The Dai Nippon Occupation Java Part One 1942 history collections

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The Dai Nippon Occupation Java 

Part one

1942

 Based On Dr Iwan’s Postal and Archives History Collections

 

Created By

 

Dr Iwan Suwandy,MHA

Private Limited E-BOOK IN CD-ROM Edition

Special For Serious Collectors and Premium Member

 one of the best Dr Iwan Dai nippon archives collections is the Diary of Mr martooadmojo during he work at Djoerangsapi city east Java from august 1942 until 1844, and at the cover of the diary there were the list of Dai nippon officer who work there

119.MB,Martoadmodjo B. handwritten Diary about his work at Japanese logistic stations at Djoerang Koeda Village ‘

Bondowoso,

Basoeki Ressort  east Java

which thrown away after his pass away in 1990 ,faound and became Dr Iwan collections, never publish)

At the cover of diary had written the name of Dai Nippon officer at Nippon Djoerangsapi ken

(I hove the family of this DN officer will glad to know their family there,please send comment and more info about them)

1. The city post office dai nippon djoerangsapi Inoue and Shiroga
2. Egami Djoerangsapi telephone office and Gado.
3. Tela factory Semboda Yasuda and Yamamoto
4.Tanaman cotton Kentjong M.Nishin
KK Djoerangsapi 5.Takashinaya sida: Mori
6.agen Genpi Djoerangsapi KK: Mori and Futama
Chokin 7.Yokohama Ginko (bank) Fujimoto, Fujii, and Hayashida
8.Osaka Seima KK: Nishiike
SH 9.CO Wadoeng: Maeda
10.CO landed: H.Takari
11.Kapas Sampelan: Mitsui and Mura
12.Rikuyu Jimusho Djoerangsapi: Nakashi, Oguri, Sitsuka, Ari Izumi (Suzuki), Kogo, Yamamoto, Fujimora, Tsubakibaru, Nakaki, Matsuyama, Mayama, Satoh and Matsuda
13.PETA: Saito Mataan

 

1.January 1942

 

 

JAPANESE PRISONERS,

captured on Bataan, being led blindfolded to headquarters for questioning.

 On 1 January 1942

 the Japanese entered Manila and the U.S, troops withdrew toward Bataan.

Army supplies were either moved to Bataan and Corregidor or destroyed.

The remaining forces on Bataan, including some 15,000 U.S. troops, totaled about 80,000 men. The food, housing, and sanitation problems were greatly increased by the presence of over 20,000 civilian refugees. All troops were placed on half-rations.

 

 

japanese soldiers using boats for transports (malaya 1942

 

 

Combining amphibious encirclement with frontal assault, General Yamashita was able to force the stubborn British defenders back time after time

 

japanese soldiers of the 5th division trying to move a truck stuck in the mud (malaya 1942)

 

until by 10 January

General Yamashita  stood at the gates of Kuala Lumpur, on the west coast of Malaya, which his 5th Division captured the next day.

 

heavily camouflaged Toyota KB Truck and a type 97 tankette moving on a poorly pavemented road of malaya (1942)

 

art work showing tanks of the japanese army 6th Tank Regiment commanded by tank commander Colonel Kawamura attacking the british in malaya 1942

 

japanese soldier using a Type 97 light machine gun above a transport truck (malaya 1942)

 

Type 11 37 mm Infantry Gun crew on a hiden position (malaya 1942)

 

 

 His eastern column meanwhile had advanced to within 100 miles of Singapore. By the middle of the month, he had united his  two columns and was preparing to attack the single line the gallant defenders had formed before the plain which constitutes the southern tip of the peninsula.²⁸

primarily to show whether one could be drawn “which would leave the Supreme Commander with enough power to improve the situation and still not give him power to destroy national interests or to exploit one theater without due consideration to another.”¹⁶

The task was a difficult one and the results were not entirely satisfactory, the British Chiefs objecting on the ground that the limitations placed on the commander were too heavy. It was sent to the Allied planners, therefore, for further study and a revised draft was prepared. This one, with slight modifications, proved acceptable and was finally approved, though with some reluctance, by all the governments involved

on 10 January 1942.¹⁷

The new command Wavell was to head was to be known as ABDACOM, for the initials of the national forces involved (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) and included Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines. The inclusion of the Philippines in Wavell’s command was a formal gesture and one Wavell himself wished to avoid.¹⁸ Significantly, neither China nor Australia was included in the ABDA area. (Map 2) As much for political as military reasons the former was organized as a separate theater commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, but independent of Allied control.

 The Australians, though they protested their omission from the discussions in Washington and their lack of representation in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, accepted the terms of the directive and permitted their troops in the ABDA area to become a part of Wavell’s command. USAFIA (U.S. Army Forces in Australia), however, was not included in the new command on the ground that its primary responsibility was to MacArthur and its main task to support the defense of the Philippines. Soon after Wavell assumed command, when it became apparent that only limited aid could be sent to the Philippines, the mission of USAFIA was broadened to include the support of operations in the ABDA area. And the northwest portion of Australia was also added to ABDACOM at General Wavell’s request.¹⁹

The staff of the new command, it was understood, would represent all the nations concerned. The American and British Chiefs of Staff did not attempt to name Wavell’s staff, but they did seek to guard against the preponderance of one nationality in his headquarters. Thus, they stipulated that his deputy and the commander of the naval forces would be Americans, and that a British officer would command the air forces and a Dutch officer the ground forces.

The problem of protecting the interests of each nation represented in ABDACOM without unduly restricting the commander was resolved by limiting Wavell’s authority to the “effective coordination of forces.” He was given command of all forces “afloat, ashore,

MAP 2: The ABDACOM Area

and in the air,” but was permitted to exercise that control only through subordinate commanders whom he could not relieve and who had the right to appeal to their governments if they considered their orders and national interests to be in conflict. Though he could assign missions to his forces, form task forces for specific operations, and appoint their commanders, he was prohibited from altering the tactical organization of the national forces in his command, using their supplies, or controlling their communications with the home government. And in matters of logistics and administration he could exercise only the most general control.

The severe limitations placed on General Wavell’s authority were in marked contrast to the heavy responsibilities laid upon him by the chiefs in Washington. Not only was he given the task of maintaining “as many key positions as possible” under the strategic objectives already outlined (that is, to hold the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia), a formidable enough undertaking in itself, but he was also enjoined “to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan.” “The first essential,” the Chiefs told him, “is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment.” With the lesson of the first Japanese successes still fresh in mind, they cautioned Wavell against dispersing his air forces or using them in piecemeal fashion.²⁰

These instructions, with their emphasis on offensive operations, were probably motivated by an understandable reluctance in Washington to dedicate a command to defensive action, but there was a clear realization that the forces in the theater were then and for some time would be hard pressed even to hold their own. And even as these instructions were being written the enemy was moving swiftly and in force toward those “key positions” Wavell was to hold.

Having established the ABDA area and appointed General Wavell its commander, the American and British staffs in Washington had still to settle the problem of reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific, for it was obvious with each passing day that the situation there was rapidly worsening. This problem brought the assembled planners up against the hard fact, which was to plague them throughout the war, that there were not enough ships to do all the jobs required. They had earlier in the conference agreed ‘that American troops would be sent to Iceland and northern Ireland, and that landings might be made in North Africa later in the year. The shipping requirements for these operations alone were so great that the North Atlantic sailings were approved only on the understanding that they would be discontinued “if other considerations intervened.”²¹ The necessity for speeding up the schedule of reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific created an additional and immediate demand for the ships already allocated to the North Atlantic projects and led to a re-examination of the entire shipping shortage.

The debate over Atlantic versus Pacific priority on shipping was precipitated

(ibid American Army In WW II)

 

On the 10^th of January 1942,

the Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies.

The newspapers brought us a lot of bad news. My father had long ago advised me to read some of the articles I liked from the Malanger and the Javabode starting since I was almost eleven years old, so now I could read all the bad news in the papers when I was at our

Sumber Sewu, plantation home near the East Java city of Malang during the weekends.

Now and then we saw Japanese planes flying over Java. I found it all strange and very unreal. The only Japanese I knew where those living in Malang; they were always very polite and friendly towards us. But from now on Japan was our enemy

.(true story By Elma)

 

January,11^th.1942

 

by Admiral Stark,

who, on 11 January, a day after

 

General Wavell arrived in Batavia with General Ter Poorten

 

 but before he assumed command, reviewed the critical situation in the Far East and raised the question of diverting ships from the less critical North Atlantic route to the Pacific.

In this he had the support of General Marshall and Admiral King, but the British, in the belief that Singapore would hold and anxious for the Americans to relieve then in Iceland and Ireland, sought other ways to find the ships.

The matter was finally referred to the shipping experts who reported the next day that by delaying the North Atlantic sailings one month, which would have the effect also of delaying the proposed North African operation, and by reducing lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union, it would be possible to send aircraft, gasoline, artillery, and about 22,000 men across the Pacific on 20 January and an additional 23,300 British troops shortly after.

 The Chiefs accepted this solution, as did the President and Prime Minister when Mr. Hopkins assured them that ships would be found to keep supplies moving to the Soviet Union.²² The minimum force principle for allocation of resources to the Pacific had now been stretched so far as to justify the postponement of troop movements to Iceland and northern Ireland and, in part at least,

 

 the delay of the North African landings. In the days to come it. was to be stretched even further.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Japanese  landings in British territory at

 Singapore

 

on 15 February 1942

In the campaign, which concluded with the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, Yamashita’s 30,000 front-line soldiers and 200 tanks fought against a poorly equiped force with no armored force, Yamashita’s force captured 130,000 British, Indian and Australian troops, the largest surrender of British-led personnel in history

 

 

 

 

officer of the 5th infantry division sergeant saito leading his man (singapore, 1942)

 

 

 

The Japanese Campaign and Victory 8 December 1941 – 15 February 1942: Lieutenant-General Percival and his party carry the Union Jack on their way to surrender Singapore to the Japanese.

 

 

 

 

The Japanese landing off the west coast of British North Borneo, 1942

 

west borneo

 

Singkawang

Read more info

The Invasion of British Borneo in 1942

The following article is taken from the British Official History book:
The War Against Japan – Volume I – The Loss of Singapore (Chapter XIII) by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby,
the Japanese Monograph No.26: Borneo Operations 1941-1945, USAFFE 1958 and
from numerous additional information kindly provided by
Allan Alsleben, Henry Klom, Tim Hayes, Coen van Galen, Pierre-Emmanuel Bernaudin and Graham Donaldson.

The Invasion of British Borneo 1942

In 1863 Great Britain granted recognition of Sarawak as an independent and sovereign country. However, this was not what Sir James Brooke, 1st Rajah of Sarawak, desired. He tried several times to gain Protectorate Status of Sarawak from Great Britain. For he knew that in time of war, Sarawak would not be able to defend itself without the help of one of the Great Powers of the time. Sadly, this proved to be true during the Chinese Uprising of 1857. Sarawak was nearly defenceless until the rather late arrival of a British Fleet from Singapore. It was during this time that Sir James Brooke began to think seriously about offering Sarawak to the United States as a colony.

Several years prior to 1863, Sir James sent a letter to then U.S. President James Polk. In this letter he offered Sarawak to the United States. The only pre-condition was that he be allowed to remain in power. Sadly, this letter was never read by President Polk.

The United States, then pre-occupied with the looming Civil War between North and South, never seriously considered Sir James’ offer. It was not until 1863 that President Abraham Lincoln replied to the letter sent almost 4 years earlier by Sir James. President Lincoln politely declined Sir James’s offer. Sir James then offered Sarawak to the Dutch, Belgians, Italians, French, and finally the Portuguese. The only serious offer came from Belgium. However, the King of the Belgians set too many strict preconditions which did not suit Sir James Brooke. With the exception of Belgium, the other nations being pre-occupied with their own issues in the region did not wish to expand their already over-stretched resources by taking in Sarawak. As a result, Sir James Brooke was “forced” into the arms of Great Britain, a nation whose respect he had yet to earn.

In 1888, Great Britain, after refusing to offer protection to Sarawak for so many years suddenly offered it. However, it was not granted in the protection of the interests of Sarawak, but in the interest of the British Empire. Apparently, Great Britain suddenly became aware that another European Power could easily take Sarawak for themselves. This is the reason why the British finally offered Sarawak protection. Under the 1888 agreement, negotiated by Sir Charles Anthony Brooke, 2nd Rajah of Sarawak, all the foreign affairs of Sarawak were to the responsibility of British Government. Internal affairs remained the responsibility of the Brooke Rajahs.

In accordance with this 1888 Agreement, Great Britain despatched troops and material to bolster the defences of Sarawak during the 1930s. During the late 1930s the Royal Air Force based 205th RAF Squadron at Kuching. This was a seaplane squadron consisting of Walrus Flying Boats. However, this was withdrawn in 1941 and returned to Singapore.

Realizing that war was imminent, the Brooke Government, under Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, conducted preliminary work to establish airstrips at selected locations throughout the country.

These airstrips would be located at Kuching, Oya, Mukah, Bintulu, and Miri. By 1938 work was completed on all the airstrips except Bintulu, which was discontinued in October 1938 due to financial reasons.

 On 26 September 1938, the Kuching Airstrip was opened. It was situated at the 7th Mile (Bukit Stabar) and measured 700 meters long by 300 meters wide.

However, despite the modern air facilities available, the RAF stationed no aircraft in Sarawak during 1941. In addition, the Royal Navy withdrew from Sarawak, and the British Protectorates of Labuan and North Borneo in 1940.

With no air or sea forces stationed in or around Sarawak, the British government encouraged the Brooke Regime to adopt a “scorched earth policy” in the event of a Japanese attack.

The Singapore Conference of October 1940 further presented the dismal defence situation of Sarawak by stating that without command of the sea or air, it would be pointless to defend Sarawak and the other British colonies in the area. An alternative plan was proposed by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham which suggested that 200 RAF and Royal Dutch Aircraft be used to defend the territories of Sarawak, Labuan, Brunei, and British North Borneo. Brooke-Popham stated that this should be sufficient to defend the territories against any Japanese attack. His request for such an outrageous amount of aircraft was declined by the British and Dutch governments on the grounds that they were simply not available.

Later, it was proposed to develop a Denial Scheme. Returning to the “scorched-earth” policy mentioned earlier, Denial Schemes were in place to destroy the oil installations at Miri and Lutong. In addition, the Bukit Sabir Airfield (11 km south of Kuching, the capital of Sarawak), was to be held as long as possible, then would be destroyed.

 

The prelude to the war

The island of Borneo is a land of primeval jungle. The coasts are fringed with mangrove and swamp, and over nine-tenths of the interior is covered with thick evergreen forests.

In 1941 the population was small – that of the whole island was estimated at less than three million – and there were less than a dozen settlements large enough to be called towns. There were few roads and only one short railway; communication was by the many waterways or by narrow jungle paths. Much of the interior was unexplored, or very inadequately known. It was rich in oil and other raw materials.

The island was partly Dutch and partly British. British Borneo lay along its northern seaboard and comprised the two states of British North Borneo and Sarawak, the small protected State of Brunei, and the Crown Colony of Labuan Island.

Borneo occupies a position of great strategic importance in the south-west Pacific. It lies across the main sea routes from the north to Malaya and Sumatra on the one hand, and Celebes and Java on the other. Strongly held, it could have been one of the main bastions in the defence of the Malay barrier, but neither the Dutch nor the British had the necessary resources to defend it. The available forces had to be concentrated further south for the defence of Singapore and Java, and all that could be spared for Borneo and the outlying Dutch islands were small detachments at important points which it was hoped might prove a deterrent to attack.

To gain control of the oilfields, to guard the flank of their advance on Malaya and to facilitate their eventual attack on Sumatra and western Java, the Japanese decided, as a subsidiary operation to their Malayan campaign, to seize British Borneo. This operation was launched by Southern Army eight days after the initial attack on Malaya.

The oilfields in British Borneo lay in two groups: one at Miri close to the northern boundary of Sarawak, and the other thirty-two miles north, at Seria in the State of Brunei. The crude oil was pumped from both fields to a refinery at Lutong on the coast, from which loading lines ran out to sea.

Landings were possible all along the thirty miles of beach between Miri and Lutong and there was, with the forces available, no possibility of defending the oilfields against determined attacks. Plans had therefore been made for the destruction of the oil installations. Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, decided it would be prudent to honor the 1888 defence agreement with Sarawak. Consequently, in late 1940, he ordered the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, a heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery, and a detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) to proceed to Kuching (British North Borneo).

In December 1940

a company of 2/15th Punjab was sent to Miri for the protection of the demolition parties, and

in May 1941

the rest of 2/15th Punjab was sent there to provide a garrison. This lone battalion consisted of approximately 1,050 soldiers under the command of Major C.M. Lane. For the defence of Sarawak region, it was deployed as follows:

At Miri was deployed a force of 2 officers, and 98 other ranks:
• 1 Infantry Company from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
• 6″ Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery Battery
• 1 Platoon of Royal Engineers
These troops were entrusted with the destruction of Miri Oil Fields. It was to be known as the Miri Detachment.

At Kuching was deployed a force of 1 officer, and 52 other ranks:
• 6 Platoons of infantry from 2/15 Punjab Regiment
These troops were to conduct a delaying action at the Bukit Stabar Airfield outside of Kuching. They were to be known as the Kuching Detachment. The other troops from the 2/15 Punjab were to be deployed piecemeal at the other airfield and oil facilities in Sarawak.

In addition, the Brooke Government mobilized the Sarawak Rangers. This force consisted of 1,515 troops who were primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen trained in the art of jungle warfare led by the European Civil Servants of the Brooke Regime. British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane who commanded the battalion was placed in charge of all forces in Sarawak, which included the native Volunteer Corps, Coastal Marine Service, the armed police and a body of native troops known as the Sarawak Rangers. Collectively, this force of 2,565 troops was known as “SARFOR” (Sarawak Force).

