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Runtuhnya timor timur
by 1979 had all but destroyed armed resistance to the occupation. Following a controversial “Popular Assembly” which many said was not a genuine act of self-determination, Indonesia declared the territory a province of Indonesia (Timor Timur).
World Vision Indonesia visited East Timor in October 1978 and claimed that 70,000 East Timorese were at risk of starvation. An envoy from the International Committee of the Red Cross reported in 1979 that 80 percent of one camp’s population was malnourished, in a situation that was “as bad as Biafra“. The ICRC warned that “tens of thousands” were at risk of starvation. Indonesia announced that it was working through the government-run Indonesian Red Cross to alleviate the crisis, but the NGO Action for World Development charged that organization with selling donated aid supplies.
Indonesia kept East Timor shut off from the rest of the world, except for a few years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, claiming that the vast majority of East Timorese supported integration. This position was followed closely by the Indonesian media such that an East Timorese acceptance of their integration with Indonesia was taken for granted by, and was a non-issue for, the majority of Indonesians
The Portuguese language was banned in East Timor and Indonesian was made the language of government, education and public commerce, and the Indonesian school curriculum was implemented. The official Indonesian national ideology, Pancasila, was applied to East Timor and government jobs were restricted to those holding certification in Pancasila training. East Timorese animist belief systems did not fit with Indonesia’s constitutional monotheism, resulting in mass conversions to Christianity. Portuguese clergy were replaced with Indonesian priests and Latin and Portuguese mass was replaced by Indonesian mass. Before the invasion, less than 30 percent of East Timorese were Roman Catholics, and by the 1980s, 80 percent were registered as Catholics. With a 90 percent Catholic population, East Timor is currently one of the most densely Catholic countries in the world.
Although by the 1980s Fretilin forces had dropped to a few hundred armed men, Fretilin increased its contacts with young Timorese especially in Dili, and an un-armed civil resistance seeking self-determination took shape.
Many of those in the protest movements were young children at the time of the invasion and had been educated under the Indonesian system. They resented the repression of Timorese cultural and political life at the expense of the Indonesian, were ambivalent of Indonesian economic development, and spoke Portuguese amongst themselves, stressing their Portuguese heritage.
Seeking help from Portugal for self-determination, they considered Indonesia an occupying force. Abroad, Fretilin’s members—most notably former journalist José Ramos-Horta (later to be Prime Minister and President)—pushed their cause in diplomatic forums.
The reduced armed resistance prompted the Indonesian government in 1988 to open up East Timor to improve its commercial prospects, including a lifting of the travel ban on journalists. The new policy came from foreign minister Ali Alatas against the advice of the military leadership who feared it would lead to loss of control. Alatas and diplomats swayed Suharto of the policy as a response to international concerns
In 1981 the Indonesian military launched Operasi Keamanan (Operation Security), which some have named the “fence of legs” program. 50,000 East Timorese men and boys were ordered to march through the mountains, sweeping guerrillas into the central part of the region. The operation failed to crush the resistance, and popular resentment toward the occupation grew stronger than ever. As FRETILIN troops in the mountains continued their sporadic attacks, Indonesian forces carried out numerous operations to destroy them over the next ten years. In the cities and villages, meanwhile, a non-violent resistance movement began to take shape.
At the same time, Indonesian forces carried out a widespread campaign of killing, torture, forced disappearances, political imprisonment, and other abuses of human rights. Starting in 1981, Indonesian officials sent thousands of prisoners to Atauro Island, where Amnesty International described the conditions as “deplorable”. Massacres by the Indonesian military have been documented across East Timor. In September 1981, 400 civilians were killed in Lacluta,
*002The leaflet of East timor fight to integrated with Indonesia leaflet from Betao police sector,Manufakti city East Timor which given to dr iwan by the the secor command when he cambat to Brimob Padang Panjang where Dr Iwan on duty in this area in 1981.(Dr Iwan private collections)
Australia and Indonesia began drafting a treaty to share resources in the Timor Gap. The treaty was signed in December 1989, with estimates ranging from one to seven billion barrels of oil to be secured.
