tIMBUL DAN Runtuhnya timor timur
Dr IWAN SUWANDY,MHA
PENEMU DAN PRESIDEN PERTAMA
(KOLEKSTOR INFORMASI SEJARAH INDONESIA)
Dr IWAN SUWANDY,MHA
ALBERT SUWANDY DJOHAN OETAMA,ST,GEA
ANTON JIMMI SUWANDY ST.MECH.
ANTONI WILLIAM SUWANDY
HANS van SCHEIK
MASA JABATAN PREDIDEN DAN SEKJEN HANYA SATU KALI SELAMA TUJUH TAHUN, PENGANTINYA AKAN DIPILIH OLEH DEWAN KEHORMATAN
BAGI YANG BERMINAT MENJADI ANGGOTA KISI
MENDAFTAR LIWAT EMAIL KISI
mengirimkan foto kopi KTP(ID )terbaru dan melunasi sumbangan dana operasional KISI untuk seumur hidup sebanyak US50,-
SETIAP BULAN AKAN DI,KIRIMKAN INFO LANGSUNG KE EMAILNYA
DAPAT MEMBELI BUKU TERBITAN KISI YANG CONTOHNYA SUDAH DIUPLOAD DI
dengan memberikan sumbangan biaya kopi dan biaya kirim
TERIMA KASIH SUDAH BERGABUNG DENGAN KISI
SEMOGA KISI TETAP JAYA
Dr Iwan Suwandy , MHA
EDISI PRIBADI TERBATAS
KHUSUS UNTUK KOLEKTOR DAN HISTORIAN SENIOR
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TIMBULNYA TIMOR TIMUR
OLEH Dr IWAN SUWANDY,MhA
HAK CIPTA @ Dr IWAN 2013
The colony of Portuguese Timor declared its independence on 28 November 1975, calling itself Timor-Leste (Portuguese: “East Timor”). Nine days later, Indonesia began the invasion of its main territory. Indonesia declared the accession of Timor-Leste on 17 July 1976 as 27th province and changed its official name to “Timor Timur”, the Indonesian translation of “East Timor”. The use of Portuguese was then forbidden, as it was seen as relic of colonization.
The Indonesians left in 1999 and Timor Timur came under the administration of the United Nations.
After the re-establishment of the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002, the East Timorese government requested that the name Timor-Leste be used in place of “East Timor”. The only other official translation is Timor Loro’sae, which is Tetum for “East Timor”. This is to avoid the Indonesian term and its reminder of the Indonesian occupation.
Governor east timor province during Indonesian occupation
- Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo (4 August 1976 – 1978)
- Guilherme Maria Gonçalves (1978–1982)
- Mário Viegas Carrascalão (18 September 1982 – 11 September 1992)
- José Abílio Osório Soares (11 September 1992 – October 1999)
I had collected the East Timor and Timor portugeus collections in 1979 during my duty in West sumatra at solok City, my friend Mayor Pol Dr Sundarun when he on duty at Est Timur have send me one document timor portugeus with revenue and hand sign ofcthe last governur of timor portugeus(look at Timor portugues collections exhibition in this cybermuseum) ,also some stamps too.
East Timur never issued local special stamps, during that time Republic Indonesia Stam were used. I have found some east timor postal history made by the Indonesia army on duty there,regional Police official cover, also a very historic document leaflet about the east timor fight to integrated to Indonesia(Perjuangan Rakyat TIMITIm untuk Berintegrasi Ke Indonesia) will show in this exhibtion
Also many East Timor political human right protest postcard an letter send to indonesia didnot show in this exhibition, this collection only for premium member.
I have found the best timor portugeus collections during 1994 when I have on duty at Idonesia Police Headquater(MABES POLRI), this collections have show at the Timor Portugeus Collections exhibition in Dr Iwan Cybermuseum.
I have on duty during East timor Refendum look at my profile potraits with Let.col.Pol, Dr Mosadeq (now Brigardir Jendral Pol.) in the front of Religious Office which broken to pieces by the native Protest.
, during the first day I saw at the Antique Shop in Dilli tiomor portugeus first coins
but they ask vry expensive price 1 juta TP(1000 uS$) that is why I didn’t bought
two weeks and back one day after refendum by the last flight from Dili To Bali, some interesting east Timor postal history , refendum document ,local news paper and Indonesia news paper related the east timor last days situation will show too. Please look at the picture of Indonesia otonom ’s East Timor Referendum propaganda poster which found at the east timor police sector (Dr iwan peivate collections)
the last day before back from dili Eat timor ,one day after Refendum, mayor Police Silvester had given me some collectionas of timor portugeus (look the timor portugeus exhibtion) and East timor picture during Indonedsia invasion East timors, please look at the pictyure of Indoneisa Army invation the Timor portugeus fort (later be the military east timor Dili Hospital, and now I donnot now the recent info, I hove the Timor Leset citizen from dilli will tell us the info).
I hope the collectors and historical writters will happy to look this rarerest collections of East timor collections, if the want to know more info and collections related to the political collections like human right protest card or letters please subscribed as the prmeium member and I will show the very rare collections of east timor,becasue in this exhibition only a part of my collections and non political collections.
Jakarta October 2013
Police Colonel(Ret)Dr Iwan suwandy,MHA.
NAPAS TILAS TIMBULNYA TIMOR TIMUR
Unlike other European nations during the 1950s and 1960s, the Portuguese Estado Novo regime did not withdraw from its African colonies, or the overseas provinces (províncias ultramarinas) as those territories were officially called since 1951.(wiki)
During the ensuing conflict, atrocities were committed by all forces involved.
The decolonization and independence of several African states after World War II, the Invasion of Goa by Indian Armed Forces and the Santa Maria hijacking, as well as the achievements of the African-American Civil Rights Movement, were also signs of the “Winds of change” supporting independence movements in Portuguese Africa.(wiki)
The Portuguese Colonial War (Portuguese: Guerra Colonial Portuguesa), also known in Portugal as the Overseas War (Guerra do Ultramar) or in the former colonies as the War of Liberation (Guerra de Libertação), was fought between Portugal’s military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal’s African colonies between 1961 and 1974
A 1962 United Nations document notes:
“the government of Indonesia has declared that it maintains friendly relations with Portugal and has no claim to Portuguese Timor…”
Pada tahun ini Indonesia mengirim pasukan PBB ke Kongo
Timor portugis (timor-timur) sudah diincar jakarta dari tahun 1963. Bung karno saat itu tidak suka dengan masih adanya kolonialisme di wilayah yang dekat dengan indonesia. Soebandrio saat itu memerintahkan BPI (badan Pusat Intelijen) untuk merancang operasi intelijen di timor portugis. Kopaska dipilih karena sebagai ajang uji coba karena baru dibentuk tahun 1962 dan baru sekali mengalami operasi waktu trikora.
Uang Timor portugeus 1963
Uang Kertas Timor Portugeus 1963
Uang Timor portugeus tahun 1963
Pada tahun 1964, Mabes AL mengirim satu tim Kopaska dipimpin seorang serda untuk melaksanakan operasi Klandestein di Timor-timur.Tugas mereka mengumpulkan data intelijen dan menggalang penduduk setempat untuk melakukan pemberontakan terhadap pemerintahan kolonial Portugis.
selama lima bulan, Kopaska mendapat perintah untuk menyusup ke daerah Timor Timur, melalui Atambua. Tugas utamanya, menggalang penduduk setempat,untuk melakukan pemberontakan melawan Portugis.
Kopaska yang dikirim ke timor itu menyamar sebagai pedagang kuda dan bertugas menggalang perlawanan penduduk terhadap kolonial portugis.
bahkan 40 orang timor yang melakukan perlawanan berkunjung ke jakarta untuk mendapatkan pelatihan.
Tapi karena situasi politik yang panas di indonesia menjelang G30S/PKI maka operasi tersebut dihentikan. Dan pemerintahan orde baru tidak tertarik dengan timor portugis. Jakarta tertarik kembali setelah di portugal terjadi kudeta dan situasi politik yang panas di daerah2 koloni portugal yang dipandang bisa mengancam kestabilan wilayah Indonesia.
