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Napak Tilas

G 30 S PKI

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NAPAK TILAS G.30 S PKI

1965

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FILM DOKUMENTER

 

Oleh

Dr Iwan Suwandy,MHA

 

Hak Cipta  @ Dr Iwan 2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SITUASI SEBELUM G.30.S

 

 

Awal januari 1965

 

 

 

Awal januari 1965, dikantor kedutaan Besar RI Di Beograd Yugoslavia datang sepucuk surat yang ditujukan kepada Duta besar Yugoslavia,

 

 

 Yoga sugoma (kelak jadi BAKIN),

pengirimnya Pangkostrad Suharto isinya Yoga sugomo ditawarkan untuk pulang ke Jakarta  dengan jabatan baru kepala Intelijen Kostrad.

 

 

 

 

 

3 Februari 1965

Dan yang kemudian berlanjut dengan pertempuran-pertempuran yang tidak henti-hentinya, sampai berakhir pada tanggal 3 Februari 1965.

Akhir Jihad Seorang Mujahid

Bertepatan dengan hari raya Idhul Fitri, pada 1 Syawal atau tanggal 13 Februari 1965, tiga buah peluru yang ditembakan oleh seorang prajurit yang patuh mendengar perintah atasannya telah menembus dada Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar.

Pada hari berbahagia bagi ummat Islam diseluruh dunia, telah Syahid seorang hamba Allah yang bernama Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar. Peluru yang membunuh Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar itu, adalah peluru prajurit yang taat pada komandannya, sekalipun komandan tertingginya itu adalah bekas serdadu penjajah KNIL, yang tidak mampu menerima jika ajaran Islam menjadi berjaya di negeri-Nya.

Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar sebagai salah seorang diantara hamba Allah yang berusaha untuk mentaati perintah-Nya, takut kepada siksa-Nya dan taqwa kepada-Nya. Semua yang telah dilakukan dan dijalaninya insya Allah adalah sarana untuk menang dan beruntung dihari mendatang.

 

5 Februari 1965

 

Tawaran Suharto ini menarik karena itu , pada tanggal 5 Februari 1965 Yoga sudah tiba di jakarta  langsung menghadap Pangkostrad dirumahnya jalan haji Agus salim ,mereka bermusyawarah dan itulah awalnya terbentuk kubu Suharto.

 

Pemanggilan Yoga oleh Suharto mangandung tiga indikasi, pertama Pemangilan Yoga tidak melalui jalan normal, seharusnya penarikanya dilakukan oleh Menpagad Ahmad Yani.karena Yoa adalah perwira AD, kenyataannya Yoga ditarik berdasarkan surat Pangkostrad Suharto. Kedua tujuan kepulangan Yoga kejakarta untuk bersama-sama Suharto menyabot  politik Sukarno.

 

Ketiga Mereka bertujuan menghancurkan PKI.

Ketiga indikasi ini bukan kesimpulan Subandrio tetapi diungkapkan oleh ali Moertopo (salah satu trio Suharto yoga) dengan bangga tanpa tending aling-aling (secara blak-blakan) mengungkapkan hal itu dengan gaya seperti orang tak berdosa.

Bagi Suharto menarik orang dengan cara itu adalah hal biasa, padahal ia sudah melangar garis komado dan hirarki.dengan cara yang inilah ia membangun kubunya,pokok perhatian kubu ini tidak kepada panglima AD tetapi menyangkut Politik nasional dan Internasional ,perhatian kubu tertuju kepada Bung Karno dan PKI.

 

Kubu Suharto disebut juga Trio Suharto-Yoga-Ali yang selanjutnya kista sebut kelompok bayangan Suharto.Mereka bersatu dengan cara tersamar.Mereka bergerak dibawah permukaaan.Awalnya teman lama dan merupak suatu tim kompak  ketika berada di KODAM Diponegoro.Kekompakn trio ini sudah teruji saat Pimpinan AD memilih panglima Diponegoro dan kekompakan mereka dilanjutkan di Jakarta.

 

Saat itu Pimpina AD mencalonkan Kolonel bambang Supeno menjadi Pangdam Diponegoro, rencana tersebut diketahui oelh perwira  dissana,saat itu Suharto berpangkat Let.Kol.juga mendengar, walaupun pangkat Suharto lebih rendah dari bambang supeno namun ia berani merebut jabatan tersebut caranya mengunakan strategi kotor namun terselubung .

 

Saat rencana pengangkatan tersebut bocor,ada sebuah rapat gelap di Kopeng, Jateng, yang dihadiri perwira  KOdam Diponegoro, rapat dikoordinir suarto melalui triona Yoga, tetapi Suharto tidak hadir ,intinya rapat merumuskan Suharto harus tampil sebagai Panglima Diponegoro ,jika tidak suahrto dan Yoga akan mengalang kekuatan bersama-sama untuk menolak  pencalonan bambang Supeno.

Saat itu Pencalonan bamabang supeno menjadi Pandam Diponegor belum ditanda tangani Presiden Sukarnosehingga upaya Suharto merebut jabatan tersebut bdengan waktu.

 

Namum scenario Suharto melalui Yoga tidak didukung oleh perwira Diponegoro, yang hadir, hanya satu perwira yang menanda tangani dr Suhardi tanda setuju sedangkan yang lain yang hadir tidak.

 

Yoga semula mengaku pertemuan tersebut tidak dibereitahu kepada Suharto, ini bisa diartikan scenario tidfak dibuat Suharto, Ketika dua Utusan KODAM Diponegoro hendak ke Jakarta untuk meminta tanda tangan presiden tentang pengangkatan Bambang supeno ,barulah Rapat gelap itu disebarkann

 

Berdasarkan memori Yoga, rapat itu adalah gagasan Suharto, pengakuan awal Yoga  bahwa Suahrto tidak mengetahui rapat tersebut agar tidak menimbulkan kecurigaan Jakarta bahwa Suharto mengalang kekuatan menolak pencalonan bambang Supeno.tetapi hal ini tidak mendapat konfirmasi apakah rapat gelap itu dikoordinir Suharto melalui Yoga atau  inisiatif Yoga sendiri.

Sebagai pembanding ,salah seorang trio Suharto-yog-ali, al moertopo ,menyatakan bahwa saat itu ia sebagai kmandan  pasukan banteng Raiders dimnta membantu Yoga melancarkan operasi intelijen.Tidak dirinci operasi intelijen yang dimaksud, tetapi tujuannya untuk mengusahakan Suharto menjadi Panglima Diponegoro,tapi Ali tidak menjelaskan siapa yang memintanya  Suharto,yoga atau kedu-duanya .

Terlepas Yoga berbohong atau tidak,tetapi rangkaian pernyatan Yoga dan Ali Moertopo menunjukkan adanya suatu komplotan Suharto.Komplotan yang berfgerak dalam operasi militer. Suharto adalah dalang yang sedang memainkan wayang-wayangnya. Tentu,dalamnngnya tidak perlu terjun langsung.

 

(subandrio)

 

 

 

Karir Kol Bambang Supeno sedikit terangkat begitu KSAD baru Letjen Ahmad Yani naik tahta. Oleh Yani, setelah berpulangnya wakasad Gatot Subroto, Supeno diberi jabatan sebagai wakasad *). Meski demikian, Yani tak kuasa juga untuk cepat-cepat memberikan pangkat jenderal. (Hal yang memang sedikit aneh, mengingat asisten Yani saja minimal berpangkat Brigjen). Yani harus mencari momentum tepat sampai anggota Wanjakti lainnya siap berdamai dengan masa lalu Supeno.

*) Soal jabatan terakhirnya Wakasad ini sebetulnya masih memerlukan data pembanding mengingat pegangannya hanya pengakuan istrinya, Ny Sri Kusdiantinah yang mungkin saja awam istilah atau jabatan militer

 

http://anusapati.blogdetik.com/2008/08/22/bambang-supeno/

Maret 1965

 Pada bulan Maret 1965 kekuatan Brigade Infanteri ‑5 ditambah I Batalyon pimpinan Mayor B. Yudo Darmojo. Sementara itu pendekatan secara diplomasi terus dilakukan

By  April 1965,

 Indonesia began to openly deploy its regular army. A full Indonesian battalion launched an assault upon the  British Parachute Regiment camp at Plaman Mapu, a small hilltop village in positioned near Indonesian border.

 

Other troops crossed the border and infiltrated to Sebatik Island near Tawau, Sabah facing the Royal Malaysian Regiment and North Borneo Armed Constabulary. Indonesian bombers made several sorties attacking positions near to the border. From 1 July to 8 September1965, 5000 Indonesian troops attacked and blockaded Malaysian Navy Base at Semporna, Malaysian Peninsula, but with no avail. Malaysian people named the raids as  “68 Days of Siege”.

The last Indonesian attacks across the Sarawak border happened just before the peace agreement, known as Jakarta Accord, signed on August 11, 1966. General Soeharto who didn’t like the confrontation from the beginning  was relieved as most of his troops deployed in the front-lines had been already withdrawn to Java in the aftermath of the Communist coup d’état.

 

April  1965

Duel RPKAD vs SAS

25-01-2013 14:06

Ini cerita tentang the first British SAS soldiers killed by a South East Asian soldier (yg tentu saja diwakili oleh prajurit dari RPKAD/Kopassus )

Setting ceritanya adalah bulan April tahun 1965, ketika Indonesia sedang berkonfrontasi dengan Malingsial. Lokasi pertempuran di desa Mapu, Long Bawan, perbatasan Kalimantan Barat dan Sabah.

Saat itu batalion 2 RPKAD (sekarang Grup 2 Kopassus) baru saja terbentuk. batalion baru ini segera dikirim untuk misi khusus ke kalimantan barat. Mereka mendarat di Pontianak bulan Februari 1965, dan segera setelah itu mereka berjalan kaki menuju posnya di Balai Karangan yang jaraknya puluhan kilometer dari lapangan terbang.

Pos Balai Karangan merupakan pos terdepan TNI yang sebelum kedatangan RPKAD dijaga oleh infanteri dari batalion asal Jatim. Sekitar 1 km di depan pos Balai Karangan adalah pos terdepan tentara Inggris di desa Mapu yang dijaga oleh satu kompi British paratrooper dan beberapa orang SAS. Menyerang pos inilah yang menjadi misi khusus batalion RPKAD. Pos Mapu tersebut sering digunakan sebagai transit bagi personel SAS yang akan menyusup ke wilayah Indonesia. TNI ingin hal ini dihentikan dengan langsung melenyapkan pos tersebut.

Pos Inggris di Mapu tersebut terletak di puncak sebuah bukit kecil yang dikelilingi lembah, sehingga pos ini sangat mudah diamati dari jarak jauh. Selain itu, pos tersebut juga cukup jauh dari pasukan induknya yang kira-kira terpisah sejauh 32 km.

Pasukan RPKAD yang baru datang segera mempersiapkan setiap detail untuk melakukan penyerangan. Prajurit RPKAD yang terpilih kemudian ditugaskan untuk melakukan misi reconnaisance untuk memastikan kondisi medan secara lebih jelas. Mereka juga memetakan pos tersebut dengan detail sehingga bisa menjadi panduan bagi penyusunan strategi penyerangan, termasuk detail jalur keluar masuknya.

Tugas recon ini sangat berbahaya, mengingat SAS juga secara rutin melakukan pengamatan ke posisi-posisi TNI. Jika kedua recon tersebut berpapasan tanpa sengaja, bisa jadi akan terjadi kotak tembak yang akan membuyarkan rencana penyerangan. Oleh karena itu, recon RPKAD sangat berhati-hati dalam menjalankan misinya. Bahkan mereka menggunakan seragam milik prajurit zeni TNI AD untuk mengelabui musuh apabila terjadi kemungkinan mereka tertangkap atau tertembak dalam misi recon tersebut.

Setelah sebulan mempersiapkan penyerangan, pada 25 April 1965 gladi bersih dilakukan. Dari tiga kompi RPKAD yang ada di pos Balai Karangan. Komandan batalion, Mayor Sri Tamigen, akhirnya memutuskan hanya kompi B (Ben Hur) yang akan melakukan penyerangan. Sementara 2 kompi lainnya tetap berada di wilayah Indonesia untuk berjaga-jaga bila terjadi sesuatu.

Dalam penyerangan ini, kompi B diharuskan membawa persenjataan lengkap. Mulai dari senapan serbu AK-47, senapan mesin Bren, peluncur roket buatan Yugoslavia, dan Bangalore torpedoes, mainan terbaru RPKAD waktu itu, yang biasanya digunakan untuk menyingkirkan kawat berduri atau ranjau.

Selesai mengatur perbekalan, Ben Hur mulai bergerak melintasi perbatasan selepas Maghrib. Karena sangat berhati-hati, mereka baru sampai di desa Mapu pada pukul 0200 dini hari. Setelah itu mereka segera mengatur posisi seperti strategi yang telah disusun dan dilatih sebelumnya.

Pos Mapu berbentuk lingkaran yang dibagi ke dalam empat bagian yang masing-masing terdapat sarang senapan mesin. Perimeter luar dilindungi oleh kawat berduri, punji, dan ranjau claymore. Satu-satunya cara untuk merebut pos ini adalah dengan merangsek masuk kedalam perimeter tersebut dan bertarung jarak dekat. Menghujani pos ini dengan peluru dari luar perimeter tidak akan menghasilkan apa-apa karena didalam pos tersedia lubang-ubang perlindungan yang sangat kuat.

Beruntung, malam itu hujan turun dengan deras seolah alam merestui penyerangan tersebut, karena bunyi hujan menyamarkan langkah kaki dan gerakan puluhan prajurit komando RPKAD yang mengatur posisi di sekitar pos tersebut.

Setelah dibagi ke dalam tiga kelompok, prajurit komando RPKAD berpencar ke tiga arah yang telah ditetapkan. Peleton pertama akan menjadi pembuka serangan sekaligus penarik perhatian. Kedua peleton lainnya akan bergerak dari samping/rusuk dan akan menjebol perimeter dengan bagalore torpedoes agar para prajurit RPKAD bisa masuk ke dalam dan melakukan close combat.

Pada jam 0430 saat yang dinanti-nanti tiba, peleton tengah membuka serangan dengan menembakkan senapan mesin Bren ke posisi pertahanan musuh. Segera setelah itu, dua peleton lainnya meledakkan bangalore torpedoes mereka dan terbukalah perimeter di kedua rusuk pertahanan pos tersebut. Puluhan prajurit RPKAD dengan gagah berani masuk menerjang ke dalam pos untuk mencari musuh.

Prajurit Inggris berada pada posisi yang tidak menguntungkan karena tidak siap dan sangat terkejut karena mereka tidak menduga akan diserang pada jarak dekat. Apalagi saat itu sebagian rekan mereka sedang keluar dari pos untuk berpatroli. Yang tersisa adalah 34 prajurit Inggris. Hal ini memang telah dipelajari recon RPKAD, bahwa ada hari-hari tertentu dimana 2/3 kekuatan di pos tersebut keluar untuk melakukan patroli atau misi lainnya. Dan hari itulah yang dipilih untuk hari penyerangan.

Dengan susah payah, akhirnya ke-34 orang tersebut berhasil menyusun pertahanan. Beberapa prajurit RPKAD yang sudah masuk ke pos harus melakukan pertempuran jarak dekat yang menegangkan. Dua prajurit RPKAD terkena tembakan dan gugur. Namun rekan mereka terus merangsek masuk dan berhasil menewaskan beberapa tentara Inggris dan melukai sebagian besar lainnya. Tentara Inggris yang tersisa hanya bisa bertahan sampai peluru terakhir mereka habis karena mereka telah terkepung.

Diantara yang terbunuh dalam pertempuran jarak dekat yang brutal tersebut adalah seorang anggota SAS. Ini adalah korban SAS pertama yang tewas ditangan tentara dari ASEAN. Namun sayangnya Inggris membantah hal ini. Bahkan dalam buku karangan Peter Harclerode berjudul “Para! Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment halaman 261 pemerintah Inggris malah mengklaim mereka berhasil menewaskan 300 prajurit RPKAD dalam pertempuran brutal tersebut. Lucunya klaim pemerintah Inggris ini kemudian dibantah sendiri oleh penulis buku tersebut di halaman 265, ia menyebutkan bahwa casualties RPKAD hanya 2 orang. Secara logis memang angka 300 tidak mungkin karena pasukan yang menyerang hanya satu kompi. Pemerintah Inggris melakukan hal tersebut untuk menutupi rasa malu mereka karena dipecundangi tentara dari dunia ketiga, bahkan salah satu prajurit dari kesatuan terbaik mereka ikut terbunuh dalam pertempuran tersebut.

Pertempuran itu sendiri berakhir saat matahari mulai meninggi. Prajurit RPKAD yang sudah menguasai sepenuhnya pos Mapu segera menyingkir karena mereka mengetahui pasukan Inggris yang berpatroli sudah kembali beserta bala bantuan Inggris yang diturunkan dari helikopter. Mereka tidak sempat mengambil tawanan karena dikhawatirkan akan menghambat gerak laju mereka.

Sekembali di pos Balai Karangan, kompi Ben Hur disambut dengan suka cita oleh rekan-rekannya. Para prajurit yang terlibat dalam pertempuran mendapatkan promosi kenaikan pangkat luar biasa. Mereka juga diberi hadiah pemotongan masa tugas dan diberi kehormatan berbaris di depan Presiden Soekarno pada upacara peringatan kemerdekaan tanggal 17 Agustus 1965.

Itulah cerita heroik batalion 2 RPKAD, cikal bakal Grup 2 Kopassus

 

Pertengahan April 1965

 

Pada pertengahan April 1965 ada Pertemuan yang lebih besar kali ini dihadiri 200 perwira di MABES AD , dalam pertemuan ini Nasution dan Yani juga tidak datang.

 

Namun pertemuan ini melahirkan doktrin baru yang dinamakan tri Udaya Sakti  pencetusnya Suharto.Isinya tiga janji jujur dari jajaran AD.yang substansinya TNI berhak memberikan saran   dan tugas  politik tak terbatas kepada Presiden.

 

 

Doktrin baru ini menimbulkan kecemasan baru dikalangan elite Politik dan Masyarakat inteltual , dengan demikian semakin jelas bahwa AD mempertahankan politik dalam Negara ada Negara yang sudah dirintis nasution.Ini berarti Kubu Nasution menang dari kubu Yani yang didukung oleh Presiden  Sukarno.

 

Suharto salah satu perwira yang ditugaskan menjadi perantara mendamaikan Yani dan nasution berada dalam posisi yang tidak enak, karena Suharto mempunyai meori yang buruk terhadap yani dan nasution.penyebabnya adalah perilaku Suharto sendiri yang buruk yang terjadi ketika Suharto masih di Divisi Diponegoro.

 

 

Pada saat Divisi Diponegoro mewngadakan hubungan baik dengan pengusaha Liem Soei Liong, Perkawan mereka antara lain menyeludupkan berbagi barang.Suharto pernah berdalih penyeludupan itu untuk kepentingan Divisi Diponegoro,

 

 Berita Penyeludupan ini cepat menyebar semua perwira staf mengetahuintya, bahkan terungkap hasil penyeludupan uangnya masuk kekantong Suharto dan Liem Soei Liong.

Saat mengetahui ulah Suharto, Yani marah pada suatu kesempatan malah sempat menempeleng Suharto, karena penyeludupan itu memalukan Korps.

 

AH Nasution mengusulan agar Suharto diadili di makamah Militer  dan segera di pecat dari AD, namun Mayjen Gatot Subroto mencegah dengan alas an perwira itu masih bisa dibina.Gatot mengusulkan kepada Presiden sukarno agar Suharto diampuni dan disekolahkan  di SESKOAD Bandung.

 

Presiden sukarno setuju, karena itu Suharto masuk SESKOAD  dan diterima oleh DAN SESKOAD Brigjen  Suwarto. Saat itu SESKOAD tidak hanya mengajarkan Pendidikan kemiliteran tapi juga bidang Ekonomi dan Pemerintahan.

Perwira di Seskoad  bertugas sebagi guru teori Negara dalam Negara.

 

Namun akhirnya Suharto membangun kubu sendiri ,kubu ini terbentuk setelah kepercayaan Amerika serikat kepada Kubu Nasution sudah  mulai luntur, ini disebabkan  fungsi nasution terhadap Pemberontakan PRRI Permesta, Kampanya Pembebasan Irian barat dan Zslogan Gnyang Malaysia tidak efektif ,

 

Tiga hal ini membuat kepentingan Ameriak Serikat di Indonesia khusus  Asia tenggara terganggu.sehngga AS tidak akrab lagi dengan Nasution.dari perspektif AS pada mulanya perlu untuk mengimbangi kebijkan Sukarno yang centrung lunak kepada PKI.

Disaat kepercayaan AS kepada Nasution Luntur, Suharto sudah menjabay ZPangkostrad, dan Suharto telah membangun kubu sendiri(Subandrio)

Agustus 1965

Ada peristiwa kecil yang dibesar-besarkan oleh kelompok Suharto, sehingga menjadi peristiwa penting dalam sejarah Indonesia, yaitu perihal  Sakitnya Bung Karno .

Dalam buku-buku ditulis sakitnya Bung Karno sangat berat ,dikabarkan D.N.Aidit pernah mendatangkan dokter dari RRC dan dokter tersebut menyatakan Bung Karno sedang kritis, jika tidak meninggal dipastikan ia akan lumpuh

Dari peristiwa ini dianalisis PKI merasa kawatir pimpinan nasional akan beralih ketngan Angkatan darat ,PKI tentu tidak ingin hal ini dan mereka menyusun kekuatan untuk merebut kekuasaan.

Informasi ini tidak dapat dikonfirmasi karena DN Aidit sudah ditembak mati, dan keberadaan dokter RRC juga tidak jelas

 

 

Dr Subandrio sebagai saksi ,menyatakan

Bung Karno memang diperiksa dokter cina dari Kebayoran Baru yang dibawa DN Aidit , bukan didatangkan dari  RRC ,sesudah diperiksa dokter itu, dr subandrio dan xdr Leimena juga ikut memeriksa Bung Karno ,jadi ada tiga dokter yang memeriksa Bung Karno.

Ketiga dokter yang memeriksa menyatakan Bung Karno masuk angin.penyebabnya beberapa malam sebelumnya Bung Karno meninjau beberapa pasar di Jakarta, untuk melihat harga bahan pokok

12 agustus 1945,menurut pengakuan Kamaruzaman aias Sjam kepala Biro khusus PKI sekaligus perwira intelijen AD, memperkuat dogeng bahwa Bung Karno sakit Berat, ketika Bung Karno sakit berat ia dipangil kerumah DN Aidit tanggal 12 agustus 1965, ia diberitahu seriusnya penyakit Bung Karno dan ada kemungkinan Dewan Jenderal mengambil tindakan segera apabila Bung Karno meninggal, dan DN Aidit memerintahkannya untuk meninjau kekuatan PKI dan mempersiapkan suatu gerakan

Isu dewan jenderal sebenarnya bersumber dari Angkatan kelima yang bersumber dari rencana sumbangan gratis senjata dari RRC .tawaran RRC diterima Bung Karno tetapi Barangnya belum dikirim dan Ide Angkatan kelima belum dirinci oleh Bung Karno.

Karena Menpangad tidak menyetujui Angkatan Kelima, tersebar isu sekelompok Perwira AD tidak puas dengan Bung Karno, is uterus bergulir dimana sekelompok perwira yang tidak puas itu disebut Dewan jenderal  akan melakukan Coup terhadap Presiden RI.

Yang paling serius menanggapi Dewan Jenderal itu adalah Let.Kol Untung Samsuri, sebagai salah satu komandan Pasukan Kawal istana, Cakra Birawa ia harus tanggap terhadap segala kemungkinan yang membahayakan keselamatan Presiden.

Ia gelisah ,Lantas Untung mempunyai rencana mendahului rencana Dewan Jenderal dengan cara menangkap mereka.Rencana ini disampaikan Untung kepada Suharto.

Menanggapi ini Suharto mendukung, malah Untung dijanjikan bantuan Pasukan ,ini diceritakan Untung kepada subandrio saat sama-sama ditahan di LP Cimahi Bandung.

Dr subandrio menerima info tentang dewan Jenderal dari wakilnya di BPI dikatakan bahwa ada sekelompok perwira akan mengadakan Coup terhadap Presiden.Setelah menerima laporan dr subandrio melaporkan kepada Presiden sukarno, Dr Subandrio bertanya kepada Ahmad Yani jawan Yani enteng saja Dewan jenderal memang ada tetapi tugasnya adalah Dewan yang merancang kenaikan pangkat.bukan mengadakan Coup.

Merasa tidak puas dr subandrion bertanya kepada Pangkopur II Brigjen Suparjo, jawabannya memang ada dewan jenderal yang sudah siap membentuk menteri baru.

 

(Subandrio)

 

September 1965

21 september 1965

Radiogram Panglima Kostrad Nomor 220 dan Nomor 239 tanggal 21 September 1965, yang ditandatangani oleh Mayor Jenderal Soeharto, isinya perintah agar Batalyon 530/Para Brogade 3/Brawijaya disiapkan dalam rangka HUT ke-20 ABRI tanggal 5 Oktober 1965 di Jakarta dengan “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama.”

Dengan adanya radiogram tersebut, muncul dugaan bahwa Soeharto sudah tahu mengnai akan adanya peristiwa G30S paling tidak sejak tanggal 21 September 1965 atau sembilan hari sebelumnya. Sebab, dengan memberikan pasukan Batalyon 530 itu “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama”, Soeharto telah memfasilitasi anggota pasukan tersebut untuk melakukan “gerakannya”.

(hagemman)

Ternyata setelah Soeharto lengser dari jabatannya sebagai presiden pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998, muncul data baru, yang diungkapkan oleh Wakil Komandan Batalyon 530/Para Brigade 3/Brawijaya Kapten Soekarbi (kini, Mayor Purnawirawan). Dalam wawancaranya dengan tabloid berita Detak, yang dimuat dalam edisi 29 September – 5 Oktober 1998, Soekarbi mengatakan,

dalam Radiogram Panglima Kostrad Nomor 220 dan Nomor 239 tanggal 21 September 1965

, yang ditandatangani oleh Mayor Jenderal Soeharto, isinya perintah agar Batalyon 530/Para Brogade 3/Brawijaya disiapkan dalam rangka HUT ke-20 ABRI tanggal 5 Oktober 1965 di Jakarta dengan “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama.”

 

Pertanyaan yang segera muncul, mengapa Soeharto meminta Batalyon 530 disiapkan dengan “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama” ?

Apalagi kemudian yang terjadi adalah sebagian dari angota pasukan Batalyon 530 terlibat dalam peristiwa G30S. Tidak diketahui apakah perintah serupa diberikan pula kepada Batalyon 454/Para/Diponegoro, yang sebagian anggotanya juga terlibat dalam peristiwa G30S.

Dengan adanya radiogram tersebut, muncul dugaan bahwa Soeharto sudah tahu mengnai akan adanya peristiwa G30S paling tidak sejak tanggal 21 September 1965 atau sembilan hari sebelumnya. Sebab, dengan memberikan pasukan Batalyon 530 itu “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama”, Soeharto telah memfasilitasi anggota pasukan tersebut untuk melakukan “gerakannya”.

 

Belum lagi hampir semua pelaku inti G30S memiliki hubungan yang dekat dengan Soeharto, mulai Brigadir Jenderal Soepardjo, Kolonel Untung, Kolonel Abdul latief, sampai Sjam Karuzzaman.

Itu sebabnya, pada saat G30S berlangsung, Soeharto hanya menunggu perkembangan, dan pada saat yang tepat, dengan cepat mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan, di saat orang-orang lain, termasuk panglima dan perwira tinggi angkatan lainnya, masih bertanya-tanya apa yang sesungguhnya terjadi.

Karena mengetahui siapa saja yang telah dijemput paksa dan siapa saja yang melakukannya, maka saat itu pada prinsipnya Soeharto dapat melakukan apa saja yang dikehendakinya, termasuk dengan mudah membasmi pelaku-pelaku G30S dan mencari kambing hitam untuk dituduh sebagai penanggung jawab atas peristiwa G30S.

 

Sebagai orang yang memiliki seluruh informasi, Soeharto secara leluasa memberlakukan keadaan darurat. Kemudian menelepon Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Laut Laksamana Madya RE Martadinata, Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Kepolisian Jenderal Soetjipto Joedodihardjo, dan Deputi Operasi Angkatan Udara Komodor Leo Watimena. Dan, kepada mereka, Soeharto memberi tahu untuk sementara Angkatan Darat dipegang olehnya, serta meminta agar mereka tidak mengadaka pergerakan pasukan tanpa sepengetahuannya (dalam hal itu, Panglima Kostrad).

Sebagai kambing hitam, ia menuduh Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Udara Laksamana Madya Omar Dani berada di pihak yang salah, dan Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim Perdanakusuma disebutkan sebagai markas pelaksana G30S. Dengan demikian, kehadiran Presiden Soekarno di Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim Perdanakusuma dicitrakan sebagai keberpihakan Soekarno pada G30S.

Itu belum semua. Dengan peguasaannya atas seluruh media massa nasional, Soeharto berhasil menjadikan versinya atas peristiwa G30S sebagai satu-satunya kebenaran. Dan, bagi orang-orang yang dianggap “berseberangan” diberi label terlibat G30S, dan dijadikan tahanan politik.

 

Sejumlah purnawirawan AURI di bawah pimpinan Sri Mulyono Herlambang, lewat buku Menyibak Kabut Halim 1965 membantah bahwa Lubang Buaya yang digunakan sebagai Markas Kelompok G30S berada di wilayah AURI. Tempat tersebut justru berada di wilayah Angkatan Darat.

Bung Karno memanggil Ahmad yani ,

dijadwalkan diterijm aoleh Presiden di istana Negara jam 8.00 tanggal 1 oktober 1965, agendanya Yani akan ditanyakan mengenai Angkatan kelima.

Seorang sumber subandrio mengatakan saat menerima surat pangilan dari Presiden beberapa hari seblum 1 oktober 1965, Ahmad yani sempat mengatakan saya mungkin akan dicopot dari Menpagad karena saya tidak setuju Angkatan Kelima ,ucapan yani ini cepat menyebar bahkan beredar isu penganti Yani adalah orang kedua di AD ialah Gatot Soebroto

(subandrio)

26 September 1965

Pada 26 september 1965 muncul informasi yang lebih jelas tentang Dewan Jenderal, informasi datang dari empat orang sipil, Muchlis Bratanata, Nawawi Nasution dari NU , Sumantri dan Agus Herman simatupang,dari IPKI , bahwa tanggal 21 September 1965 diadakan rapat dewan jenderal di Gedung Akademi Militer Jkarta, Rapat ini mengesahkan Kabinet versi Dewan Jenderal.

 

 

Muchlis malah menunjukkan pita rekaman pembicaraan dalam rapat tersebut, dalam rekaman itu ada suara Let jen s.Parman membacakan susunan kabinet dengan susunan sebagai berikut

Latjen AH Nasution sebagai Perdana Menteri

Letjen Ahamd yani sebagai Waperdam I merangkap Menhankam

Mayjen M.T. Hartono Menteri Luar negeri

Mayjen suprapto menteri dalam negeri

Letjen s.Parman Menteri Kehakiman

Ibnu Sutowo menteri Pertambangan

Rekaman ini lantas Dr Subandrio serahkan kepada Presiden Sukarno ,rencana Dewan jendral ini sangat peka  dan sifatnya gawat terhadap pemerintahan Presiden Sukarno.

Seharusnya rencana ini sangat rahasia, mengapa bisa bocor ketangan orang sipil ? kesimpulannya ini adalah suatu alat provokasi , jika benar berarti rekaman ini palsu tujuannya mematangkan suatu rencana besar yang semakin jelas gambarannya. Bsa untuk mempengaruhi Untung untuk akan semakin yakin dengan dewan jenderal  yang semula kabar angin menjadi benar-benar ada.

Hampir bersamaan dengan isunya Dewan jenderal muncul Dokumen Gllchirst  beruka telegram sangat rahasia  dari Duta besar Inggris di jakrta Sir Andrew Gilchrist kepada kementerian Luar negeri Inggris, dokumenini bocor ketika hubungan Indonesia –Inggris sangat tegang akibat konfrontasi malaysia soal borneo(sebagian wilayah kalimantan), sat itu Malaysia bekas koloni Inggris baru merdeka ,Inggris membantu malaysia dengan mengirimkan pasukan ek Borneo.

Dokumen ini terletak diatas meja dr Subandrio dalam keadaan terbuka oleh stafnya, surat ini dikirim oleh seorang kurir mengaku bernama kahar Muzakar, tanpa identitas tanpa lamat.

Nmun berdasarkan informasi surat itu sbeleumnya tersimpan dirumah Bill Parmer seorang amerika tinggal di jkarta sebagai distributor film-film Amerika, rumah Bill Palmer sering dijadikan bulan-bulanan demonstrasi Pemudan dan beberapa Golongan yang menentang film porno yang diedarkan dari rumah Palmer.

Isi dokumen sangat gawat isinya, Andrew Gilchrist melaporkan atasan di Kemlu Inggris yang mengarah kepada dukungan Inggris  untuk mengulingkan Presiden Sukarno.

Disana ada pembicaraan Gilchris dengan kolega Amerikanya t tentang persiapan suatu operasi milter di Indonesia,Rencana ini cukup dilakukan oleh “our local army friends”

Dr Subandrio selaku ketua BPI mengerahkan intelijen untuk mengecheck otentisitas dokumen itu ,hasilnya membuat dr subandrio yakin bahwa dokumen Gilchrist otentik.

Pada saat dilaporkan kepada Presiden sukarno, beliau terkejut berkali-kali ia bertanya tentang keaslian dokumen itu  dan berkali-kali dr subandrio menyatakan dokumen itu asli, dari reaksi Bung Kurno terlhat ia cemas dan  membakar Bung Karno  karena sebagai target operasi.walaupun beliau tenag-tenag kelihatannya ia terbakar oleh provokasi itu.

Dokumen itu sengaja dibocorkan, agar jatuh ketangan Bung Karno dan PKI  dan ini adalah provokasi pertama dan dewan jnderal sebagai provokasi kedua.

Yoga diutus Suharto menemui S.Parman guna menyampaikan saran agar berhati-hati  karena isu  bakal adanya penculikan jenderal sudah santer beredar .Parman tidak serius menanggapi  saran itu sebab itu hanya isu, Parman bertanya kepada Yoga apakah pak yoaga sudah punya bukti,jawab yoga belum,lantas Parman menyarankan Yoga untuk mencari bukti ,jangan percaya isu sebelum memperoleh bukti.Yoga menyanggupi untuk mencari bukti.

Dr Subandrio berkesimpulan informasi disampai yoga untuk mengetahui reaksi Parman yang dikenal dekat dengan ahmad yani,info itu untuk mengatahui apakah Parman sudah tahu dan sampai sejauh mana  antisipasi Parman terhadap isu tersebut ,reaksi Parman mewakili persiapan Ahmad yani.Parman tidak siap mengantisipasi kemungkina yang akan terjadi begitu juga dengan Ahmad yani ,

Dari info ini sudah diketahui Ahmad yani dan para jendral termasuk Parman tidak siap mengantisipasi penculikan. Gerakan memanfaatkan Kolonel latif dan manipulasi kelompok Untung belum tercium oleh kelompok Yani,

Tindakan suahrto memberitahu Parman liwat Yoga sangat strategis, jika penculkan gagal ia kan tetap jadi pahalawan  karena menyelamatkan Parman.

 

Secara intuitif Dr Subandrio berpendapat Amerika serikat ikut main didua isu ini, soal sakit Prsesiden DN Aidit tahu presiden hanya sakit masuk angin sehingga target mereka bukan untuk menjebak PKI.Plintiran ISU ini lebih untuk konsumsi publik, jika ada perebutan kekuasaan wajar dilakukan oleh PKI,jika presiden sakit Wajar PKI  merebut kekuasaan karena takut  negara akan dikuasai Militer dan  karena itu wajar pulah PKI  dihabisi Militer.

 

http://www.sukarnoyears.com/books/kesaksian.pdf

(Subandrio)

 

28 september 1965

Kolonel  Latief mengungkapkan,

selain bertemu dengan Soeharto pada tanggal 30 September 1965 di Rumah Sakit Pusat Angkatan Darat (RSPAD),

dua hari menjelang tanggal 1 Oktober 1965 (tanggal 29 September 1965), ia juga menghadiri acara kekeluargaan di kediaman Soeharto di Jalan Haji Agus Salim.

Pada pertemuan pertama, Latief memberi tahu adanya isu Dewan Jenderal akan melakukan kudeta terhadap pemerintahan Presiden Soekarno. Menanggapi pemberitahuan itu, Soeharto mengatakan, ia sudah mengetahui hal itu dari seorang bekas anak buahnya dari Yogyakarta yang bernama Subagiyo, yang datang sehari sebelumnya (28 September 1965).

(hagemman)

Apakah sebenarnya yang terjadi baca info dari dokumen CIA dibawah ini

Semenjak kemerdekaan, Indonesia sudah menjadi ladang operasi intelejen dari berbagai negara. Jaringan yang cukup berpengaruh adalah M-16 dari Inggris dan CIA dari AS di samping intelejen RRC dan KGB-nya Uni Soviet.

Semua jaringan intelejen ini bekerja di bidang pengawasan, pengaruh, pengarahan operasi, sampai pengambilalihan kekuasaan di tahun 1965 dari Presiden Soekarno oleh Soeharto yang dilandasi dengan satu kepentingan yang pembuktiannya hanya bisa dilihat dalam kelanjutan setelah kudeta 1965..

Namun, rentetan peristiwa setelah kejatuhan Soekarno membuktikan peristiwa tersebut terencana sangat matang dan canggih.

 

Sebuah dokumen operasi Intelejen CIA 1964 – 1966 yang lengkap dari Amerika Serikat telah dibuka pada publik internasional.

 

Dokumen tersebut telah diterjemahkan dan diterbitkan sebagai salah satu bahan untuk meluruskan sejarah yang selama ini terdistorsi kepentingan Orde Baru.

 

Indonesia di bawah kepemimpinan Soekarno memainkan peranan penting dalam kancah perang dingin antara blok Barat yang dipimpin AS dan blok Timur yang terdiri dari negara-negara sosialis.

 

Kepemimpinan Indonesia terlihat dalam menggalang kekuatan internasional dalam Konferensi Asia-Afrika dan Gerakan Non-Blok maupun NEFO (New Emerging Forces) sebagai garis politiknya untuk menghadapi imperialisme dengan OLDEFO.

 

 

Dokumen CIA yang sebelumnya merupakan dokumen rahasia yang berisi sejumlah informasi penting seputar peristiwa tersebut kini telah terbuka untuk publik.

 

Penerbit Hasta Mitra yang dipimpin Joesoef Isak dan selama ini dikenal sebagai penerbit karya-karya Pramudya Ananta Toer, menerbitkan terjemahaan dokumen CIA itu dalam sebuah buku yang berjudul Dokumen CIA, Melacak Penggulingan Sukarno dan Konspirasi G30S-1965.

 

Mengomentari buku ini, Letjen (purn) Agus Widjojo mengatakan kekuatannya terletak pada kenyataan bahwa ia merupakan dokumen otentik yang menggambarkan kepentingan negara adidaya dalam situasi Perang Dingin

 

 

. “Pada masa itu ideologi adalah panglima, sehingga dinamikanya antara Barat dan Timur. Namun, faktor intern dalam negerilah yang menentukan terjadinya peristiwa 1965,” ujar putra almarhum Jenderal Soetojo, yang menjadi salah seorang korban peristiwa Gerakan 30 September 1965.

 

Agus menegaskan secara umum teori pertentangan antara sipil yang dipimpin Soekarno dan PKI berhadapan dengan sebagian TNI-AD adalah faktor internal yang menjadi titik lemah bagi masuknya kepentingan konflik perang dingin, dalam hal ini Amerika Serikat, Uni Soviet, dan Cina, yang bukan kebetulan dimenangkan oleh Amerika yang mewakili Barat.

 

Karena itu, Agus Widjojo mengingatkan, bila kita bercermin pada kejadian tahun 1965 itu, dalam situasi krisis multidimensi dan ancaman disintergrasi yang dialami oleh bangsa Indonesia pada saat ini, pilihannya hanyalah melakukan konsolidasi dalam satu rekonsiliasi yang pasti, atau hancur berkeping-keping dalam perang saudara dan intervensi asing di bidang ekonomi maupun politik

 

Keterlibatan Rusia dan RRC

Mengomentari buku yang akan diluncurkan itu, mantan aktivis angkatan 66 dan Forum Demokrasi, Rahman Toleng, berharap agar jangan cuma keterlibatan CIA saja yang dilihat pada waktu persitiwa 1965 tersebut.

