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Sultan Agung wafat pada tahun 1645, sebelum penyerangan itu terlaksana.
Pengganti SULTAN Agung , Sultan Amangkurat I (1645-1677) ternyata bersikap lemah dan mau bekerjasama dengan Belanda.
The british had ben forced out of the cosmopolitan peper trading fort at banten near present day serang in 1648, but the were determinet to break the dutch monopoly.
SULTAN AGENG TIRTAYASA
Lahir : Banten, 1631
Wafat : Jakarta, 1692
The naval commercial power of the VOC, especially in an island region such as Indonesia, meant that the Company could pursue its interests on many fronts, but its two most important adversaries in the period to 1800 were Makasar and Mataram. Makasar, the main port in southern Sulawesi, became a major centre for the ‘smuggling’ trade which defied the Dutch monopoly until it succumbed to the Dutch and allied indigenous forces in a three-year war ending in 1669.
(Jan Pieterszoon Coen, architect of Dutch empire in the East)
The Founding of Batavia
Coen’s first step was to establish a permanent headquarters at Jayakarta on the north-western coast of Java, close to the pepper producing parts of Sumatra and the strategic Sunda Straits. In 1618, he sought and received permission from Prince Wijayakrama of Jayakarta to expand the existing Dutch post, and proceeded to throw up a stone barricade mounted with cannon. The prince protested that fortifications were not provided for in their agreement and Coen responded by bombarding the palace thereby reducing it to rubble. A seige of the fledgling Dutch fortress ensued, in which the powerful Bantenese and a recently arrived English fleet joined the Jayakartans. Coen was not so easily beaten, however (his motto:”Never Dispair!”), and escaped to Ambon leaving a handful of his men in defense of the fort and its valuable contents.
Five months later, Coen returned to discover his men still in possession of their post. Though outnumbered 30-to-1 they had rather unwittingly played one foe against another by acceding to any and all demands, but were never actually required to surrender their position due to the mutual suspicion and timidity of the three attacking parties. Coen set his adversaries to flight in a series of dramatic attacks, undertaken with a small force of 1,000 men that included several score of fearsome Japanese mercenaries. The town of Jayakarta was razed to the ground and construction of a new Dutch town begun, eventually to include canals, drawbridges, docks, warehouse, barracks, a central square, a city hall and a church-all protected by a high stone wall and a moat-a copy in short, of Amsterdam itself.
(Natives bring nutmegs for sale to a Dutch trading post at Banda Neira)
The only sour note in the proceedings was struck by the revelation that during the darkest days of the seige, many of the Dutch defenders had behaved them selves in a most unseemly manners-drinking, singing and fornicating for several nights in succession. Worst of all, they had broken open the company storehouse and divided the contents up amongst themselves. Coen, a strict disciplinarian, ordered the immediate execution of those involved, and memories of the infamous siege soon faded-save one. The defenders had dubbed their fortress “Batavia,” and the new name stuck.
Coen had placed his headquarters on Java some distance from the rising central Java power of Mataram, but the two quickly came into conflict. In 1628 and 1629 forces from Mataram attacked Batavia but were repulsed. Thereafter, it was the Company which harassed Mataram, both deliberately circumscribing its power and finding itself drawn into civil wars and political conflicts within Mataram to defend its own interests. Following its participation in the defeat of Trunojoyo in 1678–1681, the VOC was a permanent element in Javanese politics and the Company gradually moved from being a maritime trading power to managing a territorial empire on Java. The Company’s administrative structure, however, continued to resemble that of a trading company, with officials below the level of governor holding mercantile titles and retaining principal responsibility for commercial matters along with administration
The Dutch however complain that she gave assistance to their enemies the people of Perak, and in 1664 it was found necessary to send a squadron under the command of Pieter de Bitter to bring her to reason. As it happened that she was at this time at war with some of her own dependants he made himself master of several places on the western coast that were nominally at least belonging to Achin.
About 1666 the English establishments at Achin and some ports to the southward appear to have given considerable umbrage to their rivals.
In 1669 the people of Dilli on the north-eastern coast threw off their allegiance, and the power of the kingdom became gradually more and more circumscribed.
This queen died in 1675, after reigning, with a degree of tranquillity little known in these countries, upwards of thirty-four years.
The people being now accustomed and reconciled to female rule, which they found more lenient than that of their kings, acquiesced in general in the established mode of government.
And she was immediately succeeded by another female monarch, named Nur al-alum, who reigned little more than two years and died in 1677.
The queen who succeeded her was named Anayet-shah.
- 1678-1681: Rijckloff van Goens
Portrait of Rijklof van Goens
His writing about
the palaces of
and his successors are important references for historians of the Mataram era in Java
aankomst Rijklof van Goens bij Cochin, 1678-1681 in NEDERLANDS OOST-INDIE
In the year 1684 she received an embassy from the English government of Madras, and appeared at that time to be about forty years. The persons who were on this occasion presented to her express their suspicions, which were suggested to them by a doubt prevailing amongst the inhabitants, that this sovereign was not a real queen, but a eunuch dressed up in female apparel, and imposed on the public by the artifices of the orang kayas. But as such a cheat, though managed with every semblance of reality (which they observe was the case) could not be carried on for any number of years without detection, and as the same idea does not appear to have been entertained at any other period, it is probable they were mistaken in their surmise. Her person they describe to have been large, and her voice surprisingly strong, but not manly.*
(*Footnote. The following curious passage is extracted from the journal of these gentlemen’s proceedings. “We went to give our attendance at the palace this day as customary. Being arrived at the place of audience with the orang cayos, the queen was pleased to order us to come nearer, when her majesty was very inquisitive into the use of our wearing periwigs, and what was the convenience of them; to all which we returned satisfactory answers. After this her majesty desired of Mr. Ord, if it were no affront to him, that he would take off his periwig, that she might see how he appeared without it; which, according to her majesty’s request, he did. She then told us she had heard of our business, and would give her answer by the orang cayos; and so we retired.” I venture, with submission, to observe that this anecdote seems to put the question of the sex beyond controversy.)
The purport of the embassy was to obtain liberty to erect a fortification in her territory, which she peremptorily refused, being contrary to the established rules of the kingdom; adding that if the governor of Madras would fill her palace with gold she could not permit him to build with brick either fort or house. To have a factory of timber and plank was the utmost indulgence that could be allowed; and on that footing the return of the English, who had not traded there for many years, should be welcomed with great friendship. The queen herself, the orang kayas represented, was not allowed to fortify lest some foreign power might avail themselves of it to enslave the country. In the course of these negotiations it was mentioned that the agriculture of Achin had suffered considerably of late years by reason of a general licence given to all the inhabitants to search for gold in the mountains and rivers which afforded that article; whereas the business had formerly been restricted to certain authorized persons, and the rest obliged to till the ground.
The court feared to give a public sanction for the settlement of the English on any part of the southern coast lest it should embroil them with the other European powers.*
(*Footnote. The design of settling a factory at this period in the dominions of Achin was occasioned by the recent loss of our establishment at Bantam, which had been originally fixed by Sir James Lancaster in 1603. The circumstances of this event were as follows. The old sultan had thought proper to share the regal power with his son in the year 1677, and this measure was attended with the obvious effect of a jealousy between the parent and child, which soon broke forth into open hostilities. The policy of the Dutch led them to take an active part in favour of the young sultan, who had inclined most to their interests and now solicited their aid. The English on the other hand discouraged what appeared to them an unnatural rebellion, but without interfering, as they said, in any other character than that of mediators, or affording military assistance to either party; and which their extreme weakness rather than their assertions renders probable. On the twenty-eighth of March 1682 the Dutch landed a considerable force from Batavia, and soon terminated the war. They placed the young sultan on the throne, delivering the father into his custody, and obtained from him in return for these favours an exclusive privilege of trade in his territories; which was evidently the sole object they had in view. On the first day of April possession was taken of the English factory by a party of Dutch and country soldiers, and on the twelfth the agent and council were obliged to embark with their property on vessels provided for the purpose, which carried them to Batavia. From thence they proceeded to Surat on the twenty-second of August in the following year.
In order to retain a share in the pepper-trade the English turned their thoughts towards Achin, and a deputation, consisting of two gentlemen, of the names of Old and Cawley, was sent thither in 1684; the success of which is above related. It happened that at this time certain Rajas or chiefs of the country of Priaman and other places on the west coast of Sumatra were at Achin also to solicit aid of that court against the Dutch, who had made war upon and otherwise molested them. These immediately applied to Mr. Ord, expressing a strong desire that the English should settle in their respective districts, offering ground for a fort and the exclusive purchase of their pepper. They consented to embark for Madras, where an agreement was formed with them by the governor in the beginning of the year 1685 on the terms they had proposed. In consequence of this an expedition was fitted out with the design of establishing a settlement at Priaman; but a day or two before the ships sailed an invitation to the like purport was received from the chiefs of Bangkaulu (since corruptly called Bencoolen); and as it was known that a considerable proportion of the pepper that used to be exported from Bantam had been collected from the neighbourhood of Bencoolen (at a place called Silebar), it was judged advisable that Mr. Ord, who was the person entrusted with the management of this business, should first proceed thither; particularly as at that season of the year it was the windward port. He arrived there on the twenty-fifth day of June 1685, and, after taking possession of the country assigned to the English Company, and leaving Mr. Broome in charge of the place, he sailed for the purpose of establishing the other settlements. He stopped first at Indrapura, where he found three Englishmen who were left of a small factory that had been some time before settled there by a man of the name of Du Jardin. Here he learned that the Dutch, having obtained a knowledge of the original intention of our fixing at Priaman, had anticipated us therein and sent a party to occupy the situation. In the meantime it was understood in Europe that this place was the chief of our establishments on the coast, and ships were accordingly consigned thither. The same was supposed at Madras, and troops and stores were sent to reinforce it, which were afterwards landed at Indrapura. A settlement was then formed at Manjuta, and another attempted at Batang-kapas in 1686; but here the Dutch, assisted by a party amongst the natives, assaulted and drove out our people. Every possible opposition, as it was natural to expect, was given by these our rivals to the success of our factories. They fixed themselves in the neighbourhood of them and endeavoured to obstruct the country people from carrying pepper to them or supplying them with provisions either by sea or land. Our interests however in the end prevailed, and Bencoolen in particular, to which the other places were rendered subordinate in 1686, began to acquire some degree of vigour and respectability. In 1689 encouragement was given to Chinese colonists to settle there, whose number has been continually increasing from that time. In 1691 the Dutch felt the loss of their influence at Silebar and other of the southern countries, where they attempted to exert authority in the name of the sultan of Bantam, and the produce of these places was delivered to the English. This revolution proceeded from the works with which about this time our factory was strengthened. In 1695 a settlement was made at Triamang, and two years after at Kattaun and Sablat. The first, in the year 1700, was removed to Bantal. Various applications were made by the natives in different parts of the island for the establishment of factories, particularly from Ayer-Bangis to the northward, Palembang on the eastern side, and the people from the countries south of Tallo, near Manna. A person was sent to survey these last, as far as Pulo Pisang and Kroi, in 1715. In consequence of the inconvenience attending the shipping of goods from Bencoolen River, which is often impracticable from the surfs, a warehouse was built in 1701 at a place then called the cove; which gave the first idea of removing the settlement to the point of land which forms the bay of Bencoolen. The unhealthiness of the old situation was thought to render this an expedient step; and accordingly about 1714 it was in great measure relinquished, and the foundations of Fort Marlborough were laid on a spot two or three miles distant. Being a high plain it was judged to possess considerable advantages; many of which however are counterbalanced by its want of the vicinity of a river, so necessary for the ready and plentiful supply of provisions. Some progress had been made in the erection of this fort when an accident happened that had nearly destroyed the Company’s views. The natives incensed at ill treatment received from the Europeans, who were then but little versed in the knowledge of their dispositions or the art of managing them by conciliating methods, rose in a body in the year 1719, and forced the garrison, whose ignorant fears rendered them precipitate, to seek refuge on board their ships. These people began now to feel alarms lest the Dutch, taking advantage of the absence of the English, should attempt an establishment, and soon permitted some persons from the northern factories to resettle the place; and, supplies arriving from Madras, things returned to their former course, and the fort was completed. The Company’s affairs on this coast remained in tranquillity for a number of years. The important settlement of Natal was established in 1752, and that of Tappanuli a short time afterwards; which involved the English in fresh disputes with the Dutch, who set up a claim to the country in which they are situated. In the year 1760 the French under Comte d’Estaing destroyed all the English settlements on the coast of Sumatra; but they were soon reestablished and our possession secured by the treaty of Paris in 1763. Fort Marlborough, which had been hitherto a peculiar subordinate of Fort St. George, was now formed into an independent presidency, and was furnished with a charter for erecting a mayor’s court, but which has never been enforced. In 1781 a detachment of military from thence embarked upon five East India ships and took possession of Padang and all other Dutch factories in consequence of the war with that nation. In 1782 the magazine of Fort Marlborough, in which were four hundred barrels of powder, was fired by lightning and blew up; but providentially few lives were lost. In 1802 an act of parliament was passed “to authorize the East India Company to make their settlement at Fort Marlborough in the East Indies, a factory subordinate to the presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and to transfer the servants who on the reduction of that establishment shall be supernumerary, to the presidency of Fort St. George.” In 1798 plants of the nutmeg and clove had for the first time been procured from the Moluccas; and in 1803 a large importation of these valuable articles of cultivation took place. As the plantations were, by the last accounts from thence, in the most flourishing state, very important commercial advantages were expected to be derived from the culture.)
A few years before these transactions she had invited the king of Siam to renew the ancient connexion between their respective states, and to unite in a league against the Dutch, by whose encroachments the commerce of her subjects and the extent of her dominions were much circumscribed. It does not appear however that this overture was attended with any effect, nor have the limits of the Achinese jurisdiction since that period extended beyond Pidir on the northern, and Barus on the western coast.