Uang Timor portugeus 1964
“the government of Indonesia has declared that it maintains friendly relations with Portugal and has no claim to Portuguese Timor These assurances continued after Suharto took power in 1965.
1965/66 Indonesian massacres echoed in East Timor
A recent Canberra seminar on the infamous mass violence in Indonesia in 1965-66 revealed many parallels with East Timorese experience under Indonesian military occupation a decade later.
CHART’s John Waddingham participated, sharing his Timor archives project experience with those now seeking to build and share documentary evidence on Indonesia’s trauma in the 1960s
The killings of several hundred thousand communists and alleged sympathisers marked the rise to presidential power of General Suharto in 1965-66.
The broad story has been well-known but the detail has not.
Any critical discussion of the Suharto government’s official narrative on the killings, and its subsequent long-term imprisonment of huge numbers of ‘leftists’, was taboo in Indonesia.
The fall of Suharto in 1998 has seen the lid lifted. Indonesian non-government organisations, activists and academics are now openly exploring those events – many with the aim of seeking reparations for victims and their families and holding perpetrators accountable for crimes against humanity
Held at the Australian National University, Canberra, New perspectives on the 1965 violence in Indonesia (11-13 February 2013) was organised by Australian-based academics researching 1965. In addition to well-known western researchers in this area like Robert Cribb and Kate McGregor, a number of very active researchers and activists flew in from Indonesia to communicate their work
Topics included the emerging public debate in Indonesia, the local and Cold War aspects of the killings, Indonesian activist actions to counter the official narrative, to remove stigmas still disadvantaging victims’ families, to collect victim and perpetrator first-hand accounts and to document claims for justice and reparations. Several presentations explored the relationship between Suharto’s military and militias and other non-state actors responsible for many killings.
The evidence for external support for the military, especially from the USA and UK, was one of a number of consistent threads in seminar discussion.
Komnas HAM report launch, Jakarta, July 2012. [Jakarta Post]
Komnas HAM report
A recent four year study on 1965 by the official Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was also discussed. The Commission’s landmark report, completed in July 2012, reported evidence of widespread crimes against humanity including killings, slavery, forced removal and displacement, torture, rape, extra-legal executions. The report recommended State apologies and reparations for victims and that responsible Indonesian military officials be charged with crimes against humanity. The 200-page Indonesian language executive summary is available here.
The Komnas HAM investigations shows that the issue is no longer taboo, but some reactions to the report suggest resistance to truth and justice on the matter remains strong. Indonesia’s Attorney-General, responsible for implementing the recommendations, has rejected the report’s legitimacy.
Shared experience: Indonesians and East Timorese. [CHART]
CHART participated in the third day of the seminar – a closed session for current activists and researchers to exchange views, information resources and strategies. While time was restricted, John Waddingham outlined CHART’s program and methods to locate, document and provide access to archival materials.
He particularly emphasised the importance of authenticating documents to ensure they were genuine and the need to demonstrate the authenticity of newly collected oral and documentary evidence from victims and perpetrators so that they cannot be challenged as fabrications.
Many exact matches were observed in the language to describe the 1965/66 killings and the invasion and occupation of East Timor. This shared experience provides an opportunity for Indonesians and East Timorese to better understand each other’s modern history.
The strong emergence of a raft of Indonesian activists and others now digging into their hidden past is a marvellous development.
We hope that one spin-off from this blossoming will be increasing interest from Indonesians in uncovering documentary and other evidence of their military’s interventions in East Timor.
With large sectors of the population forced into resettlement camps, food production was severely limited. Those in the camps were allowed to farm only a small area of land nearby, and constant re-use of soil made it barren. Hunger and starvation began to claim thousands of lives in the late 1970s. One church worker reported five hundred East Timorese dying of starvation every month in one district.
Leaders of Indonesian intelligence influential with Suharto initially envisaged that invasion,
subdual of Fretilin resistance,
and integration with Indonesia would be quick and relatively painless. The ensuing Indonesian campaigns were devastating for the East Timorese, an enormous drain on Indonesian resources, severely damaging Indonesia internationally, and ultimately a failure. Schwarz suggests the fact that Indonesian military’s power base remained barely dented by the mid-1970s intelligence miscalculations and ongoing failures, was a measure of the military’s dominance of Indonesian affairs.
Uang Timor Portugeus 1970
Dilli waterfront in 1971
Throughout the war period Portugal faced increasing dissent, arms embargoes and other punitive sanctions imposed by most of the international community. By 1973, the war had become increasingly unpopular due to its length and financial costs, the worsening of diplomatic relations with other United Nations members, and the role it had always played as a factor of perpetuation of the entrenched Estado Novo regime and the non-democratic status quo. The combined guerrilla forces of the MPLA, the FNLA, and UNITA, in Angola, PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea, and FRELIMO in Mozambique, succeeded in their 13-year-long pro-independence rebellion through guerrilla warfare,
a British organization formed in 1973 to advocate for democracy in Indonesia, increased its work around East Timor. In the United States, the East Timor Action Network (now the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network) was founded and soon had chapters in ten cities around the country. Other solidarity groups appeared in Portugal, Australia, Japan, Germany, Malaysia, Ireland, and Brazil. Coverage of the massacre was a vivid example of how growth of new media in Indonesia was making it increasingly difficult for the “New Order” to control information flow in and out of Indonesia,
Documents show that Kissinger delayed telling President Richard Nixon
about the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1973
about a week after the end of fighting in the Yom Kippur War to keep him from interfering.
On October 6, 1973, the Israelis informed Kissinger about the attack at 6 am; Kissinger waited nearly 3 and a half hours before he informed Nixon.The Yom Kippur War began on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel.
Kissinger has published lengthy and dramatic telephone transcripts from this period in the 2002 book Crisis. One week later, under Nixon’s direction, and against Kissinger’s initial advice,
the US military conducted the largest military airlift in history to aid Israel on October 12, 1973. US action contributed to the 1973 oil crisis in the United States and its Western European allies, which ended in March 1974. Kissinger negotiated the end to the war.
The Portuguese Armed Forces’ Movimento das Forças Armadas overthrew the Estado Novo government in response to the ongoing and stalemated war in Portuguese Guinea, as well as in rebellion against the unpopular new military laws that were to be presented the following year (Decree Law: Decretos-Leis n.os 353, de 13 de Julho de 1973, e 409, de 20 de Agosto) whereby militia officers who completed a brief training program and had served in the overseas territories’ defensive campaigns, could be commissioned at the same rank as military academy graduates.
After the coup, the newly installed revolutionary Portuguese government withdrew all overseas military forces and agreed to a quick handover of power for the nationalistic African guerrillas.
The end of the war after the Carnation Revolution military coup of April 1974 in Lisbon resulted in the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Portuguese citizens plus military personnel of European, African and mixed ethnicity from the former Portuguese territories and newly independent African nations
. From May 1974 to the end of the 1970s, over 1 million citizens left these former colonies, and would restart their lives predominantly in Portugal, South Africa, North America, the rest of Western Europe and Brazil. This migration is regarded as one of the largest peaceful migrations in the world’s history.
The former colonies faced severe problems after independence. Devastating and violent civil wars followed in Angola and Mozambique, which lasted several decades, claimed millions of lives and resulted in large numbers of displaced refugees.
Economic and social recession, authoritarianism, lack of democracy and other elemental civil and political rights, corruption, poverty, inequality and failed central planning eroded the initial revolutionary zeal. A level of social order and economic development comparable to what had existed under Portuguese rule, including during the period of the Colonial War (1961–1974), became the goal of the independent territories.
Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415; it became one of the last to leave. The former Portuguese territories in Africa became sovereign states, with Agostinho Neto in Angola, Samora Machel in Mozambique, Luís Cabral in Guinea-Bissau, Manuel Pinto da Costa in São Tomé and Príncipe and Aristides Pereira in Cape Verde as the heads of state.