In August 1941

 a partial denial scheme, which reduced the output of oil by seventy per cent, was put into effect. It was also decided that no attempt should be made to defend British North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan, and

 

 the Governor of North Borneo, Mr. Robert Smith,

 was informed that the Volunteers and police were to be used solely for the maintenance of internal security. It was however decided to defend Kuching because of its airfield, and because its occupation by the enemy would give access to the important Dutch airfield at Singkawang II, sixty miles to the southwest and only some 350 miles from Singapore.

Order of Battle for British forces Sarawak, December 1941

Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane (commander)

2nd Battalion of 15th Punjab Regiment

heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery

detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers)

Sarawak Rangers

Coastal Marine Service

plus other native troops

The country between Kuching and the sea is roadless, but is intersected by a number of winding waterways which flow through mangrove swamps to the sea. There are two main approaches to the town: the first by the Sarawak River, which is navigable by vessels up to sixteen foot draught; and the second by the Santubong River, which will take vessels up to twelve foot draught. The roads from Kuching run east to Pending, north-west to Matang, and south to Serian a distance of forty miles from Kuching. The airfield lay seven miles south of the town on the Serian road. At the airfield a road branched off to the west; after crossing the Sarawak River at Batu Kitang, where there was a vehicular ferry, it terminated at Krokong fifteen miles short of the Dutch frontier.

There were two plans of defence that were proposed- Plan A and Plan B.
Plan A called for a mobile defence. The objective was to hold the Bukit Stabar Airfield as long as possible. Further delaying actions were also to be conducted so as to allow for the proper execution of the denial schemes. If enemy resistance was such that it could not be delayed, then the airfield would be destroyed and the entire force would retreat into the mountains and jungles in small parties and fight as a guerrilla force for as long as possible. Unfortunately, at

the Anglo-Dutch Military Conference

during September 1941 held in Kuching,

it was pointed out that Plan A could not be carried out if the Japanese landed 3,000 to 5,000 men with air and sea support. J.L. Noakes, the defeatist Sarawak Secretary for Defence, had continued to argue the inadequacy of SARFOR and that it had no hope against the Japanese if they landed in force. His idea was to take a ‘wait and see’ attitude and continue to appeal to Singapore for more troops and equipment. In the event that this was not forthcoming, Sarawak should surrender so as to prevent any bloodshed. Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, was completely against this defeatist talk and vehemently argued that Sarawak should put up a fight, a fight to maintain the honor of the Brooke Raj. At the end it was decided that the town could not be defended against the weight of attack which was to be expected, and the plan was reluctantly changed to one of static defence of the airfield.

During late November 1941, Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, GOC Malaya Command, took a 2-day tour of Sarawak to assess the adequacy of its defence preparations. He summarized the situation as follows: “Nobody could pretend that this was a satisfactory situation, but at least it would make the enemy deploy a larger force to capture Sarawak than would have been necessary if it had not been defended at all and that, I think, is the true way to look at it…the best I could do was to promise to send them a few anti-aircraft guns and too tell them of the arrival of Prince of Wales and Repulse, which were due at Singapore in a few days…not that I expected anit-aircraft guns to be of much practical value. But I felt that the moral effect of their presence there would more than counterbalance some slight dispersion of force”.

As a result of Percival’s assessment of Sarawak’s defences, an alternative plan of action was proposed, Plan B. This was based on static defence. All available troops and supplies were to be concentrated within a 5.5 kilometer perimeter of the Bukit Stabar Airfield to ensure that its destruction was not interfered with. The rationale for Plan B was presented by Brooke-Popham as follows: “The only place which it was decided to hold was Kuching, the reason for this being not only that there was a modern airfield at this location, but that its occupation by the enemy might give access to the Dutch airfields in Borneo, furthermore, it would also give the enemy access to Singapore. Being only some 350 miles from said place”.

Further orders were issued by Vyner Brooke that all the Civil Servants not assigned to the Sarawak Rangers were to remain at their posts. No thought must be given to the abandonment of the native population by any European officer of the Brooke Raj.

The Brooke Government which had already heard of

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (on 7 December 1941)

quickly ordered the complete and total destruction of the oil fields and airfields at Miri and Seria. Orders for the demolition of the refinery at Lutong and the denial of the oilwells reached the officer commanding at Miri

on the morning of the 8th December,

 and by the evening of the same day the task was completed. On the following day the landing ground there was made unfit for use, and on the 13th the Punjabis and the oil officials left by sea for Kuching. The destruction of the oilfields had been completed none too soon.

 

 

 

Japanese Occupation of Malaya, North Borneo & Sarawak

(Japanese troops advancing through Malaya)

 

Throughout much of World War II,  British Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak were under Japanese occupation.

The Japanese Empire commenced the Pacific War with the invasion of Kota Bahru in Kelantan

on 8 December 1941 at 00:25,

 about 90 minutes before the Attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii at 07:48 on 7 December Hawaii time, or 01:48 on 8 December Malayan time.

 

They then invaded the island of Borneo in mid December 1941, landing on the west coast near Miri in Sarawak; invasion was completed by 23 January 1942 when they landed at Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo on the east coast. During the occupation an estimated 100,000 people were killed.

 

Defence in Sarawak and North Borneo

The main objectives were the oilfields at Miri in Sarawak region and Seria in Brunei. The oil was refined at Tutong near Miri. Despite rich oil supplies, the Sarawak region had no air or sea forces to defend it.

 

Only in late 1940 did Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham order the 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment, a heavy 6-inch gun battery from the Hong Kong-Singapore Royal Artillery, and a detachment of 35th Fortress Company (Royal Engineers) to be positioned at Kuching. They numbered about 1,050 men. In addition, the Brooke White Rajah government also organised the Sarawak Rangers. This force consisted of 1,515 men who were primarily Iban and Dyak tribesmen. Altogether these forces were commanded by British Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Lane and was known as “SARFOR” (Sarawak Force).

 

After having heard of the attack on Pearl Harbor, on 8 December 1941, the Brooke government instructed that the oilfields at Miri and Seria and refinery at Lutong be quickly demolished.

 

Japanese landing and the battle

The main Japanese force, led by Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, consisted of units from Canton, southern China:

• 35th Infantry Brigade Headquarters
• 124th Infantry Regiment from Japanese 18th Division
• 2nd Yokosuka Naval Landing Force
• 4th Naval Construction Unit
• 1 platoon of the 12th Engineer Regiment
• 1 unit from the 18th Division Signal Unit
• 1 unit from the 18th Division Medical Unit
• 4th Field Hospital, 18th Division
• 1 unit from the 11th Water Supply and Purification Unit

 

(The Japanese landing off the west coast of British North Borneo, 1942)

 

On 13 December 1941,

 the Japanese invasion convoy left Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina, with an escort of the cruiser Yura (Rear-Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto) with the destroyers of the 12th Destroyer Division, Murakumo, Shinonome, Shirakumo and Usugumo, submarine-chaser Ch 7 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru. Ten transport ships carried the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade HQ under the command of Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. The Support Force consisted of Rear-Admiral Takeo Kurita with the cruisers Kumano and Suzuya and the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri.

 

The Japanese forces intended to capture Miri and Seria, while the rest would capture Kuching and nearby airfields. The convoy proceeded without being detected and,

at dawn on 15 December 1941,

 two landing units secured Miri and Seria with only very little resistance from British forces. A few hours later, Lutong was captured as well.

 

Meanwhile, on 31 December 1941,

the force under Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe moved northward to occupy Brunei, Labuan Island, and Jesselton (now called Kota Kinabalu). On 18 January 1942, using small fishing boats, the Japanese landed at Sandakan, the seat of government of British North Borneo.

The North Borneo Armed Constabulary, with only 650 men, hardly provided any resistance to slow down the Japanese invasion.

 

After securing the oilfields, on 22 December,

 the main Japanese forces moved westwards to Kuching. The Japanese airforce bombed Singkawang airfield to prevent a Dutch attack. After a battle between the Japanese fleet and a Dutch submarine, the fleet approached

the mouth of the Santubong river on 23 December.

The convoy arrived off Cape Sipang and the troops in twenty transport ships, commanded by Colonel Akinosuke Oka, landed at 04:00, 24 December. Although 2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment resisted the attack, they soon became out-numbered and retreated up the river. By the afternoon, Kuching was in the hands of Japanese forces.

 

At about 16:40 on 25 December,

 the Japanese troops successfully captured Kuching airfield. The Punjab regiment retreated through the jungle to the Singkawang area. After Singkawang was secured as well on 29 December, the rest of the British and Dutch troops retreated further into the jungle southward trying to reach Sampit and Pangkalanbun, where a Dutch airfield at Kotawaringin was located. South and central Kalimantan were taken by the Japanese Navy following attacks from east and west. After ten weeks in the jungle-covered mountains, the Allied troops surrendered on 1 April 1942. Lastly, Sarawak fell into the hands of The Empire of Sun.

 

(Hinomaru Yosegaki – Japanese WWII Good Luck Flag)

 

 

  The map of the Dutch East Indies 1941-1942

 

 

On 1 January 1942,

 two infantry platoons commanded by a company commander landed on Labuan Island, capturing the British Resident, Hugh Humphrey who later recalled: “I was repeatedly hit by a Japanese officer with his sword (in its scabbard) and exhibited for 24 hours to the public in an improvised cage, on the grounds that, before the Japanese arrived, I had sabotaged the war effort of the Imperial Japanese Forces by destroying stocks of aviation fuel on the island”. ^[1] On 8 January, Kawaguchi proceeded to Jesselton and having occupied that town and Beaufort, where he disarmed the small police unit. Using ten small fishing boats, two infantry companies (minus two platoons), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe, captured Sandakan, the seat of government of British North Borneo, and rescued the 600 interned Japanese citizens.

 On the morning of the 19th January,

 the Governor Robert Smith surrendered the State and, refusing to carry on the administration under Japanese control, was interned with his staff. This unit then captured Tawau and Lahad Datu on the 24th and 31st respectively. This time they freed a further 1,500 Japanese citizens. The Japanese forces suffered no combat casualties during this operations.

 

The convoy which left Miri

on the 22nd of December

 was escorted by the cruiser Yura, the destroyers Murakumo, Shirakumo and Usugumo, the minesweepers W 3 and W 6 and the aircraft depot ship Kamikawa Maru. Covering Force was consisted of cruisers Kinu, Kumano and Suzuya, with the destroyers Fubuki and Sagiri.

West of Covering Force was the 2nd Division of the 7th Cruiser Squadron (Mikuma and Mogami) with destroyer Hatsuyuki. It was sighted and reported to Air Headquarters, Far East, by Dutch reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of the 23rd, when it was about 150 miles from Kuching.

At 11.40 that morning

twenty-four Japanese aircraft bombed Singkawang II airfield, so damaging the runways that a Dutch striking force which had been ordered to attack the convoy was unable to take off with a bomb load.

 Despite the critical situation the Dutch authorities urged the transfer of their aircraft to Sumatra.

 Air Headquarters, Far East, agreed

 and during the afternoon of the 24^th

 the aircraft were flown to Palembang.

The convoy did not however escape unscathed.

On the evening of the 23^rd

 it was first attacked by Dutch submarine K-XIV (Lt.Cdr. C.A.J. van Well Groeneveld) sank two enemy ships and damaged two others,

and the following night of 23/24 December 1942

 another Dutch submarine K-XVI (Lt.Cdr. L.J. Jarman) torpedoed the IJN destroyer Sagiri (1,750 tons) near Kuching, Sarawak.

Their own torpedoes caught on fire and the ship simply blew up, killing immediately 121 officers and men.

The IJN destroyer Shirakumo and minesweeper W 3 rescued 120 survivors. The K-XVI was herself sunk by Japanese submarine I-66 (Cdr. Yoshitome) on her way back to Soerabaja.

Five Bristol Blenheims of 34th (B) RAF Squadron from Singapore, at almost extreme range, bombed the ships at anchor the same evening, but did little damage.

The convoy was seen at 6 p.m. on the 23rd

approaching the mouth of the Santubong River. Two hours later Colonel Lane received orders from Singapore to destroy the airfield.

 It was too late to change back to mobile defence and, as there seemed to him no point in attempting to defend a useless airfield, he asked General Percival for permission to withdraw as soon as possible into Dutch north-west Borneo.

While awaiting a reply Lane concentrated his battalion at the airfield, with forward detachments in the Pending area east of the town and on the roads to the north of it, 18-pounder gun and 3-inch mortar detachments covering the river approaches, and a Punjabi gunboat platoon, working with the Sarawak Rangers and the Coastal Marine Service, patrolling north of Kuching.

The convoy proceeded westward, arriving at a point, east of Cape Sipang

at 0300 on the 24th. At 0120,

the IJN transport Nichiran Maru with Colonel Akinosuke Oka arrived at the prearranged anchorage off the mouth of the Santubong River.

 At 0400,

the unit aboard the IJN transport Nichiran Maru, commanded by Colonel A. Oka, completed its transfer to landing barges and proceeding west of Cape Sipang.

At about 9 a.m.

 twenty enemy landing craft were observed approaching the shore.

The small Punjabi gunboat platoon, hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew up the river without loss.

 At 11 a.m.

as they neared the town the landing craft were engaged by the gun and mortar detachments, who sank four before themselves being surrounded and killed. During the afternoon three more craft were sunk by gunfire, but the remainder were able to land their troops on both sides of the river,

and by 4.30 p.m.

 the town was in Japanese hands.

Meanwhile Lane had been instructed by Percival to hold the Japanese for as long as possible and then act in the best interests of west Borneo as a whole.

Since the capture of the town threatened to cut off the forward troops, Lane ordered them to withdraw to the airfield.

The Japanese followed up

and before dark

made contact with the airfield defences.

Throughout the night

sporadic firing went on as they felt their way round the perimeter.

 Major-General Kawaguchi received a report from his intelligence officer that there was approximately 400-500 British troops in the vicinity of the Kuching airfield.

December,25^th.1941

As Christmas Day dawned,

firing temporarily ceased and advantage was taken of the lull to send the hospital detachment with the women and children on ahead into Dutch Borneo.

During the morning

 the Japanese encircling movement continued, and a company was sent to hold the ferry crossing at Batu Kitang so as to keep the road clear for escape.

A general withdrawal into Dutch Borneo was ordered to start at dusk, but heavy firing was heard to the north of Batu Kitang shortly after noon and, fearing that his line of retreat would be cut, Lane decided on immediate withdrawal.

The enemy, reinforced by the 2nd Yokosuka SNLF, soon aware of his intention, launched a full-scale attack on the two Punjabi companies forming the rearguard.

Of these two companies only one platoon succeeded in rejoining the main body. The remainder, totaling four British officers and some 230 Indian troops, were cut off and either killed or captured.

 At about 1640 on the 25th,

the Japanese troops completely secured the Kuching airfield. The Japanese losses during this operation (including those at sea) were about 100 killed and 100 wounded. The rest of the battalion reached Batu Kitang without loss to find the village deserted and the ferry unattended.

They had great difficulty in crossing the river, but by dark all except the covering force were over. Most of the transport had to be left behind.

. From the 26^th

‘Sarfor’ ceased to exist as a combined Indian and State Force, and the Punjabis, much reduced in strength, carried on alone

 

 December,27^th.1941

Following the capture of Kuching airfield, the Detachment commander ordered Colonel Oka to secure the strategic area around Kuching with the main force of the 124th Infantry Regiment, while he with one infantry battalion (excluding two companies)

 left Kuching on the 27th and returned back to Miri.

The main body made its way to Krokong. There the road ended, and the remaining vehicles and heavy equipment had to be abandoned. There, too, the Sarawak State Forces, in view of their agreement to serve only in Sarawak, were released to return to their homes

 

 

December,31^st.1941

Renewed Japanese attacks threatened to cut off the covering force, but it managed to make good its escape to the southward, and after a march of about sixty miles through dense jungle with little food or water

 rejoined the battalion at Singkawang II airfield on the 31st.

.

On the morning of the 27th

the column crossed the border into Dutch Borneo and two days later arrived at Singkawang II airfield where there was a garrison of 750 Dutch troops.

 

It was realized at Headquarters, Malaya Command, that the Punjabis would be urgently in need of food and ammunition.

On the 30th December

 

 

And

 then Japanese troops landing Tarakan,

They managed to get through barbed wire, to destroy all machine-gun nests and killing almost all Dutch commanding officers with knives.

They soon captured the first and second row of barracks.

At daybreak the Dutch garrison commander, Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal, discovered that front line is weak and that all further resistance would be useless.

 

 He dispatched a messenger, under a flag of truce, with an offer to surrender.

 

Colonel Kyohei Yamamoto, commander of the Right Wing Unit, immediately wired the commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment, informing him of the enemy’s surrender.

 

After the Dutch troops finally surrendered, the 2nd Kure Special Naval Landing Force advanced rapidly to the Tarakan airfield and occupied it

by the morning of January 12th.

 

 During this advance the unit was bombed by Dutch bombers from Samarinda II airfield and 18 Japanese soldiers were killed. At 1200 hours one infantry company dispatched from the Right Wing Unit also

Japanese troops occupied the village of Djoewata

 with a Dutch coastal battery located there at the north end of the island.

 

 

During this first fightings Japanese managed to capture a group of about 30 KNIL soldiers. When this group refused to tell them how to get to the main city of the island, they were all stabbed to death with Japanese rifles. Only one men survived this massacre. He managed to drag himself to a hospital where he recovered. The Left Wing Unit Operations, Tarakan Island, January 1942

The Left Wing Unit landed at the prearranged point at 0300

On January, the 11^th

¹⁹⁴²

and advanced west into the jungle toward the rear of the Dutch coastal battery which it was supposed to destroy. Due to the dense jungle and the steep terrain, the unit was able to advance only 100 meters per hour. After losing its way several times, the unit finally came out in the rear of the Dutch coastal battery around 1700 on the 12th. The Sakaguchi Detachment Headquarters had lost track of the movements of the Left Wing Unit and there had been no report from the officer who was sent out to contact the unit.