This agreement, along with general economic partnership with Indonesia, is frequently cited as a crucial factor for the Australian government’s position. And yet given that nearly 60,000 East Timorese had died during the fighting between Australian and Japanese forces that followed the invasion of Timor by the Japanese during the Pacific War
some Australians believed their government owed a special debt to the former Portuguese colony. James Dunn, a senior Foreign Affairs adviser to the Australian Parliament before and during the occupation, condemned the government’s position, saying later: “What had been of vital strategic value in 1941 was, in 1974, irrelevant and dispensable.”
Some Australian World War II veterans protested the occupation for similar reasons.
Successive Australian governments saw good relations and stability in Indonesia (Australia’s largest neighbour) as providing an important security buffer to Australia’s north, but the East Timor issue complicated co-operation between the two nations. Australia provided important sanctuary to East Timorese independence advocates like Jose Ramos-Horta (who based himself in Australia during his exile). Australia’s trade with Indonesia grew through the 1980s and the Keating Labor Government signed a security pact with Indonesia in 1995 and gave relations with Jakarta a high priority. The fall of Indonesian President Suharto and a shift in Australian policy by the Howard Government in 1998 helped precipitate a proposal for a referendum on the question of independence for East Timor.[165
Indonesia occupied East Timor from December 1975 to October 1999. After centuries of Portuguese colonial rule in East Timor, a 1974 coup in Portugal led to decolonization among its former colonies, creating instability in East Timor and leaving its future uncertain. After a small-scale civil war, the pro-independence FRETILIN declared victory in the capital city of Dili and declared an independent East Timor on 28 November 1975.
Claiming its assistance had been requested by East Timorese leaders, Indonesian military forces invaded on 7 December and by 1979 had all but destroyed armed resistance to the occupation. Following a controversial “Popular Assembly” which many said was not a genuine act of self-determination, Indonesia declared the territory a province of Indonesia (Timor Timur).
The 1991 Santa Cruz Massacre
caused outrage around the world, and reports of other such killings were numerous. Resistance to Indonesian rule remained strong;[1
the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two men from East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, for their ongoing efforts to peacefully end the occupation. A 1999 vote to determine East Timor’s future resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of independence, and in 2002 East Timor became an independent nation. The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor estimated the number of deaths during the occupation from famine and violence to be between 90,800 and 202,600 including between 17,600 and 19,600 violent deaths or disappearances, out of a 1999 population of approximately 823,386. The truth commission held Indonesian forces responsible for about 70% of the violent killings.
Immediately after the invasion, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council passed resolutions condemning Indonesia’s actions and calling for immediate withdrawal. The governments of the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom were supportive of Indonesia throughout the occupation. Australia and Indonesia were the only nations in the world to recognise East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and soon afterwards began negotiations to divide resources found in the Timor Gap. Other governments, including Japan, Canada and Malaysia, also supported the Indonesian government.
The invasion and suppression of East Timor’s independence movement, however, caused great harm to Indonesia’s reputation and international credibility.
20 november 1992
On 20 November 1992 FRETILIN leader Xanana Gusmão was arrested by Indonesian troops. In May 1993 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for “rebellion”, but his sentence was later commuted to 20 years. The arrest of the universally acknowledged leader of the resistance was a major frustration to the anti-integration movement in East Timor, but Gusmão continued to serve as a symbol of hope from inside the Cipinang prison. Nonviolent resistance by East Timorese, meanwhile, continued to show itself. When President Bill Clinton visited Jakarta in 1994, twenty-nine East Timorese students occupied the U.S. embassy to protest U.S. support for Indonesia.
