of much practical value. But I felt that the moral effect of their presence there would more than counterbalance some slight dispersion of force”.
As a result of Percival’s assessment of Sarawak’s defences, an alternative plan of action was proposed, Plan B. This was based on static defence. All available troops and supplies were to be concentrated within a 5.5 kilometer perimeter of the Bukit Stabar Airfield to ensure that its destruction was not interfered with. The rationale for Plan B was presented by Brooke-Popham as follows: “The only place which it was decided to hold was Kuching, the reason for this being not only that there was a modern airfield at this location, but that its occupation by the enemy might give access to the Dutch airfields in Borneo, furthermore, it would also give the enemy access to Singapore. Being only some 350 miles from said place”.
Further orders were issued by Vyner Brooke that all the Civil Servants not assigned to the Sarawak Rangers were to remain at their posts. No thought must be given to the abandonment of the native population by any European officer of the Brooke Raj.
The Brooke Government which had already heard of
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
(December 1941 – March 1942)
7 December, 1941.
Hundreds of Japanese airplanes attack in the early morning hours, without provocation or warning, the assembled fleet of the United States of America in Pearl Harbour Hawaii.
The bulk of the naval power of a country not at war with Japan is sunk or crippled. The infamy of Pearl Harbour. The dreaded words are broadcast by radio to all of the Dutch East Indies. We are now also at war with Japan. 
(- Frank Samethini, The Sky Looked Down)
The storm had broken at last. With the news of war arrived the order for general mobilization.
Read More at another E-book In CD_ROM
“The Dai Nippon War In Pearl harbor “
The sample of info
FLYING FORTRESSES, Boeing B-I7C heavy bombers, burning at Hickam Field, Oahu,
on 7 December 1941. At 0730
on 7 December the first waves of Japanese aircraft struck the U.S. defenses. Although a few U.S. fighter planes managed to get into the air and destroyed some of the Japanese planes, the attack wrought severe damage. After neutralizing the airfields the Japanese struck at the U.S. Navy warships in the harbor.
WRECKAGE AT THE NAVAL AIR STATION at Pearl Harbor, after the enemy attack, 7 December.
THE DESTROYER USS SHAW EXPLODING during the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December. The first attack on the U.S. warships anchored in the harbor was delivered at 0758. By 0945 all the Japanese aircraft had left Oahu and returned to their carriers. The U.S. Pacific Fleet suffered a major disaster during the attack which lasted one hour and fifty minutes. Sunk or damaged during the attack were the destroyers Shaw, Cassin, and Dowries; the mine layer Oglala; the target ship Utah; and a large floating drydock. Also hit were the light cruisers Helena, Honolulu, and Raleigh; the seaplane tender Curtis; and the repair ship Vestal.
U.S. BATTLESHIPS HIT AT PEARL HARBOR. Left to right: West Virginia, Tennessee, and Arizona.
THE WEST VIRGINIA aflame.
DAMAGED WARSHIPS. The U.S. destroyers Dowries, left, and Cassin, right, and the battleship Pennsylvania, in background, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Of the eight battleships hit, the Arizona was a total loss; the Oklahoma was never repaired; the California, Nevada, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Tennessee were repaired and returned to service. The slight depth of Pearl Harbor made possible the raising and refitting of these ships.
DESTROYED CURTIS P-40 FIGHTER PLANE at Bellows Field. Of the Army’s 123 first-line planes in Hawaii, 63 survived the attack; of the Navy’s 148 serviceable combat aircraft, 36 remained. Only one small airfield on the north shore near Haleiwa was overlooked during the raid.
WRECKED PLANES AT WHEELER FIELD after the 7 December attack.
JAPANESE MIDGET SUBMARINE which ran aground on the beach outside Pearl Harbor, 7 December. Early on the morning of 7 December at least one Japanese submarine was reconnoitering inside Pearl Harbor, having slipped past the antisubmarine net. After making a complete circuit of Ford Island the submarine left the harbor and later ran aground on the beach where it was captured intact.
DESTROYED HANGAR AT HICKAM FIELD, 7 December. During the attack the Army lost 226 killed and 396 wounded; the Navy, including the Marine Corps, lost 3,077 killed and 876 wounded. The Japanese attack was entirely successful in accomplishing its mission, and the U.S. forces were completely surprised both strategically and tactically.
SOLDIERS LEAVING PIER to board trucks for Schofield Barracks, Honolulu. As a result of the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian command was reorganized. There was little enemy activity in the Central Pacific after the 7 December attack. The Japanese had seized Wake and Guam and were concentrating on their southern campaigns. As the build-up of men and equipment progressed, reinforcements began to pour into Hawaii for training and shipment to Pacific stations.
CONSTRUCTION WORK AT WHEELER FIELD, 11 December 1941. After the Japanese raid many destroyed or damaged buildings were rebuilt.
ARMY TROOPS IN LCP(L)’S, during an amphibious training exercise leave Oahu for a beach landing. After the entry of the United States into World War II training was intensified, and specialized training in amphibious landings was given the troops arriving in the Hawaiian Islands since most of the islands to be Taken later would have To be assaulted over open beaches In February 1943 the Amphibious Training Area, Waianae, Oahu, was activated for framing units in amphibious landings LCP(L)-S had no bow ramp for disembarking troops.
DEPLOYING FOR ADVANCE INLAND after landing on the beach. During the war more than 250,000 men were given instruction in amphibious assault operations.
(Setyawati Soelaiman,the private notes during Dai nippon Occupation)
Happy circumstances changed quickly,
after Jepanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.
Three days earlier Faculty of Letters, Dies natalist still partying in the streets of a building Kramat.
We sing, dance and food of Indonesia.
While it has entered a new student who is very artistic, too.
Morning, Bernet Kempert along with his wife and also dating several other professors. Apparently Professor Bernet Kempert diligent student visiting parties.
Now occur the war and Japan will surely continue the business in Pacific perperangan Dutch government therefore be prepared for it later when the Japanese army attacked aka tone of resistance both on the beach around the headland Priok UTRA strengthened, Civilian population forming voluntary troops,
Stadwacht (city guard) and to protect the population Sipil.Kemudian Landwacht Luchteweerf and the lady there fussing with Covis and learn first aid.
The Professor was not immune from the resistance Sikarela and began giving lectures in various Kempert Bernet seragam.Prof clothes as well.
Already several times Kemajoran Airport was bombed,
Mini library books dipindahkanke main warehouse is further strengthened by a thick wall of concrete. We all helped to bring the books.
By the time we stopped the bombing of college and had to take shelter under the stairs room F until there are signs the situation was critical clear.Meskipun all our college students remains except a few people who have been displaced interior
We still ride a bike to Gambier and chatted at cantin if no studi .Although at a time, when Prof. Sorel Bernet Kempert showed pictures of Pompei and Herculeneus no sign of another bombing.
We should be going into F, the professor was saying when it showed a tengkurup: “This pose is good to die …”.
Later he shook tanggan with each student and the student to ask himself /
We moved very sad at having to part from our professor who, though only known since December 1940 has been very close to us.
With no air or sea forces stationed in or around Sarawak, the British government encouraged the Brooke Regime to adopt a “scorched earth policy” in the event of a Japanese attack.
Keadaan yang berbahagia cepat berobah, setelah Jepang mnyerang Pearl harbor tanggal 7 desember 1941. Tiga hari sebelumnya Fakultas Sastra masih berpesta Dies natalis dalam sebuah gedung dijalan kramat. Kami menyanyi ,menari dan menyediakan makanan Indonesia .
Sementara itu sudah masuk beberapa mahasiswa baru yang sangat artistic juga.
Pagi,Bernet Kempert beserta isteri dating juga dan beberapa professor lain . Rupanya Prof bernet Kempert rajin mengunjungi pesta-pesta mahasiswa.
Sekrang terjadi perperangabn dan Jepang pasti akan meneruskan usaha perperangan di Pasifik karena itu pemerintah Hindia Belanda bersiap-siap untuk nanti bila Balatentara Jepang menyerang aka nada perlawanan baik di pantai utra sekitar tanjung Priok diperkuat, penduduk Sipil membentuk Pasukan sukarela,
Stadwacht(penjaga Kota) dan Landwacht untuk melindungi penduduk Sipil.Kemudian ada Luchteweerf dan para Nyonya menyibukkan diri dengan Covis dan belajar pertolongan pertama.
Para Professor juga tidak luput dari usaha perlawanan Sikarela itu dan mulai memberikan kuliah dalam pakaian seragam.Prof Bernet Kempert beragam juga.
Sudah beberapa kali Bandar Udara Kemajoran dibom,
Buku-buku perpustakaan Mini dipindahkanke gudang Utama yang lebih diperkuat dengan dinding tebal dari beton .Kami semua membantu membawa buku-buku itu.
Pada saat pemboman kami berhenti kuliah dan harus berlindung dibawah tangga ruangan F sampai ada tanda all clear.Meskipun keadaan sudah gawat kami mahasiswa tetap kuliah kecuali beberapa orang yang telah mengungsi kepedalaman.
Kami masih tetap naik sepeda ke Gambir dan mengobrol dikantin kalau tidak ada kuliah.Namum pada suatu saat ,ketika Prof Bernet Kempert memperlihatkan gambar sorel tentang Pompei dan Herculeneus ada tanda pengeboman lagi.
Kami harus segera pergi keruang F ,professor masih mengatakan ketika memperlihatkan seorang yang tengkurup:” Ini pose yang baik untuk meninggal…”.
Kemudia ia berjabat tanggan dengan masing-masing mahasiswa dan mahasiswi untuk minta diri /
Kami sedih amat terharu karena harus berpisah dari professor kami yang meskipun baru kenal sejak Desember 1940 sudah amat dekat dengan kami.
Capt J.F. Read,
moved to the Northern Territory, and embarked for Timor
on 7 December 1941
‘with much enthusiasm’
after three and a half months of fatigue duties and training at Darwin
Officers of the 2/21st Battalion take a break in Darwin before embarking
In view of the precariousness of the defensive positions Read was obliged to effect a supply plan based on a series of dumps,
the establishment of which occupied the detachment until the invasion.
Duty at Ambon
As part of the military agreement made by the governments of Australia and the NEI in 1941, AIF troops were sent to help garrison the island of Ambon, which lies just south of the larger island of Ceram. Ambon was an important air and sea link between Australia, New Guinea, and the northern NEI.
The airfield at Laha, and the harbours of Ambon and Binnen Bays, were considered to be of vital significance to the Allies.
Accordingly, an Australian battalion (the 2/21st), with supporting units and a detachment of Lockheed Hudson bombers from No. 13 Squadron, RAAF, was landed at Ambon in mid-December 1941.
This combined unit, known as “Gull Force”, reinforced the existing local garrison of 2,600 men, and was placed under the overall command of Dutch Lieutenant Colonel J.R.L. Kapitz
Australian Military Forces “Passed By Censor”postal used cover
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THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE
Four Japanese surface forces participated in SHO-GO, including every type of ship in their inventory.
Three Japanese surface battleship-cruiser-destroyer forces would drive the Americans from
the Leyte beachhead.
The fourth force, consisting of aircraft carriers and two old hybrid carrier-battleships, would be used as a decoy to draw
Third Fleet northward,
away from Leyte.
During this stage of the war, due to fuel shortages, the majority of these warships were stationed at two widely dispersed locations. Located in the Japanese homeland at
Kure Naval Base in the Inland Sea
were the Mobile Fleet’s remaining aircraft carriers. Far to the south at
Lingga island Roads,
near Singapore, were the major surface combatants.
Four Japanese surface forces participated in SHO-GO, including every type of ship in their inventory. Three surface battleship-cruiser-destroyer forces would drive the Americans from the Leyte beachhead.
The fourth force, consisting of aircraft carriers and two old hybrid carrier-battleships, would be used as a decoy to draw ADM Halsey’s Third Fleet northward, away from Leyte.
During this stage of the war, due to fuel shortages, the majority of these warships were stationed at two widely dispersed locations. Located in the Japanese homeland at Kure Naval Base in the Inland Sea were the Mobile Fleet’s remaining aircraft carriers. Far to the south at Lingga Roads, near Singapore, were the major surface combatants.
The Northern Force was led by VADM Jisaburō Ozawa. He was considered the most talented Japanese Naval Officer remaining in the fleet. Originally, he was scheduled to attack from the north with Japan’s remaining carrier forces. After the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” in June 1944, the Mobil Fleet’s total carrier aircraft strength was depleted to just over one hundred aircraft. Thus Japan had large fleet carriers remaining in her fleet, she just didn’t have the aircraft or trained pilots to man them. It was then decided the force VADM Ozawa would take to Leyte would be used as a decoy to draw the American Third Fleet north. The decoy force consisted of:
See: I.J.N. Warship Pronunciation (opens in new window)
Carrier Division THREE’s (VADM Ozawa) 29,000 ton large carrier and flagship ZUIKAKU (RADM T. Kaizuka). She was a veteran of the Pearl Harbor attack and nearly every other major Japanese campaign including the Battle of the Philippine Sea, where she was damaged.
To make his decoy force a more tempting target, three light carriers, ZUIHŌ (CAPT K. Sigiura), CHITOSE (CAPT Y. Kishi), and CHIYODA (CAPT E. Zyo) were included:
ZUIHŌ, 14,000 tons, was a veteran of the original Philippine invasion. She also served at Midway, the Aleutians, Santa Cruz (where she was damaged), and the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf her anti-aircraft armament was increased to sixty-eight 25mm guns.
Two 13,600 ton sister carriers completed the bait. CHITOSE and CHIYODA, originally completed as seaplane carriers, were refitted as light carriers in 1943 and 1944 respectively. Both served in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and were capable of operating 30 aircraft apiece.