 Therefore, at midnight on the 11th, Lieutenant Colonel Namekata from the artillery unit was ordered to land with one infantry company with the mission of capturing the Dutch coastal battery, which was the main objective of the Left Wing Unit. At approximately 0200 on the 12th Lieutenant Colonel Namekata’s unit landed at the same point as had the Left Wing unit, proceeded along the coast and by daybreka reached a position in front of the battery. Initially, it was planned that the Detachment Headquarters was to land in the same area as the Right Wing Unit, immediately after the area was secured and than proceed by land to city of Tarakan. However, because Right Wing Unit had lost it way the Headquarter could not land as scheduled. On the 12th, upon learning of the Dutch forces to surrender, the Headquarter arranged with the Navy to land on Tarakan Island.

On the 12th,

 the following message was received by the Naval Forces: “Although the enemy has offered to surrender, it is feared that the coastal battery located at the south end of the island is not aware of this and it would be dangerous to proceed to the Tarakan pier, therefore held up your sailing”. In spite of this message, the warning was ignored and the movement went on as planned. When the six minesweepers entered the bay, they were fired on by the Dutch coastal battery and two minsweepers W 13 and W 14 were hit by 4.7 inch grenades and sank with most of its crew.

This were Japanese only naval losses in this action.

 The naval commander later promised amnesty for the guncrews and based on this promise the Dutch Island Commander managed to persuade the guncrews to surrender. The Japanese Army Commander on the other hand was to brutal to have the prisoners turned over to him. So he ordered to tie the men into small groups of three. Some time later they were thrown into the water where all 219 Dutch soldiers drowned.

The commander of the Sakaguchi Detachment,

 

 

 Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi,

 left his ship at about noon on the 12th and landed at

 

 

 

 

 

 

the mouth of Amal RiverTarakan

 

 

 

 

 arriving at the office of the British Petroleum Manufacturor at sunset.

On the morning of 13th, he accepted the enemy commander and formally accepted his surrender. Mopping-up the island was completed on the 13th. On the 14th, the entire Sakaguchi Detachment boarded the ships and left the island. Their new objective was Balikpapan All prisoners of war were executed by the Japanese in retaliation for the destruction of the oil installations; an event that was repeated later in Balikpapan. The Japanese soldier on guard on Tarakan Island, 1942. The photo was taken shortly after the Japanese occupied the island

a Dutch possession, fell on

January 12^th 1942

after a brief but vicious struggle, the Japanese killing most of the Dutch officers at close quarters with knives. Tarakan in hand,

Battle of Tarakan

Part of World War II Date

11 January 1942

Location Tarakan Island, Netherlands East Indies Result Decisive Japanese Victory Combatants Empire of Japan Kingdom of the Netherlands Commanders Major General Shizuo Sakaguchi Lieutenant Colonel S. de Waal Strength Over 6,600 Over 1,300 Casualties 255 killed All killed in battle or executed after surrendering

156: Tarakan Island – Dortmund Amateur Wargamers – Best of Show award

the Japanese commander, General Sakaguchi, prepared to move against his next objective, Balikpapan.

He sent two captured Dutch officers as envoys to Lt. Colonel C. van den Hoogenband, the Balikpapan garrison commander.

They delivered a written ultimatum demanding surrender.

The message included a warning:

When the Balikpapan garrison destroys the natural resources and oil installations at Balikpapan and the surrounding country, all commanding officers, their Dutch soldiers and other Dutchmen related to them will be killed without exception. [2]

Undaunted, Hoogenband ordered the oil facilities to be put to the torch. Samethini took part in this operation, the resulting fires and explosions sending thick pillars of black smoke into the sky.

 

 

 

General Sakaguchi’s ultimatum

 

 

Smoke rises from burning oil facilities at Balikpapan (January 1942)Photo Source: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

 

 

Lt. August Deibel of 2-VLG-V with his Buffalo (serial B-3110) at RAF Kallang, early 1942.

 He shot down

 

 two Nakajima Ki-27 fighters

on 12 January

before being wounded and having to bail out himself.^{[N 8][23]}

read more about Dai Nippon fighter  Nakijama Ki-27

 

While manufacturing the Nakajima Ki-27 fighter under license,in 1942

 

Manshu undertook redesing of this aircraft as an advanced trainer.

The aircraft was built as the Ki-79 a single-seat trainer powered by a 510 hp Hitachi Ha-13a,and the two-seat Ki-79 b with Hitachi Ha 23.

 By 1943

they were becoming available in quantity,with both models equpping the Sendai and Tachiarai Army Flying Schools and the Tokorozawa Army Aviation Maintenance School.

The Ki-79 b model was supplied to the Army Air Academy as well as the Tokyo,Otsu and Oita Army Boys Flying Schools,set up for high scool studens to interest them in becoming pilots for the same 2 Koren aircraft on Kamikaze missions.

Other Ki-79 a and Ki-79 b trainers that been sent to Singapore.Java,the lower Philippines and elsewhere in the Japanese occupied zones for additional training of green pilots.

In Java and Sumatra local Indonesian forces took over the Japanese arms in theit areas and offered select Japanese pilots the opportunity to help train insurgents in the use Japanese fighters.

While the Americans destroyed similar aircraft when they found in Japan,the Russians left them on the airfields in the occupied Manchuria,where they were soon picked up by the Red Army air Force.

When the Peoples Liberation Army was officially formed in July 1946 the 2 Koren trainers became the first standart Trainers of the PLAAF,the air force of the communits army

 

 

 

 

 

January,12^th.1942

the battle of manado

 

 

commander of the 1st Yokosuka SNLF paratroopers during the japanese invasion of the dutch east indies, in january 1942 during

the battle of manado January 1942

 commander Horiuchi was tasked to conquer the Longoan airfield, 09:00 hours

January 12th, 1942,

334 Japanese paratroopers were dropped on and around the airfield, Having heard the dropping dutch commander Captain van den Berg ordered the two remaining Overvalwagens (armoured car) to attack the airfield. Although the Japanese paratroopers suffered heavy casualties, they succeeded to capture the Langoan airfield. Enraged by the heavy losses, the Japanese executed a large number of KNIL POW’s

 

japanese navy paratroopers attacking the dutch troops in Longoan airfield (january 1942)

 

 

 

The idea of a Supreme Allied War Council came up early in the conference. It quickly became apparent that the World War I model would hardly meet the requirements of a global war, and action was deferred until the more urgent problems were disposed of.

January,13^th.1942

Finally, on the 13th, the British returned to the subject of the organization of the alliance.

By this time the ABDA command had been created and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound suggested that the same pattern be followed on a global scale.

This was entirely agreeable to the Americans, as was the British suggestion to avoid confusion between Allied and national activities by adopting a standard nomenclature. Joint was to be used for interservice collaboration of one nation; combined, for collaboration between two or more nations.²⁴

One further matter remained to be settled — the location of the Allied command post. The British, naturawanted it in London; the Americans, in Washington. There had been some consideration earlier in the conference of a dual system operating out of both capitals, but this idea was quickly discarded

 

The Americans did not favor this solution. Though they did not object to Sir John Dill’s appointment and even preferred him to anyone else, they felt that British representation in Washington should be limited to the level of the Chiefs of Staff. The assignment of a high-ranking British officer in Washington with access to the President would, they believed, create many problems. The proposal also seemed to them to suggest the dual command post concept. To General Marshall, “there could be no question of having any duplication of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in Washington and London.” Though he had no objection to parallel subordinate committees, “there could be,” he asserted, “only one Combined Chiefs of Staff who would give broad directions on the allocation of materiel.”²⁵

The final details for U.S.-British collaboration were settled at the last meeting of the conference.

 

By the 13^th January 1941

 it had been virtually decided that the headquarters of the alliance would be in Washington. The British therefore proposed to leave in the American capital Field Marshal Sir John Dill to represent Mr. Churchill on the highest levels, and the heads of the Joint Staff Mission, the organization established after the ABC-1 meetings in March 1940, to represent the Chiefs of Staff. Similarly, the Americans were to designate their own officials to represent the President and the Chiefs of Staff in London.

 

On the evening of the 13th  January 1941

the Americans prepared a draft of the arrangements already agreed upon, which with some modifications was accepted by the British and became the basis for the organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the war.²⁶ As defined by the conferees,

the Combined Chiefs of Staff consisted of the British Chiefs of Staff or their representatives in Washington, and the U.S. Chiefs, who, in the accepted terminology, were designated as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined chiefs were to sit in Washington only and to meet weekly, or more often if necessary.

They were to have a secretariat to maintain their records and prepare and distribute their papers, and a staff of planners designated the Combined Staff Planners (consisting of the chief American planners and their British opposite numbers). This latter group was “to make such studies, draft such plans, and perform such other work” as directed by the Chiefs.

The authority granted to the Combined Chiefs was broad. They were to “develop and submit recommendations” for the ABDA area and for the other areas “in which the United Nations may decide to act in concert . . . modified as necessary to meet the particular circumstances.”

 

To perform these functions, they were given responsibility for recommending to their political superiors “a broad program” of the requirements for implementing strategic decisions and for preparing general directives establishing policy governing the distribution of the weapons of war. Such weapons and war equipment were to be allocated “in accordance

with strategical needs” through appropriate groups in Washington and London under the authority of the Combined Chiefs. Finally, the Combined Chiefs were given responsibility to settle the broad issues of priority for overseas military movements.

The combined organization established at the ARCADIA Conference, though it stemmed in large measure from the efforts to meet the crisis in the Southwest Pacific, was patterned on the ABC-1 arrangements and on British practice. Under the former, an effective and well-manned British Joint Staff Mission had been established in Washington, and it was this body that provided the basis for a Combined Chiefs of Staff organization in the American capital.

British experience with committee organization provided the other key to the combined system established at ARCADIA. Thus, the Combined Chiefs were responsible to the President and Prime Minister in much the same way as the British Chiefs were already responsible to Churchill in his dual capacity as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.²⁷

And the organization of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that emerged during the months after the ARCADIA Conference was shaped in large degree by the necessity for providing American counterparts to the highly developed system of committees and secretariats under the British Chiefs and the War Cabinet.

January,14^th.1942

The conference scored one other major achievement before its close on 14 January. Last on the agenda the British had submitted before the meeting was an item calling for the establishment of “joint machinery” for collaboration.

Just what the British had in mind was not clear, but in preparation for the coming discussion the Americans studied the matter and decided they would seek as their solution to the problem of collaboration the establishment of a Supreme Allied War Council, patterned on the World War I model, and of two committees to support the council — a Military Joint Planning Committee and a Joint Supply Committee.²³

 

 

 

 

 

GENERAL TER POORTEN Greets General Wavell (left) on his arrival at Batavia.

 Now, in the first week of January, the 16^th

 Army, which had been given the 38th Division to accelerate its drive into the Indies, completed its preparations for the advance. At Davao in the southern Philippines it organized two task forces, one to take the important oil center of Tarakan in northern Borneo, and the other Menado in the Celebes.

 Both left Davao at the same time, 9 January 1942.

The first landed at Tarakan on 11 January and, after overcoming slight resistance from the Dutch defenders aided by American B-17’s based near Surabaya, took that town the same day. The second force, reinforced by about 330 naval paratroopers and supported by the seaplane tenders Chitose and Mizuho and three heavy cruisers, took Menado at the same time.

The seizure of these two points completed the Japanese control of

 

 the Celebes Sea

 

And

 the northern approaches to Makassar Strait.

 Through that strait lay one of the routes to Java.³⁰

 

 

 

JANUARY 1942

amazing story of Louis Rapmund.

 

Louis Rapmund

During one of my many late night internet searches I found his name in two obscure articles published in a New Guinea journal in the late 1940s. Rapmund was a Dutch NEI (Netherlands East Indies) officer who worked in western New Guinea facilitating the recovery of Indian, Papuan, and Dutch nationals who had been held by the Japanese. Rapmund assisted Nellist and Rounsaville Teams (of the Alamo Scouts) on their famous mission to liberate a Dutch governor and his family, along with 40 Javanese and twelve French civilians from an internee camp at Cape Oransbari

 

 

Last photo of the Rapmund Family – Madang 1940

“The last time I saw my father was in 1942 in Java,” said Louise. “He was literally running out the back door of our house as the Japanese were coming in the front door.

They were looking for him. This has helped heal a wound in my soul that festered for over sixty years. I loved my father. He was a wonderful man.”

Over the next week Louise gathered what photos she could find of her father and sent them to me for the ASA Photo Archive.

As the photos attest, Louis Rapmund was a striking figure; a handsome young man struck down in the prime of his life in a brutal war. But now thanks to modern technology, the undying love of a daughter, and the generosity of a total stranger, the words he penned a lifetime ago have helped bring others a little closer.

 

 

Louise & husband

 

in the first week of January 1942

Japanese Forces  opened the second phase.

 

The objectives of this phase of the plan included the seizure of the Bismarck Archipelago and Malay Peninsula; the capture of Singapore; and, in preparation for the final assault on Java, heart of the Indies, the acquisition of air and naval bases in southern Sumatra, Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, Amboina, and Timor.

 

 The occupation of Java itself and of northern Sumatra was scheduled for the third phase, after which the Japanese would complete their operations in Burma and consolidate their position in the conquered area.

 

 

 

 

 

 

So rapidly had their forces moved and so light had been resistance that even before the end of the year Japanese commanders in the field were urging their superiors in Tokyo to speed the timetable of conquest

 

 

January,1^st.1942

 

JAPANESE PRISONERS,

 captured on Bataan, being led blindfolded to headquarters for questioning. On 1 January 1942 the Japanese entered Manila and the U.S, troops withdrew toward Bataan. Army supplies were either moved to Bataan and Corregidor or destroyed. The remaining forces on Bataan, including some 15,000 U.S. troops, totaled about 80,000 men. The food, housing, and sanitation problems were greatly increased by the presence of over 20,000 civilian refugees. All troops were placed on half-rations

On January 2th, 1942

 

, the Philippine capital of Manila was occupied by the japanese

January,5^th,1942

The postal used cover with DEI Kon 10 cent stamps send from CDS Madioen 5.1.42 to Batavia center had sencored red Chop and the c0ver open by sencored ,closed with DEI Official geopend door censor flap

It was at this juncture, on 10 January,

 that General Wavell reached Batavia, capital of the Netherlands Indies, located on the northwest coast of Java. Already there or soon to arrive were his deputy, General Brett, and the commanders of his ground and naval force, Lt. Gen. H. ter Poorten and Admiral Hart. In the absence of Air Marshal Sir Richard E. C. Peirse, General Brereton was appointed deputy commander of the air forces. On the 15th, General Wavell formally assumed command of the ABDA area (ABDACOM) with headquarters at Lembang, inland from the capital and about ten miles north of Bandoeng.³¹ (Chart 2)

From the start it was apparent that the defense of the ABDA area, even in the unlikely event that the promised reinforcements arrived in time, had little chance of success. Already the Japanese had taken Hong Kong, isolated the Philippines, landed in Borneo and the Celebes, and were making rapid progress down the Malay Peninsula.

 To oppose their advance Wavell had, in addition to the British forces fighting a losing battle in Malaya and the American forces in the Philippines, two Dutch divisions in Java and small Dutch garrisons elsewhere in the Indies; a naval force — including the U.S. Asiatic Fleet — of heavy and 8 light cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 36 submarines; and an air force of 4 fighter and 6 bomber squadrons, including the remnants of the Far East Air Force, plus 250 more planes in Burma and Malaya. With these meager forces General Wavell could only try to hold back the Japanese tide while waiting for reinforcements which never came.³²

The urgent need for reinforcements was only one of Wavell’s problems. Keeping the peace within his own small international headquarters, unraveling the confused command relationships between his forces, and reconciling conflicting national interests and strategic concepts were others almost as serious. Even so minor a matter as the location of the headquarters could not be settled amicably and it was only after he had overridden the strong objections of his naval commanders that Wavell established his headquarters at Lembang.³³

The relationship between Wavell and MacArthur, though it created no difficulties, illustrated the confused situation in ABDACOM. In addition to the task of holding the Malay Barrier, Wavell had also been instructed to re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippine garrison. Before assuming command, he objected to this assignment and proposed that the islands be excluded from the ABDA area. President Roosevelt, without consulting his military advisers, approved this suggestion to avoid any delay in Wavell’s assumption of command. When General Marshall learned of this action he saw

 

 

CHART 2–ORGANIZATION OF ABDACOM, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1942

 

ABDA COMMAND meeting with General Wavell for the first time. Seated around the table, from left: Admirals Layton, Helfrich, and Hart, General ter Poorten, Colonel Kengen, Royal Netherlands Army (at head of table), and Generals Wavell, Brett, and Brereton.

that it might well have an adverse effect upon morale in the Philippines and was contrary to the ABDA agreement. An important reason for the establishment of Wavell’s command had been the desire to co-ordinate the efforts of the Allies in the Far East, and the United States had allocated to the defense of ABDA aircraft which had been under MacArthur’s command or sent out originally for his use. With King’s support, therefore, Marshall recommended to the President that he rescind his earlier message. The President saw the point immediately, and Wavell was told the day after he assumed command that the Philippines would remain in his area.³⁴

The establishment of the ABDA area made necessary also a reshuffling of the U.S. Army commands already in existence in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. Although MacArthur was assured by the War Department that the establishment of ABDACOM would not alter his position or affect his forces, he actually lost a part of his command. The U.S. Army Forces in Australia were then a part of USAFFE (U.S. Army Forces, Far East) and under MacArthur’s direction. Now he was told that these forces would be formed into a separate command on a level with USAFFE and placed under General Brereton, who had been selected because of his “intimate knowledge of your situation and needs.” The reason for this move was that the Japanese advance into the Indies had made control by MacArthur of the forces in Australia and the Netherlands

Indies impractical. But, he was assured, “when satisfactory communications with the Philippines have once been reestablished your resumption of actual command of all American Army forces in the Far East will be easily accomplished.”³⁵

Other than the paper changes in command, the establishment of ABDACOM had no effect on operations in the Philippines. MacArthur reported formally by radio to his new superior and sent representatives from Mindanao to Java to solicit what aid they could, but the relationship between the two headquarters was never more than nominal.