She died in 1688, having reigned something less than eleven years, and was succeeded by a young queen named Kamalat-shah; but this did not take place without a strong opposition from a faction amongst the orang kayas which wanted to set up a king, and a civil war actually commenced. The two parties drew up their forces on opposite sides of the river, and for two or three nights continued to fire at each other, but in the daytime followed their ordinary occupations. These opportunities of intercourse made them sensible of their mutual folly. They agreed to throw aside their arms and the crown remained in possession of the newly elected queen. It was said to have been esteemed essential that she should be a maiden, advanced in years, and connected by blood with the ancient royal line. In this reign an English factory, which had been long discontinued, was reestablished at Achin, but in the interval some private traders of this nation had always resided on the spot. These usually endeavoured to persuade the state that they represented the India Company, and sometimes acquired great influence, which they are accused of having employed in a manner not only detrimental to that body but to the interests of the merchants of India in general by monopolizing the trade of the port, throwing impediments in the way of all shipping not consigned to their management, and embezzling the cargoes of such as were. An asylum was also afforded, beyond the reach of law, for all persons whose crimes or debts induced them to fly from the several European settlements. These considerations chiefly made the Company resolve to reclaim their ancient privileges in that kingdom, and a deputation was sent from the presidency of Madras in the year 1695 for that purpose, with letters addressed to her illustrious majesty the queen of Achin, desiring permission to settle on the terms her predecessors had granted to them; which was readily complied with, and a factory, but on a very limited scale, was established accordingly, but soon declined and disappeared. In 1704, when Charles Lockyer (whose account of his voyage, containing a particular description of this place, was published in 1711) visited Achin, one of these independent factors, named Francis Delton, carried on a flourishing trade. In 1695 the Achinese were alarmed by the arrival of six sail of Dutch ships of force, with a number of troops on board, in their road, not having been visited by any of that nation for fifteen years, but they departed without offering any molestation.
This queen was deposed by her subjects (whose grounds of complaint are not stated) about the latter part of the year 1699, after reigning also eleven years; and with her terminated the female dynasty, which, during its continuance of about fifty-nine years, had attracted much notice in Europe.
Her successor was named Beder al-alum sherif Hasham, the nature of whose pretensions to the crown does not positively appear, but there is reason to believe that he was her brother. When he had reigned a little more than two years it pleased God (as the Annals express it) to afflict him with a distemper which caused his feet and hands to contract (probably the gout) and disqualified him for the performance of his religious duties.
English force Dutch surrender at Jayakerta
, but Banten forces take over from the English in a surprise move. The English and the Pangeran of Jayakerta retreat.
Dutch rename post at Jayakerta to Batavia (today’s Jakarta).
Coen passes through Jepara,
and burns down the city again, including the English trading post.
Coen arrives at Jayakerta
, and burns down the original town of Jayakerta, leaving only the Dutch post of Batavia remaining to become VOC headquarters.
VOC begins building city at Batavia.
VOC under Coen almost exterminates population of Banda to prevent “smuggling”. Survivors settle on small islands near Seram.
One of Coen’s goals was to make the VOC strong enough on its own so that it did not have to depend on the goodwill of neighboring rulers. He intended to do this by changing the VOC from a trade empire to an empire that ruled actual territories, then settling those territories with colonists from the Netherlands. Military strength was important, both for maintaining a position of power among the local kings and sultans, and for keeping the Spanish, Portuguese and English away.
British found trading post at Ambon.
Agung and VOC make overtures to each other.
VOC agents in Ambon arrest, torture and execute English agents on charges of conspiracy.
Aceh sacks Johore. Carstenz expedition for VOC explores southern coast of Irian Jaya. Coen returns to the Netherlands. Carpentier is new Governor-General of the VOC. VOC takes nominal claim to Aru Islands.
the expansionist Javanese state of Mataram, which laid a general claim to Palembang in 1625
The first “hongi” raids took place in Maluku.
These were attacks, usually by local allies of the VOC, against anyone who was growing cloves without authorization of the VOC.
Coen returns from the Netherlands
to serve as Governor-General of the V.O.C. again.
Soldiers from Banten infiltrate
the fortress of Batavia, kill some guards, and escape, but do little damage.
Sultan Agung sends army against VOC in Batavia;
dams Ciliwung River in attempt to deny fresh water to the VOC. He fails to oust the Dutch, who prevent his army from receiving supplies by sea. Commanders of the Mataram army are executed for failure.
Last of the English leave Banda.
Agung attacks Batavia again.
He is defeated, although Coen dies during the siege. Banten, fearing Agung now more than the VOC, pleads for peace with the VOC.
Iskandar Muda sends navy of Aceh against Portuguese Melaka,
but the Aceh navy is destroyed. September 20: Coen passes away. Introduction of sugar cultivation in Banten.
Dutch abandon Solor, which is retaken by the Portuguese.
Agung raids east Java;
the Hindu kingdom of Balambangan asks for VOC help and is refused. Balambangan then asks the King of Gelgel in Bali for help.
War between VOC and Banten.
after this year no information from Dva-pa- tan or bali anymore, because the the Dva-pa-tan or bali Kingdom were appart from the Java Kingdom (Mataram)
after Sultan Agung of Mataram Kingdom occupied blambangan Bali protectorated Kingdom ex Mojopahit east java
after attack in 1633 and Dva-pa-tan or Bali Kingdom didn’t succeed occupied by Sultan Agung because Bali protected by Ducth East India company-VOC.
Dutch arrest Kakiali,
leader of Hitu in Maluku, on charges of smuggling.
This was the “mercantilist” age of trade empires. There were many powers that wanted to create trade empires: the Dutch through the VOC, the English, Banten, and Gowa were among them. There was no such thing as “free trade” under these empires. The VOC especially wanted total control of trade, and any selling to anyone outside the VOC was considered “smuggling”.
VOC signs treaty with Kutai on Kalimantan.
Agung, realizing that he cannot defeat Dutch, makes overtures towards VOC.
Van Diemen becomes Governor-General of VOC.
Portuguese abandon posts on Solor after six years. VOC bans all private correspondence (until 1701).
VOC attacks Ternate.
VOC releases Kakiali, who pledges friendship to VOC but makes anti-Dutch alliance between Hitu, Ternate, and Gowa.
Local Muslims overcome Portuguese fortress at Ende on Flores. Agung gives permission for Portuguese and Catholic refugees from Batavia to settle around Jepara. Around this time the VOC started pushing the Portuguese out of many of their posts in Nusa Tenggara.
Chief minister Matoaya of Gowa
is succeeded by his son Pattingalloang. Unlike his father, Pattingalloang did not maintain good relations with the Bugis. The bad feeling would eventually lead some Bugis to side with the VOC against Gowa and Makassar.
Portugal regains independent crown from Spain.
Portuguese abandon trading post at Jepara.
Further north on the east coast, pepper became the basis for a revival of the Palembang and Jambi regions, which had been the heart of Srivijaya.
This prosperity, however, attracted the attention of the expansionist Javanese state of Mataram, which laid a general claim to Palembang in 1625 and
sent a fleet in 1641–42 to force both Palembang and Jambi to become vassals of Java
Taj ul-Alam becomes Sultana of Aceh, starts period of female rulers; Johore and Aceh settle differences. January 14: VOC takes Melaka from Portuguese, with help from the Sultan of Johore. The Sultan opens ports in Riau to all traders. Kakiali and Hitu attack VOC on Ambon.
And the Dutch seized Melaka in 1641.
The VOC takeover of Melaka
was the real end of Portuguese importance in the region. But after losing Melaka, some Portuguese started trading with Gowa on Sulawesi. With the English and Portuguese almost gone, and Batavia and Ambon relatively secure from neighboring rulers, this was the most profitable time for the VOC.
VOC gets monopoly on trade with
Palembang by treaty.
Tasman explores coasts of Irian Jaya for VOC on voyage back from New Zealand. “Statutes of Batavia”, based on Roman law, are introduced as a legal code for VOC territories.
becomes Sultan of Ternate with VOC help.
VOC established outpost at Perak.
Sultan Agung dies,
and is succeeded by Susuhunan Amangkurat I.
Relations between Amangkurat I and the VOC are good in the beginning. VOC finally takes Hitu.
Dutch arrive again on Solor, abandoned by the Portuguese ten years earlier.
Cooperation treaty between VOC and Mataram,
involving promises of mutual assistance against enemies and extradition of runaway debtors, among other things.
Ships of Mataram may trade at any VOC port except Ambon, Ternate or Banda, but must apply for a pass at Batavia if they are sailing for Melaka or points beyond.
Portuguese begin building a settlement at the present site of Kupang on western Timor.
VOC builds a trading post in the Tanimbar Islands.
1650 – VOC intervenes in uprising against Sultan Mandarsyah of Ternate, sparking civil war.
VOC reopens post at Jepara; Amangkurat I begins interfering in coastal trade.
VOC takes Kupang on western Timor;
Portuguese move to Lifau, in what is now East Timor.
VOC outpost at Perak is destroyed.
VOC takes Sultan Mandarsyah of Ternate to Batavia, makes him sign agreement not to grow cloves, starts military moves against opposing faction in Ternate.
Amangkurat I bans the export of rice or timber.
Tensions grow between the VOC and Gowa.
VOC deports population of Hoamoal near Ternate to Ambon.
VOC forces population of Buru to relocate to Kaleji Bay.
VOC sets up post at Manado.
War between VOC and Palembang.
VOC forces burn down Palembang,
and reestablish the VOC post.
Amangkurat I has several family members murdered,
including the mother of the future Amangkurat II.
Treaty between VOC and Banten:
prisoners and runaway slaves are to be exchanged; VOC receives a presence at Banten free from rent or taxes; boundary between Banten and VOC territory is set.
VOC builds fort in the Aru Islands,
but soon abandons it
VOC attacks Gowa,
destroys Portuguese ships in harbor, and forces peace treaty on Sultan Hasanuddin of Gowa.
Amangkurat I closes ports again; VOC leaves Jepara.
By the end of the 1660s,
Banten was trading directly
with China, Japan, Thailand, India and Arabia, using its own ships to compete with English, French, Danish and VOC traders.
Sultan Ageng of Banten was a strong opponent of the VOC monopoly who insisted on promoting trade with other European, Arab and Asian traders as he pleased.
Dr Iwan Note:
To this historical fact, we can proved with the founding of many Chinese ceramic from this era late Ming and early Qing found at Banten Lama,around karang Hantu port and Sorosuwan Citadel.
For complete information look at other CD-ROM
the Chinese ceramic found in Indonesia
contact via comment at
Portuguese headquarters in the east is moved from Larantuka, Flores to Lifau (today Oecussi or Pantemakassar) in what is now East Timor.
VOC signs treaty with chiefs on Roti.
Spanish abandon post at Tidore.
VOC allows Arung Palakka and followers to settle at Batavia.
Banten begins direct trade with Manila.
Treaty of Painan:
coastal areas of Minangkabau, including Padang, become a protectorate of the VOC, which guarantees them security against raids from Aceh.
VOC sends out a fleet under Admiral Cornelis Speelman, with Bugis soldiers under Arung Palakka and Ambonese soldiers under “Captain Jonker”,
to settle issues in Gowa and Maluku.
VOC expedition under Speelman
lands at Butung, and clears the island of Gowa forces. Speelman expedition forces the Sultan of Tidore (now free of Spanish presence) to submit to the VOC. A peace treaty is signed between Ternate and Tidore, now both under VOC control.
Future Amangkurat II begins seeking VOC help against his father. The English give up claims to Banda in exchange for Manhattan Island in America.
Sultan Hasanuddin of Gowa
is remembered for fighting bravely against the VOC, but he eventually had to sign a treaty giving up almost all his territories to the Dutch.
Indonesian war boat
Speelman expedition finally defeats Gowa.
Treaty of Bungaya:
Gowa submits to VOC control, and Sultan Hasanuddin has no influence outside the general area of the city of Makassar. VOC extends claims to Sumbawa and Flores after the defeat of Gowa.
VOC builds a fort at Menggala in Lampung.
Sultan Hasanuddin of Gowa passes away; continuing troubles against the VOC in Gowa finally end. V
OC traders at Banjarmasin are massacred.
VOC establishes outposts at Bengkalis
(across the straits from Melaka) and Perak, both for controlling the trade in tin.
Louis XIV of France invaded the Netherlands with 100,000 soldiers. The Dutch had to open the dikes and flood the fields to prevent Amsterdam from falling to the French. However, since travel and communication were so slow in the 1600s and 1700s, these events had little effect on the activities of the VOC, which had the power to govern itself in any case.
Rebels appeal to Islamic sentiments among the common people against both the court of Mataram and the VOC.
Amangkurat I sends his son, Pangeran Puger, to the VOC to ask for help.
VOC sends Admiral Speelman to fight the rebels against Mataram in North Java and Madura. Speelman quiets the rebellion along the coast between Cirebon and Jepara.
VOC makes a treaty with Amangkurat I:
VOC will help Mataram, VOC territory around Batavia will be extended eastward, VOC may establish a factory anywhere they like without any restrictions on exports or imports, Mataram will restrict Malays, Arabs and other outsiders from settling in Mataram, and Mataram will repay the VOC for the cost of putting down the rebellion.
Speelman receives the right to make treaties on behalf of Amangkurat I.
VOC pushes Trunojoyo out of Surabaya.
Trunojoyo leaves behind over a 100 cannons.
Amangkurat I dies.
seeks VOC help against the rebels.
VOC occupies Sangir islands.
Amangkurat II gives the VOC a monopoly
on the sugar trade in Jepara.
Amangkurat II, without money to pay his debts to the VOC, promises to give up Semarang, his claims to the Priangan, and fees from coastal ports until debts are paid.
VOC and Amangkurat II march on Kediri and destroy Trunojoyo’s headquarters
after a fifty-day siege. Arung Palakka and his supporters fight for the VOC as mercenaries, and conspire to win away Makassarese mercenaries fighting for Trunojoyo.
Nine Makassarese chiefs who had been fighting for Trunojoyo as mercenaries surrender to the VOC, and are allowed to return to Sulawesi.
VOC and Arung Palakka
drive the remaining Makassarese out of East Java. VOC makes an alliance with Minahasans at Manado.
gives himself up to the combined VOC and Mataram forces, under the promise that his life will be spared. He is executed anyway.
(In one story, he is promised the post of minister and executed by Amangkurat II himself, with a royal keris.)