The big guns of the Northern Force were laid in the hands of two hybrid battleship-carriers in Carrier Division FOUR (RADM Chiaki Matsuda):
Originally built in 1915-1818, ISE (RADM N. Nakase) and HYŪGA (RADM T. Nomura) were later modified twice. After their defeat at Midway which cumulated in the loss of four fleet carriers, the Japanese had removed the after turrets on ISE and HYŪGA and replaced them with make-shift flight decks. This, their last major modification, reduced their main armament from twelve to eight 14-inch, 45 caliber guns. This drastic alteration never realized its full intended potential as the seaplanes they were intended to carry were never made available. Now, going to sea planeless, this wastefulness seemed more apparent than ever. Of special note was the installation of one hundred-eighty 5-inch rocket launchers placed in six thirty-rocket boxes placed near their stern.
U.S. Archives Photograph
Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, IJN
Escorting the carriers and battleships were
the light cruisers ŌYODO,
All three ships were capable of speeds up to 36 knots.
Completed at Kure Dock Yard on April 28, 1943, ŌYODO was the largest and most capable of the three. She displaced nearly 11,500 tons fully loaded and carried an impressive main armament of six 6-inch, 60 caliber guns.
ISUZU was half ŌYODO’s size at 5,570 tons and was completed in 1923. After completing modification in 1933, she was finally rearmed as an anti-aircraft cruiser and flagship for anti-submarine groups in 1944.
The eldest of the lot was TAMA. Completed in 1921, by July 1944 she was armed with five 5-inch, 50 caliber guns, two 5-inch AA guns, forty-four 45mm AA guns, and six 13mm machine guns.
The screening ships of the Northern Force consisted of
six AKIZUJI Class 3,700 ton destroyers.
were all built from 1940 onward. They were highly impressive ships boasting eight 3.9-inch, 65 caliber DP guns, four 25mm AA guns, 72 depth charges, and four 24-inch torpedo tubes. Originally planned as AA cruisers they were completed as destroyers with torpedo armament.
Four Japanese lighter warships of
the MATSU Class completed the decoy force.
KUWA, MAKI, KIRI, and SUGI were all completed within one month of each other in July-August 1944. Built as destroyer escorts they were equipped with Type 31 radar, three 5-inch, 40 caliber AA guns, twenty-four 25mm AA guns, 36 depth charges, and four 24-inch torpedo tubes.
The Northern Force, an impressive array of Japan’s few remaining warships, would be the sacrificial lamb, laid on a plate for the Americans to consume. In order for SHO-GO to work, this force would have to draw ADM Halsey’s Third Fleet north, away from the Leyte invasion beach. The Japanese striking forces would then have a chance to rush in behind Third Fleet and disrupt the invasion. If VADM Ozawa’s force could achieve this goal his mission would be considered successful.
The strike on the American Leyte invasion force would come from the three remaining forces of the Japanese Combined Fleet.
The most powerful group, the formidable First Strike Force “A” and “B”, was comprised of thirty-two front-line warships. From their training location near Singapore these two groups would transit together to Leyte Gulf via
the Sibuyan Sea
and San Bernardino Strait.
This route was the long way around and would take a considerable amount of time and consume a large amount of precious fuel oil.
In addition, they would have to rely upon friendly air cover if their sortie was to be successful. Upon reaching the Philippine Sea, First Strike Force was to sweep down the east coast of Samar from the north and attack the invasion beach and shipping. Any American warships encountered along the way were to be destroyed.
National Archives Photograph
“Opponent at Samar”
Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, IJN
Commander First Strike Force “A” and “B”
Later designated as “Centre Force”
Commander of the Combined Fleet, placed his trust in seasoned warrior VADM Takeo Kurita to command First Strike Force. Under his experienced guidance, First Strike Force was to lead the Japanese Navy back on the road to victory. Late in the war, he was second in ability only to VADM Ozawa as a tactician. He had under his command five battleships in two divisions:
Battleship Division (BATDIV) One’s YAMATO and MUSASHI, 71,000 ton giants, with nine 18.1-inch, 45 caliber guns apiece, were the center pieces of First Strike Force. Recognized as the largest and most powerful battleships in the world, their 150,000 shaft-horse-power could propel them through the water at a speed of 27 knots.
Their division mate NAGATO, 43,581 tons, had eight 16-inch, 45 caliber guns, and a top speed of nearly 25 knots. Although she was over twenty years old, she was fully capable of causing mass destruction if let loose among the American transports in Leyte Gulf.
Slightly smaller were Battleship Division (BATDIV) Three’s 32,000 ton KONGŌ and HARUNA, each carrying eight 14-inch, 45 caliber guns. They were the most “Japanese” looking battleships in the fleet, sporting the oriental-style pagoda masts, from which the battle bridge and lookout posts were situated. Laid down in 1911 and 1912 respectively, they were both rebuilt twice and each carried an impressive secondary armament of fourteen 6-inch, 50 caliber guns, later reduced to eight. This reconstruction added an additional 4,000 tons to their overall weight. Both were capable of speeds approaching 30 knots.
Though the Americans held the advantage in the total number of ships during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese advantage was in their well-seasoned group of heavy cruisers. Cruiser Divisions (CRUDIV) Five and Seven, all veterans of the Pacific war, consisted of ten front-line warships. They constituted the fastest striking power of First Strike Force; each of these magnificent ships weighing in at 13,000 to nearly 15,000 tons. Coupled with their capable speeds well in excess of 30 knots, their main armament of eight to ten 203mm, 8-inch guns had destroyed many American warships through the Pacific war:
NACHI Class heavy cruisers MYŌKŌ and HAGURO displaced 14,980 tons, both being built between 1924 and 1929. Modernized from 1939 to 1941 they carried ten 8-inch, 50 caliber guns, eight, 127mm (5-inch), 40 caliber DP guns, AA guns, torpedoes, and 3 aircraft.
ATAGO Class heavy cruisers TAKAO, ATAGO, MAYA, and CHŌKAI were the backbone of the fleet. They were a modified MYOKO design, completed in 1932 and modernized in 1938/1939/1941. Originally displacing 12,986 tons, after modernization they weighed 15,781 tons fully loaded. Each ship carried ten 8-inch, 203mm, 50 caliber guns placed in five turrets in a three-forward low-high-low, two-aft, high-low configuration. This class was known for its impressive, almost battleship-like, large bridge structure.
The MOGAMI Class heavy cruisers SUZUYA and KUMANO were the last two ships built in their class, both completed on October 31, 1937. Weighing in at 13,887 tons they were capable of sustained cruising at 35 knots. Originally armed with only torpedo tubes, in 1939/1940 they were rearmed as heavy cruisers with ten 8-inch, 203mm, 50 caliber guns, significantly increasing their firepower.
TONE Class cruisers TONE and CHIKUMA were designed originally as MOGAMI Class light cruisers. Each had eight 8-inch, 203mm, 50 caliber guns in four turrets forward in a low, high, low, low configuration. Aft, they were able to accommodate five aircraft, as they were designated as float plane-carriers, intended to operate with carrier task forces, providing long-range air scouting.
Destroyer Squadron’s (DESRON) Two and Ten, each led by one light cruiser, boasted 15 capable destroyers, all armed with the dreaded long-lance torpedo.
AGANO Class light cruisers NOSHIRO and YAHAGI were both completed in 1943 and were armed with six 6-inch, 50 caliber guns. Secondary armament consisted of AA batteries, torpedo tubes, and two float planes.
Destroyer Squadron Ten’s five KAGERŌ Class destroyers URAKAZE, ISOKAZE, YUKIKAZE, HAMAKAZE, were all completed in 1940, except NOWAKI, completed in 1941. They displaced 2,490 tons and at the time of Leyte Gulf each carried four 5-inch, 50 caliber DP guns, fourteen 25mm AA guns, 36 depth charges, and four 13mm machine guns. Their most potent weapon were their eight 24-inch torpedo tubes.
Destroyer Squadron Two boasted nine destroyers of the YŪGUMO Class. These included NAGANAMI, FUJINAMI, KISHINAMI, OKINAMI, HAMANAMI, ASASHIMO, KIYOSHIMO, HAYASHIMO, and AKISHIMO. These were possibly the best destroyers remaining in the fleet and could maintain 35 knots. Their standard armament was two 5-inch, 50 caliber DP guns, two 5-inch, 40 caliber guns, twelve 25mm AA guns, eight 24-inch torpedo tubes, and 36 depth charges.
DESRON Two’s remaining destroyer was of the one-of-a-kind SHIMAKAZE, sole ship of her Class. She was armed to the teeth with six 5-inch, 50 caliber guns, twenty-eight 25mm AA guns, four 13mm machine guns, eighteen depth charges, and fifteen 24-inch torpedo tubes.
Aiding VADM Kurita was Strike Force “C,” commanded by VADM Shoji Nishimura. His force was directed to attack the American invasion fleet from the south of Leyte via Surigao Strait. With First Strike Force, they would meet up in Leyte Gulf, close the pincher, and shoot up the transport ships and shell the troops on the beachhead.
Vice Admiral Nishimura had at his disposal the old battleships’ YAMASHIRO and FUSŌ:
Both 40,000 ton battleships were completed during World War I. Designed as “super-dreadnoughts”, each mounted twelve 14-inch, 45 caliber guns in six turrets and fourteen 6-inch, 50 caliber guns in single turrets. In 1930/1935 both were given a pagoda-style mast, new machinery, and boilers enabling them to average about 25 knots.
The most capable ship in the Southern Force Van was the heavy cruiser MOGAMI. Lead ship in her class, she had to be rebuilt less than one year after her completion because of design flaws. Severely damaged at Midway, she was rebuilt as a seaplane-carrier cruiser with six 8-inch, 203mm, 50 caliber guns forward in a low, low, high configuration and a seaplane deck aft, able to accommodate eleven aircraft.
Four destroyers completed the Southern Force Van:
Three 2,370 ton ASASHIO Class ships MICHISHIO, YAMAGUMO, and ASAGUMO were completed in 1937/1938. Each carried six 5-inch, 50 caliber DP guns, and by 1944 each had eighteen to twenty-four 35mm AA guns, and four 13mm machine guns. In addition to their depth charges, they all carried eight 24-inch torpedo tubes.
SHIGURE was a SHIRATSUYU Class destroyer, the first destroyers armed with quadruple torpedo tubes. She displaced 1,980 tons and was armed with five 5-inch, 50 caliber guns, two 13mm AA guns, and 16 depth charges. She had the reputation as a “lucky” ship, being able to survive each battle she entered.
National Archives Photograph
Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, IJN
The last leg of the Japanese pincher that was also planned to storm into Leyte Gulf was a cruiser-destroyer force led by VADM Kiyohide Shima. This force was designated as the Second Striking Force by the Japanese GHQ.
The firepower of Second Striking Force came from its two 8-inch gun heavy cruisers:
NACHI and ASHIGARA. Both were modern, battle-tested ships displacing 14,980 tons each, fairly larger than their American counterparts. Built between 1924 and 1929 they were modernized from 1939 to 1941, maintaining their impressive armament of ten 8-inch, 50 caliber guns in five turrets. They also operated 610mm torpedo tubes and three aircraft.
Light cruiser ABUKUMA, was a Pearl Harbor veteran.
ABUKUMA, completed in 1925, was given a new bow in 1930 after a collision in Tokyo Bay. In 1943 her armament was altered to five 5-inch, 50 caliber DP guns, twenty-two 25mm AA guns, two 13mm machine guns, and twenty-four 24-inch torpedo tubes.
Four supporting destroyers completed the force.
Two, of the FUBUKI Class, AKEBONO and USHIO, were completed in 1931. After many modifications they were 2,427 ton ships with four 5-inch, 50 caliber DP guns, twenty-two 25mm AA guns, ten 13mm machine guns, and thirty-six depth charges.
KASUMI was completed in 1939. One of ten ships of the ASASHIO Class, three of her sister ships served in the Southern Force Van.
SHIRANU was a KAGERŌ Class destroyer. Five of her sister ships served in Destroyer Squadron Ten, under VADM Kurita’s First Strike Force.
These ships had sailed from the Inland Sea earlier in the month and, on October 21, were located in Coron Bay on Mindoro Island.
Vice Admiral Shima had not been included in the SHO-GO planning initially. Now, as a last-minute ploy, his forces were directed to “cooperate” with those of VADM Kurita’s. In addition, he was also directed to “cooperate” with VADM Nishimura’s Striking Force “C.” This poor, last minute planning by the Staff at General Headquarters in Tokyo only complicated matters. Not only did the plan suffer from poor organization, but a personal conflict also existed.
National Archive Photograph
Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, IJN
Vice Admiral Shima’s six months’ seniority
caused the latter much discontentment. The relationship between the two admirals was anything but cordial.
Vice Admiral Shima was a political power within the fleet and had thus worked his way up through the rank structure. In contrast, VADM Nishimura was a salty “sailor’s admiral,” gaining his flag rank through the command of sea-going ships and squadrons. As it turned out, due to their personal differences or stubborn pride, the coordination of their attack would be non-existent.
The General Headquarters staff’s decision to attack during daylight did not sit favorably with
and his senior officers. They had trained for months for a night engagement, a tactic the Japanese Navy had developed a great proficiency in. They knew they stood no chance of victory during a daylight engagement with the Americans with their overwhelming superiority in carrier aircraft.