 

 

Dia juga mengindikasikan keterlibatan agen-agen RRC dan Rusia di belakang peristiwa tersebut. Mantan Wakil Ketua MPRS, pada tahun 1966, Mayjen (Pur) Abdul Kadir Besar, mengingatkan faktor di dalam negeri juga berperan seperti pernyataan Anwar Sanusi (anggota CC PKI/Anggota Front Nasional) sebelum peristiwa 30 September 1965, bahwa ibu pertiwi sedang hamil tua.

 

“Itu merupakan sebuah tanda akan terjadi kejadian besar tersebut. Oleh karena itu, data-data dari dalam negeri pun juga harus dijadikan pembanding dokumen CIA tersebut,” ujarnya.

 

Dalam pandangan Abdul Kadir, PKI punya rencana 4 tahunan dalam demokrasi parlementer-terpimpin ala Soekarno yang yakin akan menang dalam Pemilu.

 

Namun karena peringatan dokter-dokter Cina tentang gawatnya penyakit Soekarno, PKI khawatir TNI AD akan mendahului merebut kekuasaan. “Oleh karenanya, PKI mendahului dengan G30S-nya,” jelasnya.

 

Dokumen Gilchrist

Untuk membaca dokumen CIA ini mungkin dibutuhkan satu latar belakang historis. Seorang purnawirawan perwira tinggi TNI-AD berusaha mendudukkan alur secara kronologis. Dalam pandangannya, peristiwa 1965 dipicu oleh sebuah dokumen yang bernama Dokumen Gilchrist. Gilchrist—duta besar Inggris pada waktu itu—sebagai pelaksana operasi intelejen Inggris dan AS, mengeluarkan dokumen yang berisikan situasi palsu tentang konsolidasi TNI-AD, yang disebutnya sebagai Dewan Jenderal.

Dokumen ini yang dibawa oleh Chaerul Saleh, tokoh Partai Murba ke Soekarno, Subandrio, dan akhirnya Adit.

 

Dalam sebuah pesta sebelumnya di Eropa, Gilchrist pernah berkata bahwa satu kali tembakan akan mengubah Indonesia.

Belakangan baru terungkap, sekretaris dubes Inggris-lah yang mempersiapkan skenario operasi anti-PKI dengan isu amoral, asusila, dan anti-agama yang kemudian dilansir ke sejumlah koran Ibu Kota seperti Merdeka, Berita Yudha, dan Angkatan Bersenjata.

 

Hal ini terungkap karena ada satu dokumen telegram kampanye dengan isu tersebut ke redaksi Merdeka.

 

Menurut sumber itu, menanggapi situasi yang digambarkan Dokumen Gilchrist, Soekarno memerintahkan untuk segera mengatasi persoalan ini.

 

Kolonel Soeparjo dan Kolonel Mursid kemungkinan menolak yang kemudian jatuh ke Letkol Untung sebagai pelaksana G30S.

 

Kalau benar DN Aidit ingin melakukan revolusi dari atas, langkah itu keliru karena dia tidak melibatkan jajaran TNI yang berpihak ke PKI, dan harus diingat Letkol Untung ternyata bukan dari kalangan tersebut.

 

Operasi Pembasmian

Ada hal menarik dalam buku itu, seperti daftar nama 500-an pemimpin PKI yang dikeluarkan oleh CIA dan disampaikan lewat Adam Malik ke TNI-AD yang berbobot perintah operasi pembasmian secara cepat agar PKI benar-benar lumpuh rantai komandonya. Hanya dengan operasi cepat inilah AS percaya dapat melumpuhkan PKI dan dapat menaikkan moral TNI-AD untuk melawan Soekarno dan PKI.

 

Hanya sedikit perwira yang memiliki keberanian dan pengalaman melawan Soekarno, yaitu mereka yang terlibat di PRRI dan Permesta semacam Zulkifli Lubis, Vence Sumual, Kawilarang, dan tentu saja Kemal Idris.

 

Aktivis buruh Dita Indah Sari mengomentari bahwa dokumen-dokumen dalam buku ini memang membuktikan pendanaan dari pemerintah AS yang dijalankan oleh CIA adalah untuk operasi penggulingan Soekarno.

 

Hal ini didahului oleh tindakan mata-mata terhadap semua kegiatan dan keputusan Soekarno, terutama sehubungan dengan konfrontasi dengan Malaysia dan pengiriman relawan ke Malaysia.

 

 

Hal-hal itu terungkap dalam semua dokumen percakapan telepon, telegram, maupun surat rahasia pejabat-pejabat AS baik di Amerika maupun di Indonesia seperti: Lindon Johnson (Presiden AS), Dean Rusk (Menteri Luar Negeri), Mc Namara (Menteri Pertahanan), Howard Jones (Dubes AS di Indonesia), V. Forrestal (Staf Dewan Keamanan Nasional), Mc George Bundy (Assisten Khusus Presiden Urusan Keamanan). Seperti yang tertuang dalam halaman 156-158:

 

Memorandum dipersiapkan CIA untuk State Department (dari Colby untuk Bundy) 18 September 1964 tentang prospek untuk aksi tersembunyi

 

…di antara mereka beberapa telah menunjukkan kemampuan melakukan kegiatan politik tersembunyi meskipun terbatas namun efektif.

 

Lebih jauh ada terdapat sejumlah pendekatan ke kedutaan dan komponen misi lainnya oleh individu-individu—beberapa untuk kepenitngan diri sendiri, yang lain adalah untuk mencari bantuan agar mereka mampu melawan komunisme di Indonesia…untuk itu kami mengajukan sebuah program aksi tersembungi yang intensif, terbatas pada tujuan awalnya, tapi dirancang untuk ekspansi jika situasi mengijinkan.

 

Konteks Perang Dingin

 

Mengenai pengungkapan berbagai dokumen itu, James D. Vilgo, seorang pensiunan Letnan Kolonel AS, menegaskan bahwa dokumen tersebut harus ditempatkan pada konteksnya, yaitu masa Perang Dingin, di mana intelejen AS memang bekerja secara ofensif.

 

“Situasi politik sekarang sudah berbeda, Kongres dan Senat AS justru mengontrol semua kegiatan militer dan intelejen AS, agar tidak bekerja terlalu jauh.

 

Dokumen ini adalah salah satu bukti kontrol yang membuka semua operasi intelejen AS, sama seperti dokumen yang bersangkutan dengan Indocina, Chili, dan ope-rasi di berbagai tempat lainnya.

 

Justru transparansi ini seharusnya diikuti oleh Indonesia yang sedang dalam masa transisi sekarang,” ujarnya.

 

Lebih lanjut ia mengatakan bahwa data-data dari AS ini seharusnya dilengkapi dengan data-data dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh pihak Indonesia sendiri agar masyarakat tahu sebenarnya apa yang terjadi dan menjadi pelajaran agar tidakterulang lagi.

 

Dalam era reformasi sekarang ini, ujarnya, yang terpenting adalah sebuah usaha untuk mengubah paradigma, terutama dalam pendidikan sejarah yang harus seobjektif mungkin.

 

 

Sebuah komite penyelidikan dapat dibentuk oleh sipil dan melibatkan intelektual dalam dan luar negeri untuk memberikan masukan pada MPR/DPR, sehingga punya kekuatan seperti Kongres dan Senat AS.

 

Dalam pandangannya, soal keterlibatan AS, tidak bisa dilihat secara sepihak karena sebenarnya yang berpengaruh adalah situasi dalam negeri pada waktu itulah yang mengkhawatirkan AS. Posisi AS adalah peninjau yang terlibat kemudian.

 

Cuci Tangan

 

Namun Dr. Salim Said, menegaskan bahwa penerjemahan dan penerbitan buku ini jangan menjadi ajang cuci tangan PKI terhadap peristiwa 1965.

 

Memang Amerika terlibat, tapi aspek-aspek lain juga di luar Amerika harus diperhitungkan, jelas buku ini diterbitkan oleh Hasta Mitra supaya menjernihkan persoalan terutama, soal keterlibatan AS, jangan malahan menjadikannya semakin kabur.

 

Joesoef Isak sendiri menegaskan dalam pengantarnya bahwa penerbitan buku ini sama sekali tidak bermaksud membangkitkan kemarahan rakyat Indonesia kepada dunia Barat.

 

“Kita sepenuhnya sadar bahwa juga di dunia barat maupun di Amerika terdapat cukup banyak unsur-unsur The New Emerging Forces dalam semua tingkatan kehidupan mereka yang sama-sama mendambakan persahabatan dan perdamaian di dunia ini. Sebaliknya kita juga sadar, bahwa kekuatan besar The Old Established Forces masih kuat bercokol dan mengacau rumah tangga kita sendiri,” ujarnya.

 

Ia melanjutkan bahwa itulah sebabnya globalisasi ekonomi-politik dan globalisasi intelejen yang berwatak destruktif bagi kemanusiaan, keadilan yang beradab, dan perdamaian bumi manusia, mutlak juga harus dihadapi dengan kerja sama dan penggalangan globalisasi solidaritas The New Emerging Forces sedunia.

 

 

 

Sumber:

-http://mhs.blog.ui.ac.id/wahyu.budi11/2011/08/21/dokumen-cia-melacak-penggulingan-dan-konspirasi-g-30-s-1965/

-Isak, Joesoef, ed. (Kata Pengantar). 2002. Dokumen CIA Melacak Penggulingan dan Konspirasi G-30-S-1965. Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, Agustus

 

 

 

 

NAPAK TILAS

SITUASI SAAT PERISTIWA G30S

30 September 1965

Oei Tjoe tat, yang juga hadir dalam jam minum kopi pagi (koffie uurtje) pada tanggal 30 September 1965

Pada tanggal 30 September 1965, malam,

 Presiden Soekarno tidak tidur di istana Merdeka.

Menjelang tengah malam,

 Soekarno meninggalkan Istana Merdeka menuju ke kediaman istrinya, Ny Ratnasari Dewi, di Wisma Yaso, Jalan Gatot Subroto (kini, Museum Satria Mandala). Dalam perjalanan ke sana,

Soekarno singgah di Hotel Indonesia untuk menjemput Ny Dewi, yang tengah menghadiri resepsi yang diadakan Kedutaan Besar Irak di Bali Room.

Oei Tjoe Tat, salah seorang menteri dalam Kabinet 100 Menteri Soekarno (Kabinet Dwikora), dalam Memoir of Oei Tjoe Tat, Pembantu Presiden Soekarno, yang diterbitkan oleh Hasta Mitra, menyebutkan ia bertemu dengan Subagiyo di dalam tahanan, dan Subagiyo,

ia telah memberi tahu Soeharto mengenai akan adanya peristiwa penting pada tanggal 30 September 1965 itu.

Dan, pada pertemuan kedua di RSPAD, Latief menyebutkan ia dan rekan-rekannya akan menjemput paksa para jenderal pimpinan teras Angkatan Darat untuk dihadapkan kepada Presiden Soekarno.

(hagemman)

Dalam pidato 30 September 1965 ia sempat mengkritik pers yang kurang tepat dalam menulis nama anak-anaknya.

 Nama Megawati sebetulnya Megawati Soekarnaputri, bukan Megawati Soekarnoputri. Demikian pula dengan Guntur Soekarnaputra

(penasukarno)

Bung Karno memanggil Ahmad yani ,dijadwalkan diterima oleh Presiden di istana Negara jam 8.00 tanggal 1 oktober 1965, agendanya Yani akan ditanyakan mengenai Angkatan kelima

Namun Ahmad Yani dibunuh beberapa jam sebelum ia menghadap Presiden Sukarno

(Subandrio)

G30 S PKI

Ayahku Ditembak Diseret lalu…….

24-01-2013 12:41

credit for Amelia Yani (Putri pertama alm Jenderal TNI AnumertaHhmad Yani)

Gerakan G 30 S PKI menyisahkan derita mendalam bagi keluarga Jenderal TNI Anumerta, Achmad Yani. Kisah tragis 1 Oktober 1965 ini diceritakan kembali oleh Amelia Ahmad Yani, anak ketiga dari pasangan Jenderal Achmad Yani dan Yayu Ruliah Sutodiwiryo .

Siang itu, Kamis 30 September 1965, udara cerah Jakarta terasa panas menyengat. Aku dan ketiga adiku menunggu kedatangan bapak pulang dari kantornya di Markas Besar Angkatan Darat (MBAD) yang terletak di Jl. Mendeka Utara, Jakarta.

 

Ketika itu bapak menjabat sebagai Menteri Panglima Angkatan Darat (Menpangad) di masa kepempinan Preside Soekarno. Sekitar pukul 14.00, kendaraan Oldsmobile hijau militer bernomor AD-1 dengan disertai regu pengawal memasuki pekarangan rumah kami di jalan Lembang Terusan No. D 48.

 

Sesaat kemudian bapak turun dari mobil. Dia terlihat tampan, gagah dan berwibawa dengan seragam militernya. Aku bangga dengan penampilan bapak yang penuh kharisma.

Usai merima jajar kehormatan dari para pengawal rumah kami, bapak langsung masuk ke dalam rumah.

 

Melihat kami sedang menunggu kedatangannya, dengan penuh kasih sayang bapak menyapa kami. Seperti biasa pula bapak langsung menanyakan keberadaan ibu,

”Ibu Nandi?” (Ibu mana). Kami pun beritahu bahwa Ibu sedang di dapur menyiapkan makan siang.

Sambil menunggu makan siang siap, bapak mengajak kami ngobrol di bar.

 

Siang itu bapak terlihat sangat gembira.

 

Padahal situasi politik di luar rumah bagaikan bara akibat makin kuatnya pengaruh komunis.

 

 

Toh begitu bapak tidak terpengaruh sedikitpun. Hati kami riang sekali. Karena senangnya, bapak tidak sadar bahwa disamping bapak, di bar itu, ada sebuah botol minyak wangi.

 

Karena tersentuh tangan bapak, botol itu berguling dan isinya tumpah membasahi meja bar. Sekejab wangi parfum merebak menguasai ruangan bar.

 

Bapak terkejut, tapi kemudian kembali larut dalam suka cita obrolan kami. Dengan kedua telapak tangannya bapak lalu meraup minyak wangi itu mengusap-usap ke tangan dan badan kami. Sambil mengusap-usap bapak berkata,

“Nek ana seng takon, seko sapa wangine, kandoa seko bapak” yang artinya, “Kalau ada yang tanya darimana kamu dapatkan wangi ini, katakan wanginya dari bapak”.

 

Mendengar itu kami tersenyum gembira. Tak lama kemudian ibu memberi kode kalau makan siangnya sudah siap disantap. Kami pun bergegas makan siang bersama.

 

Setelah makan siang, beberapa jam kemudian, bapak berangkat main golf ditemani pak Bob Hasan.

 

Sore harinya sekitar pukul 18.00 bapak pulang. Sembari berjalan masuk rumah melalui pintu belakang, bapak berpesan kepada pak Dedeng, sopir bapak, agar alat-alat golf segera dibersikan, karena kata bapak sudah tidak akan dipakai lagi.

Setengah jam kemudian bapak terlihat menuju kamar mandi. Percikan air terdengar jelas dari luar. Oh ternyata bapak mandi.

 

Selesai mandi, bapak mengenakan celana panjang warna abu-abu dipadu kemeja putih.

 

Bapak keliatan segar dan keren. Singkat kata malam pun tiba.

 

Malam itu bapak menerima kunjungan Jenderal Basuki Rahmat dan tamu-tamu lain yang tidak kami ketahui siapa mereka.

 

Entah apa yang mereka bicarakan. Disaat yang sama ibu tampak di dapur menyiapkan makan malam untuk bapak.

 

Sedangkan aku dan saudara-saudaraku ada di ruang belakang. Ada yang belajar, ada pula yang menyetel musik. Sementara pembantu rumah kami, Mbok Milah sibuk menyuapi adikku Edi yang saat itu baru berumur 7 tahun.

 

Setelah makan malam siap, ibu lalu menenui dan pamit kepada bapak katanya mau ‘nyepi’ di rumah Menpangad, rumah dinas bapak di jalan Taman Suropati 10. Ibu ditemani Tante Tinik, teman akrab ibu sejak kecil, Om Tris adik ibu dan Om Sandi, ajudan rumah tangga kami.

 

Malam itu kami semua tidak ada yang ikut menemani ibu. Karena ibu lebih senang nyepi sendiri, tanpa anak-anak.

 

Sekitar pulul 22 malam barulah bapak bebas dari tamu.

 

Beberapa saat kemudian setelah makan malam, bapak langsung masuk ke kamar tidurnya.

 

Sementara kami masih duduk-duduk di ruang belakang sambil menunggu kakakku yang tertua, Rulli, pulang dari Bandung.

 

Ia dan teman-temannya sedang mengikuti latihan Resimen Mahajaya di Batujajar.

 

Ketika ibu pergi nyepi dan bapak masuk kamar, malam itu rumah mendadak sunyi senyap.

 

Apalagi ketika para pengawal dan ajudan bapak pulang ke rumah mereka masing-masing.

Sesekali terdengar anjing menyalak dan menggonggong dari kejauhan.

Baru kira-kira pukul 23.00 sampai 24.00 telpon rumah kami terus berdering. Dari kejauhan si penelpon hanya bertanya dimana bapak.

 

Tanpa merasa curiga kami pun beritahu kalau bapak sudah tidur.

 

Malam kian larut. Rasa kantuk mulai menghantui kami. Satu persatu mulai beranjak tidur. Aku pun demikian.

 

Namun sekitar pukul 14.30 subuh (1 Oktober 1965), kami dikejutkan oleh suara tembakan bertubi-tubi. Terdengar pula hentakan sepatu tentara yang berlarian.

Hiruk pikuk sekali. Semua terjadi secara mendadak dan cepat. Hinggar bingar suasana benar-benar membingungkan. Mendengar itu aku beranikan diri mengintip melalui cela pintu kamar.

 

 

 

Aku melihat banyak tentara dengan baret merah tua. Aku melihat sesosok tubuh diseret tanpa belas kasihan.

 

Kakinya ditarik oleh dua orang tentara.

 

Tubuhnya diseret menyapu lantai.

 

Ya Alah, itu bapak, kataku spontan.

 

Serta merta aku langsung menghambur ke luar kamar sembari menjerit-jerit,

“Bapaaaak…..! Bapak……..!”.

Seketika aku dan saudara-saudaraku menangis pedih melihat bapak diperlakukan dengan keji.

 

Dengan langkah gontai sambil terus menangis, kami mengikuti para tentara yang membunuh bapak sampai ke pintu belakang.

 

Tiba-tiba para tentara itu berbalik dan menghadrik,

“Kalau anak-anak tidak masuk, akan ditembak juga semuanya”.

Kami ketakutan. Kami gemetaran. Kami semua berlari masuk ke dalam rumah. Sedih, marah, takut, bingung bercampur menjadi satu. Kami tak tahu lagi harus berbuat apa.

 

Beberapa saat kemudian kami mendengar suara kendaraan menderu-deru membawa bapak pergi.

 

Saat itu kami tidak tahu kemana bapak dibawa. Namun segumpal darah hangat tertinggal di ruang makan. Pintu kaca berserakan tertembus peluru. Darah tercecer di sepanjang lantai hingga ke jalan raya, bekas bapak diseret dari dalam rumah. Tujuh butir peluru kosong berhamburan di lantai.

Sejurus tanpa diperintah kami berhamburan masuk ke dalam kamar tidur bapak. Kami berebut mengangkat telpon.

 

Namun sayang, ternyata jaringan telepon sudah disabotase.

 

Segera kami meminta Mbok Milah untuk memanggil Om Bardi, ajudan bapak.

 

 

Sementara kami duduk dilantai mengelilingi darah bapak sambil berharap bapak tidak meninggal.

 

Disaat itu tiba-tiba munculah komandan penjaga yang dilucuti. Ia bingung. Ia kaget. Apalagi ketika dia melihat darah segar tercecer membasahi lantai. Spontan dia bertanya,

“Ini Darah Siapa?”.

 

Serempak kami menjawab,

“Ini darah bapak”.

Mendengar jawaban kami, sang komandan itu tak lagi berkata-kata.

 

Wajahnya kosong menatap darah bapak. Kami benar-benar dicekam rasa takut, marah dan tidak tahu harus berbuat apa.

(Amelia Yani)

 

Namun untuk kesekian kali, sial bagi Supeno. Yani yang berada di belakangnya malah terbunuh dalam Gestok 1965. Ia yang praktis bukan lagi perwira yang diperhitungkan, juga ikut digulung oleh penguasa militer baru, Mayjen Soeharto.

——

(http://anusapati.blogdetik.com/2008/08/22/bambang-supeno/

 

pada tanggal 30 September 1965 malam,

Soeharto telah diberi informasi oleh Kolonel Infanteri Abdul Latief, Komandan Brigade Infanteri I Jayasakti Kodam V Jaya, bahwa akan dilakukan penjemputan paksa terhadap para jenderal pimpinan teras Angkatan Darat, termasuk Panglima Angkatan Darat Jenderal Ahmad Yani, untuk dihadapkan kepada Presiden Soekarno.

Agak aneh, mengapa Soeharto tidak melaporkan informasi yang diterimanya dari Latief kepada Jenderal Ahmad Yani, atasannya. Kemungkinannya hanya dua, ia terlibat atau ia hanya menggunting dalam lipatan, yakni mengambil keuntungan dari gerakan yang dilakukan orang lain.

.

Adanya pertemuan antara Kolonel Abdul Latief dengan Mayor Jenderal Soeharto menjelang peristiwa G30S membuat kecewa Letnan Jenderal Purnawirawan Kemal Idris

memimpin pasukan tanpa identitas yang ditempatkan di sekitar Monumen Nasional.

“.

al 1 Oktober 1965, pukul 06.30, Mayor Jenderal Soehato memerintahkan seorang perwira Kostrad, Kapten Mudjono untuk memanggil Komandan Batalyon 530 Mayor Bambang Sipeno yang menempatkan pasukannya di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan. Karena Mayor Bambang Supeno tidak ada di tempat, maka Wakil Komandan Batalyon 530 Kapten Soekarbi, yang memimpin pasukan di lapangan, bertanya apakah ia bisa mewakili. Perwira itu menjawab tidak bisa. Namun, pukul 07.30, perwira Kostrad itu kembali, dan mengatakan, Kapten Soekarbi diperbolehkan menggantikan Mayor Bambang Supeno. Tidak lama kemudian datang menghadap pula Wakil Komandan Batalyon 454 Kapten Koencoro.

Pasukan yang ditempatkan di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan adalah anggota dua batalyon yang diundang Panglima Kostrad Mayor Jenderal Soeharto ke Jakarta untuk mengikuti peringatan HUT ke-20 ABRI pada tanggal 5 Oktober 1965. Sebab itu, Soeharto dengan mudah memanggil pemimpin kedua batalyon itu, dan memerintahkan agar menarik kembali pasukan mereka ke Markas Kostrad.

Soekarbi membantah pernyataan yang menyebutkan bahwa Kostrad tidak tahu kehadiran pasukannya di sekitar Istana dan Monumen Nasional, mengingat anak buahnya bolak-balik ke Markas Kostrad untuk menggunakan kamar kecil (toilet).

Berbeda dengan Soeharto, yang pukul 06.30, sudah mengetahui identitas pasukan yang berada di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan, Presiden Soekarno dan regu pengawalnya sama sekali masih tidak tahu-menahu mengenai apa yang terjadi.

Pada tanggal 30 September 1965, malam,

Presiden Soekarno tidak tidur di istana Merdeka. Menjelang tengah malam, Soekarno meninggalkan Istana

Merdeka menuju ke kediaman istrinya, Ny Ratnasari Dewi, di Wisma Yaso, Jalan Gatot Subroto (kini, Museum Satria Mandala).

Dalam perjalanan ke sana, Soekarno singgah di Hotel Indonesia untuk menjemput Ny Dewi, yang tengah menghadiri resepsi yang diadakan Kedutaan Besar Irak di Bali Room

(hagemman)

Saya catharien Panjaitan putrid tertua D.I.Pndjaitan saat itu berusia 17 tahun,pada  malam hari skeitar jam 4-5.00 pagi rumahnya dikepung oleh pasukan, dan ayahnya D.I>Pandjaitan setelah menegnakan pakaian turun kebawah, tentara yang menegeoung rumah menghormnta,setelah itu memukul nya dengan senjata sehingga jatuh,kemudian diseret keluar dan diabwa dengan kendaraan. Llau saya mengubunggi jemndral nasution melaporkan kejadian ini.

(Catharine Panjaitan,putrid D.I.Panjaitan,matro TV,30 Septemebvr 2013

 

 

CIA INFORMATION ABOUT

Gestapu

 September 30

 PKI organizations Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani hold mass demonstrations against the runaway inflation in Jakarta.

September 30 In the evening,

Lt.-Col. Untung, head of the Cakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Guards), other Diponegoro and Brawijaya Division soldiers, and PKI supporters gather at Halim Air Base, with Gen. Omar Dhani and Aidit present.

The forces are under the tactical command of Brigadier-General Supardjo, who had recently been commanding guerilla forces in the Konfrontasi against Malaysia.

They leave and attempt to take seven top army generals. Nasution escapes by leaping over the wall of his house, his young daughter is shot and Lt. Tendean, his aide, is taken away. Gen. Ahmad Yani is killed at his house, as are two others. Three other generals are taken alive with Lt. Tendean and the bodies of the dead to Halim, where the remaining live captives are murdered and thrown in the well called Lubang Buaya.

Rebel soldiers take Merdeka Square in Jakarta by the Presidential Palace, the radio and TV stations.

October 1

 Suharto arrives at Kostrad Headquarters overlooking Merdeka Square, takes emergency control of loyal troops after consulting with available generals.

October 1 At 7:00 A.M.,

 the radio announces that “Movement 30 September” (Gerakan 30 September, or G30S) is pro-Sukarno, anti-corruption, anti-United States and anti-CIA.

 

 

 

 

The Events of October 1st


The major military units involved on the side of the September 30th movement were officially under the command of General Suharto’s KOSTRAD, the Army’s Strategic Reserve.

 The semi-official Indonesian Army history of GESTAPU states:

 “Both the 454th and 530th Battalions together with the 328th Kudjong Battalion of the Siliwangi Division were under the operations command of the 3d Paratroop Brigade of the Army’s Strategic Reserve.” The Army book observes further that “KOSTRAD troops were scattered all over Indonesia, as [sic] that at the time of the coup General Soeharto had only the dc Kudjava and dc Parakomando battalion around Djakarta. Other KOSTRAD troops were at ‘the other side.'”

The major mission of these KOSTRAD “coup” units was to take up positions around the crucial Merdeka Square, controlling Sukarno’s Palace, the Indonesian Radio station, and the central telecommunications facilities.

One company of soldiers from the Palace Guard, the Tjakrabirawa, are said

 to have participated, together with KOSTRAD elements, in the kidnapping-murder of the six army generals. Lt. Col. Untung had been since May 1965 commander of one of the three Tjakrabirawa battalions.

Considering Untung’s position, this participation is quite possible, although it could have introduced a perhaps unnecessary complication into the proceedings. General Sabur, the commander of the Palace Guard, played a very unclear role in the GESTAPU and its aftermath.

Although jailed for a period after 1965, he has been released and no charges have been brought against him.

Whether Untung could have acted without Sabur’s knowledge is uncertain. Only a few Tjakrabirawa troops were really necessary on October 1st, and they could have been KOSTRAD soldiers in Palace Guard uniforms.

 

 The extraordinary lack of professionalism in the execution of the “kidnappings” makes it unlikely that “unwitting” Tjakrabirawa troops played a significant role. Their role seems to have been that of making the first contact at each of the victim’s home.

In the early morning hours of October 1st

 GESTAPU troops went to the homes of seven generals.

Three of the generals, including Army head General Yani, were killed immediately and their bodies and three other generals were taken to a place called Lubang Buaja (Crocodile’s Hole) on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base.

 More than 100 troops surrounded the house of General Nasution but in a “near miraculous” escape, Nasution got away by climbing over a wall and hiding in the bushes. The fiction that one of his aides was captured and successfully impersonated one of the best known men in Indonesia for some hours afterwards (a crucial element in the CIA Research Study version of events), need not puzzle us.

 No such thing happened and General Nasution was meant to “escape,” (The shooting of his daughter, apparently by accident through a door, seems too ghastly to have been part of the GESTAPU plan, although her death and funeral were very important in whipping up the subsequent fury against the PKI. Nasution’s much commented upon “moodiness” after October 1st may in part be accounted for by his remorse about not taking better precautions to protect his family.)

General Nasution, the leading anti-Communist military figure in Indonesia,

had to be on the list of victims of GESTAPU. His absence would have been incredible. He was not, however, a member of General Yani’s “Generals’ Council.” The fact that it was General Suharto, rather than the more well known Nasution, who took the leadership of the counter-GESTAPU forces may have a complicated explanation.

 We do not know the subtleties of the Suharto-Nasution relationship. The most probable explanation is that the immediate appearance of Nasution as the head of the anti-PKI effort would have aroused suspicions.

Some stories

have Nasution being kept “protected”                                                                         

 in a hidden place on October 1st from 6 AM until 7 PM

when he finally appeared at KOSTRAD headquarters. Other reports have him at KOSTRAD headquarters on the morning of October 1st. Nasution is alleged to have broken his ankle in climbing over the wall, probably part of the cover story for why it had to be Suharto who took the lead.

Among the more incredible “mistakes” of the GESTAPU movement was the failure to try to kill or kidnap the two generals in Djakarta who had operational command of military forces in the area, General Suharto and General Umar. Ruth McVey has commented on how extraordinary this omission was, in view of the fact that

 Col. Latief was one of the major GESTAPU conspirators:

“Col. A. Latief headed the mobile force of the Djaya (Djakarta) Division and had commanded a series of interservice capital defense maneuvers; he must have known the basic provisions for an emergency in the capital.”

 In fact, Col. Latief seems to have been one of Suharto’s men. McVey states:

“Latief, also a Diponegoro Division officer (Suharto’s former division), had fought under Suharto during the revolution; at the time of the Irian campaign he was at the Mandala Command headquarters in Ambone….

He was assigned to KOSTRAD; his command at the time of the coup, Brigade I, was one of the KOSTRAD infantry brigades.”

Latief, according to Suharto himself, visited him on the night of September 30th at the hospital where Suharto was seeing his ill son. Another account has Col. Latief paying a visit to the military hospital on the morning of October 1st where Nasution’s injured daughter had been brought. General Suharto and General Umar worked closely together almost immediately from the beginning on October 1st in “defeating” GESTAPU.

General Sukendro

One general who was supposed to have originally been on the list of GESTAPU victims because of his position on General Yani’s staff was General Sukendro. He was in Peking on October 1st. In fact, Sukendro was a close associate of Nasution and had the reputation of a man with intimate associations with the American military and the CIA.

Sukendro came back from Peking with the story that on October 1st Chinese officials had shown Indonesians a list of the murdered generals before it had been announced. (Intimations of Chinese involvement in GESTAPU were rampant in the early months after October 1st but faded to nothing after their purpose had been served.)

What exactly occurred at Lubang Buaja

where the six murdered and captured generals were taken and eventually dumped into a well is uncertain. Why they were taken there seems clear.

 Lubang Buaja, despite stories that “secret” military training of PKI people was occurring there, was well known as a place where Air Force officers since July had been conducting training of volunteers for the Malaysian Confrontation

. Those trained included youths from both PKI and other organizations.

 The quick murder of the generals and their alleged mutilation by Communists was the core of the GESTAPU scenario.

 Whether there were people from Communist organizations present at Lubang Buaja is uncertain. It is possible that unwitting volunteers had been brought there to lend their presence to the proceedings. This could have been complicating however.

 It was sufficient that the dastardly deed be done at a place that was known as a gathering spot for the training of PKI volunteers. “Confessions” could be produced later.

There are a few indications that if, in fact, there were “volunteers” present at Lubang Buaja on the morning of October 1st they were not necessarily from PKI organizations.

The eye-witness account used in the CIA Research Study states that

 there were civilians crowding around the prisoners yelling “kill the unbelievers,” rather extraordinary words for Communists to be uttering. Accounts seem . to agree that the generals were almost unidentifiable, bloodied and beaten up, wearing pajamas, and blindfolded. Mortimer states that, among other non-Communist youths, people from the Moslem Ansor youth organization were expected at Lubang Buaja for training on October 1st. We may speculate that the GESTAPU officers present may have told anti-PKI youths that they had captured the killers of the generals.

Whoever killed and “mutilated” the generals, their murder served several important purposes for GESTAPU. Most importantly, it could be blamed on the PKI. The murder of General Yani opened the way for Suharto to take over control of the Army and implement the wrap-up of GESTAPU.

 

 

It was standing procedure for Suharto to become acting Army head whenever Yani was not available.

Suharto’s behavior on October 1st

 seems to be that of someone who is immediately aware that Yani is dead. We find no discussion in accounts of October 1st of efforts by Suharto to locate and rescue captured generals until late in the day.

 He acted very quickly to take charge. He exhibited none of the uncertainty and hesitancy that characterized nearly everyone else on October 1st.

The killing of the generals was also important in inhibiting Sukarno from declaring in favor of the September 30th Movement, a danger that could have upset the scenario but which had been taken into account.

 The fact that Lubang Buaja could also be associated with the Air Force (although, contrary to general impression, it was not in fact located on Halim Air Force Base) was also useful in assuring that General Dani and the Air Force would not be tempted to throw their military forces behind the September 30th Movement. Once it became known what an enormous crime had been committed by the “progressive” GESTAPU–political murder was very rare in Indonesia–no one was likely to jump on the band-wagon and complicate the planned failure of GESTAPU. Of course, the discrediting of the leftist Air Force and General Dani was part of the purpose of GESTAPU.

It is probable that the killing of the generals was communicated as rapidly as possible to Sukarno

so that he would not think of backing GESTAPU. Accounts have a helicopter flying over Lubang Buaja, perhaps part of Sukarno’s (or Suharto~s?) efforts to verify absolutely that it was true. Sukarno was also probably told how the PKI was linked to the murders. His early knowledge that Nasution had probably “escaped” also served to inhibit any impulse to support GESTAPU.

When the first message of the September 30th Movement was broadcast over Radio Indonesia around 7 AM

it was announced that Sukarno was being protected and that certain prominent persons who were to be targets of the Generals’ Council action had also been taken under “protection.”

 This was actually part of a deliberate action to control the behavior of and information available to leading non-GESTAPU political figures whom, if at large, could interfere with the GESTAPU scenario.

 

 PKI Chairman Aidit was brought to Halim very early on October 1st. (His wife states that he was kidnapped from his home.) Dani was brought to Halim. (Accounts differ on this.) Sukarno was brought to Halim.

Most of Sukarno’s advisors, such as Subandrio, Njoto, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, were not in Djakarta.

Reports have it at if they had been in Djakarta they were on the list of persons to be “protected.”

Although there was some contact between these individuals at Halim, much of the time they were kept separated from each other in different houses with GESTAPU messengers going back and forth

. (The phones had been cut in Djakarta. Only the Army had an emergency communication system functioning.)

Aidit in particular was kept “protected” from any contact with Sukarno.

From the CIA Research Study account we learn that

 “Aidit definitely was accompanied by two bodyguards, who stayed with him the whole day of the 1st while he was at Halim and who accompanied him on the plane on his flight from Halim to Jogjakarta on the morning of the 2nd.” The actual function of these “bodyguards” seems obvious. (It is remarkable how little role, even in the official accounts, Aidit seems to have played at Halim in guiding the movement that he is alleged to have been responsible for.)

Back at Merdeka Square,

 the GESTAPU-KOSTRAD troops had occupied the radio station at about the same time that the generals were being kidnapped.

 The use of the radio to broadcast a carefully prepared series of messages was a crucial part of the GESTAPU operation.

 

The fact that

 Suharto, located just across the square in KOSTRAD headquarters, took no action until the evening to put the radio off the air-

-although he says that he very quickly decided that something was wrong–was suspicious and “explained” in the official version in terms of Suharto’s desire to avoid violence.

(His tolerance toward troops who had apparently killed or abducted six leading Army generals is remarkable.) In fact, Suharto deliberately waited to “retake” the radio station until the planned messages were completed. This he accomplished without firing a shot. (In the whole GESTAPU affair, including outside of Djakarta, only a handful of people were killed other than the generals.)

The most important characteristic of the first 7 AM GESTAPU radio broadcast in which the existence of the September 30th Movement was announced was that it was unclear whether GESTAPU was pro- or anti-Sukarno.

The deliberate creation of uncertainty was necessary in part so as to prevent anyone “unexpected” from involving themselves

. The fact that the name of Sukarno was not invoked in support of GESTAPU, which any genuine leftist coup attempt would probably have faked if necessary in order to increase the chances for success, probably made GESTAPU seem somewhat anti-Sukarno.

 The emphasis on its being “inside the military” was calculated to prevent anyone, especially the PKI, from taking to the streets and getting in the way. Basically, the impact of the 7 AM message was to confuse people and keep them sitting still waiting for the next message. In any event, given the climate of rumor in Djakarta, GESTAPU was not an implausible event, although who was behind it and what it was to accomplish was uncertain.

Another apparently calculated aspect of the first radio broadcast was the statement that a Revolutionary Council was going to be set up, with the implication–later made very clear–that it would be the new government.

 It was not until the afternoon that the “rather peculiar assortment of names” on the Revolutionary Council was announced.

 

 The indication of the abolition of the existing cabinet, however, was apparently partially intended to provide a rationale and gloss of legality for General Suharto to take quick command of the Army without consultation with Sukarno.

 In justifying his behavior afterwards, Suharto has cited the fact that GESTAPU had overthrown the existing government and therefore he was free to act on his own. (One of the contradictions in the post-1965 explanation of GESTAPU is that if the Untung group was primarily concerned to execute a limited operation to purge the Army of leading anti-PKI generals, why was it necessary to set aside the existing government, giving the operation the clear flavor of a political coup?)

Even the term “Revolutionary Council” may have been devised as another bit of dust thrown in the eyes of the confused public. Apparently the last time that “Revolutionary Councils” had been established in Indonesia was in 1956 and 1957 when some of the dissident anti-PKI regional military commanders had done so.

Although the radio announcement of the membership of the new Revolutionary Council, “the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia,” was not broadcast until about 2 PM, we will discuss it here.

 It seems possible to discern several functions for this message. The rather heterogeneous and lack-luster membership seems calculated to discourage anyone from rallying to support. (Clearly, few, if any, of the non-military members of the Council had been informed before hand.

A better selection could have been faked if assuring the success of the “coup” had really been important.) The unknown middle-ranking officers took the top positions for themselves.

The heads of the non-Army military services were prominently displayed as members of the Council, perhaps part of the overall plan to prevent uncontrolled military forces from involving themselves in the GESTAPU events.

Linking the heads of the Air Force, Navy, and Police with GESTAPU would make it possible to label any unwanted military action by these forces as part of the GESTAPU revolt.

It is uncertain how much additional calculation was put into the membership list. A handful of PKI officials from affiliated organizations were included, but none of the top PKI leaders.

This again would discourage unplanned PKI involvement Later analyses of the membership indicate the possibility that the CIA’s “experts” on communism may have devised the list according to their calculation of a plausible “stage” which the “revolution” in Indonesia had reached.

 

 In October 1965 The Washington Post published a story by Chalmers Roberts, apparently based on CIA briefings, that said U.S. officials reported to have evidence that Sukarno, through a coup, had “intended to turn his country into an Indonesian version of a Communist ‘People’s Democracy.'” We may guess that as part of the devising of a cover story for GESTAPU the CIA experts tried to simulate the kind of government that the PKI and Sukarno (apparently little distinction was made) might plausibly have been expected to set up if a pro-Communist coup occurred in Indonesia in the fall of 1965.

 

 

1965 – 1967

   
   
 

 

December 1965

   
 

 

December 1965
Cabinet session

   
   
   

The September 30 coup

Much mystery has been associated with the actual coup attempt on September 30, 1965. In this attempted coup, six of seven top military officers were murdered. Soon after, media fabrications about how these men were treated before being killed were to play a big part “in stirring up popular resentment against the PKI.

Photographs of the bodies of the dead generals – badly decomposed [after being dumped in a well] – were featured in all the newspapers and on television. Stories accompanying the pictures falsely claimed that the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out by Communist women” (“Deadly Deceits”, pp57/8).