A couple in discussion
From the 1680s
to the early nineteenth century, there was a rapid increase in the output of woven cotton and batik. (Andaya 1989: 40)
Weaving was a major source of income for local families by 1785,
with red and blue checks prominent. Although cotton was the most important fibre, silk and palm fibres also figured. (Pelras 1996: 241-2, 245) Numerous migrants, from South and Southeast Sulawesi, diffused the area’s techniques around the archipelago. (Heersink 1999: 49-50; Maznah 1996: 88)
The Philippines had a lively weaving tradition, noted in the first Spanish documents. Panay had the highest reputation for its diaphanous materials woven from pineapple fibres, known as piña or nipi.
This cloth was also famous for its designs and bright and varied colours, and almost every family in the province of Iloilo had a loom by the early nineteenth century. (McCoy 1982: 301-3; Mallat 1983: 190, 195-6)
Also entering into Philippines textiles, often in complex mixtures, were cotton, silk, and abacá, the latter a kind of banana confusingly called Manila hemp. Ilocos was the chief centre of cotton cloth production, with an estimated 20,000 looms
By the late seventeenth century,
Persia produced much cheap cotton cloth, but it still could not rival fine Indian cottons. (Ferrier 1996: 174-5)
Coarse stuffs were traditionally employed for tents and ‘middle class’ clothing, but there were indications of better quality cloth, including prints, being made in the eighteenth century, notably in Isfahan, Yazd and Kirman. (Issawi 1971: 262-81)
Iraq had the misfortune of being fought over repeatedly by Persians and Turks from the sixteenth century, dimming the textile glories of the Abbasid Caliphate
A gloomy French report from the 1780s
opined that ‘a few woollen manufactures’ in Baghdad was all that remained, and that imports from Persia, India and Europe dominated the market.
In reality, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Kirkuk retained small silk, cotton and woollen industries, and some rural linen production survived
had given the world the name ‘muslins,’ was a mere shadow of its former self. (Khoury 1997: 33-7; Shields 2000: 76-8, 99; Lombard 1978: 64)
Silks and woollens were initially to the fore in the Ottoman empire, but cottons grew rapidly from the seventeenth century, beginning close to existing centres in Syria. The Diyarbakir region of Southeastern Anatolia was prominent, specialising in red cloths modelled on Indian fashions. (Baker 1995: 160; Issawi 1966: 33) As for Cyprus, it printed calicoes to cover divans. (Issawi 1966: 44) Bursa, the old Ottoman capital, initially focused almost exclusively on silk, but developed the printing of cottons after 1600.
Istanbul also became known for its prints. (Baker 1995: 160) The rise of cotton textiles in the Ottoman Balkans came in the eighteenth century, supplementing existing woollens. (Crampton 1987: 10-11; Castellan and Todorov 1976: 19; Jones 1981: 189-91; Issawi 1966: 43-4, 48-9
Greater Syria, incorporated into the Ottoman empire in 1516,
had the best established cotton weaving sector in the Middle East, based on local cultivation of cotton. The area also produced exquisite silks, and cloth of gold. (Lamm 1937: 226-34)
Pre-colonial records are even sparser for eastern Indonesia than they are for Sulawesi, and only the sketchiest outline can be given of the region’s history before the 17th century.
The islands of Maluku had supplied cloves to other parts of the world since at least 1700 B.C., according to archaeological evidence from the Middle East, and they were also the only source of nutmeg. The small islands with their narrow coastal plains, however, could only sustain a relatively small population, and there appear to have been no large polities in the region before the 15th century, when the tiny clove-producing islands of Ternate and Tidore began to emerge as major political centres. Except in Sula, Buru, Ambon and Seram, where Ternatean aristocrats ruled directly, both empires operated as a network of alliances and vassalages, rather than as tightly ruled polities, and there was considerable ebb and flow in the degree of authority that each exercised. Ternate reached the peak of its power in the late 16th century under the warlike Sultan Baabullah.
As the main reason for European interest in the Indies, the Spice Islands were amongst the first to experience direct European military intervention. Ternate and Tidore were unable to prevent first the Portuguese and Spanish and later the Dutch and English from establishing fortified trading posts in the region, though Ternate had a number of military victories over the Europeans in the course of the sporadic hostilities of the 16th and early 17th centuries.
By the middle of the 17th century, however, Ternate’s need for free trade in spices was fundamentally in conflict with the Dutch aims for monopoly. In 1652, the Dutch extracted a treaty from Ternate giving the Company a monopoly of clove production, and broke the power of local Ternatean lords in a series of bloody campaigns during the next few years. The Company then centred clove production on Ambon and sent out periodic expeditions to destroy clove trees in other regions.
The great island of New Guinea was also a major centre of population, but its people were concentrated in the interior and except on the fringes close to Maluku there is no record at all of political forms before the 17th century.
Imagining the Archipelago
Although trade routes had tied the Indonesian archipelago to China, India and the Middle East since very early times, the region remained relatively unknown to outsiders until five or six centuries ago. Long distances and the hazards of travel, together with the fact that Indonesians themselves carried most of the products of their islands to the outside world, meant that scholars in the major centres of civilization generally relied on sparse and often second hand accounts of Southeast Asia.
In the West, the Egyptian geographer Claudius Ptolemy (c. 85–165 AD) prepared a major geographical work, the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, containing a compilation of information on the region gathered from traders and seafarers. Ptolemy described a Golden Chersonese, or peninsula, far to the east which is normally identified with the Malay Peninsula and he records the existence of many islands in the vicinity. Ptolemy’s geography formed the basis of most Western conceptions of the Far East until the 16th century, and also influenced some of the Arab geographers. The maps of Idrisi (d. 1165) show a good deal more detail than those based on Ptolemy’s account, but they clearly reflect an attempt to reconcile imprecise and contradictory information originating from several centuries and a wide variety of sources.
The Indonesian Battaks King Sisingamangaraja Picture,art and document Historic collections
Frame One :
The Chronologic Historic of Sisingamangaraja.
Raja Si Singamangaraja I : Raja Manghuntal
King Si Singamangaraja I: King ManghuntalKing Si Singamangaraja I was the son of King Bonanionan Sinambela, namely the third or youngest son. King Boru Pasaribu Bonanionan married. Although they had long been married, but they do not have derivatives. Therefore Boru Pasaribu go to the “Spear-Sulu Sulu” to “marpangir” (wash with lime). Each time you finish marpangir, Boru Pasaribu pray to “Ompunta” above, beg mercy for gifted offspring. On one day, came flying into the light-Sulu Sulu Spear and alighted at altitude is respected in the place. Who came were introducing ourselves, like a flash-light glow that came and it was Ompunta Guru Doli. Ompunta Tuan Guru Boru Pasaribu Doli said that would give birth to a child. He said: “Believe that you will give birth to a child and give his name Singamangaraja”. If your son has grown up, tell him to take the signs of the kingdom of Raja Uti, comprising:1. Piso Gaja densely packed
2. Pungga Haomasan
3. Lage Haomasan
4. Hujur Siringis
5. Podang Halasan
6. Taboos SitarapullangNot long after starting Pasaribupun Boru contain. Once pregnant for 19 months Boru Pasaribu birth to a son. The Son is born with teeth that have grown and hairy tongue. During adolescence Singamangaraja much to do or act strange, especially in people who are not forgiving, who broke his promise, forgetting his compatriot a weak, relieve those who tarbeang losing gamble. The Singamangarajapun never showed amazement of people who partied in which gondangnya be silent and paddy and maize roots turned upward following the Si Singamangaraja when dihariara parjuragatan somersaults. This happened because they were forgotten.After the mother’s adult Singamangaraja Boru Pasaribu convey the message of Guru Ompunta Doli that Singamangaraja should take the signs of the kingdom of King Uti. He did not know where the sacred village of King Uti likewise his mother. He went armed with the show and lead prayer walking into the shrine.In the course of many obstacles as well as arrival at the sacred village of King Uti which turned out to exist in the area of Barus. There also he tried but all can be overcome with good. Sisingamangaraja met with King Uti and they eat together and she said: “It is true this is the King of the Batak people.” When finished eating they ask pedigree (martarombo) and Si Singamangarajapun her point, and besides that Sisingamangaraja ask a few elephants. The purpose Over Singamangaraja, King UTI said it would give such a message was conveyed on condition Si Ompunta Singamangaraja need to submit a banana leaf width of leaf thatch, quail tail and rope made of sand. Conditions that prompted the King Uti to get harajaon signs that can be met all the Singamangaraja. Being on the demand for elephant, Raja Uti gave origin Si Singamangaraja can catch yourself. The Singamangarajapun call the elephant saw the astonished King Uti. And after that he brought the signs were returned to the Bakara harajaon including the elephant. With harajaon signs it, be he a king Singamangaraja, mangalompoi lion, Lion naso halompoan.King Sisingamangaraja I to IX, King Si Singamangaraja not known when the death and where his tomb. The kings of this after having offspring and felt it was his successor go there and wander densely packed Piso Gaja not carried. They certainly have died is through the natural signs that there is a branch of a broken hariara Namarmutiha. If there is a broken branch hariara means any family member who died and if the main branch which means broken Si Singamangaraja King was dead. Namarmutiha hariara is also known as hariara mark and is still growing in Bakara.Usually this condition is followed by the dry weather season, so that the community expects rain through tonggo-tonggo King Sisingamangaraja. The Onom Ompu (Bakara, Sinambela, Sihite, Simanullang, Marbun and Simamora) from Bakara prepare margondang ceremony and asked the son of King Si Singamangaraja willingness for them gondangi.
By wearing clothing Batak ulos Jogia Sopipot and lift the dish contains rice bowl magic repose ulos Sande Huliman as conditions martonggo, son of the king even this is welcome to start the show. He also asked gondang and convey tonggo-tonggo (pray) to Ompunta the above to ask for rain, then manortorlah son of this king. At manortor that heaven was overcast and finally heavy rains and society Si Onom Ompupun greeted him with words Horas Horas Horas. Then piso Gaja densely packed even referred to it and removed / drew perfectly from the nest and lifted upward while manortor. Who among the king’s son who can do things on top of it was he who became King Si Singamangaraja the next, so do not have the oldest son.
Respectively be the King The next Singamangaraja and approximate year reign is as follows:
Ø Singamangaraja II, King Tinaruan Ompu
Ø Singamangaraja III, King Itubungna
Ø Singamangaraja IV, Sir Sorimangaraja
Ø Singamangaraja V, King Pallongos
Ø Singamangaraja VI, King Pangolbuk
Ø Singamangaraja VII, sir Ompu Lumbut
Ø Singamangaraja VIII, Ompu Sotaronggal
Ø Singamangaraja IX, Ompu Sohalompoan
Ø Singamangaraja X, Ompu Mr. Na Bolon
Ø Singamangaraja XI, Ompu Sohahuaon
Ø Singamangaraja XII, Patuan Bosar, title Ompu Pulo Batu
King Si Singamangaraja X: Ompu Tuan Nabolon
King Si Singamangaraja X Ompu Mr. Nabolon died because beheaded by Si Pokki Nangolngolan or Tuanku Rao, who with a sly sense to invite the King Si Singamangaraja X to come to Butar. At a meeting in Butar that the Pokki decapitate King Sisingamangaraja X. Chief King is flying away, flying into the lap of his mother Boru Situmorang. By his mother, secretly buried in a large stone in Lumban King, because earlier he had sensed the events that would befall his son.
The body of King Si Singamangaraja X parhorboan lying on the hill, buried in the earth because of the hill suddenly collapsed. King of the Onom Ompu with the followers who accompanied King Si Singamangaraja X and some friends were against the Pokki it dies. But because the Pokki troops who had been hiding came to help the Pokki and the Pokki become stronger, they fled to Mount Immune am left. The Pokki continued to attack and many ditewaskannya Bakara both adults and young children.
According to the Pokki Nangolngolan (Tuanku Rao), he was the son of the King’s sister Sisingamangaraja X who goes to Bonjol. Pokki Nangolngolan said that he had missed the bone and he’ll feed him (manulangi) and will give the piso-piso (money) as an offering. Because the sweet words of the then King Sisingamangaraja this Pokki X went to butar. Although initially he say why the Pokki not come into Bakara.
Because do not get the corpse of King The Singamangaraja X, Tuanku Rao continued to attack the Bakara. Many residents who were killed. His troops burned the entire area in its path from Butar into Bakara including Pande Lumban palace in Bakara.
Wife of the King The first X Singamangaraja namely Boru Situmorang with 2 small children fled to the village of Boho Daily Lintong parents Situmorang. Being the second wife surnamed Nainggolan Boru and his son King Mangalambung kidnapped the Pokki with other children who had expected a son of King Si Singamangaraja X. They were taken to the southeast on the way back to Bonjol. In his travels in South Tapanuli was an outbreak of infectious disease (begu antuk) are also on / attacking forces so Tuanku Rao mess. Prisoners scattered in the South Tapanuli. Some of these scattered settlements in the area make South Tapanuli this.
King Si Singamangaraja XI: Ompu Sohahuaon
Not to mention over the suffering caused by the attack happened also Pokki prolonged dry season. The Society agreed Onom Ompu convey this to the Boru Situmorang and asked him to return to the Bakara. After Boru Situmorang brought her two children back, masyarakatpun requested that they Sohahuaon Ompu gondangi to rain.
Events margondangpun well prepared and Ompu Sohahuaon little dress comes with Batak ulos. Boru Situmorang and the community was shocked and amazed Onom Ompu, because Ompu Sohahuaon young gondang was able to ask and say tonggo-downs tonggo to rain. They chanted with manortor. Haripun darkened by clouds and fell with a heavy hujanpun. Ompu manortor Sohahuaon continue until the end gondang who asked him to. Then handed over to him and Piso Gaja densely packed manortor back while wielding Piso Gaja densely packed perfectly and sheathed again. Ompu Sohahuaon Singamangaraja crowned king of Si XI at the age of 10 years.
In the reign of King Si Singamangaraja XI drafted “Pustaha Harajaon (royal library),” written with ink / Chinese ink on legal-sized paper-made Italian Watermark in writing and Batak language. This library is made of guidance from Ompu Sohahuaon own. Pustaha harajaon consists of 24 volumes, each about 5 cm thick jilidnya whose contents can be briefly described as follows:
Volume 1 to 3: Government Mr Sorimangaraja for 90 derived from the Princess But Donda Nauasan.