At the same time, human rights observers called attention to continued violations by Indonesian troops and police. A 1995 report by Human Rights Watch noted that “abuses in the territory continue to mount”, including torture, disappearances, and limitations on basic rights. After a series of riots in September and October 1995, Amnesty International criticised Indonesian authorities for a wave of arbitrary arrests and torture. The report indicates detainees were beaten with iron bars, kicked, lacerated, and threatened with death.
East Timor was a particular focus for the Indonesian government’s transmigration program, which aimed to resettle Indonesians from densely to less populated regions. Media censorship under the “New Order” meant that the state of conflict in East Timor was unknown to the transmigrants, predominantly poor Javanese and Balinese wet-rice farmers. On arrival they found themselves under ongoing threat of attack by East Timorese resistance fighters, and became the object of local resentment, since large tracts of land belonging to East Timorese had been compulsorily appropriated by the Indonesian government for transmigrant settlement. Although many gave up and returned to their island of origin, those migrants that stayed in East Timor contributed to the “Indonesianisation” of East Timor’s integration. 662 transmigrant families (2,208 people) settled in East Timor in 1993, whereas an estimated 150,000 free Indonesian settlers lived in East Timor by the mid-1990s, including those offered jobs in education and administration. Migration increased resentment amongst Timorese who were overtaken by more business savvy immigrants.
The Indonesian government’s primary response to criticism of its policies was to highlight its funding of development in East Timor’s health, education, communications, transportation, and agriculture. East Timor, however, remained poor following centuries of Portuguese colonial neglect and Indonesian critic George Aditjondro points out that conflict in the early years of occupation lead to sharp drops in rice and coffee production, and livestock populations. Other critics argue that infrastructure development, such as road construction, is often designed to facilitate Indonesian military and corporate interests. While the military controlled key businesses, private investors, both Indonesian and international, avoided the territory. Despite improvements since 1976, a 1993 Indonesian government report estimated that in three-quarters of East Timor’s 61 districts, more than half lived in poverty.[118
Indonesian military abuses against women in East Timor were numerous and well-documented. In addition to suffering arbitrary detainment, torture, and extrajudicial execution, women faced rape and sexual abuse—sometimes for the crime of being related to an independence activist. The scope of the problem is difficult to ascertain, owing to the intense military control imposed during the occupation, compounded by the shame felt by victims. In a 1995 report on violence against women in Indonesia and East Timor, Amnesty International USA wrote: “Women are reluctant to pass on information to non-governmental organizations about rape and sexual abuse, let alone to report violations to the military or police authorities.”
Other forms of violence against women took the form of harassment, intimidation, and enforced marriage. The Amnesty report cites the case of a woman forced to live with a commander in Baucau, then harassed daily by troops after her release. Such “marriages” took place regularly during the occupation. Women were also encouraged to accept sterilization procedures, and some were pressured to take the contraceptive Depo Provera, sometimes without full knowledge of its effects.
in 1996 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two men from East Timor, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, for their ongoing efforts to peacefully end the occupation. A 1999 vote to determine East Timor’s future resulted in an overwhelming majority in favor of independence,
In 1996 East Timor was suddenly brought to world attention when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor”. The Nobel Committee indicated in its press release that it hoped the award would “spur efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people’s right to self-determination”. As Nobel scholar Irwin Abrams notes:
For Indonesia the prize was a great embarrassment…. In public statements the government tried to put distance between the two laureates, grudgingly recognising the prize for Bishop Belo, over whom it thought it could exercise some control, but accusing Ramos-Horta of responsibility for atrocities during the civil strife in East Timor and declaring that he was a political opportunist. At the award ceremony Chairman Sejersted answered these charges, pointing out that during the civil conflict Ramos-Horta was not even in the country and on his return he tried to reconcile the two parties.
Diplomats from Indonesia and Portugal, meanwhile, continued the consultations required by the 1982 General Assembly resolution, in a series of meetings intended to resolve the problem of what Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called the “pebble in the Indonesian shoe”.