 The September 30/1 October coup is known as the “Gestapu” affair, with the attempt itself being crushed by the commander of the Army’s strategic command, Major-General Suharto, within fewer than 24 hours (“The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966”, p45). Aspects about the coup attempt have led to speculation about the possible role of an agent provocateur (or provocateurs).

Was it in fact part of a more comprehensive CIA/Suharto plot? Peter Dale Scott has evidently made the strongest case, based on detailed analytical research, that even the coup attempt was probably manipulated from the inside by Suharto and the CIA (Pacific Affairs, volume 58, no.2, Summer 1985).

But the swift labelling of the Gestapu affair as a botched Communist grab for power has generally prevailed ever since, becoming a standard item of mainstream historical writing.

Whatever the exact truth here, it is fascinating to see how the spurious Suharto/CIA version of history has regularly got reproduced, and in the most respected histories. For example, eminent (and very conservative) Oxford University historian, John Roberts, has had this to say: “Food shortages and inflation led to an attempted coup by the Communists (or so the military said), and in 1965, the Army stood back ostentatiously while popular massacre removed the Communists to whom Sukarno might have turned.

He himself was duly set aside the following year and a solidly anti-Communist regime took power” (“Shorter Illustrated History of the World”, BCA, 1994, p547). So while Roberts does signal a doubt about the nature of the coup, he goes on, incredibly enough, to: (1) promote the blatant and easily demonstrable lie that the military had nothing to do with the genocide; (2) actually give the massacre a positive tone in the sense that it was purportedly “popular”; and, (3) then give the new regime a similarly positive tone in that it was “solidly” founded. All this can justly be called the crudest propaganda. Even Roberts’ expressed reservation about the coup seems tailored as well to help transmit the idea of a considered, judicious judgement. Such then is the best tradition of Western history-making on matters of this sort; and the fate of some one million people, brutally butchered, is cavalierly consigned to the dustbin of capitalist history.

One of the problems in investigating the 1965-69 genocide is the lack of reliable documentary evidence of the more specific details of what happened.

Most of the killings during the peak period – from October 1965 through to March 1966 – were dispersed in action, and done at night in the countryside by small bands. “The New Rulers of the World” claimed to show the only extant photograph of any of the killings. Unlike the case with the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Indonesian official and unofficial records are very scanty. This seems to have been deliberate policy to a large degree so as to not only prevent scrutiny at the time, but also obfuscate any future efforts to establish the truth, or, worst of all, accountability. However, we do now know crucial elements of the American and British connections to the murders.

 
   
     

 

 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
     

 

1966
February 21 Sukarno names new cabinet, including Omar Dhani and Subandrio, who are wanted for arrest.

March 11 Sukarno tries to hold cabinet meeting while students demonstrate outside. Suharto does not attend. Troops loyal to Suharto, commanded by Col. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, surround the building. Sukarno flees to Bogor by helicopter with Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. Three major generals follow Sukarno to Bogor, and discuss the situation with him for several hours. Sukarno signs a document giving broad powers to Suharto, the “Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret” or “Supersemar” letter.

March 12 Suharto, using the new “Supersemar” powers, officially bans the PKI.

March 16 Sukarno issues an announcement that he still has full authority as chief executive, to no effect.

March 18 Subandrio and most of Sukarno’s cabinet are arrested.

September Indonesia rejoins the United Nations.


SEPTEMBER 30, 1965

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December 1966

 
 
 
 
 


17 August 1966

Leaving the Independence Day commemoration ceremony

 


March 1967
Student demonstrations

 

 

 

U.S. Assessment of Indonesia

Excerpt from “The CIA’s Track Two)
At some point in 1964 or 1965 (probably late 1964) the deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia and the left-ward drift of Indonesia had gone so far that the U.S. faced the need to reassess its policy toward Indonesia with an eye toward adopting new policies. Howard Jones, the American ambassador at the time, has described the extremely pessimist official assessment of how bad things had gotten from the American point of view. Ewa Pauker and Guy Pauker at RAND have described the projection of near-term PKI takeover and the pessimism about the ability of the Indonesian Army to reverse the apparently inevitable flow of events.

Jones indicates that a number of important meetings were held in which U.S. policy toward Indonesia was reassessed, beginning at the State Department in August 1964 after Sukarno’s Independence Day speech, his most anti-American statement up to that time. The March 1965 annual meeting of U.S. mission chiefs held in the Philippines with Averell Harriman and William Bundy, was also important.

 

Ellsworth Bunker, personal representative of President Johnson, spent 15 days in Indonesia in April 1965 evaluating the situation. There were undoubtedly other secret and perhaps more important meetings in which U.S. policy was put together.

The U.S. seems to have faced essentially six options with regard to Indonesia:

1. A hands-off policy of continuing much the same as before, letting things drift. (Of course, the U.S. had never been passive toward Indonesia and this can only be characterized as a hands-off policy in contrast to the other options.) The probable result would be that Indonesia would go Communist. There seems to have been near unanimous official agreement on the inevitability of Communist takeover in Indonesia if existing trends continued. The most important country in Southeast Asia would be lost. The U.S. effort to save Vietnam (bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965) would probably be frustrated and all of Southeast Asia would be threatened. Clearly, this was an unacceptable option.

2. Try to get Sukarno to change his apparent policy of leading Indonesia toward Communist rule. The Embassy under Ambassador Jones had been pursuing this course for years, with little success (in American eyes). Sukarno had made more than clear his determination to continue his left-ward drive, both domestically and in foreign policy. Most Washington officials had given up on Sukarno and many agreed that “Sukarno has to go.” Some identified him as a “crypto- Communist.” This option was simply unworkable.

3. Eliminate Sukarno. Apparently this was considered, but rejected. The consequences would be too unpredictable. The Communist Party and its affiliates were so large and so extensively embedded in Indonesian society and political life that even in the absence of Sukarno’s protection they might be able to hang on and prosper. An effort to go after the PKI in such circumstances would probably result in a very unpredictable and dangerous civil war which the United States, preoccupied with Vietnam, was not in a position to handle. A danger of killing Sukarno was that those who might be identified with it would be discredited because of Sukarno’s enormous popularity in Indonesia, which efforts to undermine over the years had been unable to shake. Blaming an assassination on the left would not be credible because of the close alliance between Sukarno and the Communists. The PKI would have no plausible motive for such an action. An arranged “natural” death for Sukarno would leave the PKI as a very important force in Indonesia, and perhaps as the logical successor.

4. Encourage the Indonesian Army to take over the government. The Embassy had been pushing this option for years with some success but without achieving the final objective. Disunity within the Army had prevented any such explicit step to date and there seemed to be other inhibitions on a direct military takeover. The Army as a whole was still unwilling to move directly against Sukarno. Sukarno’s determination to resist any further expansion of the Army’s role was clear. In fact, he was doing much to try to “domesticate” and undermine the Army as an independent, anti-Communist force. Even in the event of an Army coup, without a solid pretext for quickly eliminating the PKI and a means of controlling Sukarno, the prospect of civil war would arise for the same reasons indicated in Option 3. While the U.S. could continue to cultivate military officials and try to stiffen their “backbone,” Army takeover via some sort of coup would not resolve the problem in Indonesia.

5. Try to undermine the PKI and get the Communists to take actions that would discredit themselves and legitimize their elimination. (Option 6, the fabrication of such a discrediting, is a variant of this option.) Such a step would also necessitate moving against Sukarno as he probably would never permit the Army to act forcefully against the PKI no matter how objectionable the PKI might appear to be. A variety of covert efforts were mounted to try to damage the PKI’s reputation and provoke it to misbehavior. These included linking the PKI with China, trying to show that the PKI did not really support “Sukarnoism” (the BPS episode), and the fabrication of documents and the attributing of provocative statements to PKI spokesmen (printed in non-Communist papers). But Sukarno helped to frustrate these efforts by banning almost all non-Communist political and press activity. The PKI was careful not to go too far and not to provide the excuse for its elimination. As PKI Chairman Aidit said, “We are prepared to tolerate insults and threats. We will not be provoked. If the army spits in our faces we will wipe it off and smile. We will not retaliate.” Option 5 was continually tried but it did not seem to be working.

6. If the PKI would not provide its own death warrant, the pretext for extermination had to be fabricated for it. The optimum implementation of this option would serve to eliminate both the PKI and Sukarno as dominant forces in Indonesian political life. This option appears to have been the one finally chosen, although the point at which commitment to it was irrevocable is very uncertain. Parts of the other options, other “tracks” continued at the same time.

 

State Department Historical Advisory Committee’s summary as of September 1, 1999 of the
“Status of Johnson and Nixon Era FRUS High Level Panel Covert Action Cases” (2 pages).
This document shows that the Panel decided on April 20, 1998 to acknowledge covert action in Indonesia, that the CIA completed review of the documents on August 28, 1998, and that the volume then went into page proofs, “however, publication has been delayed.”

Issues for HLP

[FRUS] Volume

Submitted to CIA/NSC

CIA Document Re-Review

State Document Re-Review

Indonesia

64-68, XXVI, Indo; Malay; Phil

Yes (2/98)

17 docs re-reviewed (14 excised; 3 denied

1 doc re-reviewed (denied)

 

Overthrow of Sukarno

The overthrow of Sukarno and the violence that followed it was a conflict in Indonesia from 1965 to 1966 between forces loyal to then-President Sukarno and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and forces loyal to a right-wing military faction led by General Abdul Haris Nasution and Maj. Gen. Suharto. On the pretext of stopping a communist coup, Nasution and Suharto led their forces to liquidate the PKI and topple the regime of Sukarno. The pivotal role of Suharto led to his assumption of the Indonesian presidency in 1967.

Prelude to conflict

Indonesian Civil War came after two decades of independence and rule by the leader of the Indonesian Nationalists, President Sukarno. As president of the newly independent republic, Sukarno stressed socialist policies domestically and an avidly anti-imperialist international policy, underpinned by an authoritarian style of rule dependent upon his charismatic personality. These policies led him to create alliances with the Soviet bloc, People’s Republic of China, and to pioneer the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement of post-colonial states at the Bandung Conference. It also created a domestic political alliance with the Communist Party of Indonesia.

Military split

These same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many enemies in the Western nations. These especially included the United States and United Kingdom, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno’s nationalisation of mineral, agricultural, and energy assets. In need of Indonesian allies in its Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. This fostered a split in the military’s ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction overlapping with the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Comintern of which it was a part.

When Sukarno rejected food aid from USAID leading to famine conditions, the right-wing military adopted regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the rural population. Several officers, including Suharto, would be caught in such schemes and would be reassigned. In an attempt to curtail the right-wing military’s increasing power, the Communist Party of Indonesia and the left-wing military formed a number of peasant and other mass organizations. The United States Agency for International Development (or USAID) is the US government organization responsible for most non-military foreign aid. …

ndonesia-Malaysia Confrontation

In 1963, a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly formed Federation of Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the right-wing faction largely absent from the conflict (whether by choice or orders of Sukarno is not clear). Year 1963 (MCMLXIII) was a common year starting on Tuesday (link will display full calendar) of the Gregorian calendar. … The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was an intermittent war over the future of the island of Borneo, between British-backed Malaysia and Indonesia in 1962-1966. … The Federation of Malaysia is a country in Southeast Asia. …

The Confrontation further encouraged the West to seek ways to topple Sukarno, viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the Domino Theory). The deepening of the armed conflict, coming close to all out warfare by 1965, both increased popular dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime and strengthened the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close to the center of power in Jakarta.

G30S” and retaliation

On the early hours of October 1, 1965, a company of soldiers from the Presidential Guard, the Tjakrabirawa, raided the homes of seven of the right-wing anti-Communist generals in the Indonesian capital Jakarta.

Three of the generals were killed immediately, among them Lieut-Gen Ahmad Yani, the Chief-of-Staff of the Army. Three other generals were captured. A seventh target, the Defense Minister and Chief-of-Staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Abdul Haris Nasution escaped; his daughter, however, was fatally wounded. Ahmad Yani’s assistants were Maj-Gen S. Parman, Maj-Gen Suprapto, Maj-Gen MT Haryono, Brig-Gen Donald Isaac Panjaitan and Brig-Gen Sutoyo Siswomiharjo. The three captured generals and the bodies of the others were taken to a place known as Lubang Buaya (“Crocodile Hole”) near the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force Base in Jakarta. The three generals and Nasution’s adjutant, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean (who claimed he was Nasution to divert the attention of the kidnapping soldiers and allowed Nasution to escape), were subsequently killed and all the bodies were thrown down a well.
The presidential guards also seized the RRI (Radio Republik Indonesia) and Telecommunications Building in central Jakarta. From the RRI building, they broadcast statements calling themselves the “30th of September Movement” (Indonesian: Gerakan 30 September, abbreviated to G30S or Gestapu) led by Lieut-Col Untung bin Syamsuri. They claimed to have arrested several generals belonging to a conspiracy, the “Council of Generals”, that had plotted a military coup against the government of President Sukarno. They further alleged that this coup was to take place on “Army Day” (October 5) with the backing of CIA, and that the Council would then install themselves as a military junta.

Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a “Revolutionary Council” consisting of various well-known military officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno’s Dwikora Cabinet as invalid (“demisioner”).

According to one chief conspirator Lieut-Col Latief, the Palace Guards had not attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI Angkatan Darat – the Army Strategic and Reserves Command), because he was considered as a Sukarno-loyalist and an apolitical general. Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the counter-allegation that the G30S was a rebellious movement that sought to replace President Sukarno’s government with a Communist government. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj-Gen Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat – Army’s Para-Commando Regiment). Haji Mohammad Soeharto (born June 8, 1921), more commonly referred to as simply Soeharto (Suharto in the English-speaking world), is a former Indonesian military and political leader. … This article or section does not cite its references or sources. …

During the evening of October 1, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel soldiers had retreated back to Halim Base. RPKAD forces proceeded to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of October 2, but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the base. The next day, soldiers discovered the buried remains of the kidnapped generals. The corpses were exhumed, displayed to the press, and buried in a sombre ceremony on October 5, 1965.

Internal military power-struggle

After the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. However, on October 5 Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army Chief-of-Staff. is the 278th day of the year (279th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. …

After the promotion, the New York Times reported that an unnamed Western “diplomatic report” alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto’s alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power. (New York Times, October 6, 1965)

Internal military power-struggle

After the assassinations of those generals, the highest ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third highest in the overall chain-of-command, was Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. However, on October 5 Sukarno moved to promote Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra, considered a Sukarno-loyalist, to Army Chief-of-Staff. is the 278th day of the year (279th in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. …

After the promotion, the New York Times reported that an unnamed Western “diplomatic report” alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto’s alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power. (New York Times, October 6, 1965)

In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Major Gen. Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves) units were closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in charge of prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, Pranoto was removed and Suharto was promoted to Army Chief-of-Staff on October 14, 1965. (New York Times, October 15, 1965)

Retaliatory campaign

The installation of Suharto as Army Chief-of-Staff established the right-wing faction’s dominance of the Indonesian Army’s command. In addition to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), this faction was also hostile toward Sukarno-loyalists, and the Chinese (both Chinese Indonesians as well as expatriates from the People’s Republic of China). For decades, the use of Chinese characters were banned in Indonesia. …

On October 18, a declaration was read over the army-controlled radio stations, banning the Communist Party of Indonesia. The ban included the party itself, and its youth and women’s wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI union. At the time, it was not clear whether this ban applied only to Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass arrest and summary executions, against suspected leftists and Sukarno loyalists. is the 291st day of the year (292nd in leap years) in the Gregorian calendar. … Extrajudicial punishment is a punishment which is conducted without the authority or permission of a court, and encompasses extrajudicial executions or killings performed without legal authority or in contravention of legal code. … This article does not cite any references or sources. …

The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and supervised by Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed at Communists community and toward President Sukarno himself. The regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left to maintain order. (New York Times, October 19, 1965)

Toppling of Sukarno

As Communists were driven out of government in the months afterward, the troika of Pres. Sukarno, Nasution, and Suharto jockeyed for power. Contemporary reports state that Sukarno was politically weak and desperate to keep power in the hands of his presidency by starting a factional struggle between Gen. Nasution and Suharto, as the two were absorbed in personal ambitions. Troika (Russian: тройка, meaning threesome) is a committee consisting of three members. …

General Nasution was believed to have launched his own bid for power on December 16, 1965, when he won appointment to the Supreme Operations Command, and gained a grip over the traditionally civilian-held portion of the military hierarchy. It was reported that Nasution would have preferred forming a military junta to replace Sukarno. (New York Times, December 16, 1965.)

However, on Feb 1, 1966, Pres. Sukarno promoted Suharto to the rank of Lieutenant General. The same month, Gen. Nasution had been forced out of his position of Defense Minister. By March, Suharto would begin the process of taking power for himself. (New York Times, February 22, 1966)

Consequences
(For more details on this topic, see New Order (Indonesia) The New Order is the term coined by former Indonesian President Suharto to characterize his regime as he came to power in 1966. …)

After being promoted, Suharto was assigned emergency powers on March 11, 1966 through a presidential decree by Sukarno known as the Supersemar. He would then go on to become president in 1967. Due to Suharto-era censorship and propaganda under his New Order government, the true numbers and ennumeration of casualties from the Civil War are heavily disputed. Other effects of the Indonesian Civil War, however, can be understood in the light of greater press freedom in the post-Suharto era.

Massacres

Beginning in later October 1965, the Indonesian army and its civilian allies (especially Muslim militia groups) began to kill members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In most cases the killings were one-sided. In most cases the authorities arrested party members and members and leaders of affiliated organizations and held them in detention for some time before sending them out to be killed over subsequent weeks and months. In some cases, the army and militias organized raids on communist villages or hamlets, slughtering all or most of the inhabitants. The estimates of the death toll of the conflict range from over 100,000 to 3 million, but most scholars accept a figure of around 500,000.[1]

Political imprisonment

It is known that with Suharto’s rise, surviving members of the Communist Party of Indonesia were branded tapol (short for tahanan politik or “political detainee”). During Suharto’s reign, tapol were often given harsh prison sentences without trial, and their property was either seized or destroyed. Spouses, children, and relatives of tapol were subjected to guilt by association. To be branded a tapol meant a permanent outcaste status in Indonesian society, even after completion of a sentence; tapol have sued in modern times for restitution of their right to the franchise and for compensation for their losses.

Possible prison sentences included internal exile to penal colonies on desolated islands within the Indonesian archipelago. These included the Buru island in the Moluccas. Among its more famous prisoners included author and PEN Freedom to Write winner Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who was imprisoned there for alleged membership in a Communist Party literary group, LEKRA. In a book of memoirs (The Mute’s Soliloquy), Pramoedya made detailed allegations of forced labour, starvation, torture and other abuses within the colony. (Inside Indonesia, April-June 1999)

Anti-Chinese laws

While resentment toward Chinese Indonesians by Malay-descended peoples of the archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, persisting through the Post-Independence era, the Indonesian Civil War unleashed both widescale violence and a new tide of anti-Chinese legislation throughout the archipelago. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (both in Indonesia as well as Malaysia), but with the anti-Communist hysteria, the association of the Chinese Indonesians with the People’s Republic of China caused them to also be viewed as a communist fifth column.

As a result of this hysteria, Indonesia’s hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland China were severed and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta burnt down by a mob. Several anti-Chinese laws were passed to curtail Chinese culture and civil rights, including laws banning Chinese language signs on shops and other buildings and mandating closure of Chinese language schools, adoption of “Indonesian” sounding names, and severe limits on Buddhist temple construction. The lasting effects of these laws and anti-Chinese sentiment fostered by the Suharto regime was demonstrated in the organization of anti-Chinese pogroms in 1998.

Military rule

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party eliminated one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It had placed third in a 1955 election. It was also among the largest Communist Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated 3 million members. Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, civilian government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the civil war.

In the place of civilian rule, a new system of military rule took hold, based on set-aside seats in the Parliament as well as the dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine of the military, in taking the roles of both soldiers and administrators. The political parties not banned outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly known as Golkar. Though Suharto would later allow for the formation of two non-Golkar parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

Rise of Islamism

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a notable side effect of having given greater space for the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal, conservative, and extremist groups practicing Islam in Indonesia. It widely believed by observers of Indonesian history and politics that Suharto’s forces whipped up anti-Communist sentiment in part by exploiting conservative Muslims’ fears of “godless” Communism to instigate a jihad against them during the civil war.

As for more mainstream groups, conservative Islamic groups (called the “Central Axis”) became a prop of the regime for some time after the civil war. Liberal Islamic groups, on the other hand, are believed to have defected during the wave of protests before the Indonesian Revolution of 1998.( The Indonesian 1998 Revolution is the term given to a series of protests and political manoeuverings that brought about the end of the rule of the three-decade long New Order government of the autocratic President Suharto of Indonesia. …)

Improved ties with the West

The change in regime from Sukarno to Suharto, though brutal, brought a shift in policy that allowed for USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country. Suharto would open Indonesia’s economy by divesting state owned companies, and Western nations in particular were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The result was the alleviation of absolute poverty and famine conditions due to shortfalls in rice supply and Sukarno’s reluctance to take Western aid, and stabilisation of the economy.

As a result of his victory in the civil war, Suharto would come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist strongman regime, similar to that of Augusto Pinochet. An ongoing military and diplomatic relationship between the Indonesia and the Western powers was cemented, leading to American, British, and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.

Revelations and mysteries

Four decades later, questions remain about the veracity of accounts of the events both leading up to and during the war provided by the Western governments and by Suharto. The ousting of the Suharto regime and beginning of the Reformation period in Indonesia and the end of the Cold War for the Western governments has allowed greater freedom of information, leading to a significant process of historical revisionism as well as the formation of conspiracy theories around the Indonesian Civil War. Still, mysteries remain over the time period. Freedom of information can mean: whether a particular piece of information can be freely created, read, modified, copied and distributed; see free content (as well as free culture and free software) freedom to express ones opinions or ideas, generally, within a society; see freedom of speech the accessibility of… In Parson Weems Fable (1939) Grant Wood takes a sly poke at a traditional hagiographical account of George Washington Historical revisionism has both a legitimate academic use and a pejorative meaning. … A conspiracy theory is a theory that defies common historical or current understanding of events, under the claim that those events are the result of manipulations by two or more individuals or various secretive powers or conspiracies. …

Was PKI actually involved in the G30S?

Supporters of Suharto claim that his actions as field general were justified due to the imminent threat of a PKI-led coup to seize power, as had been attempted in 1948. Several critics of Suharto note, however, that the PKI in 1965 had an inclination that was similar to Eurocommunism and had come to prefer parliamentary electoral politics to armed insurrection; in fact, the PKI placed third in a 1955 presidential election, behind Sukarno’s own Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and the Islamist party Masyumi.
These critics allege that Suharto purposefully exaggerated PKI involvement in the assassinations of the generals (both during the war and in subsequent propaganda events held on the anniversary) as mere window dressing for what was his own ruthless quest for power. The critics commonly point out that Suharto had already been involved in a 1959 corruption scandal involving sugar smuggling in the Bandung area, and that since the 1990s post-Cold War period that Suharto’s regime was known for both dishonesty and brutality.

There are several theories about the involvement of the PKI in the G30S movement.
They are as follows:

* The culprit of the G30S was the PKI
The PKI launced a coup d’etat against the Indonesian Army and the government to launch a communist government in Indonesia.

* The G30S was an army Internal Problem
An army clique led by Suharto launched the coup precisely by sneaking into the PKI

* The G30S was done by the CIA
The CIA worked together with an army clique to destroy the PKI. The aim of CIA in Indonesia at that time was clearly to destroy communism in Southeast Asia.

* The G30S was a Meeting Point between American and British Interests
The interests of Britain which wanted Sukarno’s confrontation against Malaysia to end with him losing power and the USA’s interest of ridding the world of communism sparked the G30S.

* Sukarno was the Mastermind of the G30S
One of the most controversial theories of the G30S, Sukarno wanted to make the top army officials ‘vanish’ because they threatened his power. The PKI was also pulled into the mess because of its closeness with Sukarno.

* The Chaos Theory
Nobody actually did the G30S. There was no grand scenario and it was ultimately affected by field operations. The G30S was a mix of Western nations, the doings of the PKI’s leaders and the army’s corrupt cliques.

Further muddling matters are recriminations of coup plots by both the left-wing and right-wing. As mentioned before, the PKI had in fact launched a coup effort in 1948; lesser known is that the right-wing military faction had already made several attempts on Sukarno’s life.

 

Gestapu: The CIA’s “Track Two” in Indonesia
By David Johnson, 1976

October 1995 note from David Johnson: This is a paper I wrote in 1976. It is presented here in its original version. It was written to encourage Congressional investigation of the issue by the Church Committee at the time. This paper was circulated privately but never published. It may have some enduring merit. Comments and criticisms are welcome.

As evidence that the subject matter is still relevant, please note this recently declassified quotation:
“From our viewpoint, of course, an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI might be
the most effective development to start a reversal of political trends in Indonesia.”


Then-US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones
March 10, 1965
Chiefs of Mission Conference, Baguio, Philippines
Quoted in Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, “Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia,” 1995, p.225]

David T. Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20005
202-862-0700
djohnson@cdi.org

(* “Track Two” was the name given to a CIA covert operation undertaken in Chile in the fall of 1970 at the direction of President Nixon. Its purpose was to use all possible means to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. Knowledge of Track Two was very tightly held. The State Department, the Defense Department, the American Ambassador in Chile, and the Forty Committee were not informed. Track Two was partially responsible for the murder of General Schneider, the Chilean Army Chief of Staff who opposed efforts of other military officers to stage a coup. Track Two failed in its objective in 1970. Other analogies to the Indonesian events are the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the Reichstag fire.)

Introduction
This paper presents the preliminary outline of a new interpretation of the events in Indonesia in 1965 that climaxed in the “coup” attempt of October 1st and the actions of the September 30th Movement (GESTAPU). It is argued that the September 30th Movement was not an action by “progressive” or dissatisfied middle-level military officers, nor a creature of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), nor was it stimulated by President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly in the hands of General Suharto (and probably General Nasution) [1995 note from David Johnson: today I would delete the reference to Nasution] and most likely a creation of the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of “saving Indonesia from Communism” in a desperate situation.

GESTAPU served the crucial function of providing a legitimate pretext for the drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to put the reins of power quickly into the hands of Suharto and to place Sukarno in a restricted position.

GESTAPU worked. It is probably the most successful covert operation that the CIA has ever carried out. The participation of the CIA in GESTAPU–its “fingerprints on the gun”–cannot be proven unless the Congress digs hard to find the truth, as was done partly in the case of Chile. The CIA connection is hypothesized because it seems a logical outcome of U.S. policy toward Indonesia and because of the relative sophistication and complexity of the GESTAPU operation. Because of the close contact between the Indonesian Army and U.S. Defense Department advisers and attaches it is probable that certain of these personnel were also involved.

It is not maintained that the thesis of this paper is necessarily correct or proven. The author’s hope is to demonstrate that it is sufficiently plausible that further research along these lines will be conducted by those more knowledgeable than he and that those in a position to do something about it will begin to look into the secret official record. The thesis is presented without a great deal of hedging but the author is aware that many of the facts he uses are open to a number of alternative explanations. Of course, many “facts” are in dispute. This first draft assumes some knowledge on the part of the reader of the basic events of the time and of the existing interpretive controversy. No special attempt is made here, however, to refute alternative theories. Only a portion of the supporting material is indicated.

Gestapu: The CIA’s “Track Two” in Indonesia

The events of October 1, 1965, in Indonesia and their origin may truly be called “a riddle wrapped in an enigma.~ There is no consensus among students of Indonesia about the “correct” explanation. All existing theories have their articulate and plausible critics. Probably the majority of careful Indonesian scholars have abandoned the search for explanation. GESTAPU is an enormously complicated puzzle in which the pieces never fit together, their shape constantly changes, and new pieces keep appearing.

In an earlier age of innocence, the attributing to the CIA of a significant causal role in international affairs was a disreputable enterprise in which most professional analysts seldom engaged. With the revelations of recent years, however, the inhibitions on serious study of CIA activities have somewhat broken down. We also know far more than we did ten years ago about the extent of CIA operations and how the CIA works. In many cases, including Indonesia, we still know very little about what the CIA actually did over the years. But more than before we can feel on safe ground to think that the CIA was active. This is not CIA scapegoating, left-wing propaganda, conspiracy fascination, or a search for simple-minded solutions. It is a necessary and important research effort that must be undertaken before it can be seriously rejected. Of course, the great secrecy that envelops the subject places substantial restrictions on what normal academic research can accomplish.

This paper is based in the first instance on the author’s reading of the recently released CIA Research Study “Indonesia-1965: The Coup That Backfired.” The author has also read nearly everything available in English in the Library of Congress on the events of 1965. The major source material that has not been examined, except as described in secondary sources, is the large body of records of post-October 1 interrogations of prisoners held by the Indonesian Army and the records of the numerous trials that have been held. Undoubtedly new insights can be derived from these materials. The author’s knowledge of Indonesia in general is relatively sparse, although he has visited the country and spent some time in previous years studying Indonesian political development. The present paper is the product of a month of very intensive research on the events of 1965 as well as some limited examination of studies on the CIA.

U.S. Assessment of Indonesia
At some point in 1964 or 1965 (probably late 1964) the deterioration of U.S. relations with Indonesia and the left-ward drift of Indonesia had gone so far that the U.S. faced the need to reassess its policy toward Indonesia with an eye toward adopting new policies. Howard Jones, the American ambassador at the time, has described the extremely pessimist official assessment of how bad things had gotten from the American point of view. Ewa Pauker and Guy Pauker at RAND have described the projection of near-term PKI takeover and the pessimism about the ability of the Indonesian Army to reverse the apparently inevitable flow of events.

Jones indicates that a number of important meetings were held in which U.S. policy toward Indonesia was reassessed, beginning at the State Department in August 1964 after Sukarno’s Independence Day speech, his most anti-American statement up to that time. The March 1965 annual meeting of U.S. mission chiefs held in the Philippines with Averell Harriman and William Bundy, was also important. Ellsworth Bunker, personal representative of President Johnson, spent 15 days in Indonesia in April 1965 evaluating the situation. There were undoubtedly other secret and perhaps more important meetings in which U.S. policy was put together.

The U.S. seems to have faced essentially six options with regard to Indonesia:

1. A hands-off policy of continuing much the same as before, letting things drift. (Of course, the U.S. had never been passive toward Indonesia and this can only be characterized as a hands-off policy in contrast to the other options.) The probable result would be that Indonesia would go Communist. There seems to have been near unanimous official agreement on the inevitability of Communist takeover in Indonesia if existing trends continued. The most important country in Southeast Asia would be lost. The U.S. effort to save Vietnam (bombing of North Vietnam began in February 1965) would probably be frustrated and all of Southeast Asia would be threatened. Clearly, this was an unacceptable option.

2. Try to get Sukarno to change his apparent policy of leading Indonesia toward Communist rule. The Embassy under Ambassador Jones had been pursuing this course for years, with little success (in American eyes). Sukarno had made more than clear his determination to continue his left-ward drive, both domestically and in foreign policy. Most Washington officials had given up on Sukarno and many agreed that “Sukarno has to go.” Some identified him as a “crypto- Communist.” This option was simply unworkable.

3. Eliminate Sukarno. Apparently this was considered, but rejected. The consequences would be too unpredictable. The Communist Party and its affiliates were so large and so extensively embedded in Indonesian society and political life that even in the absence of Sukarno’s protection they might be able to hang on and prosper. An effort to go after the PKI in such circumstances would probably result in a very unpredictable and dangerous civil war which the United States, preoccupied with Vietnam, was not in a position to handle. A danger of killing Sukarno was that those who might be identified with it would be discredited because of Sukarno’s enormous popularity in Indonesia, which efforts to undermine over the years had been unable to shake. Blaming an assassination on the left would not be credible because of the close alliance between Sukarno and the Communists. The PKI would have no plausible motive for such an action. An arranged “natural” death for Sukarno would leave the PKI as a very important force in Indonesia, and perhaps as the logical successor.

4. Encourage the Indonesian Army to take over the government. The Embassy had been pushing this option for years with some success but without achieving the final objective. Disunity within the Army had prevented any such explicit step to date and there seemed to be other inhibitions on a direct military takeover. The Army as a whole was still unwilling to move directly against Sukarno. Sukarno’s determination to resist any further expansion of the Army’s role was clear. In fact, he was doing much to try to “domesticate” and undermine the Army as an independent, anti-Communist force. Even in the event of an Army coup, without a solid pretext for quickly eliminating the PKI and a means of controlling Sukarno, the prospect of civil war would arise for the same reasons indicated in Option 3. While the U.S. could continue to cultivate military officials and try to stiffen their “backbone,” Army takeover via some sort of coup would not resolve the problem in Indonesia.

5. Try to undermine the PKI and get the Communists to take actions that would discredit themselves and legitimize their elimination. (Option 6, the fabrication of such a discrediting, is a variant of this option.) Such a step would also necessitate moving against Sukarno as he probably would never permit the Army to act forcefully against the PKI no matter how objectionable the PKI might appear to be. A variety of covert efforts were mounted to try to damage the PKI’s reputation and provoke it to misbehavior. These included linking the PKI with China, trying to show that the PKI did not really support “Sukarnoism” (the BPS episode), and the fabrication of documents and the attributing of provocative statements to PKI spokesmen (printed in non-Communist papers). But Sukarno helped to frustrate these efforts by banning almost all non-Communist political and press activity. The PKI was careful not to go too far and not to provide the excuse for its elimination. As PKI Chairman Aidit said, “We are prepared to tolerate insults and threats. We will not be provoked. If the army spits in our faces we will wipe it off and smile. We will not retaliate.” Option 5 was continually tried but it did not seem to be working.

6. If the PKI would not provide its own death warrant, the pretext for extermination had to be fabricated for it. The optimum implementation of this option would serve to eliminate both the PKI and Sukarno as dominant forces in Indonesian political life. This option appears to have been the one finally chosen, although the point at which commitment to it was irrevocable is very uncertain. Parts of the other options, other “tracks” continued at the same time.

Background to October 1st
Undoubtedly, elements of the Indonesian military (and other anti-Communist groups) were also considering what to do about the drift of Indonesia toward Communist rule. It was highly unlikely, however, that the U.S. could sit passively and expect that Indonesians on their own would do what had to be done. American analysts seemed to have concluded that no Indonesian group on its own had the capability and will to do what was necessary to prevent Communist takeover. American initiative and cooperation were necessary.

The U.S. over the years had built up close relationships with many Indonesians, particularly in the Army. In fact, this was the essence of U.S. policy toward Indonesia over the previous five or more years. The coincidence of U.S. and anti-PKI Army interest would make natural, and simply a continuation of patterns already established, a collaboration and pooling of resources to carry out the best means available for stopping the PKI and “saving” Indonesia. The CIA provided a pool of expertise and technical capability for devising and implementing a relatively sophisticated and delicate maneuver.

The problem of lack of Army internal cohesion, as indicated in Option 4, remained a stumbling bloc. Efforts were made to achieve unity in moving against the PKI (and necessarily Sukarno) but although most generals agreed that the PKI had to go, some very important officers–notably the Army Chief of Staff General Yani– were apparently unwilling to take steps that would severely damage Sukarno. After the failure of attempts to secure Army unity, the U.S. and the collaborating generals (principally Suharto and Nasution) [1995 note: again, I would today delete Nasution] decided that the urgency of the threat and the need for quick action required working with those who were willing. It was necessary to move in spite of the absence of Army unity.

Actions were undertaken to try to polarize Indonesian politics between the Communists and others, an effort that it was hoped might move the reluctant generals to the “right” side. The Gilchrist letter seems to have been part of a covert effort to stimulate distrust and antagonism between Sukarno and General Yani. It appears, however, that General Yani remained something of a Sukarno-loyalist. General Yani had become dispensable and probably he stood in the way of what had to be done.

The “Generals’ Council” rumor, frequently considered the product of PKI work, was probably an important element of the CIA-Suharto covert operation in preparing the ground for GESTAPU. The rumor served a number of useful purposes. It helped to further the heightening of tension and uncertainty in Indonesian political life. It served to stimulate mistrust between Sukarno and certain generals that the CIA wanted to break with Sukarno. It alarmed the PKI and might even make it take the provocatory step that was hoped for. It provided a focus for debate and rumor that distracted attention from the real “conspiracy.” It bore a resemblance to something that actually existed, General Yani’s “braintrust,” and thus provided a ready target group for the GESTAPU operation, plausible victims for the “PKI’s” atrocities. The rumor helped to create a climate in which people would find GESTAPU at least superficially plausible, especially immediately on October 1st. There would be widespread belief in the imminent threat of a Generals’ Council coup and “unwitting” people (notably the soldiers used by GESTAPU on October 1st) would be willing to take actions that they might otherwise question. The General’s Council rumor helped to create something of a “controlled environment” in which certain planned stimuli would produce a relatively predictable response. Finally, the rumor was an important part of the cover story for why the PKI might be believed to have taken the action to be attributed to it.


The exploitation of the Sukarno’s health rumor mill was another important part of the cover for GESTAPU. Unfortunately for the cover story, however, it turns out to have been one of the weak links. The post-1965 explanation of why the PKI allegedly carried out GESTAPU attributes a major role to the presumed fear on the part of the PKI that Sukarno was about to die. Chinese doctors are alleged to have convinced Aidit of this. The problem is that Sukarno recovered rapidly from his illness in August 1965 and Aidit, who was in constant contact with Sukarno, had more than sufficient time to find out about Sukarno’s health for himself and to turn off any plans that were based on Sukarno’s imminent demise. (The implausibility of this story may in part account for the growth of theories that attribute the authorship of GESTAPU to Sukarno and place the PKI in a subordinate role. Even the Suharto government seems to have adopted this “explanation.~) In 1965, however, the circulation of rumors by the CIA-Suharto group served to create a climate that would make GESTAPU plausible as well as the PKI’s complicity in it.

It does seem clear that the PKI Politburo held meetings in August 1965 at which the health of Sukarno was discussed, as well as the Generals’ Council rumors, and probably the existence of “progressive” officers. What was actually said about these subjects, however, is far from clear. The official Army version, presented through “confessions,” probably took real events, kernels of truth, and spun them into the required pattern.

A very interesting question is whether the Untung group made contact with the PKI, perhaps to get the PKI to directly implicate itself or at least to take actions that could later be interpreted as “participation in GESTAPU.” It seems likely that the GESTAPU conspirators would have considered it risky to acquaint anyone not “in the know” with what was going on. The danger would have been very great that the PKI would be suspicious and pass the information to Sukarno who would investigate. The PKI was constantly on the alert for “provocations.” There is a possibility, however, that some vague intimation of GESTAPU was passed to Aidit via a source that Aidit would have found credible. If so, it appears that Aidit rejected PKI participation, despite later trial evidence.

An overlooked source of information on the relationship, if any, between the PKI and a “progressive” officers GESTAPU group is an article by the leftist journalist Wilfred Burchett that was originally published in November 1965. Burchett, relying on “an Indonesian whom I know as having close contact with the PKI leadership and who escaped the army dragnet in Jakarta,” states that the PKI received “documentary” evidence of the existence of a Generals’ Council in August and informed Sukarno about it. Burchett continues:

“In late September, Colonel Untung, head of the presidential guard, learned of the planned coup from independent sources. He approached leaders of the PKI, among others, revealing what they had known for some time, and urged joint action. to thwart the coup. The PKI leaders reportedly refused on the ground that such an action would be “premature” and that as long as Sukarno remained at the helm everything possible should be done to maintain unity, while all patriotic elements within the armed forces should remain vigilant to deal with any coup from above.”

Of course, we have no way of knowing if this is what happened but it is possible.

The backgrounds of Lt. Col. Untung, the alleged leader of the September 30th Movement, and his colleagues have been examined by a number of independent scholars. The picture that emerges is not that of a group of “progressive” or disgruntled officers, but rather of a group of successful and professional military officers who had exhibited signs of anti-PKI views, had been given sensitive positions in which their past and present political affiliations and views would have been subjected to careful examination, and some of whom–perhaps the most important ones–had recently been trained in the U.S. (General Supardjo and Col. Suherman) and undoubtedly exhaustively “vetted” by the CIA and U.S. defense intelligence.

What seems to link most of the GESTAPU officers together is not their “progressiveness” but their association, both past and present, with General Suharto. Those participants, particularly in the Air Force, not overtly linked with Suharto may be considered CIA-Suharto “assets” activated to play their role in the GESTAPU scenario. The penetration of the Air Force and the Palace Guard by anti-PKI Army forces (and the CIA) is at least as plausible as the degree of penetration attributed to the PKI. The vigilance of the anti-PKI generals in keeping PKI influence out of their officer corps is well known, as is the effort to keep track of and penetrate the more leftist branches of the military services.