So great was their distaste for a daylight engagement, VADM Kurita felt a few words of encouragement were needed; here are his words
Radio messages sent from Sasebo, Japan using outdated call signs tricked US Navy cryptanalysts into believing that carrier Akagi was still in home waters. Later on the same day, the cryptanalysts realized that all Japanese warships’ call signs had changed
On 7 December 1941
the planes from the Japanese navy bombed Pearl Harbor and with it started the war in the Pacific. The Japanese attack was a great succes, also because in the days after the attack the Japanese airforce destroyed half of the American bombers in the Philippines and sunk the British battleships at Singapore with torpedoes and bombs.
Indeed within a few weeks Japan conquered Malakka, Singapore, the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines.
The battle was only short because the allies – among them the Dutch – completely underestimated the power, the technical equipment and the tough perseverence of the Japanese military system. In the Netherlands Indies the gouvernment also hadn’t taken into account that the local population at first saw the Japanese as ‘liberators’ and would welcome them.
On 15 February the Dutch fleet was defeated in the Battle of the Java Sea and on 8 March 1942 the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) capitulated.
The Japanese policy concerning the Europeans
Because of the quick surrender of the allies tens of thousands of prisonors of war fell into Japanese hands. The Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated never to surrender themselves, but litteral fight till their death. Therefore the showed little respect to the allied prisoners and at first didn’t know what to do with these large numbers of prisoners of war either. Soon was decided to use these prisoners as forced labourers. It started with loading and unloading of ships, next the building of airfields (for instance in the Moluccas and on Flores) and of railroads (for instance the Birma-railway and the Pakan Baroe-railway), and eventually also the work in the mines and shipyards in Japan.
Bali girl October 1941
On December 8, 1941
Han Samethini was conscripted into
the KNIL 6th Infantry Battalion in Balikpapan in 1941
KNIL ID Card
This was the core unit of the town’s 1,100 man garrison
.Balikpapan BPM management
hurriedly arranged evacuation of the employees’ families to Java.
Embracing Anna and Margie one last time before they departed, Han could only hope they would be safe at his mother’s house in Surabaya.
Certainly there was no better place to send them. Java was the redoubt, the home territory, to be stoutly defended even if all the other islands fell to the enemy.
From across the Far East came reports of Japanese attacks, Japanese advances, Japanese victories.
Dutch East Indie Campaign Map
On 8 December 1941, Netherlands declared war on Japan. General Hisaichi Terauchi (also known as Count Terauchi)—who was the commander of the Southern Expeditionary Army Group—began the campaign with attacks against Borneo: on 17 December, Japanese forces successfully landed on Miri, an oil production centre in northern Sarawak, with support from a battleship and aircraft carrier along with three cruisers and four destroyers.
Initially, the Japanese forces launched air strikes on key areas and gained air superiority. Following the airstrikes, landings were made at several locations targeting airfields and other important points in the area. In addition to the landings at Miri, the Japanese forces made landings at Seria, Kuching, Jesselton and Sandakan between 15 December 1941 and 19 January 1942. After these main objectives in Borneo were completed, the Japanese forces planned a three-pronged assault southward using three forces named as Eastern Force, Center Force and Western Force. The aim of this assault was to capture the oil resources in the East Indies. The Eastern Force was to advance from Jolo and Davao, and move on to capture Celebes, Amboina and Timor while protecting the Center Force’s flank. The Center Force was to capture oil fields and airfields in Tarakan Island and Balikpapan. Both these forces would support the Western Force, which was to attack and capture the oil refineries and airfields in Palembang. The Japanese forces launched the assault on 11 January and landed at Tarakan.
The Japanese lines of advance in the Dutch East Indies, Sarawak and North Borneo(British), and Portuguese Timor.
To coordinate the fight against the Japanese, the American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces combined all available land and sea forces under the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM or ABDA) banner. This command was activated on 15 January 1942, with the overall commander being British Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell. The command structure had the American Army Air Force Lt. General George Brett as deputy commander, the British Lt. General Henry Royds Pownall as chief of staff; under this came the American Admiral Thomas C. Hart as naval commander, the Dutch Lt. General Hein ter Poorten as ground forces commander, and the British Air Chief marshal Sir Richard E.C. Peirse as the air commander. Although the forces were combined, they had differing priorities: the British believed the defense of the territory of Singapore and the eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean (the route to British Ceylon and British India) to be paramount, the Americans and Australians did not want a total penetration of Southwest Asia that would take bases necessary for any serious counterattack, and the Dutch considered Java and Sumatra, their “second homeland where [they] had been trading and living for over three centuries”, to be the most important place to defend.
Even the combined forces could not stop or even slow the Japanese advance due to their much greater numbers; to face the Japanese attacking naval forces, the ABDA command had a conglomerate of ships drawn from any available units, which included the U.S. Asiatic Fleet (fresh from the fall of the Philippines), a few British and Australian surface ships, and Dutch units that had previously been stationed in the East Indies. Major forces included two seaplane tenders (USS Langley and Childs), two heavy cruisers (USS Houston and HMS Exeter), seven light cruisers (HNLMS De Ruyter, Java and Tromp, USS Marblehead and Boise, HMAS Hobart and Perth), 22 destroyers, and, perhaps their greatest strength, 25 American and 16 Dutch submarines (although the Dutch submarines were geriatric and short of spare parts). Being based on Java, these ships had to take on the central and western prongs of the three-headed Japanese assault; the central force’s combat ships, the light carrier Ryūjō, the seaplane tenders Sanyo Maru and Sanuki Maru, three light cruisers and sixteen destroyers, while the western force contained five heavy cruisers, and seven destroyers. In addition, four fleet carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryū and Sōryū) and the four Kongō-class battleships.
The manner of the Japanese advance resembled the insidious yet irresistible clutching of multiple tentacles. Like some vast octopus it relied on strangling many small points rather than concentration on a vital organ. No one arm attempted to meet the entire strength of the Abda fleet. Each fastened on a small portion of the enemy and, by crippling him locally, finished by killing the entire animal. […] The Japanese spread their tentacles cautiously, never extending beyond the range of land-based aircraft unless they had carrier support. The distance of each advance was determined by the radius of fighter planes under their control. This range was generally less than 400 miles, but the Japanese made these short hops in surprisingly rapid succession. Amphibious operations, preceded by air strikes and covered by air power developed with terrifying regularity. Before the Allies had consolidated a new position, they were confronted with a system of air bases from which enemy aircraft operated on their front, flanks and even rear.
The Japanese forces were using Tarakan airfield as a forward airbase by 17 January, and Balikpapan was also captured a week later. However, the Dutch garrisons had destroyed the oil fields before they were captured by the Japanese in both cases. Several Japanese vessels were destroyed or damaged due to naval and air counterattacks from the Allied forces, but the defending Dutch battalions were overrun by the Japanese forces. By 28 January, the Japanese forces had taken control of the airfields at Balikpapan and their aircraft were operating from them. By the end of January, Japanese forces had captured parts of Sulawesi and Kalimantan. By February, Japanese forces had landed on Sumatra and encouraged a revolt in Aceh.
Most of the naval components of the allied force were crushed in the battles of Java Sea, Sunda Strait and Second Java Sea; the only American ship larger than a destroyer to survive was the old cruiser Marblehead. In addition, the land forces on the islands were quickly overwhelmed and most major resistance was overcome within two months of the initial assaults, although a guerrilla campaign in Timor was successfully waged for a time. The ABDA command fell apart at about 01:00 on 1 March, less than two months after its inception, when Admiral Conrad Emil Lambert Helfrich, Governor-General of the East Indies, dissolved the command.
Allied forces did not attempt to retake the islands of Java, Sumatra, Timor, or Bali during the war. Japanese forces on those islands surrendered at the conclusion of World War II. Most of the Japanese military personnel and civilian colonial administrators were repatriated to Japan following the war, except for several hundred who were detained for investigations into war crimes, for which some were later put on trial. About 1,000 Japanese soldiers deserted from their units and assimilated into local communities. Many of these soldiers provided assistance to Indonesian Republican forces during the Indonesian National Revolution.
Early on the morning of 8 December the U.S. forces in the Philippines
were notified that a state of war existed and a full war alert was ordered. On the same day the first Japanese aerial attack on the Philippines took place. This was followed by others and on 10 December enemy landings were made on Luzon.
Before dawn on December 8,Japanese had bombed Singapore
Japanese soldiers parading through Singapore, 1942
Bombing of Singapore. 8 Dec 1941. The Japanese
Japanese landed troops
At midday, Japanese warplanes struck the Philippines, smashing half of the American air force on the ground.
Japanese Infantry utilizing the 70 mm gun in Urban Combat, Hong Kong 1941
Bottom of Form
On 8 December,1941
he launched an invasion of Malaya, from bases in French Indochina.
Bangkok was taken by Japanese on the 9th.
On December 10,
CAVITE NAVY YARD,
Luzon, during a Japanese aerial nii.uk. Early on <he morning ol H December H) I i Uic Japanese struck the rJiilippme Islands. By tlie end of the first day the U.S. Army Air Torres had lost half of its bombers and a ‘bird of its fighter planes h.tsrd ilierc. During the morning of 10 December practically the entire Navy yard at Cavite was destroyed by enemy bombers. The first Japanese landings on Luzon also look place
on 10 December.
after the Japanese bombing raid of 10 December.1941
After the destruction of the Navy yards at Cavite, the remaining II naval patrol bombers were flown to the Netherlands East Indies, The ground forces were left with little or no air support. The Japanese, having control of the air over the Philippines, began to mass their troops for the capture of the islands.
MEDIUM BOMBERS, B-18’S (top) and pursuit planes, P-36’s (bottom) of the U.S. Far East Army Air Force attack infantry troops during 1941 maneuvers in the Philippines. When the Japanese attacked the Philippine Islands the United States had some 300 aircraft in the Far East Air Force, but of these only 125 were suitable for combat. The 300 planes represented over 10 percent of the total U.S. air strength at this time. The pilots and crews were well trained and lacked only combat experience.
JAPANESE ADVANCING during the drive on Manila. The medium tank is a Type 94 (1934) , with a 57-mm. gun with a free traverse of 20 degrees right and left. It had a speed of 18 to 20 miles an hour, was manned by a crew of 4, weighed 15 tons, and was powered by a diesel engine.
CAMOUFLAGED 155-MM. GUN M1918 (GPF) parked on the Gerona-Tarlac road, December 1941.
The Japanese forces moved down Luzon forcing the defending U.S. troops to withdraw to the south. On 30 December a large-scale attack was launched and the U.S. troops were driven back ten miles to Gapan. After another enemy attack they fell back twenty miles farther. A secondary enemy attack at Tarlac failed to achieve important gains. The northern U.S. force protected the withdrawal of the southern force by a delaying action. All troops were beginning to converge in the vicinity of Manila and the Bataan Peninsula.
told Marshall on 10 December that what Japan feared most was Soviet entry into the war, he emphasized a fact well understood in Washington.
That did not mean, however, that military authorities were unanimously in favor of Soviet participation.
for example, seriously questioned the advisability of such a move because of the effect it would have on the war in Europe.
agreed fully that any move that would weaken Soviet resistance on the eastern front would be disastrous to the Allied cause.
But it was undeniable, he pointed out, that a Soviet attack against Japan would improve America’s position in the Pacific. The fact that Japan had not attacked the Maritime Provinces seemed to him significant. “If immediate fighting in the Manchukuo front is disadvantageous to Japan,” Marshall declared, “it is, for that reason, immediately advantageous to us.
and had sought to make the necessary arrangements with the Soviet Union. These efforts had been unsuccessful, but as late as November 1941, General Marshall was still optimistic and confided to a group of newsmen that “arrangements are being made to provide landing fields for flying fortresses in Vladivostok” and that the Philippine-based B-17’s would shuttle between Clark Field and Vladivostok in the event of war, dropping their bombs en route on the “paper cities of Japan.”2
The Pearl Harbor attack gave impetus to the efforts to complete arrangements with the Soviet Union for American use of the Maritime Provinces.
On the day after the attack
Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador,
on this question and Marshall raised it in military conference. But Litvinov, on instructions from his government, quickly put an end to such hopes.
the President Rosevelt ,
during a visit to the White House, and to Mr. Hull later, he made it perfectly clear that the USSR would have to maintain a neutral position in the Far East.
was too heavily committed in the war against Germany and “could not risk an attack by Japan.”3
reluctance to engage in discussions dealing with the Far East was in marked contrast
Chiang Kai-shek’s eagerness for concerted action.
China had not been included in the prewar discussions of strategy and no plans had been made for the use of Chinese bases or troops in the event of war with Japan.
The first suggestion that China become an active partner in such a war came from Chiang who, when he heard of the Pearl Harbor attack, summoned the American and Soviet ambassadors and told them of his hopes for a military alliance of all the anti-Axis nations under American leadership.
This thought the Ambassadors passed on to their governments, but it was not until the 11th that
formally proposed such an alliance, as well as the preparation of comprehensive plans for concerted action against Japan and the formation of a military mission headed by an American, with headquarters at Chungking.4
In Washington, the desirability of international military collaboration was fully recognized and plans for a meeting were already being made. Chiang’s suggestions, therefore, though they were not entirely in accord with American views, were readily accepted by Roosevelt, but with the proviso that several conferences, not one, be held to co-ordinate the efforts of the Allies.
All together there would be three: one in Chungking, one in Singapore, and one in Moscow, and invitations went out immediately.
Chiang quickly agreed, as did the British, who were scheduled to meet separately with the Americans in Washington later in the month.
But Stalin asked that his country not be pressed into any action against Japan, and Roosevelt’s invitation for a meeting in Moscow trailed off in a series of inconclusive messages.5
Preparations for the other two meetings, to be held concurrently and to consider ways to halt the Japanese, were quickly completed. Representing the United States at Chungking would be Generals Brett, then in India, and Magruder, head of the mission to China. Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, military observer in Singapore and an old hand in the Far East, would attend the meeting there. The results of these conferences, Roosevelt stipulated, were to be forwarded to Washington by 20 December so that they could be used in the forthcoming meeting with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 22 December.