Those suspected of opposing integration were often arrested and tortured. In 1983 Amnesty International published an Indonesian manual it had received from East Timor instructing military personnel on how to inflict physical and mental anguish, and cautioning troops to “Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on)”. In his 1997 memoir East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance, Constâncio Pinto describes being tortured by Indonesian soldiers: “With each question, I would get two or three punches in the face. When someone punches you so much and so hard, it feels as if your face is broken. People hit me on my back and on my sides with their hands and then kicked me…. [In another location] they psychologically tortured me; they didn’t hit me, but they made strong threats to kill me. They even put a gun on the table.” In Michele Turner’s book Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942–1992, a woman named Fátima describes watching torture take place in a Dili prison: “They make people sit on a chair with the front of the chair on their own toes. It is mad, yes. The soldiers urinate in the food then mix it up for the person to eat. They use electric shock and they use an electric machine….”
5 mei 1998
Indonesia and Portugal announced on 5 May 1999 that it had agreed to hold a vote allowing the people of East Timor to choose between the autonomy plan or independence. The vote, to be administered by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), was originally scheduled for 8 August but later postponed until 30 August. Indonesia also took responsibility for security; this arrangement caused worry in East Timor, but many observers believe that Indonesia would have refused to allow foreign peacekeepers during the vote.
In late 1998, Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer drafted a letter to Indonesia setting out a change in Australian policy, suggesting that East Timor be given a chance to vote on independence within a decade. The letter upset Indonesian President B. J. Habibie, who saw it as implying Indonesia was a “colonial power” and he decided to announce a snap referendum. A UN sponsored referendum held in 1999 showed overwhelming approval for independence, but was followed by violent clashes and a security crisis, instigated by anti-independence militia. Australia then led a United Nations backed International Force for East Timor to end the violence and order was restored. While the intervention was ultimately successful, Australian-Indonesian relations would take several years to recover.
The Australian Labor Party altered its East Timor policy in 1999 and adopted a policy of support for East Timorese independence and opposition to the Indonesian presence there, through its Foreign Affairs spokesperson Laurie Brereton. Breretons’ credibility was attacked by the governing Liberal-National Coalition government and its Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer, and Prime Minister Howard. They were assisted in their campaign by the then-Labor-backbencher Kevin Rudd (who would later lead the Labor Party to victory in the 2007 Australian federal election).
8 juni 1998
In late 1998, the Australian Government of John Howard drafted a letter to Indonesia advising of a change in Australian policy, and advocating for the staging of referendum on independence within a decade. President Habibie saw such an arrangement as implying “colonial rule” by Indonesia and he decided to call a snap referendum on the issue.
In 1999 researcher Rebecca Winters released the book Buibere: Voice of East Timorese Women, which chronicles many personal stories of violence and abuse dating to the earliest days of the occupation. One woman tells of being interrogated while stripped half-naked, tortured, molested, and threatened with death. Another describes being chained at the hands and feet, raped repeatedly, and interrogated for weeks. A woman who had prepared food for FRETILIN guerrillas was arrested, burned with cigarettes, tortured with electricity, and forced to walk naked past a row of soldiers into a tank filled with urine and feces.
As groups supporting autonomy and independence began campaigning, a series of pro-integration paramilitary groups of East Timorese began threatening violence—and indeed committing violence—around the country. Alleging pro-independence bias on the part of UNAMET, the groups were seen working with and receiving training from Indonesian soldiers. Before the May agreement was announced, an April paramilitary attack in Liquiça left dozens of East Timorese dead. On 16 May 1999, a gang accompanied by Indonesian troops attacked suspected independence activists in the village of Atara; in June another group attacked a UNAMET office in Maliana. Indonesian authorities claimed to be helpless to stop the violence between rival factions among the East Timorese, but Ramos-Horta joined many others in scoffing at such notions. In February 1999 he said: “Before [Indonesia] withdraws it wants to wreak major havoc and destabilization, as it has always promised. We have consistently heard that over the years from the Indonesian military in Timor.”