In September 1974, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam met with Suharto and indicated that he would support Indonesia if it annexed East Timor. On 11 November 1975, the Whitlam government was dismissed. This placed restrictions on the caretaker government of Fraser. Until the results of the 13 December election were known any action required approval from both political parties and the Governor General. On 4 December 1975 Australia unsuccessfully sought a UN resolution to determine the independence of East Timor, the Australian Government evacuated Australians and other foreign nationals from Dili. José Ramos-Horta arrived in Darwin on 5 December saying that aid agencies the Australian Red Cross and Australian Society for Intercountry Aid Timor (ASIAT) had been banned from East Timor. In the same news conference Horta said that East Timor, Fretlin Government would not accept any UN assistance that included Australia.
An Indonesian official declared in December 1974: “Indonesia has no territorial ambition … Thus there is no question of Indonesia wishing to annex Portuguese Timor.”
In 1974, a coup in Lisbon caused significant changes in Portugal’s relationship to its colony in Timor. The power shift in Europe invigorated movements for independence in colonies like Mozambique and Angola, and the new Portuguese government began a decolonization process for East Timor. The first of these was an opening of the political process.
FRETILIN, UDT, and APODETI
When East Timorese political parties were first legalised in April 1974, three groupings emerged as major players in the postcolonial landscape. The União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union, or UDT), was formed in May by a group of wealthy landowners. Initially dedicated to preserving East Timor as a protectorate of Portugal, in September UDT announced its support for independence. A week later, the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, or FRETILIN) appeared. Initially organised as the ASDT (Associacão Social Democrata Timorense), the group endorsed “the universal doctrines of socialism”, as well as “the right to independence”. As the political process grew more tense, however, the group changed its name and declared itself “the only legitimate representative of the people”. The end of May saw the creation of a third party, Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense (Timorese Popular Democratic Association, or APODETI). Advocating East Timor’s integration with Indonesia and originally named Associacão Integraciacao de Timor Indonesia (Association for the Integration of Timor into Indonesia), APODETI expressed concerns that an independent East Timor would then be economically weak and vulnerable.
FRETILIN took power after the civil war and declared an independent East Timor on 28 November 1975.
Indonesian nationalist and military hardliners, particularly leaders of the intelligence agency Kopkamtib and special operations unit, Opsus, saw the Portuguese coup as an opportunity for East Timor’s integration with Indonesia. The central government and military feared that an East Timor governed by leftists could be used as a base for incursions by unfriendly powers into Indonesia, and also that an independent East Timor within the archipelago could inspire secessionist sentiments within Indonesian provinces. The fear of national disintegration were played upon military leaders close to Suharto and remained as one of Indonesia’s strongest justifications for refusing to entertain the prospect of East Timorese independence or even autonomy until the late 1990s. The military intelligence organisations initially sought a non-military annexation strategy, intending to use APODETI as its integration vehicle.
In January 1975, UDT and FRETILIN established a tentative coalition dedicated to achieving independence for East Timor. At the same time, the Australian government reported that the Indonesian military had conducted a “pre-invasion” exercise at Lampung. For months, the Indonesian Special Operations command, OPSUS, had been covertly supporting APODETI through Operasi Komodo (Operation Komodo, named after the lizard). By broadcasting accusations of communism among FRETILIN leaders and sowing discord in the UDT coalition, the Indonesian government fostered instability in East Timor and, observers said, created a pretext for invading. By May tensions between the two groups caused UDT to withdraw from the coalition.
The tension reached a boiling point in mid-1975, when rumors began circulating of possible power seizures from both independence parties. In August 1975, UDT staged a coup in the capital city Dili and a small-scale civil war broke out. Ramos-Horta describes the fighting as “bloody”, and details violence committed by both UDT and FRETILIN. He cites the International Committee of the Red Cross, which counted 2,000–3,000 people dead after the war. The fighting forced the Portuguese government onto the nearby island of Atauro. FRETILIN defeated UDT’s forces after two weeks, much to the surprise of Portugal and Indonesia. UDT leaders fled to Indonesian-controlled West Timor. There they signed a petition on 7 September calling for East Timor’s integration with Indonesia; most accounts indicate that UDT’s support for this position was forced by Indonesia.
7 september 1975
Legal expert Roger S. Clark notes that Indonesia’s invasion and occupation violated two key elements of international law: the right to self-determination and the prohibition on aggression. Neither the petition of 7 September 1975 calling for integration, nor the later resolution of the “People’s Assembly” in May 1976, qualify as “informed and democratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage”, as required by UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), which establishes the guidelines for the norms of self-determination. Other inadequacies existed in the petitions as well.
Indonesia’s use of military force in East Timor is cited as a violation of Chapter I of the United Nations Charter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state….” Some observers have argued that East Timor was not a state at the time of the invasion, and is thus not protected by the UN Charter. This claim mirrors those made against Indonesia by the Dutch during the Indonesian National Revolution. As legal scholar Susan Marks points out, if East Timor was considered a Portuguese colony,
then although “there may be some doubt about the application of this provision [of UN Charter Chapter I] in the context of an armed conflict between a colonial power and its own colony, there can hardly be doubt that it applies to force by one sovereign state against another state’s colony”.
8 October 1975
Once they had gained control of East Timor, FRETILIN faced attacks from the west, by Indonesian military forces—then known as Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)—and by a small group of UDT troops. Indonesia captured the border city of Batugadé on 8 October 1975; nearby Balibó and Maliana were taken eight days later. During the Balibó raid, members of an Australian television news crew—later dubbed the “Balibo Five“—were killed by Indonesian soldiers. Indonesian military officials say the deaths were accidental, and East Timorese witnesses say the journalists were deliberately killed. The deaths, and subsequent campaigns and investigations, attracted international attention and rallied support for East Timorese independence.
At the start of November, the foreign ministers from Indonesia and Portugal met in Rome to discuss a resolution of the conflict. Although no Timorese leaders were invited to the talks, FRETILIN sent a message expressing their desire to work with Portugal. The meeting ended with both parties agreeing that Portugal would meet with political leaders in East Timor, but the talks never took place. In mid-November, Indonesian forces began shelling the city of Atabae from the sea, and captured it by the end of the month.
Frustrated by Portugal’s inaction, FRETILIN leaders believed they could ward off Indonesian advances more effectively if they declared an independent East Timor. National Political Commissioner Mari Alkatiri conducted a diplomatic tour of Africa, gathering support from governments there and elsewhere. According to FRETILIN, this effort yielded assurances from twenty-five countries—including the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, Mozambique, Sweden, and Cuba—to recognise the new nation. Cuba currently shares close relations with East Timor today
28 November 1975
The colony of Portuguese Timor declared its independence on 28 November 1975, calling itself Timor-Leste (Portuguese: “East Timor”).
UDT leader 1975 Fransisco Lopes da cruz AMRT Fransisco Lpoes de Cruz with armed supporters in the territories controlled by Indonesian Nov 1975
Apodeti leader 1975 Gulherme Concalves AMRT Apodeti leader with armed supporters in the territories controlled by Indonesian Nov 1975
Indonesian Military pull down Portugeus Flag at Batugede nov 1975
On 28 November 1975, FRETILIN unilaterally declared independence for the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Indonesia announced, UDT and APODETI leaders in and around Balibó would responded the next day by declaring that region independent from East Timor and officially part of Indonesia. But this Balibo Declaration was drafted by Indonesian intelligence and signed on Bali. Later this was described as the ‘Balibohong Declaration’, a pun on the Indonesian word for ‘lie’. Portugal rejected both declarations, and the Indonesian government approved military action to begin its annexation of East Timor.
1 Desember 1975
Nine days after east timor independence Indonesia began the invasion of its main territory
PENDARATAN PERTAMA PASUKAN TNI – MARINIR DI TIMOR LOROSAE
Indonesian Navy Ship at east timor bay dec 1975
7 Desember 1975
Claiming its assistance had been requested by East Timorese leaders, Indonesian military forces invaded on 7 December
On 7 December 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor. Operasi Seroja (Operation Lotus) was the largest military operation ever carried out by that nation. Troops from FRETILIN’s military organization FALINTIL engaged ABRI forces in the streets of Dili, and reported 400 Indonesian paratroopers were killed as they descended into the city. Angkasa Magazine reports 35 dead Indonesian troops, and 122 from the Fretilin side. By the end of the year, 10,000 troops occupied Dili and another 20,000 had been deployed throughout East Timor. Massively outnumbered, FALINTIL troops fled to the mountains and continued guerrilla combat operations. Indonesian soldiers in towns, particularly Dili, were reported to have indiscriminately killed civilians, including the rape and killing of women and children.