“1(US Army In WW II)
But participation by the Soviet Union in the war against Japan was not the only way that nation could aid the Allied cause in the Far East. In the Maritime Provinces were bases that lay within bombing distance of the industrial heart of Japan. In the hands of American forces, these bases would constitute a formidable threat to the Japanese enemy. The possibility that the Soviet Union would allow the United States to base its forces in the Maritime Provinces was a specter that haunted the Japanese and was always a factor in their planning. The Americans had considered this possibility in their prewar plans and estimates,
Tentara Jepang mendarat dengan 5.500 tentara di Guam pada 10 Desember 1941. Jepang dapat memenangkan pertempuran ini.
At 1300 on 13 December 1941,
the Japanese invasion convoy left Cam Ranh Bay, Indo-China, with an escort of cruiser Yura (Rear-Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto) with the destroyers of the 12th Destroyer Division, Murakumo, Shinonome, Shirakumo and Usugumo, submarine-chaser Ch 7 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru and 10 transport ships carried the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade HQ under the command of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi (known as Kawaguchi Detachment), 124th Infantry Regiment from the Japanese 18th Division, 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force plus the 4th Naval Construction Unit.
On 14 December1941
the remaining fourteen U.S. Army bombers were flown to Port Darwin, Australia, and the ships that were undamaged after the attack were moved south.
RESIDENTS OF CAVITE evacuating the city
the Malaya and Borneo operations northeast of Natoma Island from 15 to 17 December 1941
The Support Force consisted of
the cruisers Kumano
and the destroyers Fubuki
Distant cover for the Malaya and Borneo
operations northeast of Natuma Island from 15 to 17 December 1942
is provided by
the heavy cruisers Atago
the battleships Haruna
the destroyers Ikazuchi,
and Arashio. To protect westwards,
the Japanese submarines I-62, I-64, I-65 and I-66 are stationed in the passage between Natuma Island and northwest Borneo.
The convoy at first proceeded toward the southwest but, during the night, it changed course to the southeast and made directly for Miri.
About this time the Left Flank Unit aboard IJN
transport ship Hiyoshi Maru separated from the main body and proceeded toward Seria. The Japanese invasion plan called for a landing to be made at
Miri city centre
to capture the oil fields.
A large force would then be left behind to initiate repairs to these oil facilities, while the rest of the force would then make their way to capture
its nearby airfield.
(Dr Iwan ever visit Kuching,Serian,Miri,Brunei,Labuan Island and Kota Kinibalu(before North Borneo) read the adventure of Dr Iwan)
Japanese destroyer Fubuki.
The destroyer took part in the British Borneo Operation, December 1941, as part of Support Force.
(2)Japanese aircraft sank
the HMS Repulse and
Prince of Wales,
eliminating the only Allied capital ships in the region.
The invasion of Luzon commenced the same day. In both Malaya and the Philippines, Japan’s tough, superbly trained armies quickly overcame forward defenses and swept south towards Singapore and Manila. Hong Kong surrendered on Christmas Day.
Japanese infantry storms ashore in the Natuna Islands, west of Borneo
Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign
The Japanese offensive in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies
(Click map to enlarge)
Map of Borneo with arrows indicating the locations of Tarakan, Samarinda, and Balikpapan
(Click map to enlarge)
Following their rapid thrusts against the British and the Americans, the Japanese launched a great, three-pronged offensive against the Netherlands East Indies. The invasion of Borneo began on the night of
When the Chungking Conference convened on 17 December
Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, the British delegate, nor
let. Gen.Brett was present. Nevertheless the Generalissimo took the opportunity to present his plans for the formation of an Allied general staff at Chungking, and for the prosecution of the war against Japan.
On the 22d,December,1941
Let.Gen.Brett, who had just received orders to go to Australia and take command of U.S. Army forces there, arrived with Wavell and the conversations with the Chinese began in earnest. Brett’s instructions from Washington were to join with the others in seeking ways to take advantage of Japan’s “present over-extension” — MacArthur’s thesis — and to reassure the Chinese that the United States was not abandoning the Philippines or its partners in Asia.
After considerable discussion, a plan that placed control in Washington and called for only limited operations in Asia was evolved by the delegates and sent to Washington.
The Generalissimo thought it unsatisfactory and sent his own. Neither contained any concrete suggestions on command or logistics, two problems that would plague the Allies in China for the next three years. The conference ended on the 23d, having produced, one of the planners wrote, “very little in the way of concrete results.”6
December 18-20 th 1942
The Singapore Conference (18-20 December),
though it produced no plan to halt the Japanese drive, was more fruitful, for from it came the first concrete proposal for
an Allied command in the Southwest Pacific.
Colonel Brink’s instructions were to present MacArthur’s views on Far East strategy, which General Marshall summarized for him as follows:
American, Australian, and Dutch air and naval forces should cooperate to keep open line of communications from Australia to Philippines.
Successful defense of Philippines considered essential to maintenance of Allied defensive structure in the Western Pacific.
Plans for immediate Philippine reinforcement definitely dependent for success upon establishment of air traffic between Philippines and bases south. Every effort should be made to supplement air supply by re-establishment of limited sea communications between Australia and Philippines.
These views, Marshall added “are generally concurred in by the President.” At the same time he informed MacArthur of the forthcoming meetings and of his instructions to the American delegates, adding the suggestion that he correspond directly with them “if practicable from the viewpoint of secrecy.”7
With these instructions and with the additional statement from MacArthur and Hart, couched in MacArthurian language, that “the Far East area is now the dominant locus of the war,
” Colonel Brink presented to the Singapore conferees 1941
the American view of the importance of the Philippines and the necessity for keeping open the lines of communication. But the British view of the importance of Singapore predominated.
The report of the conferees, therefore, while it called for large reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific and adopted all of MacArthur’s suggestions for the protection of the air and sea lanes between Malaya and the Philippines, gave second place to the defense of the Philippines.
Japanese conquest of Singapore, the conferees thought, would be a disaster of the first order. Not only would it make certain the loss of the Netherlands Indies with is vast resources in oil and rubber, but it would also place the enemy in position to isolate Australia and New Zealand and to separate the British and American fleets in the Far East.
The importance of the Philippines was limited, in the report of the Singapore Conference, to its use “as an advanced and flanking base for offensive action against Japanese lines of communication.”8
The most important result of the Singapore meeting was the proposal made by Brink for a unified command.
The conference, he told the Chief of Staff, “dearly indicated the need for one supreme head over a combined allied staff” to co-ordinate the efforts of the American, British, Australian, and Dutch forces in the area and to make plans for the future. The “unofficial opinions” of the conferees, he added, indicated that the appointment of an American familiar with the Pacific area to this post “would not only be acceptable but desirable.”
If such an appointment were made and a headquarters established, Brink suggested that it be located in Java. But he did not fail to point out that the majority of the delegates believed the major base of Allied operations in the Southwest Pacific should be in Australia, with an advance base in the Indies.9
Brink’s suggestion was quickly picked up in Washington. In the Army War Plans Division, where it went first for comment, the idea of a unified command in the Far East was described as “an absolute essential for the successful prosecution of the war effort in this theater,” and a matter that ought to be discussed with the British. Action in the division ended with the note, “This matter is being considered by the Chief of Staff. It has been discussed at the White House.”10
1941 cover from THAILAND to GB with d/r. BANGKOK p/m. and plain resealing tape tied by boxed MALAYA censor h/s. – OPENED BY / CENSOR 48. Also s/r. ’10’ transit censor h/s.
Preparations for the other two meetings, to be held concurrently and to consider ways to halt the Japanese, were quickly completed. Representing the United States at Chungking would be Generals Brett, then in India, and Magruder, head of the mission to China.
Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, military observer in Singapore and an old hand in the Far East, would attend the meeting there.
The results of these conferences, Roosevelt stipulated, were to be forwarded to Washington by 20 December so that they could be used in the forthcoming meeting with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, scheduled for 22 December.
This meeting, which lasted
from 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942
By the time the reports of the Singapore and Chungking Conferences reached the War Department, Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff had arrived in Washington for the first of the many wartime conferences which marked the most successful military alliance in the history of warfare.
This meeting, which lasted from 22 December 1941 to 14 January 1942 and is known by the code name ARCADIA,
was in many respects the most important of the conferences held during the war. It established an organization for the conduct of coalition warfare that survived all the stresses and strains of conflicting national interests; reaffirmed the basic decision to make the major effort in Europe at a time when the American people had not yet recovered from the shock of Pearl Harbor and when disaster threatened in the Pacific and Asia; established the first Allied command of the war; and laid down a broad program for the future as well as a plan for immediate action.11
The divergence between British and American views, which had been plainly evident at the ABC meetings early in 1941, was again apparent at the ARCADIA conference. The Americans believed that their national interests would best be served and the security of the United States best assured by the early defeat of Germany and Japan. This objective they put ahead of all others and made the measuring rod for every problem put before them. The British, too, sought the early defeat of the enemy, but they differed with the Americans on how to do it. Further, their national interests encompassed the security and future of a far-flung empire with its long lines of communication.
Their task was more complex than that of the Americans and their path to victory more circuitous. For them, the Middle East, Singapore, Malaya, Australia, India — all held an importance the Americans could not grant on purely military grounds. The British pressed hard for the allocation of Allied resources to the defense of these positions, not only at ARCADIA but at the conferences that followed, while the Americans pushed single-mindedly for those operations that would bring about the defeat of the enemy. But determination to agree and good will on both sides overcame all differences.
About one thing, the major objective of Allied strategy, there was no disagreement. The principals subscribed to a basic statement of war aims that served as the strategic objective for the year 1942 and the basis for the division of the resources of the two nations. “Much has happened since February last,” the conferees noted, “but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy. and her defeat is the key to victory.
Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.”12 It was agreed therefore, as “a cardinal principle” of American and British strategy, “that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theater should be diverted from operations against Germany.”
In terms of the existing situation, this “cardinal principle” meant that the production of armaments would have to be stepped up; that essential positions would have to be defended; that the vital lines of communication would have to be held; and that, by a combination of bombing, blockade, and propaganda, German resistance would have to be reduced so that the Allies could land on the Continent in 1943.
But the principle of minimum force in the Pacific was one that could be interpreted variously and usually was, depending on the situation. There were always those who could justify additional forces for the Pacific on the ground that they were required to safeguard vital interests there. This was the Navy’s position, argued forcefully and consistently by Admiral King.
In the Pacific and Far East, the Americans and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed, it would be necessary to maintain the security of Australia, New Zealand, and India; to support China; and to gain “points of vantage” from which an offensive against Japan could “eventually be developed.”
These were long-range objectives; the “immediate object” was to hold Hawaii, Alaska, Singapore, the Malay Barrier, the Philippines, Rangoon, and the route to China.
As a general statement of strategy, the objectives outlined by the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff had little relevance to the immediate emergency in the Far East where the Japanese were advancing rapidly on every front.
What was needed was agreement on the apportionment of the resources of both nations to that area, and, specifically, the amount to be assigned each of the vital positions still in Allied hands but defended by a variety of national forces and independent commanders.
Both sides were apparently reluctant to enter into detailed discussions of this subject, but they agreed that the planners should study the question of the disposition of the forces in and en route to the Southwest Pacific.
This study, the Chiefs stipulated, should be based on three alternative assumptions; first, that the Allies would hold both the Philippines and Singapore; second, that they would hold Singapore and the Netherlands Indies but lose the Philippines; and third, that they would lose Singapore and the Philippines.
The planners went to work on the problem immediately and quickly produced a report the Chiefs approved on the last day of the year. Recognizing that the forces then in the area could not hold the positions prescribed and that immediate reinforcements would have to be provided, the planners framed the following statement of Allied aims:
Hold the Malay Barrier, that is the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the islands stretching eastward to northwest Australia, “as the basic defensive position”; and Burma and Australia “as essential supporting positions.”
Re-establish communications with the Philippines and support the garrison there, while maintaining communications to Burma and Australia and within the Far East area.
Appended to the report were lists of the forces already in the theater and scheduled to arrive by 1 February.
These the planners
recommended be deployed “as now arranged,” if the Philippines and Singapore held, If they did not, the reinforcements should be used to defend the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, with American troops being used on the east side of the barrier (Australia), British and Commonwealth forces on the west (Burma and India).
Should the Philippines alone fall to the Japanese — an admission the Americans were not yet willing to make to the British who firmly believed that Singapore would hold — then U.S. reinforcements would be employed along the barrier and the lines of communication to the east.13
By the time this study was approved, the Chiefs of Staff had already decided to set up a unified American command in the Far East. The dangers and disadvantages of command by co-operation had been made abundantly clear by the disaster at Pearl Harbor, and Marshall felt very strongly that unity of command was perhaps even more important than the allocation of resources or the assignment of troops. On the 25th, after he had Brink’s report on the Singapore Conference, he raised the problem with his American and British colleagues. “The matters being settled here,” he told them, “are mere details which will continuously reoccur unless settled in a broader way. . . . I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater. . . . If we make a plan for unified command now, it will solve nine-tenths of our troubles.”
Without minimizing the difficulties of establishing such a command over the forces of four nations, Marshall believed that it could be done and was willing “to go the limit” to achieve it. “A man with good judgment and unity of command,” he said, “has a distinct advantage over a man with brilliant judgment who must rely on cooperation.” But the consensus of the meeting was not in Marshall’s favor and the subject was dropped after polite comment.14
The next day Mr. Roosevelt, apparently after discussion with Marshall and King, raised the question of a unified command in the Far East at a White House meeting with Churchill and others.