As militia leaders warned of a “bloodbath”, Indonesian “roving ambassador” Francisco Lopes da Cruz declared: “If people reject autonomy there is the possibility blood will flow in East Timor.” One paramilitary announced that a vote for independence would result in a “sea of fire”, an expression referring to the Bandung Sea of Fire during Indonesia’s own war of independence from the Dutch. As the date of the vote drew near, reports of anti-independence violence continued to accumulate.
Timorese groups fought a campaign of resistance against Indonesian forces for the independence of East Timor, during which many atrocities and human rights violations by the Indonesian army were reported. The Indonesian army is reported to have trained and supplied militias imported from Indonesia to terrorise the population. Foreign powers such as the Australian government, concerned to maintain good relations with Indonesia, had been consistently reluctant to assist a push for independence (despite popular sympathy for the East Timorese cause among many in the Australian electorate). However, the departure of President Suharto and a shift in Australian policy by the Howard Government in 1998 precipitated a proposal for a referendum on the question of independence. Ongoing lobbying by the Portuguese government also provided im
Pada saat kampanye jajak Pendapat ,Dr Iwan dan Dr Mosadeq dwngan mengendarai mobil menuju kerah Timor Kupang tetapi ditengah jalan kelihatan rombongan dengan baju merah sangat banyak naik truk menuju Dilli untuk kampanye, Dr Iwan meminta agar kembali ke Dilli karena suasana kurang kondusif, benar saat tiba di dilli tak berapa waktu kemudian terdengar banyak tembakan-tembakan, rupanya ada seorang wartawan (kemudian diketahui dari luar negeri mati ditembak, dan jenazahnya ditemukan kemudian didepan gereja Dilli), ada permintaan dari pasukan pengaman Jajak Pendapat ke Poliklinik Polda Tim TIM didepan Marcado pasar Dilli untuk mengirimkan ambulans dan tim P3K untuk membantu pengaman kesehatan, setelah mereka kembali didapat informasi ada banyak tembakan-tembakan ,dan sebagian dari pasukan yang panik mereka menembak keudara.,korban yang luka dievakuasi ke Rumah sakit Korem dilli, dan juga ada beberapa korban yang luka kena saling berkelahi diobati di Poliklinik Polda Tim Tim,memang sangat tragis kedua pihak yang bersaing berada di zpoliklinik yang sma saling melirik dengan geram.
Satu hari sebelum jajak Pendapat tiba dari jkarta Assisten Operasi kapolri, Dirlantas POLRI dan Dan Brimob Polri untuk menginspeksi persiapan jajakpendapat,dan sorenya mereka kembali lagi ke Jakarta.
Saat jajak pendapat suasana aman,tetapi jalan sepi, Dr Iwan,dan dr Mosadeq ,ikut serta tim kes depkes RI serta Tim dari Hankam mengikuti Dr Iwan berputar keliling dilli dengan ambulans Polda TIMTIM melihat Jajak pendapat,rupanya mereka takut jalan sendiri karena sejak beberapa hari tampak banyak anggota Aitarak yang hilir mudik dengan embawa senjata pedang dan suasana sangat mencekam.