General Brereton’s assignment as air commander in the ABDA area, pending the arrival of Air Marshal Pierse, complicated an already confusing situation. Brereton was also commander of U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), a post General Brett had held before him, and in this capacity also came under Wavell’s control. But this control was only partial, for, as the War Department explained to Brereton, “U.S. troops in Australian territory come under the control of General Wavell only when specifically allotted for service in the ABDA area.”³⁶

The physical difficulties of exercising command simultaneously over USAFIA, a logistical and administrative headquarters in Australia, and over ABDAIR, an operational headquarters in Java, as well as the conflicting missions of the two, made it imperative to clarify Brereton’s status. On the 16th, therefore, a day after he assumed command, General Wavell, at Brereton’s request, asked Marshall to relieve Brereton of his responsibilities in Australia so that he could concentrate on the full-time job of directing his air forces. This was quickly done, and General Barnes, who had in effect been directing the activities of USAFIA since the 12th, was authorized to assume command of base facilities in Australia.³⁷

Barnes himself seems to have been somewhat confused about his status and responsibilities for he was never formally designated as a commander of USAFIA and Brereton continued to receive messages addressed to him with that title. Moreover, when Brereton had difficulty getting logistical support from Australia that he wanted, he complained to the War Department, which promptly informed Barnes that he was to provide that support as best he could. At the same time, the War Department made it clear to Barnes that he was not under Brereton’s but Wavell’s command, and that General Brett, as Wavell’s deputy, could issue orders to him. So far as the War Department was concerned this ended the matter, but General Barnes, even at the end of January, was apparently not clear on his relationship to ABDACOM “in general” and to General Brett “in particular regarding troops and supplies in Australia.”³⁸

Not only was there confusion over command in the ABDA area, but national commanders differed with one another and with the Supreme Commander over the conduct of operations and the allocation of resources. To the American, Dutch, and Australian officers, it seemed that General Wavell was devoting far too much attention, as well as a disproportionate share of Allied resources, to the defense of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, an attitude that seemed to them to reflect British rather than Allied interests. The American commanders, Admiral Hart and General Brereton, free from any territorial interest in the area, wished to protect the lines of communication and air and naval bases along the Malay Barrier, which they believed essential links in defensive structure of the Southwest Pacific and the starting points for offensive operations. The Dutch desired above all else to concentrate Allied resources on the defense of their territories. And the Australians, concerned over the defense of the homeland, continually pressed for a greater share of the theater’s resources on the east. If General Wavell made any effort to reconcile these views, the records do not show it. Despite the representations of the national commanders to their governments — in Washington Brett’s were refuted by the Army planners, as was his proposal to break up the new theater — Wavell continued to act on the assumption that the security of the Netherlands Indies and Australia depended on the defense of Malaya and Singapore.³⁹

These difficulties were brought out sharply in the discussion of naval reinforcements. Most of the British and Dutch vessels in the area were assigned to convoy duty, leaving only the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, based on Surabaya, free for operations. The Dutch, whose naval forces were under the operational control of the British, were none too happy over this assignment, preferring to employ their vessels in the defense of Dutch territory. Their irritation was further increased by the British announcement of the transfer of some of their cruisers and destroyers to the Indian Ocean and American refusal to provide naval reinforcements for convoy duty. Ultimately the Australians were persuaded to send additional vessels into the area, but the damage had been done and the Dutch resentment persisted.⁴⁰

The Dutch were displeased also with the way naval operations were being conducted. Admiral Hart, they felt, had his forces too far back and was showing more concern over Darwin and the supply routes to Australia than over the progress of the enemy through Makassar Strait and the Molucca Sea. They were disappointed, too, over their failure to gain command of the naval elements in ABDA. Their interests, they felt, were predominant and their knowledge of the area greater than that of the Americans. This attitude, which Dutch naval officers made little effort to conceal, added to Hart’s already considerable burdens and complicated his task enormously.

By the end of January, relations between Admiral Hart and the Dutch naval commander had become so strained that they could no longer be ignored. It was then that General Wavell suggested to the Prime Minister that Hart

 

be relieved on account of his age and that a Dutch officer, or, if the United States would send naval reinforcements to the ABDA area, a younger American be given command. The suggestion was passed on to Washington and finally to Hart himself who replied that he did not consider himself too old to discharge his duties and did not wish to be relieved. Though both Admirals King and Stark supported the Asiatic Fleet commander, the President decided to adopt Wavell’s suggestion. His decision was influenced largely by the fact that the United States had refused to send naval reinforcements to the area and by the hope that the Dutch would assume a more active role in the naval defense of ABDA. There was never any feeling, Admirals King and Stark later recalled, that Hart had proved unfit or that he was too old to exercise command. After the President had made his decision Hart had no recourse but to step down, which he did on the 5th by asking to be relieved on account of ill health, a course Admiral Stark had recommended to him. Six days later the Secretary of the Navy ordered him home.⁴¹ His place was taken by Vice Adm. Conrad E. L. Helfrich, Dutch naval commander.

ADMIRALS HELFRICH AND HART

With the relief of Admiral Hart, ABDACOM lost its last American force commander. Air Marshall Pierse had taken over from General Brereton on 28 January, as originally intended, and the Dutch continued to command the ground forces. The U.S. Chiefs, anxious to secure direction of one of the major elements in ABDACOM in the interests of “homeland support,” put forward Brett’s name as commander of the Allied air forces. Both the President and the Prime Minister supported the nomination, but Brett seems to have had larger ambitions and argued that such a “drastic change” would be unsettling. The matter was dropped.⁴²

While the Allies sought to solve the problem of command and bring reinforcements into the area, the Japanese continued to advance almost without interruption. In Malaya General Yamashita forced the British back from line after line until on 27 January Lt. Gen. A. E. Percival, the British commander in Malaya, withdrew his forces to Singapore. The causeway connecting the fortress to the mainland was blown on 31 January. Only the waters of Johore Strait lay between Yamashita and his goal. For a week, while the Singapore garrison

desperately prepared its defenses, Japanese aircraft and artillery paved the way for the final assault.

 

The loss of Singapore was a major blow to the Allied cause in the Far East and a disaster of the first magnitude for the British who had long regarded it as an impregnable fortress and the key to the defense of Australia, New Zealand, and India. Fortunately, the British estimate of the importance of Singapore to the security of the Dominions proved incorrect, but that did not lessen the immediate shock or minimize the seriousness of the blow to the British Far Eastern Fleet, which had already suffered the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse. With its base gone, the British Navy now had to retire to Sydney in Australia and to Ceylon, and when Ceylon was threatened briefly in April, to the east coast of Africa.

For ABDACOM, which had been established only a month before, the fall of Singapore was a crushing blow. In anticipation of this disaster, General Wavell had warned the Chiefs of Staff on the 13th that a drastic change in plans might soon be necessary. It was doubtful, he wrote, that Sumatra, obviously the next Japanese objective, could be held, and if it were not, then Java would fall. Though he told the Chiefs he intended to continue his present plans for the defense of Java “until situation enforces changes,” it was apparent by the 15th that he had no real hope for success, a view that was reinforced by his recommendation to divert reinforcements, two Australian divisions, already en route from the Middle East to Java, to Australia or Burma, preferably the latter.⁴⁴

The Dutch took violent exception to Wavell’s estimate. They insisted that Java must be defended, regardless of the fate of Sumatra. To them and to the Netherlands Government-in-exile Java had an even greater political, moral, and sentimental significance than Singapore had for the British. Wavell’s proposal seemed to them an abandonment by their Allies and confirmed their worst fears that ABDACOM was a device to use Allied resources for the defense of Singapore and of British interests in the Far East.

Unpalatable as it was to the Dutch, Wavell’s estimate had to be accepted for not only was Singapore about to fall into Japanese hands, but Java was clearly threatened from three directions — the South China Sea, Makassar Strait, and Molucca Sea. Following up the Borneo

landings of late December and early January, the Japanese, moving by water through Makassar Strait, had landed at Balikpapan

Gen.-Maj. H. ter Poorten (rechts) met General Sir Archibald P. Wavell (midden), opperbevelhebber van Abdacom, te Batavia, 22 jan.1942

 

 on the January,24th.1942

 The landings had been made only after a battle with U.S. naval forces — their first of the war — in which the American destroyers won a tactical victory but failed to stop the enemy. The Japanese took Balikpapan easily but failed to capture the oil refineries there. These, the Dutch had already gutted.

. Only a day before, another Japanese force had sailed through the Molucca Sea to land at Makassar on the southwest tip of Celebes Island, facing Makassar Strait. By 10 February that strait and the north shore of the Java Sea were under Japanese control.

The Molucca Sea approach to the Malay Barrier fell into Japanese hands as a result of amphibious hops and naval-air engagements in which the Allies fought a desperate but losing battle. From Menado, which they had taken

 on 11 January,

 the Japanese moved on to Kendari

 

 

On January 22th.1942

the Balikpapan ‘s Dai Nippon invasion force was sighted heading south through the Makassar Strait.

The Dutch air force attacked the convoy continuously during daylight, but its antiquated Martin B-10 bombers inflicted little damage. In the predawn hours of the 24th the Japanese landed 5,500 soldiers in two separate groups. The bulk of Sakaguchi’s 56th Regimental Group came ashore north of town. A detached battalion, the Surprise Attack Unit commanded by Major Kaneuchi, landed south of Balikpapan. Guided by Indonesian fifth columnists, the latter force proceeded to the village of Banubaru, cutting off the Dutch line of retreat. Having learned from hard experience at Tarakan, where Dutch coastal artillery had sunk two warships, the Japanese were avoiding the big guns defending Balikpapan.

In the event, the Dutch did not attempt to hold their positions. Hoogenband had received orders to withdraw inland after completing sabotage operations. He led an infantry column out of town, along the road to Banubaru. The Dutch ran into the advancing main body of Kaneuchi’s Surprise Attack Unit, and the Japanese promptly gave battle. Han fought as part of a machine gun crew, feeding the ammunition belt into the weapon as the gunner mowed down the leading edge of the oncoming enemy. The KNIL troops were defeated and the Dutch force broke up. With no other alternatives but death or capture, Samethini joined a group of survivors heading north into the jungle towards their only hope of escape, the airfield at Samarinda. [3]

on the January, 24th,1942

 the same day they landed at Balikpapan. Amboina Island was occupied a week later by a strong force which overcame the small Dutch and Australian garrison with little difficulty. By the end of the month the Japanese controlled the Molucca Sea and were in position to cut the line between Java and Australia and to breach the east flank of the Malay Barrier.

On the western flank of the barrier, the Japanese had early secured the South China Sea approaches and

Offshore it had been a different story.

At approximately 20.00 hours (8 pm) on the 24th,

 American destroyers of Des Div 59 attacked the invasion convoy, sinking four troop transports and an escort vessel. The next day two more transports were claimed, one by Dutch and American bombers, the other by a Dutch submarine. This was the largest naval action since the start of the Pacific War, but the brief Allied tactical victory could not change the outcome of events on land.

Over the next several days, Han and his companions hacked their way through a tangled wilderness teeming with malarial mosquitoes. Pursued and repeatedly attacked, they reached Samarinda and boarded a plane for Java. As the transport winged over Borneo’s deep green forests and muddy brown rivers, Han might have gazed out the window and reflected on this land of opportunity that had so suddenly become a place of death and defeat. But he was not a man to dwell on regrets. Surely Anna and Margie were alive and waiting for him in Surabaya. That mattered more than anything. [4]

On that day, they took their captives to the nearby sea shore:

Even eight patients from the local hospital were among the group of 78 victims marched to a beach near the old Klandasan Fortress. Two of the victims were then beheaded on the beach, the other 76 forced into the sea…all were shot one by one, their bodies left to drift with the tide. [5]

 

 

The only way out: Samarinda II airfield, Borneo
(Allied air recce photo taken in 1944)

 

Australian troops of 2/3 Machine Gun Battalion at Arinem (Western Java) in January 1942

 

a group of american tanks captured by the japanese army in the phillipines and used by the japanese during the battle of corregidor and in the invasion of Burma

Burma was to have been seized in two phases and its occupation completed only after operations to the south were over.

But early in January

the schedule had been speeded up and before the end of the month the 15th Army had pushed across the Thai-Burma border and seized

 

Dai Nippon in  Moulmein 1942

Look

 

dutvh POW at Moulmein camp

 

japanese infantry using a type 89 Grenade Discharger against british troops in burma 1942

 

 

officer of the japanese army 56th infantry Division carrying the regimental flag (burma 1944)

read more

 

                                 The Sword and the Cross

                               Two of the dramatic photographs in Pacific Fury illustrating

                                   the cruelty and the compassion of the Pacific conflict

Eyewitnesses in Pacific Fury: Alexander Roberts as an RAAF pilot and, bearded, as air liaison officer with the Chindits in Burma; Catherine ‘Kay’ Cotterman, prisoner of the Japanese in Manila; and William ‘Bill’ Macauley, prisoner of the Japanese in Hong Kong

 

On the 20th January 1942

came messages from the President and Chief of Staff, addressing Wainwright as commander in the Philippines and telling him of his promotion to lieutenant general. No confusion was possible. “Upon the departure of General MacArthur,” wrote Marshall, “you become commander of U.S. forces in the Philippines.”⁵⁵ Beebe had no choice but to turn over the messages to Wainwright, who, next morning, formally assumed command of U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), the name of his new headquarters, and designated Beebe his chief of staff. Like MacArthur, he commanded the naval forces as well as those of the Army, and was therefore a joint commander.⁵⁶

 

 

January,21st,.1942

It was only when MacArthur learned of Wainwright’s assumption of command on the 21st that he informed the War Department of his own arrangements.

 

japanese officers interrogating american general Jonathan Mayhew Wainwright IV (bataan 1942)

 

To Marshall these seemed unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons, and he told the President so. Wainwright, he felt, should continue in command. The President accepted this advice and MacArthur was advised that unless he had strenuous objections, Wainwright would retain his new post.⁵⁷ MacArthur made no objections. He understood thoroughly Marshall’s difficulties; he said, and would accommodate himself to the arrangements already made. “Heartily in accord with Wainwright’s promotion to lieutenant general,” he radioed, “His assignment to Philippine command is appropriate.”⁵⁸

 

 

 

american POWs being searchead by japanese guard (bataan 1942)

 

Thus ended the uncertainty and confusion. Wainwright was now confirmed as the commander of all forces in the Philippine Islands with the large authority and heavy responsibilities formerly possessed by General MacArthur. But he was not independent of his former commander, for MacArthur, though not yet officially appointed to his new office, had acquired even greater responsibilities than before and command over an area stretching from Melbourne to Manila

group shotunder fire

 

japanese soldiers advancing under heavy fire of british troops during the invasion of burma (1942)

 

type 92 heavy machine gun crew in the mountains of burma

 

January,23th 1942

 

OFFICERS OF THE WAR PLANS DIVISION, 23 January 1942.

on the 25th January

 

The women and children were sent on by road to Pontianak on the coast, whence they escaped by ship on the 25th January,

only four days before the Japanese occupied the town. Lane placed his battalion under Dutch command for the defence of the airfield and the surrounding area.

There followed a breathing space while the Japanese prepared for their next advance, though clashes took place between patrols near the border.

The Japanese troops in Singkawang, 1942.
The man with the moustache on the right is Major-General Kiyotake Kawaguchi.

 

Han arrived in Java at the end of January.

Making his way to Surabaya, he searched at once for Anna and Margie. To his great worry, they were not at his mother’s house and he was unable to find them. He then fell ill with malaria contracted during the forced march in Borneo. The disease evolved the dangerous complication called blackwater fever, and he was sent to a hospital. [6]

The report of Balikpapan’s loss added to the litany of woes announced by the radio broadcasts on Java. Frank Samethini heard the news at Fort Menari, near Surabaya, where he’d been posted since the outbreak of the war:

Weeks pass without a shot being fired by us at the fort. But the radio tells of defeat, of bitter defeat by the ridiculed little men, the former smiling, bowing and hissing barbers, merchants of inferior goods made in Japan. There are also numerous reports of bravery from other sectors of our forces, but the closing message of the bulletin is always the same: battle lost, we retreat before the swarming ants….[7]

The day before Balikpapan’s fall the Japanese overran Kendari on the island of Celebes, capturing the finest air base in the East Indies.

I am reading a letter from Lisa while on duty in the listening post (“Darling, do you want it to be a boy or a girl?”), when suddenly a sound from a great distance enters the earphones.

Growing louder and louder, it seems to come from every direction. No, wait, from high in the invisible vault above the cloud banks it comes! In a flash I recognise it with a sudden, racing heart: approaching aircraft. Can’t be ours, we haven’t got that many!

 My thumb sinks the alarm button while I reach for her letter fluttering to the floor. My field glasses show the Jap airplanes up as silver-winged, transparent dragonflies, three flights of five bombers in each squadron, moving slowly across the sky, too high for the black and white popping blossoms of our ack-ack.

 What little is left of our fighter planes whiningly soar upwards to meet their fate. The dragonflies move on southwards – southwards! But that is Surabaya! Fear clutches my throat. My God! Almost immediately I hear the dull boom of exploding bombs in a muffled staccato that pierces through my heart. Where, oh God, have they fallen? [8]

 

(ibid Hans Semethini)

The Japanese planned to attack the airfield from the north, and also from the west by a force landed on the coast. This attack was held up by bad weather for nearly a week, but on the 24th January five companies advanced along the road from the Dutch border, and

 

 by the 25th had reached a village two and a half miles north-east of the airfield. Having destroyed the stores and barracks, the defenders launched an attack

Meanwhile three Japanese companies had left Kuching in small craft during the night of the 25th

 

on the 26th which was repulsed.

That evening a counter-attack succeeded in turning their flank and

early on the 27^th

 the order was given to evacuate the airfield. A Dutch tank was used to hold a crossroads for a while. During the withdrawal two Punjabi platoons were surrounded but, refusing to surrender, they fought on under their Indian officer until late in the afternoon.