The Prime Minister, like his military advisers, did not favor the idea and there the matter rested for the moment. But neither the President nor General Marshall abandoned their fight and both privately did their utmost to change Churchill’s mind.15
In this they were successful so far as the principle of unified command was concerned but agreement on the officer who would exercise such a command and the limits of his authority was not so easily reached. Oddly enough, the British wanted an American and the Americans favored a British officer
motorcyclists of the snlf on guard duty (hong kong 1941)
AERIAL VIEW OF CORREGIDOR ISLAND off the tip of Bataan.
On 25 December,
Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, was established on Corregidor. Manila was declared an open city on the following day and the remains of the naval base at Cavite were blown up to prevent its supplies from falling into enemy hands.
TANK OBSTACLES AND BARBED WIRE strung to delay the enemy advance on Bataan (top); members of an antitank company in position on Bataan (bottom).
As the Japanese advanced,
the defending forces withdrew toward the Bataan Peninsula. The rugged terrain, protected flanks, and restricted maneuvering room on Bataan limited the enemy’s ability to employ large numbers of troops. Preparations for the defense of the peninsula were intensified and the stocks of supplies were increased.
General Wavell, then Commander-in-Chief, India, for the post.
Finally on 28 December,
agreed to the American proposal and Wavell was alerted to his coming appointment. It was decided also that Wavell, when he assumed command, would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, then being established, and that his headquarters would be located in Java.
Meanwhile U.S. Army planners had been working on a directive designed
Universal Carrier captured by Japanese in HONG KONG, Dec.1941
Miri Serawak at the border of Brunei,
commander of the 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe giving orders to his troops before landing (Borneo, december 1941)
there was no clear demarcation between the first and second phase. There the Japanese, driving in two columns down the east and west coasts of the peninsula, continued to advance without halt.
troops of the japanese army 5th infantry division landing on a beach in malaya (december 1941)
troops of the japanese army 5th infantry division landing on a beach in malaya (december 1941)
The war in British Borneo,
December 1941 – January 1942
The convoy crossed the South China Sea without being sighted, and
at about 2330 on the 15th,
the main body of the convoy arrived at the Miri anchorage, approximately two nautical miles from the shore, while the Hiyoshi Maru arrived at the Seria anchorage at midnight.
Immediately upon reaching the anchorage, both flank units commenced to transfer to landing barges. At first the sea was relatively calm but
about 0100 on the 16th,
the wind velocity increased and the waves grew high. Transfer from ships to barges was extremly difficult until it became impossible to keep the landing barges close to the ships and the units were forced to continue the transfer operation by ship’s crane.
commander of the 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe giving orders to his troops before landing (Borneo, december 1941)
Finally between 0510 and 0610
the Right Flank Unit completed its landing, while the Left Flank Unit landed about 0440. The Right Flank Unit quickly captured the government buildings and the post office at Miri as well as the surrounding district with plantations.
In the meantime, the Left Flank Unit landed on the west coast near Serian and occupied the large copra plantations, the Serian oilfields, and the strategic sector north of Serian to prepare for an attack against Brunei. There was offered very little resistance by the British forces, and during the morning on the 16th, the two units secured the oilfield at Serian and oilfields and airfield at Miri. The main body of the Kawaguchi Detachment found only about 50 members of the police unit defending Miri. They surrendred with very little fighting. Two companies of the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF landed on the coast near Lutong and within two and a half hours captured the important Lutong oil refinery. It then proceeded to occupy and secure the Miri airfield without meeting any resistance.
Part of the Detachment was immediately assigned the mission of restoring the oilfields at Miri and Seria, while, after 17 December, the main body of the Detachment prepared for the next operation – the landing at Kuching. The Japanese troops suffered only 40 casualties between 16 and 23 December, most were drownings as a result of Japanese amphibious operations.
News of the landing did not reach Air Headquarters, Far East,
until 9 p.m. on the 16th.
Reconnaissance aircraft from Singkawang II were ordered to investigate
at daylight on the December,17th.
New Airbase in Singkawang: Ki-43 of the 77th
Up and running; an AIR HQ is on it’s way and will unload tommorow, so it will soon be VERY up and running! But I already have planes, 2 Base Forces there
Photo Taken at our New Airbase in Singkawang: Ki-43 of the 77th Sentai:
In the meantime, the word of the invasion had also reached Tarakan Island on the eastern coast of Borneo, where the three Dornier flying boats of Naval Air Group GVT-7 (Marine Luchtvaart Dienst) were immediately prepared for attack. These three aircraft, (with registrations X-32, X-33 and X-34) were Dornier Do-24K’s, capable of carrying a payload of 1,200 kg.
Japanese attacked in the early morning of December 17th.1941
The flying boat X-34 (Luitenant ter Zee 3e klasse A. Baarschers) never made it to Miri. He had to made an emergency landing in the jungle, while it was heading for the Japanese invasion fleet near Miri
DECEMBER 17th, 1941:
After the reconnaissance report from 2 Vl.G.I,
Dutch Air Headquarters ordered 1 Vl.G.I, which operated from Samarinda II airbase, to attack the same target.
In the early afternoon
three flights (Flight Commanders Beckman, Butner and Vrijburg) flew to Miri. When they reached the target area, they observed a burning Japanese warship.
Though the crews thought that this must have been the result of 2 Vl.G.I’s earlier attack, P.C. Boer credits this damaged ship to the Dorniers of Naval Air Group GVT-7, since we already saw that van den Broek’s crews claimed no hits during their first raid.
The first two flights (Beckman and Butner) bombarded the ships with no results (“far from near misses”) but were attacked by Mitsubishi F1M fighters.
One of the crews of the third flight claimed a hit on a Japanese transport but this Glenn was also attacked by F1M floatplanes, one of which was shot down.
The last plane to attack the Japanese fleet was the Glenn Martin of the Flight Commander of the third flight (Vrijburg).No Japanese fighters and AA fire this time, so Vrijburg took his time to drop his two 1000 pounders on a large destroyer.
They could not again find the ship after the attack and claimed it as destroyed, which was not confirmed by Air Headquarters by the way.
In late 1941,
a total of 24 Hurricane Mk IIB´s in crates on route to Singapore for the Royal Air Force were rerouted to Tjililitan (Java) for use by tbe Dutch East Indies Air Force.
DECEMBER 18th, 1941:
Two flights of 2 Vl.G.I (Flight Commanders Theunissen and Cooke) repeated the attack in the early morning of this day. The weather was excellent and so were the bombing results.
The first flight (Theunissen) to attack scored two hits on a large transport which, according to Japanese records, was badly damaged but did not sink.
Again the Glenn Martins were intercepted by F1M floatplanes but the air gunners shot down one of them. The second flight (Cooke) hit a “cruiser” and the belly gunners of the Glenns observed it as it went down.
Cooke’s flight was also attacked by Japanese fighters and this time the Glenn Martin M571, flown by Lieutenant Groeneveld, was shot down. Groeneveld and his crew bailed out and eventually ended up at Long Nawang (Borneo) where they were executed by Japanese troops in August 1942.
P.C. Boer credits Cooke’s flight with the sinking of IJN destroyer Shinonome since this attack was made near Lutong (4 24’N – 114 00’0) whereas the Dorniers made their attack near Seria (20 miles north-east of Miri).
The 1 Vl.G.I also tried to attack the Japanese fleet again later that day, but by now the weather conditions had changed completely. Only two planes managed to reach the target area but were unable to locate the ships.
 This is the article written by Allan Nevitt “Fleeting Glory: The Fubukis of DesDiv 12” at Nihon Kaigun. There are more errors in this article, in the passages about later operations by this division.
This work was delayed
Dutch naval aircraft attacked the ships at anchor later that day and
again on the 18th December 1941
, but without effect.
On the 19th December 1941
the Dutch flying boat X-32 from Tarakan Island
IJN destroyer Shinonome
sank the Japanese destroyer Shinonome (Cdr. Hiroshi Sasagawa)
of 1,950 tons off Miri, while another flying boat X-33 damaged a transport ship.
The destroyer could not take the pounding and went down with her entire crew of 228 officers and men. Kuching realized that its turn was soon to come and work went on day and night to complete the airfield defences.
Read more info
Who sank IJN destroyer Shinonome, December 1941?
The IJN destroyer Shinonome (1,950 tons) was a powerful ship, completed in 1927 as one of the Fubuki Class fleet destroyers. At the outbreak of war in the Pacific, she was under command of Commander Hiroshi Sasagawa. His ship had been assigned to Destroyer Division 12 under the command of Commander Nobuki Ogawa, which was initially deployed as escort for the valuable troop transports steaming towards the virtually unprotected shores of the Malaya Peninsula. On December 16, she left Cam Ranh Bay (French Indochina) for Miri, British North Borneo, together with the other two ships of Destroyer Division 12, the IJN destroyers Shirakumo and Murakumo, the light cruiser Yura, the seaplane depot ship Kamikawa Maru, a few sub-chasers and two minesweepers. In addition, a cover force (Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita) with two heavy cruisers Kumano and Suzuya, a light cruiser Kinu and the destroyer Fubuki were sent out as reinforcement. The invasion fleet reached Miri in the night of 15 and 16 December 1941, where the troops went ashore almost unopposed. The 2,500 men of the Kawaguchi Detachment were able to capture Miri and Lutong without much fighting.
The next day proved to be far less comfortable for the Japanese invasion force. In the early morning of December 17, 1941 a flight of 2 Vl.G.I, operating from Singkawang II airbase, found several Japanese ships near Miri. That same morning the 1st “Patrouille” (Flight Commander Van den Broek) of 2 Vl.G.I attacked these ships from 4,500 meters but claimed no hits. The crews reported heavy AA fire and two of the Glenn Martin bombers returned slightly damaged .
In the meantime, the word of the invasion had also reached Tarakan Island on the eastern coast of Borneo, where the three Dornier flying boats of Naval Air Group GVT-7 (Marine Luchtvaart Dienst) were immediately prepared for attack. These three aircraft, (with registrations X-32, X-33 and X-34) were Dornier Do-24K’s, capable of carrying a payload of 1,200 kg.
They attacked in the early morning of December 17.
The flying boat X-34 (Luitenant ter Zee 3e klasse A. Baarschers) never made it to Miri. He had to made an emergency landing in the jungle, while it was heading for the Japanese invasion fleet near Miri.
He later reached, together with two of his crew members, a refugee camp at Long Nawang, only to be massacred there by Japanese troops in August 1942.
The other two flying boats X-33 and X-32 were able to attack the fleet. The X-33 (Officier-Vlieger 2e klasse J.G. Petschi) attacked a Japanese transport ship without succes, while X-32 (Officier-Vlieger 2e klasse B. Sjerp – unit commander) did far better.
He dropped 5 bombs of 200 kg each, scoring two hits on a IJN destroyer Shinonome and a near miss. The latter apparently did most of the damage, as the target was immediately rent by a thunderous explosion, and fires broke out aboard. A few minutes later, when the smoke cleared, the waves closed over the Shinonome, who had disappeared beneath the surface, taking below its captain, Commander Hiroshi Sasagawa, and the entire crew of 228 men.
After the war, a committee was formed to assess the casualties the Allied naval and airforces had inflicted on the Japanese Navy and merchant navy during the war. They reached a remarkable conclusion regarding Shinonome’s loss. This warship was supposedly sunk by a Dutch mine. Although the author has little doubt about the true cause of the sinking, it is interesting to see how the committee reached this conclusion.
In 1998, an article was posted on the Nihon Kaigun website, narrating the history of Destroyer Division 12 during its short career . The passage about the Shinonome mentions that the Commander of Destroyer Division 12, Commander Nobuki Ogawa, thought she had been lost to a mine or an internal explosion. He nor anyone else had apparently observed the air attack by the flying boats. The Assessment Committee adopted this theory, and never gave other possibilities much thought. There may be a few reasons why the Imperial Japanese Navy thought a mine was responsible:
– There were no survivors of IJN destroyer Shinonome to account for her loss.
– The stormy weather prevented the Dutch aircraft from being sighted, and therefore caused the confusion.
I put in a few hours of research to try to find out if there were any mines in the vicinity, but I am pretty sure there were none in the area. The Dutch minelayer Prins van Oranje made a sortie to British Borneo to pick up Japanese inhabitants, but there is no record of any mine being laid. The same goes for the British Royal Navy in Singapore, which restricted her operations to the waters of Malaya.
Note This article was written by JAN VISSER (The Netherlands). Much thanks also goes to BERT KOSSEN (the Netherlands).
Evacuated from Borneo in December 1941,
Anna and Margie returned to Surabaya as planned. They lived in the Brantas straat house with mother-in-law Emma and sister-in-law Elisabeth, who was now pregnant. (hans semethini)
on the December 19th
by a raid on the town by fifteen Japanese bombers which set fire to a large petrol store but otherwise did little material damage. A large part of the native population however fled from the town, and labour, which had been difficult to obtain before, became almost unprocurable
On the 22nd December1941
the main body (two battalions) of the Japanese invasion force re-embarked at Miri and left for Kuching, leaving one battalion to secure all British Borneo outside Sarawak.
Although after the occupation of Miri the Detachment commander, Major-General Kawaguchi, was unable to obtain any additional information in regard to the enemy’s strength or disposition, he did learn that there is one small railway on the western coast and no roads through the jungle. Consequently, an attack on north Borneo would have to be made from landing barges.
The first signs of the increased tempo of Japanese operations in the Netherlands Indies came very quickly.