Volumes 4 to 7: Government royal Singamangaraja I s / d IX.
Volume 8: About Sword Padri Tuanku Rao against Mr. Nabolon Sisingamangaraja X.
Volume 9: About Pongkinangolngolan and Datu Safe Tagor Simanullang.
Volumes 11 to 12: About Pastor Pilgram, killing of the Reverend Lyman and Munson by King Panggalamei.
Volumes 13-16: The period of rebuilding the capital of the kingdom of Bakara, and regions in 1835-1845 Toba on pembumi hangusan knurl war.
Volume 17: Subject Dr. Junghun, van der Tuuk who come see Sisingamangaraja XI and about photonya.
Vol 18 s / d 24: Coronation of Ompu Sohahuaon be Sisingamangaraja XI, his government until the year 1886 and about a devastating infectious disease in the land of Batak.
Pustaha Harajaon is found from the pile being burned by the royal house of the Dutch Military. Brought to Holland by Reverend Pilgrams and now in the Museum Library of the Netherlands in Leiden Holland. Pustaha Harajaon not forwarded by Sisingamangaraja XII writing because there is no chance, because since the beginning of his reign, the Dutch colony has launched its aggression in Batak and surrounding soil, so Ompu Pulobatu fought for 30 years until death at the age of 59 years on 17 June 1907.King Si Singamangaraja XI Ompu Boru Arita Sohahuaon married as first wife who gave birth to King Parlopuk. The second wife gave birth Situmorang Boru Patuan Bosar Pulo Batu Ompu title. Different age of King Parlopuk with Patuan Bosar very far, there are about 15 years.
When Ompu Sohahuaon fell ill, the way the government carried out by King Parlopuk. King Parlopuk long enough to hold the job and properly implemented.
Ompu Sohahuaoan died in Bakara and built his tomb by King Parlopuk with Si Onom Ompu in Lumban King. This is the first tomb in the Bakara because Sisingamangaraja I to IX are not known to have died where. The King Left Singamangaraja XI died, Patuan Bosar being migrated to the Acehnese.The tomb was demolished by King Si Singamangaraja XII because Bakara attacked the Netherlands. King Si Singamangaraja bones XI brought join fight to the forest, because they do not want the skull of her parents were taken by the Dutch. During the struggle of these bones on Leave in huta Promise Dolok Sanggul then moved again to the Huta Paung. After the time of independence, again on the move at home Soposurung.Approximately 105 years later, the tomb was rebuilt by the family of King Sisingamangaraja and in 1975 the bones of King Sisingamangaraja istrerinya XI and returned to the tomb originally buried in Bakara. King Parlopuk continue to implement Singamangaraja government until the year 1871, ie after dinobatkannya Patuan Bosar as King Sisingamangaraja XII.King Si Singamangaraja XII: Patuan Bosar Ompu title Pulo BatuAlthough the king had died The Singamangaraja XI, Si Onom Ompu not feel something is missing in the government, because the King Parlopuk works pretty well. But when the dry season comes and brings suffering, start the Onom Ompu margondang think to the event. King Parlopukpun they invite to their gondangi martonggo begged him to rain. But the rain did not fall down too.Initially Ompu Pulo Batu gondangi because they would not feel that his brother had been substitute father as king. Finally Ompu Pulo Batu willing to see the pain suffered by society Si Onom Ompu. After the ceremony as it is commonly done, Ompu Pulobatu successfully bring rain. Pulo Ompu Batupun crowned king of The Singamangaraja XII in 1871.1848
Pulo Ompu Stone was born in 1848 from his mother Boru Situmorang. At the time of youth, Ompu Pulo Batu traveled to Aceh, there mingle with merchants from Persia and learn many things. Therefore, when the war against the Dutch, King Si Singamangaraja XII aided by fighters from Aceh, and the stamp / stempelnya use of Arabic and Batak.In 1877
King Si Singamangaraja XII declared war on the Netherlands. Then he runs the war against the Netherlands for 3 decades.
In 1601 the Est India Company’s first expedition was sent to the Indies, carrying trade goods and silver coin to the value of £28,742. It is not known what proportion of the coins was of the “Portcullis” issue. As trade coins they were too little and too late; the Spanish dollar was the accepted standard for the area, so they were probably used as bullion. The unit is a dollar or 8 testerns with fractions of half, quarter, and eighth.
This map shows the locations mentioned in the talk and Bantam in NE Java was the main factory (Trading Post) for the E.I.C.
The Struggle between the English and the Dutch for the Eastern Archipelago
Our real struggle for the Indian trade was to be with a very different rival. The decline of Spain and Portugal left the two Protestant sea-powers of the North face to face in the Asiatic seas. Holland entered on the contest in the patriotic flush of achieved independence, and with the same newly born sense of national unity which nerved Portugal for her heroic explorations two hundred years before. England had left behind her the spacious age of Elizabeth; before her stretched the crooked diplomacy and domestic disorders of a dynasty which could never become English at heart, and which had in the end to be cast forth. Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century the States-General played the leading maritime part in Europe, as the Portuguese House of Aviz had played it in the first half of the sixteenth.
The magnificent position which Holland thus won,
she merited by her services to mankind. It is scarcely too much to say that the political reformation of Europe dates from the Dutch Declaration of Independence in 1581. Then for the first time was asserted and enforced the principle that governments exist for nations, not nations for governments, as no abstract dogma, but as a truth for which a whole people was willing to die.
The vigour which achieved the liberty of Holland pulsed through every vein of her internal and external life. Amsterdam, the city of refuge from Parma’s havoc at Antwerp, became the European emporium of Indian commerce, richer and more powerful by far than Venice, Genoa, or Lisbon in their prime. Her manufactures were improved and her financial strength increased by the Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition, and who gave to Amsterdam alike the genius of Spinoza and the diamond-cutting industry which centres there to this day. Dutch navigators put a girdle of discovery and colonization round the globe from New Holland, now Australia, to New Amsterdam, now New York. Dutch agriculture, by transferring the potato and turnip from the garden to the field, created a new winter food for men and cattle, as has been pointed out by the political economist Thorold Rogers. This change made possible the growth of population in modern Europe, feeding threefold the inhabitants off areas which had barely supported one-third litz frequent peril of famine, and contributing more than any other cause to banish leprosy from Christendom. At the same time the Dutch leaped forward to the front rank of intellectual
activity. Holland became the printing house of Europe. Her thinkers were the oracles of their age, her painters have left an imperishable influence on art. Leyden was more famous for a time than Oxford or Paris, and it is still a tradition of the Scottish Bar to complete a legal education at the great Dutch university.
The outburst of national energy found its chief vent on the sea. The Indian voyage of De Houtman in 1595 fired the popular enthusiasm, and while the London merchants were awaiting the changing moods of Elizabeth, or extracting subscriptions for a single expedition, no fewer than fifteen fleets sailed between 1595 and 1601 from Holland to the East. This period of “separate” Dutch voyages is so little realized by English historians, yet forms so essential a part of the Dutch precedent closely followed by the English Company, that I give their details below4. Of the sixty-five ships sent from Holland in the six years from April, 1595, to May, 1601, Amsterdam supplied by far the larger number; Zeeland, with Middleburg as its centre, came next; and the merchants of minor states competed with companies of their own.
The Dutch government sagaciously foresaw the dangers to which separate expeditions might give rise in distant and hostile seas: that opposition of interests among rival groups of adventurers of the same nation, and that weakness in the face of a common enemy, to which the English system of “separate voyages” subsequently succumbed. On March 20, 1602, as we have
Delhi Gate of the fort at Agra
seen, it united the Indian Companies in the several states into one Joint Stock Association under the title of the United East India Company, with an exclusive monopoly of the Indian trade for twenty-one years, dating from January 1, 1602.
The combination was compulsory, as any company which refused to join would be ipso facto shut out from the Indian trade. On the other hand, the Dutch government behaved liberally to the separate organizations, and took over their directors for life into the joint directorate of the United Company. In this way the number of directors of the United Company, although fixed in permanence under the charter at sixty, was at first seventy-three. All this will become clear to any one who will take the pains to consult the Dutch records on the subject.
In a similar spirit the joint directorate was divided into six chambers, representing the six subscribing states in proportion to the amount which they severally contributed to the common capital. This representative principle was carried still further in the executive Committee of Seventeen entrusted with the management of the United Company’s expeditions. Sixteen of its members were taken from the six subscribing provincial centres in direct ratio to their contributions, while the seventeenth was appointed by the minor states in succession.
The government had close relations with the personnel of the directorate. Reports were made to the States-General; accounts were to be submitted to them;
they supervised the Company’s instructions to its servants; and they left in the hands of the Company until 1638 a sum of twenty-five thousand florins (£2000) due for the charter of 1602. The Council of Seventeen was, in fact, a sort of elected Board of Control, intermediate between the Dutch Company and the States-General, somewhat, although by no means exactly, like the Board of Control established nearly two centuries later between the English East India Company and Parliament.
The qualification for a director in the four leading Chambers was £500 and £250 in the two minor ones. The directors and their staff were to be remunerated by one per cent. on the cargoes. A general reckoning was to be made every ten years, at which periods shareholders might reclaim their subscriptions and withdraw. The shares were ordinary ones of £250 each, and “head-participant” shares of £500. The subscription was thrown open to the whole population of Holland. But practically the first expedition in 1602 consisted of the ships belonging to the previous separate companies and taken over from them by the United Dutch Company.
So high rose the tide of national enthusiasm that even ruined Antwerp, bleeding and mangled in the claws of Spain, found money for shares. Her clandestine subscriptions, through agents at Amsterdam and Middelburg, roused the wrath of her oppressors, and an Antwerp merchant was condemned to lifelong imprisonment for this offence. The great Company, with its
capital of, say, £540,000, and with ample powers of conquest or attack vested in it by the State, was recognized by friend and foe as a new national force. It marks, in truth, the final development of that policy of sea-war by sea-trade with which Holland had first confronted, and was now about to beat down, Spain.
The States-General perfectly understood that there could be no peace between the two nations. It was not merely a question of the sullen Spanish pride, and of the long slaughter of Protestant saints and patriots in sacked towns and on bloody fields; it was also the spectral procession of those one hundred thousand judicial murders of peaceful men and women by fire and torture and burying alive, before the country rose in its despair, that compelled every act of Holland to be an act of war against Spain. The United East India Company was the instrument by which the Dutch were to compel the oppressor first to an unwilling truce, and finally to let them go.
That magnificent achievement belongs to European history, and I here venture only to note a few of the first landmarks which it left behind in Asia. In 1602 the fleet of the Dutch Company routed the Portuguese near Bantam, and laid open for ever the road to the Moluccas or Spice Islands. From that date the ascendency of the Dutch in the Eastern seas, although subject to occasional checks, was only a question of time.
In 1603 they threatened Goa, the middle capital of the Indo-Portuguese route, and in 1606 blockaded its western terminus by carrying the war into the estuary
of the Tagus itself. They shut up that river by a great expedition, to which the Dutch East India Company largely contributed, and in April, 1607, they totally destroyed the Spanish fleet in Gibraltar Bay. In the furthermost East, the Dutch wrenched the fairest isles of the Moluccas from the Portuguese, and although partially expelled for a time, they returned in force, gradually completed the conquest, and ousted the Portuguese trade even in Japan.
A bird’s eye view of Bantam
The exclusive possession of the Spice Islands became a fixed point in the Dutch policy. The instructions to their first governor-general, Pieter Both (1609–1614), were that “the commerce of the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda should belong to the Company, and that no other nation in the world should have the least part.” Throughout their long negotiations with England, they never yielded their sovereign rights in the Spice Islands.
Having thus struck at Spain at the two extremities
of her Indo-Portuguese trade, Lisbon and the Moluccas, the Dutch proceeded deliberately to establish themselves at vantage-posts along the line of communication. Into the military operations of the next half-century space precludes me from entering. Five dates must suffice to mark the further Dutch conquest of the Indian trade-route. Having made themselves a power in Java, midway between the Malay Straits and the Moluccas, they fixed their capital at Batavia on its northern coast, in 1619. In 1641 they captured Malacca from the Portuguese, and thus turned the straits into a Dutch waterway. From 1638 onwards they expelled the Portuguese from Ceylon, driving them from their last stronghold in 1658. They took possession of the great half-way house of Indo-European commerce, the Cape of Good Hope, and settled a colony there in 1652. When Portugal emerged, in 1640, from her sixty years’ captivity to Spain, she found that her power in the Eastern seas had passed to the Dutch. In 1641 she surrendered for ever her exclusive claims to the spice trade by a treaty with Holland, on the basis of the Dutch retaining their conquests, and of free navigation and trade to both powers in the Eastern seas.
Holland’s conquest of the Indian Archipelago was, in truth, a conquest by treaty not less than by war. Always ready to fight, she regarded fighting chiefly as an instrument of trade. Her object was not, as Portugal’s had been, to take vengeance on the “nefandissimi Machometi secta” for the loss of the Holy Places in Palestine, or to swell the pride of a royal house by
new Asiatic titles and to bring the kingdoms of the East within the Christian fold, but by establishing a sufficient degree of sovereignty over the islands to prevent them from selling their spices to any European nation but herself. Where she found a stringent supremacy needful, she established it; where a less control sufficed, she was at first willing to leave the princes and peoples very much to themselves. The whole process is laid bare in the documents copied for the English East India Company during our occupation of Java (1811–1818) and now preserved in the India Office.
I intend, as in my sketch of the Portuguese policy in Asia, to exhibit briefly from the manuscript records the methods, rather than the military operations, by which the Dutch built up their supremacy in the Eastern seas. So far as it is possible to generalize, the Dutch kept three points steadily in view. First, the sovereign authority of Holland must be acknowledged by the island-chiefs. This was asserted sometimes as the result of conquest, but frequently in the form of a protectorate, the native princes consenting to hold their territories as a kind of fief under the Dutch suzerainty. Second, all other European nations, and especially England, were to be excluded from the island trade; and in many cases specific engagements were entered into for war against Portugal and Spain. Third, as the Dutch tightened their grasp on the Archipelago, they adopted more drastic provisions for the maintenance of their monopoly. The natives were forbidden
to sail beyond certain limits from their respective coasts, under pain of piracy; they were prohibited from trading with Indian or other Asiatic ports; and they were compelled to root up their spice-trees in islands which competed with the produce of the Dutch settlements. Stipulations were sometimes introduced
The Old East India House used as the Sign of a “Joiner.”
to permit the introduction of the Reformed Religion.