7 Desember 1975 jam 05.00 WITA, gugus tempur laut TNI Angkatan Laut terlihat diperairan lepas pantai kota Dili, Timor Timur (East Timor).
Gugus tempur laut ini dinamakan Gugus Tugas Ampibi Operasi Seroja yang terdiri atas KRI Martadinata(342) yang bertugas sebagai pemberi bantuan tembakan pada operasi pendaratan Batalion Tim Pendarat (BTP 5)/Infanteri Marinir, KRI Ratulangi (400) sebagai kapal komando, KRI Barakuda (817), sebagai kapal buru kapal selam,
KRI Teluk Bone (511) sebagai kapal pengangkut BTP5/Infanteri Marinir dan tank ampibi (PT76 & BTR-50) yang akan didaratkan, KRI Jayawijaya (921) sebagai kapal bengkel yang berfungsi sebagai kapal pendukung, dan terkahir KRI Sorong (911) sebagai kapal tanker.
Gugus tempur ini dan juga Gugus Rajawali Flight ( terdiri dari 9 pesawat Herculus TNI AU) adalah ujung tombak Operasi Seroja yang dilakukan lewat penyerbuan pantai dan operasi lintas udara.
KRI Martadinata(342) yang bertugas sebagai pemberi bantuan tembakan pada operasi pendaratan Batalion Tim Pendarat (BTP 5)/Infanteri Marinir, KRI Ratulangi (400) sebagai kapal komando, KRI Barakuda (817), sebagai kapal buru kapal selam, KRI Teluk Bone (511).
sebagai kapal pengangkut BTP5/Infanteri Marinir dan tank ampibi (PT76 & BTR-50) yang akan didaratkan, KRI Jayawijaya (921) sebagai kapal bengkel yang berfungsi sebagai kapal pendukung, dan terkahir KRI Sorong (911) sebagai kapal tanker.
Gugus tempur ini terlihat di lepas pantai kota Dili dalam rangka penyerbuan Kota Dili yang diawali dengan tembakan-tembakan ke arah pantai untuk memberikan tembakan perlindungan dan juga tembakan bantuan dari meriam 76 mm milik KRI Martadinata.
Pada saat yang sama Batalion Tim Pendarat Marinir 5 mulai melakukan aksi pendaratannya dan berhasil sampai mendarat dan mengendap-endap di Kampung Alor dan mulai melakukan pergerakan menuju Kota Dili untuk menguasainya.
Pendaratan ini bukan tidak diliputi ketegangan, sebab gerakan gugus tugas ini sejak awal dibayang-bayangi oleh 2 kapal perang Portugal.
Dan celakanya , 7 Desember pagi, kedua kapal tersebut justru merapat di lepas pantai Dili. “Mereka buang jangkar lebih dekat ke pulau Atauro, karena di sana bercokol pemerintahan pelarian Portugal dari Timor,” kata Hendro Subroto, wartawan TVRI yang meliput saat itu.
Kedua kapal perang tersebut adalah 1 fregat dari kelas Commandante Joao Belo dan 1 kapal survei bernama Alfonso D. Alburqueque. Kapal-kapal itu sudah berada di perairan Timor Timur sejak bulan Oktober 1975. Seperti disengaja dan sudah mengetahui, mereka mendekati perairan Dili bersamaan dengan akan dilakukannya operasi ampibi.
KRI Martadinata dan KRI Ratulangi saling membayangi dengan fregat Portugal, namun yang utama mengawasi adalah KRI ratulangi yang dilengkapi meriam utama 100 mm. Sedangkan KRI Martadinata tetap fokus pada memberikan bantuan tembakan pada pendaratan marinir dibibir pantai.
Ketika diawasi oleh kedua KRI kita, kedua kapal Portugal tersebut tidak melakukan manuver yang mengganggu ataupun membahayakan operasi pendaratan, mereka hanya mengawasi saja.
Jarak antara kapal perang RI dengan kapal perang Portugal hanya 4 mil laut atau 7 kilometer saja. Dan bila baku tembak pecah antara kedua kubu tersebut, maka jarak ini sangatlah dekat dan masuk jarak tembak meriam kedua belah pihak.
Indonesia Warship Dec 1975. AMRT Indonesian troops disembarking East timor 7 december 1975
Setelah Berhasil Mendarat Di Pantai, pertempuran terus berlanjut hingga ke pedalaman. MARINIR merangsek maju dan membersihkan daerah daerah yang dicurigai
Indonesian Military landed at east timor 7 dec 1975
Indonesia Army Pantser at east timor dec 1975
Akhirnya Timor Timur dapat dikuasai oleh Pasukan Pendarat KKO-MARINIR
Indonesian Troops invasion East timor(now Timor leste)
Indonesian Army Parachute at ast timor 7 December 1975
Indonesian army parachute at coconut trea in Dilli east timor dec 7 1975
Main roads in front of Diocese Dilli next to Hotel Timor building Dec 1975
Indonesian Soldiers in position Dec 1975 AMRT Military operations during yhe Indonesian invasion of East timor dec.7.1975
Indonesian Military at east timor 1975
Indonesian Military with indonesian flag at east timor Dec 1975
Indonesian Soldiers at East timor dec ,7th . 1975
AMRT Miltary operations during the Indonesian invasion of East Timor Dec 7 1975
Dading Kalbuadi(left) Indonesian officials comander dec 7 1975 during indonesian invasion of east timor
17 Desember 1975
On 17 December, Indonesia formed the Provisional Government of East Timor (PGET) which was headed by Arnaldo dos Reis Araújo of APODETI as president and Lopez da Cruz of UDT. Most sources describe this institution as a creation of the Indonesian military. One of PGET’s first activities was the formation of a “Popular Assembly” consisting of elected representatives and leaders “from various walks of Timorese life”.
PERANAN ANGKATAN DARAT – TNI AD DAN ANGKATAN UDARA – TNI AU
serbuan Indonesia ke Timor Timur juga karena adanya kehendak dari sebagian rakyat Timor Timur yang ingin bersatu dengan Indonesia atas alasan etnik dan sejarah.
Angkatan Darat Indonesia mulai menyebrangi perbatasan dekat Atambua tanggal 17 Desember 1975 yang menandai awal Operasi Seroja.
Sebelumnya, pesawat-pesawat Angkatan Udara RI sudah kerap memasuki wilayah Timor Timur dan artileri Indonesia sudah sering menyapu wilayah Timor Timur. Kontak langsung pasukan Infantri dengan Fretilin pertama kali terjadi di Suai, 27 Desember 1975.
Korban berjatuhan dari pihak militer dan sipil. Warga sipil banyak digunakan sebagai tameng hidup oleh Fretilin sehingga korban yang berjatuhan dari sipil pun cukup banyak. Pihak Indonesia juga dituding sering melakukan pembantaian pada anggota Fretilin yang tertangkap selama Operasi Seroja berlangsung.
Batugede 1975 Mario Caracalo and Joao Carascalao
Immediately after the invasion, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council passed resolutions condemning Indonesia’s actions and calling for immediate withdrawal. The governments of the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom were supportive of Indonesia throughout the occupation. Australia and Indonesia were the only nations in the world to recognise East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and soon afterwards began negotiations to divide resources found in the Timor Gap. Other governments, including Japan, Canada and Malaysia, also supported the Indonesian government. The invasion and suppression of East Timor’s independence movement, however, caused great harm to Indonesia’s reputation and international credibility.