Then, on 22 December, 1941
General Homma put the bulk of his 14th Army ashore at Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila.
japamese army officer Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga shaking hands with raiders of the Kaoru Special Attack Corps before leaving to a mission against a USAAF landing strip on Leyte (oct 1944)
Lieutenant General Kyoji Tominaga giving sake wine to soldier of the Kaoru Special Attack Corps before leaving to a mission against a USAAF landing strip on Leyte (oct 1944)
The remainder landed two days later at Lamon Bay, south of the capital, to form the southern arm of a giant pincer movement converging on Manila. But Homma quickly discovered he was dealing with a determined and able foe.
MacArthur did not, as Homma and Imperial General Headquarters expected, stay to fight it out on the central plain of Luzon. Instead he put into effect the long-standing ORANGE plan and withdrew his forces to the Bataan Peninsula in a skillful and dangerous double retrograde movement, made in two weeks under the most difficult circumstances and constant pressure. At the same time he proclaimed Manila an open city and transferred his headquarters to Corregidor. Thus, when Homma,
On returning back to Miri on 28 December1941,
Major-General Kawaguchi ordered Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe to advance on the 31st by landing barges to Brunei with one infantry battalion and there to collect small boats to be used for the attack on north Borneo.
The Japanese soldiers of the Watanabe Force, however, discovered that the British had already destroyed all big ships in the harbour, so that only small native boats remained.
The ABDACOM Interlude
While the American and British heads of state with their military staffs were in Washington establishing the strategic basis and the organization for the conduct of the war, the Japanese Army and Navy had continued their drive into Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific with unabated vigor.
Operations during the first phase of their plan for seizing the southern area had been remarkably successful and
In the last week of December1941,
Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army, and Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, 2d Fleet commander, jointly recommended advancing the schedule of operations against Sumatra and Borneo, thus making possible the invasion of Java a month earlier than planned.
At Japanese Imperial General Headquarters
the Terauchi-Kondo proposal met a favorable reception, for it would not only speed operations in the south and keep the enemy off balance but it would also make available at an earlier date the troops needed in Manchuria if the Soviet Union should enter the war — a danger that continued to haunt the Japanese. Early in January, therefore, Imperial General Headquarters approved the recommendation and advanced the timetable for the seizure of the southern area.29
Late in December 1941
the Japanese had gained control of British Borneo and the South China Sea approaches to the Malay Barrier
after the Japanese army during World War II occupation and so-called, as a kind of spicy, today Let me introduce such a thing
This cover (envelope), immediately after the outbreak of World War II, the Dutch East Indies (Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia) island of Java is proffered addressed to Honolulu, Hawaii from the (now Jakarta) Batavia.
The so-called Pacific War, December 8, 1941,
Japan declared war against the U.S., the UK, but began to declare war on Japan the two countries, In response to this, December 10, Japan, the Netherlands declared a war on, and then rush to the combat system of the Dutch East Indies and Japan. In Batavia, the capital of young people has been drafted, but began in earnest the activities of field post office and is not intended to be proffered from the military post office in Batavia this cover also such.
In the image has not been introduced, to cover, addressed to (or lover From a wording) women living in Honolulu, as well as condemn the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese military, letter of the contents of praying of her safety had been enclosed is.
After the initial stamp was canceled with a pen, post office postmark of the Dutch field that contains the character “A” indicates the Batavia has been pressed. Perhaps you are thinking at the time of postal acceptance, the field office and postmarked too late, every time being by helping to eradicate the stamp with a pen, press and hold the postmark of the field station at a later time.
However, the disruption also had root for carrying the mail by the outbreak of war, this cover can actually be delivered to Honolulu is not, has been returned to sender. And in the back, also has been pressed stamp of January 1, 1942 indicate that.
the info and comment from the family of Swiss natiomality who work at Dutch BPM oil company at Borneo
Dear Dr. Suwandy,
My fiancée and I, a journalist and writer in Germany/Berlin, have become deeply interested in the history of Royal Dutch Shell, more specifically of its subsidiary Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij BPM during the Japanese invasion in early spring 1942 – exactly what you are documenting in “The Dai Nippon Occupation”.
We have met an eye and ear witness who told us an incredible story. She was an eight year old girl with Swiss nationality and living in Surabaya, when Japan invaded the country.
Her equally Swiss father was an engineer at BPM and a member of the destruction squads that blew up the wells and refineries in Borneo and in the Dutch East Indies before the invasion.
He was ordered by the BPM management to leave the country by ship with his Dutch colleagues, but he was the only one to refuse.
Why? Because only the employees of BPM where to be shipped to Australia, not their families, children and wives. They were left to the Japanese who put them as POWs into concentration camps.
This in itself is a dreadful crime, but it got worse. Our witness told us, that the ships of an unspecified number were destroyed by the Japanese and sunk within or close to the port of Surabaya.
She had heard the detonations. All employees of BPM on them died. She and her father fled by train into the jungle. He seems to have been a very brave man, because as Swiss national he resisted internment and helped other POW by smuggling medicine and food into the camps.
Our questions to you are as follows:
1. Have you ever heard or read about this incident?
2. Do you believe this story? Could it be true?
3. Have you heard about these ships and do you maybe remember one or more of their names?
So far, we have identified about 40 ships, which were destroyed or scuttled in or close to Surabaya in early spring 1942, but on none of them seem to have been passengers from BPM.
4. Can you advise us any further sources of information that we should use?
5. Can we purchase a copy of your CD-Version of “The Dai Nippon Occupation”?
We have read the report “East Indies Episode” from 1949, written by Johan Fabricius. He does not mention the evacuation to Australia via Surabaya, neither any families left behind in the Dutch East Indies.
If we can be sure of the truth of this story, we plan to identify some of the surviving families and to write a book about it.
We would be extremely grateful if you could help us with your knowledge about the Japanese invasion and we promise to mention you and your website in any kind of publication.
Thank you very much in advance.
Reginald Grünenberg, Berlin
Dear Reginald Grunenberg.
Thanks for visit my web blod and your info related to my e-book in CD-rom The Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia part three eastern area.
The book still in processing because many new information have found,and always new info will complete this very difficult and very lile info exist now.
I suggest you to buy my E-Book and you will now what exactly happened in Indonesia during the War 1942-1945 exactly related to your father.
If you want to buy rthat e-book in CD-ROM which only very limited edition(only ten items) will send to you directly,please contact me vi my email
and upload your ID scan,this only for security against hiject only and also your home address where I will send the CD-rom.
The CD-rom consist
Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia 1942-1945
Dai Nippon Occupation Sumatra 1942-1945
Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia Eastren Area 1942-1945
The Pasific War 1942,Thew Pasific War 1943,The Pasific War 1944And The Pasific War 1945
Are you need all the informations, or only eastern area of Indonesia only
As innformtaionmy son also Oil exploration Geology Engeneering who work at Indonesia Oil company PERTAMINA which before was the BPM company during DEI era. That is why I am interest to about the BPM History an I also write about the BPM-PERTAMINA Oil company History collections if you need this info I will sold together with the other CD to you
I am waiting for your letter to my email address
Dr Iwan suwandy,MHA
maart 1941 – april 1943:
de Duitse opmars stagneert
In juni 1941 vallen de Duitsers de Sovjet Unie binnen. In december 1941 verklaren ze de oorlog aan de Verenigde Staten. Engeland krijgt er daardoor twee machtige bondgenoten bij. In West-Europa wordt niet meer gevochten.
Duitsland verliest terrein
De strijd in Noord-Afrika verloopt wisselend, maar eindigt met een Duitse nederlaag in september 1942. In Rusland wordt de Duitse opmars in januari 1943 bij Stalingrad gestuit na zes maanden zware gevechten met meer dan anderhalf miljoen doden. Duitsland verliest terrein.
In Nederland wordt het persoonsbewijs wordt ingevoerd. De bezetters blijven verwoede pogingen doen om Nederland tot een nationaal-socialistische ‘volksgemeenschap’ om te vormen. De propaganda wordt opgevoerd.
Steeds meer Nederlandse instellingen worden onder nationaal-socialistische leiding gebracht en de bezetter probeert het onderwijs, de kerken, en de vakbonden onder nationaal-socialistische invloed te brengen. Ook de cultuur en het uitgaansleven worden ‘genazificeerd’. Maar het lukt de bezetters niet om de Nederlanders voor zich te winnen.
Door de oorlog neemt in Nederland de schaarste toe. Invoer over zee is onmogelijk en veel goederen worden naar Duitsland afgevoerd. Steeds meer producten worden verdeeld via een distributiesysteem; ze komen ‘op de bon’. Niet alleen voedsel maar bijvoorbeeld ook brandstof en benzine worden schaars. De zwarte handel neemt toe.
Ondertussen gaat de vervolging van de Nederlandse joden verder. Zij worden stap voor stap geïsoleerd van de rest van de bevolking. Vanaf mei 1942 moeten ze een jodenster op hun kleding dragen en in juli begint de deportatie. Dit wekt afschuw, al durven weinig mensen zich er actief tegen te verzetten.
Nederland wacht met spanning op een geallieerde invasie. Ter verdediging bouwen de Duitsers vanaf december 1941 verdedigingswerken langs de kust van het noorden van Noorwegen tot de Pyreneeën: de Atlantik-Wall. De hele Nederlandse kuststrook wordt hiervoor vanaf mei 1942 ontruimd.
In de loop van 1941 wordt het persoonsbewijs ingevoerd. Het persoonsbewijs wordt ontwikkeld door de Nederlandse ambtenaar Jacobus Lambertus Lentz in samenwerking met de Duitse bezetter. Geen land in Europa heeft een identiteitsbewijs dat technisch en administratief zo volmaakt is.
Iedere Nederlander vanaf 15 jaar moet dit identiteitsbewijs, voorzien van pasfoto en vingerafdruk, altijd bij zich dragen. De gegevens staan genoteerd in een centraal register. De invoering stuit op weinig verzet.
PB van Jan Koning. Klik op pb voor vergroting.
PB van Jan Koning. Kik op pb voor vergroting.
Door het persoonsbewijs krijgen de Duitsers meer mogelijkheden om de Nederlanders te controleren, bijvoorbeeld in verband met de tewerkstelling in Duitsland en bij de jodenvervolging is het van grote betekenis. Ook de opsporing en arrestatie van verzetsmensen worden er een stuk makkelijker door.
Mede omdat de hiervoor genoemde gevolgen er nog niet waren stuit de invoering van het ‘pb’ op weinig verzet.
Vanaf medio 1941 wordt bij joden een dikke hoofdletter ‘J’ in hun PB gestempeld.
Het Persoonsbewijs wordt vaak verward met een Ausweis. Een Ausweis is echter niet hetzelfde als een persoonsbewijs, hoewel beide documenten vaak met hetzelfde woord worden aangeduid. Een Ausweis is een papier waarop staat dat men vergunning heeft om op een bepaalde plaats of gedurende een bepaalde tijd ergens aanwezig te zijn.
Ook kan een Ausweis een vrijstelling geven, zoals een vrijstelling voor de Arbeitseinsatz. Wie over straat moet gedurende de spertijd, heeft een Ausweis nodig. Ook voor het bezit van een fiets kon men onder bepaalde omstandigheden een Ausweis krijgen.
Met een overweldigende hoeveelheid propagandamateriaal proberen de Duitsers de Nederlandse bevolking te beïnvloeden.
Door middel van bioscoopjournaals, radio uitzendingen, pamfletten, brochures en kleurige affiches proberen de Duitsers de Nederlanders te winnen voor het nationaal-socialisme en te overtuigen van de uiteindelijke Duitse overwinning. Anti-joodse gevoelens worden aangewakkerd en de angst voor het communisme gevoed. Het effect is beperkt.
Door de uitzendingen van Radio Oranje, de illegale én legale kranten weten de Nederlanders dat de oorlog niet goed verloopt voor Duitsland. Ook werpen geallieerde vliegtuigen strooibiljetten uit waarin de Duitse propaganda wordt bestreden. De letter V staat symbool voor het Engelse Victory (overwinning). De Engelse leider Churchill maakt vaak het V-teken.
In de zomer van 1941 nemen de Duitsers de V over in hun campagne ‘V = Victorie, want Duitschland wint op alle fronten’. Als tegenactie gaan Nederlanders de affiches bekladden. De V wordt de W van Wilhelmina, of de V van Verliest of Verzuipt.
Schaarste, distributie en zwarte handel
Al voor de bezetting bestond in Nederland een distributiesysteem om schaarse, moeilijk te krijgen, levensmiddelen eerlijk te verdelen. Tijdens de bezetting daalt het levenspeil.
Invoer over zee is onmogelijk, de productie in Nederland daalt en veel Nederlandse goederen worden naar Duitsland afgevoerd. Echte koffie, thee en tabak zijn al snel bijna niet meer te krijgen en worden vervangen door surrogaatproducten van mindere kwaliteit.
Op de bon
Steeds meer producten komen ‘op de bon’ en zijn alleen te koop door bonnen, die uitgegeven worden door de overheid, in te leveren. Het rantsoen wordt steeds kleiner en het distributiesysteem ingewikkelder.
Ook producten die op de bon zijn, zijn soms moeilijk verkrijgbaar. Vaak staan er lange rijen voor de winkels. Bij distributie hoort onvermijdelijk bestrijding van zwarte handel en een systeem van prijsbeheersing.
Door deze schaarste ontstaat een zwarte handel in moeilijk te krijgen goederen. Sommige zwarthandelaren maken grote winsten. De naam zwarte markt is een directe Nederlandse vertaling uit het Duits. In Nederland heet het eerst ‘sluikhandel’. De Duitsers zijn erg tegen de zwarte handel en het zonder toestemming slachten van vee.