A few examples must suffice to illustrate these general principles of policy. The arena was that great island world, perhaps the mountain-tops and plateaus of a submerged continent, which stretches from the shores of Asia to the Australian coast An almost continuous belt of long islands (Sumatra, Java, Flores and Timor, and others) curves south-eastwards from the Malay Peninsula to the northwest point of Australia. Within this belt, on the north, lie Borneo; Celebes to the east of Borneo; the Moluccas or Spice Islands, including Ternate and Tidore; with the valuable Nutmeg and Clove Isles, Banda, Amboyna, Pulaway, Pularoon, and Rosengyn among them to the south; and finally New Guinea at the easternmost extremity. The Philippines stretch in elongated broken masses northward from the Spice Islands toward Formosa, China, and Japan.
The Dutch resolved to make themselves masters both of the outer or southern belt of long islands and of the rich spice archipelago which they girt in. A glance at the map will show that the first strategic point on the outer belt is Achin, on the north-western point of Sumatra, commanding the entrance to the narrow sea between that island and the Malay Peninsula. The King of Achin claimed a disputed supremacy over all Sumatra, and in 1600 the Dutch entered into a treaty with him for a resident factory. The relations were gradually strengthened into an armed alliance against
the Portuguese, whose Eastern capital, Malacca, dominated the opposite coast. When the Dutch grew strong and the Achin raja, fearing the results of their success, began to give trouble, he found his dependent chiefdoms and islets had themselves entered into separate engagements with Holland acknowledging her sovereignty, and securing to her the privileges of exclusive trade. From the year 1688 onward, and even before that date, the Dutch treaties with the Sumatra minor chiefs pledged them to hostility against the King of Achin.
On the opposite coast of the Malay Peninsula the Dutch took even more effective measures. The keys to the passage on the northern side were Portuguese Malacca, about two-thirds down the straits, and the native kingdom of Johor, at their exit near the eastern point of the Malay Peninsula. In the early days’ of the Dutch Company, Malacca, the Eastern capital of Portuguese Asia, could defy any Protestant fleet unless aided by a native land power. So in 1606 the Dutch made a compact with Johor to seize Malacca; Holland to keep the town and fortress, Johor to have the adjacent territory, and all captured property to be divided between them. From this time onward the Dutch could attack Malacca with the help of the Achin fleet from Sumatra on the northwest and of the Johor levies from the east. It was only their unstable relations with these native states that deferred the final fall of the Portuguese headquarters in the Far East to Holland in 1641. In that year the country around Malacca also abjured
its allegiance to Portugal and promised fidelity to the Dutch.
Of scarcely less importance than the Malacca passage between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, which thus came into Dutch keeping, were the Straits of Sunda between Sumatra and Java. This narrow opening formed an alternative entrance through the belt of long islands into the Archipelago, and the Dutch Company resolved to secure the command of it. Bantam, on the north-western point of Java, dominated its exit into the inner sea of islands. Even before the United Company’s first voyage, the “separate” Dutch commanders had made a compact with the Raja of Bantam for “mutual honest trade,” and the subsequent treaties with Bantam fill many pages of the India Office records.
In 1609, by an engagement known as the “Eternal Treaty,” the Dutch agreed to aid the Bantam raja against foreign enemies, particularly the Spanish and Portuguese, and his state slowly passed into a dependency of Holland The Dutch perceived, however, that the mouth of the Jacatra River, with its spacious bay, a little to the east of Bantam, afforded superior convenience for shipping. In 1612 a treaty secured free trade to the Dutch at Jacatra, and after a scuffle with the English, the Dutch destroyed the old Javanese town, rebuilt it under the name of Batavia, and made it their headquarters in the East (1619).
The clearness of vision which led them to secure the two main inlets into the Archipelago (the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sunda) also guided the
Dutch to the best sites in the enclosed island world. The positions which they took up were either strong for war or rich in trade, and eventually passed into the Dutch power by conquest from the Portuguese or by treaties with the native chiefs. Almost everywhere we find a defensive alliance with the natives against the Portuguese becomes the basis of the Dutch power. Thus
A Chinese Street in Batavia, Java
at Ternate, the chief seat of trade in the Moluccas or Spice Islands, the Sultan entered into a treaty with the Dutch admiral in 1607 for protection against a Spanish-Portuguese armada. The right to build and to destroy forts followed. The uprooting of the clove-trees which might compete with the Dutch at Amboyna came in due course; and in 1649 the Sultan appointed the Dutch governor as his viceroy over his chief island dependencies.
One other example must suffice. Amboyna, the richest clove island of the Southern Moluccas, had been visited by the Dutch “separate” expeditions, and entered into a trade arrangement. In 1600 this friendly relation was strengthened into a compact for the expulsion of the Portuguese and the erection of a Dutch castle. In 1605 the chiefs acknowledged the sovereignty of Holland, in return for a guarantee of protection against Portugal and Spain. They agreed to aid the Dutch in their wars and to sell their cloves to no other nation. As the Dutch drew tighter their bonds on the Moluccas, Amboyna, like its suzerain island, Ternate, grew restive. But in 1618 the Dutch finally established their supremacy at Amboyna, and secured by treaties the exclusive trade, the free exercise of the Reformed Religion, and the right to demand forced labour. In 1628 they took advantage of a dispute in the family of the Ternate raja to shake off his suzerain claims to the customs duties at Amboyna, and to declare themselves masters of the island by virtue of conquest from the Portuguese in 1605.
The harsher measures of the Dutch in the Archipelago belong, generally, to a period subsequent to 1623. It was not till a much later date that they fully developed their system of confining the islanders on pain of piracy to their own or adjacent coasts, forbade their sending or receiving embassies to or from India and the Asiatic continent, and enforced a tribute in “full-grown slaves.” In the early years of the seventeenth century the Dutch really were what they declared themselves to be, the deliverers of the islands from Portuguese oppression. In return for their protection they demanded the exclusive trade and such subsidiary guarantees as they deemed needful to secure it.
The growing rivalry of the English put an end to this state of comparative calm. On the one hand, the Dutch claimed the monopoly of the richest of the Spice Islands on the threefold ground of priority of occupation, services rendered to the natives against the Portuguese, and treaties which at once defined and secured their rights. On the other hand, the English asserted the still earlier arrival of Drake’s ship in 1579, denied that the isolated coast castles of the Dutch amounted to effective occupation of a great archipelago, and claimed an equal right with the Dutch to make treaties with the native powers.
The English claim founded on Drake’s priority of discovery could not be pressed in serious diplomacy, as it told against our general contention that a title to territory could be maintained only on the ground of
actual possession, or effective occupation. But it long served as a national rallying cry. In 1606 Sir Henry Middleton asserted our right to a factory in the Moluccas, “for that Sir Francis Drake had trade in Ternate
Sir Francis Drake
before the name of the Hollanders was known in those parts of the world.” As late as 1652 it formed a basis of a discourse, the East India Trade first discovered by the English, in which the author gravely relates how the Dutch “took the advantage of the negligent and inconsiderate English” to secure the profits of Drake’s
discovery. This popular plea, although put forward in official documents, cannot be accepted by an honest historian. But it explains that sense of having been overreached which embittered English feeling to the Dutch.
The situation was in fact incompatible with peace. Yet Holland and England were not only at peace in Europe, but were the joint champions of a great religious cause. Nor could either country at once forget that, but for Elizabeth’s coldness to the Dutch overtures, the English queen might have been the sovereign of the united nations. On the arrival of the English ships in the East in 1602, the commanders of the two Protestant fleets joined against the Portuguese; and, as we saw, the plunder of a Portugal ship supplied the return cargo for the first voyage of the London Company. But the Dutch quickly perceived that the English were both weak and inconvenient neighbours in the Archipelago.
Each English voyage worked with a small capital, and raised the local prices by eagerness to secure a freight. The Dutch abstained for a time from hostilities, yet strove to frighten the natives from dealing with the newcomers by representing them as buccaneers. When the island chiefs found that the English, instead of making piratical descents, came with money in their hands, and parted with it more freely than the Dutch, this device failed. The Dutch next tried bribery, and in 1603 were said to have offered twelve thousand dollars to the natives of Pularoon if they would not trade with the English. The death of Elizabeth in 1603, and
King James’s treaty with Spain and Portugal in the following year, broke the tradition of Dutch and English friendship based on the joint championship of the Protestant cause. Scruples of sentiment or of religion disappeared, and commercial rivalry became the permanent factor in the relations of England and Holland.
It is not needful to dwell on the. early phases of the struggle which ensued. The English Company was the weakling child of the old age of Elizabeth and of the shifty policy of King James; the Dutch Company was the strong outgrowth of the life and death struggle of a new nation with its Spanish oppressors. The English Company began with slender resources in 1601 the system of “separate voyages,” which the Dutch Company, after a trial of that method on a great scale after 1595, deliberately abandoned in 1602 for the joint system of a -United Company with vast capital – the joint system which the English adopted only after eleven years of painful experience in 1612, and even then in a less stable form.
Yet the English boldly stood forth to the natives not only as rivals but as opponents of the Dutch. In 1605 the King of Tidore, in the Spice Islands, appealed to King James for help against the Hollanders, on the ground that his Majesty was in friendship with Spain. The King of Ternate, hard by, inquired after the health of the “great Captain Francis Drake,” whose return we have daily expected,” and complained that the Dutch, having driven out the Portuguese, prevented him from granting a factory to the English. The King
of Bantam in Java rejoiced that “now England and Bantam are both as one.” From Achin in Sumatra, commanding the western gateway of the Archipelago, to the Spice Islands in its farthest east, the Dutch found themselves encountered by a new set of competing, and sometimes hostile, compacts between the native princes and the English Company.
We even went so far as to try to provide an English wife for the King of Sumatra. As that potentate had expressed a wish for such a consort, “a gentleman of honourable parentage” proposed at a court meeting of the Company in 1614, “his daughter of most excellent parts for music, her needle, and good discourse, as also very beautiful and personable.” The probable benefit to the Company was gravely debated, “and the lawfulness of the enterprise proved by Scripture.” But, as the State Papers show, some feared that the other wives “may poison her if she became an extraordinary favourite.” The father was willing to take the risk, but we do not hear that the lady went out. Yet the bare suggestion must have seemed alarming to the Dutch.
Nor did the English diplomacy in Europe tend to soothe the rivalry in the Asiatic seas. Holland quickly valued at its real worth the lip-friendship of King James. During the Dutch efforts for a settlement with Spain, England was detached from the Protestant cause by the bait of a Spanish marriage, and of the Netherlands as a prospective dowry of the Infanta after the death of the childless archduke. Holland, thus deserted,
saw her hoped-for peace with Spain dwindle to the Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609, leaving the menace of a Spanish war on its expiration, and a resentment against England for a century to come.
A gun from the Indian Archipelago
The Dutch in the East took prompt measures to deal with the situation. If England proved so faint a friend in Europe, the Archipelago was to become a place of little ease for the English Company. Scarcely had the Spanish truce of 1609 given Holland a breathing-pause than she resolved to consolidate her Asiatic settlements under a firm local control. The Council of Seventeen nominated Pieter Both, a man of great ability, to the charge of the Company’s factories, and in November, 1609, the States-General commissioned him with extensive powers as the first governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. Pieter Both justified their confidence. He had proved his capacity as admiral of the Brabant Company’s expedition in 1599–1601, and his initial duty in his new high office was to take an oath of fidelity of the Dutch servants in the East to the States-General and the United Company.
He sailed as governor-general with a fleet of eight ships in January, 1610, and after months of storm arrived
at Bantam in January, 1611. During the next four years he brought the islands within a network of treaties. He thus confirmed from Java to the Moluccas the supremacy and exclusive trade of the Dutch; procured, when expedient, the toleration of the Protestant religion; and laid the foundations of a new national power in the Eastern Archipelago. On the expiration of his office, he sailed in January, 1615, with four richly laden vessels for Europe, but perished in a hurricane off the Mauritius. The name of a mountain in that island long commemorated his loss, and appears in a journal of 1689 as “Pierre Both.”
He had found his task an easy one. The native rulers in the Archipelago, like the coast rajas with whom the Portuguese dealt on the Malabar seaboard, were princes on a small scale. The greatest of them, like the King of Achin and the Sultan of Ternate, exercised an uncertain suzerainty over detached territories and islands, each with lesser chiefs of its own. Nor as regards the English did the first Dutch governor-general find much difficulty. The whole number of English ships sent out up to the year 1610, inclusive, amounted to seventeen, and of the seventeen vessels only a few were at any one time in Asiatic waters. The Dutch, on the other hand, had sent out sixty-five ships before the union of the separate companies in 1602, and sixty-nine vessels from 1602 to 1610. The armament and fighting force of the English ships were also inferior to the Dutch. The Dutch, moreover, took a practical care for the well-being and morals of their
servants that was unknown in the English factories. While the London Company sent out volumes of sermons and forced back the first English wife, the Dutch governor-general carried with him thirty-six goodly young women as mates to their countrymen in the East. It was not till more than half a century later that the English Company, moved by the scandal of a half-caste population, followed their example.
The English factors and captains in the Archipelago were in truth outmatched at every point, and the London Company found itself compelled to seek support nearer home. In 1611 it opened negotiations at Amsterdam. A letter of Robert Middleton to the burgomasters of that city proposed “that as our nations have long continued in firm bonds and league of amity, so we might peaceably proceed to trade jointly together without troubling of either states.” The Dutch replied in an amicable spirit, and proposed to approach the States-General on the subject. But meanwhile the London merchants realized that the struggle was a national one, not to be settled by the two Companies alone, and had declared to the Lord High Treasurer of England that they “are enforced at last to break silence and complain their griefs.”