 It was only when their ammunition was expended and the enemy was attacking in overwhelming numbers that the gallant little party laid down its arms. Japanese reports have since given their casualties at the hands of these two platoons as between 400 and 500 killed or wounded.

Of the seventy Punjabis engaged only three escaped. The remainder were never seen again; there is evidence to show that they were brutally put to death by the infuriated Japanese.

On the evening of the 27th January

the remnants of the Punjabis crossed the Sungei Sambas and took up a position on the high ground at Ledo, fifteen miles south-west of the airfield.

and by daybreak on the 27^th

 had landed at Pemangkat due west of the airfield. Striking north-east and south and meeting with little opposition, they quickly captured the coastal villages and moved towards Bengkajang, thus threatening to surround the Allied force at Ledo.

After the fighting at Singkawang II airfield the British-Dutch forces retreated to Sanggau. There this force was split and the Dutch troops went to Sintang, while the British-Indian troops went to Nanga Pinoh.

On the 29th,

after a series of rearguard actions, the Punjabis withdrew to Ngabang and two days later to Nanga Pinoh.

 By this time further resistance was useless,

.

 

2.February 1942

During the frequent Japanese air raids of February 1942,

they took refuge in a bomb shelter in the front yard. This was a dugout reinforced with sandbags, built by Emma’s neighbors from across the street. At times they had to remain in the shelter for up to eight hours.

 

February,1^st.1942

the Japanese occupied the Pontianak town

February,2^nd.1942

 

 

Surabaya  Starting boombardement in February 1942

In Surabaya, Elisabeth was visiting a friend of her mother’s. She recalls:

The sirens started with a horrible noise and we thought they were just practicing, but then the bombs started to fall and the aeroplanes were fighting in the air. We were so afraid and we all dived under the bed. After what seemed like hours, the all clear came. We were all dazed and didn’t know what to think about it all. There was chaos everywhere…. [9]

 

on February 3th.1942,

the Japanese launched their first major air attacks on the city. Frank was on anti-aircraft observation duty that day:

I am reading a letter from Lisa while on duty in the listening post (“Darling, do you want it to be a boy or a girl?”), when suddenly a sound from a great distance enters the earphones. Growing louder and louder, it seems to come from every direction. No, wait, from high in the invisible vault above the cloud banks it comes! In a flash I recognise it with a sudden, racing heart: approaching aircraft. Can’t be ours, we haven’t got that many! My thumb sinks the alarm button while I reach for her letter fluttering to the floor. My field glasses show the Jap airplanes up as silver-winged, transparent dragonflies, three flights of five bombers in each squadron, moving slowly across the sky, too high for the black and white popping blossoms of our ack-ack.

 

What little is left of our fighter planes whiningly soar upwards to meet their fate. The dragonflies move on southwards – southwards! But that is Surabaya! Fear clutches my throat.

 

My God! Almost immediately I hear the dull boom of exploding bombs in a muffled staccato that pierces through my heart. Where, oh God, have they fallen? [8]

In Surabaya, Elisabeth was visiting a friend of her mother’s. She recalls:

The sirens started with a horrible noise and we thought they were just practicing, but then the bombs started to fall and the aeroplanes were fighting in the air. We were so afraid and we all dived under the bed.

 

After what seemed like hours, the all clear came. We were all dazed and didn’t know what to think about it all. There was chaos everywhere…. [9]

 

 

 

A formation of Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” Japanese medium bombers.
This type flew missions against Surabaya from Kendari, Celebes.

 

 

“There was chaos everywhere….”
Japanese bombs fall on Surabaya (February 1942)

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

February,3^rd.1942

The Javanese Etnic group:KRIDO REKSO WIROTOMO: BRANCH DJAKARTA p/a M.L.Joedokoesoemo  Kesehatan II/2 Street Batavia centrum circulAir stencil letter to Mr L.Ch.Damais Java street 72 pavilliun  Batavia centrum,Postalkly used with DEI Karbouw  2 cent CDS Batavia Centrum 3.2.42

 The letter :

By means of this letter KRW Jakarta branch officials to declare all the members of his attitude in the current war as follows:

a.Perkumpulan Krido Rekso wirotomo Djakarta  branch remained standing.
b.The Meeting this year  postponed until  at a good time.
c.All the lessons (Beksan and Gamelan) and other works such as “Cipto Ening” and others dismissed.
d.Starting from  February 1942 all members exempt from payment of contributions.

To the members who are delinquent (not paid) contributions are kindly requested to pay arrears until January 1942. This outstanding money (cut at the cost of shipping) continue to be sent to you let bendahari R.Soebari Pasar Minggoe.Djakarta Post Office (f 70)
 

 Apart from the above that if something about the proposal and make associations in this war, the board asked the committee also requested the committee get forgivenes of  any errors
  for its obligations,

yours respectfully
Board-Rekso Krido-Wirotomo
Djakarta branch

(old spelling has been adapted to the current to be easily translated)

 

Original info

Dengan perantaraan  surat ini pengurus KRW cabang Djakarta mempermaklumkan kepada sekalian anggota tentang sikapnya dalam masa perang saat ini seperti berikut:

a.Perkumpulan Krido Rekso wirotomo cabang Djakarta tetap berdiri.

b.Rapat tahun ini ditunda sampai pada saat yang baik.

c.Semua pelajaran (Beksan dan Gamelan) dan pekerjaan-pekerjaan lainnya seperti “Cipto Ening” dan lain-lainnya diberhentikan.

d.Mulai bulan Pebruari 1942 semua anggota dibebaskan dari pembayaran kontribusi.

Kepada Angggota yang masih menunggak(belum membayar) Kontribusi  diminta dengan hormat supaya membayar tunggakan itu sampai bulan januari 1942. Uang tunggakan ini(dipotong dengan ongkos pengiriman)hendaklah terus dikirimkan kepada saudara bendahari  R.Soebari di Kantor Post Pasar Minggoe.Djakarta( f 70)

 Selain dari pada yang tersebut diatas jika sesuatu usul tentang dan buat perkumpulan dalam masa perang ini, maka pengurus meminta kepada penguruds dan juga pengurus meminta dipermaafkan segala kekeliruan

 selama menjalankan kewajibannya,

Wassalam

Pengurus Krido-Rekso-Wirotomo

Cabang Djakarta

(ejaan lama telah disesuaikan dengan yang berlaku saat ini agar mudah diterjemahkan)

 

Japanese bombing raids against East Java began on 3 February, 1942.

 

and on the 4th February 1942

the Punjabis with Dutch agreement set out in two columns for Sampit and Pangkalanboeoen on the south coast. The British tried to get out of Borneo by going south. Their aim was to find a radio station at Sampit (or if that failed at Pangkalanboen) in order to get contact with Java Island or to reach one of the harbours in the south of Borneo.

The force at Nanga Pinoh was split in three parts: A (Sikh), B (PM) Company and part of Staff (Hindu) Company under command of Major Milligan formed the western column, which took the shorter route, C (Khattack), D (Jat) and part of Staff (Hindu) Company under command of Lieutenant Colonel Ross-Thompson formed the eastern column, which took the longer route and the blitzparty. The blitzparty consisted of 2 officers and 4 men and it was their task to go as fast as possible to Sampit in order to get contact with Java Island

February. 6th, 1942

 

Sydney Morning Herald (February 6, 1942)
National Library of Australia

Japan’s fearsome Zero fighter planes inflicted heavy casualties on the Dutch and Allied interceptors, and the city was soon without effective air defense:

The following week a few more air raids are directed on fortifications outside Surabaya, but the scattered pillboxes and gun emplacements are perfectly camouflaged and no direct hit is suffered. The enemy aircraft, unchallenged since the last Dutch plane was downed, fly low over the dense swamp vegetation in an effort to draw fire and so pinpoint our gun positions. But the order by the fort commander is clear: repulse enemy landings on the beaches and nothing else. Do not shoot at aircraft, do not even shake a fist at them lest they spot you. Keep your head low and swear if you must, but all all events stay out of sight. What kind of war is this? [10]

By the middle of February, Singapore had surrendered,

Read more

THE BATTLE FOR SINGAPORE 

The True Story of Britain’s Greatest Military Disaster 

 

Gen Yamashita landed at singapore

 

General Percival with white flag in Singapore

Read more-book in CD-ROM

Created By dr Iwan suwandy,MHA

“The dai Nippon War In Singapore”

.

 

 

Peter Thompson –

 

General Arthur Percival, ill-fated British commanding officer in Singapore, Olga and Maisie Prout, the brave sisters who defied the Japanese during the occupation of the island colony and Captain William ‘Bill’ Drower, the man the Japanese couldn’t kill. Their dramatic stories are told in The Battle for Singapore

 

the bulk of the American army in the Philippines was bottled up on the Bataan Peninsula,

and the Japanese had taken Palembang in southern Sumatra.

 

The enemy was now on Java’s doorstep. Getting 24 hours’ leave, Frank entered Surabaya to find the town “swarming with British and Australian soldiers.” There were also American air and artillery units on Java.

 

 These hastily collected reinforcements, belatedly shipped to the East Indies without adequate arms or supplies, were too little, too late

The following week a few more air raids are directed on fortifications outside Surabaya, but the scattered pillboxes and gun emplacements are perfectly camouflaged and no direct hit is suffered. The enemy aircraft, unchallenged since the last Dutch plane was downed, fly low over the dense swamp vegetation in an effort to draw fire and so pinpoint our gun positions. But the order by the fort commander is clear: repulse enemy landings on the beaches and nothing else. Do not shoot at aircraft, do not even shake a fist at them lest they spot you. Keep your head low and swear if you must, but all all events stay out of sight. What kind of war is this? [10]

(ibid Frank semethini)

on 8th February 1942,

 without waiting for the fall of Singapore, launched their attack on southern Sumatra. From Camranh Bay in Indochina came a strong naval force to support the transports headed for Palembang with its airfield and oil refinery. On the 14th about 700 paratroopers were dropped in the Palembang area, but achieved only a limited success against the Dutch and British defenders. At the end of the day Allied troops were still in control, but next morning, when the main Japanese force landed upshore and began to move toward Palembang, they withdrew. Two days later, the Japanese were in control of southern Sumatra, leaving the northern part of the island to the conquerors of Singapore. Only the Straits of Sunda now separated the Japanese from their main objective, Java.⁴⁵

Shortly before midnight of 8 February,

 under cover of an extremely heavy artillery bombardment, the Japanese began to cross the straits.

By the morning of the February. 9th,

they had established a firm position on the island and were pouring reinforcements into the lodgment area. From there the Japanese spread over the island, infiltrating the defender’s lines and isolating them into small pockets of resistance.

 

 

From Balikpapan, the Japanese moved on to Bandjermasin, along the southeast coast of Borneo, which they took on

On 9 Feb 1942,

The day before the Japanese entered the island, he reported he could leave immediately on a cargo ship; however he was instructed to stay at his post as Australia’s most senior civilian official otherwise Canberra “would be deprived of independent information and effect on morale would be bad’. 

 

 

10 February 1942

(2)February,12th.1942.

The Battle Of Palembang

 

Teishin Shudan (Raiding Group) paratroopers landing during the battle of Palembang, February 1942

 

The Dai Nippon  paratroops army  by parachute landed at Palembang and the oil area at plaju near Palembang were attack and occupied ,look the pictures.dai Nippon capture the oil field

 

japanese troops in a captured oil field (dutch east indies 1942)

 

japanese army paratrooper (Teishin Shudan) using a Type 99 light machine gun during the Battle of Palembang (february 1942)

 

(2)FEBRUARY,14TH,1942

On Saturday the 14th of February 1942,

my father came to fetch Henny (my younger sister) and I from our boarding-school for the weekend. We went into town where we did some shopping for my mother and next we went to the Javasche Bank. When my father came out of the bank, we heard and then saw Japanese planes coming over. This time they machine-gunned Malang. I saw two working men, who were hit, falling from the roof where they were busy. They were dead, we saw them lying in their blood on the street. I had never seen dead people before; Henny and I were deeply shocked. Henny started crying, my father took us both quickly away from this very sad sight.

(Elizabeth Van Kampen, Memories of the Dutch East Indies: From Plantation Society to Prisoner of Japan,web blog,2011)

On Saturday the 14th of February 1942,

 my father came to fetch Henny (my younger sister) and I from our boarding-school for the weekend.

 We went into town where we did some shopping for my mother and next we went to the Javasche Bank.

 When my father came out of the bank, we heard and then saw Japanese planes coming over.

This time they machine-gunned Malang. I saw two working men, who were hit, falling from the roof where they were busy.

They were dead, we saw them lying in their blood on the street. I had never seen dead people before; Henny and I were deeply shocked. Henny started crying, my father took us both quickly away from this very sad sight

(ibid Elizabeth Van Kampen)

Of the adventures of the two columns on their long journey through the almost unexplored jungles and swamps of southern Borneo much might be written. Travelling by forest track and by raft and boat on treacherous rivers, short of food and clothing, and constantly exposed to tropical heat and rain they finally reached the coast. The blitzparty arrived at Sampit on

 14th February 1942,

On the February. 15^th

 General Percival, with his water, food, and ammunition gone, decided that further resistance was impossible. That afternoon, he met Yamashita at the Ford Motor Factory and formally surrendered his command, an act which symbolized the end of British imperial power in the Far East.⁴³

 

 

 

On 15 Feb,1942

After the British surrender(in Singapore),

 he and two colleagues escaped on a small boat to Sumatra where they were intercepted and forced to land on Bangka island. 

 At Muntock, Bowden tried to explain his diplomatic status but was then beaten by Japanese guards and taken outside. According to later reports, was shot after being forced to dig his own grave.

 

MEANTIME ON JAVA, AUSTRALIA’S TRADE COMMISSIONER to the Dutch-controlled East Indies, Herbert Anton Peterson, moved his office from Batavia (now Jakarta) to Bandung as the Japanese navy won sea battles in the Sunda Straits and Java Sea.

His wife was safely back in Australia but he had already lost one son in airborne operations and another was a POW in Italy.

 

 

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(3)FEBRUARY,15TH. 1942

On Sunday the 15^th of February we received the bad news over the radio that Singapore had fallen into Japanese hands. Indeed, that was a very sad Sunday. Who had ever thought that Singapore could fall? Were the Japanese so much stronger than the Allies? And then there was the Battle of the Java Sea from 27 February to 1 March 1942. The Dutch warships Ruyter and Java were hit by Japanese torpedoes; they sunk with a huge loss of life. The Allies lost this battle..

.Jungle and Indian Ocean

Soon it was the New Year.

 We had no more Japanese visitors. There were not many Dutch or other Europeans outside of camps.

 In Malang there was already a camp for men called Marine Camp. And another camp, we were told, called De Wijk, prepared to house women and children. Taking a long, last walk through the rubber plantations and jungle, my father and I beheld the Indian Ocean. My father looked at me and said, “I have to ask you something, you are almost 16 so you are old enough. I want you to look after Mama and your sisters when I have to leave Sumber Sewa. Will you promise me that?” I remonstrated, but he insisted and I agreed.

And so, at the beginning of February 1942, my father received a phone call ordering him to leave our home in Sumber Sewu within six days and report to the Marine Camp in Malang. This would be a fateful separation. By now, most Dutch men were internees.

A Japanese visitor

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On Sunday the 15^th of February

we received the bad news over the radio that Singapore had fallen into Japanese hands. Indeed, that was a very sad Sunday. Who had ever thought that Singapore could fall?

 

Were the Japanese so much stronger than the Allies?

 

Sunday, 15 February

 

 

Australian light cruiser PERTH relieved light cruiser ADELAIDE which departed Fremantle with convoy MS.4 of four tankers and two cargo ships.

 

On the 15th, convoy MS.4 was ordered back to Fremantle, except for PERTH and Dutch steamer ‘S JACOB (note: name as shown in reports, but does not appear in Lloyds) (2839grt). En route they were joined by Dutch steamers SWARTENHONDT (5084grt) and KARSIK (3057grt).

 

On the 21st, three ship convoy was ordered back to Fremantle and PERTH escorted it to within 700 miles of Fremantle before proceeding Tanjong Priok arriving on the 24th.

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American heavy cruiser HOUSTON, destroyer PEARY and Australian sloops SWAN and WARREGO departed Darwin escorting US Army transports MEIGS, MAUNA LOA, PORT MAR and Australian coaster TULAGI, carrying 1800 troops to reinforce Timor. Shortly after sailing, the convoy came under air attack, all four transports suffered damage from near misses, and it returned to Darwin.

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Auxiliary anti-submarine ship MATA HARI (Temporary Lt G A Brignall RNR) was sunk by Japanese gunfire at Banka. S/Lt I Ellis MRNVR, Temporary Acting S/Lt (E) W MacCrorie RNVR, Temporary S/Lt (E) T R Gordon MRNVR, Lt V A Burton MRNVR, Lt J R Pickhall MRNVR, Lt Cdr B Scott MRNVR, Temporary S/Lt A H Hogge RNR, S/Lt G Lyons MRNVR,Temporary S/Lt (E) H M MacGregor RNVR, Temporary Acting S/Lt (E) F J Lumley RNR, Temporary S/Lt F W Matthews RNVR, Paymaster S/Lt R W Cornell MRNVR and Temporary Lt A C Carton RNR, were taken prisoners by the Japanese.

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Steamer RHU (254grt) was seized by Japanese forces at Singapore.

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Auxiliary patrol boat DYMAS, which had departed Singapore on the 13th, was captured by a Japanese cruiser nine miles north of Muntok Light. S/Lt R. G. Banks MRNVR and rest of the crew were made prisoners of war and DYMAS was taken to Muntok.

 

Tug YIN PING (191grt) was sunk by Japanese surface craft 20 miles 225° from Muntok. Of a crew of ten and 65 passengers, 50 were lost, including Capt T K W Atkinson of Singapore Dockyard and Cdr B M Douglas Rtd of SULTAN.

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Steamers SIUSHAN (296grt), MERSING (65grt) and requisitioned yacht SILVIA were lost at Singapore.