De sluikhandel geeft de Duitsers een mooi excuus: dat er schaarste is komt niet door de Duitsers maar door de zwarthandelaren! Als de zwarte handel verdwijnt is er voldoende voor iedereen! Met posters verspreidt de Duitse bezetter die boodschap.
Door benzinegebrek rijden er bijna geen auto’s meer. Bussen, auto’s en zelfs sommige brommers rijden met een gasgenerator. Daarin worden kolen of hout omgezet in gas. Op dat gas draait de motor. Bussen hebben daarom een soort aanhangwagen waar de generator op staat.
Sommige auto’s rijden met een enorme ballon gas op het dak. Voor taxi’s worden paarden gespannen. Trams en treinen rijden minder vaak en worden steeds voller. Door het tekort aan rubber verschijnen er fietsen met houten banden of fietsen met massief rubberen banden (gemaakt van oude autobanden) en met stepwielen (uiteraard alleen bij het voorwiel
‘Mijn vader waarschuwde al in 1933: “Als de nationaal-socialisten aan de macht komen, is het gedaan met het christelijke onderwijs”. Daar was hij fel op tegen. In 1940 en 1941 werkten mijn ouders mee aan het illegale blad Vrij Nederland. Ik ben van huis uit in het verzetswerk terechtgekomen.
In die eerste tijd waren er nog maar weinig mensen die verzet pleegden. Die deden het eigenlijk allemaal uit overtuiging. Of ze nu communist, socialist of christen waren. Toen eenmaal duidelijk was dat Duitsland zou verliezen, kwamen er veel meer mensen bij.’
Hilde Dekker, medisch analiste in opleiding, Groningen
De bezetters willen het onderwijs gebruiken om de Nederlandse jongeren een nationaal-socialistische opvoeding te geven. Maar zij weten dat dit veel weerstand zal oproepen. In Nederland hecht men grote waarde aan het eigen onderwijssysteem, waarin verschillende religieuze groepen aparte scholen hebben (een kenmerk van de ‘verzuiling’).
De Duitsers zijn bang om de invloedrijke Nederlandse kerken tegen zich in het harnas te jagen en daarom blijven de Duitse maatregelen beperkt.
NSB’ers op school
Bij de benoeming van nieuwe leraren krijgen NSB’ers voorrang. Sommige schoolboeken worden verboden of veranderd. Het aantal verplichte uren Duits wordt uitgebreid. Onder leerlingen en leerkrachten is de stemming meestal fel anti-Duits.
Er doen veel moppen en liedjes de ronde waarin de nazi’s worden bespot. NSB-kinderen en NSB-leraren worden gepest. Door de ontwrichting van de samenleving neemt in de loop van de bezetting het aantal spijbelaars toe. De laatste oorlogswinter moeten veel scholen sluiten vanwege gebrek aan brandstof.
‘Het gaf mij moed als de dominee openlijk opriep tot verzet. Ik merkte het ook bij mijn verzetswerk. Als er ergens een dominee heel principieel was, kon je er veel meer onderduikers plaatsen. In het zuiden van Nederland, waar bijna iedereen katholiek was, speelde dat nog veel sterker. Als de pastoor zei dat de onderduikers geholpen moesten worden, hielp vrijwel iedereen.’
Hilde Dekker, koerierster, Groningen
‘Op zondag ging ik twee keer naar de gereformeerde kerk. Er werd dan gebeden voor de koningin en de vervolgden. Dat gaf een ontzettende steun. Er waren momenten dat ik diep ontroerd was. Je snakte ernaar om iets positiefs te horen, iets van gezamenlijk opkomen voor de verdrukten. De kerken waren altijd overvol, je zat mannetje aan mannetje.’
Max Léons, ondergedoken joodse verzetsman
‘Mijn vader was een verzetsman. Het geloof was zijn grote inspiratiebron. Als meisje van tien, elf bracht ik codeboodschappen en bonkaarten weg. Soms bracht ik onderduikers naar een duikadres. Bij verhoor heb ik nooit wat losgelaten. De steun van God gaf me de kracht en moed om te doen wat er van me gevraagd werd. Ons sterkste wapen tegen de sadistische, satanische invaller was het gebed.’
Hilda Post, schoolmeisje, Nieuwlande
Voor het uitbreken van de oorlog hebben de Nederlandse kerken een grote invloed in het verzuilde Nederland. Al voor de oorlog veroordelen de Nederlandse kerken het nationaal-socialisme. Ook tijdens de bezetting is de invloed groot. De kerken worden goed bezocht.
Tijdens de bezetting sturen de kerken herhaaldelijk brieven naar Seyss-Inquart om te protesteren tegen de jodenvervolging en andere Duitse dwangmaatregelen. De kerkelijke protesten worden ook voorgelezen vanaf de preekstoel. Daarnaast roepen veel geestelijken de gelovigen op om onderduikers te helpen.
De bezetter weet dat er in veel kerken een anti-Duitse stemming heerst. Toch treden de bezetters voorzichtig op tegen de kerken. Zij weten hoeveel invloed de kerken hebben en willen de vele Nederlandse gelovigen niet verder van zich vervreemden.
Indirect probeert de bezetter de kerkelijke invloed wel te verminderen door allerlei maatschappelijke instellingen onder nationaal-socialistische leiding te plaatse. Dit geldt bijvoorbeeld voor de katholieke en christelijke vakbonden in juli 1941. De kerken roepen de vakbondsleden op om het lidmaatschap op te zeggen. Slechts 5% zal lid blijven.
Cultuur en uitgaansleven
‘De slappe onnadenkende massa demonstreert dagelijks haar karakterloze houding door de bestorming der bioscopen, die als prima propagandaplaatsen door den vijand worden uitgebuit.’
Trouw, 15 oktober 1943
De Duitsers proberen probeert naast de Nederlandse pers ook het culturele leven in Nederland te controleren en in te schakelen in de nationaal-socialistische propaganda. In november 1941 wordt de Kultuurkamer opgericht.
De Kultuurkamer is een beroepsvereniging onder NSB-leiding. Alle toneelspelers, musici, dansers, schrijvers, beeldend kunstenaars, filmers, fotografen, journalisten en zelfs boekhandelaren moeten zich aanmelden. Wie weigert mag zijn beroep niet langer uitoefenen.
De meeste podiumkunstenaars melden zich als lid. Veel beeldend kunstenaars weigeren. Zij kunnen makkelijker clandestien opdrachten uitvoeren. Kultuurkamer-weigeraars worden vaak actief in het verzet. Zij roepen het publiek op om de bioscopen en theaters te boycotten.
Vanaf februari 1941 worden de Nederlandse bioscopen gebruikt voor Duitse propaganda. Het verzet roept op tot een boycot van de bioscopen maar dat heeft geen succes. Het bioscoopbezoek neemt juist toe. Er is tijdens de bezetting een grote behoefte aan afleiding en vermaak.
De propaganda neemt men voor lief. Soms laat het publiek in de donkere zaal demonstratief afkeurende reacties horen. Ook hier heeft de Duitse propaganda weinig invloed op de meeste Nederlanders
Deportatie en onderduik
‘Ik woonde in een joodse buurt. Ik heb mensen zoveel mogelijk proberen te helpen. Ze konden altijd voor één of twee nachten bij me terecht. Die razzia’s waren vreselijk, maar je werd wel hard hoor. Ja, wat zeg je tegen mensen als ze worden meegenomen. Je omhelst ze en wenst ze het allerbeste. Meer kun je toch niet?’
Miep Roestenburg, drogisterijhoudster, Amsterdam
‘De verhalen die je hoorde over wat er met de joden gebeurde, geloofde ik niet. Dat was zo verschrikkelijk, dat kon niet waar zijn. Achteraf blijken zelfs de ergste verhalen de waarheid nog niet te benaderen. Ik heb niks gedaan. Om echt wat te doen, moest je veel moed hebben. Ik was niet flink.’
Truus van der Zwaag, machinestikster op een naaiatelier, Amsterdam
De discriminatie en het isoleren van de Nederlandse joden van de rest van de Nederlandse bevolking gaat verder. Openbare gelegenheden worden verboden voor joden. Overal verschijnen bordjes met de tekst ‘Voor Joden verboden’. Er komen aparte joodse scholen.
Vanaf circa 1 mei 1942 moeten alle joden een gele ‘jodenster’ gaan dragen. Dan begint de deportatie; joden moeten zich melden voor “tewerkstelling in Duitsland”. Ondanks harde dreigementen besluiten velen zich niet te melden. Weer grijpt de bezetter hard in: wie zich niet meldt loopt de kans bij razzia’s te worden opgepakt.
Om de deportatie ordelijk en effectief te laten verlopen schakelt de bezetter de Joodse Raad in. Deze Joodse Raad wordt verantwoordelijk gemaakt voor de uitvoering van de deportatiemaatregelen. Ze werken mee ‘om erger te voorkomen’ en velen kunnen zich niet voorstellen wat het Duitse einddoel is. De raad kan bewijzen van uitstel verlenen, maar wie uitstel heeft, komt later toch aan de beurt.
Via het doorgangskamp Westerbork deporteren de bezetters 107.000 joden naar concentratiekampen, zoals Auschwitz en Sobibor. Van hen zullen er slechts 5.500 overleven. Ruim 25.000 joden duiken onder. Van deze groep wordt een derde alsnog opgepakt en omgebracht. In totaal wordt bijna 80% van de joodse bevolking in Nederland vermoord.
‘Mijn vader was politieman. Daardoor wist hij wie wanneer werd opgepakt. Dat gaf hij door aan mij, zodat ik de mensen kon waarschuwen. Soms was dat vreselijk. Ik herinner me een vrouw die gillend haar keuken in vloog terwijl haar man gelaten hun kleren ging inpakken. Dan was ik wel kapot hoor.’
Riek Ternouw, 23 jaar, zonder werk, Amsterdam
In Amsterdam worden circa 20.000 joden via de Hollandsche Schouwburg afgevoerd naar Westerbork. Medewerkers van de Joodse Raad helpen bij het wegsmokkelen van joodse kinderen uit de crèche tegenover de Hollandsche Schouwburg. Daar wachten de kinderen op deportatie. Ongeveer 500 van de 5.000 kinderen worden zo gered. Sommige joodse ouders leggen in wanhoop hun kind te vondeling, als laatste mogelijkheid om het te redden.
Walter Süskind, medewerker van de Joodse Raad, houdt toezicht op de gang van zaken in de Hollandsche Schouwburg. Hij gaat vertrouwelijk om met de Duitse bewakers. Soms voert hij ze zelfs dronken. Dat geeft hem de kans om zo’n 2000 gevangenen uit de Schouwburg en de crèche te redden. Samen met zijn assistent Felix Halverstadt verandert hij de gegevens in de kaartenbakken.
Als er weer een groep op transport moet, leidt Süskind de SS-bewakers af. Die horen dan even niet hoe Halverstadt de ‘vertrekkenden’ telt: 182, 183, 184, 195, 196 … Dit kan voor tien mensen de redding betekenen. Süskind zelf komt begin 1945 om bij de evacuatie van Auschwitz. Zijn vrouw, dochtertje, moeder en schoonmoeder zijn daar enkele maanden eerder vergast.
De familie Zendijk
Als de deportaties beginnen, praat de familie Zendijk over onderduiken. Het familiebedrijf in Deventer is door de Duitsers overgenomen, maar met de opbrengst van wat verborgen juwelen is misschien iets te regelen. Moeder wil echter niet dat het gezin van zes uiteenvalt.
Vader ontmoet voor zaken Jan Visscher uit Amsterdam. Die zegt: ‘Ik begrijp niet dat u met uw gezin uw ongeluk zit af te wachten.” Vader antwoordt: “Wie neemt er nu zes joden in huis?’ Waarop Visscher spontaan zegt: “Dan komen jullie maar bij ons.”
Visscher woont in zijn bedrijfspand aan de Prinsengracht. Voor de Zendijks wordt een achterhuis ingericht. Zonder jodensterren, maar met de J in het persoonsbewijs reizen ze op 5 januari 1943 per trein naar Amsterdam; er wordt niet gecontroleerd.
‘We aten, sliepen, plasten en wasten ons in één kamer’, vertelt dochter Roza, ‘schaamte was er niet meer bij.’
Roza mag als enige het achterhuis uit. Ze doet schoonmaakwerk in huis, zogenaamd als een nichtje uit Groningen.
“We hebben honger geleden, en overal zaten vlooien. Maar we hadden veel steun aan elkaar. Bij de bevrijding is de groepsfoto gemaakt. Er was blijdschap, maar later het drama van het verlies van zoveel familieleden. Mijn broer, mijn grootouders… Het was een trieste tijd.”
De familie Levy
De familie Levy woont in Varsseveld in de Achterhoek. Op kerstavond 1941 komt er een Nederlandse SS’er aan de deur. Het blijkt een schoolvriend van zoon Jonny. Hij waarschuwt: ‘Ga nooit werken in Duitsland. Er zijn kampen waar de joden worden vermoord.’
‘Vanaf dat moment’, vertelt Jonny, ‘begonnen mijn ouders te zorgen voor een eventuele onderduik; eentje voor henzelf en de andere voor hun drie zoons. Toen we op 10 april 1943 naar Amsterdam moesten verhuizen, was het moment aangebroken om te verdwijnen.’
De jongens komen in Lichtenvoorde op de boerderij van de familie Geurink. Er was een schuilkelder gemaakt. In het varkenshok was de ingang, afgedekt met een deksel. Het is te zien op de foto.
‘Later kwamen er nog vele onderduikers bij. Willem Geurink zat in de verzetsgroep Trouw. Hij hield met gevaar voor eigen leven mensen verborgen. Ik heb hem later weleens gevraagd waarom hij het allemaal gedaan had. Hij antwoordde dat die taak hem van boven was opgelegd.’