Before examining what took place on October 1st it is important to recognize that (if the thesis of this paper is correct) we are looking at a collection of actors and a sequence of events that were put together primarily to accomplish a very immediate and urgent task: the discrediting of the PKI (and its allies) in as dramatic and quick a fashion as possible, and the immobilization of factors that might complicate the situation. While some thought had obviously been given to cover, it is doubtful that extensive effort was put into constructing a cover story that would withstand close, dispassionate scrutiny . The ability of the Cornell researchers, after only a few months of research using primarily written materials, to reveal the weaknesses of the immediate cover story is testimony to its inherent crudeness. The CIA-Suharto group probably felt that, if they moved quickly and drastically enough, there was little likelihood that much foreign effort would be put into examining GESTAPU in detail. Certainly no Indonesian would he disposed to raise doubts.

A certain refinement of cover and justification for actions that, for the most part, had already been taken (the murder of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians) was provided by the obviously spurious Aidit “confession” and the fabricated confession and show trial of Njono. Untung was also put on trial early in 1966. Even sympathetic foreign journalists have raised questions about these early trials (no foreign journalists were permitted to attend and only selected Indonesians). We do not know at what point the Indonesian authorities found out about the Cornell study and other evidence that apparently their story was not going over abroad as well as they had hoped. It seems probable that the trials of Dani and Subandrio were primarily milestones in the campaign to remove Sukarno and less parts of the GESTAPU cover story. It was the trial of Sudisman in 1967 and that of Sjam in 1968 that were explicitly calculated for their effect on the foreign skeptics. Of course, Suharto has had other reasons as well for continuing the show trials.

The Events of October 1st
The major military units involved on the side of the September 30th movement were officially under the command of General Suharto’s KOSTRAD, the Army’s Strategic Reserve. The semi-official Indonesian Army history of GESTAPU states: “Both the 454th and 530th Battalions together with the 328th Kudjong Battalion of the Siliwangi Division were under the operations command of the 3d Paratroop Brigade of the Army’s Strategic Reserve.” The Army book observes further that “KOSTRAD troops were scattered all over Indonesia, as [sic] that at the time of the coup General Soeharto had only the dc Kudjava and dc Parakomando battalion around Djakarta. Other KOSTRAD troops were at ‘the other side.'”

The major mission of these KOSTRAD “coup” units was to take up positions around the crucial Merdeka Square, controlling Sukarno’s Palace, the Indonesian Radio station, and the central telecommunications facilities.

One company of soldiers from the Palace Guard, the Tjakrabirawa, are said to have participated, together with KOSTRAD elements, in the kidnapping-murder of the six army generals. Lt. Col. Untung had been since May 1965 commander of one of the three Tjakrabirawa battalions. Considering Untung’s position, this participation is quite possible, although it could have introduced a perhaps unnecessary complication into the proceedings. General Sabur, the commander of the Palace Guard, played a very unclear role in the GESTAPU and its aftermath. Although jailed for a period after 1965, he has been released and no charges have been brought against him. Whether Untung could have acted without Sabur’s knowledge is uncertain. Only a few Tjakrabirawa troops were really necessary on October 1st, and they could have been KOSTRAD soldiers in Palace Guard uniforms. The extraordinary lack of professionalism in the execution of the “kidnappings” makes it unlikely that “unwitting” Tjakrabirawa troops played a significant role. Their role seems to have been that of making the first contact at each of the victim’s home.

In the early morning hours of October 1st GESTAPU troops went to the homes of seven generals. Three of the generals, including Army head General Yani, were killed immediately and their bodies and three other generals were taken to a place called Lubang Buaja (Crocodile’s Hole) on the outskirts of Halim Air Force Base. More than 100 troops surrounded the house of General Nasution but in a “near miraculous” escape, Nasution got away by climbing over a wall and hiding in the bushes. The fiction that one of his aides was captured and successfully impersonated one of the best known men in Indonesia for some hours afterwards (a crucial element in the CIA Research Study version of events), need not puzzle us. No such thing happened and General Nasution was meant to “escape,” (The shooting of his daughter, apparently by accident through a door, seems too ghastly to have been part of the GESTAPU plan, although her death and funeral were very important in whipping up the subsequent fury against the PKI. Nasution’s much commented upon “moodiness” after October 1st may in part be accounted for by his remorse about not taking better precautions to protect his family.)

General Nasution, the leading anti-Communist military figure in Indonesia, had to be on the list of victims of GESTAPU. His absence would have been incredible. He was not, however, a member of General Yani’s “Generals’ Council.” The fact that it was General Suharto, rather than the more well known Nasution, who took the leadership of the counter-GESTAPU forces may have a complicated explanation. We do not know the subtleties of the Suharto-Nasution relationship. The most probable explanation is that the immediate appearance of Nasution as the head of the anti-PKI effort would have aroused suspicions. Some stories have Nasution being kept “protected” in a hidden place on October 1st from 6 AM until 7 PM when he finally appeared at KOSTRAD headquarters. Other reports have him at KOSTRAD headquarters on the morning of October 1st. Nasution is alleged to have broken his ankle in climbing over the wall, probably part of the cover story for why it had to be Suharto who took the lead.

Among the more incredible “mistakes” of the GESTAPU movement was the failure to try to kill or kidnap the two generals in Djakarta who had operational command of military forces in the area, General Suharto and General Umar. Ruth McVey has commented on how extraordinary this omission was, in view of the fact that Col. Latief was one of the major GESTAPU conspirators: “Col. A. Latief headed the mobile force of the Djaya (Djakarta) Division and had commanded a series of interservice capital defense maneuvers; he must have known the basic provisions for an emergency in the capital.” In fact, Col. Latief seems to have been one of Suharto’s men. McVey states: “Latief, also a Diponegoro Division officer (Suharto’s former division), had fought under Suharto during the revolution; at the time of the Irian campaign he was at the Mandala Command headquarters in Ambone….He was assigned to KOSTRAD; his command at the time of the coup, Brigade I, was one of the KOSTRAD infantry brigades.” Latief, according to Suharto himself, visited him on the night of September 30th at the hospital where Suharto was seeing his ill son. Another account has Col. Latief paying a visit to the military hospital on the morning of October 1st where Nasution’s injured daughter had been brought. General Suharto and General Umar worked closely together almost immediately from the beginning on October 1st in “defeating” GESTAPU.

One general who was supposed to have originally been on the list of GESTAPU victims because of his position on General Yani’s staff was General Sukendro. He was in Peking on October 1st. In fact, Sukendro was a close associate of Nasution and had the reputation of a man with intimate associations with the American military and the CIA. Sukendro came back from Peking with the story that on October 1st Chinese officials had shown Indonesians a list of the murdered generals before it had been announced. (Intimations of Chinese involvement in GESTAPU were rampant in the early months after October 1st but faded to nothing after their purpose had been served.)

What exactly occurred at Lubang Buaja where the six murdered and captured generals were taken and eventually dumped into a well is uncertain. Why they were taken there seems clear. Lubang Buaja, despite stories that “secret” military training of PKI people was occurring there, was well known as a place where Air Force officers since July had been conducting training of volunteers for the Malaysian Confrontation. Those trained included youths from both PKI and other organizations. The quick murder of the generals and their alleged mutilation by Communists was the core of the GESTAPU scenario. Whether there were people from Communist organizations present at Lubang Buaja is uncertain. It is possible that unwitting volunteers had been brought there to lend their presence to the proceedings. This could have been complicating however. It was sufficient that the dastardly deed be done at a place that was known as a gathering spot for the training of PKI volunteers. “Confessions” could be produced later.

There are a few indications that if, in fact, there were “volunteers” present at Lubang Buaja on the morning of October 1st they were not necessarily from PKI organizations. The eye-witness account used in the CIA Research Study states that there were civilians crowding around the prisoners yelling “kill the unbelievers,” rather extraordinary words for Communists to be uttering. Accounts seem . to agree that the generals were almost unidentifiable, bloodied and beaten up, wearing pajamas, and blindfolded. Mortimer states that, among other non-Communist youths, people from the Moslem Ansor youth organization were expected at Lubang Buaja for training on October 1st. We may speculate that the GESTAPU officers present may have told anti-PKI youths that they had captured the killers of the generals.

Whoever killed and “mutilated” the generals, their murder served several important purposes for GESTAPU. Most importantly, it could be blamed on the PKI. The murder of General Yani opened the way for Suharto to take over control of the Army and implement the wrap-up of GESTAPU. It was standing procedure for Suharto to become acting Army head whenever Yani was not available. Suharto’s behavior on October 1st seems to be that of someone who is immediately aware that Yani is dead. We find no discussion in accounts of October 1st of efforts by Suharto to locate and rescue captured generals until late in the day. He acted very quickly to take charge. He exhibited none of the uncertainty and hesitancy that characterized nearly everyone else on October 1st.

The killing of the generals was also important in inhibiting Sukarno from declaring in favor of the September 30th Movement, a danger that could have upset the scenario but which had been taken into account. The fact that Lubang Buaja could also be associated with the Air Force (although, contrary to general impression, it was not in fact located on Halim Air Force Base) was also useful in assuring that General Dani and the Air Force would not be tempted to throw their military forces behind the September 30th Movement. Once it became known what an enormous crime had been committed by the “progressive” GESTAPU–political murder was very rare in Indonesia–no one was likely to jump on the band-wagon and complicate the planned failure of GESTAPU. Of course, the discrediting of the leftist Air Force and General Dani was part of the purpose of GESTAPU.

It is probable that the killing of the generals was communicated as rapidly as possible to Sukarno so that he would not think of backing GESTAPU. Accounts have a helicopter flying over Lubang Buaja, perhaps part of Sukarno’s (or Suharto~s?) efforts to verify absolutely that it was true. Sukarno was also probably told how the PKI was linked to the murders. His early knowledge that Nasution had probably “escaped” also served to inhibit any impulse to support GESTAPU.

When the first message of the September 30th Movement was broadcast over Radio Indonesia around 7 AM it was announced that Sukarno was being protected and that certain prominent persons who were to be targets of the Generals’ Council action had also been taken under “protection.” This was actually part of a deliberate action to control the behavior of and information available to leading non-GESTAPU political figures whom, if at large, could interfere with the GESTAPU scenario. PKI Chairman Aidit was brought to Halim very early on October 1st. (His wife states that he was kidnapped from his home.) Dani was brought to Halim. (Accounts differ on this.) Sukarno was brought to Halim. Most of Sukarno’s advisors, such as Subandrio, Njoto, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, were not in Djakarta. Reports have it at if they had been in Djakarta they were on the list of persons to be “protected.” Although there was some contact between these individuals at Halim, much of the time they were kept separated from each other in different houses with GESTAPU messengers going back and forth. (The phones had been cut in Djakarta. Only the Army had an emergency communication system functioning.) Aidit in particular was kept “protected” from any contact with Sukarno.

From the CIA Research Study account we learn that “Aidit definitely was accompanied by two bodyguards, who stayed with him the whole day of the 1st while he was at Halim and who accompanied him on the plane on his flight from Halim to Jogjakarta on the morning of the 2nd.” The actual function of these “bodyguards” seems obvious. (It is remarkable how little role, even in the official accounts, Aidit seems to have played at Halim in guiding the movement that he is alleged to have been responsible for.)

Back at Merdeka Square, the GESTAPU-KOSTRAD troops had occupied the radio station at about the same time that the generals were being kidnapped. The use of the radio to broadcast a carefully prepared series of messages was a crucial part of the GESTAPU operation. The fact that Suharto, located just across the square in KOSTRAD headquarters, took no action until the evening to put the radio off the air–although he says that he very quickly decided that something was wrong–was suspicious and “explained” in the official version in terms of Suharto’s desire to avoid violence. (His tolerance toward troops who had apparently killed or abducted six leading Army generals is remarkable.) In fact, Suharto deliberately waited to “retake” the radio station until the planned messages were completed. This he accomplished without firing a shot. (In the whole GESTAPU affair, including outside of Djakarta, only a handful of people were killed other than the generals.)

The most important characteristic of the first 7 AM GESTAPU radio broadcast in which the existence of the September 30th Movement was announced was that it was unclear whether GESTAPU was pro- or anti-Sukarno. The deliberate creation of uncertainty was necessary in part so as to prevent anyone “unexpected” from involving themselves. The fact that the name of Sukarno was not invoked in support of GESTAPU, which any genuine leftist coup attempt would probably have faked if necessary in order to increase the chances for success, probably made GESTAPU seem somewhat anti-Sukarno. The emphasis on its being “inside the military” was calculated to prevent anyone, especially the PKI, from taking to the streets and getting in the way. Basically, the impact of the 7 AM message was to confuse people and keep them sitting still waiting for the next message. In any event, given the climate of rumor in Djakarta, GESTAPU was not an implausible event, although who was behind it and what it was to accomplish was uncertain.

Another apparently calculated aspect of the first radio broadcast was the statement that a Revolutionary Council was going to be set up, with the implication–later made very clear–that it would be the new government. It was not until the afternoon that the “rather peculiar assortment of names” on the Revolutionary Council was announced. The indication of the abolition of the existing cabinet, however, was apparently partially intended to provide a rationale and gloss of legality for General Suharto to take quick command of the Army without consultation with Sukarno. In justifying his behavior afterwards, Suharto has cited the fact that GESTAPU had overthrown the existing government and therefore he was free to act on his own. (One of the contradictions in the post-1965 explanation of GESTAPU is that if the Untung group was primarily concerned to execute a limited operation to purge the Army of leading anti-PKI generals, why was it necessary to set aside the existing government, giving the operation the clear flavor of a political coup?)

Even the term “Revolutionary Council” may have been devised as another bit of dust thrown in the eyes of the confused public. Apparently the last time that “Revolutionary Councils” had been established in Indonesia was in 1956 and 1957 when some of the dissident anti-PKI regional military commanders had done so.

Although the radio announcement of the membership of the new Revolutionary Council, “the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia,” was not broadcast until about 2 PM, we will discuss it here. It seems possible to discern several functions for this message. The rather heterogeneous and lack-luster membership seems calculated to discourage anyone from rallying to support. (Clearly, few, if any, of the non-military members of the Council had been informed before hand. A better selection could have been faked if assuring the success of the “coup” had really been important.) The unknown middle-ranking officers took the top positions for themselves. The heads of the non-Army military services were prominently displayed as members of the Council, perhaps part of the overall plan to prevent uncontrolled military forces from involving themselves in the GESTAPU events. Linking the heads of the Air Force, Navy, and Police with GESTAPU would make it possible to label any unwanted military action by these forces as part of the GESTAPU revolt.

It is uncertain how much additional calculation was put into the membership list. A handful of PKI officials from affiliated organizations were included, but none of the top PKI leaders. This again would discourage unplanned PKI involvement Later analyses of the membership indicate the possibility that the CIA’s “experts” on communism may have devised the list according to their calculation of a plausible “stage” which the “revolution” in Indonesia had reached. In October 1965 The Washington Post published a story by Chalmers Roberts, apparently based on CIA briefings, that said U.S. officials reported to have evidence that Sukarno, through a coup, had “intended to turn his country into an Indonesian version of a Communist ‘People’s Democracy.'” We may guess that as part of the devising of a cover story for GESTAPU the CIA experts tried to simulate the kind of government that the PKI and Sukarno (apparently little distinction was made) might plausibly have been expected to set up if a pro-Communist coup occurred in Indonesia in the fall of 1965.


The 1968 CIA Research Study states that “the Revolutionary Council was the perfect Communist front organization.” Justus van der Kroef has provided the most extensive exposition of the “People’s Democracy” thesis, along the lines of Eastern European experience. Actually, judging by a more careful study of Soviet and Chinese examples, the PKI membership on the Revolutionary Council was too limited and the composition of the Council was far from being a “perfect” simulation. (The eight year old CIA Research Study contains several rather amateurish efforts to show the traces of Chinese Communist ideology or practice in the GESTAPU events, reflective of the spirit of the times.)

The behavior of Sukarno on October 1st, the subject of much speculation later on, seems to be that of someone who is unsure of what is going on, but wary and trying desperately to get a handle on the situation. The GESTAPU officers did not actually keep him prisoner at Halim Air Force Base–General Supardjo’s role seems to have been that of a rather skilled handler of Sukarno, keeping up the GESTAPU pretence–and permitted him to send and receive messages and selected visitors. To the extent possible, however, information and advice available to Sukarno was controlled. (Sukarno’s later emphasis on his being at Halim of his own free will was in the context of the rising anti-PKI hysteria. Sukarno struggled to keep it under control and did not want people to think that the “PKI-GESTAPU” had kidnapped him.)

We must assume that the CIA had prepared a psychological assessment of Sukarno which was an ingredient in planning the GESTAPU operation. How accurate and insightful the CIA’s profile may have been we do not know. Considering the obsession of Westerners with Sukarno’s sex life and the image of irresponsibility and irrationality that had been built up about him, we may suspect that the assessment was not highly useful. Some Americans seem to have considered Sukarno a coward and Howard Jones cites a Washington view, circa 1958, that Sukarno “did not have the intestinal fortitude to order the Indonesian military into action since it would split the country. Sukarno had worked all his life to unite his country; he was the last man to take an action that would result in a division that might be irrevocable.” The view of Sukarno as unwilling to take decisive and divisive military action against other Indonesians could have been a factor in the planning of GESTAPU. Sukarno’s lack of ruthlessness would be exploited.


One of the clearer indications of the absence of collusion between Sukarno and the GESTAPU officers, and of their willingness to ignore him when necessary, is the fact that (according to the CIA Research Study) at about noon on October 1st Sukarno told General Supardjo to stop the September 30th Movement. However, some important radio broadcasts had yet to be made, and the rationale for the apparently fabricated incriminating October 2 Harian Rakjat editorial would have been destroyed if General Supardjo had immediately stopped GESTAPU. The GESTAPU actions continued in Djakarta until the evening.

At about 1 PM an announcement, over General Sabur’s name, was broadcast that “President Sukarno is safe and well and continues to execute the leadership of the State.” This seems to have been a genuine statement from Sukarno, and implied his rejection of the September 30th Movement. Sukarno did not leave Halim until about 8:30 PM when he went to Bogor, having failed to prevent Suharto from taking over the Army.

In addition to the GESTAPU radio broadcasts containing the details of the Revolutionary Council, the other important afternoon message was a statement attributed to General Dani, the leftist Air Force Chief of Staff, expressing support for the September 30th Movement. This was broadcast at 3:30 PM. The means by which this “Order of the Day” was elicited from Dani, or whether it was fabricated, is uncertain. The statement carried a dating of 9:30 AM, before Sukarno’s radio message, although it was not actually broadcast until six hours later.

The CIA Research Study comments on this “incredibly poorly timed” message of General Dani: “Two hours after Sukarno had studiously avoided committing himself over the radio the Air Force Chief Dani had pledged support of the Air Force to the coup.” The peculiarity of this was accentuated by the fact that Dani was considered to be a man who carefully calculated his steps to fall in line with Sukarno. It seemed impossible that Dani could take such an action without Sukarno’s endorsement. Perhaps in the confused and controlled circumstances at Halim the GESTAPU officers had managed to convince Dani earlier in the day that Sukarno wanted him to prepare a pro-GESTAPU Order of the Day to have on hand in case of need. (The possibility of straight fabrication exists, although the author has found no emphatic assertion to this effect by Dani.)

Assuming that the Dani message was a planned part of the GESTAPU scenario, it’s purpose, of course, was to incriminate the leftist Dani and the Air Force in the GESTAPU coup attempt and the murder of the generals. (In the early days after October 1st Suharto seems to have been even more interested in defaming the Air Force than the PKI. After all, the Air Force had weapons and the PKI did not.) The Dani message also helped to enhance the plausibility of a PKI newspaper editorial expressing similar views on the next day. Early and unambiguous identification of Dani with GESTAPU would also inhibit him from taking unwanted military action.

Following the broadcast of the Dani statement, there were only a few steps left for GESTAPU, except for the action in Central Java to be examined later. Another incident of incriminating PKI involvement in GESTAPU was the alleged appearance late in the day near Merdeka Square of Pemuda Rakjat (the PKI youth organization) youths armed with Chinese weapons supposedly given to them by the Air Force. They were quickly disarmed by units of the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU 530th Battalion which had already “rejoined” the loyal forces. (Perhaps the incident was arranged in part to demonstrate that the KOSTRAD-GESTAPU units were not really bad.)

This futile arming of “PKI” youths with marked Chinese weapons that were never used is another of the almost endless string of GESTAPU “mistakes.” The CIA Research Study comments: “The weapons were all small arms of Chinese origin, with the ‘Chung’ trademark stamped on them. The Indonesian army was known not to have any weapons of that type. There is absolutely no doubt that the arms were the property of the Indonesian Air Force.” (Suharto is later said to have thrust one of these “Chung” guns before Sukarno as proof of GESTAPU’s evil.)

While the CIA analyst may have “no doubt,” another explanation seems more probable. (Stories of Chinese arms shipments to Indonesia were rife after October 1st but even the CIA Study, in other places, questions their accuracy.) The CIA is known to have had a large store of Chinese weapons at this time, which were used for a variety of purposes, including such “incriminating” schemes. This incident was simply another planned part of the GESTAPU effort to incriminate the PKI in GESTAPU in dramatic fashion. The youths might have been unwitting Pemuda Rakjat but that could have been too dangerous and it seems more probable that they were other youths, or possibly it did not even happen at all.

Apparently there were armed anti-PKI youths in Djakarta already on October 1st who had some idea of what was going on. Donald Hindley has written the following:


“October 1 was an even more confusing day for the civilians of Djakarta….And yet, while the situation was still in doubt, a few civilians did take action to use the September 30 Movement as the excuse for a public attack on the Communist Party. “By the evening of 1 October, several Moslems had met and agreed to form a Moslem Action Command Against Communism. These initial, and very few, activists were members of HMI (Moslem University Student’s Association), PII (Moslem High School Students), Gasbiindo (Indonesian Moslem Trade Union Association), and the Muhammadijah, all of them organizations formerly affiliated with Masjumi. The only politician willing to be involved on that first day was Subchan, a vice-chairman of the NU and, in many ways, atypical of his party’s leadership. That evening the group made contact with the army leadership, in the person of Djakarta commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusuma, who agreed to give them a few weapons. More important, Umar approved the formation of KAP-Gestapu (Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu: Gestapu being an abbreviation of the Indonesian for ‘September 30 Movement’). The plans for the more narrowly based, specifically Moslem Action Command were quietly dropped. Already, then, the army leadership had proffered its encouragement and (as yet less clearly apparent) protection for those who would spearhead a civilian campaign against the PKI.”

If this is true, it indicates either remarkable prescience (it occurred before any evidence of PKI connection to GESTAPU had been announced) or, in our interpretation, that the GESTAPU action was a CIA-Suharto creation. The list of organizations involved on October 1st reads like a list of those civilian groups who would most likely have been working under CIA guidance. The use of anti-PKI students by the Army after October 1st is well known. The use of similar groups in many countries is also standard CIA practice. The extraordinarily early creation of KAP-GESTAPU with Army support is evidence of how the groundwork for the subsequent exploitation of the GESTAPU events was laid right from the beginning, if not before.

By about 7 PM on October 1st the Army had retaken the Indonesian Radio station and at 8:45 PM an announcement was broadcast that the “counter-revolutionary” September 30th Movement had kidnapped a number of generals but that Sukarno and Nasution were now safe and “the general situation is again under control.”

Then occurred what subsequent observers have considered one of the most puzzling GESTAPU “mistakes,” the appearance on October 2nd (after almost all other papers had ceased publication) of an issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat containing an editorial and cartoon endorsing the September 30th Movement. There is a remote possibility that the PKI editors were taken in by the messages they heard over the radio and had thrown caution overboard and in fact wrote such an editorial, but it is more probable that it was a fabrication. The Cornell study examined the October 2nd issue of Harian Rakjat at length and raised some doubts about the authenticity of the editorial and cartoon. The Cornell researchers, however, did not go so far as to declare them phony. The Cornell study does state that “the Djakarta garrison commander, Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumae, issued an order dated 6:00 p.m. on the 1st to the effect that no publications of any kind were to appear without permission of the Djakarta war authority, save for the Army newspapers Berita Yudha and Angkatan Bersendjata, whose buildings were to be guarded to ensure that they did come out.” The Cornell study states that it is “quite likely that the Harian Rakjat office and plant…was occupied by government troops at or not long after the time that Gen. Umar gave this order.”


The Djakarta pattern was followed even to the extent of having another remarkable “escape” of the leading military figure, General Sujosumpeno, the Division Commander, who then put down the coup with ease. Only two officers were killed by GESTAPU, Col. Katamso, the commanding officer in Jogjakarta, and his deputy. The subsequent discovery of their bodies was again used to whip up anti-PKI emotions. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that Col. Katamso was a most unlikely victim of the “progressive” GESTAPU. According to Ruth McVey’s research, Katamso was a relatively pro-PKI military officer and, in Rex Mortimer’s words, “the singling out of Colonel Katamso for destruction seems decidedly perverse.” (We may speculate that as no further victims of the Yani-type were needed, the CIA-GESTAPU group decided that they might as well make a pro-PKI officer the sacrificial lamb in Central Java.)

There were a few alleged PKI demonstrations of support for GESTAPU in Central Java but it appears that, as in Djakarta, most, if not all, were fabricated. The “PKI” action that received most attention was a demonstration in Jogjakarta on October 2nd. Major Muljono, a civic action officer in the Diponegoro Division, was the GESTAPU leader in Jogjakarta. He seems to have been the one that put together the demonstration and other pro-GESTAPU actions. The CIA Research Study states that “The major PKI mass organizations were restrained from action….Apparently Muljono was able to influence the Communist youth more than the PKI leadership.” The Cornell study states that the demonstration in Jogjakarta “appears to have been chiefly a function of connections between the local coup leader, Major Muljono, and civilian youth groups. The demonstration was notable for the absence of PKI, SOBSI, Gerwani, and BTI participants.” Major Muljono was the only important officer in Central Java who was later put on trial. He “confessed” everything.

The wrap up of GESTAPU in Central Java took slightly longer than in Djakarta but followed the same pattern of “Suharto-style” negotiations and immediate, cooperative surrender.


Our analysis is that the basic reason why the CIA-Suharto group decided to extend GESTAPU outside of Djakarta is that they wanted to show that the PKI-GESTAPU was a nation-wide threat so as to justify a nation-wide repression of the PKI. Central Java was the easiest place for Suharto to arrange the necessary GESTAPU actions and PKI “implication.” GESTAPU was limited to a few cities where the Diponegoro Division was concentrated. As the CIA Research Study states, “Nothing of the sort that happened in Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo happened anywhere else in Java, not even in East Java, where there were many powerful centers of Communist strength.” The Cornell study comments on the Central Java coup efforts that “what is extraordinary is not the amount of Communist participation in the initial phase of the affair but the lack of it.”

Before concluding, let us consider the fate of the leading GESTAPU conspirators. Some of them were tried and sentenced to death (Lt. Col. Untung, General Supardjo), others were said to have been killed in military clashes (Col. Suherman), and others (Col. Latief) have never been brought to trial or had their execution announced. It is our assumption that all of the leading military officers involved in GESTAPU on October 1st were “witting” actors in the CIA-Suharto plan. There is a remote chance that someone like Untung could have been unwitting but considerations of security would seem to have excluded the possibility of using someone who might easily have informed higher authorities of GESTAPU’s existence or plans. We believe, particularly if the CIA connection is accurate, that these conspirators have subsequently been provided with new identities by the CIA and resettled outside of Indonesia. This kind of resettlement and looking after one’s assets is relatively standard CIA procedure. The temptation to tie up loose ends and prevent any possibility of leaks raises the suggestion that the GESTAPU officers have been eliminated after serving their purpose but, not to be ironic, the honorable men at the CIA would probably consider this to be in violation of their code of conduct.

The official announcements of executions of GESTAPU officers, such as there have been, have been rather vague. For example, although Untung was tried and convicted in early 1966, it was not until September 1968 that Suharto stated for the first time that Untung and three other military leaders of the coup had been executed in December 1967. The 1968 CIA Research Study speculated that Latief was one of those executed in 1967 but in 1972 Latief made his first public appearance as a witness in the trial of Pono, an alleged PKI coup organizer. General Supardjo remained at large after October 1965 and was not arrested until early 1967. Apparently the Army knew where he was and his arrest was timed to serve a purpose in the ouster of Sukarno. In December 1965 it was announced that Col. Suherman and the other important GESTAPU officers from the Diponegoro Division headquarters had been shot dead in a clash with government troops in Central Java. Other Army sources have said that they were actually captured before they were shot. The evidence available to the author indicates that there have been no public or independently verified executions of any of the GESTAPU officers.

Conclusion
Discounting the dubious confessions displayed at the post-1965 show trials, the CIA-Suharto hypothesis seems to have the following advantages over other explanations of GESTAPU:


1. It is consistent with PKI policy and behavior before, during, and after the October 1st events. It explains PKI unpreparedness.
2. It is consistent with President Sukarno’s behavior before, during, and after the events of October 1st. Sukarno had never resorted to political murder.
3. It explains why the coup was launched in such a disadvantageous military situation, why it was carried out with such incompetence, and why it failed so easily. GESTAPU was meant to fail, and quickly.
4. It is consistent with expected U.S. activism. It is highly implausible that the U.S. would have passively permitted Indonesia to “go Communist.” Something had to be done. A desperate situation required desperate measures.
5. It relates the GESTAPU action to those who benefited from it.
6. It is consistent with what we know of the backgrounds of the GESTAPU officers. They were, for the most part, Suharto’s men and there is no evidence, except for that obtained through “confessions,” that they had any pro-PKI inclinations.
7. It explains why General Yani and his associates were killed (and not merely kidnapped or put on trial). There were several strong motives for the CIA and Suharto to get rid of Yani. Victims of the “PKI” were required and in the Indonesian context, Yani was a “constitutionalist,” loyal to the existing regime, as General Schneider was later in Chile.
8. It is inconsistent (a positive value) with a series of highly suspicious trials that were stage-managed by the Indonesian Army for obvious political purposes. As Justus van der Kroef wrote in 1970, “What Indonesians have been reading about Gestapu thus far is likely, in retrospect, to be more valuable as an index to the manipulation of the opinion and feelings concerning the September 30 events than as a contribution to an understanding of the coup itself.” That a few trials, those of Sudisman and Sjam, impressed some foreign observers is only indicative of the fact that the state of the art has advanced since the 1930’s in the Soviet Union.

The Cornell study in 1966 perceived the absence of links between GESTAPU on the one side and the PKI and Sukarno on the other and the essentially reactive behavior of the latter. The Cornell researchers concluded that the GESTAPU actors were entirely within the military establishment. A number of analysts noted the many associations between the GESTAPU officers and General Suharto. In the climate of 10 years ago, however, prior to the revelations of CIA operations, few were willing to take the next step and draw the logical connections that most adequately explain GESTAPU and its origins.

 

BENEDICT ANDERSON
PETRUS DADI RATU

 

In the early 1930s, Bung Karno [Sukarno] was hauled before a Dutch colonial court
on a variety of charges of ‘subversion’
. He was perfectly aware that the whole legal process was prearranged by the authorities, and he was in court merely to receive
a heavy sentence. Accordingly, rather than wasting his time on defending himself against the charges, he decided to go on the attack by laying bare all aspects of
the racist colonial system. Known by its title ‘Indonesia Accuses!’ his defence plea has since become a key historical document for the future of the Indonesian people
he loved so well.

Note:
Indonesia Menggugat ( Indonesia Accuses)
Sukarno’s famous defense speech at his trial by the Dutch on 18 August 1930.

 

Roughly forty-five years later, Colonel Abdul Latief was brought before a special military court—after thirteen years in solitary confinement, also on a variety of charges of subversion. Since he, too, was perfectly aware that the whole process was prearranged by the authorities, he followed in Bung Karno’s footsteps by turning his defence plea into a biting attack on the New Order, and especially on the cruelty, cunning and despotism of its creator. It is a great pity that this historic document has had to wait twenty-two years to become available to the Indonesian people whom he, also, loves so well. [1] But who is, and was, Abdul Latief, who in his youth was called Gus Dul? While still a young boy of fifteen, he was conscripted by the Dutch for basic military training in the face of an impending mass assault by the forces of Imperial Japan. However, the colonial authorities quickly surrendered, and Gus Dul was briefly imprisoned by the occupying Japanese.

Subsequently, he joined the Seinendan and the Peta in East Java. [2] After the Revolution broke out in 1945, he served continuously on the front lines, at first along the perimeter of Surabaya, and subsequently in Central Java. Towards the end he played a key role in the famous General Assault of March 1, 1949 on Jogjakarta [the revolutionary capital just captured by the Dutch]: directly under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Suharto. After the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, Latief led combat units against various rebel forces: the groups of Andi Azis and Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi; the separatist Republic of the South Moluccas; the radical Islamic Battalion 426 in Central Java, the Darul Islam in West Java, and finally the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia [CIA-financed and armed rebellion of 1957–58] in West Sumatra. He was a member of the second graduating class of the Staff and Command College (Suharto was a member of the first class). Finally, during the Confrontation with Malaysia, he was assigned the important post of Commander of Brigade 1 in Jakarta, directly under the capital’s Territorial Commander, General Umar Wirahadikusumah. In this capacity he played an important, but not central, role in the September 30th Movement of 1965. From this sketch it is clear that Gus Dul was and is a true-blue combat soldier, with a psychological formation typical of the nationalist freedom-fighters of the Independence Revolution, and an absolute loyalty to its Great Leader. [3]


His culture? The many references in his defence speech both to the Koran and to the New Testament indicate a characteristic Javanese syncretism. Standard Marxist phraseology is almost wholly absent. And his accusations? The first is that Suharto, then the Commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve [Kostrad], was fully briefed beforehand, by Latief himself, on the Council of Generals plotting Sukarno’s overthrow, and on the September 30th Movement’s plans for preventive action. General Umar too was informed through the hierarchies of the Jakarta Garrison and the Jakarta Military Police. This means that Suharto deliberately allowed the September 30th Movement to start its operations, and did not report on it to his superiors, General Nasution and General Yani. [4] By the same token, Suharto was perfectly positioned to take action against the September 30th Movement, once his rivals at the top of the military command structure had been eliminated. Machiavelli would have applauded.

We know that Suharto gave two contradictory public accounts of his meeting with Latief late in the night of September 30th at the Army Hospital. Neither one is plausible. To the American journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto said that Latief had come to the hospital to ‘check’ on him (Suharto’s baby son Tommy was being treated for minor burns from scalding soup). But ‘checking’ on him for what? Suharto did not say. To Der Spiegel Suharto later confided that Latief had come to kill him, but lost his nerve because there were too many people around (as if Gus Dul only then realized that hospitals are very busy places!). The degree of Suharto’s commitment to truth can be gauged from the following facts. By October 4, 1965, a team of forensic doctors had given him directly their detailed autopsies on the bodies of the murdered generals. The autopsies showed that all the victims had been gunned down by military weapons. But two days later, a campaign was initiated in the mass media, by then fully under Kostrad control, to the effect that the generals’ eyes had been gouged out, and their genitals cut off, by members of Gerwani [the Communist Party’s women’s affiliate]. These icy lies were planned to create an anti-communist hysteria in all strata of Indonesian society.

Other facts strengthen Latief’s accusation. Almost all the key military participants in the September 30th Movement were, either currently or previously, close subordinates of Suharto: Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, Colonel Latief, and Brigadier-General Supardjo in Jakarta, and Colonel Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the Diponegoro Division’s HQ in Semarang. When Untung got married in 1963, Suharto made a special trip to a small Central Javanese village to attend the ceremony. When Suharto’s son Sigit was circumcised, Latief was invited to attend, and when Latief’s son’s turn came, the Suharto family were honoured guests. It is quite plain that these officers, who were not born yesterday, fully believed that Suharto was with them in their endeavour to rescue Sukarno from the conspiracy of the Council of Generals. Such trust is incomprehensible unless Suharto, directly or indirectly, gave his assent to their plans. It is therefore not at all surprising that Latief’s answer to my question, ‘How did you feel on the evening of October 1st?’—Suharto had full control of the capital by late afternoon—was, ‘I felt I had been betrayed.’


Furthermore, Latief’s account explains clearly one of the many mysteries surrounding the September 30th Movement. Why were the two generals who commanded directly all the troops in Jakarta, except for the Presidential Guard—namely Kostrad Commander Suharto and Jakarta Military Territory Commander Umar—not ‘taken care of’ by the September 30th Movement, if its members really intended a coup to overthrow the government, as the Military Prosecutor charged? The reason is that the two men were regarded as friends. A further point is this. We now know that, months before October 1, Ali Murtopo, then Kostrad’s intelligence chief, was pursuing a foreign policy kept secret from both Sukarno and Yani. Exploiting the contacts of former rebels, [5] clandestine connexions were made with the leaderships of two then enemy countries, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as with the United States. At that time Benny Murdani [6] was furthering these connexions from Bangkok, where he was disguised as an employee in the local Garuda [Indonesian National Airline] office. Hence it looks as if Latief is right when he states that Suharto was two-faced, or, perhaps better put, two-fisted. In one fist he held Latief–Untung–Supardjo, and in the other Murtopo–Yoga Sugama [7]–Murdani.

The second accusation reverses the charges of the Military Prosecutor that the September 30th Movement intended to overthrow the government and that the Council of Generals was a pack of lies. Latief’s conclusion is that it was precisely Suharto who planned and executed the overthrow of Sukarno; and that a Council of Generals did exist —composed not of Nasution, Yani, et al., but rather of Suharto and his trusted associates, who went on to create a dictatorship based on the Army which lasted for decades thereafter. Here once again, the facts are on Latief’s side. General Pranoto Reksosamudro, appointed by President/Commander-in-Chief Sukarno as acting Army Commander after Yani’s murder, found his appointment rejected by Suharto, and his person soon put under detention. Aidit, Lukman and Nyoto, the three top leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party, then holding ministerial rank in Sukarno’s government, were murdered out of hand. And although President Sukarno did his utmost to prevent it, Suharto and his associates planned and carried out vast massacres in the months of October, November and December 1965. As Latief himself underlines, in March 1966 a ‘silent coup’ took place: military units surrounded the building where a plenary cabinet meeting was taking place, and hours later the President was forced, more or less at gunpoint, to sign the super-murky Supersemar. [8] Suharto immediately cashiered Sukarno’s cabinet and arrested fifteen ministers. Latief’s simple verdict is that it was not the September 30th Movement which was guilty of grave and planned insubordination against the President, ending in his overthrow, but rather the man whom young wags have been calling Mr. TEK. [9]

Latief’s third accusation is broader than the others and just as grave. He accuses the New Order authorities of extraordinary, and wholly extra-legal, cruelty. That the Accuser is today still alive, with his wits intact, and his heart full of fire, shows him to be a man of almost miraculous fortitude. During his arrest on October 11, 1965, many key nerves in his right thigh were severed by a bayonet, while his left knee was completely shattered by bullets (in fact, he put up no resistance). In the Military Hospital his entire body was put into a gypsum cast, so that he could only move his head. Yet in this condition, he was still interrogated before being thrust into a tiny, dank and filthy isolation cell where he remained for the following thirteen years. His wounds became gangrenous and emitted the foul smell of carrion. When on one occasion the cast was removed for inspection, hundreds of maggots came crawling out. At the sight, one of the jailers had to run outside to vomit. For two and a half years Latief lay there in his cast before being operated on. He was forcibly given an injection of penicillin, though he told his guards he was violently allergic to it, with the result that he fainted and almost died. Over the years he suffered from haemorrhoids, a hernia, kidney stones, and calcification of the spine. The treatment received by other prisoners, especially the many military men among them, was not very different, and their food was scarce and often rotting. It is no surprise, therefore, that many died in the Salemba Prison, many became paralytics after torture, and still others went mad. In the face of such sadism, perhaps even the Kempeitai [10] would have blanched. And this was merely Salemba—one among the countless prisons in Jakarta and throughout the archipelago, where hundreds of thousands of human beings were held for years without trial. Who was responsible for the construction of this tropical Gulag?

History textbooks for Indonesia’s schoolchildren speak of a colonial monster named Captain ‘Turk’ Westerling. They usually give the number of his victims in South Sulawesi in 1946 as forty thousand. It is certain that many more were wounded, many houses were burned down, much property looted and, here and there, women raped. The defence speech of Gus Dul asks the reader to reflect on an ice-cold ‘native’ monster, whose sadism far outstripped that of the infamous Captain. In the massacres of 1965–66, a minimum of six hundred thousand were murdered. If the reported deathbed confession of Sarwo Edhie to Mas Permadi is true, the number may have reached over two million. [11] Between 1977 and 1979, at least two hundred thousand human beings in East Timor died before their time, either killed directly or condemned to planned death through systematic starvation and its accompanying diseases. Amnesty International reckons that seven thousand people were extra-judicially assassinated in the Petrus Affair of 1983. [12] To these victims, we must add those in Aceh, Irian, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and elsewhere. At the most conservative estimate: eight hundred thousand lives, or twenty times the ‘score’ of Westerling. And all these victims, at the time they died, were regarded officially as fellow-nationals of the monster.