Malam hari setlah Jajak Pendapat
Dr Iwan segera memanggil beberapa anggota kesehatan yang berasal dari penduduk asli Timor Portugis, mereka mengatakan bahwa mereka yakin jajak pendapat akan dimenangi oleh penduduk asli Timor Timur yang memilih untuk merdeka,karena sangat yakin dengan info mereka, Dr Iwan satu hari setelah jajak Pendapat melakukan rapat koordinasi dengan Dinas Kesehatan dan kepala RS Dilli,Korem Dilli,dan seluruh anggota kesehatan Polda, merencana agar segera melakukan evakuasi petugas yang wanita,dan mengevakuasi obat-obat dan alat kesehatan yang berharga ke Timor Kupang, sehingga pada saat mau kembali ke Jakrta kesesokan harinya seluruh asrama Polda Dilli dibelakang Poliklinik sudah kosong baran=barang berharga dan yang tinggal petugas lelaki yang terpaksa tidur di lantai beralas karpet karena tempat tidur spring bed merekapun sudah dibawa kabur ke Timor Kupang berdama keluarganya yang wnaita dan anak-anaknya,
salah seoran petugas kesehatan etnik alsi Timor Timur memberikan oleh-oleh beberapa lembar uang timor portugis,foto dan buku-buku timor timur tempo dulu yang dapat kita llihat d dibawah ini.
Dr Iwan kembali dari Dilli satu hari setelah jajak pendapat,saat di lapangan terbang ada anggotaAitarak yang sweeping, tetapi mereka tidak mengenal Dr Iwan dan Dr Mosadeq yang tampangnya tidak seperti polisi, berangkat dengan pesawat terakhir dari Dilli ke Bali, setelah itu tidak ada lagi transportasi keluar Timor ti mur karena setelah tiga hari jajak pendapat diumumkan hasil jajak pendapat dan timbul Chaos yang terkenal dengan istilah
Dilli Masacre bacalah informasi terkait dari wiki dibawah ini
Persiapan dan strategi Dr Iwan ini ternyata benar, dan dan ia dapat kembali dengan selamat (Dr Iwan)
SESUDAH PENGUMAN HASIL JAJAK PENDAPAT,3 HARI SETELAH JAJAK PENDAPAT
Effects of the Dili Massacre
The Dili Massacre on 12 November 1991 was a turning point for sympathy for pro-independence East Timorese. A burgeoning East Timor solidarity movement grew in Portugal, Australia, and the United States. After the massacre, the US Congress voted to cut off funding for IMET training of Indonesian military personnel. However, arms sales continued from the US to the Indonesian National Armed Forces. President Clinton cut off all US military ties with the Indonesian military in 1999. The Australian government promoted a strong connection with the Indonesian military at the time of the massacre, but also cut off ties in 1999.
The Massacre had a profound effect on public opinion in Portugal, especially after television footage showing East Timorese praying in Portuguese, and independence leader Xanana Gusmão gained widespread respect, being awarded the Portugal’s highest honour in 1993, after he had been captured and imprisoned by the Indonesians.
Australia’s troubled relationship with the Suharto regime was brought into focus by the Massacre. In Australia, there was also widespread public outrage, and criticism of Canberra’s close relationship with the Suharto regime and recognition of Jakarta’s sovereignty over East Timor. This caused the Australian government embarrassment, but Foreign Minister Gareth Evans played down the killings, describing them as ‘an aberration, not an act of state policy’. Prime Minister Keating’s first overseas trip was to Indonesia in April 1992 and sought to improve trade and cultural relations, but repression of the East Timorese continued to mar cooperation between the two nations.
Gareth Evans and Prime Minister Paul Keating (1991–1996) gave maintenance of close relations with the Indonesian government a high priority, as did the subsequent Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer during their first term in office (1996–1998). Australian governments saw good relations and stability in Indonesia (Australia’s largest neighbour) as providing an important security buffer to Australia’s north. Nevertheless, Australia provided important sanctuary to East Timorese independence advocates like Jose Ramos-Horta (who based himself in Australia during his exile).
The fall of President Suharto and the arrival of President B.J. Habibie in 1998 and the rise of Indonesian democracy brought a new prospect for a potential change in the dynamic between the Australian and Indonesian governments.
Referendum for independence, violence
New Indonesian President B. J. Habibie was prepared to consider a change of status for East Timor. Portugal had started to gain some political allies firstly in the EU, and after that in other places of the world to pressure Indonesia. In late 1998, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard with his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer drafted a letter setting out a major change in Australian policy. The letter supported the idea of autonomy but went much further by suggesting that the East Timores be given a chance to vote on independence within a decade. The letter upset Habibie, who saw it as implying Indonesia was a “colonial power” and he decided in response to announce a snap referendum to be conducted within six months.