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Auxiliary patrol boats JERANTUT (217grt) and KLIAS (207grt) were scuttled at Palembang.

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Steamer HONG CHUAN (67grt) was lost at Djambi when she caught fire from burning shore installations and a drifing barge.

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Cdr (E) G. H. Craven-Phillips of NASAR (RNAS Sembawang) was lost in ML.433.

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Japanese submarine I.65 sank steamer JOHANNE JUSTESEN (4681grt) in 9-04N, 75-58E. Of a crew of 59, one was lost.

 

 

 

 

A light tank of 3rd Hussars disembarks at Sumatra on 14 February 1942.

 

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 February,15^th.1942

New information and photos on ML-KNIL Lodestar flights from Max Schep

Dutch researcher Max Schep has some valuable detailed information on ML-KNIL Lodestar flights in February and March 1942 via the logbooks of pilots Lt Jansen and Olt Oonincx.

This shows that the very first foreign military aircraft to arrive in Broome was possibly not Lt Lamade’s SOC-3 floatplane, as noted in Zero Hour in Broome, but Lodestar LT 919. Olt (“under lieutenant”) Oonincx flew this aircraft from Malang to Broome on 15th February, after a flight time of 330 minutes. LT919 continued on to Brisbane and subsequently remained in Australia.

Just hours after LT919 departed Broome, Lt Jansen arrived in Lodestar LT909 at 11.06am on 16th February 1942 (the SOC-3 also arrived on this same day). Jansen was flying a full plane, comprising himself, three crewmen and twelve passengers. The passengers were ML-KNIL aircrews, travelling to meet expected B-25s in Brisbane. They had departed Andir, Java mid-afternoon on 15th February, arriving at Denpassar, Bali a couple of hours later, where they stayed overnight. Soon after 5am the next morning they took off for Broome, arriving after a flight time of 349 minutes, or almost six hours. The newly arrived Dutchmen spent the day in Broome. To celebrate the occasion some of the men were photographed on Broome airfield in front of LT909. The same photographer also took a picture of some men posing in front of Lamade’s SOC-3 on the tidal flats with the long jetty in the background. These are wonderful photos – thank you for sharing them Max.

Monday, 16 February

 

 

Auxiliary minesweeper FUH WO (Temporary Lt B Shaw RNVR) was lost on Banka Island, after being beached and blown up by her crew. No officers or ratings were lost.

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Lt Cdr C A Smith Rtd of SULTAN, Temporary Acting Boatswain C Harding of the Singapore Dockyard, Temporary Lt Cdr T W Moore RNR of SULTAN III, Temporary Lt J F Adams RNR of SULTAN III (Examination Service, Penang), Temporary Lt R H Williams RNR of SULTAN III (Examination Service, Penang), Temporary Lt G R Wiseman RNR of SULTAN, Temporary Lt J S Whyte RNR of Examination Service, Singapore and Temporary Paymaster Lt R H Douglas RNVR at Batavia were lost, presumed missing on the 16th (posted July 1946).

 

Lt R C Beckwith and S/Lt R C Ripley RCNVR, both formerly of battleship PRINCE OF WALES, in SULTAN and FANLING respectively and Temporary Lt A J Martin RNVR in PULO SOEGI, were lost on the 16th (posted January 1946, also Halifax list for Canadian officer)

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Ferry BAGAN (244grt) was scuttled at Palembang.

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Auxiliary patrol vessel ELIZABETH with 15 crew and 11 passengers was sunk by Japanese gunfire in the Banka Strait. Twenty four were missing

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Steamer TAYLTHYRIUS (10,254grt), which had been damaged on the 3rd, was seized by Japanese forces at Singapore.

.

 

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Convoy SJ.2 departed Batavia with steamers EMPIRE STAR (13,479grt) and PLANCIOUS (5955grt), escorted by light cruiser DURBAN and destroyer JUPITER, the latter detaching the same day.

 

From the Sunda Strait, the ships proceeded independently, PLANCIUS proceeding to Colombo escorted by DURBAN and arriving on the 22nd, while EMPIRE STAR, with US Admiral Hart embarked, proceeded to Fremantle on her own.

 

By 16 February,

 three days after Wavell had told the Combined Chiefs in Washington that he might not be able to hold Sumatra,

 the situation in the ABDA area had rapidly worsened. There was no longer any chance of holding Java, Wavell now told the Chiefs. Its loss would be serious, he asserted, and would deprive the Allies of their only base in the South China Sea. But, he pointed out, the fall of Java would not be fatal to the Allied cause. Burma and Australia, not Java, he declared, were the “absolutely vital” positions in the war against Japan. He therefore recommended again that the two Australian divisions be diverted to Burma,

 

special naval landing force paratroopers commander Toyoaki Horiuchi on a monument tributed to japanese army and navy paratroopers killed during the invasion of the dutch east indies

 

On 16 February 1942,

The Dutch Royal Air forve use Hurricane MK II B  were flown to Kalidjati and formed into two makeshift oprerational squadrons.

 

 

 

The following day, 17th February,

 LT909 flew out at dawn, and subsequently arrived at Brisbane the next day, after stops at Daly Waters and Cloncurry.

The aircraft was back at Broome on 20th February, and then made the long flight back to Java, arriving in Malang after a relatively fast flight time of just over five hours. These aircraft were very hard worked at this time. By the end of February Jansen had flown far to the west, taking passengers to Bangalore, via Colombo and Sumatra: despite the latter island being rapidly occupied by the Japanese at this time. Indeed on the return flight the pilot notes picking up women and children evacuees from Lho Nga and returning to Medan on 3rd March. LT-909 was one of the Lodestars taken to a hidden airstrip outside Andir. At 2.05am on 7th March it departed for the mammoth evacuation flight to Port Hedland. Jansen lists two crew and seven passengers onboard. He landed safely at Port Hedland at 10.20am, after a flight time of over eight hours.

Max Schep is involved with the “Dutch Profiles” series of books which looks into great detail at a selected aircraft type and its Dutch service history. Some of these types are relevant for Australia, such as the P-40s operated by 120 Squadron. An interesting edition on the subject of refugee aircraft and their markings is currently being prepared – a note will be posted when it is available.

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Tuesday, 17 February

 

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American bomber B-17 on fire after Japanese bombardment, Bandoeng airfield on Java, February 17th 1942

 

 

Convoy WS.16 escort from Oversay
	joined	detached
17th	battleship Malaya, aircraft carrier Eagle, cruiser Hermione, destroyers Active, Anthony, Blankney, Croome, Duncan, Firedrake, Laforey, Lightning destroyers Verity, Walker, Witherington

 

 

The combined convoy was steamers AWATEA, BERGENSFJORD, BRISBANE STAR, DELFTDIJK, DENBIGHSHIRE, DUCHESS OF RICHMOND, DUCHESS OF YORK, EMPIRE PRIDE, NEA HELLAS, PORT JACKSON, POTARO, SIBAJAK, STRATHEDEN and VOLENDAM. Commodore ships remained as previously.

 

Convoy WS.16A with BERGENSFJORD, NEA HELLAS and VOLENDAM formed the Aden convoy escorted by COLOMBO from the splitting position on 3 April until dispersed off Aden on the 6th after which the ships went to Suez as independents.

 

Convoy WS.16B was the Bombay detachment steaming in the following order from 3 April – AWATEA, BRISBANE STAR, DELFTDIJK, DENBIGHSHIRE, DUCHESS OF RICHMOND, DUCHESS OF YORK, EMPIRE PRIDE, PORT JACKSON, POTARO, SIBAJAK and STRATHEDEN, escorted by ALAUNIA and WORCESTERSHIRE (which joined at the splitting position) and arrived at Bombay 8 April.

 

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Dutch destroyer VAN NES and escorted Dutch steamer SLOET VAN DER BEELE (2977grt), carrying evacutees from Billiton, were sunk by Japanese bombing south of Banka. There were no survivors from either ship.

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Auxiliary patrol vessel TANDJONG PINANG (133grt) with 17 crew and 150 passengers (survivors from steamer KUALA lost on the 14th), was sunk by Japanese surface craft 30 miles south of Pulo Ubar. There were only three survivors and Temporary Lt B Shaw NZRNVR, Temporary Lt E G Gerard NZRNVR and Temporary Lt G Studholme NZRNVR were lost. Commissioned Gunner A Rafferty, who also had been rescued from KUALA was also lost.

.

 

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Dutch light cruiser HEEMSKERK arrived at the Seychilles, and carried on, arriving at Colombo on the 21st.

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Convoy SJ.3 departed Tandjong Priok with steamers KRIAN (857grt), ORISKANY (1644grt) and RESANG (252grt) for Colombo and GIANG ANN (1063grt), auxiliary patrol ships DARVEL and PING WO (3105grt), the latter towing disabled destroyer VENDETTA, for Fremantle.

 

VENDETTA left Tanjong Priok harbour in tow of two tugs and was met outside the harbour by PING WO, which took over the tow before they joined SJ.3 escorted by destroyer ELECTRA and sloop YARRA. On the 22nd off Christmas Island, light cruiser ADELAIDE relieved YARRA in the escort.

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Convoy SR.6 of steamers WINGSANG, CHILKA, and ELLENGA departed Calcutta for Rangoon, escorted by Indian sloop INDUS, while convoy MR.4 with steamers KUTSANG, NEURALIA and PRESIDENT DOUMER had departed Madras on the 16th for Rangoon, escorted by light cruiser EMERALD. On the 19th, the two convoys merged as SR.6. Due to the situation around Rangoon only troopships ELLENGA (5196grt) and NEURALIA (9182grt) were to proceed there. The rest of the convoy was ordered to Calcutta and arrived on the 22nd.

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Steamer TATUNG (1560grt), which had been immobilised, was seized by Japanese forces at Tanjong Batoe.

 

 

February 18^th 1942

A Small Group Army and Air Force aircraft ABDACOM (American British Dutch Australian Command) operation with British aircraft  Huricane at Tjililitan in Batavia.
Ten Aircraft Brewsters at the Airport Assistant Tjisaoek and 10 Huricane aircraft in the second part of Branch IV in Kalidjati

Wednesday, 18 February

 

Destroyer ENCOUNTER was sent from Batavia to evacuate RAF and service personnel from Padang.

 

Light cruiser DANAE and ENCOUNTER evacuated 877 evacuees from Padang.

 

PANGKOR also brought out 244 from Benculen.

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Japanese submarine I.55 reported sinking a transport north of Sunda Strait.

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Auxiliary patrol vessel MALACCA (210grt) was scuttled in the Tjemake River, Sumatra.

 

 

Thursday, 19 February

 

 

In Japanese carrier based air attacks on Port Darwin, American destroyer PEARY (LCDR J M Bermingham), British tanker BRITISH MOTORIST (6891grt), steamers ZEALANDIA (6683grt), NEPTUNIA (5952grt), American steamer MAUNA LOA (5436grt) and Army Transport MEIGS (7358grt) were sunk, and British steamers BAROSSA (4239grt) and MANUNDA (9115grt) damaged.

 

PEARY lost LCDR Bermingham, LT A F Gustafson, LT M M Koivisto, Ensign P M Joyce and seventy six enlisted men, with LT R L Johnson and thirteen enlisted men wounded. BRITISH MOTORIST with a crew of 60 and one gunner, lost two crew. ZEALANDIA had three crew killed. NEPTUNIA’s cargo, which included depth charges, exploded and 45 crew were killed. MAUNA LOA had five crew killed. MEIGS lost two crew.

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American steamer DON ISIDRO (3261grt) was badly damaged by Japanese bombing NW of Bathurst Island, near Darwin in 11S, 130E, beached and considered a total loss. Four crew died, seven missing and 73 rescued by Australian minesweeper WARRNAMBOOL. Two of the survivors died after reaching Darwin.

 

American steamer FLORENCE D (2638grt), in company, was sunk by Japanese bombing at 10-56S, 130-07E. Three crew were lost and the 34 survivors rescued by WARRNAMBOOL and lugger ST FRANCIS.

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American destroyer EDSALL, in operations in the Dutch East Indies, was damaged by the explosion of one of her own depth charges close aboard.

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Convoy SJ.4 departed Tandjong Priok with British steamers LEE SANG (1655grt), MODASA (9070grt), STANMORE (4970grt), Norwegian ERLING BROVIG (9970grt) and Dutch GENERAAL MICHIELS (1282grt), GENERAAL VAN GEEN (1290grt) and GENERAAL VAN SWIETEN (1300grt) for Colombo, escorted by light cruiser DRAGON until the 21st February. The ships arrived at Colombo independently between 28 February and 3 March.

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Convoy SM.2 departed Tandjong Priok with steamers WHANG PU (3204grt) and CABLE ENTERPRISE (943grt) for Fremantle, escorted by light cruiser DRAGON until later in the day.

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Australian heavy cruiser AUSTRALIA lost her Walrus when it hit the ship during landing and caught fire. Pilot Flight Officer E J Rowan RAAF was killed, but S/Lt G H Jackson RAN and the TAG were rescued.

 

 

 

February 19^th.1942

The Japanense boombardement Buitenzorg(Bogor) semplak  airfield and in the midday attack  Bandung Andir airfield

Gubernor General Tjarda vsn Stoukerborough with his  Chief of Staf Ter Porten moved from Batavia to Bandung and they stayed at Mei Ling Villa which owned by  the Tionghoa Volkraad (house of representative)’s member H.H. Kan

 

February ,19^th.1942

In a major engagement above Semplak on 19 February 1942, eight Dutch Brewster fighters intercepted a formation of about 35 Japanese bombers with an escort of about 20 Zeros. The Brewster pilots destroyed 11 Japanese aircraft and lost four Brewsters; two Dutch pilots died.^[33]

 

February 20^th.1942.

This put Surabaya within range of enemy bombers. From Kendari,

Friday, 20 February

 

 

BATTLE OF BADOENG STRAIT

 

Allied ships were in two groups. The first were Dutch cruisers DE RUYTER, JAVA, Dutch destroyers PIET HEIN and the American JOHN D FORD, and POPE. Dutch destroyer BANCKERT was part of the force, but ran aground at the mouth of Tjilatjap harbour and could not proceed.

 

The second group was Dutch cruiser TROMP from Surabaya and American destroyers STEWART, PARROTT, JOHN D EDWARDS and PILLSBURY from Ratai Bay.

 

STEWART was damaged by Japanese gunfire, with one enlisted man killed and the executive officer LT C B Smiley and one enlisted man wounded. JOHN D EDWARDS had one enlisted man wounded. PIET HEIN (Lt Cdr J M L I Chompff) was lost with all but 33 of her crew and TROMP was badly damaged.

 

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Convoy SM.3 departed Batavia unescorted with British steamers ADRASTUS (7905grt), CITY OF MANCHESTER (8917grt), MARELLA (7475grt), Dutch PHRONTIS (6181grt) and Norwegian PROMINENT (2282grt). Steamers CITY OF MANCHESTER and PROMINENT proceeded to Tjilatjap and the rest of the convoy to Fremantle.

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Convoy SJ.5 departed Batavia with British steamers ANGBY (786grt), FILLEIGH (4856grt), JALAKRISHNA (4991grt), LULWORTH HILL (7628grt), SILVERLARCH (5064grt), YOMA (8131grt) and Norwegian HAI LEE (3616grt). Escort at the start was by heavy cruiser EXETER, destroyer STRONGHOLD and Indian sloop JUMNA. The ships proceeded to Colombo, arriving independently between 28 February and 6 March.

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Battleship WARSPITE arrived at Sydney, NSW, after refitting in the United States.

 

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Destroyer NIZAM departed Colombo for the west coast of Sumatra to evacuate personnel. Patrol vessel PANGKOR of the China Force was also sent to evacuate personnel. NIZAM was recalled on the 21st for escort duties.

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Australian minesweeper BALLARAT evacuated important stores and completed the destruction of port facilities and abandoned equipment at Oosthaven on the 20th.

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Japanese submarine I.65 sank steamer BHIMA (5280grt) in 7-47N, 73-31E. Crew of 68, two passengers, all rescued.

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Steamer KOOLAMA (4068grt) was sunk by Japanese bombing off Wyndham, West Australia.

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Dutch steamer TOBELO (983grt) was sunk by Japanese bombing at Kupang.

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Steamer JALAKRISHNA (4991grt) was damaged by Japanese bombing in the Dutch East Indies.

 

 

Saturday, 21 February

 

 

Convoy SJ.6 departed Tandjong PrioK with steamers MANGOLA and THEPASTRIN NAWA (3260grt) for Fremantle and KIANG (1451grt), JALAVIHAR, ELSA, STRAAT SOENDA (6439grt) and GENERAAL VAN DE HEYDEN (1213grt) for Colombo.

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Convoy SJ.7 departed Tandjong Priok with troopship ORCADES (23,456grt), carrying 3768 troops and refugees, escorted by destroyer ELECTRA to the 22nd and Australian light cruiser HOBART to the 23rd, when the convoy dispersed and the escorts detached. ORCADES arrived at Colombo on the 27th.

 

Americans providing reinforcements for Australia.⁴⁶

Washington agreed with Wavell’s estimate of the probable loss of Java. Reinforcement was evidently futile and the wisest course, the Combined Chiefs thought, would be to send at least one of the Australian divisions to Burma and the other to Australia. It was clear also that the fall of Java would split the ABDA area and make a co-ordinated defense of its eastern and western extremities impossible. The British therefore suggested that Burma be taken out of ABDACOM and transferred to their command in India, a proposal that the U.S. Chiefs and General Wavell, who had always believed Burma was an integral part of the Indian command, readily accepted. This was accomplished formally

on 21 February.⁴⁷

 

Sunday 22, February

 

 

LANGLEY and SEA WITCH, carrying crated aircraft, were detached to Java. LANGLEY was lost and SEA WITCH was able to escape after delivering her cargo at Tjilatjap.

 

LANGLEY was sunk by Japanese bombing. Only sixteen crew and passengers were lost. The survivors were picked up by WHIPPLE and EDSALL. WHIPPLE then scuttled LANGLEY.