Latief speaks of other portions of the national tragedy which are also food for thought. For example, the hundreds of thousands of people who spent years in prison, without clear charges against them, and without any due process of law, besides suffering, on a routine basis, excruciating torture. To say nothing of uncountable losses of property to theft and looting, casual, everyday rapes, and social ostracism for years, not only for former prisoners themselves, but for their wives and widows, children, and kinfolk in the widest sense. Latief’s J’accuse was written twenty-two years ago, and many things have happened in his country in the meantime. But it is only now perhaps that it can acquire its greatest importance, if it serves to prick the conscience of the Indonesian people, especially the young. To make a big fuss about the corruption of Suharto and his family, as though his criminality were of the same gravity as Eddy Tansil’s, [13] is like making a big fuss about Idi Amin’s mistresses, Slobodan Miloševic’s peculations, or Adolf Hitler’s kitschy taste in art. That Jakarta’s middle class, and a substantial part of its intelligentsia, still busy themselves with the cash stolen by ‘Father Harto’ (perhaps in their dreams they think of it as ‘our cash’) shows very clearly that they are still unprepared to face the totality of Indonesia’s modern history. This attitude, which is that of the ostrich that plunges its head into the desert sands, is very dangerous. A wise man once said: Those who forget/ignore the past are condemned to repeat it. Terrifying, no?

Important as it is, Latief’s defence, composed under exceptional conditions, cannot lift the veil which still shrouds many aspects of the September 30th Movement and its aftermath. Among so many questions, one could raise at least these. Why was Latief himself not executed, when Untung, Supardjo, Air Force Major Suyono, and others had their death sentences carried out? Why were Yani and the other generals killed at all, when the original plan was to bring them, as a group, face-to-face with Sukarno? Why did First Lieutenant Dul Arief of the Presidential Guard, who actually led the attacks on the generals’ homes, subsequently vanish without a trace? How and why did all of Central Java fall into the hands of supporters of the September 30th Movement for a day and a half, while nothing similar occurred in any other province? Why did Colonel Suherman, Major Usman and their associates in Semarang also disappear without a trace? Who really was Syam alias Kamaruzzaman [14]—former official of the Recomba of the Federal State of Pasundan, [15] former member of the anti-communist Indonesian Socialist Party, former intelligence operative for the Greater Jakarta Military Command at the time of the huge smuggling racket run by General Nasution and General Ibnu Sutowo out of Tanjung Priok, as well as former close friend of D. N. Aidit? Was he an army spy in the ranks of the Communists? Or a Communist spy inside the military? Or a spy for a third party? Or all three simultaneously? Was he really executed, or does he live comfortably abroad with a new name and a fat wallet?

Latief also cannot give us answers to questions about key aspects of the activities of the September 30th Movement, above all its political stupidities. Lieutenant-Colonel Untung’s radio announcement that starting from October 1st, the highest military rank would be the one he himself held, automatically made enemies of all the generals and colonels in Indonesia, many of whom held command of important combat units. Crazy, surely? Why was the announced list of the members of the so-called Revolutionary Council so confused and implausible? [16] Why did the Movement not announce that it was acting on the orders of President Sukarno (even if this was untrue), but instead dismissed Sukarno’s own cabinet? Why did it not appeal to the masses to crowd into the streets to help safeguard the nation’s head? It passes belief that such experienced and intelligent leaders as Aidit, Nyoto and Sudisman [17] would have made such a string of political blunders. Hence the suspicion naturally arises that this string was deliberately arranged to ensure the Movement’s failure. Announcements of the kind mentioned above merely confused the public, paralysed the masses, and provided easy pretexts for smashing the September 30th Movement itself. In this event, who really set up these bizarre announcements and arranged for their broadcast over national radio?
Most of the main actors in, and key witnesses to, the crisis of 1965, have either died or been killed. Those who are still alive have kept their lips tightly sealed, for various motives: for example, Umar Wirahadikusumah, Omar Dhani, Sudharmono, Rewang, M. Panggabean, Benny Murdani, Mrs. Hartini, Mursyid, Yoga Sugama, Andi Yusuf and Kemal Idris. [18] Now that thirty-five years have passed since 1965, would it not be a good thing for the future of the Indonesian nation if these people were required to provide the most detailed accounts of what they did and witnessed, before they go to meet their Maker?

According to an old popular saying, the mills of God grind slowly but very fine. The meaning of this adage is that in the end the rice of truth will be separated from the chaff of confusion and lies. In every part of the world, one day or another, long-held classified documents, memoirs in manuscript locked away in cabinets, and diaries gathering dust in the attics of grandchildren will be brought to His mill, and their contents will become known to later generations. With this book of his, ‘shut away’ during twenty-one years of extraordinary suffering, Abdul Latief, with his astonishing strength, has provided an impressive exemplification of the old saying. Who knows, some day his accusations may provide valuable material for the script of that play in the repertoire of the National History Shadow-Theatre which is entitled . . . well, what else could it be?—Petrus Becomes King.

In traditional Javanese shadow-theatre, Petruk Dadi Ratu is a rollicking farce in which Petruk, a well-loved clown, briefly becomes King, with predictably hilarious and grotesque consequences. For Petrus, read Killer—see note 12 above. Suharto notoriously saw himself as a new kind of Javanese monarch, thinly disguised as a President of the Republic of Indonesia.

 

 

The Secret
Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia

 

 

Subversion as a Foreign Policy

The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia.
New York: The New Press, 1995. 318 pages.

George Kahin has taught at Cornell University since 1951 and is one of the leading scholars of Southeast Asian history

—————————-

The book reveals a covert intervention by the United States in Indonesia in the late 1950s involving among other things the supply of thousands of weapons, creation and deployment ofa secret CIA airforce and logistical support from the Seventh Fleet. The operation has been kept almost totally secret from the American public for nearly 40 years.
This CIA operation proved to be even more disastrous than the Bay of Pigs-
San Francisco Chronicle

Kahin, George McT. and Kahin, Audrey R.

An extraordinary account of civil war in Indonesia provoked by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Kahin, George McT. and Kahin, Audrey R. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: The New Press, 1995. 318 pages.
George Kahin has taught at Cornell University since 1951 and is one of the leading scholars of Southeast Asian history. This book covers Indonesian history from the end of the colonial period through the Eisenhower years. It stops short of the 1965 coup, which a CIA study described as follows: “In terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950s.” To get anything else out of the CIA about Indonesia, you still need a crowbar, even if you leave out 1965.
But George Kahin was personally acquainted with most of the key players in Indonesian politics during the 1950s, and he managed even without the CIA’s documents. The importance of this work is that it exposes the covert policy of Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers in Indonesia during the 1950s. This policy set the stage for the 1960s. The events of 1965-1966, dismissed at the time by the world’s media as an “abortive Communist coup,” are still hotly disputed, and appear suspicious by any reasonable standard — the whole thing could have been set up by the CIA. That’s a book that cannot yet be written, but at least we’re off to a reliable start.

 

Two Indonesias, Two Americas

June 9, 1998

By Peter Dale Scott

Indonesia is replaying its year of living dangerously, with the potential again for a more democratic society or another spasm of military repression.

As in 1965, the year of a military bloodbath that claimed possibly one million civilian lives, the U.S. government is in a key supporting role. Washington could restrain the army or push it into another violent crackdown.

As in 1965, today’s drama pits two Indonesian national traditions against each other — one, its history as one of the most tolerant Muslim cultures; the other, a long experience of ruthless repression over the last three decades by Indonesia’s army.

But there are two American traditions as well. One is humanitarian, represented by the millions of dollars which the U.S. government has poured into Indonesian human rights groups and other non-governmental organizations. The other tradition, less recognized but with deep historical roots, advocates and teaches the use of repressive violence against Third World populations to maintain “order.”

Sharpened by Cold War fears, those two Indonesias and those two Americas collided tragically in 1965. From the bloodbath, dictator Suharto rose to power. A decade later, he authorized a reprise of those murderous tactics in suppressing an independence movement in East Timor, starting in 1975 and continuing into this year. An estimated 200,000 people — a third of the Timorese population — died.

This spring, as popular demonstrations protested new austerity measures, the first question was: would the army revert to its brutal tradition of mass slaughter. The second question was: how would President Clinton react with the Cold War over but with Washington still viewing Indonesia as vital to Asian economic stability?

The Clinton administration had joined international lending agencies in demanding “reforms” that drove up the price of food, fuel and other necessities. Those price hikes sparked bloody riots, which left more than 500 dead and led to new cases of “disappeared” dissidents. But Suharto’s government finally toppled. With his army divided, Suharto resigned on May 20. His successor, Vice President B.J. Habibie, promised new elections next year.

The U.S.-Indonesian security nexus has a long history, with complex relationships existing beneath the protective blanket of national security. But to many Americans, the brutality of the Indonesian army is simply abhorrent, outside U.S. military traditions and repulsive to America’s democratic values. Many know the story of the 1965 bloodbath through the 1983 movie, “The Year of Living Dangerously,” and others have heard periodic accounts of the atrocities against East Timor.

But there is a dark — seldom acknowledged — thread that runs through U.S. military doctrine which makes the Indonesian repression disturbingly less foreign. Dating back to the founding of the Republic, this military tradition explicitly defended the selective use of terror, whether in suppressing Indian resistance on the frontiers in the 19th Century or in quelling rebellion against U.S. interests abroad in the 20th Century.

The American people are largely oblivious to this hidden tradition because most of the literature advocating state-sponsored terror is carefully confined to national security circles and rarely spills out into the public debate. Over the decades, congressional investigations have exposed some of these abuses. But when that does happen, the cases are usually deemed anomalies or excesses by out-of-control soldiers.

But the historical record shows that military terror has never been fully expunged from U.S. doctrine. The theories survive today in textbooks on counterinsurgency warfare and “low-intensity” conflict.

Some historians trace the formal acceptance of those brutal tenets to the 1860s when the army was facing challenge from a rebellious South and resistance from Native Americans in the West. Out of those crises emerged the modern military concept of “total war” — which considers attacks on civilians and their economic infrastructure an integral part of a victorious strategy.

In 1864, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman cut a swath of destruction through civilian territory in Georgia and the Carolinas. His plan was to destroy the South’s will to fight and its ability to sustain a large army in the field. The devastation left plantations in flames and brought widespread Confederate complaints of rape and murder of civilians.

Meanwhile, in Colorado, Col. John M. Chivington and the Third Colorado Cavalry were employing their own terror tactics to pacify Cheyennes. A scout named John Smith later described the attack at Sand Creek, Colo., on unsuspecting Indians at a peaceful encampment:

“They were scalped; their brains knocked out; the men used their knives, ripped open women, clubbed little children, knocked them in the head with their guns, beat their brains out, mutilated their bodies in every sense of the word.” [U.S. Cong., Senate, 39 Cong., 2nd Sess., “The Chivington Massacre,” Reports of the Committees.]

Though Smith’s objectivity was challenged at the time, today even defenders of the Sand Creek raid concede that most women and children there were killed and mutilated. [See Lt. Col. William R. Dunn, I Stand by Sand Creek.] Yet, in the 1860s, many whites in Colorado saw the slaughter as the only realistic way to bring peace, just as Sherman viewed his “march to the sea” as necessary to force the South’s surrender.

Counterinsurgency

Four years after the Civil War, Sherman became commanding general of the Army and incorporated the Indian pacification strategies — as well as his own tactics — into U.S. military doctrine. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan, who had led Indian wars in the Missouri territory, succeeded Sherman in 1883 and further entrenched those strategies as policy. [See Ward Churchill, A Little Matter of Genocide.]

By the end of the 19th Century, the Indian warriors had been vanquished, but the army’s winning strategies lived on. When the United States claimed the Philippines as a prize in the Spanish-American War, Filipino insurgents resisted. In 1900, the U.S. commander, Gen. J. Franklin Bell, consciously modeled his brutal counterinsurgency campaign after the Indian wars and Sherman’s “march to the sea.”

Bell believed that by punishing the wealthier Filipinos through destruction of their homes — much as Sherman had done in the South — they would be coerced into helping convince their countrymen to submit. Learning from the Indian wars, he also isolated the guerrillas by forcing Filipinos into tightly controlled zones where schools were built and other social amenities were provided.

“The entire population outside of the major cities in Batangas was herded into concentration camps,” wrote historian Stuart Creighton Miller. “Bell’s main target was the wealthier and better-educated classes. … Adding insult to injury, Bell made these people carry the petrol used to burn their own country homes.” [See Miller’s “Benevolent Assimilation,” published in 1982.]

For those outside the protected areas, there was terror. A supportive news correspondent described one scene in which American soldiers killed “men, women, children … from lads of 10 and up, an idea prevailing that the Filipino, as such, was little better than a dog. … Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to ‘make them talk,’ have taken prisoner people who held up their hands and peacefully surrendered, and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show they were even insurrectos, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to drop into the water below and float down as an example to those who found their bullet-riddled corpses.”

Defending the tactics, the correspondent noted that “it is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with a civilized people. The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality.” [Philadelphia Ledger, Nov. 19, 1900]

In 1901, anti-imperialists in Congress exposed and denounced Bell’s brutal tactics. Nevertheless, Bell’s strategies won military acclaim as a refined method of pacification.

In a 1973 book, one pro-Bell military historian, John Morgan Gates, termed reports of U.S. atrocities “exaggerated” and hailed Bell’s “excellent understanding of the role of benevolence in pacification.” Gates recalled that Bell’s campaign in Batanga was regarded by military strategists as “pacification in its most perfected form.” [See Gates’s Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902.]

Independence Struggles

At the turn of the century, the methodology of pacification was a hot topic among the European colonial powers, too. From Namibia to Indochina, Europeans struggled to subdue local populations. Often outright slaughter proved effective, as the Germans demonstrated with massacres of the Herrero tribe in Namibia from 1904-1907. But military strategists often compared notes about more subtle techniques of targeted terror mixed with demonstrations of benevolence.

Counterinsurgency strategies were back in vogue after World War II as many subjugated people demanded independence from colonial rule and Washington worried about the expansion of communism. In the 1950s, the Huk rebellion against U.S. dominance made the Philippines again the laboratory, with Bell’s earlier lessons clearly remembered.

“The campaign against the Huk movement in the Philippines … greatly resembled the American campaign of almost 50 years earlier,” historian Gates observed. “The American approach to the problem of pacification had been a studied one.”

But the war against the Huks had some new wrinkles, particularly the modern concept of psychological warfare or psy-war. Under the pioneering strategies of the CIA’s Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, psy-war was a new spin to the old game of breaking the will of a target population. The idea was to analyze the psychological weaknesses of a people and develop “themes” that could induce actions favorable to those carrying out the operation.

While psy-war included propaganda and disinformation, it also relied on terror tactics of a demonstrative nature. An Army psy-war pamphlet, drawing on Lansdale’s experience in the Philippines, advocated “exemplary criminal violence — the murder and mutilation of captives and the display of their bodies,” according to Michael McClintock’s Instruments of Statecraft.

In his memoirs, Lansdale boasted of one legendary psy-war trick used against the Huks who were considered superstitious and fearful of a vampire-like creature called an asuang.

“The psy-war squad set up an ambush along a trail used by the Huks,” Lansdale wrote. “When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man on the patrol, their move unseen in the dark night. They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed the asuang had got him.” [See Lansdale’s In the Midst of Wars.]

The Huk rebellion also saw the refinement of free-fire zones, a technique used effectively by Bell’s forces a half-century earlier. In the 1950s, special squadrons were assigned to do the dirty work.

“The special tactic of these squadrons was to cordon off areas; anyone they caught inside the cordon was considered an enemy,” explained one pro-U.S. Filipino colonel. “Almost daily you could find bodies floating in the river, many of them victims of [Major Napoleon] Valeriano’s Nenita Unit. [See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines.]

On to Vietnam

The successful suppression of the Huks led the war’s architects to share their lessons elsewhere in Asia and beyond. Valeriano went on to co-author an important American textbook on counterinsurgency and to serve as part of the American pacification effort in Vietnam with Lansdale.

Following the Philippine model, Vietnamese were crowded into “strategic hamlets”; “free-fire zones” were declared; and the Phoenix program eliminated thousands of suspected Viet Cong cadre.

In 1965, the U.S. intelligence community formalized the hard-learned lessons by commissioning a top-secret program called Project X. Based at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, the project drew from field experience and developed teaching plans to “provide intelligence training to friendly foreign countries,” according to a Pentagon history prepared in 1991 and released in 1997.

Called “a guide for the conduct of clandestine operations,” Project X “was first used by the U.S. Intelligence School on Okinawa to train Vietnamese and, presumably, other foreign nationals,” the history stated.

Linda Matthews of the Pentagon’s Counterintelligence Division recalled that in 1967-68, some of the Project X training material was prepared by officers connected to the Phoenix program. “She suggested the possibility that some offending material from the Phoenix program may have found its way into the Project X materials at that time,” the Pentagon report said.

In the 1970s, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School moved to Fort Huachuca in Arizona and began exporting Project X material to U.S. military assistance groups working with “friendly foreign countries.” By the mid-1970s, the Project X material was going to armies all over the world.

[In its 1992 review, the Pentagon acknowledged that Project X was the source for some of the “objectionable” lessons at the School of the Americas where Latin American officers were trained in blackmail, kidnapping, murder and spying on non-violent political opponents. But disclosure of the full story was blocked near the end of the Bush administration when senior Pentagon officials ordered the destruction of most Project X records. — See Robert Parry’s Lost History: Contras, Cocaine & Other Crimes, and Washington Post, Feb. 22, 1997]

Indonesian Domino

By the mid-1960s, some of the U.S. counterinsurgency lessons had reached Indonesia, too. The U.S. military training was surreptitious because Washington viewed the country’s neutralist leader Sukarno as politically suspect. The training was permitted only to give the United States influence within the Indonesian military which was considered more reliable.

A secret memo to President Johnson dated July 17, 1964, spelled out the political motive. “Our aid to Indonesia … we are satisfied … is not helping Indonesia militarily,” a State Department memo informed Johnson. “It is, however, permitting us to maintain some contact with key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable of resisting Communist takeover. We think this is of vital importance to the entire Free World.” [DOS Memo for President, July 17, 1964]

The covert U.S. aid and training was mostly innocuous-sounding “civic action,” which is generally thought to mean building roads, staffing health clinics and performing other “hearts-and-minds” activities with civilians. But “civic action” also provided cover in Indonesia, as in the Philippines and Vietnam, for psy-war.

The secret U.S.-Indonesian military connections paid off for Washington when a political crisis erupted the next summer and fall, threatening Sukarno’s government. To counter Indonesia’s powerful Communist Party, known as the PKI, the army’s Red Berets organized the slaughter of thousands of men, women and children. So many bodies were dumped into the rivers of East Java that they ran red with blood.

In a classic psy-war tactic, the bloated carcasses also served as a political warning to villages down river. “To make sure they didn’t sink, the carcasses were deliberately tied to, or impaled on, bamboo stakes,” wrote eyewitness Pipit Rochijat. “And the departure of corpses from the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when bodies were stacked on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly flew.” [See Rochijat’s “Am I PKI or Non-PKI?” Indonesia, Oct. 1985.]

Living Cynically?

Some historians have attributed the grotesque violence to a crazed army which engaged in “unplanned brutality” or “mass hysteria.” But the recurring tactic of putting bodies on gruesome display fits as well with the military doctrines of psy-war, a word that one of the leading military killers used in untranslated form in one order demanding elimination of the PKI.

Sarwo Edhie, chief of the political para-commando battalion known as the Red Berets, warned that the communist opposition “should be given no opportunity to concentrate/consolidate. It should be pushed back systematically by all means, including psy-war.” [See The Revolt of the G30S/PKI and Its Suppression, translated by Robert Cribb in The Indonesian Killings.] Sarwo Edhie had been identified as a CIA contact when he served at the Indonesian Embassy in Australia. [See Pacific, May-June 1968.]

Elite U.S. reaction to the horrific slaughter was muted and has remained ambivalent ever since. The Johnson administration denied any responsibility for the massacres, but New York Times columnist James Reston spoke for many opinion leaders when he approvingly termed the bloody developments in Indonesia “a gleam of light in Asia.”

The American denials of involvement held until 1990 when U.S. diplomats admitted to a reporter that they had aided the Indonesian army by supplying lists of suspected communists. “It really was a big help to the army,” embassy officer Robert Martens told Kathy Kadane of States News Service. “I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that’s not all bad. There’s a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.” Martens had headed the U.S. team that compiled the death lists.

Kadane’s story provoked a telling response from Washington Post senior editorial writer Stephen S. Rosenfeld. He accepted the fact that American officials had assisted “this fearsome slaughter,” but then justified the killings. Rosenfeld argued that the massacre “was and still is widely regarded as the grim but earned fate of a conspiratorial revolutionary party that represented the same communist juggernaut that was on the march in Vietnam.”

In a column entitled, “Indonesia 1965: The Year of Living Cynically?” Rosenfeld reasoned that “either the army would get the communists or the communists would get the army, it was thought: Indonesia was a domino, and the PKI’s demise kept it standing in the free world. … Though the means were grievously tainted, we — the fastidious among us as well as the hard-headed and cynical — can be said to have enjoyed the fruits in the geopolitical stability of that important part of Asia, in the revolution that never happened.” [WP, July 13, 1990]

Bringing It Home

Through television in the 1960-70s, the Vietnam War finally brought the horrors of counterinsurgency home to millions of Americans. They watched as U.S. troops torched villages and forced distraught old women to leave ancestral homes. Camera crews caught on film brutal interrogation of Viet Cong suspects, the execution of one young VC officer and the bombing of children with napalm.

In effect, the Vietnam War was the first time Americans got to witness the pacification strategies that had evolved secretly as national security policy since the 19th Century. As a result, millions of Americans protested the war’s conduct and Congress belatedly compelled an end to U.S. participation in 1974.

But the psy-war doctrinal debates were not resolved by the Vietnam War. Counterinsurgency advocates regrouped in the 1980s behind President Ronald Reagan, who mounted a spirited defense of the Vietnamese intervention and reaffirmed U.S. resolve to employ similar tactics against leftist forces in Central America and Africa.

Reagan added an important new component to the mix, however. He authorized an aggressive domestic “public diplomacy” operation which practiced what was called “perception management” — in effect, intimidating journalists to ensure that only sanitized images would reach the American people. Reporters who disclosed atrocities by U.S.-trained forces, such as the El Mozote massacre by El Salvador’s Atlacatl battalion in 1981, came under harsh criticism and saw their careers damaged.

Some Reagan operatives were not shy about their defense of political terror as a necessity of the Cold War. Neil Livingstone, a counter-terrorism consultant to the National Security Council, called death squads “an extremely effective tool, however odious, in combatting terrorism and revolutionary challenges.” [See McClintock’s Instruments of Statecraft.]

Congress objected to excesses of Reagan’s interventions, especially in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The administration responded with more public relations, insisting that U.S. clients were respecting human rights. The administration covered up political murders as well as large-scale massacres throughout Central America. In the political battles, Congress had only limited success in reining in Reagan’s aid to the armies of El Salvador and Guatemala and the contra rebels of Nicaragua.

Similarly, Congress found that its 1992 prohibition against training the Indonesian army over its atrocities in East Timor was circumvented as well. In March 1998, Congress learned that the Pentagon had continued to train the Indonesian army unit, the Kopassus Red Berets, that had led many of the massacres over the past 35 years and was blamed for kidnapping and torturing political dissidents earlier this year. [WP, May 23, 1998]

A Defense Department official stated that the training program was to “gain influence with successive generations of Indonesia officers.” [NYT, March 17, 1998] U.S. Green Berets taught Kopassus such tactics as “advanced sniper techniques, military operations in urban terrain, psychological techniques [and] close quarters combat.” [See statement by reporter Allan Nairn, May 9, 1998.]

At the time, Kopassus was headed by Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, a U.S.-trained officer who graduated at the top of his class at Fort Benning, Ga. Prabowo was linked directly to orders to kill 20 civilians in East Timor in 1989. [See The Nation, March 30, 1998.] He was sacked on May 22.

Two Traditions

What is clear from these experiences in Indonesia and elsewhere is that the United States, for generations, has sustained two parallel but opposed states of mind about military atrocities and human rights: one of U.S. benevolence, generally held by the public, and the other of ends-justify-the-means brutality sponsored by counterinsurgency specialists.

Normally the specialists carry out their actions in remote locations with little notice in the national press. That allows the public to sustain its faith in a just America, while hard-nosed security and economic interests are still protected in secret.

But sometimes the two competing visions clash in the open, as they did in Vietnam. With today’s political turmoil, Indonesia may be another case where the shadow struggle steps into the light and the public can judge the real principles behind U.S. foreign policy, for good or ill.

As for the Indonesians, they are facing their own national schizophrenia, finally with a chance that the more democratic side might prevail. What remains to be seen is whether the people of Indonesia can keep a brutal military at bay — and whether the United States will use its influence this time to persuade the Indonesian army to respect human rights

 

1 Oktober 1965

Bung Karno memanggil Ahmad yani ,dijadwalkan diterijm aoleh Presiden di istana Negara jam 8.00 tanggal 1 oktober 1965, agendanya Yani akan ditanyakan mengenai Angkatan kelima.tetapi beberap jam sebelum ia mengahadap ia dibunuh dirumahnya

(subandrio)

 

Pukul 5 pagi, Om Bardi ajudan bapak datang. Serta merta kami semua lari berhamburan kepadanya. Sambil menunjuk gumpalan dan ceceran darah, kami beritahu kalau bapak telah ditembak dan dibawa pergi oleh tentara-tentara berseragam hijau, pakai baret merah, sepatu lars dan banyak kain-kain kecil warna putih, merah, kuning di pundak mereka.

 

Om Bardi kaget. Dahinya mengkerut. Dia seakan berusaha mencari jawaban, kenapa bapak dibunuh. Sejurus dia mondar-mandir dengan nafas yang tidak menentu.

 

Belum habis dengan Om Bardi, tiba-tiba sebuah jib masuk pekarangan rumah kami, setelah ditengok rupanya jib itu membawa ibu pulang. Begitu masuk rumah ibu kaget lantaran mendapati kami semua sudah bangun. Ibu bertanya,

“Ada apa pagi-pagi sudah bangun”. Dengan perasaan galau, kami katakan,

 

 

 

“Bu… bapak bu. Bapak ditembak dan dibawa pergi naik truck”.

 

Seketika ibu menjerit-jerit. Ibu histeris. Sambil berlari ke luar rumah ibu meminta,

“Cari! Cari bapak! Cari sampai ketemu! Kemana bapak? Cari! Cari!”.

Kami semua tertegun bingung, kacau.

 

Sementara Om Bardi tampak terus mondar-mandir karena bingung tak tahu harus buat apa.

 

Sejurus ibu pingsan dan kami gotong beramai-ramai ke dalam rumah. Ia dibaringkan di kursi biru di ruang makan. Ketika sadar dari pingsannya, ibu mengajak kami untuk berdoa bersama

 

Jam 06.00 pagi, Jenderal Umar Wirahadikusuma, Panglima Kodam V Jaya datang dan mendapati ibu terbaring di kamar tidur.

 

Setelah ia pulang para tentara lain berdatangan ke rumah kami. Penjagaan di rumah kami digantikan oleh pasukan dari Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD).

 Kami disarankan untuk sementara waktu meninggalkan rumah. Darah bapak mulai dibersihkan, di pel. Saat itu dadaku terasa sesak.

Pagi itu baru kami tahu ternyata yang dibunuh dan diculik bukan hanya bapak sendiri, tapi juga para perwira tinggi yang selalu menyebut diri mereka, “Tangan Kanan bapak”.

Kira-kira pukul 09.00 pagi, karangan bunga dari “Bela Flora” datang dengan ucapan, “Selamat Ulang Tahun 1 Oktober 1965” buat ibuku.

Ternyata yang mengirimnya adalah bapak sendiri.

 Bunga itu membuat kedukaan kami semakin mendalam.

 

 

Menjelang tengah hari kami mengemasi beberapa lembar pakaian ke dalam koper. Kami sekeluarga mengungsi ke daerah Pasar Minggu.

 

Tetangga kami, keluarga Jenderal Marjadi memiliki kebun dan rumah kecil disana. Kami tinggal di rumahnya tanpa penerangan listrik.

 

Daerah itu masih berupa hutan. Aku tak ingat lagi berapa puluh orang yang menyertai kami.

Sepanjang hari kami hanya duduk-duduk saja, mengobrol dengan para pengawal.

Satu-satunya informasi yang bisa kami terima adalah dari siaran Radio Australia. Tapi beritanya pun simpang siur.

 

Semua ajudan bapak datang silih berganti. Kadang Om Bardi, kadang Om Darto. Bila mereka tiba kami selalu bertanya bagaimana keadaan bapak?

 

Apa sudah dirawat dokter?

Apa Bung Karno bersama-sama bapak?

Tapi lagi-lagi kami mendapat jawaban yang tidak pasti. Untuk menenangkan kami, Om Bardi atau Om Darto selalau bilang,

“Adik-adik nggak usah kuatir, bapak ada disana, bersama-sama Bung Karno. Bapak baik-baik saja”.

Namun bagai disambar petir, berita yang menyentakan datang dari Radio Australia bahwa Jenderal Achmad Yani telah diculik dan dibunuh oleh sekelompok tentara yang belum dikenal.

Sedangkan kedudukan bapak sebagai Menpangad oleh Bung Karno digantikan oleh Mayor Jenderal Pranoto.

Saat itu perasan dan tenaga kami serasa lemas luluh lantak. Tapi kami belum yakin dengan berita radio itu.

(AMELIA Yani)

 

 

 

Pertanyaan yang segera muncul, mengapa Soeharto meminta Batalyon 530 disiapkan dengan “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama” ? 

Apalagi kemudian yang terjadi adalah sebagian dari angota pasukan Batalyon 530 terlibat dalam peristiwa G30S. Tidak diketahui apakah perintah serupa diberikan pula kepada Batalyon 454/Para/Diponegoro, yang sebagian anggotanya juga terlibat dalam peristiwa G30S.

Dengan adanya radiogram tersebut, muncul dugaan bahwa Soeharto sudah tahu mengnai akan adanya peristiwa G30S paling tidak sejak tanggal 21 September 1965 atau sembilan hari sebelumnya. Sebab, dengan memberikan pasukan Batalyon 530 itu “perlengkapan tempur garis pertama”, Soeharto telah memfasilitasi anggota pasukan tersebut untuk melakukan “gerakannya”.

Belum lagi hampir semua pelaku inti G30S memiliki hubungan yang dekat dengan Soeharto, mulai Brigadir Jenderal Soepardjo, Kolonel Untung, Kolonel Abdul latief, sampai Sjam Karuzzaman.

Itu sebabnya, pada saat G30S berlangsung, Soeharto hanya menunggu perkembangan, dan pada saat yang tepat, dengan cepat mengambil langkah-langkah yang diperlukan, di saat orang-orang lain, termasuk panglima dan perwira tinggi angkatan lainnya, masih bertanya-tanya apa yang sesungguhnya terjadi.

Karena mengetahui siapa saja yang telah dijemput paksa dan siapa saja yang melakukannya, maka saat itu pada prinsipnya Soeharto dapat melakukan apa saja yang dikehendakinya, termasuk dengan mudah membasmi pelaku-pelaku G30S dan mencari kambing hitam untuk dituduh sebagai penanggung jawab atas peristiwa G30S.

 

Sebagai orang yang memiliki seluruh informasi, Soeharto secara leluasa memberlakukan keadaan darurat. Kemudian menelepon Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Laut Laksamana Madya RE Martadinata, Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Kepolisian Jenderal Soetjipto Joedodihardjo, dan Deputi Operasi Angkatan Udara Komodor Leo Watimena. Dan, kepada mereka, Soeharto memberi tahu untuk sementara Angkatan Darat dipegang olehnya, serta meminta agar mereka tidak mengadaka pergerakan pasukan tanpa sepengetahuannya (dalam hal itu, Panglima Kostrad).

.

Pada tanggal 1 Oktober 1965, pukul 06.30, Mayor Jenderal Soehato memerintahkan seorang perwira Kostrad, Kapten Mudjono untuk memanggil Komandan Batalyon 530 Mayor Bambang Sipeno yang menempatkan pasukannya di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan. Karena Mayor Bambang Supeno tidak ada di tempat, maka Wakil Komandan Batalyon 530 Kapten Soekarbi, yang memimpin pasukan di lapangan, bertanya apakah ia bisa mewakili. Perwira itu menjawab tidak bisa. Namun, pukul 07.30, perwira Kostrad itu kembali, dan mengatakan, Kapten Soekarbi diperbolehkan menggantikan Mayor Bambang Supeno. Tidak lama kemudian datang menghadap pula Wakil Komandan Batalyon 454 Kapten Koencoro.

Pasukan yang ditempatkan di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan adalah anggota dua batalyon yang diundang Panglima Kostrad Mayor Jenderal Soeharto ke Jakarta untuk mengikuti peringatan HUT ke-20 ABRI pada tanggal 5 Oktober 1965. Sebab itu, Soeharto dengan mudah memanggil pemimpin kedua batalyon itu, dan memerintahkan agar menarik kembali pasukan mereka ke Markas Kostrad.

Soekarbi membantah pernyataan yang menyebutkan bahwa Kostrad tidak tahu kehadiran pasukannya di sekitar Istana dan Monumen Nasional, mengingat anak buahnya bolak-balik ke Markas Kostrad untuk menggunakan kamar kecil (toilet).

Berbeda dengan Soeharto, yang pukul 06.30, sudah mengetahui identitas pasukan yang berada di sekitar Monumen Nasional dan Istana Kepresidenan, Presiden Soekarno dan regu pengawalnya sama sekali masih tidak tahu-menahu mengenai apa yang terjadi.

Sementara itu, pukul 06.00, Brigadir Jenderal Soepardjo, pimpinan G30S, berangkat ke Istana untuk melaporkan peristiwa G30S kepada Presiden Soekarno. Karena Soekarno tidak berada di Istana, Soepardjo sempat menunggu selama dua jam di sana.

, tanggal 1 Oktober 1965, pukul 06.30, Presiden Soekarno keluar rumah, memasuki mobil kepresidenan dan bergegas ke Istana Merdeka. Pagi itu, Soekarno dijadwalkan menerima Wakil Perdana Menteri II Dr Leimena dan Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat Jenderal Ahmad Yani.

Di dalam mobil, Suparto, staf ajudan yang mengemudikan mobil itu, memberi tahu informasi yang diperolehnya dari Komandan Detasemen Kawal Pribadi (DKP) Komisaris Polisi Mangil Martowidjojo, yakni bahwa pada pukul 04.00, ada penembakan di rumah Menteri Koordinator Pertahanan dan Keamanan/Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata Jenderal AH Nasution dan rumah Wakil Perdana Menteri II Dr Leimena, yang letaknya bersebelahan.

Presiden Soekarno langsung memerintahkan Suparto untuk memberhentikan mobil yang baru bergerak beberapa meter itu. Ia langsung memanggil Mangil dan meminta penjelasan tentang penembakan tersebut.

Kemudian Soekarno bertanya, “ Baiknya bagaimana, saya tinggal di sini dulu atau langsung kembali ke istana ? “  Mangil menjawab, “ Sebaiknya Bapak tinggal di sini dulu, karena saya masih harus menunggu laporan dari Inspektur I Jatiman (Kepala Bagian II DKP) yang tadi saya perintahkan untuk mengecek kebenaran berita tersebut.”

Mendengar jawaban itu, Soekarno menghardik Mangil dengan nada keras, “ Bagaimana mungkin, kejadian pukul 04.00 pagi, sampai sekarang belum diketahui dengan jelas … “  Soekarno dan regu pengawalnya kemudian meninggalkan Wisma Yaso menuju Istana Merdeka. Rencananya mereka akan melalui Jembatan Semanggi, Jalan Jenderal Sudirman, Jalan MH Thamrin, Jalan Medan Merdeka Barat, dan Jalan Merdeka Utara.

Sewaktu rombongan Presiden Soekarno melintas  di atas Jembatan Dukuh Atas, menjelang Bundaran Hotel Indonesia, Jatiman menghubungi Mangil dan membenarkan ada tembakan di rumah Jenderal AH Nasution dan Dr Leimena. Ia juga menginformasikan tentang adanya pasukan Angkatan Darat “ yang terasa mencurigakan “ di sekitar Istana dan kawasan Monumen Nasional.

Mendengar informasi itu Mangil memutuskan untuk menjauhkan Soekarno dari pasukan tersebut. Pada saat yang sama, Wakil Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa Kolonel (CPM) Maulwi Saelan menghubungi Mangil lewat handy-talky dan memerintahkan untuk membawa Soekarno ke rumah istrinya yang lain, Ny Harjati, di kawasan Slipi, di sebelah lokasi Hotel Orchid (sekarang).

Setelah menunggu Soekarno di rumah Ny Harjati. Begitu tibam pukul 07.00, Soekarno segera masuk ke dalam rumah diikuti Saelan.

Soekarno segera memerintahkan Saelan mengontak semua panglima angkatan. Namun, sejak malam hingga pagi itu, jaringan telepon lumpuh sehingga Saelan meminta Suparto untuk menghubungi secara langsung.

Saelan kemudian mendatangi Mangil di luar, dan mengupayakan untuk mencari tempat yang aman bagi Soekarno.

 Berbagai gagasan pun bermunculan, tetapi setelah Suparto kembali pada pukul 08.30 dan melaporkan bahwa ia berhasil mengadakan kontak dengan Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Udara Laksamana Omar Dani di Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim, maka diputuskan untuk membawa Soekarno ke sana.

Soekarno menyetujui hal itu karena itu sesuai dengan Standard Operating procedure (SOP) Tjakrabirawa. Bahwa jika dalam perjalanan pengamanan Presiden terjadi sesuatu yang mengancam keamanan dan keselamatan Presiden, maka secepatnya Presiden di bawa ke Markas Angkatan Bersenjata terdekat.

 Alternatif lain adalah menuju Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim Perdanakusuma karena di sana ad pesawat terbang kepresidenan C-140 Jetstar. Atau, pelabuhan Angkatan Laut, tempat kapal kepresidenan RI Varuna berlabuh. Atau, bisa juga ke Istana Bogor karena di sana diparkir helikopter kepresidenan Sikorsky S-61V.

Sekitar pukul 09.30, rombongan Presiden Soekarno tiba di Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim. Presiden disambut Omar Dani dan Komodor Leo Watimena, yang karena ketidaktahuannya atas apa yang terjadi, dapat ditarik ke kubu Soeharto suang harinya.

Setelah mendapatkan informasi bahwa Soekarno berada di Halim, maka Brigjen Soperjo pimpinan G30sPKI ia menyusul ke Halim. Pukul 10.00, ia bertemu dengan Soekarno dan melaporkan mengenai gerakannya. Namun, Soekarno menolak untuk mendukung gerakan itu, dan meminta ia menghentikan gerakannya untuk menghindari pertumpahan darah.

Sebagai kambing hitam, ia menuduh Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Udara Laksamana Madya Omar Dani berada di pihak yang salah, dan Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim Perdanakusuma disebutkan sebagai markas pelaksana G30S. Dengan demikian, kehadiran Presiden Soekarno di Pangkalan Angkatan Udara Halim Perdanakusuma dicitrakan sebagai keberpihakan Soekarno pada G30S.

.

 

Sejumlah purnawirawan AURI di bawah pimpinan Sri Mulyono Herlambang, lewat buku Menyibak Kabut Halim 1965 membantah bahwa Lubang Buaya yang digunakan sebagai Markas Kelompok G30S berada di wilayah AURI. Tempat tersebut justru berada di wilayah Angkatan Darat

Itu belum semua. Dengan peguasaannya atas seluruh media massa nasional, Soeharto berhasil menjadikan versinya atas peristiwa G30S sebagai satu-satunya kebenaran. Dan, bagi orang-orang yang dianggap “berseberangan” diberi label terlibat G30S, dan dijadikan tahanan politik

Namun, penguasaan atas pasukan dan media massa saat itu membuat Soeharto bisa melakukan tindakan apa saja yang dikehendakinya melalui kaki tangannya. Bahkan, Soekarno lewat kesaksian Brigjen Sugandhi, Kepala Pusat Penerangan Hankam, dan ajudan Presiden Soekarno sendiri, Kolonel Marinir Bambang Widjanarko, dikatakan bertanggung jawab atas G30S.