Tambahan Perang Seroja
3 Markas Hankam, 23 Agustus 1975.
Pada pagi hari tanggal 23 Agustus 1975 di Markas Hankam di jalan Saharjo di Tebet (Jakarta), sedang diadakan rapat rutin membahas perkembangan terakhir Vietnam dan kamboja, yang baru beberapa bulan sebelumnya jatuh ke tangan kekuatan komunis.
Tiba-tiba Assintel Hankam Mayjen LB Moerdani masuk ruangan dan memanggil Paban Renintel Kol (Art) Soebijakto untuk datang di kamar kerjanya. Setelah bertemu empat mata, Assintel menyampaikan perintah pendek Menhankam :
“Berangkat secepatnya ke Surabaya. telah disediakan satu destroyer dengan satu kompi marinir untuk berangkat ke Dili. Selamatkan dan ungsikan konsul Indonesia beserta seluruh staf dan keluarganya. Keadaan sangat gawat, pertempuran telah mencapai ibu kota Timor Timur (Timtim).
Tugas supaya dilaksanakan secara bijaksana dengan mempertimbangkan masalah-masalah diplomatik. Ingat, Australia akan mengikuti secara seksama. Kolenel ditunjuk sebagai ketua misi penting ini. Selamat jalan !”
Pukul 15:00 WIB ketua misi sampai di Surabaya, dijemput Assintel Armada Letkol (P) Moh. Arifin di Bandara Juanda. Ketua misi langsung menuju ke pangkalan AL. Di sana telah menunggu Panglima Armada Laksamana Rudi Purwana. Panglima menerangkan, kapal baru saja selesai mengisi bahan bakar dengan menggunakan mobil-mobil tangki sipil, karena Armada kekurangan mobil seperti itu. Pasukan marinir juga belum lengkap, karena para anggota yang bediam di luar kota sedang dijemput.
Pada pukul 17:00 WIB, kompi marinir telah siap dan berbaris dengan rapi di kade. Setelah laporan kepada Panglima Armada, dengan teratur mereka menaiki tangga KRI Monginsidi. Pada pukul 18:00 WIB kapal mulai bergerak berlayar perlahan menuju Laut Jawa. Malam pertama diisi taklimat mengenai tugas yang diemban kepada para perwira dan komandan kompi marinir.
Pada pagi hari dari jendela kapal terlihat daratan tandus di sebelah kanan kapal. Menurut komandan kapal, itu adalah daratan Madura. Padahal seharusnya kapal sudah sampai di sebelah utara Sumbawa, setelah berlayar semalaman. Komandan kapal Mayor (P) Harianto melaporkan semalam terjadi kebakaran cerobong, karena bahan bakarnya tidak murni.
Ternyata minyak diesel sebagai bahan bakar mesin kapal telah tercampur bensin dan minyak tanah, disebabkan truk angkut bahan bakar sipil yang disewa. Mungkin saja sebagian masih terisi bensin atau minyak lainnya, yang menurut perwira mesin menyebabkan naiknya suhu.
Mesin kapal terpaksa dihentikan menunggu dingin kembali. Di depan kota Maumere (Flores) kapal berhenti sebentar untuk mengambil 5 awak kapal yang disusulkan dengan menggunakan pesawat terbang. Pada tanggal 26 Agustus -pagi- kapal sudah berlabuh di Atapupu, suatu pelabuhan di kota Atambua di Timor Barat.
Pada pukul 20:00 WIB, KRI Monginsidi meninggalkan Atapupu dan berlayar perlahan menuju ke arah timur. Kira-kira pukul 23:30 WIB, kapal sudah mendekati kota Dili yang semua lampunya terlihat padam. Tembakan-tembakan mortir sudah mulai terdengar beserta kobaran-kobaran api di daerah pegunungan yang tadinya terlihat samar-samar sudah mulai tampak terang.
Pada saat gawat itulah misi Indonesia datang dengan kapal destroyer Monginsidi dan muncul di depan kota dengan lampu-lampu menyala.
Tugas pertama yang semula adalah mengungsikan konsul Indonesia bersama staf dan keluarganya, bertambah ketika datang perintah melalui radio sandi. Isinya adalah mengungsikan orang-orang asing yang ada di Timtim.
Perintah ke-dua ini ditutup dengan peringatan bahwa Australia juga akan mengirim sebuah kapal perang ke daerah itu. Karenanya, komandan misi supaya berhati-hati.
Operasi prihatin di timor – timor
Misi ini kemudian menjadi Kontingen, karena kekuatan semula -ketua misi yang didampingi Assintel Armada, beserta pengawal 1 kompi marinir di bawah komando Kapten (Mar) Solang- kini diperkuat dengan bantuan 6 kapal dagang dari beberapa perusahaan pelayaran Indonesia yang dapat dikerahkan, yang saat itu kebetulan berada tidak jauh dari Nusa Tenggara Timur. Operasi diberi nama sandi “Prihatin” oleh pimpinan Dephankam. Nama sandi ini diterima komandan kontingen saat KRI Monginsidi sudah berada di perairan Sumbawa.
Pada 26 Agustus pukul 24:00 WIB, KRI Monginsidi sudah berada 1,5 kilometer di depan Pelabuhan Dili. Dari kapal terlihat perang saudara berkecamuk dengan hebatnya. Dengan tidak hentihentinya pertahanan UDT di sebelah barat pelabuhan dibombardir mortir. Kebakaran terjadi di manamana, termasuk alang-alang di pegunungan di sekitar kota.
Tiba-tiba sekitar pukul 03:00 WIB terlihat sebuah kapal berukuran sedang dengan semua lampu dimatikan, berusaha keluar pelabuhan lewat jalur satusatunya yang ada. Melihat gerak-gerik mencurigakan itu, Mayor Herianto senagai komandan kapal segera diperintahkan secepatnya menghentikan kapal tadi dengan cara menutup pintu ke luar satu-satunya jalur ke luar pelabuhan.
Kapal tidak dikenal itu terpaksa berhenti. Selanjutnya kapal asing tadi diminta untuk membuka jati diri. Kapal tanpa lampu itu menyatakan diri sebagai milik pemerintah Portugal dan di dalamnya ada Gubernur Timor Portugis bernama Limos Pires sebagai penumpang. Gubernur disertai seluruh stafnya yang berbangsa Portugis, dikawal satu kompi para Portugal.
Kapal berlayar menuju Pulau Atauro, dalam rangka menghindari perang saudara, atas perintah pemerintah Lisbon. Komandan kontingen segera menawarkan bantuan untuk ikut menampung dan mengantar gubernur yang sedang lari itu, sampai di tujuan. Setelah menunggu beberapa saat, jawaban diberikan melalui radio, bantuan yang ditawarkan tidak diperlukan dengan ucapan terima kasih. Ia juga kirim salam kepada komandan kontingen dan minta agar diperkenankan meneruskan pelayaran.
Setelah jalur pelayaran dibuka oleh KRI Monginsidi, kapal pelarian segera diberi tanda agar melanjutkan perjalanannya. Dalam beberapa saat kapal itu telah ditelan kegelapan malam di pagi dini hari tanggal 27 Agustus 1975.
Dengan hilangnya kapal pelarian Gubernur Limos Pires, timbul pertanyaan besar di benak segenap awak kapal KRI Monginsidi. Kalau penguasa tunggal berketatapan menghindari tanggung jawabnya, lalu siapa yang akan membawa rakyat Tmtim mencari jalan keluar dari anarki sebagai akibat kebijaksanaan tinggal glanggang colong playu [ini bahasa Jawa, saya ndak ngerti ! ;-)] pemerintah Portugis itu ?
Jawaban yang paling tepat adalah : “Tidak Ada”. Dengan demikian -oleh pemerintah Portugal- nasib rakyat diserahkan kepada hasil kekacauan dan hasil saling bunuh antarrakyat yang bertikai sendiri.
Pada waktu hari mulai terang, tiba-tiba saja tembakan berhenti. Kemungkinan besar kehadiran negara tetangga besar yang diwakili kapal perang KRI Monginsidi adalah penyebabnya. Hal ini -belakangan- dibenarkan konsul Indonesia, saat terjadi pertemuan yang diadakan komandan kontingen dengan tokoh-tokoh kedua belah pihak yang bertikai.