The tale they told was one to which no English sovereign could turn a deaf ear. They had “long and patiently endured sundry notorious wrongs and injurious courses at the hands of the Hollanders,” and being now reduced to extremities “but having no means of remedy, do humbly implore your Lordship’s honourable
assistance and mediation to the States.” They based their claim to trade in the Archipelago on the prior discoveries of Drake, Cavendish, and Lancaster; and on Drake’s compact with the King of Ternate (the suzerain of the Moluccas) long before the Dutch were heard of in those seas. The argument had its inconveniences, for it would have told still more strongly in favour of the Portuguese prior rights which the English Company were about to scatter to the winds. But it sufficed to bring the question within the range of European diplomacy, and to open out new opportunities to James in his favourite role of the peacemaking monarch.
From this period the relations of the Dutch and English Companies divide into two distinct branches: continuous negotiation in Europe, and continuous contests in the East. After preliminary action by our ambassador in Holland, the States-General, in 1613, sent commissioners accompanied by Grotius, then pensionary of Rotterdam and the foremost international jurist of the age, to treat with English commissioners in London. Much wrangling resulted in a vague agreement in 1614 that each nation should enjoy such places as it had conquered or discovered, and pay customs
duties to the other at those ports, while both should join against the common enemy – Spain and Portugal. The governor of the English Company held a conference with the Dutch ambassador in London for “a loving alid friendly trade both defensive and offensive,” by the two corporations: we to throw open the Cambay coast to the Dutch, and they to admit us to the Spice Islands.
The growing animosities in the East rendered this arrangement a dead-letter, and in January, 1615, negotiations were renewed at The Hague. Sir Henry Wotton, our ambassador in Holland, together with certain commissioners to represent the East India Company, received a favourable audience from Barneveldt, who would gladly have seen the two Companies join “to beat the Spaniard out of the East Indies.” King James himself put pressure on the English Company to come to terms, but forbade any open breach with Spain. This last condition rendered a real agreement impossible for Holland. The English commissioners demanded free trade by the law of nations. The Dutch replied that any trade at all in the Eastern seas could be secured only by great armaments and garrisons against Spain, and that if the English refused to share in the cost, they could not fairly claim to share in the profits.
Finally Barneveldt offered three alternatives. First, for the English to retire from the trade; second, for the English to unite in a joint East India Company with the Dutch; third; for the English to maintain their position by a vigorous war. He declared that the
View of the River Hugli at Calcutta
The River Hugli, with its crowded shipping at Calcutta, tells the story of the commerce to-day between India, Europe, and the Farther East. The river-banks are lined with signs of busy trade, and the smart native boats ply their way in and out among the large foreign craft that load and unload their export and import wares.
States-General regarded the East Indian trade as a cardinal point in their national policy, and that they assisted the Dutch Company with great sums to maintain it by force of arms. The English, on the other hand, thought that the Dutch capital was wasted in wars and on an army of ten thousand soldiers in the East. Nothing remained but for our commissioners to come away. The negotiations of 1615 broke down at The Hague, as those of 1613–1614 had proved fruitless in London.
King James felt annoyed that he had failed in his part of royal peacemaker, and the Dutch were aware of the fact. They saw their advantage in a union which should compel the English to share in the Protestant defence of the Indies, and they had confidence in their own ability to retain the lion’s share of the trade. They therefore transferred the scene of operations once more to England, and their ambassador urged as a groundwork “for the amalgamation of the two Companies that they should jointly subscribe £1,200,000 to a common stock. The English Company had by this time broken the Spanish-Portuguese power on the Indian coast, and saw their way to trade without sharing in the costly armaments and island-defences of the Dutch. In August, 1615, they declared that they were content that Holland should surcease from her wars with Spain in the East, being themselves “confident that in time they will eat the Spaniard out of that trade, only by underselling him in all parts of Christendom.” So with “good words” they thanked the Dutch
ambassador, and the third series of negotiations came to an end.
Broach, on the coast of India, in 1778
Meanwhile the Hollanders were rendering our position intolerable in the Archipelago. In 1613 they forcibly prevented the people of Machian in the Moluccas from trading with us. In 1614 our agents retaliated by a treaty with the rich nutmeg island Banda, whose inhabitants declared themselves willing to live and die with the English. In 1615 the London Company encouraged its factors to break boldly into the Spice Islands and to attempt both Banda and Amboyna. But the Dutch replied by the argument of “seven tall ships” in the Archipelago, and threatened to sink any English interloper. In December, 1615, at their headquarters at Bantam in Java, “the envy of the Hollanders is so great that to take out one of our eyes they
will lose both their own.” In 1617 came the news that the Dutch had forty or fifty English prisoners in irons at Amboyna, starving on a single cake of bread a day, so that they were reduced to skin and bone.
The personal hatred between the agents of the two Companies had now risen to fever-heat. The English despised the phlegmatic “mechanic” ways of the Hollanders, called them “shoemakers” and “beer-brewers,” and flew into a passion at the mere sight of a Dutch document. In 1618 our admiral at Batavia, Sir Thomas Dale, on receiving a communication in Flemish, “scolded, stamped on the ground, swore, cursed,” asking “why the letters were not in French, Spanish, Latin, or any other language if we did not like to write English.” The Dutch paid back abuse with scorn, pulled down the English flag, befouled it, and tore it to pieces, and hit upon a device for rendering it hateful to the natives. In 1617 they “covered all the seas from the Red Sea to the coast of China, spoiling and robbing all nations in the name and under the colour of the English.” In 1618 they publicly insulted our flag by running up the French and English colours, with Prince Maurice’s banner displayed above, “triumphing in the doing thereof, because they have overcome both.”
If we look only to their position in the East, they had cause for exultation. Their second governor-general, Gerard Reynst (1614–1615), proved a worthy successor to Pieter Both. A director of the United Company at Amsterdam, Reynst was induced to accept the governor-generalship by liberal allowances, a gold
medal with a massy chain, and the assurance of being reappointed a director on his return. He sailed in July, 1613, at the head of a large fleet, with ample powers from the Council of Seventeen ratified by the States-General, and with a commission direct from Prince Maurice. This double sanction of the States-General and of the House of Orange represented the union of the supreme civil power with the highest military authority in Holland. It gave to the Flemish Company a national basis which was absent from the charters of our Stuart kings, and which the English Company only obtained by Acts of Parliament under Dutch William, three-quarters of a century later. The tenure of office for the Dutch governor-generals was five years – a term afterwards adopted for our own.
Thus backed by the strength of his nation, Reynst detached a squadron on the voyage out to plant factories at Aden and on the Arabian coast, and became the founder of the Dutch trade in the Red Sea. But his chief aim was to shut up the nutmeg and clove islands of the Archipelago against the English. With a fleet of eleven ships he chastised the Banda chiefs who had traded with us, seized on the neighbouring islands, and drove us out of Amboyna. His career was cut short by dysentery in December, 1615. Laurens Reaal (1616–1618), provisionally appointed to fill his place by the Council of India then assembled at Ternate, consolidated what his two predecessors had won. He strengthened the Dutch fortifications throughout the Archipelago, extended the Company’s commerce, filled its
exchequer, and prepared the way for the great governor-general who succeeded him.
The English Company also armed itself for a life or death struggle. In spite of obstacles the four expeditions of its First Joint Stock (1613–1616) were bringing home rich cargoes, and its shares rose to 207 per cent. in 1617. But much of its property then remained in the Indies, and, owing to losses from the Dutch, had eventually to be sold to the Second Joint Stock at a low valuation. Its accounts could not be finally wound up until 1621, and its whole profits during the eight
years (1613–1621) only amounted to 87½ per cent. Its permanent achievement, as we shall see, was the strengthening of our position not in the Eastern Archipelago, but on the west coast of India under the sanction of the Moghul emperor obtained by Sir Thomas Roe. In 1616, however, its credit stood high, and the expectations from the division of its profits still higher.
When, therefore, on the expiration of the four years of the First Joint Stock (1613–1616), the London Company resolved to open a new contribution for another four years, it was eagerly subscribed. The spirit of adventure among the English nobility and country gentry, which had found scope on the Spanish main under Elizabeth, but which the Spanish entanglements of James pent up, sought an outlet in the Second Joint Stock of the East India Company. Fifteen dukes and earls, thirteen countesses and ladies of title, eighty-two knights, judges and privy councillors, headed the list of 954 subscribers. The contributions amounted to £1,629,040, the largest capital that had ever been subscribed to any joint stock undertaking in the world. With this sum, to be divided into three voyages, it seemed as if the English Company might at length hold their own against Holland in the Eastern seas.
They soon discovered, however, that the capture of the spice trade was not to be achieved by money alone. Both at home and in the East the English organization was inferior to the Dutch. The original weakness in the constitution of the London Company still rendered it unfit for great or permanent efforts. The “separate”
voyages of 1601 to 1612 had indeed given place to recurring joint stocks. But the change only superseded temporary groups of adventurers for single voyages by somewhat less temporary groups of adventurers for three or four voyages. Each group, whether for a single voyage, or for three or four, knew that its existence was limited to a brief term of years. Its object was to make as much money as it could within the period allotted to it, and to spend as little as possible on fortifications which it would have to leave behind in the East and make over at a low valuation to the next group of adventurers. The Dutch East India Company felt its interests to be bound up with those of the Dutch Government, adopted the state policy, and willingly spent vast sums on troops and fortresses in the confidence that it would reap the permanent fruits of its territorial conquests.
The English Company, in fact, still remained a private venture; the Dutch Company knew itself to be a national enterprise. The difference received emphasis from the personal character of King James. The London Company’s charter was never quite safe from court intrigues. If royal favourites could no longer procure a license for English interlopers, his Majesty was King of Scotland as well as of England, and the charter did not affect his northern subjects. In the crisis of its struggle with the Dutch, the London Company learned with dismay that the king had in 1617 granted a patent to Sir James Cuningham for a Scottish Company to trade to Greenland, Muscovy, and the East Indies –
“in as ample manner and as the Company of London do.”
The danger was grave. For the Scotch would not only prove keen rivals in trade, but their charter might be covertly utilized by English interlopers, and a Presbyterian nation was not unlikely to come to an understanding with the Calvinist and Lutheran Dutch. The movement which resulted in the Scottish Brigade in Holland had set in; and the London Company might find itself beset by a Scotch and Dutch combination in the East. We shall find that the steward of the Dutch factory at Amboyna in 1623 was an Aberdeen man. King James listened to the remonstrances of his English subjects, and in 1618 the new grant was recalled upon the London Company agreeing to compensate the Scotch patentee.
The concession did not come too soon. In the autumn of the same year, 1618, the English Company found itself once more compelled to appeal for state support in what now clearly revealed itself as a struggle between the Dutch and the English nations. It presented memorials to the king and the Privy Council, setting forth “the manifest and insupportable wrongs and abuses done by the Hollanders unto your Majesty and your Majesty’s subjects in the East Indies.” The two nutmeg islets of Pularoon and Rosengyn, with a chief town in Lantor or Great Banda which had freely surrendered to his Majesty, had been threatened or attacked by the Hollanders, and English prisoners had been publicly shown in chains. “Lo, these are the
men,” said the Dutch to the islanders, “whom ye made your gods, in whom ye put your trust, but we have made them our slaves.” Twenty of the miserable captives were since dead of cruel usage.
Court of Proprietors, East India House
The Dutch had also taken two English ships, rifled another, and put the crews in irons, declaring they had the authority of King James himself to capture any English vessel to the east of the Celebes. They refused to restore a vessel unless we gave up our claim to Pularoon, boasting “that one Holland ship would take ten English: that they care not for our king, for Saint George was now turned child.”
King James reopened negotiations in earnest (September, 1618) and demanded that Dutch commissioners should be sent to London. A report was allowed to reach The Hague that he had ordered the seizure in England of certain Dutch East Indiamen, and in November
the Dutch commissioners were accredited – six on behalf of the Dutch East India Company, and four on behalf of the States-General with the Dutch ambassador at their head.
The two questions to be settled were compensation for past injuries and a fair arrangement for the future. The Dutch commissioners proved able diplomatists, very subtle and cunning “as they seemed to our plain city men. At the very first meeting they took up a firm stand against “reparation of damage,” and by January 27, 1619, they were sending for men-of-war to carry them home. When Lord Digby patched up the breach, things again came to a stand in April, as the Hollanders, while demanding that the English Company should share the charges of the Dutch fortresses in the East, refused to allow it any share in their control. The king himself now intervened, declaring that in a matter that so nearly and highly concerns the weal of both countries, his Majesty will neither spare any travail to effect it, nor be in anything more partial to either side than if they were both his own subjects.”
The king’s eagerness constrained the London Company to come to terms. In July, 1619, was concluded a treaty which yielded the main points to the Hollanders and proved from the first unworkable by the English. The London Company obtained no compensation for past injuries, reckoned at £100,000 during a single year, and no share in the control of the Dutch fortifications to whose cost they were to contribute. The treaty, after granting an amnesty for all excesses on
either side, and providing for a mutual restitution of ships and property, declared the trade in the East to be open to both Companies. Both Companies should exert themselves to reduce the native dues and exactions, to keep down prices of Indian commodities in the East, and to maintain a high scale of prices in Europe.
Gold lace workers at Lucknow
On the southeast Indian coast the English were to have free trade at Pulicat on paying half the expenses of the Dutch garrison. In Java the pepper trade should be equally divided. In the Moluccas and the Banda and Amboyna Archipelagoes, which included the clove and nutmeg islands, the English should have one-third and the Dutch two-thirds of the trade, paying for the garrisons in a corresponding ratio. Each Company
was to furnish ten ships of war to be kept in the East for purposes of common defence, and not to be employed on home voyages, but only in the port-to-port trade. All forts should remain in the hands of their present possessors – which practically meant of the Dutch, as we had then so few – and certain proposed fortifications of the English were to be postponed for two or three years, until both Companies could. agree upon them.
The treaty was to be binding for twenty years. Its execution was to be supervised by a joint Council of Defence in the Indies, composed of four members from each Company, with an appeal in case of dispute to the States-General and the King of England. So much eventually turned on this Council of Defence clause that I give it in full5. Its functions were defined as the direction of the common defence by sea, the distribution of the ships of war, and the regulation of dues or imposts for maintaining the forts and garrisons.
There is no mention of civil or criminal jurisdiction, nor of any system of law to be administered.