Kancah pertempuran Eropa rupanya berimbas juga pada keadaan di Hindia-Belanda. Bersamaan dengan ekspansi Jerman ke Belanda bulan Mei 1940, Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda di Indonesia menahan sebanyak 2.436 orang Jerman. Banyak diantara mereka merupakan pegawai kolonial, ahli budaya, insinyur, dokter, ahli minyak bumi dan juga diplomat bahkan seniman terkenal Walter Spies yang merupakan pendiri sekolah lukis di Bali juga ditangkap. Kemudian orang-orang Jerman ini dimasukkan dalam kamp pengasingan di Sumatra Utara . Proses penangkapan ini berlangsung hingga penghujung tahun 1941.(blackfile mywebblog)
A Javanese drayman is pictured driving a dray pulled by two horses in the foreground of image. A streetscape is pictured in the background
Image depicting a Drayman in Batavia (now Jakarta), Indonesia.
Black and white photograph from a photography album by David Ralph Goodwin, RAN. The album contains 108 black and white photographs from World War II, many highly significant, showing sea battles (live fire), survivors, wounded and the dead being buried at sea. The photographs are secured with photo corners – a few now adrift. Includes images of German troops evacuating from Greece; German airborne troops in front of Junkers; airborne assault on Crete; Singapore burning; and later actions in Coral Sea. Includes a photo of HMAS Canberra, which was sunk on 9 August 1942, in the Battle of Savo Island.
David Ralph Goodwin was born 14 November 1921 in Mordialloc. He enlisted 11 May 1938 in Melbourne, service number 22112, and became an Able Seaman. During World War II he served on HMA Ships Perth (19 May 1939 – 28 August 1941) and Hobart (29 August 1941 – 4 September 1942) before being transferred to HMAS Cerberus (5 September 1942 – 21 July 1943), the Royal Australian Navy’s Western Port training facility. He remained at HMAS Cerberus until June 1943 when he was diagnosed as suffering from anxiety neuroses. He was discharged on 21 July 1943. He formed the ex-HMAS Perth Association in 1966. David Ralph Goodwin died on the 4th of June 2011
Image depicting the main city square of Batavia (now Jakarta), Indonesia.
Main city square is pictured in image. A road is shown in the foreground with power lines overhead, buildings are pictured in the background of image
People are pictured washing their clothes in a canal
Image depicting people, who appear to be Indonesian nationals, washing their clothes in a canal. (Ciliwung )
A hotel is pictured in the middleground of image. A cleared area is pictured in the foreground, lettering on the building reads ‘Yen Pin’.
Image depicting a hotel in Batavia (now Jakarta), Indonesia.
People are pictured riding on an electric tramcar at Batavia, capital of the Dutch East Indies
Image of a tramcar in Batavia (now Jakarta), Indonesia.
Source: Museum Victoria
Look the video of Jakarta 1941
Gedung Socitet Jogya 1941
Sekarang kalau orang menyebut Gedung Societet akan menunjuk kawasan Shoping Center sebelah timur, yang memang bernama “Societet”. Tempatnya kumuh, sungguh bahu, dekat pasar sayur sehingga semrawut dan macet. Namun, apabila melihat foto Gedung Societet tahun 1941, orang seperti meliat bangunan yang “lain” dengan sekarang. Ada suasana yang berbeda dari sekarang. Inilah Yogyakarta, dalam kurum waktu cukup lama telah mengalami banyak perubahan dari segi fisik, meskipun dari segi nama tidak berubah. Lihatlah Gedung Societet tahun 1941
Orang Tionghoa Pejabat Hindia Belanda tahun 1941(sumber Reegering Almanac 1941)
Afdelling Financiele ,Schatkistambtenaar de klasse K.T.Liem
Dienst Der Oost-Aziatische Zaken
Hooftranslateur voor de Japansche S.Cho(Tsang Tsui Shih) sejak 1 januari 1939
Hoofdcommies : Tan tek beng ,10 mei 1940
Major,Kapitein , Letnan der Chinesen
Voorsitter Khouw Kim An (Majoor de Chinesen 3 februari 1937)
Sekretaris Tan Boen Sing,11 April 1922,
Lie Tjian Tjoen 17 Agustus 1029(kapitein de chinesen) Lie Boen Sin,27 sept 1929(lieutenant)
Niet ambtelijke Leden
Ong Kek Tjiaoe,21 april 1931 Dr Tjiong Boen Kie, 9 maret 1940
Afdeelling Noordkust van Atjeh (Sigli)
Luitenant der Chineezen Tjong Tjhi Tjhaij, 31 des. 1926
Luitenant der Chineezen Tan Joe Sin, 19 oct.1922
Luitenant der Chineezen Wong Tjiauw ,26 sept 1913
Afdeelling Oostdkust van Atjeh met Alaslanden Gajoloeas en Serbodjadi (Langsa)
Luitenant der Chineezen Chioe Sim Aann, 20 Jan 1918
Luitenant der Chineezen Tjoeng Ted Joeng, 21 Maret 1918
Luitenant der Chineezen Moe Tin Siong
Residentie Oostkust van Sumatra
Afdeelling Deli en Serdang (Medan)
Onderafdeelling Beneden Deli(Medan)
Major der Chineezen Khoe Tjin Tek
Luitenant der Chineezen medan Oei han Tiong Luitenant der Chineezen Laboeandeli : Hsu Hua Chang Luitenant der Chineezen Belawan : Oey Chin Kiat.
Afdeelling Simaeloengoen en De Karolanden(Pematangsiantar)
Onderafdeelling Simaeloengoen (Pematangsiantar)
Luitenant der Chineezen : Ang Cheng
Luitenant der Chineezen : Lim Hoh Eng
Afdeelling Nias Goenoeng Sitoli
Onderafdeelling Nias en omligende eilanden(Goenoeng Sitoli)
Luitenant der Chineezen : Lim Eng The
Onderafdeelling Batoe-eilande(Poelau Tello)
Luitenant der Chineezen : Go Tiauw Hie, 16 juni 1932
Residentie Riouw en Onderhooringheden
Onderafdeelling Selat Pandjang
Luitenant der Chineezen : Kan Tjong Ho ,1 oct 1934
Onderafdeelling Bagan Siapi-api
Luitenant der Chineezen : LOe Tjin Poh
Kapiten de chineesen te Tandjong Pinang : Oei Pit Ship,8 Sept .1930 Luitenant der chineesen voor Zuid Bintan : Tan Foo Kong,18 Okt.1915 Luitenant der Chineesen voor Noord-Bintan : Tan Swie Kie,19 juli 1916 Luitenant der Chineesen te Pl,Boeloeh : Tan Joe She,1 aug 1930
Onderafdelling Karimoen (Tandjoengbalai)
Luitenant der Chineesen te Tandjoengbalai Oei Kim Hoe,29 Maret 1935 Tandjoeng batoe Wong Seap Par, 27 April 1929
Onderafdelling Linga(Dao Singkep)
Luitenant der Chineesen te Penoeba : Lie Eng Goan,20 dec 1938 Dabo(singkep): Tjoa meng Koei, 15 Sept.1938
Onderafdelling Poelau Toedjoeh(Terempa)
Luitenant der Chinesen terempa : Tjioe Tiong Thin ,Feb 1938
Afdelling Inderagiri (Rengat)
Luitenant der Chineesen Go Koen Sia ,16 jan.1936
(Dr iwan pernah kerumah nya tahun 1985, dan bertemu putranya, dan membeli beberapa koleksi almarhum seperti lukisan Tiongkok,dan medali yang diperolehnya dari gubernur jendral dan juga ada postal history masa revolusi berupa dokumen dengan metera pendudukan jepang)
Onderafdelling Inderagirische Benelanden (Tembilahan)
Luitenant der Chineesen tembilahan Lauw Tio Sia,1 jan.1936
Residentie west Sumatra 1941
Kapten etnis Tionghoa Padang :
Liem Tjhoen Goan (sejak 1 April 1937)
Letnan etnis Tionghoa Pariaman:
Ghan Ho Ie (sejak 19 sept.1906)
Letnan etnis Tionghoa Bukittinggi(Fort de Kock) dan Padang Panjang :
Tjoa sin Soe (sejak 4 Maret 1929) Letnan etnisTionghoa Payakumbuh :
Tjoa Seng Lian (sejak 18 maret 1939), putranya Tjoa Tjoan Soei menikah dengan adik mertua Dr iwan Oei Tiong Hien, Oei Soei Heng dan putranya Ien.
Onderafdeling Hoofplaats Palembang en Banjoeasinstreken(Palembang)
Kapiten der Chineesen Kwee Gan Keng, 9 Jan.1934
Residentie Bangka en Billiton
Kapitein der Chinesen Bong Joeng Kin ,24 dec 1932 Luitenant der Chinesen Se Siong Men, 24 Dec 1932
Kapitein titulair de chineesen :Phong Jong Fong, 25 Maret 1938
Residentie Westerafdeelling van Borneo(hoofdplaats Pontianak)
Kapitein der chineezen Kwee Eng Hoe
Kapitein der Chineezen te
Singkawang : Theng Soen Teng Pemangkat : Lie Kian Nam Montrado : Eo Djong Khim
Kapitein der Chineezen Lim A Lak
Kapitan der Chineezen Tjen Fai Tjong
Kapitan der Chineezen Tjang Fen Sen
Residentie Zuider en Oosterafdelling van Borneo
Kapitein der chineesen Tjoe Tay An , 5 April 1918
Kapitein titulair der Chinesen Oey Tay Poen, 24 Agustus 1923
Luitenant der Chineesen voor de onderafdelling Koetai en Boven Mahakam (standplaats Samarinda) : Ngo Keng Tjoen, 6 sept 1918
Luitenant der Chineesen te Sanga-sanga Dalam : Tan Keng Ban (voor het onderdistrict sanga-sanga) 21 maret 1928
Luitenant der Chineesen Voor het onderdistrict Balikpapan : Wong Thay Hin, 28 Agustus 1933
Afdeelling Boeloengan BN Beroe(Tarakan)
Onderafdeeling Beraoe(Tandjoeng Redeb)
Luitenant der Chineezen Lim Kim Fen, 3 Juli 1940
Conniezeen redacteur : E.K.Njo,12 sept 1935
Luitenant der Chineezen Tjoa Tiong Hean, 30 Jan 1930
Residentie Timor en Onderhoorigheden
Kapitein der chineezen Lie San Njan, 15 feb 1925
Hoof de Chineezen Tjioe Tek Giok,29 april 1925- Tjioe Soen Seng(Babaoe Koepang)-Tjong Soei Tap(Tjamplong Koepang), Tjoeng KIe Seng(Naiklioe-Koepang).
Hoof de Chineezen Djong Kiet Hien,29 Agustus 1940
Onderafdeelling Zuid-midden Timor(Soe)
Hoof de Chineezen Ta A Hin(Niki-niki), Tan Kion Tjeang(Kapan), Sea I Hoat(SoE)
Onderafdeelling Nord-midden Timor(Kofannanoe)
Hoof de Chineezen Tan Foe Djoen
Hoof de Chineezen Laij Ko Hie(atamboea)
Afdeelling Alor ( Kalabahi)
Hoof de Chineezen Ong Gwan Tjin alias Ong Kie Seng,27 April 1938
Hoof de Chineezen Lie Siang tek, 12 Juni 1939
Hoof de Chineezen Ong Ka Tjao, 12 Juni 1929
Onderafdeelling Mangarai (Roeteng)
Hoof de Chineezen Pius The Kie Teng, 14 Maret 1938
Afdeelling Soembawa en Soemba(Raba)
Hoof de Chineezen Oei Si KOan, 28 Nov 1936
Hoof de Chineezen Oei Si Moe alias Oei Hok Goei(soembawa besar), Wong Jat Hwa(Taliwang)
Onderafdeelling Oost Soemba (Waingapoe)
Hoof de Chineezen Lie Thiauw La,15 Juni 1938
Kapitein der Chineezen soerakarta Ing Siang Tan
Luitent der chineezen sragen Liem Poo Djong
Orang Minang Sebagai Pejabat Hindia Belanda Ssumtera Barat tahun 1941(sumber Regeering Alamanac 1941)
Districthoofd ter beschikking :
Ahmad Arif gelar Datoek Madjo Oerang sejak 12 Juni 1939
Bereau Commies redacteur : Abdul Hadis sejak 14 juli 1939
Veldpolitie en Rechersche Wedana van politie : Amadin gelar Soetan Marah Bangso sejak 28 juni 1938 Assitent-wedana by de Reserche : Soelaiman Effendi sejak 28 juni 1938
Afdelling Zuid Benedenlanden (Padang)
Assisten-wedana van Politie : Kaharoedin gelar Datoek Rangkajo Basa sejak 12 Juni 1939 Leutenant der voor Indier : Mohammad bin Saiboe Gandoe sejak 14 Mei 1937
Afdelling Tanahdatar (Padangpandjang)
Assisten-wesna de Reserche : Mohammad Talib gelar Radja nan Soetan sejak 11 oktober 1935
Afdelling Agam (Fort De Kock)
Assiten-wedana de Reserche : Boerhanooeddin gelar Soetan mangkoeto
Afdelling Limapoeloeh Kota (Pajakoemboeh)
Assisetn-wedana van Politie: Mohammad Talib gelar Radja Nan Soetan sejak 29 Desember 1938
Afdelling Solok (Sawah Loento)
Assisten WEdana van reserche : Marah Hasan gelar Datoek Batoeah sejak 30 Juni 1939
( Sumber regeering alamanac 1941)
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