 

The convoy arrived at Colombo on 5 March.

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Patrol vessel PANGKOR departed Batavia to evacuate personnel from Sibolga and Ongha, then proceeded to Colombo.

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Boom defence vessels BARRIER, BARLANE and BARRICADE departed Batavia for Colombo and patrol vessels CIRCE and MEDUSA for Fremantle, via Tjilatjap.

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Convoy SJ.8 departed Tandjong Priok with EDENDALE (1659grt) for Fremantle and FU KWANG (1559grt), TINOMBO (872grt) and ROOSEBOOM (1035grt) for Colombo.

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Japanese submarine I.58 sank Dutch steamer PIJNACKER HORDIKJ (2982grt) south of Tjilatjap.

 

 

Monday, 23 February

 

 

Norwegian steamer BELITA and Norwegian collier WOOLGAR departed Colombo for Batavia, escorted until the 25th by destroyer NIZAM and minesweeper BATHURST. The merchantmen proceeded independently for Batavia until recalled.

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Convoy SM.4 departed Tandjong Priok with steamer SPRINGDALE (1579grt) for Fremantle and SEIRSTAD and PERAK (1188grt) for Colombo. The ships proceeded independently after Sunda Strait.

 

The plan for sending the Australian divisions to Burma, however, came to naught. Concerned over the defense of their own country, the Australians persistently refused, despite strong appeals from Churchill and Roosevelt, to permit the diversion of these divisions to Burma, and finally,

on 23 February, they were ordered home.⁴⁸

Though the loss of Java was conceded by all except the Dutch, there was a reluctance to act on this assumption. To do so would create the impression that the Americans and British were deserting their Dutch allies. On the 20th, therefore, the Combined Chiefs, asserting that “every day gained is of importance,” directed Wavell to defend Java “with the utmost resolution” and not to withdraw or surrender any of the troops there. To minimize the loss of Allied troops in Java, the Chiefs specifically prohibited Wavell from reinforcing that island further, but did give him discretion to use his naval forces and American planes in Australia as he thought best.⁴⁹

Even as these fresh instructions were being received at ABDACOM, the Japanese were making their execution impossible. On the 19th, they landed on the southern tip of Bali, immediately to the east of Java. Next day they landed on Timor, half of which was Dutch and half Portuguese. Control of these islands, lying between Java and northwest Australia, completed the isolation of Java, placed Japanese land-based fighters within bombing range of the Dutch base at Surabaya, and made further reinforcements from Australia impossible.

 

 

 

 

. on 23 February

had been ordered to Tjilatjap, on the south coast of Java,

 

with its cargo of thirty-two assembled P-40’s and their pilots. On the 27th, almost within sight of Java, it was spotted by Japanese patrol planes and sunk. The freighter Seawitch with 27 P-40’s in her hold had left Fremantle at the same time, but sailed separately and made its way successfully to Java. It arrived there on the eve of invasion and the P-40’s, still crated, were dumped into the sea to prevent their capture.⁵⁵

Meanwhile the Japanese had completed their preparations for the invasion of Java. D-day was set for

 air reconnaissance confirmed that the airfield was unfit for use. Thereupon Air Headquarters made arrangements for supplies to be dropped and the following day three Blenheims from Singapore, modified to carry containers, successfully dropped 900 pounds of supplies on the airfield.

the 23rd February

 at Kenamboi, where they were re-united with C and D Company.

 

 

February,24^th,1942

Japanese filght attacked and bombardement Kemajoran Batavia, Semplak Buitenzorg and Kalijati airfield.

Tuesday, 24 February

 

 

Steamers INDRAGIRI (592grt), NAM YONG (1345grt), and BOERO (7135grt) departed Tandjong Priok for Colombo.

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Dutch steamer KOTA RADJA (7117grt) was sunk by Japanese bombing at Surabaya.

Dutch light cruiser HEEMSKERK departed Colombo for Trincomalee to embark ammunition and proceed to the Dutch East Indies. She then left Trincomalee the next day for Sunda Strait with all despatch, but was diverted to Tjilatjap on the 26th. On 1 March, both she and destroyer ISAAC SWEERS were ordered to return to Colombo.

 

 

Wednesday, 25 February

 

British heavy cruiser EXETER, Australian light cruiser PERTH and British destroyers ENCOUNTER, ELECTRA and JUPITER departed Tanjong Priok to join Dutch Admiral Doorman’s force at Surabaya. Australian light cruiser HOBART was also ordered to sail, but had not completed refuelling. Instead she joined a Western Striking Force with light cruisers DANAE, DRAGON and destroyers TENEDOS and SCOUT. The EXETER group arrived at Surabaya at 0330/26th and sailed at 1900 that day.

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Japanese submarine I.58 sank Dutch steamer BOERO (7135grt) south of Sunda Strait. Crew of 70, with no casualties.

.

_____

 

. With the Japanese making ready for the final assault on Java,

General Wavell turned to his superiors for new instructions. Their orders were to transfer command of Java to the Dutch and withdraw, but to maintain ABDACOM and keep his headquarters intact. When and where he would go was left to him. Ground forces “for whom there are arms” were to remain and continue the fight, but air forces that could operate from bases outside Java and other troops “who cannot contribute to defense” were to be withdrawn, the Americans and Australians to go to Australia. General Brett was to return to Australia, when released by Wavell, to command the U.S. forces there.⁵⁰

The ABDA commander did not agree with the program. What he wanted was the dissolution of ABDACOM, all reason for its existence having disappeared. Burma, he pointed out, had already been separated from the ABDA theater and Java’s defense was a local problem, best handled by the Dutch themselves. If the Philippines, which had never really been under his control, were taken over by the Americans again and northwest Australia by the Australians, he told the Chiefs, he could turn over his remaining forces to the Dutch and leave the area by

25 February.⁵¹

This recommendation was in line with the solution being proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff for the establishment of two areas in the Far East, one to be under American control and to include Australia; the other a British area encompassing India and the Indian Ocean. The Dutch opposed such a solution for fear it would mean the end of Allied assistance in the Netherlands Indies. ‘For God’s sake,’ wrote the Dutch governor-general to Marshall, “take the strong and active decisions and don’t stop sending materials and men.”⁵²

Still anxious to avoid the appearance of abandoning their allies, the U.S. Chiefs continued to oppose the dissolution of ABDACOM. But in recognition of the fact that Wavell had lost the confidence of the Dutch and obviously wanted to pull out, they agreed to the dissolution of his headquarters and his transfer to India, leaving control of the ABDA area to the Dutch. And lest the Dutch should think that the Americans had made this arrangement to shirk their commitments, Marshall assured the Dutch governor that the forces then assembling in Australia were “seeking opportunity to enter the ABDA battle” and would “continue their full support of the Dutch commanders in their magnificent fight.”⁵³

On the 25th

General Wavell turned over command to the Dutch and left for India where General Brereton had already gone to organize an American air force. This move placed MacArthur technically under the Dutch, but he had already been told that “because of your special situation all procedures in your case remain as heretofore.”⁵⁴ The burden of defending Java was now squarely on the Dutch. Their forces, with the exception of minor ground units (including an American artillery battalion), American and British naval units, and a small U.S.-Australian fighter force, composed the entire command.

There was still a chance that fighters could be brought in by sea, though the air ferry route had been closed by the Japanese seizure of Timor. To this task was assigned the aircraft tender Langley,

 

 

 

 

Thursday, 26 February

 

 

Convoy MR.5 departed Madras with steamers ERINPURA (5143grt), ETHIOPIA (5574grt), KAROA (7009grt) and VARSOVA (4701grt) escorted by heavy cruiser DORSETSHIRE, which departed Trincomalee on the 26th. The convoy and escort arrived at Rangoon on 3 March.

_____

 

Steamer ASHRIDGE was the last steamer to departed Tandjong Priok, escorted through the Sunda Strait by destroyer STRONGHOLD

Back in Balikpapan, the Japanese rounded up civilians and the newly captured prisoners of war. They delayed their promised vengeance until

 

On February 27^th,1942,

And then there was the Battle of the Java Sea from 27 February to 1 March 1942. The Dutch warships Ruyter and Java were hit by Japanese torpedoes; they sunk with a huge loss of life. The Allies lost this battle.

 

 

japanese destroyer Inazuma launching a type 93 long lance torpedo against allied ships in the Second Battle of the Java Sea

 

Frank looked out from Fort Menari to see a small fleet of Allied cruisers and destroyers – American, British, Dutch, and Australian – steaming through the Western Fairway:

…the binoculars pick up the sleek outlines in camouflage grey, stealing through the mist of dawn out into the open sea. Our gallant Navy sailing to their last engagement with the enemy, to bear the brunt of the great onslaught. [11]

In the Java Sea the ABDA fleet boldly attacked the more powerful Japanese warships escorting the East Java invasion force, hoping to break through and sink the troop transports.

The Japanese, with their heavier guns and advanced “Long Lance” torpedoes, drove them off after inflicting severe losses.

Among the vessels sunk was

 the Dutch flagship, the light cruiser De Ruyter.

She went down with 345 of her crew, including Warrant Officer Frans Anton Boerman, Frank’s father-in-law.

Read more

 

Dutch cruiser De Ruyter
Laid down: 1933. Launched: 1935. Commissioned: 1936
Seven 150-mm guns on a 6442-ton displacement
Crew: 435

In the Battle of the Java Sea on 27 February 1942, De Ruyter was the flagship of the Dutch rear-admiral Karel Doorman, with his flag captain Eugène Lacomblé (who had previously served on board the ship as a lieutenant). Off the north coast off Java the ABDA fleet was surprised at night by a Japanese squadron consisting of the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro supported by 14 destroyers.

De Ruyter was supposedly hit by a single Japanese Long Lance torpedo at about 23:30 and sank at 02:30 the next day with the loss of 345 men, including Admiral Doorman and Captain Lacomblé. Her wreck was found after the war and declared a war grave, with only the ship’s bell (now in the Kloosterkerk in the Hague) being recovered.

 

Battle of the Java Sea

In February 1942, the Allies established a naval “Combined Striking Force” for the protection of Java.

 The “Eastern Striking Force”, comprising the Dutch cruisers Java and De Ruyter, the US heavy cruiser Houston, the British cruiser Exeter, and the Australian cruiser Perth , was placed under the command of Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman. “Eastern Striking Force” also included the destroyers Witte de With and Kortenaer (RNN), J.D. Edwards, Alden, John Ford and Paul Jones (USN), and Jupiter, Electra and Encounter (RN).

On February 27,

 Doorman’s force sailed from Surabaya to intercept the Japanese “Eastern Invasion Force”, which comprised four cruisers and 14 destroyers, escorting 41 transport vessels. At about 4 pm, the two forces met in a battle which lasted much of the night. Outgunned, Doorman’s force was unable to engage the invasion fleet, which escaped to the north while the escort vessels were pressing their attack.

Allied casualties were heavy.

 

Admiral Doorman

was lost along with both of the Dutch cruisers and almost all of their crews.

The Exeter was badly damaged by shell-fire, and was sunk along with its escorting destroyer Encounter two days later. Among the other destroyers engaged, Kortenaer, Jupiter and Electra were all sunk, with considerable loss of life. The Japanese invasion fleet was delayed, but not prevented from making a landing on Java on 28 February. The surviving cruisers, Houston and Perth, were sunk on the evening of the same day as they attempted to withdraw to Ceylon, having encountered the Japanese “Western Invasion Force” in the Sunda Strait.

 

Admiral Doorman’s flagship De Ruyter at anchor shortly before the battle of the Java Sea.

Read more about Admiral Karel dorman

Rear-Admiral K.W.F.M. Doorman, RNN

 

Karel Willem Frederik Marie Doorman Born Utrecht April 23, 1889 – Died on board light cruiser De Ruyter February 28, 1942   Although Karel Doorman was the son of an army officer, he joined the officer’s course at the Naval Institute in 1906, which he completed successfully four years later. After some years in the Netherlands East Indies, he returned to Holland to become one of the pioneers in Dutch naval aviation. He earned his wings in 1915, and what followed was a turbulent period at the naval airfield De Kooy until 1921, during which he survived 33 emergency landings. Then, he went to the High Naval Academy to study the art of naval warfare. He was sent out to the NEI for the last time in 1937, where he became the Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Service during the last prewar years. Being an aviator himself, he understood the value of a well-trained and well-equipped Naval Air Service (the correct Dutch term is Marine Luchtvaartdienst, or MLD) and under his command, the MLD became just that. In June 1940, he was given command of the Netherlands East Indies Seagoing Squadron, which normally included the bulk of the Dutch surface fleet. Although a neglected dysentery started to play up shortly before the start of the Pacific War, he retained command and was also given command of the Combined Striking Force on February 3, 1942. The idea was to use this scratch-collection of Dutch, American, British and Australian warships to attack and destroy Japanese invasion convoys. During the month of February, the force made a number of sorties, which were usually unsuccessful due to Japanese aerial intervention. It only came to blows during the Battle of Badung Strait, when a numerically superior Allied Force attacked four Japanese destroyers and a transport, unfortunately without much success. In return, the Japanese managed to sink the destroyer Piet Hein and damage several other ships. After this battle, it was clear that the next step would be the invasion of Java island. In compliance with Admiral Helfrich’s orders, Doorman continued to sweep the Java sea with his force, until the Japanese invasion fleet was finally sighted on February 27. Although the two forces were more or less equal in terms of strength, the Allied were handicapped by the lack of a good communication system, aerial reconnaissance and rest during the past few months. Both the light cruisers Java and Doorman’s flagship, De Ruyter were hit and sunk by torpedoes, taking a heavy toll among the exhausted crews. It is believed Doorman, his staff and De Ruyter’s commanding officer, Commander E.E.B. Lacomblé chose to remain on board as the cruiser sank. In honor of Admiral Doorman, the only two Dutch aircraft carriers and lastly, a new frigate were named after him. In addition, he was one of only persons who were made Knights in the Military Order of William 3rd class. [1] Ranks Midshipman 1st class [2] August 24, 1910 Lieutenant August 24, 1912 Lieutenant-Commander November 1, 1920 Commander February 1, 1933 Captain September 6, 1937 Rear-Admiral May 16, 1940 Postings [3] Coastal defence ship Hr.Ms. Tromp and Hr.Ms. De Ruyter 1910 – 1913 Light cruiser Hr.Ms. Noord Brabant April, 1914 – 1915 Pilot Instructor 1916 – 1917 Commanding Officer, Naval Airbase De Mok August 18, 1917 –   First Officer, Naval Airfield De Kooy   – 1920 Commanding Officer, Naval Airfield De Kooy 1920 – 1921 Student Netherlands Naval War College November 2, 1921 – 1923 Staff Officer, Ministry of Navy, Weltevreden (Java) 1923 – 1926 Gunnery Officer, coastal defence ship Hr.Ms. Zeven Provinciën May 14, 1926 – January, 1928 Head MLD Technical Department, The Hague March 12, 1928 – July 14, 1928 First Officer, Naval Airfield De Kooy July 14, 1928 – November 2, 1931 Commanding Officer, minelayer Hr.Ms. Prins van Oranje 1932 – 1932 Commanding Officer, destroyer Hr.Ms. Witte de With 1933 – 1933 Commanding Officer, destroyer Hr.Ms. Evertsen and Group Destroyers 1 1934 – 1934 Chief of Staff, Den Helder naval base June, 1934 – September 4, 1937 Commanding Officer, light cruiser Hr.Ms. Sumatra October 25, 1937 – June 15, 1938 Commanding Officer, light cruiser Hr.Ms. Java June 15, 1938 – August 13, 1938 Commanding Officer, Naval Air Service NEI August 17 1938 – May 5, 1940 Commanding Officer, NEI Squadron June 17, 1940 – February 27, 1942 Commanding Officer, Combined Striking Force February 3, 1942 – February 27, 1942 Awards Dutch Knight in the Military Order of William (MWO.3) Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion (NL) Officer in the Order of Orange Nassau (ON.4) Service Medal for naval officers, for 30 years’ of service (XXX) Mobilization Cross 1914-1918 (Mk) Foreign Silver Cross 5th class, Order Virtuti Militairi (Poland) [1]: The other was Captain J.P. van Helsdingen, a fighter pilot of the KNIL airforce. He was killed in action on March 5, 1942. [2]: The rank of sublieutenant had not yet been introduced at this time. [3]: For a more thorough, albeit romanticized, description of Doorman’s career, the book “Ik val aan, volg mij”  by Anthony van Kampen (Published by C.V. Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, 1947), is recommended reading.

 

 De Ruyter was lost in the battle along with Doorman and 344 of its crew.

The Dutch cruiser Java under attack from Japanese aircraft in February 1942.

Read more info

The mysterious fate of Cornelius Blaak and PK-AFZ

Some months ago we received a query from a relative of Dutch KNILM pilot Cornelius Blaak. His only son is now 80 years old and knew very little about his father’s death in February 1942.

 Blaak was the pilot of KNILM DC-3 PK-AFZ, which crash-landed in Sumatra after getting lost at the end of a flight from Broome to Batavia. Although they survived the crash landing, Blaak and three crew members were killed soon afterwards. The family had received some information from the excellent Pacific Wrecks organisation as per:
http://www.pacificwrecks.com/aircraft/dc-3/ph-afz.html

Dutch airline history specialist Richard Pflug was asked if he could shed any further light on this incident. He replied with the following in November 2011:

According to what I read,

in the night of 26/27th of February 1942

 PK-ALT, PK-ALO and PK-AFZ left Broome with destination Bandung.

That night there were very strong winds making the planes drift. Only PK-ALO made it to Bandung. PK-ALT and -AFZ drifted of course.

The radio operator on board PK-ALT remembered a technique from training called “impulse bearing” to get a tie line on Bandung. Despite heavy static he was able to get some bearing on Bandung, but was unable to determine if the were NE or SW of Bandung.