Uniknya, Bambang Wijanarko yang memberikan kesaksian  bahwa Soekarno terlibat dalam peristiwa G30S, tetap ditugaskan mendampingi Soekarno sampai jabatannya sebagai Presiden Indonesia resmi dicabut oleh MPRS.

Kesaksian Sugandhi dibantah oleh Oei Tjoe tat, yang juga hadir dalam jam minum kopi pagi (koffie uurtje) pada tanggal 30 September 1965.

Cerita Sugandhi tentang apa yang terjadi pagi itu, menurut Oei Tjoe Tat mengada-ada.

Seperti Sugandhi, kesaksian Bambang Widjanarko pun dibantah oleh Kolonel (CPM) Maulwi Saelan dan Ajun Inspektur Polisi Tingkat I Sogol Djauhari Andul Muchid, berugas di bagian Higiene dan Dinas Khusus Kepresidenan. Sogol disebut Bambang Widjanarko sebagai orang yang menyerahkan surat Untung tentang penjemputan paksa para jenderal kepada Soekarno tanggal 30 September 1965 malam.

Pertanyaan besar yang mengganjal, adalah mengaoa sama sekali tidak ada yang mempersoalkan, mengapa Soeharto tidak melaporkan adanya gerakan untuk menjemput paksa para jenderal Angkatan Darat kepada atasannya, Jenderal Ahmad Yani, yang tewas dalam aksi penjemputan paksa itu ?

Sumber  :

G30S, Terlibatkah Soeharto ? – James Luhulima
Kompas 27.10.2004

Catatan : Kliping yang disajikan di atas hampir berusia 5 tahun dan tentunya bisa ada beberapa hal yang telah terjadi dalam  kurun waktu lima tahun tersebut  – kendati demikian tetap materi di atas amat menarik untuk kita simak bersama. Terima kasih.

(hagemman)

Umar Wirahadikusumah mengumumkan jam malam mulai 1 Oktober 1965, pukul 18.00 sampai 06.00 pagi, dan menutup semua koran kecuali Angkatan Bersenjata dan Berita Yudha. Koran-koran lain tidak boleh beredar selama seminggu. Waktu sepekan ini dimanfaatkan pers militer untuk mengampanyekan bahwa PKI ada di belakang G30S.

Meski masih berpidato dalam berbagai kesempatan, pernyataan BK tidak disiarkan oleh koran-koran. Bila Ben Anderson di jurnal Indonesia terbitan Cornell mengungkapkan hasil visum et repertum dokter bahwa kemaluan jenderal tidak disilet dalam pembunuhan di Lubang Buaya 1 Oktober 1965, jauh sebelumnya Soekarno dengan lantang mengatakan, 100 silet yang dibagikan untuk menyilet kemaluan jenderal itu tidak masuk akal.

Dalam pidatonya terdengar keluhan. Misalnya, di Departemen P dan K orang-orang yang mendukung BK dinonaktifkan. Sebetulnya seberapa drastiskah merosotnya kekuasaan yang dipegangnya?

(penasukarno)

1 oktober 1965

Setelah peristiwa G30S, Soekarno berusaha mengendalikan keadaan melalui pidato-pidatonya.

“Saya komandokan kepada segenap aparat negara untuk selalu membina persatuan dan kesatuan seluruh kekuatan progresif revolusioner. Dua, Menyingkirkan jauh-jauh tindakan-tindakan destruktif seperti rasialisme, pembakaran-pembakaran, dan perusakan-perusakan. Tiga, menyingkirkan jauh-jauh fitnahan-fitnahan dan tindakan-tindakan atas dasar perasaan balas dendam.”

Ia juga menyerukan “Awas adu domba antar-Angkatan, jangan mau dibakar. Jangan gontok-gontokan. Jangan hilang akal. Jangan bakar-bakar, jangan ditunggangi”. Dalam pidato ia menyinggung Trade Commission Republik Rakyat Tiongkok di Jati Petamburan yang diserbu massa karena ada isu Juanda meninggal diracun dokter RRT. Padahal, beliau wafat akibat serangan jantung. Soekarno menentang rasialisme yang menjadikan warga Tionghoa sebagai kambing hitam

(penasukarno)

 

 

3 Oktober 1965,

sekitar jam 09.00 malam, ketika kami sedang duduk-duduk dengan para pengawal, ibu tiba-tiba keluar dari kamarnya. Wajahnya sangat sayu. Ibu mengatakan kepada tante Tinik supaya disiapkan kebaya hitam. Ibu pun mengajak kami untuk masuk ke dalam kamarnya. Kami terperanjat. Setiba di kamar kami bertanya kepada ibu,

“Kenapa ibu minta kebaya hitam?”. Ibu menjawab,

“Bapakmu wis ora ono, entas teko nang ibu. Pesene: jaga anak baik-baik”. (Bapak sudah tidak ada lagi, baru saja bapak datang pada ibu dan pesannya: Jagalah anak baik-baik). Malam itu kami semua menangis. Ibu bilang: sudahlah! Kamu semua berdoa untuk bapak. Supaya bapak tenang di Surga.

(Amelia Yani)

 

4 Oktober 1965

Selanjutnya sore Senin, 4 Oktober 1965, Om Bardi dan beberapa pengawal datang lagi.

Pakaian mereka penuh lumpur dengan wajah yang sangat letih.

 Kami langsung menyambut mereka dan bertanya, “Sudah ketemu bapak om?”.

Dengan suara perlahan Om Bardi menjawab, “Sudah. Sudah ketemu”.

 Suaranya lirih hampir tak terdengar.

Om Bardi pun langsung menemui ibu di kamar. Ia lama sekali di dalam.

Kami menunggu di luar dengan penuh tanda tanya.

Rupanya Om Bardi sedang menyampaikan kepada ibu tentang keadaan bapak yang sebenarnya.

Tak lama kemudian kami semua dipanggil.

Aku melihat Om Bardi menundukan kepala dan menangis. Firasat jelek mulai menghantui kami.

Benar saja, tak lama kemudian, ibu berkata kepada kami,

“Bapak betul-betul sudah tidak ada. Sekarang hanya ada ibu dan kamu semua. Kita harus mengikhlaskan bapak. Kamu semua harus menerima kenyataan ini”.

Hari penantian, hari-hari yang panjang dan penuh rasa bimbang dan sedih, berakhir sudah bersamaan dengan habisnya semua harapan. Bapak telah tiada, gugur sebagai bunga bangsa dalam suatu tindakan yang sangat keji.

Ibu lalu mengajak kami semua berdoa untuk bapak.

 Usai berdoa ibu berkata kepada Om Bardi bahwa ibu ingin melihat jasad bapak.

Om Bardi mengatakan sebaiknya tidak usah.

Tapi ibu tetap saja memaksa.

Om Bardi lantas meyakinkan ibu bahwa semua jasad para korban sudah dibawa ke Rumah Sakit Angkatan Darat (RSAD) untuk dibersihkan.

Ibu lalu memutuskan, kami semua pulang ke rumah. Dengan mengendarai jib lengkap dengan pengawal, pukul 05.00 sore, kami pulang ke rumah di Jl. Lembang D 58.

Suasana di jalan-jalan yang kami lalui, yang biasanya ramai dengan kendaran dan manusia, kini sepi dan lengang.

Sampai di rumah, kami kaget, kami dapati rumah sudah bersih.

 Pintu dan kaca yang tertembus peluru sudah diganti.

Lantai rumah sudah dipel, bahkan tak ada sedikit pun noda darah yang tertinggal. Sepi…, sepi sekali suasana rumah kami.

Saat masuk ke dalam rumah, ibu langsung menuju kamar tidurnya.

Sementara aku menuju ruang makan lalu duduk di kursi biru mencoba mengerti apa yang telah terjadi.

Saat itu aku sadar, kami semua telah menjadi anak yatim. Orang tua kami tinggal ibu seorang diri. Perasaanku hancur memikirkan bagaimana kami hidup dan menata masa depan tanpa ayah.

Keinginan untuk melihat jasad bapak sudah tak tertahan. Perasaan itu terus menggebu dalam dada, kapankah, jam berapakah kami boleh melihat jasad bapak? Saat yang dinanti-natikan akhirnya datang juga.

Jam 09.00 malam, ibu, aku dan saudara-saudaraku naik kendaraan beriring-iringan menuju Markas Besar Angkatan Darat (MBAD) di JL. Merdeka Utara 2, Jakarta.

Di sepanjang jalan sangat lengang, sepi, seram penuh tentara berjaga-jaga. Selain itu banyak orang menangis dengan wajah geram.

 

Tak lama kemudian kami memasuki MBAD yang sudah penuh sesak dengan manusia, bau mayat dan asap dupa mengepul memenuhi ruangan.

Tujuh peti jenasah terselubung bendera merah-putih, masing-masing dijaga oleh empat Taruna Akademi Militer Nasional.

Aku dan kakak serta adik-adikku dituntun menuju peti jenasah bapak.

 Di depannya tertulis Letnan Jendral Ahmad Yani.

Yah…, inilah bapak, tapi sayang jasad bapak tidak dapat dilihat lagi.

 Bapak ada di dalam peti ini, entah sudah seperti apa wujudnya. Kami hanya dapat memeluk peti sembari menangis, “Bapak…..Bapak……Bapak……”.

Ruangan penuh dengan asap dupa, tangis dimana-mana, suasana semakin haru, semua menundukan kepala, semua menangis.

Aku melihat ibu terpaku.

 Semangat dan tenaganya seakan sudah terkuras habis.

Ibu bahkan tidak sanggup menangis lagi lalu tak sadarkan diri, meskipun dikerumuni ibu-ibu dan dikipasi.

 Kami semua duduk, lemas dan lunglai. Disana baru akau ketahui ada ibu Soeprapto, ibu Haryono, ibu Parman, ibu Panjaitan, ibu Sutoyo lengkap dengan putra-putrinya. Keluarga Tandean juga ada. Kami semua larut dalam duka. Para pengunjung pun tak kuasa menahan tangis. Bahkan di luar para tentara dan massa pun sendu menangis. Histeris. Karena semua merasa kehilangan

Pukul 12.00 tengah malam, kami meninggalkan MBAD dengan perasaan hampa. Rumah terasa kosong meskipun tamu-tamu sangat banyak. Besok siang, bapak bersama jenderal-jenderal lainnya akan dimakamkan di Taman Makam Pahlawan (TMP) Kalibata.

(Amelia Yani)

5 Oktober 1965

Pagi 5 Oktober 1965, dengan pakaian yang gelap-gelap, kami menuju MBAD. Sepanjang jalan aku melihat masyarakat berbaris untuk melihat iring-iringan kami. Tentara berjaga-jaga dengan pakaian tempur dan senjata lengkap. Banyak prajurit menitikan air mata. Wajah mereka muram, marah dan geram. Mereka, aku, ibu dan semuanya kehilangan bapak. Suasana haru, duka dan berkabung menyelimuti MBAD. Sampai-sampai langit pun mendung seakan ikut berduka.

Pukul 10.00 pagi, upacara pemberangkatan jenasah yang dipimpin Jenderal A.H Nasution dimulai. Pak Nas —sapaan akrab Jenderal A.H Nasution—- karena luka-lukanya harus memakai tongkat dan dipapah beberapa perwira. Peti jenasah berselubung Merah Putih satu per satu dibawa keluar, dinaikan ke atas kendaraan panser dikawal tentara, didampingi perwira-perwira tinggi sahabat bapak dengan wajah merah dan haru. Pemberangkatan dilepaskan dengan salvo penghormatan kepada mereka yang gugur. Sepanjang perjalanan dari MBAD menuju Kalibata, iring-iringan kendaraan berjalan sangat pelan diikuti mendung dan gerimis. Deretan tentara dan massa berjejer sedih di sepanjang jalan. Suasana sangat hening. Berat. Perjalanan dari MBAD ke Kalibata memakan waktu tiga jam.

Sampai di TMP Kalibata, tempat sudah penuh sesak dengan masyarakat. Melalui salvo kehormatan, kami berjalan menuju gerbang Kalibata tempat peristirakatan terakhir ayah dan para jenderal lainnya. Keluarga masing-masing berada disekitar liang lahat. Ibu duduk dibawah pohon kamboja tak sadarkan diri. Adikku Untung juga tak sadarkan diri. Perlahan-lahan peti jenasah diturunkan bersamaan. Riwayat hidup bapak dan para jenderal yang lain dibacakan, disertai doa. Tangis dimana-mana. Aku dan saudara-saudaraku hanya terdiam. Kami hanya menurut ketika disuruh melemparkan tanah, dan bunga-bungan ke dalam kubur. Saat itu aku hanya dapat berdoa untuk bapakku dan pelan kuucap,

“Selamat jalan bapak, selamat beristirahat, sampai ketemu lagi di surga”. Akan kuingat selalu hari itu, 1 Oktober 1965. Hari yang dimulai dengan tragedi dan banjir darah di rumahku. Hari yang yang kurasakan sebagai hari terpanjang dalam hidupku, hari yang telah mengubah jalan hidup pribadiku dan bangsaku……..Selamat Jalan Bapak”

(Amelia Yani)

 

 

Tak jelas apa pasal yang dituduhkan padanya. Lima tahun lamanya Supeno hidup dibui, sampai akhirnya dibebaskan pada tahun 1971 dan namanya direhablitasi kembali.

Sebetulnya, ini rehabilitasi omong kosong, karena toh ia tak mendapat ganti rugi apalagi kembali ke jabatan lama. Apalagi pembebasan itu tak berarti banyak. Jiwa dan fisik Supeno sudah terampas sejak di dalam penjara. Di rumahnya, Supeno hidup sakit-sakitan. Tiga tahun kemudian, ia meninggal dunia.

Belakangan, mungkin tersadarkan perannya sebagai pencipta doktrin Sapta Marga yang diagungkan tentara Orba, pemerintah akhirnya memberikan pangkat anumerta brigjen untuk Supeno. Ya, Supeno meraih bintang di pundaknya pada saat ia tak lagi punya nyawa.

Supeno benar-benar seperti Bambang Ekalaya, burung yang bisa terbang tinggi tapi tak pernah bisa mencapai langit karena selalu saja terhalang oleh awan.

——

1 oktober 1965

Bung Karno donder mendengar kabar dan berita yang mengatakan bahwa para perwira Angkatan Darat yang menjadi korban dalam peristiwa di subuh 1 Oktober 1965 mengalami penyiksaan mahahebat sebelum nyawa mereka dihabisi. Kabar seperti ini, menurut si Bung, sengaja disebarluaskan untuk membakar emosi rakyat dan mendorong “gontok-gontokan” di kalangan rakyat yang akhirnya menjelma menjadi “sembelih-sembelihan”.

)Penasukarno)

 

 

3 Oktober 1965

 

AMANAT P.J.M. PRESIDEN/ PANGLIMA TERTINGGI ABRI PEMIMPIN BESAR REVOLUSI BUNG KARNO

JANG DIUTJAPKAN MELALUI RRI PADA TGL.3 OKTOBER 1965 DJAM 01.30.

 

Saudara-Saudara sekalian.

Mengulangi perintah saja sebagai Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersendjata/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi jang telah diumumkan pada tanggal 1 Oktober ’65, dan untuk menghilangkan semua keragu-raguan dalam kalangan rakjat, maka dengan ini saja sekali lagi menyatakan bahwa saja berada dalam keadaan sehat wal’afiat dan tetap memegang tampuk pimpinan Negara dan tampuk pimpinan Pemerintahan dan Revolusi Indonesia.

 

 

Pada hari ini tanggal 2 Oktober ’65 saja telah memanggil semua Panglima Angkatan Bersendjata bersama wakil Perdana Menteri kedua Dr. Leimena dan para pejabat penting lainnya dengan maksud untuk segera menyelesaikan persoalan apa yang disebut peristiwa 30 September.

 

 Untuk dapat menyelesaikan persoalan ini saja telah perintahkan supaja segera ditjiptakan satu suasana yang tenang dan tertib, dan untuk itu perlu dihindarkan segala kemungkinan bentrokan dengan sendjata.

 

Dalam tingkatan perdjoangan Bangsa lndonesia sekarang ini, saja perintahkan kepada seluruh rakyat untuk tetap mempertinggi kewaspadaan dan kesiapsiagaan dalam rangka meningkatkan pelaksanaan Dwikora. Kepada seluruh Rakjat lndonesia saja serukan untuk tinggal tetap tenang dan kepada semua menteri dan petugas- petugas negara lainnja untuk tetap mendjalankan tugasnya masing-masing seperti sediakala.

 

Pimpinan Angkatan Darat pada dewasa ini berada langsung dalam tangan saja dan untuk menyelesaikan tugas sehari-hari dalam Angkatan Darat sementara saja tundjuk Maj. Djen. Pranoto Reksosamodra, Ass keIII Men/ PANGAD.

 

Untuk melaksanakan pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban jang bersangkutan dengan peristiwa 30 September tersebut telah saja tundjuk Maj.Djen. Suharto, Panglima Kostrad sesuai dengan kebidjaksanaan jang telah saja gariskan.

Saudara-saudara sekalian.

Marilah kita tetap membina semangat persatuan dan kesatuan Bangsa; marilah kita tetap menggelorakan semangat anti nekolim.

Tuhan bersama dengan kita semua

Koleksi: Perpustakaan Nasional RI, 2006

(penasukarno)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dewi Soekarno Dan Peristiwa G30S 1965

 

Tanggal 30 September 1965 malam, Presiden Soekarno berpidato di hadapan peserta Musyawarah Nasional Teknik (Munastek), di Istora Senayan.

Selepas berpidato, Bung Karno menjemput istrinya, Ratna Sari Dewi, yang sedang ke acara makan malam Duta Besar Iran di Nirwana Supper Club, Hotel Indonesia. Soekarno kemudian menginap di rumah Dewi, di Wisma Yaso.

 Paginya, 1 Oktober 1965, sebelum berangkat ke Istana Negara, Soekarno menerima laporan dari bawahannya perihal G30S. Ia pun langsung meluncur ke Istana Negara.

Namun, ketika mendekati Istana, ada kabar bahwa Istana sudah dikepung pasukan tak dikenal. Karena itu, iring-iringan mobil yang membawa Bung Karno berbelok ke Jalan Budi Kemuliaan. Lalu, atas usulan ajudan Bung Karno, Kolonel Saelan, Bung Karno diminta ke Grogol, ke rumah istrinya, Harjati.

Namun, keputusan Bung Karno berputar haluan ke Grogol disayangkan oleh Dewi. “Demi menyesali bahwa Presiden (Soekarno) mengambil keputusan yang salah waktu itu. Menurut Dewi, seharusnya Presiden tetap ke istana,” ujar Professor Aiko Kurasawa, yang telah mewawancarai Dewi seputar kejadian itu.

 

Pada tanggal 1 Oktober itu, sekitar pukul 6.30 sore, Bung Karno kembali ke rumah Dewi. Ia kelihatan sangat terkejut dan tertekan. Anak buahnya satu demi satu datang. Tak lama kemudian, Bung Karno keluar lagi tanpa menyebut tujuan.

Rupanya, Bung Karno ke Halim Perdana Kusumah. Saat itu Dewi terus berupaya menghubungi beliau. Akhinya, Bung Karno mengirim memo kepada Dewi. Memo dengan kop “Komando Operasi Siaga Komando Strategis” berisi pesan bahwa Bung Karno selamat. Di memo itu juga Bung Karno menjelaskan bahwa terjadi aksi Angkatan Darat untuk menyelamatkan Presiden.

Dewi akhirnya mengetahui Bung Karno berada di Halim. Ia pun pergi ke Halim menemui suaminya. “Dia satu-satunya istri Soekarno yang sempat ke Halim,” kata Aiko. Berdasarkan pengakuan Dewi, sebagaimana dituturkan Aiko, dirinyalah yang membujuk Bung Karno agar tidak pergi ke Madiun.

Tak lama kemudian, Bung Karno pindah ke Istana Bogor. Hampir setiap hari Dewi berkomunikasi dengan Bung Karno via surat. Aiko, yang telah menganalisi 9 lembar dari surat itu, mendapat kesan bahwa Bung Karno tidak mengetahui rencana aksi G30S sebelumnya.

Upaya Dewi Melindungi Bung Karno

Menurut Prof Aiko, Dewi kemudian berupaya menyelamat Bung Karno. Pada tahap awal, ia berupaya mendekati Soeharto. Ia berharap Pangkostrad itu bisa memulihkan stabilitas dan melindungi Bung Karno.

“Dewi kemudian mengundang Soeharto dan istrinya (Ibu Tien) ke Wisma Yaso untuk makan bersama,” ungkap Aiko.

Tak hanya itu, Dewi juga berupaya mendekati istri Nasution. Ia mengirim surat secara diam-diam melalui sekretaris pribadinya.

Yang menarik, seperti diungkapkan Aiko, Dewi memang bersikap anti-komunis dan lebih memihak kaum nasionalis. “Kebencian Dewi terhadap komunis mungkin didorong oleh rasa persaingan dengan ibu Hartini (istri keempat Bung Karno) yang dekat dengan tokoh-tokoh PKI,” ungkap Aiko.

 

Sebelum G30S 1965, Jepang menjanjikan pinjaman sebesar 1,3 juta dollar AS. Pinjaman itu sedianya akan dipergunakan untuk pembangunan Rumah Sakit Daulat. Proyek tersebut atas prakarsa Dewi. Untuk keperluan itu, ia membangun sebuah yayasan bernama Yayasan Sari Asih. Rencana pembangunan sedianya dimulai 10 Desember 1965 di atas tanah milik Dewi. Lalu, dalam rangka proyek ini, Dewi berangkat studi banding di Jepang dan Eropa. Ia berangkat tanggal 2 Januari 1966.

Selama kepergiannya, di Indonesia terjadi banyak peristiwa. Diantaranya pemecatan Nasution dari Kabinet dan Reshuffle Kabinet. Mendengar kabar itu, Dewi langsung pulang. “Dewi merasa, Soekarno cenderung memihak golongan kiri karena tidak ada dirinya,” papar Aiko.

Menurut Yuanda Zara, sang penulis biografi Dewi Soekarno, Subandrio-lah yang memaksakan Bung Karno berpisah dari Dewi yang dianggap terlalu dekat dengan Nasution dan tokoh kanan.

Kepulangan Dewi ke Indonesia bersamaan dengan Supersemar. Tetapi ia belum menyadari arti penting surat itu bagi kekuasaan Bung Karno. Karena itu, ia pun berusaha menjembatani suaminya dengan Soeharto. Pada tanggal 17 Maret 1966, ia mengundang Soeharto makan bersama di Wisma Yaso. Lalu, pada tanggal 20 Maret 1966, ia bermain golf dengan Soeharto.

“Soeharto saat itu menganjurkan Dewi agar mendorong suaminya ke luar negeri untuk istirahat. Saat itulah Dewi baru menyadari kalah,” ungkap Aiko.

Akhirnya, pada November 1966, Dewi ke Jepang untuk pemeriksaan kehamilannya. “Tetapi ternyata Presiden (Soekarno) mengharapkan Dewi melahirkan di Jepang,” tambah Aiko.

Atas nasihat dokter, Dewi tinggal di Jepang dan melahirkan disana. Ia melahirkan putrinya, Karina Kartika Sari Dewi Soekarno, pada tanggal 17 Maret 1966. Karina sendiri tidak pernah bertemu dengan Soekarno.

Ulfa Ilyas

 

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Kisah Buruk Soeharto Di Mata Soebandrio

 

Pada tahun 2000 lalu, mantan Wakil Perdana Menteri Indonesia di era tahun 1960-an, Soebandrio, menerbitkan memoar berjudul Kesaksianku Tentang G30S.

Buku memoar tersebut adalah bentuk pembelaan Subandrio terhadap tudingan sepihak yang dialamatkan kepada dirinya: terlibat G30S. Tudingan itu sungguh pahit. Tidak hanya karena Subandrio harus mendekam di penjara selama 30 tahun, tetapi juga harus memikul aib sebagai penghianat bangsa.

Namun, melalui memoarnya tersebut, Subandrio melancarkan serangan balik ke Soeharto. Ia menuding Soeharto justru telah melakukan kudeta merangkak terhadap kekuasaan Soekarno. Tak hanya itu, buku setebal 80 halaman itu juga membeberkan cacat Soeharto.

Menurut Soebandrio, Soeharto punya rekam jejak yang buruk jauh sebelum peristiwa G30S. Yang pertama, semasa di divisi Diponegoro, Soeharto menjalin relasi dengan pengusaha tionghoa, Liem Sioe Liong. Keduanya menjalankan bisnis penyelundupan berbagai barang.

Saat itu, kata Soebandrio, Soeharto berdalih bahwa bisnis penyelundupan itu untuk kepentingan Kodam Diponegoro. “Berita penyelundupan itu cepat menyebar. Semua perwira saat itu mengetahuinya,” ujar Soebandrio.

Belakangan terungkap bahwa penyelundupan itu bukan untuk kepentingan Kodam Diponegoro, melainkan untuk kepentingan pribadi Soeharto dan Liem. “Duitnya masuk ke kantong Soeharto dan Liem,” kata Soebandrio.

Kabar itu berhembus kemana-mana. Kata Soebandrio, ketika berita itu mencuat, Jenderal Ahmad Yani sangat marah. Sampai-sampai, dalam suatu kejadian, Yani menempeleng Soeharto. Soeharto dianggap mempermalukan korps Angkatan Darat (AD).

Tak hanya itu, Jenderal AH Nasution mengusulkan agar Soeharto diadili di Mahkamah Militer dan dipecat dari AD. Namun, usulan itu dimentahkan oleh Mayjend Gatot Subroto. Alasannya, Soeharto masih bisa dibina. Akhirnya, Soeharto pun disekolah di Seskoad di Bandung.

Cerita tentang Soeharto sebagai penyelundup ini bukan barang baru. Harold Crouch dalam The Army and Politics In Indonesia juga menyinggung hal tersebut. Menurut Crouch, Soeharto dicopot tahun 1959 karena keterlibatannya dalam penyelelundupan. Robert E Elson, yang menulis buku Suharto, A Political Biography (2001), juga menyinggung bisnis ilegal Soeharto tersebut.

Yang Kedua, Soeharto membangun klik di dalam tubuh Angkatan Darah (AD) saat itu. Soebandrio menyebutnya Trio Soeharto-Yoga-Ali. Awalnya, pada tahun 1959, Soeharto tiba-tiba memanggil pulang Yoga Soegama, yang saat itu masih menjabat sebagai Dubes Indonesia di Yugoslavia. Saat itu, Soeharto memanggilan Yoga untuk diberi jabatan baru: Kepala Intelijen Kostrad.

Bagi Soebandrio, pemanggilan Yoga oleh Soeharto itu bermasalah. Pertama, pemanggilan Yoga itu diluar aturan formal alias menabrak aturan. Semestinya, kata Soebandrio, yang punya otoritas memanggil Yoga itu adalah Ahmad Yani selalu Menteri/Panglima AD (Menpangad). Kedua, tujuan kepulangan Yoga ke tanah air adalah untuk mensabotase politik Bung Karno. Ketiga, untuk menghancurkan PKI.

Menurut Soebandrio, komplotan trio Soeharto-Yoga-Ali ini sudah berlangsung erat semasa di Kodam Diponegoro. Bahkan, Soeharto pernah menggunakan komplotannya ini untuk mensabotase rencana pengangkatan Kolonel Bambang Supeno sebagai Panglima Kodam Diponegoro.

Saat itu, pimpinan AD mencalonkan Kolonel Bambang Supeno sebagai Pangdam Diponegoro. Kabar itu tercium oleh Soeharto, yang saat itu masih berpangkat Letkol tetapi ‘ngebet’ sekali jadi Pangdam. Untuk meraih cita-citanya, Soeharto menggelar rapat gelap dengan sejumlah perwira di Kodam Diponegoro. Rapat itu dikoordinir oleh Yoga Soegama, yang notabene komplotan Soeharto.

Ketiga, Soebandrio juga menyingkap keterlibatan Soeharto dalam percobaan kudeta yang dirancang Tan Malaka untuk menggulingkan Kabinet Sjahrir pada tanggal 3 Juli 1946. Awalnya, kata Soebandrio, kelompok Tan Malaka mengajak semua kalangan militer di Jawa Tengah, termasuk Soeharto, dalam gerakan tersebut.

Pada tanggal 20 Juni 1946 (?), Perdana Menteri Sjahrir diculik oleh kelompok Soedarsono. “Soeharto selaku salah seorang komandan militer Surakarta terlibat dalam penculikan itu,” ujar Soebandrio.

Tanggal 2 Juli 1946, dua batalyon pasukan penculik berkumpul di markas Soeharto. Pasukan itu kemudian dikerahkan untuk menguasai aset strategis, seperti RRI dan Telkom. “Malam itu juga mereka menyusun surat pembubaran Kabinet Sjahrir dan menyusun kabinet baru yang sedianya ditandatangani oleh Presiden Soekarno esok harinya,” ungkap Soebandrio.

Tetapi percobaan kudeta itu gagal. Para pelakunya ditangkap dan ditahan. Pada saat itulah Soeharto berbalik arah, dari awalnya berkomplot dengan penculik kemudian menangkapi para penculik.

Namun, cerita tentang kelicikan Soeharto dalam peristiwa percobaan kudeta tanggal 3 Juli 1946 itu bukan cerita baru. M Yuanda Zara dalam bukunya Peristiwa 3 Juli 1946: Menguak Kudeta Pertama dalam Sejarah Indonesia juga mengungkap kelicikan Soeharto itu.

Menurut Yuanda, Soeharto sebetulnya terlibat dalam pembebasan tahanan pro-kudeta di penjara Wirogunan. Ia kemudian membawa tanahan itu ke markasnya, di Wiyoro, di mana Soedarsono sudah menunggunya.

Di malam itu juga, kata Yuanda, Mohammad Yamin Cs membuat konsep maklumat kepada Presiden Soekarno, yang isinya seolah-olah penyerahan kekausaan kepada Tan Malaka. Pembuatan konsep maklumat itu dilakukan di markas Soeharto.

Rencananya, maklumat itu akan dibawa oleh Soedarsono esok paginya, 3 Juli 1946, ke Presiden Soekarno. Dengan liciknya, Soeharto membocorkan info ini ke pihak Istana dan sekaligus memberitahu rencana Soedarsono ke Istana. Alhasil, pada tanggal 3 Juli 1946, ketika Soedarsono ke Istana Presiden, ia dengan gampang dilucuti oleh pasukan pengawal Presiden.

Padahal, sebelumnya Bung Karno pernah memerintahkan Soeharto melalui pesan yang dibawa oleh Sundjojo, Ketua Pemuda Pathuk, untuk menangkap atasannya, Mayor Jenderal Sudarsono, karena dicurigai ingin merebut kekuasaan. Tetapi Soeharto menolak perintah Presiden Soekarno tersebut. Sampai-sampai Soekarno marah dan menyebut Soekarno sebagai “Opsir koppig” (opsir yang keras kepala).

Kejadian ini memperlihatkan kepada kita, betapa lihainya Soeharto dalam membaca situasi, mengambil keuntungan di dalamnya, dan secara licik tampil sebagai pahlawan. Yuanda menyebut ini strategi nglurug tanpa bala, menyerbu tanpa pasukan, tetapi memakai tangan orang lain untuk kepentingannya.

Pembaca boleh tidak setuju dengan pendapat Soebandrio ataupun ulasan saya di atas. Namun, seiring dengan dibukanya dokumen dan arsip mengenai peristiwa G30S 1965, ada baiknya membaca kembali peristiwa tersebut secara kritis. Termasuk mempertanyakan kembali keabsahan Soeharto sebagai pahlawan dibalik cerita tersebut

 

Sumber Artikel: http://www.berdikarionline.com/gotong-royong/20130919/kisah-buruk-soeharto-di-mata-soebandrio.html#ixzz2gXCevGoe
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1 Nopember 1965

Sementara itu di ibukota RI Jakarta timbul peristiwa pernberontakan G 30 S/PKI pada tanggal 1 Nopember 1965. Pemberontakan G 30 S / PKI telah memakan korban beberapa pimpinan AD. Namun dengan cepat telah berhasil ditumpas, kemudian lahirlah Orde Baru.

Pada masa pemerintahan Orde Baru, politik konfrontasi ditinjau kembali. Sesuai dengan program kabinet Ampera bahwa politik luar negeri Indonesia adalah bebas dan aktif, maka oleh pernerintah Orde Baru dimulailah kontak‑ kontak diplomatik untuk memulihkan hubungan baik antara Indonesia dan Malaysia.

 

12-13  desember 1965

Donder pertama saat Bung Karno berbicara di depan wartawan di Istana Bogor, malam hari, 12 Desember 1965.

 

Donder kedua, keesokan harinya, saat Bung Karno berbicara di depan gubernur se-Indonesia, di Istana Negara, 13 Desember 1965.

Kepada para wartawan, cerita Bung Karno di depan para gubernur, dia bertanya darimana media massa mendapat cerita tentang kronologi pembunuhan enam jenderal dan seorang perwira pertama Angkatan Darat yang diculik kelompok Untung.

Tak ada seorang wartawan pun yang menjawab. Menteri Penerangan Achmadi, Kepala Dinas Angkatan Darat Brigjen Ibnu Subroto dan Letkol Noor Nasution yang mengawasi Antara pun tak bisa mengatakan darimana mereka mendapat kabar itu.

“Saya tidak tahu apakah gubernur-gubernur tadi malam menyetel radio atau televisi. Maka ada baiknya saya ceritakan sedikit pendonderan-pendonderan saya tadi malam. Begini, tatkala sudah terjadi Lubang Buaya, jenazah-jenazah daripada jenderal dibawa kesana dan dimasukkan ke dalam sumur. Ooh, itu wartawan-wartawan suratkabar menulis, bahwa jenderal-jenderal itu disiksa di luar perikemanuiaan. Semua, katanya, maaf. Saudari-saudari, semuanya dipotong mereka punya kemaluan.”

“Malahan belakangan juga ada di dalam surat kabar ditulis bahwa ada seorang wanita bernama Djamilah, mengatakan bahwa motongnya kemaluan itu dengan pisau silet. Bukan satu pisau silet, tetapi lebih dahulu 100 anggota Gerwani dibagi silet. Dan silet ini dipergunakan untuk mengiris-ngiris kemaluan. Demikian pula dikatakan, bahwa di antara jenderal-jenderal itu matanya dicungkil.”

“Saya pada waktu itu memakai saya punya gezond verstand, Saudara-saudara. Dan dengan memakai saya punya gezond verstand, itu saya betwiffelen, ragukan kebenaran kabar ini. Tetapi saya melihat akibat daripada pembakaran yang sedemikian ini. Akibatnya ialah, masyarakat seperti dibakar. Kebencian menyala-nyala, sehingga di kalangan rakyat menjadi gontok-gontokkan, yang kemudian malahan menjadi sembelih-sembelihan.”

“Saudara-saudara mengetahui, bahwa saya sejak mulanya berkata, jangan, jangan, jangan, jangan sembelih-sembelihan, jangan gontok-gontokkan, jangan panas-panasan.”

“Nah, Saudara-saudara, waktu belakangan ini saya dapat bukti, bahwa memang benar sangkaan saya itu, bahwa jenderal-jenderal yang dimasukkan semua ke Lubang Buaya tidak ada satu orang pun yang kemaluannya dipotong. Saya dapat buktinya darimana? Visum repertum daripada team dokter-dokter yang menerima jenazah-jenazah daripada jenderal-jenderal yang dimasukkan ke dalam sumur Lubang Buaya itu.”

“Visum repertum oleh dokter dituliskannya pro justitia. Bahwa sumpah pro justitia tidak boleh bohong, tidak boleh menambah, tidak boleh mengurangi. Apa kenyataan itu, harus dimasukkan dalam visum repertum itu harus jadi pegangan, sebab ini satu kenyataan, bukan khayalan. Tetapi visum repertum adalah satu kenyataan menurut apa yang didapatkan oleh dokter itu

(pena sukarno)

 

20 November 1965

Dalam pidato 20 November 1965 di depan keempat panglima Angkatan di Istana Bogor BK mengatakan,

 “Ada perwira yang bergudul. Bergudul itu apa?

Hei, Bung apa itu bergudul?

Ya, kepala batu.”

 

 Tampaknya ucapannya itu ditujukan kepada Soeharto.

 

 Pada kesempatan yang sama Soekarno menegaskan, “Saya yang ditunjuk MPRS menjadi Panglima Besar Revolusi. Terus terang bukan Subandrio. Bukan Leimena…. Bukan engkau Soeharto, bukan engkau Soeharto, dan seterusnya (berbeda dengan nama tokoh lain, Soeharto disebut dua kali dan secara berturut-turut).

 

 

 

Mengapa Soekarno tak mau membubarkan PKI, padahal ini alasan utama kelompok Soeharto menjatuhkannya dari presiden.

 

 Karena dia konsisten dengan pandangan sejak tahun 1925 tentang Nas (Nasionalisme), A (Agama), dan Kom (Komunisme).

 

Dalam pidato ia menegaskan, yang dimaksudkan dengan Kom bukanlah Komunisme dalam pengertian sempit, melainkan Marxisme atau lebih tepat “Sosialisme”.

 

Meskipun demikian Soekarno bersaksi “saya bukan komunis”.

 

Bung Karno juga mengungkapkan keterlibatan pihak asing yang memberi orang Indonesia uang Rp 150 juta guna mengembangkan “the free world ideology”.

 

Ia berseru di depan diplomat asing di Jakarta, “Ambassador jangan subversi.”

(penasukarno)

12 desember 1965

Tanggal 12 Desember 1965 ketika berpidato dalam rangka ulang tahun Kantor Berita Antara di Bogor, Presiden mengatakan tidak ada kemaluan yang dipotong dalam peristiwa di Lubang Buaya. Demikian pula tidak ada mata yang dicungkil seperti ditulis pers.

Peristiwa pembantaian di Jawa Timur diungkapkan Soekarno dalam pidato di depan HMI di Bogor 18 Desember 1965. Soekarno mengatakan pembunuhan itu dilakukan dengan sadis, orang bahkan tidak berani menguburkan korban.

“Awas kalau kau berani ngrumat jenazah, engkau akan dibunuh. Jenazah itu diklelerkan saja di bawah pohon, di pinggir sungai, dilempar bagai bangkai anjing yang sudah mati.”

Dalam kesempatan sama, Bung Karno sempat bercanda di depan mahasiswa itu, “saya sudah 65 tahun meski menurut Ibu Hartini seperti baru 28 tahun. Saya juga melihat Ibu Hartini seperti 21 tahun.”

Gaya bahasa Soekarno memang khas. Ia tidak segan memakai kata kasar tetapi spontan. Beda dengan Soeharto yang memakai bahasa halus tetapi tindakannya keras. Di tengah sidang kabinet, di depan para Menteri, Presiden Soekarno tak segan mengatakan “mau kencing dulu” jika ia ingin ke belakang . Ketika perintahnya tidak diindahkan, ia berteriak “saya merasa dikentuti”. Pernah pula ia mengutip cerita Sayuti Melik tentang kemaluannya yang ketembak. Namun, di lain pihak ia mahir menggunakan kata-kata bernilai sastra, “Kami menggoyangkan langit, menggempakan darat, dan menggelorakan samudera agar tidak jadi bangsa yang hidup hanya dari 2 ½ sen sehari. Bangsa yang kerja keras, bukan bangsa tempe, bukan bangsa kuli. Bangsa yang rela menderita demi pembelian cita-cita.”

(penasukarno)

 

 

 (http://anusapati.blogdetik.com/2008/08/22/bambang-supeno/

 

“Dicap Anak PKI, Anakku Pilih Berantem”

Peristiwa seputar penangkapan membabi-buta setelah meletusnya peristiwa G30S/PKI memang bisa menimpa siapa saja, termasuk bagi anggota-anggota TNI yang memiliki jabatan. Termasuk di dalam kategori ini adalah yang sekarang sedang membuat pledoi untuk meluruskan sejarah kelam puluhan tahun lalu. Seperti penangkapan Kolonel Abdul Latief oleh penguasa Orde Baru dan dijatuhi hukuman mati tanpa pengadilan.