Dalam kesenyapan pagi tanpa tembakan itu, komandan kontingen memerintahkan Assintel Armada untuk mengadakan pengintaian pantai, dikawal 1 regu marinir bersenjata lengkap yang dipimpin sendiri oleh komandan kompinya. Dua perahu karet bermotor segera diturunkan dan setelah siap kedua perahu mendekati pantai dengan sangat hati-hati.
Di pelabuhan, terlihat bendera putih dengan ukuran besar berkibar. Di tengah pelayaran, perahu-perahu patroli disongsong sebuah perahu motor kecil yang membawa bendera putih. Ternyata di dalam perahu itu selain awak kapal juga ada seorang staf konsulat Indonesia yang mencoba mengetahui maksud kedatangan kapal perang, atas permintaan pihak Fretilin.
Pejabat ini lalu diminta segera naik kapal perang untuk memberikan taklimat mengenai situasi dan saran-saran yang diperlukan. Takliman singkat berisi soal politis prinsipil yang tampaknya akan sulit untuk diatasi dalam waktu pendek.
On the day following the invasion, a committee of the United Nations General Assembly convened to debate the situation. Nations allied with Indonesia—including India, Japan, and Malaysia—wrote a resolution blaming Portugal and the Timorese political parties for the bloodshed; it was rejected in favor of a draft prepared by Algeria, Cuba, Senegal, and Guyana, among others. This was adopted as GA Resolution 3485 (XXX) on 12 December, calling on Indonesia to “withdraw without delay”. Ten days later the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 384 (1975), which echoes the GA resolution’s call for an immediate Indonesian withdrawal.
Major investment by the Indonesian government to improve East Timor’s infrastructure, and health and education facilities since 1975, did not end East Timorese resistance to Indonesian rule.[119
Timor Timor menjadi bagian dari Indonesia tahun 1976 sebagai provinsi ke-27 setelah gubernur jendral Timor Portugis terakhir Mario Lemos Pires melarikan diri dari Dili setelah tidak mampu menguasai keadaan pada saat terjadi perang saudara.
Portugal juga gagal dalam proses dekolonisasi di Timor Portugis dan selalu mengklaim Timor Portugis sebagai wilayahnya walaupun meninggalkannya dan tidak pernah diurus dengan baik.
Amerika Serikat dan Australia “merestui” tindakan Indonesia karena takut Timor Leste menjadi kantong komunisme terutama karena kekuatan utama di perang saudara Timor Leste adalah Fretilin yang beraliran Marxis-Komunis. AS dan Australia khawatir akan efek domino meluasnya pengaruh komunisme di Asia Tenggara setelah AS lari terbirit-birit dari Vietnam dengan jatuhnya Saigon atau Ho Chi Minh City.
In March 1976, UDT leader Lopez da Cruz reported that 60,000 Timorese had been killed during the invasion. A delegation of Indonesian relief workers agreed with this statistic.
the Security Council expressed the same sentiment in Resolution 389 (1976), and the General Assembly passed resolutions every year between 1976 and 1982 calling for self-determination in East Timor. Governments of large countries like China and the United States opposed further action; smaller countries like Costa Rica, Guinea-Bissau, and Iceland were the only delegations calling for strong enforcement of the resolutions
Ini cerita waktu Operasi Seroja, integrasi Timtim antara 26 Feb 1976 s/d 26 Mar 1976.
KAPAL SELAM RI BERHADAPAN DENGAN KAPAL SELAM US
Sedangkan dalam Operasi Seroja, satuan kapal selam bertugas menjaga perairan Timor dari infiltrasi asing. Terutama, di perairan laut yang berbatasan dengan Australia.
Pada saat itu KS KRI Pasopati sedang menyelam di pantai utara dekat kota Baucau, tiba-tiba ada laporan dari Juru Sonar ada suara baling-baling mendekat ke KS kita, untuk itu komandan kapal memerintahkan KS naik ke kedalaman periskop dan mengintip cakrawala, ternyata cakrawala bersih tanpa ada satu kapalpun disana.
“Juru sonar, berapa baringan dan kecepatan?” tanya komandan. “Baringan 040 kecepatan 10 knots ndan” jawab juru sonar. Komandan mengecek lagi arah itu tidak terdapat kapal disitu. Komandan mengambil kesimpulan itu adalah KS asing yang mendekat. Untuk itu secara diam-diam peran tempur disiapkan di KS kita dan haluan kapal diubah menyongsong arah KS asing itu.
“Siapkan torpedo untuk ditembakkan” perintah komandan, tetapi tiba-tiba Juru sonar berkata “Baringan 000, suara menjauh, kecepatan 30 knots!”
Ternyata KS itu menjauh tidak mau berkonfrontasi dengan KS kita diperairan Timtim…dari hasil analisa kemungkinan KS itu adalah KS USN milik Armada VII karena kecepatannya cukup tinggi 30 knots dan diketahui hanya mereka yang KSnya bisa secepat itu pada masa itu…
Like the PGET itself, the Popular Assembly is usually characterised as an instrument of propaganda created by the Indonesian military; although international journalists were invited to witness the group’s meeting in May 1976, their movement was tightly constrained. The Assembly drafted a request for formal integration into Indonesia, which Jakarta described as “the act of self-determination” in East Timor.
17 juli 1976
Indonesia declared the accession of Timor-Leste on 17 July 1976 as 27th province and changed its official name to “Timor Timur”, the Indonesian translation of “East Timor”. The use of Portuguese was then forbidden, as it was seen as relic of colonization.(wiki)
After winning the December elections, the Fraser government took the approach that trade with Southeast Asia and political ties with Southeast Asia were too important to be put at risk for what was seen as a lost cause. Australia abstained from the 1976 and 1977 UN General Assembly Resolutions, and by 1978 became the only government to officially recognise East Timor as a province of Indonesia.
18-29 September 1976
Pertempuran terdahsyat terjadi di Baucau pada 18-29 September 1976.
Walaupun TNI telah berhasil memasuki Dili pada awal Februari 1976, namun banyak pertempuran-pertempuran kecil maupun besar yang terjadi di seluruh pelosok Timor Timur antara Fretilin melawan pasukan TNI.
Starting in September 1977, Indonesian forces began what Catholic officials in East Timor called an “encirclement and annihilation” campaign. 35,000 ABRI troops surrounded areas of FRETILIN support and killed hundreds of men, women, and children. Air and naval bombardments were followed by ground troops, who destroyed villages and agricultural infrastructure. Thousands of people may have been killed during this period. During a firefight with Indonesian troops in December 1978, FRETILIN’s leader Nicolau Lobato was killed. His successor was Xanana Gusmão, who was instrumental in building the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), an umbrella structure for people and groups opposed to the occupation.
Indonesian forces moved hundreds of thousands of people into camps, where they were imprisoned and subjected to hunger. FRETILIN radio claimed Indonesian planes dropped chemical agents, and several observers—including the Bishop of Dili—reported seeing napalm dropped on the countryside
The Indonesian government reported in 1977 that several mass graves containing “scores” of people killed by FRETILIN had been found near Ailieu and Samé
The Indonesian government presented its annexation of East Timor as a matter of anticolonial unity. A 1977 booklet from the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, entitled Decolonization in East Timor, paid tribute to the “sacred right of self-determination” and recognised APODETI as the true representatives of the East Timorese majority. It claimed that FRETILIN’s popularity was the result of a “policy of threats, blackmail and terror”. Later, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated this position in his 2006 memoir The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor. The island’s original division into east and west, Indonesia argued after the invasion, was “the result of colonial oppression” enforced by the Portuguese and Dutch imperial powers. Thus, according to the Indonesian government, its annexation of the 27th province was merely another step in the unification of the archipelago which had begun in the 1940s.
Dalam pertempuran terakhir di Lospalos 1978, Fretilin mengalami kekalahan telak dan 3.000 pasukannya menyerah setelah dikepung oleh TNI berhari-hari. Operasi Seroja berakhir sepenuhnya pada tahun 1978 dengan hasil kekalahan Fretilin dan pengintegrasian Timor Timur ke dalam wilayah NKRI.