News of the proposal provoked a violent reaction in East Timor from pro-Indonesian militia. The Indonesian army did not intervene to restore order. At a summit in Bali John Howard told Habibie that a United Nations Peace Keeping force should oversee the process. Habibie rejected the proposal, believing it would have insulted the Indonesian military.
The referendum, held on 30 August, gave a clear majority (78.5%) in favour of independence, rejecting the alternative offer of being an autonomous province within Indonesia, to be known as the Special Autonomous Region of East Timor (SARET).
Directly after this, Indonesian military-supported East Timorese pro-integration militia and Indonesian soldiers carried out a campaign of violence and terrorism in retaliation. Approximately 1,400 Timorese were killed and 300,000 forcibly pushed into West Timor as refugees. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, irrigation systems, water supply systems, and schools, and nearly 100% of the country’s electrical grid were destroyed.
Activists in Portugal, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere pressured their governments to take action. The violence was met with widespread public anger in Australia. The Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs, Labor’s Laurie Brereton, was vocal in highlighting evidence of the Indonesian military’s involvement in pro-integrationist violence and advocated United Nations peacekeeping to support the East Timor’s ballot. The Catholic Church in Australia urged the Australian Government to send an armed peacekeeping force to East Timor to end the violence. Street protesters harried the Indonesian Embassy.
John Howard conferred with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and lobbied U. S. President Bill Clinton for an Australian led international peace keeper force to enter East Timor to end the violence. The United States offered crucial logistical and intelligence resources and an “over-horizon” deterrent presence. Finally, on 11 September, Bill Clinton announced:
I have made clear that my willingness to support future economic assistance from the international community will depend upon how Indonesia handles the situation from today.
Indonesia, in dire economic straits relented and on 12 September, Indonesian President Habibie announced:
A couple of minutes ago I called the United Nations Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, to inform about our readiness to accept international peacekeeping forces through the United Nations, from friendly nations, to restore peace and security in East Timor.
It was clear that the UN did not have sufficient resources to combat the paramilitary forces directly. Instead, the UN authorised the creation of a multinational military force known as INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), with Security Council Resolution 1264. Troops were contributed by 17 nations, about 9,900 in total. 4,400 came from Australia, the remainder mostly from South-East Asia. The force was led by Major-General (now General) Peter Cosgrove. Troops landed in East Timor on 20 September 1999.
SESUDAH JAJAK PENDAPAT TIMBUL CHAOS, Dr iwan sudah tiba kembali ke Jakrta,ada banyak monunikasi dengan pasukan kesehatan POLRI yang bertugas sebagai pasukan pengaman Jajak Pendapat dengan opewrasi Lorosae , mereka mendapat arahan dari Dr iwan, dan bebrpa kali dikrim supermie dan bahan makan lain dengan pesawat POLRI dari Kupang untuk membantu mereka seccara tersamar sebagai bantuan obat dengan initial palang merah,obat sudah tersedia cukup karena sudah diamankan sebelum hasil jajk pendapat diumumkan,sehingga Markas POLDA TIMTIM memiliki cukup persiapan makanan dan obat, selanjutnya para petugas melakukan evakuasi berjalan kaki dengan menghadapi banyak kesulitan menuju ke Timor Kupang melaui perbatas di ayambua.
Dr Iwan sempat inut rapat koordinasi untuk pemngaman pengungsi di Depkes RI dengan menteri kesehatan, dan uga dengan Menko Kesra RI yang juga diikuti Gubernur timor Kupang, laporannya masih ada dapat dibaca dibawah ini.