The English Company felt that the royal role of peacemaker had been played chiefly at their cost. They petitioned the king in particular against the articles touching the forts, “as utterly cutting off the Company from all hope and expectation of their obtaining any parts of the forts at any time hereafter, which in the end would utterly exclude the Company from the whole trade of the Indies.” Even the king’s ambassador at The Hague thought the fortress clauses might have been more advantageous to us, while his friend Chamberlain plainly wrote to him “Say what they can, things are passed as the other [side] would have it.” Secretary Calvert regarded the treaty as a mere suspension of the dispute, and believed a great opportunity had been lost, for the Portuguese, French, and Danes were all eager for a trade alliance with us in the East. However, on July 16, 1619, King James ratified the engagement, and sweetened the pill to his subjects by a clause promising to erect no other East India Company during the treaty term of twenty years.
As a matter of fact, it but little affected events in the East. The treaty did not reach India till March, 1620, when the Dutch and English generals suspended their hostilities, proclaimed it on every ship from the mainmast, feasted each other, and liberated all prisoners on both sides. But their quarrel had got beyond control from home, and their amity ended as the smoke of their salvos cleared off. The English were trying
to enforce two distinct claims which the Dutch believed to be incompatible with their position in the Eastern Archipelago: a claim to trade in the nutmeg and clove islands of the Banda and Amboyna groups, and a claim to a fortified settlement close to the Dutch headquarters in Java.
A glance at the map will show the significance of these claims. At the eastern end of the Archipelago lie two groups, represented for our present purpose by Amboyna, a clove island, and by the Banda, literally the “United,” nutmeg isles, including Lantor or Great Banda, Pularoon, Pulaway, and Rosengyn6. Not only did these islets produce the most valuable spices, but they might be approached from the southwest. If the English could establish themselves in Amboyna, Pularoon, and Rosengyn, they would, so to speak, turn the flank of the Dutch positions commanding the Straits of Malacca and of Sunda. By keeping to the south of the line of long islands (Sumatra, Java, Flores, Timor, etc.) they could secure a direct access, not unattended indeed by nautical dangers, to the clove and nutmeg archipelago. These matters, which were hidden from King James and his councillors, were vital to the Dutch control of the spice trade. The Dutch directors in Holland understood them better; and while granting us
A Seventeenth-Century map of India
an equal share in the cheap pepper of Java, they would concede only one-third of the traffic with the clove and nutmeg islands of the further East. We were outmatched in point of knowledge as in armed force.
The Dutch rested their title to these islands on their conquest from the Portuguese and on treaties with the local chiefs. The English claimed that they were places of common resort for the spice trade, that in some of them they had built blockhouses which the Dutch pulled down, and that others, including Amboyna, Pularoon, and Rosengyn, had granted us a settlement or freely placed themselves under the protection of King James. The struggle for them, with its mutual outrages and reprisals, need not be detailed. It commenced as far back as 1608, became acute after 1616, and ended with the catastrophe of Amboyna in 1623.
While the English tried to circumvent the Dutch western positions on the Malacca and Sunda straits, and to fasten on the richest spice isles of the easternmost archipelago, they also threatened the Dutch settlements in Java itself. In December, 1618, the English by way of reprisal captured the Dutch Black Lion at Bantam. In January, 1619, they beat the Dutch fleet in a “cruel bloody fight” in which three thousand great shot were fired without lasting result, and in October the Dutch defeated our squadron off Sumatra – the last battle for the famous old Red Dragon. The Dutch Black Lion had a less noble end – being accidentally burned while in our possession by four
drunken English sailors, one of whom we hanged and the other three were flogged round the fleet.
A Native of Java
This sea-struggle around the western entrances into the Archipelago had its counterpart conflict on shore. The ships of the two Protestant nations were individually pretty well matched, the captains equally skilful, the crews equally brave, and victory sometimes fell to the one, sometimes to the other. Our cursing and stamping admiral, Sir Thomas Dale – a determined man, bred in the cruel school of the Spanish-Dutch war – had by unsparing severity wrung order out of anarchy in Virginia, and was sent with six ships to India in 1618. But the English found the land forces in Java numerically superior to their own, and directed by a man of still more masterful character, and with a genius for organization not possessed by any other European then in the East.
Jan Pieterszoon Coen, born at Hoorn in 1587, had learned the secrets of commerce in the famous house of the Piscatori at Rome, and went first to Dutch India in 1607. By 1613 his talents raised him to the office of director-general of commerce and president at Bantam, with the control of all outlying agencies (comptoirs).
In 1617 the Council of Seventeen appointed him governor-general, with a ratification from the States-General and a commission direct from Prince Maurice of Orange – powers so ample as afterwards to warrant him in questioning orders of the directors unless approved of by the States-General. In June, 1618, he entered on his high office at Java. “If the King of England does not make it his particular care,” a shrewd French observer reported, “the English run the risk of having the worst in the Indies, as being weaker than the Flemings are in that country.”
Coen was to the Dutch Indies in the seventeenth century what Albuquerque had been to the Portuguese in the sixteenth, and what Dupleix became to the French in the eighteenth. He resolved to found the Dutch power on a lasting territorial basis. His clear vision of a Dutch empire in the East met with opposition from narrower minds – the antagonism which Albuquerque’s policy had encountered from the honest Almeida, and which the schemes of Dupleix were to receive from a corrupt French court. But the Dutch Company, like the English Company in after days, knew a great man when they got one; and in spite of internal differences and a temporary eclipse, Coen was supported, rewarded, and honoured. His two governor-generalships, from 1618 to 1623, and from 1627 to 1629, form the seed-time of the Dutch greatness in the East.
A strongly fortified capital, commanding the western entrance to the Archipelago, yet centrally situated, was
necessary to his design. The Straits of Malacca were already controlled by treaties, and circumstances led Coen to the northern exit of the Straits of Sunda as the position from which to dominate the island world. The two possible sites were Bantam and Jacatra at the north-western end of Java, where the Sunda Straits debouch into the Archipelago. Bantam was nearer to the straits, Jacatra lay round the corner to the northeast, but was the stronger position. Both places were resorted to by the English and Dutch, and the two nations claimed treaty rights with the native princes at each. One of Coen’s first acts as governor-general was to obtain leave from the Jacatra chief for a fortified settlement on his river.
Presently the Jacatra and Bantam chiefs grew afraid of the rising fortress, and, although not liking the English, obtained their help to expel the Dutch. Coen had sailed to the Moluccas to avenge a native revolt and to reunite his fleet; and in January-February, 1619, the Dutch at Jacatra, after a defence of their half-built walls, had to capitulate. They agreed to surrender their fortress, people, and war munitions to the English, and the money and goods of the Dutch Company to the native prince. The English were to provide a ship to convey away the Hollanders to the Indian coast of Coromandel, or whithersoever they might resolve to go, except to the Moluccas or Amboyna.
The claims of Bantam caused delay, and Coen had now reunited his fleet’ at the Moluccas. His return
Matchlocks from various parts of India
to Java prevented the treaty from being carried out. In the spring of 1619 he utterly destroyed the native town of Jacatra, seized the estuary of the river together with the adjacent territory, and built on it the city and fortress from which, under the new name of Batavia, the Dutch rule the Eastern Archipelago to this day.
Our admiral, brave, passionate Dale, having unwisely divided his fleet, and being stricken with fever from the swamps of the Jacatra River, sailed for India. Coen hurried on the fortifications at Batavia so as to give the complete command of the Jacatra estuary to the Dutch. He prepared to punish the Bantam prince who had joined and then quarrelled with the English during his (Coen’s) absence in the Moluccas. He drew the bonds tighter on the English trade, and resolved to use our alliance with Bantam as a casus belli for driving us out of the Spice Islands. At this juncture, early in 1620, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of July, 1619, arrived at Batavia, with its amnesty for the past and promise of peace in the future.
But scarcely had the joint cheering for King James and Prince Maurice died away and the’ fleets been stripped of their bunting, than the treaty of 1619 was discerned to be itself a new source of strife. In 1618 the Dutch directors frankly wrote to Coen that, although they were trying to come to an agreement with the London Company, yet in the meanwhile he was “strictly to carry out our previous orders for expelling the English and all other nations from all treaty places or where we have forts.” Coen had laid his plans
accordingly. The Dutch directors were, however, willing to give the treaty of 1619 a fair chance. “It is our sincere and earnest desire,” they wrote in 1619–1620, honestly to observe its terms, and they even contemplated building a fortress at the Cape of Good Hope jointly with the English. But they insisted on our executing our engagements to the utmost letter, and above all on our maintaining the full complement of war-ships agreed on.
Cape Town and Table Mountain
The last condition was one which the English Company could not fulfil. Coen knew this and foresaw that its non-fulfilment would leave him a free hand. While he therefore made fair arrangements for the joint Council of Defence on shore, for the mutual command of the fleet, and for caerying the two national flags at the mainmast every alternate fortnight, a guarded or even hostile attitude to the English was enjoined on the outlying Dutch settlements.
The truth is the two Companies had widely different interests in the main business of defencL The Dutch truce with Spain was about to expire (1621), and Holland resolved to break the Spanish-Portuguese power in the East as a preparation for the inevitable European war. The English were by no means so anxious to attack the Spaniards, with whom they were ostensibly at peace, and whom they believed they could undersell in an open market by the fair rivalry of trade. After several joint expeditions, the English failed to supply their quota of ships, but offered to pay half the naval expenses. Then they withdrew more openly, and after bitter recriminations the Dutch declared that the English “have neither law nor justice … the knife of the one [alone] keeps the knife of the other in the sheath.” The English replied that the Dutch used the alliance for their own ends, and that the treaty was for a fleet of defence and not for conquest. In 1623 they declined to join in a third expedition against the Spanish Manilas and their ships separated from the Dutch alike in Java and the Moluccas.
A second cause of quarrel arose out of the blockade of Bantam, which the joint council undertook, but which the English soon declared to be a plan of conquest outside the duties of “defence.” The English only wanted an open trade at Bantam, and this the prince was willing to concede. The Dutch desired to avenge the attack of Bantam on their rising fort at Jacatra in 1618, and to ruin the trade of a rival port lying so close to their new Batavian capital. The question of the sovereign jurisdiction in the Archipelago supplied a third and more bitter subject of strife. The Dutch directors explicitly ordered that the laws of Holland were to be observed at Batavia; that the claim given by the treaty to the English was to a share of the trade but to no share of the dominium; and that the treaty had not “reduced our rights even in the smallest way in the Moluccas, Amboyna, and Banda.” The treaty had, in fact, omitted to provide for the question of jurisdiction. The English president himself was fined in 1621 for not obeying orders issued at Batavia in the name of the States-General, and in 1622 he was mulcted on the complaint of a native.
A fourth cause of quarrel was the money contribution for fortifications under the treaty. Here again the two nations had opposed interests in the East. It was the Flemish policy of ruining Spain by armed trade, as against the London Company’s desire for open ports. The Dutch wanted as many fortifications as they could get at the joint expense; the English wanted few fortifications, and none which they could not control. The
Dutch accused the English of insufficient subsidies. The English replied that, while they found the money, the Dutch spent it, or pocketed it, as they pleased, and made no equal contribution on their part. The Dutch records themselves disclose some laxity in this respect. In 1621 the Dutch cut down the outlay on forts, garrisons, and the governor’s table allowances, yet warned their agents that “the English need not get the benefit of it,” but are to be charged as before. Nor were the English to be allowed to “build or make anything at their own expense, on which hereafter they can claim ownership.” All this is clear from Dutch manuscript records in the India Office. The English retaliated for the imposts enforced from them for fortresses in the Eastern Archipelago, by levying dues from Flemish ships near Ormuz, to the wrath of the Dutch captains.
The restitution of property clause furnished a fifth ground of wrangling, in which both sides thought themselves overreached. The constant and bitter personal disputes between the local agents of the two Companies supplied a sixth cause, which would alone have rendered unworkable the treaty of 1619. Within two years King James himself recognized that it had broken down. In March, 1621, he pressed the Dutch Government to send commissioners again, and in July he hastened its decision by threatening letters of marque. The commissioners arrived in England in November, 1621, but their negotiations were spun out to January, 1623 – too late to avert the impending tragedy.
As Barneveldt’s project for a United Dutch-English
Company had been strangled by the diplomatic discord at London and The Hague, so all hope of compromise between the two nations was stifled amid the passionate disputes of their sea-captains in the East, and extinguished forever in the torture chamber of Amboyna
On March 13, 1604, King Sukadana Panembahan Giri Kusuma binding agreement with the Dutch (VOC) , which infuriated the Sultan of Mataram.
1606: On February 14, 1606, an expedition led by Koopman Gillis Michaelszoon Dutch first arrived in Banjarmasin, because of bad temperament captain was killed in a riot. 
1607: Aji Mas Anom Paser Indra became the ruler until the year 1644.
1607: June 7, 1607 expedition led by Koopman VOC Michaelszoon Gillis arrived in Banjarmasin, all the crew were killed in retaliation for the seizure of Banjar junks in Banten in 1596. 
1609: On October 1, VOC conduct cooperation pact with the Prince Duke of Sambas. 
1610: Aji violated Kutai VII became King until the year 1635.
1610: King maimed became ruler based in Pekana porcupine, Authorship.
1612: In May 1612, fire destroyed the Dutch Company Banjar Banjar Old Empire’s capital, so capital was moved to Martapura. British trade partnership, chaired by Sir Henry Middleton coming to Brunei.
1613: Amiril Pengiran Lion King Tidung Laoet served until 1650.
1615: Prince Dipati Anta-founded the Duchy Kotawaringin Kasuma, fractional area of the Sultanate of Banjar most western border with the Kingdom of Tanjungpura.
1622: Sultanate of Mataram send Tumenggung Bahurekso, Regent of Kendal Sukadana attack under control Bunku Princess / Queen Mas Jaintan (Mustika Giri’s mother), this attack will attack worrying Banjar Sultanate of Mataram. Giri mustaka (Raden Saradewa) son-king Prince Dipati Kotawaringin Kasuma Anta-crowned king-Matan Sukadana Syafiuddin title of Sultan Muhammad (1622-1659). He was the first king of the title of Sultan, the previous king Panembahan Sukadana title only.