PERLAKUAN serupa juga menimpa salah satu personal Angkatan Darat yang cukup punya jabatan strategis. Pangkatnya memang selevel dengan A. Latief, kolonel. Karena saat itu jumlah jenderal bisa dihitung dengan jari, maka dengan pangkat yang belum mencapai bintang, dapat menduduki jabatan penting. Adalah Kolonel Bambang Supeno, wakil kepala Staff Angkatan Darat (Wakasad). Ia “diambil” dari rumahnya yang megah pada malam tanggal 1 Oktober 1965. “Saya sangat shock melihat banyak pasukan bersenjata memaksa Bapak naik truk,” kenang Ny. Sri Kusdiantinah yang waktu itu masih menjadi istri Kolonel Bambang Supeno sedih.

Seusai penangkapan sang suami itulah derita panjang menyertai keluarga Ny. Sri Kusdiantinah. Sebab, setelah hari itu dirinya tidak lagi berjumpa dengan sang suami dalam jangka waktu cukup lama. Bahkan untuk mencari tahu keberadaan suaminya saja dia tidak mendapat keterangan sedikitpun. Kondisi keamanan dan politik yang tidak menentu, membuat terputusnya semua alat komunikasi. “Malahan lampu-lampu penerangan di sekitar rumah saya pun dimatikan,” cerita perempuan yang masih tampak cantik asal Madiun ini.

Keadaan ini membuat tiga anaknya yang menginjak usia remaja seringkali menanyakan keberadaan sang ayah. Mereka tentunya membutuhkan figur seorang ayah dalam keluarga, karena bagaimanapun ayah merupakan panutan dalam keluarga. Tetapi karena keadaan memaksa, maka hanya Ny. Sri Kusdiantinah hanya mengandalkan kemampuan untuk menghibur anak-anaknya. “Mereka kan sudah agak besar, jadi tidak sampai menangis merengek-rengek, mencari bapaknya,” paparnya.

Meski begitu karena mereka sebagai keluarga tentara yang sering ditinggal tugas, maka sudah terbiasa ditinggal dalam jangka waktu yang cukup lama. Namun, keberangkatan suaminya yang sangat mendadak dan dijemput oleh banyak pasukan yang bukan dari kesatuannya membuat semua anggota keluarganya sangat khawatir terhadap kondisi Bapak. Karena hal itu di luar kebiasaan, di mana dalam melaksanakan tugas jauh hari sebelumnya Bapak pasti memberi tahu ditugaskan ke mana. “Ini tidak”.bahkan ganti baju pun Bapak tidak sempat. “Wis diglandang ngono wae..,” kisah Ny. Kusdiantinah dengan logat bahasa Jawa yang kental.

Apalagi anak saya yang terkecil waktu itu kan sangat manja dan deket sekali dengan bapaknya, kalau ditinggal sehari saja tidak pamitan” wah bisa nangis seharian dia. Belum kalau tugas ke daerah. Sebelum berangkat, pasti dia pesan apa saja yang dia inginkan. Malamnya minta dikeloni dulu, pokoknya manja banget dia sama bapaknya. Aleman (manja). Ini malah berhari-hari ditinggal tanpa pamitan,” kenang ketua Pusat Penerjemah Nasional Universitas Nasional ini, pahit.

Bagi Ny. Kusdiantinah tidak begitu penting berapa lama ditinggal suaminya. Tetapi kejelasan keberadaan suaminya jauh lebih penting, sebab bagaimanapun dengan status keberadaan yang jelas dirinya tidak terlalu memusingkan keselamatan suaminya. Bagaimanapun kondisinya suami adalah pelindung bagi keluarga. “Anak-anak saya itu kan masih memerlukan perhatian yang besar dari ayahnya,” ucapnya.

Penantian Ny. Sri Kusdiantinah tidak memerlukan waktu lama, karena setelah beberapa bulan kemudian dirinya menerima pemberitaan resmi. Pemerintah yang sedang sibuk menyikat habis paham komunis di Indonesia.

Melalui jajaran Angkatan Darat yang diutus secara khusus menemui dirinya dan memberitahukan bahwa sang suami Kolonel Bambang Supeno pejabat Wakasad dinyatakan terlibat dalam pemberontakan G30S/PKI, dan dijatuhi hukuman mati tanpa diadili terlebih dahulu. “Pertama yang saya ingat adalah bagaimana nasib anak-anakku di kemudian hari,” katanya dengan suara agak tersendat.

Penderitaan Anak-Anak

Bayangan Kusdiantinah tentang masa depan anak-anaknya ternyata terbukti di kemudian hari. Perlakuan orang-orang di sekelilingnya mulai berubah.

Orang-orang yang semula berhubungan baik, satu persatu mulai menjauh. Kebanyakan mereka takut akan imbas yang dapat saja menimpa atau ikut-ikutan dicap sebagai komunis. “Cap yang menempel itu sungguh merupakan beban berat yang harus kami pikul selama bertahun-tahun,” tutur Ny Kusdiantinah sedih.

Hatinya teriris itu ketika suatu saat anaknya sepulang sekolah dengan wajah belepotan lumpur dan baju sobek-sobek. Walaupun tidak terdengar tangis yang menyertai kepulangannya, tetapi dari sorot matanya dia tahu kalau anak keduanya ini menyimpan tangis di hatinya. Karena, dia harus mempertahankan harga dirinya walaupun dengan jalan berkelahi melawan teman yang mengolok-oloknya. “Dia tidak terima kalau dirinya dikata-katai sebagai anak PKI. Apalagi tahu sendiri kan “anak kolong” (anak-anak tentara yang tinggal di barak, Red) terkenal tidak pernah takut kepada siapapun, sepanjang itu benar,” ceritanya dengan geram.

Berbeda dengan keduanya, ucap Kusdiantina, yang putri sulung mantan walikota Madiun menyikapinya. Dia lebih banyak diam menghadapi berbagai persoalan yang mendera keluarganya.

Segala tekanan, olok-olok dari teman dan cap anak PKI yang melekat pada dirinya tidak dipedulikan. “Dia lebih dewasa dalam bertindak, sehingga kecaman dalam bentuk apa pun dia anggap angin lalu,” pujinya pada anak pertamanya ini.

Tetapi penderitaan sebenarnya yang paling parah dialami oleh Ny Sri Kusdiantinah sendiri. Karena gaya hidup keluarga Bambang Supeno -yang waktu itu menduduki jabatan cukup penting– dapat dikatakan lebih dari cukup.

Di rumahnya tersedia beberapa pembantu yang siap melayani keluarga ini sepanjang waktu. Belum lagi ajudan yang disediakan dari kesatuan sang suami siap melayani setiap waktu. “Jadi waktu itu kehidupan keluarga saya cukup terjamin, walaupun tidak dapat dikatakan mewah,” kenangnya.

Belum lagi kalau dirunut ke belakang kehidupan yang dijalani oleh Ny Sri Kusdiantinah sangat jauh dari kesusahan. Karena jabatan ayahnya R.M. Sedyono Padmohadiprojo tidak jauh dari kedudukannya sebagai Kepala Daerah Tingkat II. Pertama menjabat sebagai wali kota Madiun, dan kemudian dipindahkan menjadi bupati Sintang di Kalimantan. Jelas bahwa latar belakang kehidupan yang dijalani Ny Kusdiantinah, secara materi sudah sangat tercukupi. Sejak kecil dirinya tidak pernah mengalami apa yang dikatakan penderitaan. Semua kebutuhan yang diperlukan dapat dipenuhi oleh orangtuanya. “Yaa….untuk ukuran waktu itu sih dapat dikatakan cukup kaya yaa,” tandasnya mengisahkan.

Sehingga jika kemudian mengalami “penurunan” cukup drastis taraf kehidupan yang dialaminya, maka wajar kalau Ny. Sri Kusdiantinah merasa sangat shock. Dari kehidupan berkecukupan dengan penghasilan suami yang mampu mencukupi kebutuhan seluruh keluarga.

Mampu membuat keluarga mereka sejajar dengan keluarga lain, yang mempunyai banyak pembantu, peralatan rumah tangga yang komplit, perabotan rumah cukup mewah. Menjadi sebuah keluarga yang “pincang”, dengan berkurangnya seorang kepala rumah tangga yang bertanggung jawab atas kehidupan mereka.

Jadi walaupun “tinggalan” Mas Bambang cukup banyak, tetapi kalau terus-terusan diambil untuk dimakan, suwe-suwe kan yoo entek (lama kelamaan habis juga). Jadi saya mulai berpikir untuk berusaha memenuhi kebutuhan yang diperlukan oleh keluarga. Maka mulailah saya berpikir usaha apa yang harus saya lakukan,” ujarnya.

(marsoedioetomo/kristoforus talu)

Catatan :
(Sebelum menikah dengan Dr Soebandrio, Sri Kusdiantinah adalah istri Kolonel Bambang Supeno (Wakasad))

18 januari 1966

 

Benang Merah Soekarno Dan Mahasiswa

Selasa 18 Januari 1966, delegasi KAMI bertemu dengan Soekarno. Ini adalah yang kedua kalinya. Cuma, pertemuan pertama dengan Soekarno berlangsung ringkas saja, yaitu saat berlangsung Sidang Paripurna Kabinet 15 Januari. Delegasi mahasiswa menyampaikan tuntutan-tuntutan pembubaran PKI, reshufle kabinet dan penurunan harga. Pertemuan 18 Januari adalah pertemuan yang terjadwal. Dalam pertemuan itu, delegasi KAMI terdiri antara lain dari Cosmas Batubara, David Napitupulu, Zamroni, Mar’ie Muhammad, Elyas, Lim Bian Koen, Firdaus Wajdi, Abdul Gafur dan Djoni Sunarja. Tentang pertemuan ini, David Napitupulupernah mengisahkan di tahun 1986, betapa Soekarno masih berhasil menunjukkan wibawa dan membuat beberapa tokoh mahasiswa ‘melipatkan’ dan merapatkan tangan di depan perut bawah dengan santun. Menjawab tudingan Soekarno yang disampaikan dengan nada keras, salah satu anggota delegasi menjelaskan kepada Soekarno bahwa kalau ada ekses-ekses yang terjadi dalam aksi-aksi KAMI, semisal corat-coret dengan kata-kata kotor, itu “adalah pekerjaan tangan-tangan kotor” yang menyusup ke dalam “barisan mahasiswa progressif revolusioner”.

Soekarno antara lain mempersoalkan corat-coret yang menyebut salah satu isterinya, Nyonya Hartini, sebagai ”Gerwani Agung”. Gerwani adalah organisasi wanita onderbouw PKI.

Delegasi KAMI juga menyampaikan tiga tuntutan rakyat. Dan Soekarno menjawab “Saya mengerti sepenuhnya segala isi hati dan tuntutan para mahasiswa”, dan menyatakan tidak menyangsikan maksud-maksud baik mahasiswa. Tetapi dengan keras Soekarno menyatakan tidak setuju cara-cara mahasiswa yang menjurus ke arah vandalisme materil dan vandalisme mental, yang menurut sang Presiden bisa ditunggangi golongan tertentu dan Nekolim, yang tidak menghendaki persatuan Bung Karno dan mahasiswa. Dalam pertemuan yang disebut dialog ini, yang terjadi adalah Soekarno mengambil kesempatan berbicara lebih banyak daripada para mahasiswa. Tentang pembubaran PKI, kembali Soekarno tidak memberikan jawaban memenuhi tuntutan pembubaran, dan hanya menyuruh mahasiswa menunggu keputusan politik yang akan diambilnya.

Tentang ‘kemarahan’ Soekarno saat pertemuan tersebut, juga diceritakan tokoh 1966 Cosmas Batubara, dalam tulisannya ‘Napak Tilas Gerakan Mahasiswa 1966’ (dalam OC Kaligis – Rum Aly, Simtom Politik 1965, Kata Hasta, 2007).

Sebelum kami diterima Presiden, tulis Cosmas, ajudan Presiden yaitu Mayor KKO Widjanarko mengatakan Presiden “akan marah kepada anda semua”. Karena itu, kata Widjanarko, “saran saya, diam saja dan dengar. Biasanya Presiden itu akan marah-marah selama kurang lebih 30 menit”. Apa yang dikatakan Mayor Widjanarko memang benar. Setengah jam pertama Presiden Soekarno marah dan mengatakan bahwa para mahasiswa sudah ditunggangi oleh Nekolim (Neo Kolonialisme dan Imperialisme). “Kemudian secara khusus Presiden Soekarno marah kepada saya” dengan mengatakan, “saudara Cosmas sebagai orang Katolik, mengapa ikut-ikut demonstrasi dan saya dapat laporan bahwa anggota PMKRI menulis kata-kata yang tidak sopan terhadap Ibu Hartini. Saudara harus tahu bahwa Paus menghargai saya dan memberi bintang kepada saya. Betul kan saudara Frans Seda bahwa Paus baik dengan saya?”. Frans Seda yang ikut hadir dalam pertemuan itu mengangguk.

“Presiden Soekarno tidak sadar bahwa para mahasiswa yang datang masing-masing sangat independen” tulis Cosmas lebih lanjut. “Kalau saya diserang secara pribadi bukan berarti yang lain akan diam”. Setelah Presiden Soekarno marah-marah, para peserta pertemuan satu persatu melakukan reaksi dan akhirnya Presiden Soekarno kewalahan. Lalu sambil menoleh kepada Roeslan Abdoelgani, Soekarno berkata, “Roeslan, mereka ini belum mengerti revolusi. Bawa mereka dan ajar tentang revolusi”.

Akhirnya pertemuan selesai tapi belum ada putusan Presiden tentang Tritura. “Seperti hari-hari sebelumnya para mahasiswa mulai lagi demonstrasi. Dalam puncak kejengkelannya terhadap demonstrasi KAMI, maka pada tanggal 25 Februari 1966 Presiden Soekarno mengeluarkan putusan membubarkan KAMI yang diikuti pengumuman tidak boleh berkumpul lebih dari lima orang”.

(penasukarno)

 

 

 

10 Maret 1966

 

 

Dalam perjalanan hidup Bung Karno, peristiwa penyerahan surat perintah ke Soeharto, yang kemudian menggantikan Bung Karno menjadi presiden, mungkin bisa dikatakan sebagai momen yang menentukan. Sebelum penyarahan surat ini, ternyata suasana Jakarta tegang dan mencekam.

 

Pada 10 Maret malam, Bung Karno terpaksa diungsikan ke Istana Bogor karena alasan keamanan. Bagaimana Bung Karno melewati hari-hari yang menegangkan itu?

 

Berikut lanjutan kesaksian Mangil seperti yang tertulis dalam bukunya berjudul Kesaksian tentang Bung Karno 1945–1967.

JAKARTA, awal Maret 1966. Hari-hari terakhir ini banyak demonstrasi. Tak jarang demonstrasi ini menuju ke Istana Bung Karno.

 

Pada suatu malam, tepatnya pada 10 Maret 1966, Bung Karno memanggil Mangil. ’’Mangil, andaikata ada pasukan tank yang datang kemari untuk menangkap atau membunuh Bapak, apakah kamu ada waktu untuk membawa Bapak keluar dari Istana. Mangil, Bapak ini tua-tua begini masih kuat jalan kaki kalau kamu menghendaki Bapak keluar dari Istana dengan jalan kaki,’’ kata Bung Karno.

 

Mangil menjawab bisa. Mendengar jawaban ini, Bung Karno tampak lega. Waktu itu putra-putri Bung Karno tengah tidur di kamar masing-masing di Istana Merdeka.

 

Karena alasan keamanan, malam itu juga Bung Karno dibawa ke Istana Bogor. Rombongan Bung Karno melewati rute jalan-jalan kampung.

 

 Waktu itu, jalannya bukan aspal, tetapi tanah. Selain tidak beraspal, jalan ini juga kecil, tidak rata, banyak comberan, dan gelap sekali. Cahaya hanya berasal dari lampu mobil yang dikendarai Bung Karno dan rombongan.

 

Pagi-pagi sekali, rombongan Bung Karno ini tiba dengan selamat di Istana Bogor.

(pensukarno)

 

11 Maret 1966

 

Sebelas Maret 1966, pagi hari. Bung Karno sudah berangkat dari Istana Bogor menuju Istana Merdeka Jakarta karena ada laporan situasi telah memungkinkan bagi Bung Karno untuk kembali ke Jakarta.

 

Diputuskan Bung Karno ke Jakarta dengan helikopter. Dalam helikopter yang ditumpangi Bung Karno ini, tampak ajudan senior presiden yang juga Komandan Resimen Cakrabirawa Brigjen Sabur, Komandan Datasemen Kawal Pribadi Mangil, dan Pilot Kolonel Penerbang Kardjono.

 

Yang terakhir ini juga ajudan presiden dari unsur AURI (sekarang TNI AU).

Tak lama kemudian, rombongan dari Bogor ini mendarat di depan Istana Merdeka. Bung Karno langsung menuju salah satu ruang di Istana Negara dan memimpin sidang kabinet. Ketika rapat tengah berlangsung, ada informasi bahwa banyak tentara liar di lapangan sekitar Monas yang letaknya tak begitu jauh dari Istana Merdeka, tempat helikopter kepresidenan diparkir. Mereka tidak memakai tanda kesatuan. Makanya disebut pasukan liar.

 

Brigjen Sabur, komandan Cakrabirawa, segera memerintah perwira bawahannya, Mayor Sutarjo, untuk mengecek kebenaran informasi yang baru saja diterima.

 

Setelah perwira yang ditugasi kembali dan melapor, memang betul di sekitar Monas ada tentara yang dikatakan liar itu. Dia menyebut tentara ini dari RPKAD.

 

 Setelah mendengar laporan ini, Sabur masuk ke Istana Negara untuk berunding dengan Mayjen Amirmachmud yang sedang mengikuti sidang kabinet selaku Pangdam V/Jakarta Raya. Pembicaraan Sabur dengan Amirmachmud memutuskan agar Bung Karno pergi ke Istan Bogor dengan helikopter.

 

 Atas saran dua jenderal ini, Bung Karno pun ke Istana Bogor dengan helikopter.

 

Dari Istana Negara, Bung Karno berjalan kaki menuju Istana Merdeka, selanjutnya ke tempat parkir helikopter yang berada di luar pagar Istana Merdeka, disertai Amirmachmud dan Mangil.

 

 Dalam perjalanan, di dekat koepel (sekolah taman kanakkanak Istana Presiden) antara Istana Negara dan Istana Merdeka, Bung Karno bertanya kepada Amirmachmud,’’Mir, ada apa lagi ini?’’

 

Amirmachmud yang beberapa tahun kemudian menjadi Mendagri ini menjawab, ’’Itu tentara di luar tidak banyak. Paling-paling 50 orang. Bapak pergi saja ke Istana Bogor.’’

 

Bung Karno, Amirmachmud, dan Mangil terus berjalan menuju tempat helikopter melewati Istana Merdeka.

 

Setelah Bung Karno, Sabur, dan Mangil naik di dalam helikopter, pilot Kardjono mulai menerbangkan helikopter mengarah ke Bogor.

 

Sementara, Amirmachmud sendiri terus menuju Istana Negara. Sebelum helikopter start, Kardjono oleh Mangil diminta tidak terbang melalui daerah Monas, tetapi ke arah utara dan barat dulu, dalam upaya untuk menyelematkan Bung Karno dari jangkauan jarak tembak tentara liar.

 

Sewaktu Bung Karno keluar halaman Istana Merdeka, dapat terlihat jelas tentara yang dikatakan liar tersebut.

 

Mereka sangat dekat dengan helikopter kepresidenan yang memang sedang diparkir di depan Istana Merdeka, tepatnya di luar pagar.

 

 Melihat tentara liar ini, Bung Karno tampak tenang. Sabur memperkirakan jumlah tentara liar ini cukup banyak.

 

Tak kurang dari satu batalyon. Mangil menulis, fakta ini menujukkan bahwa Bung Karno sama sekali tidak dalam ketakutan ketika meninggalkan istana. Bung Karno tetap tenang meski tentara liar berada dalam jarak yang cukup dekat dengan helikopter kepresidenan.

 

Bahkan, Bung Karno telah masuk dalam jarak tembak. Selama menuju helikopter ini, Mangil selalu berada di depan Bung Karno dengan tujuan sebagai pagar hidup. Siapa tahu ada yang mencoba menembak Bung Karno.

Setelah beberapa lama terbang dengan helikopter, Bung Karno dan rombongan tiba di Istana Bogor.

 

 Bung Karno terus menuju kediamannya di paviliun istana. Beberapa saat kemudian, terdengar bunyi helikopter mendarat.

 

Tampak turun dari helikopter Wakil Perdana Menteri (Waperdam) I Soebandrio dan Waperdam III Chaerul Saleh. Keduanya membawa ajudan masing-masing.

 

Keempat orang tersebut langsung menuju paviliun. Tetapi bukan paviliun Bung Karno, melainkan paviliun tempat Mangil dan beberapa anah buahnya berjaga. Tak lama kemudian, tamu-tamu ini oleh Sabur dipersilakan beristirahat.

 

Tak terasa hari cepat merambat sore. Sekitar pukul 15.00 WIB, terdengar lagi bunyi helikopter mendarat.

 

 Dari paviliun tempat Mangil berjaga, terlihat tiga orang turun dari helikopter. Ternyata, mereka adalah Jenderal Basuki Rahmat, Jenderal M. Jusuf, dam Pangdam V/Jaya Jenderal Amirmachmud.

 

 Ketiganya terus menuju paviliun Mangil. Oleh Mangil, mereka dipersilakan duduk. Ia lantas menghubungi Sabur.

 

Sesudah berbincang-bincang dengan ketiga jenderal tersebut, Sabur menuju paviliun tempat Bung Karno beristirahat.

 

 Beberapa saat kemudian, Sabur datang dan mempersilakan ketiga jenderal tersebut datang ke paviliun Bung Karno.

 

Sekitar magrib, Sabur dengan tergesa-gesa datang ke paviliun Mangil sambil membawa kertas dan berkata kepada staf ajudan presiden, meminta mesin ketik dan kertas. ’’Gua mau bikin surat perintah, nih…’’

 

Mangil mengaku tidak memperhatikan apa yang diketik Sabur. Mangil tetap saja duduk di kursi.

 

Sesudah selesai mengetik, dengan langkah terburu-buru Sabur kembali ke paviliun Bung Karno.

Kurang lebih pada pukul 20.00 WIB, Basuki, Jusuf, dan Amirmachmud meninggalkan paviliun Istana Bogor ke Jakarta dengan naik mobil. Setelah itu, tidak ada kegiatan lagi dan tidak ada tamu untuk Bung Karno.

(penasukarno)

 

 

 

 

 

 

12 Maret 1966

 

Keesokan harinya, pada 12 Maret 1966, Mangil mendengar siaran radio, soal adanya surat perintah dari Presiden Soekarno kepada Menteri/Panglima Angkatan Darat Letjen Soeharto. Surat ini berisi tiga poin.

 

Pertama, menjamin keamanan dan ketenangan serta kestabilan jalannya pemerintahan dan revolusi.

Kedua, menjamin keselamatan pribadi dan kewibawaan presiden RI. Terakhir, melaksanakan dengan pasti segala ajaran Pemimpin Besar Revolusi.

 

Kelak, peristiwa ini dikenal dengan nama surat perintah 11 Maret (Supersemar).

 

Selain bersejarah, peristiwa ini mempunyai sisi lain.

 

Ia adalah kontroversi, sekaligus misteri.

 

Soalnya, sampai awal 1999, surat asli Supersemar ini tak ditemukan.

 

Entah siapa yang memegang surat aslinya. Pemerintah mempunyai dua kopi surat ini.

 

Anehnya, dua kopi surat ini berlainan.

 

Yang pasti, surat ini menandai pergantian kekuasaan dari Bung Karno ke Soeharto.

(penasukarno)

 

 

 


Aku Tahu Gerakan Jenderal Soeharto

Menjadi seorang Presiden mungkin “tidak terlalu sulit,” tetapi menjadi seorang pemimpin negeri sangatlah tidak mudah. Meraih jabatan sebagai Presiden banyak ditopang oleh kematangan strategi politik, tetapi menjadi pemimpin sebuah negeri sangat membutuhkan kekuatan mental serta kesediaan sakit dan berkorban demi negeri serta rakyat yang dipimpinnya.

Konsep sebagai seorang pemimpin besar telah ditunjukkan secara nyata oleh Presiden Soekarno dalam menyikapi langkah-langkah kudeta Jenderal Soeharto dan kroninya.

 

TINDAKAN Soeharto menyelewengkan Surat Perintah 11 Maret 1966 sangat menyakiti perasaan Bung Karno. Sejumlah petinggi militer yang masih setia pada Sukarno ketika itu pun merasa geram. Mereka meminta agar Sukarno bertindak tegas dengan memukul Soeharto dan pasukannya. Tetapi Sukarno menolak.

Sukarno tak mau terjadi huru-hara, apalagi sampai melibatkan tentara. Perang saudara, menurut Sukarno, adalah hal yang ditunggu-tunggu pihak asing—kaum kolonial yang mengincar Indonesia–sejak lama. Begitu perang saudara meletus, pihak asing, terutama Amerika Serikat dan Inggris akan mengirimkan pasukan mereka ke Indonesia dengan alasan menyelamatkan fasilitas negara mereka, mulai dari para diplomat kedutaanbesar sampai perusahaan-perusahaan asing milik mereka.

Kesaksian mengenai keengganan Sukarno menggunakan cara-cara kekerasan dalam menghadapi manuver Soeharto disampaikan salah seorang menteri Kabinet Dwikora, Muhammad Achadi. Saya bertemu Achadi, mantan menteri transmigrasi dan rektor Universitas Bung Karno itu dua pekan lalu di Jalan Taman Amir Hamzah, Jakarta Pusat. Achadi bercerita dengan lancar kepada saya dan beberapa teman. Air putih dan pisang rebus menemani pembicaraan kami sore itu.

Komandan Korps Komando (KKO) Letjen Hartono termasuk salah seorang petinggi militer yang menyatakan siap menunggu perintah pukul dari Sukarno. KKO sejak lama memang dikenal sebagai barisan pendukung utama Soekarno. Kalimat Hartono: “hitam kata Bung Karno, hitam kata KKo” yang populer di masa-masa itu masih sering terdengar hingga kini.

Suatu hari di pertengahan Maret 1966, Hartono yang ketika itu menjabat sebagai Menteri/Wakil Panglima Angkatan Laut itu datang ke Istana Merdeka menemui Bung Karno. Ketika itu Achadi sedang memberikan laporan pada Sukarno tentang penahanan beberapa menteri yang dilakukan oleh pasukan yang loyal pada Soeharto.

Mendengar laporan itu, menurut Achadi, Bung Karno berkata (kira-kira), “Kemarin sore Harto datang ke sini. Dia minta izin melakukan pengawalan kepada para menteri yang menurut informasi akan didemo oleh mahasiswa.”

“Tetapi itu bukan pengawalan,” kata Achadi. Untuk membuktikan laporannya, Achadi memerintahkan ajudannya menghubungi menteri penerangan Achmadi. Seperti Achadi, Achmadi juga duduk di Tim Epilog yang bertugas menghentikan ekses buruk pascapembunuhan enam jenderal dan perwira muda Angkatan Darat dinihari 1 Oktober 1965. Soeharto juga berada di dalam tim itu.

Tetapi setelah beberapa kali dicoba, Achmadi tidak dapat dihubungi. Tidak jelas dimana keberadaannya.

Saat itulah Hartono minta izin untuk menghadapi Soeharto dan pasukannya. Tetapi Bung Karno menggelengkan kepala, melarang.

 

Padahal masih kata Achadi, selain KKO, Panglima Kodam Jaya Amir Machmud, Panglima Kodam Siliwangi Ibrahim Adji, dan beberapa panglima kodam lainnya juga bersedia menghadapi Soeharto.

 

“Bung Karno tetap menggelengkan kepala. Dia sama sekali tidak mau terjadi pertumpahan darah, dan perang saudara.”

 

Kalau begitu apa yang harus kami lakukan, tanya Achadi dan Hartono.

 

Bung Karno memerintahkan Hartono untuk menghalang-halangi upaya Soeharto agar jangan sampai berkembang lebih jauh. “Hanya itu tugasnya, Hartono diminta menjabarkan sendiri. Yang jelas jangan sampai ada perang saudara,” kata Achadi.

 

Menghindari perang saudara inilah sebagai wujud kecintaan Presiden Soekarno terhadap rakyat dan negeri ini. Pantang bagi Bung Karno meneteskan darah diatas negeri ini, apabila hanya akan ditukar dengan sebuah kekuasaan

 

(penasukarno)

 

 

 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 Pancasilasakti Memorial Monument
In Memory of the Army Command Gestapu victims

 

 

General A. Yani
Army Commander-in-Chief

 
 
   

Lt. General M.T. Haryono
Deputy Commander
Fnance and Public Relations

Lt. General Suprapto
Deputy Commander
Administration

   
   

Lt. General S. Parman
First Assistant Intelligence

Maj. General D.I. Panjaitan
Fourth Assistant Logistics

   
   

Maj.General Sutoyo Siswomihardjo
Prosecutor General

Captain Pierre Tendean
Adjutant to General Nasution


Note: All officers received a honorary promotion

 
 

 The Coup and Its Aftermath


In the early hours of October 1 General Yani and five of his closest army associates, all general officers, were routed from their beds by units of the presidential security guard and told the president wished to see them immediately. Three resisted and were shot and killed on the spot; the other three were bundled into trucks and taken away, along with the bodies
of the three dead. The most senior general of all, Abdul Haris Nasution, the celebrated former army commander and now Minister of Defense, also was sought at his home that night but escaped, although an aide was killed and Nasution’s young daughter mortally wounded. (Nasution had gone over a garden wall to the grounds of the Iraqi ambassador’s neighboring residence, but broke his leg in the fall and remained hidden there until well after dawn.)

 

 

Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole)
Where victims were found

 

 

Cita2 perjuangan kami untuk menegakkan kemurnian Pantja Sila
tidak mungkin dipatahkan hanja dengan mengubur kami dalam sumur ini.
 

(Our struggle to uphold the sanctity of Panca Sila principles
will not end with our burial in this hole)

 
 

 

Funeral procession

 
 
 
 

September 30, 1965.

General Abdul Harris Nasution
gives the eulogy at the funeral
for the officers killed

   
The officers killed in the G30S events: Gen. Ahmad Yani
Lt.-Gen. Haryono
Lt.-Gen. Parman
Lt.-Gen. Suprapto
Maj.-Gen. Panjaitan
Maj.-Gen. Siswamohardjo
Captain Tendean (aide to Nasution)
What really happened in 1965?
Nobody knows. There are a great many theories, reports and analyses. Many of the leadings participants are now dead. During Suharto’s regime the government has banned most books and publications about the 1965 events, which makes the situation even more difficult.

 

Minister of Defense General A.H. Nasution escaped capture
His adjutant Pierre Tendean became the victim instead.

 Lubang Buaya

 

Troops watching the streets

 

General Nasution and General Suharto
Mourning at MABAD (Military Headquarters)

 Funeral Procession

 

Procession arrives at Kalibata Hero Cemetery

Managing Indonesia1. The Coup That Failed

During the last months of 1965 the Indonesian nation was gripped in a great and tragic madness. It was one of those times in human affairs when the assumptions on which civic life depends are swept away in a flood of hate and violence. In the capital city of Jakarta the children of the elite took to the streets, and public buildings were sacked. In the countryside of Java and Bali, villagers attacked their neighbors with knives and machetes. The dead were too numerous to count; estimates ran into the hundreds of thousands. By the time the killing came to an end, the third largest Communist party in the world lay destroyed.

It is in the nature of such events that controversy should surround the central questions they present. 1 Much of the controversy has concerned the role the Communist party of Indonesia played in the violent coup attempt that set so many other bloody events in motion. Another controversial subject has been the extent to which Sukarno himself might have known in advance about the attempted coup by dissident army officers. Still other questions have concerned the role of Soeharto, the army general who succeeded to power in the aftermath of the killings, and the role of the Chinese and the Americans in the affair. Yet, by far the most disturbing question has been how so many people could die, not anonymously as in modern warfare, but at the hands of their neighbors.

Wholly satisfactory answers to these questions will probably continue to elude us. Too many participants are dead, too many survivors silent. The trauma remains one from which the society can hardly be said to have recovered.

Nevertheless, it is important to search out as best one can the true nature of what happened. For these violent events, and the perceptions of those who survived them, contain the origins of much of what followed.

The Immediate Background to the Coup

The story begins in Jakarta in August 1965. It was a time of great discord in Indonesia’s national government. President Sukarno seemed nominally supreme in his command of state affairs, but this was far from the actual case. He had presided over the banishment from public life of a growing number of nationally prominent personalities and their parties, until his government no longer represented a large portion of the nation’s elite. As his political base narrowed, his role was increasingly reduced to that of balancing the interests and ambitions of the two powerful groups that remained, the Communist party and the army. The party leaders and the army had been deeply divided over a number of issues for many years. Neither side doubted that some kind of showdown would eventually occur between them. At the time, however, both had reason to feel unprepared for such a test of strength.

The Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI) had suffered a serious setback during the previous year. Breaking with its own long-term strategy of working in concert with other major groups in the national front, the party had struck out on its own in urging tenant farmers in Central and East Java to take “unilateral action” against their landlords, to make the land they tilled their own. But the campaign was disastrously ill conceived and considerable violence occurred; in the end the party’s rural forces were bested. Meanwhile, the party was progressing in its efforts to infiltrate the army officer corps, but the number of officers it could rely on in a physical showdown was small.

The leadership of the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) had meanwhile been shaken by evidence of significant disunity in its own senior ranks. A seminar that had been called earlier in the year to draw the army’s regional commanders together in a unified stand on matters of national policy had degenerated into polemics. It was the first such meeting since the regional rebellions of the late 1950s had been put down. In the political environment of 1965, army unity in ideological matters had become a high priority. According to participants, a significant minority of commanders held out in support of Sukarno’s increasingly leftist domestic and international priorities.

In the background lay Indonesia’s “confrontation” against neighboring Malaysia. The decision to “confront” the founding of Malaysia in late 1963 may well have been the result of happenstance as much as studied Indonesian intent. In any case, the time could not have been worse from the Indonesian point of view. The country was in the midst of a prolonged drought; rice production was down, and food was in short supply. In addition, the confrontation campaign disrupted Indonesia’s exports and this, in turn, reduced not only the country’s earnings of foreign exchange, but also the government’s revenues, the bulk of which came from taxes on foreign trade. Thus the government was increasingly obliged to finance its own operations by printing paper money. Inflation spiraled. Among the urban population, many of whom depended on civil servants’ incomes, the conditions of daily life became harsh indeed.

The campaign against Malaysia created serious problems for the Indonesian armed forces. The army was organized and trained for territorial defense; most of its units had no experience outside their native provinces. The air and naval arms necessary for invasion had proven hopelessly inadequate in the West Irian campaign. The army leadership also mistrusted both the air and naval services; they had been equipped and trained in recent years by the Russians, and their leaders were on good terms with the local Communist party leaders. Moreover, army intelligence had little knowledge of what awaited invading forces on their arrival on the Malayan peninsula; the first small units sent ashore on intelligence and sabotage missions had been quickly rounded up. But the balance of military forces on either side of the Straits of Malacca was not what weighed most heavily on the army commanders. Their main concern was the domestic political situation. From the outset they had to avoid the Communist party outflanking them on an issue of such strong nationalist appeal. As plans for the invasion of Malaysia advanced, they also had to avoid having their best and most loyal officers and their units removed from Java. The recent Communist party campaign in the countryside of Java left army commanders deeply concerned about their own rear defenses. From late 1964 on, Indonesian army intelligence officers were in secret communication with their opposite numbers in Kuala Lumpur, with a view to limiting the scale and costs of engagement. 2

The anti-Malaysia campaign presented the Communist party, on the other hand, with an opportunity to strengthen its standing with Sukarno and to isolate Indonesia still further from the Western powers. Sukarno was deeply committed personally to the anti-Malaysia policy but, after almost two years, little had happened beyond the war of propaganda; the army was obviously dragging its feet. By the beginning of 1965 the Communist party was pressing for a full role in the cabinet, and under the ground rules Sukarno himself had laid down, the party could not be denied indefinitely. In the early months of the year the party had further unnerved the generals by making two even more threatening proposals: (1) that the commanders of the armed forces, at every level, should be advised by a “troika” of political commissars, one of whom would represent the Communist party; and (2) that “workers and peasants” should be armed in a “fifth force” for the “safeguarding of the revolution.” By March 1965 Sukarno was receiving intelligence reports that some army commanders were making plans to overthrow him. In May he began to support the “troika” idea.

These developments thoroughly alarmed the army leadership, as well as many in the civilian elite. Lt. Gen. Achmad Yani, the army commander-in-chief, was now meeting regularly with a “brain trust” of his closest associates to discuss the army’s deteriorating political position. He protested the party proposals. He denied reports of an army plot against the president. But the party initiatives had placed him and his colleagues thoroughly on the defensive, and civilian friends wondered how long the army could stave off the PKI’s accession to formal power.

All this fed into the tension that was mounting in the background when, on August 3, Sukarno suddenly fell ill. The precise nature of his illness was never clear. He had had a long-term kidney condition and periodically sought treatment in Vienna. On this occasion, however, a team of Chinese doctors was flown in from Beijing, and Sukarno’s personal staff was totally mute about his condition. The impact this development had on both the party and army leaders is not difficult to imagine. Indeed, both were soon engaged in planning their moves should Sukarno suddenly die. Within a few days, Sukarno was said to be recovering; soon he was said to be preparing his annual address for Independence Day on August 17. But leaders of the party and the army were now receiving reports that the other was on the verge of a coup. By early September the Jakarta press was referring to rumors of a possible coup by either the army or the party. As things turned out, it was the army’s most senior officers who were caught unprepared.

Sukano, the Coup of 1965.

The Coup and the Aftermath


The British, Australian and rarely, the Americans treat war like a game of “cricket”, playing war by the rules. However as this collection of reports will show behind the scenes the story is far from “cricket”.
The coup that deposed President Sukano from power in Indonesia, contributed to the end of “Confrontation” however the cost in human lives was enormous; as many as two million people may have died with the full knowledge, assistance and gloating of Australia, Britain and the US!

Was the army behind it? Certainly not as an organization.
Rebel officers such as Untung probably acted without broad support.

What about Suharto? There is no direct evidence against him. However, rumors persist that Suharto may have heard of the coup plans before September 30th, and so was ready to take advantage of the disorder beforehand.

Was the PKI behind it? The PKI had made two hopeless attempts to take power before, in 1926 and again at Madiun in 1948. Is it possible that rebellious, undisciplined officers planned the coup, and then the PKI announced its support?

The coup plotters may have been motivated by President Sukarno’s illnesses–assuming that a weaker president meant that the government could be taken more easily. This sort of thinking may have led them to overestimate their own strength. It might also be possible that Sukarno’s worsening health caused the coup plotters to act too soon.

Were foreign powers involved? There was heavy involvement by China in Indonesian politics in 1965. The Chinese government in Beijing seemed to already know the names of the generals who had been targeted before the announcements on the middle of October 1–and the Chinese list of names included Nasution as a victim, even though he had escaped. Long after the coup in Jakarta was suppressed, on October 19, Chinese news stories expressed support for it.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union were supplying aid either directly to the government or to their friends in ABRI. Some official Soviet news stories were critical of the coup events, however. The West German goverment supplied secret aid to anti-communists. We know today, too, that the CIA gave lists of Indonesian communists to the Indonesian military during the purges that came after. But did foreign powers help plan G30S? Probably not, but again, we do not know.

It is perhaps most possible that whatever secret plans had been made did not go exactly as the planners intended beforehand.

By the end of 1965, a huge wave of popular violence against the PKI had started. In West and Central Java, the army began rounding up Communists, but in many villages, people took the law into their own hands. In some areas, such as East Java or Aceh, Islamic groups (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama youth group Ansor) fought to wipe out communists. However, there was a heavy anti-communist purge on Bali as well. Thousands were sent to prison, and over a year’s time, perhaps more than 250,000 were dead. ABRI did not commit all of the killings, but ABRI officers did arm and train the student groups that committed killings, and also did not act to stop the violence until the PKI had been wiped out.

Suharto’s main supporters in ABRI were Brig. Gen. Kemal Idris, Col. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, and Maj. Gen. Dharsono.


Revised: April 14, 2004

 
 

The Coup and the Aftermath


By 1965 Indonesia had become a dangerous cockpit of social and political antagonisms. The PKIs rapid growth aroused the hostility of Islamic groups and the military. The ABRI-PKI balancing act, which supported Sukarnos Guided Democracy regime, was going awry. One of the most serious points of contention was the PKIs desire to establish a “fifth force” of armed peasants and workers in conjunction with the four branches of the regular armed forces (army, navy, air force, and police). Many officers were bitterly hostile, especially after Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered to supply the “fifth force” with arms. By 1965 ABRIs highest ranks were divided into factions supporting Sukarno and the PKI and those opposed, the latter including ABRI chief of staff Nasution and Major General Suharto, commander of Kostrad. Sukarno collapsed during a speech and rumors that he was dying also added to the atmosphere of instability.