Dr Iwan melaporkan situasi Timor Timur Zteakhir, Dr Iwan sempat mengumpulkan bebrapa dokumen,surat kabar saat di TimTIm dan juga saat sudah kembali di jakarta, silahka melihat info terkait dibawah Ini (Dr Iwan)
After the 1999 vote for independence, paramilitary groups working with the Indonesian military undertook a final wave of violence during which most of the country’s infrastructure was destroyed. The Australian led International Force for East Timor restored order and following the departure of Indonesian forces from East Timor, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor administered the territory for two years, establishing a Serious Crimes Unit to investigate and prosecute crimes committed during 1999. Its limited scope and the small number of sentences delivered by Indonesian courts have caused numerous observers to call for an international tribunal for East Timor.
On 20 September 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end.
The independent republic
Xanana Gusmão, first President of East Timor and present Prime Minister.
The administration of East Timor was taken over by the UN through the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established on 25 October 1999. The INTERFET deployment ended on 14 February 2000 with the transfer of military command to the UN. Elections were held in late 2001 for a constituent assembly to draft a constitution, a task finished in February 2002. East Timor became formally independent on 20 May 2002. Xanana Gusmão was sworn in as the country’s President. East Timor became a member of the UN on 27 September 2002.
On 4 December 2002, after a student had been arrested the previous day, rioting students set fire to the house of the Prime Minister Marí Alkatiri and advanced on the police station. The police opened fire and one student was killed, whose body the students carried to the National Parliament building. There they fought the police, set a supermarket on fire and plundered shops. The police opened fire again and four more students were killed. Alkatiri called an inquiry and blamed foreign influence for the violence.
Relations with Australia have been strained by disputes over the maritime boundary between the two countries. Canberra claims petroleum and natural gas fields in an area known as the ‘Timor Gap’, which East Timor regards as lying within its maritime boundaries.
Main article: 2006 East Timor crisis
Unrest started in the country in April 2006 following riots in Dili. A rally in support of 600 East Timorese soldiers, who were dismissed for deserting their barracks, turned into rioting where five people were killed and over 20,000 fled their homes. Fierce fighting between pro-government troops and disaffected Falintil troops broke out in May 2006. While unclear, the motives behind the fighting appeared to be the distribution of oil funds and the poor organization of the Timorese army and police, which included former Indonesian-trained police and former Timorese rebels. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri called the violence a “coup” and welcomed offers of foreign military assistance from several nations. As of 25 May 2006, Australia, Portugal, New Zealand, and Malaysia sent troops to Timor, attempting to quell the violence. At least 23 deaths occurred as a result of the violence.
On 21 June 2006, President Xanana Gusmão formally requested Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri step down. A majority of Fretilin party members demanded the prime minister’s resignation, accusing him of lying about distributing weapons to civilians. On 26 June 2006 Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigned stating, “I declare I am ready to resign my position as prime minister of the government… so as to avoid the resignation of His Excellency the President of the Republic”. In August, rebel leader Alfredo Reinado escaped from Becora Prison, in Dili. Tensions were later raised after armed clashes between youth gangs forced the closure of Presidente Nicolau Lobato International Airport in late October.
In April 2007, Gusmão declined another presidential term. In the build-up to the April 2007 presidential elections there were renewed outbreaks of violence in February and March 2007. José Ramos-Horta was inaugurated as President on May 20, 2007, following his election win in the second round. Gusmão was sworn in as Prime Minister on August 8, 2007. President Ramos-Horta was critically injured in an assassination attempt on February 11, 2008, in a failed coup apparently perpetrated by Alfredo Reinado, a renegade soldier who died in the attack. Prime Minister Gusmão also faced gunfire separately but escaped unharmed. The Australian government immediately sent reinforcements to East Timor to keep order.
New Zealand announced in early November, 2012, it would be pulling its troops out of the country, saying the country was now stable and calm. Five New Zealand troops were killed in the 13 years the country had a military presence in East Timor
SELESAI @ HAK CIPTA Dr IWAN 2013