1625: Muhammad Ali became the Sultan of Brunei XII until 1660.
1626: Production of pepper Banjar greatly increased, so the VOC attempted to gain monopoly pepper, and try to eliminate the incidence in 1612 the Dutch invasion of the sultanate of Banjar. The Netherlands also apologized for his actions robbed the Banjar in cruise ship sultanate of Brunei trade to July 4, 1626. Trading empire Banjar still directed to Cochin China (Veitnam) not to Batavia.
1634: VOC sent six merchant ships headed to Banjarmasin Londensteijn Gijsbert van, then added a few ships under the command of Antonie and Steven Scop Barentsz. 
1635: June 17, 1635 Pearl British ship arrived in Banjarmasin, Tewseling and Gregory.
1635: 4 September 1635 the Sultan of Banjar is represented by Ratna Syahbandar Goja Babouw Kings held the first commercial contract in Batavia by the Dutch Company is represented by: Hendrik Brouwer, Antonio van Diemen, Jan van der Burgh, Steven Barentszoon. VOCs also helps Banjar to conquer the eastern Kalimantan (Sand). 
1635: Prince Aji ing chances, Duke Sinum Bannerman Martapura Kukar VIII became King until the year 1650. This king conquered the kingdom of Kutai Martadipura.
1636: Sultanate of Banjar claim areas along the Sambas Karasikan Berau as well as its territory since that time Banjarmasin already has the military capacity to confront the attacks of Mataram.
1636: The first time the Dutch began to dwell in Banjarmasin as VOC trading office in Banjarmasin established under the leadership of Wollenbrant Gelijnsen. 
1637: Banjarmasin hold peace relations with Mataram. 
1638: Sultan Banjarmasin send envoys to the Sultan of Makassar Makassar and East Kalimantan borrow area as a place of trade. Sultan Muhammad Zainudin moved the capital of the Sultanate Matan Matan kingdoms from the river to the land called the kingdom of Indra Indra Laya Laya.
1638: Contract Craemer Banjar Sultan refused a request to send pepper to Makassar, came the anti-war Dutch VOC many as 108 people, 21 Japanese were killed, and the lodges were burned and the destruction of VOC VOC ships in Banjarmasin.
1640: Governor-General Antonio van Diemen VOC ordered that hostilities with the Sultanate of Banjar is stopped and only requires 50,000 as compensation for the real tragedy in 1638.
1641: Around mid-October 1641 Prince Tapesana and Kiai Narangbaya as Sultan Banjarmasin envoy arrives in Jepara and its escort of 500 people to deliver gifts to the Sultan Agung – the king of Mataram.   
1641: Inayatullah became Sultan Banjar V until the year 1646
1643: Dutch erected forts and factories on the island of Tatas (now Central Banjarmasin). 
1644: Maulana Aji Anom Lions became the ruler Paser until the year 1667.
1646: Sultan Banjar VI Saidullah be until the year 1660.
1648: Dutch get a monopoly of pepper Banjarmasin dipasakan to the Sultan. 
1650: Prince Aji Dipati ing the Great became King Kukar Martapura IX until year 1665. Amiril Pengiran Tidung Maharajalila I served the King until the year 1695.
1659: Sultan Muhammad Zainuddin I (Marhum Affairs Laya) ruled the Sultanate Sukadana-Matan (1659-1724). Abdul-Jabbar became the Sultan of Brunei Jalilul XI until the year 1660.
1660: Sultan Rakyatullah be Banjar VII until 1663, he made a treaty with the VOC December 18, 1660. Brunei Sultan Abdul Mubin become XIII until the year 1673.
1661: Abdul Mubin Hakkul XIII to become the Sultan of Brunei in 1673. Sukadana-imperial envoy arrived in the Sultanate Matan Banjar to report that Sukadana back into the area of the Sultanate of Banjar pegaruh since earlier in 1638.
1662: According to Barra in 1662 there were only 12 junks a Malay, English, Portuguese and pepper transporting gold to Makassar, while in the Port of Banjarmasin filled with more than 1000 sailboats, both interinsuler trade and inter-continental trade.
1663: Sultan Sultan Amrullah be Banjar VIII, but he later coup by Sultan Agung to be the Sultan of Banjar IX until year 1679, with the help of tribal Biaju and moved the capital to the River Prince, New York.
1665: Prince Aji Dipati Maja became King Kusuma ing Martapura Kukar X until the year 1686.
1766: Sultan of Sulu island Balambangan surrender to the British. 
1667: I to King Solomon Panembahan Paser until the year 1680. He was the first ruler who holds Panembahan Paser.
January 21, 1668: La Mohang Daeng Mangkona whose inhabitants founded the city of Samarinda is known as the Bugis Samarinda Seberang.
1670: Sultan Muhammad Tajuddin from Sambas reigned until the year 1708.
1672: Sultan Muhammad Syamsudin Sa’idul Khairiwaddien Nata, as the first ruler Sintang wear wear a higher degree of Sultan, ruled until 1737.
1673: Muhyiddin XIV became the Sultan of Brunei until 1690.
1675: Muhammad Syafeiuddin I to the Sultan of Sambas until 16701675-1685.
1680: Good Amirullah Kusuma ascended the throne back to Emperor Banjar X until the year 1700. Adam Panembahan I became Panembahan Paser until 1705. King Senggauk be Panembahan Mempawah.
1686: Queen’s Court, the first woman to lead the Kutai Kingdom in 1700.
January 18, 1689: Spreader Catholicism, Fr. Antonino Ventimiglia arrives at Banjarmasin from Goa, India. 
June 25, 1689: Portuguese ships under the command of Captain Francesco Luigi Cottigno entering the island area plot in Kapuas district and establishing relationships with the tribe Dayak Ngaju .
1690: Nassaruddin became Sultan of Brunei until the year 1705.
1695: Amiril Pengiran Tidung Maharajalila II serving ruler until the year 1731.
1698: Sultan Banjarmasin, Saidilah establish a contract with the UK.
1699: In April, two of the English Captain Henry Watson and Cotesworth instructed to establish factory / warehouse in Yogyakarta. 
1700: Hamidullah became Sultan Banjar XI until the year 1734. Prince Aji Old Dipati XII became the Sultan of Kutai which until the year 1710. In 1700 the war between the Hedgehog and Matan, because the seizure of diamond inheritance Kobi. Hedgehogs assisted by Bantam and VOC, because it then Bantam expressed Hedgehogs and Matan under the power of the Sultanate of Banten.
the first British contack with what is indonesia date back to 1601 when Quen Elisabeth I sent an emissary to the sultan of Acheen (Aceh). correspondence from those early contacts is still exant in the british library in london. World demand for spices had led the european powers to establish route to the indies, the island the today form the indonesia archipelago. Trading post and garrisons were won and lost in the European power struggle, but it was the dutch who came dominate the lucrative trade in spices.
Early history of Christianity in Indonesia is not the same as the dawn of the Protestant Church. In 1605 the Christian religion is no longer a stranger in the archipelago. Mung * kin once the Christian merchants from Arab khalifa or from South India to set foot in Indonesia starting from the 7th century or the 8th AD In 1323-1324 a member of the Franciscan Order, Oderico de Pordenone, visiting Borneo, the palace of Majapahit, and Sumatra. Twenty years later a messenger from the Pope met with a number of Christians in Sumatra [SGA I, 34v]. However, in this era of Christianity has not been rooted in the Earth Indonesia. Congregations that there may not leave scars, and in any case consists only of migrants.
Conversely, the expansion of Christianity that took place in the 16th century laid the foundation of the church that stands today. Around the year 1500 entered the Roman Catholic mission coincided with the soldiers and Portuguese and Spanish traders. In those days people of Spain and Portugal had just managed to repel the Arab rulers of Europe, but the Islamic kingdoms in North Africa remains a security threat to Southern Europe. At that time the Turks launched a great attack in the name of Islam in Southeast Europe. They conquered Christian countries in the Balkan peninsula and in 1529 invaded the country instead of Germany. Europeans feel besieged, and attempting to make a counter-attack by moving the circular. That way they hope to also get direct access to areas of origin of luxury goods as long as it reached Europe through the mediator in the East Indies and Egypt or Turkey. Then they explore the ocean to find a way to “the Indies”, which is located behind the Turkish camp.For them, the Indian was a fairy tale, the source of unimaginable wealth. As he sailed westward, the Spaniards discovered America, which at first they thought were “the Indies” (so-called natives “Indians”). A few years later, the Portuguese managed to reach the “Indies” the truth, namely the Indian Ocean region, and immediately began a military and economic war against the Muslims there, who they view as a ally of the Turks. They are not strong enough to colonize a large area, but only seize or establish a series of fortress along the trade route that stretched from India to Indonesia and China Eastern. Main strongholds is Goa (west coast of India), Malacca (Malaysia area now), Ternate and Solor (off the coast of Flores), as well as the Macao (China offshore). From their base in America, the Spaniards colonize and Christianize the North and Central Philippine region. At a later date, their influence extends to the islands of Sangihe and North Maluku.
It is clear that the activities of Europeans in Indonesia, particularly the Portuguese, religious motives, military motifs, and motifs interwoven trade. So fortresses they have dual functions. In it there is a military barracks, warehouses for merchandise, and a church building. The priests serving the soldiers and merchants in the fort. Sometimes they also came out to bring Christianity to the natives who live around the fort. But in general spread of the gospel does not become their primary goal. Said one high official of the Portuguese era: “They come with a crucifix in one hand and a sword in the other. But when they found wealth, they immediately rule out the cross and fill their pockets “. The most active group mission is to perform the work of the clergy of the order, in particular members of the Society of Jesus (SJ) who worked in Asia since the 1540s. Beside them, the Order of Franciscans and Dominicans also need to be called.
Laying the Basic Christian Church
Here we only give an outline of the history of Catholic missions in the 16th century and the 17th. Who want to know the ropes can find in the work history of the Catholic Church in Indonesia, Volume I, and the Yeast Carita I. We will successively discuss the development of western Indonesian archipelago and in the East.
At the time the Portuguese arrived in the archipelago, the inhabitants of coastal areas of Sumatra and Java had converted to Islam. After all, in terms of politics they are relatively compact, they have formed a powerful kingdom with a relatively large area, such as Aceh, Johor, Banten and Demak. Therefore, the mission did not succeed to get a foothold there. Only in the city of Malacca, which in the 1511-1641 period is the main stronghold in the east of Portuguese Goa, there is a rather large Christian congregation, headed by a bishop. But this congregation is made up of immigrants from Europe and their descendants. Elsewhere in the western part of the archipelago there is never a stable congregation.
in 1612, in Tolucco (Fort Hollandia). The main Dutch base of the Moluccas remained however the fort of Malayo. In a few years, practically the greater part of the island of Ternate had been lost to the Spanish control. Great aid in this reached to the Dutch from their natural allies the Ternatens. In the same years in which these forts in Ternate were built, the Dutch control extended also to the other islands of the archipelago. Starting from 1608 also all the island of Makian was occupied by the Dutch who constructed to three fortresses long the coasts of the island. Makian was the richer island in absolute than nail of ambita garofano and that more from the Dutch who aimed to control the commerce of the spices. Another fortress, Fort Nassau, was built in 1609 in the island of Moti (Motir), island situated between Tidore and Maquiem (Machian), also this island was rich of cloves. In 1609, also the Spanish fort of Bachan was captured by the Dutch commandants vice admiral Simon Jansz Hoen. Practically after 1606, and between 1607 and 1610, the Dutch with theirs ally succeeded to force the Spanish on the defensive and took the control of great part of the islands. Under the Spanish control only remained the southern side of the island of Ternate (where was the main town of “Nuestra Seńora del Rosario”), the entire island of Tidore and some ports in the islands of Halmahera and Morotai. The Spanish garrisons had their headquarters in the islands of Ternate and Tidore where it’s often difficult to understand by the documents where were situated the spanish “presidios”, the some “presidio” was sometimes called with different names causing not little difficulties to understand where and which was. In addition to a multitude of fortified places in Ternate and Tidore, the Spaniards maintained sometimes for a few years some garrisons also in the peripheral islands of Halmahera, Morotai and Sulawesi, these places were important for the maintenance of the garrisons, because those islands were sources of sago and other indispensable food for the maintenance of the garrisons and of the population of the islands of Ternate and Tidore, islands where because of the conformation of the land and the continuous state of war in which they were did not allow the cultivation of such products. Often the spanish garrisons depended for the refueling of food, dressed and ammunitions nearly exclusively from the so-called fleet of “soccorro” that was sendt every year from the Philippines. When one of these fleets lacked to the appointment or because it was captured from the Dutch or because the bad weather who provoked frequent shipwrecks, were times of great lack for the Spanish soldiers of the garrisons and for the population of the Spanish city of Ternate. In spite of these deprivations and of the high human and material cost, the Spaniards maintained their own garrisons in Ternate, Tidore and in other islands, until 1663, year in which on order of the governor of the Philippines Manrique de Lara was decided the dismantling and the abandonment of all the garrisons of the Moluccas.
The Company’s initial interest was in obtaining spices from Maluku for direct shipment to Europe, and it established a fort in Ambon (Amboina) in 1605. Under the third Governor-General, J.P. Coen, however, the Company’s ambitions began to extend to taking part in trade within Asia. Coen decided that the Company needed a more central base and in 1619 founded a new headquarters, which he called Batavia, in the small trading city of Jayakarta on the northwestern coast of Java. In developing this so-called inter-Asian trade, the VOC made the most both of its capital reserves, which gave it disproportionate power in the market place, and its naval strength, which enabled it to sweep from the seas both pirates and Asian traders it now classified as smugglers because they infringed its monopolies.
The VOC’s interests in Indonesia were only part of its Asian empire. The Company had major trading operations in India and was the only European power permitted to trade in Japan. It came to control the islands of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Formosa (now Taiwan), as well as a significant territory at the Cape of Good Hope. Most of the Company’s territories were ruled by governors subordinate to the Governor-General in Batavia; the gouvernement of Java’s Northeast Coast, therefore, was no more directly monitored from Batavia than was the distant Cape settlement. Even within the VOC structure, therefore, the ‘Netherlands Indies’, as a precursor to modern Indonesia, had no formal existence.