The circumstances surrounding the abortive coup of September 30, 1965; an event that led to Sukarnos displacement from power; a bloody purge of PKI members on Java, Bali, and elsewhere; and the rise of Suharto as architect of the New Order regime still remain shrouded in mystery and controversy. The official and generally accepted account is that procommunist military officers, calling themselves the September 30 Movement (Gestapu), attempted to seize power. Capturing the Indonesian state radio station on October 1, 1965, they announced that they had formed the Revolutionary Council and a cabinet in order to avert a coup by corrupt generals who were allegedly in the pay of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The coup perpetrators murdered five generals on the night of September 30 and fatally wounded Nasutions daughter in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him. Contingents of the Diponegoro Division, based in Jawa Tengah Province, rallied in support of the September 30 Movement. Communist officials in various parts of Java also expressed their support.

The extent and nature of PKI involvement in the coup are unclear, however. Whereas the official accounts promulgated by the military describe the communists as having a “puppetmaster” role, some foreign scholars have suggested that PKI involvement was minimal and that the coup was the result of rivalry between military factions. Although evidence presented at trials of coup leaders by the military implicated the PKI, the testimony of witnesses may have been coerced. A pivotal figure seems to have been Syam, head of the PKIs secret operations, who was close to Aidit and allegedly had fostered close contacts with dissident elements within the military. But one scholar has suggested that Syam may have been an army agent provocateur who deceived the communist leadership into believing that sympathetic elements in the ranks were strong enough to conduct a successful bid for power. Another hypothesis is that Aidit and PKI leaders then in Beijing had seriously miscalculated Sukarnos medical problems and moved to consolidate their support in the military. Others believe that ironically Sukarno himself was responsible for masterminding the coup with the cooperation of the PKI.

In a series of papers written after the coup and published in 1971, Cornell University scholars Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey argued that it was an “internal army affair” and that the PKI was not involved. There was, they argued, no reason for the PKI to attempt to overthrow the regime when it had been steadily gaining power on the local level. More radical scenarios allege significant United States involvement. United States military assistance programs to Indonesia were substantial even during the Guided Democracy period and allegedly were designed to establish a pro-United States, anticommunist constituency within the armed forces.

In the wake of the September 30 coups failure, there was a violent anticommunist reaction. By December 1965, mobs were engaged in large-scale killings, most notably in Jawa Timur Province and on Bali, but also in parts of Sumatra. Members of Ansor, the Nahdatul Ulamas youth branch, were particularly zealous in carrying out a “holy war” against the PKI on the village level. Chinese were also targets of mob violence. Estimates of the number killed (both Chinese and others) vary widely, from a low of 78,000 to 2 million; probably somewhere around 300,000 is most likely. Whichever figure is true, the elimination of the PKI was the bloodiest event in postwar Southeast Asia until the Khmer Rouge established its regime in Cambodia a decade later.

The period from October 1965 to March 1966 witnessed the eclipse of Sukarno and the rise of Suharto to a position of supreme power. Born in the Yogyakarta region in 1921, Suharto came from a lower priyayi family and received military training in Peta during the Japanese occupation. During the war for independence, he distinguished himself by leading a lightning attack on Yogyakarta, seizing it on March 1, 1949, after the Dutch had captured it in their second “police action.” Rising quickly through the ranks, he was placed in charge of the Diponegoro Division in 1962 and Kostrad the following year.

After the elimination of the PKI and purge of the armed forces of pro-Sukarno elements, the president was left in an isolated, defenseless position. By signing the executive order of March 11, 1966, Supersemar, he was obliged to transfer supreme authority to Suharto. On March 12, 1967, the MPRS stripped Sukarno of all political power and installed Suharto as acting president. Sukarno was kept under virtual house arrest, a lonely and tragic figure, until his death in June 1970.

The year 1966 marked the beginning of dramatic changes in Indonesian foreign policy. Friendly relations were restored with Western countries, Confrontation with Malaysia ended on August 11, and in September Indonesia rejoined the UN. In 1967 ties with Beijing were, in the words of Indonesian minister of foreign affairs Adam Malik, “frozen.” This meant that although relations with Beijing were suspended, Jakarta did not seek to establish relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. That same year, Indonesia joined Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore to form a new regional and officially nonaligned grouping, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was friendly to the West.

New evidence on how the October 1st. coup was triggered
Damning new evidence has come to light pointing to the extent of the involvement of the United States government, closely supported by the Australian and British administrations, in the military coup staged in Indonesia by General Suharto on October 1, 1965 and the subsequent massacre of up to one million workers, peasants, students and political activists.

The Sydney Morning Herald in 1999, published a three-part series that included interviews with former Indonesian political prisoners and extracts from documents obtained from US and Australian archives. The material shows that the Western powers urged the Indonesian military commanders to seize upon false claims of a coup attempt instigated by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), in order to carry out one of the greatest civilian massacres of the 20th century and establish a military dictatorship.

By most estimates, between 500,000 and a million PKI members and supporters, as well as people of ethnic Chinese origin, were murdered, and tens of thousands were detained in prisons and concentration camps, without any visible resistance. The documents show that throughout late 1965 and early 1966 US and Australian officials approvingly reported to their respective governments that army units and Muslim groups were working hand-in-hand to shoot, hack or club to death at least 1,500 suspected PKI sympathisers per day, sometimes parading their heads on sticks.

This enthusiasm in the Western embassies for the bloodbath reflected deep strategic and political interests. In the decade before the coup, the major powers had come into increasing conflict with the unstable nationalist regime of Indonesian President Sukarno. In late 1957 and again in 1964-65 he had barely contained mass movements of workers and peasants, whose strikes and occupations threatened first Dutch and then US and British banks, companies and plantations. By 1965 Sukarno was precariously balancing between the military commanders, the Muslim organisations and the PKI, which had some three million members and supporters, making it the third largest Communist Party in the world, after China and the Soviet Union.

The US had cut off foreign aid to Sukarno while building up relations with sections of the military. From the mid-1950s it began training and equipping Indonesian officers and troops, in preparation for a move to topple or sideline Sukarno. The first coup attempt came in November 1956 when Indonesian army Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Zulkifli Lubis sought to take control of Jakarta and overthrow the government. Regional military takeovers followed the next month in Central and North Sumatra. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the CIA inspired a series of secessionist and right-wing revolts in the oil-rich regions of Sumatra and Sulawesi, where Caltex and other US oil firms had large investments. Then between 1959 and 1965, the US supplied $64 million in military aid to the Indonesian generals.

A huge amount was at stake for the US and its allies. Indonesia had immense natural resources, including some of the largest oil and rubber operations in the world, a teeming population and its 3,000 islands sat astride the sea routes from Asia to Europe. The US and the other capitalist powers regarded the archipelago as an absolutely crucial prize in the war against the anti-imperialist struggles that erupted across Asia after World War II. The 1949 victory of Mao Zedongs forces in China had been followed by that of Ho Chi Minhs in northern Vietnam. Insurgencies arose in Indochina, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines from the late 1940s.

In the months prior to the Indonesian coup, the US administration of Democratic Party President Lyndon Johnson had dramatically escalated its intervention in Vietnam, sending in hundreds of thousands of troops and beginning its saturation bombing of the north. And the British and Australian governments were engaged in military conflict with Sukarnos regime over Indonesias opposition to the British-backed formation of Malaysia, which encompassed key portions of the large mainly Indonesian island of Borneo.

The September 30 affair
The first part of the Sydney Morning Heralds series is substantially based on an interview with former Sergeant Major Bungkus and earlier statements by former Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Latief. Both were jailed in 1965 for their involvement in a supposed military putsch instigated by the PKI on September 30, 1965. They were only released from prison in March this year (1999), apparently the only survivors of the participants in the September 30 affair. Hundreds of others were tortured and executed.

Their testimony completely undermines the official version of Suhartos coup; that he and his fellow generals were responding to a takeover bid instigated by the PKI through its supporters in the military. By this official account (presented in “documentary” form annually on all Indonesian TV stations until last year) PKI-inspired officers rounded up six of the Indonaias highest-ranking generals on the night of September 30 and brutally killed them, leaving their bodies horribly mutilated. The plot was only thwarted, the authorised story insists, and the nation saved from the “evil” of communism, when General Suharto heroically intervened and took control of Jakarta the next day.

According to the statements given by Bungkus and Latief, the alleged “PKI coup” was an internal military power struggle, engineered by Suharto as a pretext to destroy the PKI.
Bungkus, as a member of the Indonesian presidential guard, was ordered on the night of September 30 to participate in one of seven teams dispatched to kill or capture senior generals. At a briefing, Bungkus and other NCOs were told by their commanding officer, Lieutenant Dul Arief, that seven top generals had set up a ?Dewan Jenderal? or Council of Generals, and were planning to stage a coup against the then president, Sukarno.

By September 1965, the situation in Indonesia was extremely tense. Rumours abounded that the army was going to once more move against Sukarno and the PKI through the establishment of such a Council of Generals.
Yet, the operation against the generals on September 30 had two obvious flaws. In the first place, the squad sent to the home of the Indonesian Defence Minister General A. H. Nasution (the officer with the closest links to the US Embassy and the CIA) somehow failed its assignment, allowing Nasution to escape. Secondly, no-one was sent to deal with General Suharto, then the commander of the Army Strategic Reserve. On October 1, Suharto, backed by Nasution, was able to quickly mobilise the necessary units to take control of Jakarta and then extend his rule across the country.

Bungkus was only a junior figure in the events but he insists that the officers from whom he took his instructions were
not linked to the PKI. And he and other members of the presidential guard who took part in the assassinations were simply following orders. In his view, Suharto carefully orchestrated the September 30 affair as a means of moving against the entire left-wing movement in Indonesia.
This is corroborated by Latief, who revealed a number of critical facts upon his release from prison. He said that he
had personally reported the coup plan to Suharto before the killings. “Pak Harto [Suharto] knew for sure that on September 30, the seven generals were to be brought to Bung Karno [Sukarno],” Latief said.

Latief said he went to the military hospital where Suharto was with his ill baby Tommy, to alert him to the intended move against the seven generals, but Suharto took no action. “I think it is clear Pak Harto used the opportunity of the arrest of the generals to blame the PKI and reach power.”
Latief also referred to a document proving British and American involvement in a plot by the seven generals to effectively seize power from Sukarno. “The plan to arrest the generals was related to the existence of a “Council of Generals” which was first revealed through the leaking of a British Embassy document, which said the council was to supervise Sukarnos policies. The document, a letter from the British Ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, also revealed the British were working with the CIA.”

Unanswered questions remain about the events of September 30-October 1. It is not certain whether Suharto merely allowed the murder of the generals, or helped organise them. The involvement of the CIA and the British in Suhartos actions requires further investigation. Noticeably, none of the archives dealing with the lead up to the coup have yet been opened. But the speed with which Suharto moved on October 1 supports the conclusion that, acting in concert with the US agencies, he engineered the whole operation to eliminate his rivals and provide a pretext for moving against Sukarno and the PKI.

Finally, it is highly unlikely that the PKI planned to overthrow Sukarnos government, in which the party participated as coalition partners with the military and Muslim leaders. In line with the Stalinist doctrine of maintaining an alliance with Sukarno and the national capitalist class, the PKI leaders had repeatedly helped quell the struggles of workers and peasants. Under the “two-stage” theory, they had insisted that socialism would only arise peacefully and gradually after a prolonged capitalist stage of development in Indonesia. Even as signs grew of preparations for a generals coup, they had urged their followers to have faith in the so-called pro-peoples aspect of the military apparatus.

Moreover, there was no mobilisation of the vast membership of the PKI and its associated trade unions, student organisations, womens movements and peasant organisations. In the subsequent holocaust there was no sign of PKI-led resistance. In fact, even as the death squads were set loose, the surviving PKI leaders and their patrons in Moscow and Beijing urged PKI followers to offer no opposition but to continue to subordinate themselves to Sukarno, who collaborated with Suharto and was retained as titular president until 1967.

The new evidence of direct US, British and Australian involvement in triggering and exploiting the 1965-66 events provides a critical lesson in the so-called democratic and humanitarian concerns of the major capitalist powers. They stand ready to orchestrate and sanction mass killings and repression to pursue their economic and strategic requirements in Indonesia and elsewhere.

US orchestrated Suhartos 1965-66 slaughter in Indonesia
Who plotted the 1965 coup?

Suharto always said it was the communists. Yet from the start, says Colonel Latief, Suharto himself was involved.
Indonesian President BJ Habibie has refused to release Colonel Latief, whose arrest in 1965 for involvement in a military coup was followed by Major-General Suhartos rise to the presidency.
Habibie has granted amnesty to 73 other political prisoners, even to members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) accused of involvement in the 1965 coup attempt. Refusing amnesty to Latief now shows how Suharto overshadows Habibie.

Interviewed in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, three days after Suharto resigned, Latief told me that he expected never to be released. Despite various kidney operations and the stroke he suffered last year, Latief is still very alert. His explanation for his involvement in 1965 directly implicates Suharto.

By late 1965, President Sukarno was ailing and without a successor. Tension between the PKI and the armed forces was growing. Conspiracies rumours were rife. Who would make the first move?

On the night of 30th. September 1965, six hours before the military coup, Latief confirmed with Suharto that the plan to kidnap seven army generals would soon start. Latief was an officer attached to the Jakarta military command. As head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), Suharto held the optimum position to crush the operation, so his name should have been at the top of the list. When troops who conducted the kidnappings asked why Suharto was not on the list, they were told: “Because he is one of us”
There was a rumour the seven generals were intending to seize power from Sukarno. Latief and two other army officers in the operation, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung (in charge of some of the troops guarding Sukarno’s palace) and General Supardjo (a commander from Kalimantan), planned to kidnap the generals and bring them before President Sukarno to explain themselves.

The 30th September Movement was thus a limited pre-emptive strike by pro-Sukarno officers against anti-Sukarno officers. They kidnapped the generals and occupied strategic centres in Jakarta’s main square, without touching Suharto’s headquarters. The plan involved no killing, but it went terribly wrong and six of the seven died.
Although Untung was assigned responsibility for collecting the generals, this crucial task was then taken over by a certain Kamaruzzaman alias Sjam, evidently a “double agent” with contacts in the Jakarta military command as well as the PKI. At his trial, Sjam admitted responsibility for killing the generals but blamed the PKI under Aidit. In 1965 when Suharto accused the PKI of responsibility for killing the generals, the Sjam-Aidit link gave Suharto enough leverage to convince his contemporaries.
Between Sjam and Suharto there was a twenty-year friendship going back to the fight against the Dutch in Central Java in 1948-49. This strengthened in the late 1950s when both attended the Bandung Staff College.

Suharto was also on close terms with Untung, who served under him during the campaign to reclaim Netherlands New Guinea in 1962 and who became a family friend.
During his trial in 1978, not only did Latief explain that he met Suharto on the night of the coup, but also that several days before he met both Suharto and his wife in the privacy of Suhartos home to discuss the overall plan. The court declared that this information was “not relevant”.
Suharto, more than anybody, described the events that night as “communist inspired”. Suhartos claim that he saw the slain generals bodies had been sexually mutilated was shown to be deliberately false by post-mortem documents, not revealed till decades later. This false claim provoked months of killings against communists, particularly in Bali and Central and East Java.

The PKI, numbering 20 million, were mostly rice farmers. Accused en masse they became victims in one of the worst massacres this century. In the opinion of the author, many writers underestimated the death toll, which may be as high as one million persons. Another 700,000 were imprisoned without trial. The most notorious general involved, Sarwo Edhie, claimed not one but two million were killed. “And we did a good job”, he added. Traumatised by violence, the nation became politically malleable.
Using Suhartos own categorisation of crimes related to 1965, his prior knowledge of the alleged coup places him in “Category A” involvement; the same as those who faced execution or life imprisonment.

The release of Colonel Latief is a litmus test of Habibies willingness to promote genuine reform. Fewer than ten long term prisoners remain. Latief has pleaded: “Most of them are already 70 years old and fragile. For the sake of humanity, please take notice of us.”


The Indonesian Massacres and the CIA
In a recent story in the San Francisco Examiner, researcher Kathy Kadane quotes CIA and State department officials who admit compiling lists of names of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), making those lists available to the Indonesian military, and checking names off as people were “eliminated.” The killings were part of a massive bloodletting after an abortive coup attempt taking, according to various estimates, between 250,000 and 1,000,000 lives and ultimately led to the overthrow of President Sukarnos government.

Since then a debate has simmered over what happened. A recent study based on information from former Johnson administration officials, asserted that for months the U.S. “did their damnedest” through public pressure and more discreet methods, to prod the Indonesian army to move against Sukarno without success.
Debate continues over the origins of the coup attempt called Gestapu. Was it the result of CIA machinations, a takeover maneuver by General Suharto, a revolt by leftist officers under the control of the PKI, a power play by the Peoples Republic of China, a pre-emptive strike by Sukarno loyalists to prevent a move by officers friendly to the CIA, some combination of these factors, or others as yet unknown? I confess to no inside knowledge of the Gestapu.

Historical Background
It is well known that the CIA had long sought to unseat Sukarno: by funding an opposition political party in the mid-1950s, sponsoring a massive military overthrow attempt in the mid-1958, planning his assassination in 1961, and by rigging intelligence to inflame official U.S. concerns in order to win approval for planned covert actions.

Before attempting to describe one aspect of the CIAs role, it is essential to provide background on the scope and nature of its worldwide operations. Between 1961 and 1975 the Agency conducted 900 major or sensitive operations, and thousands of lesser covert actions. The majority of its operations were propaganda, election or paramilitary. Countries of major concern, such as Indonesia in the early 1960s, were usually subjected to the CIAs most concerted attention.
Critics of the CIA have aptly described the mainstays of such attention: “discrediting political groups… by forged documents that may be attributed to them. . . ,” faking “communist weapon shipments,” capturing communist documents and then inserting forgeries prepared by the Agency Technical Services Division. The CIAs “Mighty Wurlitzer” then emblazoned and disseminated the details of such “discoveries.”

The Mighty Wurlitzer was a worldwide propaganda mechanism consisting of hundreds or even thousands of media representatives and officials including, over a period of years, approximately 400 members of the American media. The CIA has used the Wurlitzer and its successors to plant stories and to suppress expository or critical reporting in order to manipulate domestic and international perceptions. From the early 1980s, many media operations formerly the responsibility of the CIA have been funded somewhat overtly by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

From the earliest days, the Agencys International Organizations Division (IOD) implemented and coordinated its extensive covert operations. The divisions activities created or assisted international organizations for youth, students, teachers, workers, veterans, journalists, and jurists. The CIA used, and continues to use, the various labor, student, and other suborned organizations not only for intelligence and propaganda purposes, but also to participate in elections and paramilitary operations and to assist in overthrowing governments. At the same time, the CIA manipulates their organizational publications for covert propaganda goals.

The labor unions the CIA creates and subsidizes, in their more virulent stages, provide strong-arm goon squads who burn buildings, threaten and beat up opponents, pose as groups of the opposition to discredit them, terrorize and control labor meetings, and participate in coups.

Use of “Subversive Control Watch Lists”
As a matter of course, the Agency develops close relationships with security services in friendly nations and exploits these in many ways-by recruiting unilateral sources to spy on the home government, by implementing pro-U.S. policies, and by gathering and exchanging intelligence. As one aspect of those liaisons, the CIA universally compiles local “Subversive Control Watch Lists” of leftists for attention by the local government. Frequently that attention is the charter of government death squads.

After the CIAs overthrow of Arbenzs government in Guatemala in 1954, the U.S. gave the new government lists of opponents to be eliminated. In Chile from 1971 through 1973, the CIA fomented a military coup through forgery and propaganda operations and compiled arrest lists of thousands, many of whom were later arrested and assassinated. In Bolivia in 1975, the CIA provided lists of progressive priests and nuns to the government which planned to harass, arrest and expel them. To curry the favor of Khomeini, in 1983 the CIA gave his government a list of KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran. Khomeini then executed 200 suspects and closed down the communist Tudeh party. In Thailand, I provided the names of hundreds of leftists to Thai security services. The Phoenix program in Vietnam was a massive U.S. backed program to compile arrest and assassination lists of the Viet Cong for action by CIA created Provisional Reconnaissance Unit death squads. In fact, former Director of the CIA William Colby compared the Indonesian operation directly to the Vietnam Phoenix Program. Colby further admitted directing the CIA to concentrate on compiling lists of members of the PKI and other left groups.

In 1963, responding to Colbys direction, U.S. trained Indonesian trade unionists began gathering the names of workers who were members or sympathizers of unions affiliated with the national labor federation, SOBSI. These trade unionist spies laid the groundwork for many of the massacres of 1965-1966. The CIA also used elements in the 105,000 strong Indonesian national police force to penetrate and gather information on the PKI.

Providing “Watch Lists” based on technical and human penetration of targeted groups is a continuing program of CIA covert operators. Today, U.S.-advised security services in El Salvador, using the techniques of the Phoenix program, operate throughout El Salvador and have taken a heavy toll on peasants, activists and labor leaders in that country. In the late 1980s, the CIA began assisting the Philippine government in the conduct of “low-intensity” operations by, among other things, computerizing security service records of leftists and assisting in the development of a national identity card program. Wherever the CIA cooperates with other national security services it is safe to assume that it also compiles and passes “Subversive Control Watch Lists.”

Putting the Pieces Together
All of this is essential to understanding what happened in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966. In September and October of 1965, the murder of six top military officers during the Gestapu coup attempt provided a pretext for destroying the PKI and removing Sukarno. Surviving officers-principally General Suharto, who was not a target-rallied the army and defeated the coup, ultimately unseating Sukarno.

Two weeks before the coup, the army had been warned that the PKI was plotting to assassinate army leaders. The PKI, nominally backed by Sukarno, was a legal and formidable organization and was the third largest Communist Party in the world. It claimed three million members, and through affiliated organizations-such as labor and youth groups-it had the support of 17 million others. The Army’s anxiety had been fed by rumors throughout 1965 that mainland China was smuggling arms to the PKI for an imminent revolt. Such a story appeared in a Malaysian newspaper, citing Bangkok sources which relied in turn on Hong Kong sources. Such untraceability is a telltale mark of the Mighty Wurlitzer.

Less subtle propaganda claimed that the PKI was a tool of the Red Chinese and planned to infiltrate and divide the armed forces. To bolster these allegations, “communist weapons” were discovered inside Chinese crates labeled as construction material. Far more inflammatory news reporting prior to October 1965 claimed the PKI had a secret list of civilian and military leaders marked for beheading.

After the coup attempt the Indonesian Army in the main left the PKI alone, as there was no credible evidence to substantiate the horror stories in the press. [Eight sentences censored.] As noted, a favorite tactic is to arrange for the capture of communist documents and then insert forgeries prepared by the Agency’s Technical Services Division.

Suddenly documents were serendipitously discovered providing “proof” of PKI guilt. On October 23, 1965, the Suara Islam reported:

…millions of copies of the text of a proclamation of the counterrevolutionary Gestapu…have been recovered…. The text…was obviously printed in the CPR [People’s Republic of China]. Steel helmets and a large quantity of military equipment have also been found…. There is in controvertible evidence of the CPR’s involvement…. The arms sent by the CPR were shipped under cover of “diplomatic immunity.” …other important documents offer irrefutable evidence of the involvement of the CPR Embassy and the CPR ambassador….

On October 30,1965 Major General Suharto, in a speech before a military audience, angrily denounced the PKI saying that captured documents proved the PKI was behind Gestapu. Suharto demanded that the “Communists be completely uprooted.”

On November 2, the Indonesian Armed Forces Bulletin asserted that the PKI had a plan for revolution, and published supposed PKI directives for the period following the October coup attempt. The document stated that the PKI “is only supporting the revolutionary council” that the coup tried to establish. It added that if the council were crushed the PKI would “directly confront” the generals whom the coup leaders accused of planning to overthrow President Sukarno. The document also said, “when the revolution is directly led by the PKI, we can achieve victory because the command will be under the PKI-our hidden strength is in the armed forces.”

Military leaders [seven words censored] began a bloody extermination campaign. Civilians involved were either recruited and trained by the army on the spot, or were drawn from groups such as the army- and CIA-sponsored SOKSI trade unions [Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees], and allied student organizations. Media fabrications had played a key role in preparing public opinion and mobilizing these groups for the massacre.

The documents, manufactured stories of communist plans and atrocities, and claims of communist arms shipments created an atmosphere of hysteria, resulting in the slaughter and the establishment of a dictatorship that still exists today.

The Agency wrote a secret study of what it did in Indonesia. [One sentence censored.] The CIA was extremely proud of its [one word censored] and recommended it as a model for future operations [one half sentence censored].

Yesterdays Fake News, Todays Fake History
The CIA desperately wants to conceal evidence of its role in the massacre, which it admits was one of the centuries worst. The U.S. media seem equally determined to protect the American image from consequences of covert operations.
Reaction to Kadanes new revelations was swift. An Op-Ed by columnist Stephen S. Rosenfeld in the July 20, 1990 Washington Post, and an article by correspondent Michael Wines in the July 12, 1990 New York Times, each deny any CIA role in the massacre. Rosenfeld, reversing his conclusions of a week before, ignores the new evidence, cites one of many academic studies, and concludes with certainty: “For me, the question of the American role in Indonesia is closed.”

New light on an active Australian involvement
Previously-secret documents at the Australian Archives in Canberra indicate that the Australian government; then led by Liberal Party Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, and the Australian military, intelligence and diplomatic services were closely involved in the 1965-66 Indonesian coup carried out by General Suharto.

In publishing some of the records on July 12, the Sydney Morning Herald chose the headline, “The silent watchers”. Its introduction said the documents showed that the federal government had “turned a blind eye” to the “indiscriminate slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians”.
But the documents themselves confirm that the Australian role was as active as that of the US government, if only on a smaller scale. Its military had trained some of the officers taking part in the massacre, and during 1965-66 the Menzies government and its officials shared intelligence sources, reports and assessments on the most intimate basis with their American, Canadian and British counterparts.

Moreover, the records demonstrate that the cables sent to and from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta mirrored, at times word for word, those from the US Embassy in their insistence that the Indonesian generals led by Suharto had to act ruthlessly to crush all support for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), especially among industrial workers.
Nor was this an “indiscriminate slaughter”. The documents point to a common view, shared by the American, British and Australian governments, that the establishment of a military dictatorship in Indonesia was an essential contribution toward the wider war against the anti-imperialist struggles that had erupted in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia.

Earlier in 1965 the Menzies government had committed troops to both Borneo and South Vietnam. In January, it had agreed to the deployment of a combat battalion and a 100-strong SAS unit to Borneo to combat Indonesian forces mobilised by the Sukarno government as part of its campaign against the British-sponsored formation of Malaysia, which included the resource-rich former British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak. In April, the Menzies cabinet had committed the first battalion of infantry to the US intervention in Vietnam

The documents published by the Sydney Morning Herald relate to the period after Suhartos seizure of power on October 1, 1965. Thus, they only indirectly shed light on the Australian involvement in the US preparations for the coup. In addition, the present Howard government continues to block access to hundreds of pages of material held in the Archives on the 1965-66 events in Indonesia. No doubt, the documents that have been released are the least incriminating.
Yet they are damning enough. They show that on October 5, 1965; just four days after Suhartos takeover; the Australian Ambassador in Jakarta, K. C. O. “Mick” Shann used identical language to that of the US Ambassador, Marshall Green, in welcoming Suhartos coup. It was “now or never” for the Indonesian army to deal with the PKI, Shann advised Canberra. On the same day, Green had told Washington that: “Army now has opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly … In short, it’s now or never.”

If anything, Shann was more vitriolic than his American colleague in demanding decisive action by the Indonesian generals. “Change there will be”, he said in a dispatch to Canberra the next day. “We will never get back to the status quo ante. But if Sukarno and his greasy civilian cohorts get back into the saddle it will be a change for the worse.”
By October 12, External Affairs Department officials in Canberra were encouraged by the developments. Arrests, murders and executions had begun, and mobs had ransacked the houses of PKI members of Sukarnos cabinet.

In a memo to External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck, a first assistant secretary in the department, Gordon Jockel, said: “Since our last note to you the army has been more vigorous and independent. Despite a presidental call for unity, the army and the Muslim groups are taking strong practical action to disarm the PKI and disrupt its organisation.” Jockel described these trends as “favourable,” although there were “still great uncertainties”.

Three days later, the Embassy informed Canberra that: “Almost daily, offices, houses and bookshops have been ransacked or burned and the momentum does not seem to be faltering.” On the same day, Shann sent a report in which he noted that mass killings of PKI supporters were underway. “At least a few (suspects) have been brutally murdered. We will never know how many people have lost their lives. We think it is a lot.”
Shann indicated that the Western powers were still not fully confident in the militarys role. There was likely to be no great joy for the West if the army came to power, he thought. It would remain “Implacably anti-imperialist and therefore … anti-American, anti-British and, to the extent that we bother them, anti-Australian.”
Two days later, on October 17, according to US documents, US and Australian officials met in Washington to discuss Indonesia and the armys strategy. A US State Department memo indicates that the US Assistant Secretary of State, McGeorge Bundy, met the head of Australias External Affairs Department, Sir James Plimsoll, and the Australian Ambassador to the US, Keith Waller and exchanged views on the armys intentions.

By October 22, Shann, like Marshall Green, was more optimistic. The Embassy reported that Indonesia was experiencing “a mounting wave of anti-communist demonstrations and sentiment and a general army-condoned, or perhaps army-inspired, blackening of the communist image.”
It referred to a “cleansing operation” that included “nocturnal army operations” at all levels of society. Shann himself had witnessed about 250 prisoners being “whisked off” by military police. “It is impossible to make any estimate of the number of people killed or detained,?” the Embassy said. “It cannot be small.”
The Embassy report concluded, enthusiastically: “He would be a very cautious man who did not derive some encouragement from events in Indonesia over the past week.”

American documents also show that when, at the end of October, the Johnson administration determined that Suharto should establish a military government, it consulted the Menzies government, together with the British.

Workers and Peasants massacred
The Australian authorities were aware that workers and villagers were among the main targets of the military repression.

In the month of November, the Australian Embassy noted that the wave of terror had been extended down to the factory floor. According to its report of November 17, it had apparently become the practice in factories and other workplaces “for the army to assemble the labour force and ask them whether they wish to continue work as usual. Those who decline are asked again and, unless they change their mind, summarily shot.”
Two days later, the Australian Embassy proudly reported on an “action”; a massacre, led by an Australian-trained officer. Colonel Sarwo Edhie was a 1964 graduate from an 18-month course at the Australian Army Staff College at Queenscliff, near Melbourne. On November 10, 1965, just a year after graduating, he commanded 400 soldiers of the feared RPKAD (Special Forces, now known as Kopassus) on a sweep through Central Java, hunting for opponents of the military junta.

At 6.30 am the troops approached a village at the foot of Mount Merapi, in the Boyolali district, 40 km north-east of Jogjakarta, firing “test shots” into the air. Between 100 and 200 people, many of them women and children, appeared at the side of the road. According to the report sent to Canberra, the villagers advanced on the troops with cries of “Nekolim,” meaning “neo-colonialists and imperialists” and were armed with bamboo spears, knives and “one or two guns”. “Shots fired over their heads by the patrol failed to deter them and the army was obliged to shoot at them, killing seven and wounding 17.”
That report was derived from a first-hand account supplied by an Indian journalist, B. K. Tiwari, who had spent 11 days in Central Java as Sarwo Edhies guest. Tiwaris account also confirmed that the military was training Muslim militia groups. In an interview with Tiwari, the Colonel had “spoken of the training he was giving Muslim groups (as yet no arms had been issued)”. Muslim youth were acting “as the ears and eyes of the army, guiding patrols and generally informing”.

Two days before Christmas 1965, the Australian Embassy estimated that, on average, 1,500 people had been murdered every day since September 30. “Estimates of the number of people killed vary between 100,000 and 200,000, the latter being the figure accepted by the American and West German embassies. The West Germans have heard that 70,000 people have been killed in East Java alone. Without having any firm basis for making an estimate we would if we had to name a figure put it at between 100,000 and 150,000. This works out at about 1,500 assassinations per day since September 30th.”
Up to one million workers and peasants were slaughtered in a CIA-organised army coup led by General Suharto which swept aside the shaky bourgeois regime of President Sukarno, crushed the rising movement of the Indonesian masses, and established a brutal military dictatorship.

Retired US diplomats and CIA officers, including the former American ambassador to Indonesia and Australia, Marshall Green, have admitted working with Suhartos butchers to massacre hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants suspected of supporting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). They personally provided the names of thousands of PKI members from the CIAs files for the armed forces death lists.
According to Howard Federspeil, who was an Indonesian expert working at the State Department at the time of the anti-communist program: “No one cared, so long as they were communists that they were being butchered.”

The coup was the culmination of a prolonged operation by the CIA, with the help of agents of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, to build up and train the Indonesian armed forces in preparation for a military dictatorship to suppress the revolutionary strivings of the Indonesian masses.
At the time of the coup, the PKI was the largest Stalinist party in the world, outside China and the Soviet Union. It had 3.5 million members; its youth movement another 3 million. It controlled the trade union movement SOBSI which claimed 3.5 million members and the 9 million-strong peasants’ movement BTI. Together with the womens movement, the writers and artists organisation and the scholars movement, the PKI had more than 20 million members and active supporters.
Yet by the end of 1965, between 500,000 and a million PKI members and supporters had been slaughtered, and tens of thousands were detained in concentration camps, without any resistance being offered.

The killings were so widespread that the rivers were clogged with the corpses of workers and peasants. While the CIA-backed military death squads rounded up all known PKI members and sympathisers and carried out their grisly work, Time magazine reported:
“The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travellers from these areas tell us small rivers and streams have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has become seriously impeded.”

Media manipulation
While the bloodbath was taking place in Indonesia, the Menzies government and the External Affairs Department sought to control and censor the news broadcast to Indonesia by Radio Australia. On October 10, 1965 Ambassador Shann advised Canberra that Radio Australia should “do nothing to engender sympathy for President Sukarno”.
Two days later, the External Affairs Departments public information officer, Richard Woolcott noted in a memo that he and a colleague had told contacts at Radio Australia that it should “by careful selection of its news items, not do anything which would be helpful to the PKI and should highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show its involvement in the losing cause of the September 30 movement.”

The Departments Gordon Jockel wrote to Shann on October 15, asking to be advised “whether there are any problems with the ABC representatives in Jakarta”. In a memo to his Minister, Paul Hasluck, on October 18, David Hay, another first assistant secretary, said: “Radio Australia should be on guard against giving information to the Indonesian people that would be withheld by the army-controlled internal media, e.g. disavowals [of coup involvement] by the PKI …”
On October 21, Woolcott reported that he had insisted that Radio Australia refer to Suharto and other key generals as “non-communist” rather than “anti-communist”and “rightist”. “I stressed again to [Radio Australia news editor John] Hall that the danger of inaccurate reporting could have an adverse effect on the army …”

By November 5, the Indonesian army was so confident that the Menzies government would do its bidding that it relayed a message to Canberra, via Shann, that news items critical of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio “should be used” by Radio Australia.
It also said “reports should never imply that the army or its supporters” were in any way “pro-Western or right wing”. At that stage in the coup, given the strength of anti-colonial feeling among the Indonesian masses, it was still unwise for the generals to openly identify themselves with their Western patrons.

The events of 1965-66 reveal the essential outlook of the Australian political and military establishment. For public consumption, government leaders extol “democratic values,” but the actual record is one of demanding and supporting, whenever it is deemed necessary, military violence … and media manipulation.
This participation in the Indonesian holocaust was not a passing phase, nor an aberration. The figures who led the Australian involvement in the 1965-66 coup were all well rewarded for many years to come. Paul Hasluck, the Minister, was later knighted and became Governor-General of Australia. David Hay, a key official, was also knighted and then appointed Administrator of Papua New Guinea from 1967 to 1970. Gordon Jockel, also from External Affairs, went on to serve as Ambassador in Indonesia from 1969 to 1972. Richard Woolcott, another high-ranking official, became Ambassador to Indonesia too?from 1975 to 1978?then headed the Foreign Affairs Department.

As for the Labor Party, while it was not in office in 1965-66, its support for the Indonesian massacre was best summed up in the early 1990s by the then prime minister, Paul Keating. He referred to Suhartos coup as “the most important and beneficial event in Australian post-war strategic history”.

 
BRITAIN KEEPS LID ON MI6 ROLE IN OUSTING SUKARNO
INDEPENDENT (London) October 5
Documents which would reveal Britains secret role in Indonesian politics in the Sixties that led to “one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century” and Jakartas eventual annexation of East Timor are being kept under lock and key.

They would uncover the Foreign Office and MI6s role in helping General Suharto seize power. His regime, backed by military hardware from Britain and the United States, occupied East Timor in 1975 and killed up to one third of the population.

The historian Mark Curtis believes Britain turned a blind eye to anti communist massacres of 500,000 people that followed an abortive coup against President Sukarno in 1965, and may have aided the action that led to Suharto taking over the following year.

The Cabinet Office, which is in charge of “open government” policy, refuses to declassify documents at the Public Record Office at Kew and Churchill College, Cambridge. They are being held beyond the 30-year period when files are normally released. Officials cite “sensitivity” in refusing to release them.
Key documents are those of the British ambassador to Indonesia in the mid-Sixties, the late Sir Andrew Gilchrist. They include some of his personal papers. Most are open except those dealing with Indonesia. Gilchrist was a key advocate of a policy of destabilising President Sukarno.

The Independent requested the release of the Gilchrist documents in 1997. They have been reviewed but no more papers have been released. Because the Indonesian Confrontation was never a “declared” war embassies of U.S, Britain, Australia and New Zealand remained open.

Backdoor Diplomacy
Gilchrist arrived in Indonesia in 1962 as it was pursuing a policy of “confrontation” with Britain’s former colony Malaya. By 1963, British, Malaysian, Australian and New Zealand forces were engaged in a low level conflict with Indonesia in which British special forces and MI6 became involved.

As a result of this and the increasing power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Britain supported the anti-communist Indonesian military and Suhartos seizure of power. British intelligence contacted him in 1965, when he sent messengers to reassure the British that the army would not step up operations against them and to explore the possibility of ending the “confrontation”.

These channels were put to good use after the abortive coup in October 1965 that triggered the rise of Suharto and the massacres.

Mr Curtis found in documents (some of which have since been reclassified by the Foreign Office) that when the Indonesian army set about eliminating the PKI, Gilchrist ensured that it (the Indonesian army) knew Britain (and Australia?) would suspend offensive operations so that it could concentrate on killing communists. ( A compelling reason to now believe that the “rules of engagement” that prevented Australian ships from shooting back in 1965/66 if engaged by Indonesian Forces was engineered to conform to the promise of Gilchrist. Australian service personnel were just pawns in this game of “war”; the abos have an appropriate saying: “Poor silly bugger me!”)

Carmel Budriardjo, a founder of the Indonesian Human Rights Organisation, said “the relationship became very close quickly” between Britain, America and the Indonesian military. Suharto was offered economic aid and the lifting of the embargo on sales of military aircraft by Britain.
Mr Curtis said that at the very least “Britain turned a blind eye to the bloody massacres and at most actively aided it. And I think there are still some question marks over the degree of that actively aiding”.

 

Among classified papers is a letter to Gilchrist from the Foreign Office official Norman Reddaway, political adviser to the commander-in-chief, Far East. Just after the apparent communist coup attempt he arrived in Singapore. His brief was
“to do whatever I could do to get rid of Sukarno”.
Suharto took power in 1966 after the coup attempt linked to the PKI, whose involvement was the pretext for Suhartos elimination of it and the massacres. Sukarnos alleged involvement was used by Suharto to discredit and replace him.

The British were not alone in supporting Suhartos coup. According to open documents, one of Gilchrists key contacts was Suhartos foreign minister, Adam Malik, later identified by the envoy as having given crucial advice to Suharto on how to “eliminate the PKI” and “undermine Sukarnos remaining power”.

Maliks aide received a hit list of 5,000 suspected communists from the Central Intelligence Agency. On 6 November 1965 the Americans fulfilled army requests for weapons “to arm Muslim and nationalist youth in central Java for use against the PKI”.
Although President Suharto resigned in May 1998 after Indonesias economic collapse and widespread civil unrest, the army still exerts enormous power in the country.

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