Selama operasi ini berlangsung, arus pengungsian warga Timor Timur ke wilayah Indonesia mencapai angka 100.000 orang.
by 1979 had all but destroyed armed resistance to the occupation. Following a controversial “Popular Assembly” which many said was not a genuine act of self-determination, Indonesia declared the territory a province of Indonesia (Timor Timur).
World Vision Indonesia visited East Timor in October 1978 and claimed that 70,000 East Timorese were at risk of starvation. An envoy from the International Committee of the Red Cross reported in 1979 that 80 percent of one camp’s population was malnourished, in a situation that was “as bad as Biafra“. The ICRC warned that “tens of thousands” were at risk of starvation. Indonesia announced that it was working through the government-run Indonesian Red Cross to alleviate the crisis, but the NGO Action for World Development charged that organization with selling donated aid supplies.
Indonesia kept East Timor shut off from the rest of the world, except for a few years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, claiming that the vast majority of East Timorese supported integration. This position was followed closely by the Indonesian media such that an East Timorese acceptance of their integration with Indonesia was taken for granted by, and was a non-issue for, the majority of Indonesians
The Portuguese language was banned in East Timor and Indonesian was made the language of government, education and public commerce, and the Indonesian school curriculum was implemented. The official Indonesian national ideology, Pancasila, was applied to East Timor and government jobs were restricted to those holding certification in Pancasila training. East Timorese animist belief systems did not fit with Indonesia’s constitutional monotheism, resulting in mass conversions to Christianity. Portuguese clergy were replaced with Indonesian priests and Latin and Portuguese mass was replaced by Indonesian mass. Before the invasion, less than 30 percent of East Timorese were Roman Catholics, and by the 1980s, 80 percent were registered as Catholics. With a 90 percent Catholic population, East Timor is currently one of the most densely Catholic countries in the world.
Although by the 1980s Fretilin forces had dropped to a few hundred armed men, Fretilin increased its contacts with young Timorese especially in Dili, and an un-armed civil resistance seeking self-determination took shape.
Many of those in the protest movements were young children at the time of the invasion and had been educated under the Indonesian system. They resented the repression of Timorese cultural and political life at the expense of the Indonesian, were ambivalent of Indonesian economic development, and spoke Portuguese amongst themselves, stressing their Portuguese heritage.
Seeking help from Portugal for self-determination, they considered Indonesia an occupying force. Abroad, Fretilin’s members—most notably former journalist José Ramos-Horta (later to be Prime Minister and President)—pushed their cause in diplomatic forums.
The reduced armed resistance prompted the Indonesian government in 1988 to open up East Timor to improve its commercial prospects, including a lifting of the travel ban on journalists. The new policy came from foreign minister Ali Alatas against the advice of the military leadership who feared it would lead to loss of control. Alatas and diplomats swayed Suharto of the policy as a response to international concerns
In 1981 the Indonesian military launched Operasi Keamanan (Operation Security), which some have named the “fence of legs” program. 50,000 East Timorese men and boys were ordered to march through the mountains, sweeping guerrillas into the central part of the region. The operation failed to crush the resistance, and popular resentment toward the occupation grew stronger than ever. As FRETILIN troops in the mountains continued their sporadic attacks, Indonesian forces carried out numerous operations to destroy them over the next ten years. In the cities and villages, meanwhile, a non-violent resistance movement began to take shape.
At the same time, Indonesian forces carried out a widespread campaign of killing, torture, forced disappearances, political imprisonment, and other abuses of human rights. Starting in 1981, Indonesian officials sent thousands of prisoners to Atauro Island, where Amnesty International described the conditions as “deplorable”. Massacres by the Indonesian military have been documented across East Timor. In September 1981, 400 civilians were killed in Lacluta,
*002The leaflet of East timor fight to integrated with Indonesia leaflet from Betao police sector,Manufakti city East Timor which given to dr iwan by the the secor command when he cambat to Brimob Padang Panjang where Dr Iwan on duty in this area in 1981.(Dr Iwan private collections)
Australia and Indonesia began drafting a treaty to share resources in the Timor Gap. The treaty was signed in December 1989, with estimates ranging from one to seven billion barrels of oil to be secured.
This agreement, along with general economic partnership with Indonesia, is frequently cited as a crucial factor for the Australian government’s position. And yet given that nearly 60,000 East Timorese had died during the fighting between Australian and Japanese forces that followed the invasion of Timor by the Japanese during the Pacific War
some Australians believed their government owed a special debt to the former Portuguese colony. James Dunn, a senior Foreign Affairs adviser to the Australian Parliament before and during the occupation, condemned the government’s position, saying later: “What had been of vital strategic value in 1941 was, in 1974, irrelevant and dispensable.”
Some Australian World War II veterans protested the occupation for similar reasons.
Successive Australian governments saw good relations and stability in Indonesia (Australia’s largest neighbour) as providing an important security buffer to Australia’s north, but the East Timor issue complicated co-operation between the two nations. Australia provided important sanctuary to East Timorese independence advocates like Jose Ramos-Horta (who based himself in Australia during his exile). Australia’s trade with Indonesia grew through the 1980s and the Keating Labor Government signed a security pact with Indonesia in 1995 and gave relations with Jakarta a high priority. The fall of Indonesian President Suharto and a shift in Australian policy by the Howard Government in 1998 helped precipitate a proposal for a referendum on the question of independence for East Timor.[165
Runtuhnya timor timur
Indonesia occupied East Timor from December 1975 to October 1999. After centuries of Portuguese colonial rule in East Timor, a 1974 coup in Portugal led to decolonization among its former colonies, creating instability in East Timor and leaving its future uncertain. After a small-scale civil war, the pro-independence FRETILIN declared victory in the capital city of Dili and declared an independent East Timor on 28 November 1975.
Claiming its assistance had been requested by East Timorese leaders, Indonesian military forces invaded on 7 December and by 1979 had all but destroyed armed resistance to the occupation. Following a controversial “Popular Assembly” which many said was not a genuine act of self-determination, Indonesia declared the territory a province of Indonesia (Timor Timur).
The 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre
caused outrage around the world, and reports of other such killings were numerous. Resistance to Indonesian rule remained strong;[1
the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two men from East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, for their ongoing efforts to peacefully end the occupation. A 1999 vote to determine East Timor’s future resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of independence, and in 2002 East Timor became an independent nation. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor estimated the number of deaths during the occupation from famine and violence to be between 90,800 and 202,600 including between 17,600 and 19,600 violent deaths or disappearances, out of a 1999 population of approximately 823,386. The truth commission held Indonesian forces responsible for about 70% of the violent killings.
Immediately after the invasion, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council passed resolutions condemning Indonesia’s actions and calling for immediate withdrawal. The governments of the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom were supportive of Indonesia throughout the occupation. Australia and Indonesia were the only nations in the world to recognise East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and soon afterwards began negotiations to divide resources found in the Timor Gap. Other governments, including Japan, Canada and Malaysia, also supported the Indonesian government.
The invasion and suppression of East Timor’s independence movement, however, caused great harm to Indonesia’s reputation and international credibility.
20 november 1992
On 20 November 1992 FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmão was arrested by Indonesian troops. In May 1993 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for “rebellion”, but his sentence was later commuted to 20 years. The arrest of the universally acknowledged leader of the resistance was a major frustration to the anti-integration movement in East Timor, but Gusmão continued to serve as a symbol of hope from inside the Cipinang prison. Nonviolent resistance by East Timorese, meanwhile, continued to show itself. When President Bill Clinton visited Jakarta in 1994, twenty-nine East Timorese students occupied the U.S. embassy to protest U.S. support for Indonesia.
At the same time, human rights observers called attention to continued violations by Indonesian troops and police. A 1995 report by Human Rights Watch noted that “abuses in the territory continue to mount”, including torture, disappearances, and limitations on basic rights. After a series of riots in September and October 1995, Amnesty International criticised Indonesian authorities for a wave of arbitrary arrests and torture. The report indicates detainees were beaten with iron bars, kicked, lacerated, and threatened with death.
East Timor was a particular focus for the Indonesian government’s transmigration program, which aimed to resettle Indonesians from densely to less populated regions. Media censorship under the “New Order” meant that the state of conflict in East Timor was unknown to the transmigrants, predominantly poor Javanese and Balinese wet-rice farmers. On arrival they found themselves under ongoing threat of attack by East Timorese resistance fighters, and became the object of local resentment, since large tracts of land belonging to East Timorese had been compulsorily appropriated by the Indonesian government for transmigrant settlement. Although many gave up and returned to their island of origin, those migrants that stayed in East Timor contributed to the “Indonesianisation” of East Timor’s integration. 662 transmigrant families (2,208 people) settled in East Timor in 1993, whereas an estimated 150,000 free Indonesian settlers lived in East Timor by the mid-1990s, including those offered jobs in education and administration. Migration increased resentment amongst Timorese who were overtaken by more business savvy immigrants.
The Indonesian government’s primary response to criticism of its policies was to highlight its funding of development in East Timor’s health, education, communications, transportation, and agriculture. East Timor, however, remained poor following centuries of Portuguese colonial neglect and Indonesian critic George Aditjondro points out that conflict in the early years of occupation lead to sharp drops in rice and coffee production, and livestock populations. Other critics argue that infrastructure development, such as road construction, is often designed to facilitate Indonesian military and corporate interests. While the military controlled key businesses, private investors, both Indonesian and international, avoided the territory. Despite improvements since 1976, a 1993 Indonesian government report estimated that in three-quarters of East Timor’s 61 districts, more than half lived in poverty.[118
Indonesian military abuses against women in East Timor were numerous and well-documented. In addition to suffering arbitrary detainment, torture, and extrajudicial execution, women faced rape and sexual abuse—sometimes for the crime of being related to an independence activist. The scope of the problem is difficult to ascertain, owing to the intense military control imposed during the occupation, compounded by the shame felt by victims. In a 1995 report on violence against women in Indonesia and East Timor, Amnesty International USA wrote: “Women are reluctant to pass on information to non-governmental organizations about rape and sexual abuse, let alone to report violations to the military or police authorities.”
Other forms of violence against women took the form of harassment, intimidation, and enforced marriage. The Amnesty report cites the case of a woman forced to live with a commander in Baucau, then harassed daily by troops after her release. Such “marriages” took place regularly during the occupation. Women were also encouraged to accept sterilization procedures, and some were pressured to take the contraceptive Depo Provera, sometimes without full knowledge of its effects.
in 1996 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two men from East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, for their ongoing efforts to peacefully end the occupation. A 1999 vote to determine East Timor’s future resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of independence,
In 1996 East Timor was suddenly brought to world attention when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor”. The Nobel Committee indicated in its press release that it hoped the award would “spur efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people’s right to self-determination”. As Nobel scholar Irwin Abrams notes:
For Indonesia the prize was a great embarrassment…. In public statements the government tried to put distance between the two laureates, grudgingly recognising the prize for Bishop Belo, over whom it thought it could exercise some control, but accusing Ramos-Horta of responsibility for atrocities during the civil strife in East Timor and declaring that he was a political opportunist. At the award ceremony Chairman Sejersted answered these charges, pointing out that during the civil conflict Ramos-Horta was not even in the country and on his return he tried to reconcile the two parties.
Diplomats from Indonesia and Portugal, meanwhile, continued the consultations required by the 1982 General Assembly resolution, in a series of meetings intended to resolve the problem of what Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called the “pebble in the Indonesian shoe”.
Those suspected of opposing integration were often arrested and tortured. In 1983 Amnesty International published an Indonesian manual it had received from East Timor instructing military personnel on how to inflict physical and mental anguish, and cautioning troops to “Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)”. In his 1997 memoir East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance, Constâncio Pinto describes being tortured by Indonesian soldiers: “With each question, I would get two or three punches in the face. When someone punches you so much and so hard, it feels as if your face is broken. People hit me on my back and on my sides with their hands and then kicked me…. [In another location] they psychologically tortured me; they didn’t hit me, but they made strong threats to kill me. They even put a gun on the table.” In Michele Turner’s book Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992, a woman named Fátima describes watching torture take place in a Dili prison: “They make people sit on a chair with the front of the chair on their own toes. It is mad, yes. The soldiers urinate in the food then mix it up for the person to eat. They use electric shock and they use an electric machine….”
5 mei 1998
Indonesia and Portugal announced on 5 May 1999 that it had agreed to hold a vote allowing the people of East Timor to choose between the autonomy plan or independence. The vote, to be administered by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was originally scheduled for 8 August but later postponed until 30 August. Indonesia also took responsibility for security; this arrangement caused worry in East Timor, but many observers believe that Indonesia would have refused to allow foreign peacekeepers during the vote.
In late 1998, Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer drafted a letter to Indonesia setting out a change in Australian policy, suggesting that East Timor be given a chance to vote on independence within a decade. The letter upset Indonesian President B. J. Habibie, who saw it as implying Indonesia was a “colonial power” and he decided to announce a snap referendum. A UN sponsored referendum held in 1999 showed overwhelming approval for independence, but was followed by violent clashes and a security crisis, instigated by anti-independence militia. Australia then led a United Nations backed International Force for East Timor to end the violence and order was restored. While the intervention was ultimately successful, Australian-Indonesian relations would take several years to recover.
The Australian Labor Party altered its East Timor policy in 1999 and adopted a policy of support for East Timorese independence and opposition to the Indonesian presence there, through its Foreign Affairs spokesperson Laurie Brereton. Breretons’ credibility was attacked by the governing Liberal-National Coalition government and its Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, and Prime Minister Howard. They were assisted in their campaign by the then-Labor-backbencher Kevin Rudd (who would later lead the Labor Party to victory in the 2007 Australian federal election).
8 juni 1998
In late 1998, the Australian Government of John Howard drafted a letter to Indonesia advising of a change in Australian policy, and advocating for the staging of referendum on independence within a decade. President Habibie saw such an arrangement as implying “colonial rule” by Indonesia and he decided to call a snap referendum on the issue.
In 1999 researcher Rebecca Winters released the book Buibere: Voice of East Timorese Women, which chronicles many personal stories of violence and abuse dating to the earliest days of the occupation. One woman tells of being interrogated while stripped half-naked, tortured, molested, and threatened with death. Another describes being chained at the hands and feet, raped repeatedly, and interrogated for weeks. A woman who had prepared food for FRETILIN guerrillas was arrested, burned with cigarettes, tortured with electricity, and forced to walk naked past a row of soldiers into a tank filled with urine and feces.
As groups supporting autonomy and independence began campaigning, a series of pro-integration paramilitary groups of East Timorese began threatening violence—and indeed committing violence—around the country. Alleging pro-independence bias on the part of UNAMET, the groups were seen working with and receiving training from Indonesian soldiers. Before the May agreement was announced, an April paramilitary attack in Liquiça left dozens of East Timorese dead. On 16 May 1999, a gang accompanied by Indonesian troops attacked suspected independence activists in the village of Atara; in June another group attacked a UNAMET office in Maliana. Indonesian authorities claimed to be helpless to stop the violence between rival factions among the East Timorese, but Ramos-Horta joined many others in scoffing at such notions. In February 1999 he said: “Before [Indonesia] withdraws it wants to wreak major havoc and destabilization, as it has always promised. We have consistently heard that over the years from the Indonesian military in Timor.”
As militia leaders warned of a “bloodbath”, Indonesian “roving ambassador” Francisco Lopes da Cruz declared: “If people reject autonomy there is the possibility blood will flow in East Timor.” One paramilitary announced that a vote for independence would result in a “sea of fire”, an expression referring to the Bandung Sea of Fire during Indonesia’s own war of independence from the Dutch. As the date of the vote drew near, reports of anti-independence violence continued to accumulate.
BERSAMBUNG KEBAGIAN KEDUA
NAPAK TILAS RUNTUHNYA TIMOR TIMUR