They decided to fly 15 minutes due South. With no land in sight the turned 180 degrees and found Prinsen Island and Krakatau. The radio operator of PK-ALT tried to transmit this information to his colleague Pieter Pronk on PK-AFZ.

Although the mechanic of PK-ALT loaded 400 litres of fuel over the allowed take-off weight of the DC-3, the result of the drifting and searching for land is that they have insufficient fuel to make it to Andir and around 2.00 AM, some 9 and a half hours after the left Broome, they touch down at Kamajoran with almost empty tanks.

PK-AFZ never arrived…..

After the war the fate of PK-AFZ and its crew was investigated by the Dutch government. The tail section was found near Tandjung Batoe. According to interviews with locals the crew survived the emergency landing almost unscathed. At a nearby village they tried to organise a boat to get to Palembang. They were betrayed to Japanese forces and on March 1st soldiers attacked their hideout. In the following shoot-out two crew members were killed. A third crew member was hit in the shoulder, escaped to the river and presumably drowned. Radio operator Pieter Pronk managed to escape and made it back to the village, but later was delivered to a passing Japanese patrol and beheaded on March 4th.

There seems to be a copy of the full investigation in a Dutch archive. This document might be very useful; if you are interested I will try to get hold of a copy of this document.

Richard was kind enough to visit the Dutch archives, and replied with this on 23rd December 2011:

Last Monday I visited the Dutch Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) and copied their file on PK-AFZ, containing letters to Plesman (CEO of KLM), De Bruijn (Manager Operations of KNILM) the widow of pilot Nieuwdorp, the death certificates of the crew members, etc. One letter is largely written in English.

According to the reports the crew was able to get the plane on the ground largely intact. A local offered his services to help them, but instead organized a mob to rob them as they were in possession of money. Allegedly two crew members were killed; one was wounded but drowned in a swamp while trying to flee. Pronk was captured wounded and treated well by his Japanese captures. But the battalion had to move on, they decided he was a burden and beheaded him. So it’s a pretty dramatic and sad story!

The family of Blaak was very happy to receive the documents. They didn’t know these letters and documents existed.

As Richard mentions, the Blaak family was very happy to receive this information. Here is the wording of the English section of the report in the Dutch archives, referred to above:

Amsterdam, 7th November 1946

On February 26th, 1942, the aircraft PK-AFZ carried out a regular ammunition transport from Broome, Australia to Batavia as its point of destination. There was therefore no question of a diversion to another airfield. Atmospheric conditions were bad. There was the ordinary monsoon headwind from (the) Western direction. Thunderstorms in the Batavia region made radio contact with the ground impossible, either from Bandoeng or Batavia.

Besides, total black-out made it impossible to make out Batavia, lights could only be turned on when immediately above the airfield, so that captain te Roller, doing the same flight under the same atmospheric conditions, also passed the Batavia airfield, but by incident was able to check his position (in the neighbourhood of the Isle of Krakatou and – having 1200L more fuel onboard – could return safely. Mr Blaak’s aircraft had no cabin tanks as Mr te Roller had and seems to have made a forced landing on the South East coast of Sumatra, near Palembang at Kajoe Agoung, apparently in the estuary of the river.

Batavia’s wireless operator seems to have heard weak S.O.S. signals sent by wireless operator Pronk on board of the aircraft and later it was reported that the crew landed safely. Suggestions for a rescue flight with an amphibious aircraft could at that time not be followed up. The ill fate of the crew became known afterwards and nothing about the aircraft itself has been heard ever since. No debris were found afterwards or reported to have been found.

This was dated 1946. The death certificates were dated September 1947, so presumably some further information was eventually received, as summarised by Richard above

February.28^th,1942

The battle in Java sea, 

 

the battle ship “de Ruyter”,

 

”Java”

 

”Kortenaer”

 

HMS Electra

And

 

destroyer HMS “Jupiter” were burned  and

HMS “Evertsen” from Dutch Navy  broken during boarding to Australia at Sunda straits.

At the night the dai Nippon  army landing at Java Island with 18 thousand of  with 100 light pantser with basic at Merak.XVI th army division

Read more info the battle of java sea

BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA 27TH FEBRUARY 1942

IJN Haguro April 1936 (Courtesy of Irootoko Digital Color Photos)

 

PERTH left Batavia on the 24th for Surabaya to join the combined American-British-Dutch -Australian fleet ( ABDA ) under the command of Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman.   The ships had not exercised together before and communications and signalling between ships was very awkward.   The fleet left Surabaya on the night of 26th February to search for the Japanese Invasion Fleet but were unable to locate them. The next day Japanese ships were reported  to the north and at 4.12pm contact was made.The battle was fought in two stages AFTERNOON.                              For the early part of the battle the Japanese were out of range of PERTH’s guns  but at 4.25pm she opened fire on Jap destroyers off her starboad bow.  At 4.37pm she came under intense and accurate fire from the Japanese 8″ cruisers NACHI and HAGURO.     HMS EXETER was hit at 5.14pm and immediately lost speed and  PERTH was forced to swerve quickly to avoid a collision.   PERTH immediately circled EXETER laying a protective smokescreen.  At 5.40pm HMS ELECTRA was hit by gunfire and sank soon after. At 5.45pm the NACHI and HAGURO appeared through the smokescreen.  The light  cruiser NAKA and destroyers  were even closer.    In the exchange of fire, PERTH  appeared to have scored hits on HAGURO but this was incorrect.  At 6.30pm the Japanese retired and were lost from view.   IJN Nachi   NIGHT                   At 7.15pm a Japanese aircraft dropped flares illuminating PERTH and the other ships and fifteen minutes later PERTH opened fire on destroyers delivering a torpedo attack on her port side.   The destroyer HMS JUPITER hit what was thought to have been a Dutch mine and exploded and sank at 9.25pm.   PERTH passed by survivors from HMS ELECTRA at 10.15pm  but was under orders not to stop and attempt rescue.   At 10.30pm  PERTH and HOUSTON once again began an exchange of fire With  NACHI and HAGURO and at the same time the IJN destroyers delivered another torpedo attack. The allied cruisers were steaming in line ahead led by De RUYTER, Then  PERTH, HOUSTON, JAVA. Just after 11pm  NACHI and HAGURO fired torpedoes hitting both JAVA and De RUYTER.   JAVA blew up an with appalling explosion. Her stern broke off and she sank in fifteen minutes with  the loss of of over 500 men.  PERTH had to swerve violently to avoid colliding with De RUYTER. De RUYTER stayed afloat for nearly another two hours before sinking. Admiral Doorman and 344 of his crew were lost in the sinking. PERTH and HOUSTON now broke off the action and headed for Tanjong Priok, the port of Batavia.   IJN Naka 1942

 

 

De Ruyter

 

 

Java

 

 

Kortenaer

 

 

WWII Cruiser HMS Exeter Found

The Heavy Cruiser that fought like a Lion in World War Two

 

The HMS Exeter – public domain

The Royal Navy’s Heavy cruiser HMS Exeter had a brief but legendary war service. In her 18-months of War she helped kill the Graf Spee and fought the Japanese.

It can be argued Battleships really started World War One. The Anglo-German naval arms race was the kindling to the fire that erupted all of the Europe in that Great War. At Versailles, Germany, vanquished in combat, was to rid herself of most of her Great High Seas Fleet, keeping only a few old tubs. In the inter-war period she was allowed to build a class of 16,000-ton ‘pocket-battleships’ -essentially very large cruisers with a battleship’s guns. The pocket battleships were to be the scourge of the sea in the event of war, ranging the globe sinking merchantmen by the dozens. One of these, the Admiral Graf Spee, engaged in the legendary Battle of the River Plate with three British cruisers and eventually scuttled herself on a bluff. In this battle the cruiser HMS Exeter, with her 8-inch guns, was the only ship that could make effective hits on the German battleship’s armor. One of these hits by the Exeter effectively wrecked the Graf Spee’s boiler room and caused her to withdraw and seek repairs.

These cruisers, the Ajax, Exeter and Achilles earned everlasting naval fame in this running battle in 1939.

All went onto very different fates. The HMS Ajax, a 7000-ton Leander class light cruiser, went on to fight in the Pacific and then in the Battle of Normandy before being broken up and scrapped in 1949. The HMS Achilles, a sister ship of the Ajax also finished the war and, in the service of the Royal New Zealand Navy, was eventually scrapped in 1976 after decades of peacetime service. The HMS Exeter, a 10,000-ton heavy cruiser of the York class, was severely damaged in the battle with the Graf Spee but was repaired in time to see combat in the Pacific.

As a member of the ABDA “Fleet that God Forgot” that fought the Imperial Japanese Navy under impossible odds in 1942, HMS Exeter was lost. She was heavily damaged in the Battle of the Java Sea and was ordered away to limp home. Finding herself just days later in combat with four Japanese cruisers and five destroyers and only supported by a pair of destroyers herself she was sunk 90 miles off Bawean Island in what is now Indonesia on March 1st, 1942 after a terrific gunfight. She has just been found after being lost at sea for over sixty years. Her wreck shows signs of the battle and it remains as a final testament to her short wartime service. Her last commander, RN Captain Oliver Loudon Gordon MVO, survived the war in a Japanese POW camp in published a memoir entitled “Fight It Out” published in 1957

 

 

Battle of the Java Sea

In February 1942, the Allies established a naval “Combined Striking Force” for the protection of Java. The “Eastern Striking Force”, comprising the Dutch cruisers Java and De Ruyter, the US heavy cruiser Houston, the British cruiser Exeter, and the Australian cruiser Perth , was placed under the command of Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman. “Eastern Striking Force” also included the destroyers Witte de With and Kortenaer (RNN), J.D. Edwards, Alden, John Ford and Paul Jones (USN), and Jupiter, Electra and Encounter (RN).

On February 27, Doorman’s force sailed from Surabaya to intercept the Japanese “Eastern Invasion Force”, which comprised four cruisers and 14 destroyers, escorting 41 transport vessels. At about 4 pm, the two forces met in a battle which lasted much of the night. Outgunned, Doorman’s force was unable to engage the invasion fleet, which escaped to the north while the escort vessels were pressing their attack.

Allied casualties were heavy. Admiral Doorman was lost along with both of the Dutch cruisers and almost all of their crews. The Exeter was badly damaged by shell-fire, and was sunk along with its escorting destroyer Encounter two days later. Among the other destroyers engaged, Kortenaer, Jupiter and Electra were all sunk, with considerable loss of life. The Japanese invasion fleet was delayed, but not prevented from making a landing on Java on 28 February. The surviving cruisers, Houston and Perth, were sunk on the evening of the same day as they attempted to withdraw to Ceylon, having encountered the Japanese “Western Invasion Force” in the Sunda Strait.

 

Admiral Doorman’s flagship De Ruyter at anchor shortly before the battle of the Java Sea. De Ruyter was lost in the battle along with Doorman and 344 of its crew. 305837

 

The Dutch cruiser Java under attack from Japanese aircraft in February 1942. 305183

1942

 

 

.

 

 

Friday 27, February

 

 

BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA

 

Destroyer JUPITER (Lt Cdr N V J T Thew) was sunk by Japanese destroyers. Five ratings were killed and one died of wounds while Temporary S/Lt A L Cato RNZNVR, Lt (E) V D Hodge OBE, Midshipman M G Rivington RNR, Lt J W R Spedding DSC and eighty six ratings were missing. Cdr Thew, Gunner (T) E D Furneaux and 45 ratings survived, but 27 of the ratings died while prisoners of war.

 

Destroyer ELECTRA (Cdr C W May) was sunk by Japanese destroyers. Cdr May, Lt R Jenner-Fust OBE, Lt E A Coale, Lt (E) F McLeod, S/Lt R Price RNR, Temporary Lt H W Davies RNVR and 102 ratings were lost. Of the survivors, S/Lt S H Cruden RNVR and four ratings were taken prisoner by the Japanese from the water, and Gunner (T) T J Cain, Surgeon Lt W R D Seymour and forty three ratings were picked up by American submarine S.38 at 0315/28th. On arriving on the scene, S.38 was attacked by destroyer ENCOUNTER, but not damaged. One rating died of wounds after arriving in Java, and 10 wounded ratings were left at Surabaya and later captured. Seven died while prisoners of war.

 

Forty survivors from JUPITER and 42 from ELECTRA departed Tjilatjap in early March on Dutch steamer VERSPECK and arrived in Australia on 10 March.

 

Dutch destroyer KORTENAER was sunk by Japanese warships. ENCOUNTER picked up 113 survivors and took them to Surabaya.

 

Dutch light cruisers DE RUYTER and JAVA were sunk by Japanese warships. British Temporary Lt W A. Jackson RNVR and Temporary Acting S/Lt W G Jenkins RNVR, on board DE RUYTER were rescued and made prisoners of war.

_____

 

Australian light cruiser HOBART, British light cruisers DANAE and DRAGON, British destroyers TENEDOS, SCOUT and the Dutch EVERTSEN departed Tanjong Priok at 2330, with the orders that if no enemy were sighted, they would retire through the Sunda Strait to Ceylon. Early on the 28th, EVERTSEN became separated and returned to Tanjong Priok. On 1 March, the force arrived at Padang to embark evacuatees, with HOBART and DANAE taking on board 648 and 319 evacuees, respectively. These ships, less DRAGON, arrived at Colombo on 5 March. DRAGON arrived on the 6th.

_____

 

Dutch light cruiser TROMP, after being damages by Japanese ships on the 20th/21st, departed Surabaya for repairs at Fremantle.

_____

 

American seaplane tender LANGLEY (CDR R P McConnell) was sunk by Japanese bombing 75miles SSE of Tjilatjap. Sixteen crew and passengers were lost – LT W C Bailey, Warrant Officer R . Curtis, five enlisted men and nine passengers, and 11 enlisted men wounded. The 308 survivors were picked up by US destroyers WHIPPLE and EDSALL, after which WHIPPLE scuttled LANGLEY.

_____

 

_____

 

Japanese submarine I.53 sank Dutch steamer MOESIE (913grt) 25 miles from Banjoewangi.

_____

 

Steamer NAM YONG (1345grt) was sunk by Japanese submarine in the Indian Ocean in 15-55S, 108-05E. Master and four crew made prisoners of war.

 

 

28 February, Saturday

 

 

Lt Cdr A H Terry DSC, command unknown and Acting Surgeon Cdr T . Stevenson OBE, MB, BCH, formerly of SULTAN II, were lost on the 28th (posted April 1946).

_____

 

 

Japanese submarine I.53 sank steamer CITY OF MANCHESTER (8917grt) in 8-16S, 108-52E. Crew of 115, 21 gunners and one passenger, with three crew lost and six presumed captured. I.53 also sank Dutch steamer PARIGI (1172grt) in 8S, 109E.

_____

 

Japanese submarine I.58 damaged tanker BRITISH JUDGE (6735grt) ten miles south of Princess Island, Sunda Strait, and escorting sloop JUMNA and minesweeper WOOLLONGONG counter-attacked. Oiler WAR SIRDAR, also with this convoy, was bombed and set afire. She was beached on Agenielien Island, northwest of Batavia in 5-31S, 106-36E, and declared a total loss on 1 March.

_____

 

Japanese submarine I.4 sank Dutch steamer BAN HO GUAN (1693grt), which was en route from Padang to Tjilatjap, south of Bali.

_____

 

Dutch steamer TOMOHON (983grt) was sunk by Japanese surface craft off Tjilatjap. Crew of 30 rescued.

On 28 February ,1942

Dutch-led forces, supported by about 5500 British, 3000 Australians (the lightly equipped Blackforce infantry brigade), and 750 Americans (a Texas National Guard unit attached to Blackforce), met the Japanese invasion of the island at Bantam Bay/Merak and Eretan Wetan (West Java) and at Kragan (East Java).

 

That day the last two Qantas flying boats moored at Chilacap (Central Java) made their final flight, full of civilian refugees, to Broome in Western Australia.

In Bandung, Peterson visited Australian women who had decided to remain with their families and distributed cash to those who needed it. Austrade’s local staff hid Trade Commission documents, closed the office and disbursed until the end of the Japanese occupation

estimated that the convoys would reach Javanese waters early

on the 27th.

Hurriedly he made his plans to meet the attack with a woefully inferior naval force led by

 

Rear Adm. K. W. F. M. Doorman.

 All Doorman had were 2 heavy cruisers, one of them the USS Houston, 3 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers.

Contact between the opposing forces came shortly after 1500 of the 27th, and the fight that began then raged throughout the afternoon and into the night. By the time the battle of the Java Sea was over the Allies had lost half their ships, including the flagship and Admiral Doorman. The Japanese had not lost a single vessel.⁵⁶

28 February.

 Supporting the invasion was the largest force of warships the Japanese had yet assembled for an amphibious operation. In it were four battleships, led by

 

Admiral Nobutake Kondo,

a carrier group led by Admiral Nagumo of Pearl Harbor fame, and the two attack forces, each now considerably reinforced.

The approach of the Japanese was carefully traced by the Allies, and

 

 Admiral Helfrich, Hart’s successor as Allied naval commander,

 

During the next few days

 the Japanese completed their control of the air and sea approaches to Java. From their circle of bases surrounding the island patrol planes kept constant watch while bombers completed the destruction of Allied airfields and military installations.

At the same time

 the powerful battle fleet ranged the waters of the Java Sea to hunt down the remnants of the Allied fleet which were split between Surabaya and Batavia, seeking some way to make their escape into the Indian Ocean.

The last fight began on the night of 28 February

When

 

 the heavy cruisers USS Houston

and

 

H.M.S. Exeter,

 

accompanied by

 

 the light cruisers H.M.A.S. Perth

and two destroyers,

 tried to slip through Sunda Strait, between Java and Sumatra.

 The Japanese had already closed the strait and the Allied warships sailed into a trap.

That night, in a vigorous battle which lasted past midnight,

 

 

the Houston

 

and

 

 Perth

went down.

On 28 Feb 1942

Dutch-led forces, supported by about 5500 British, 3000 Australians (the lightly equipped Blackforce infantry brigade), and 750 Americans (a Texas National Guard unit attached to Blackforce), met

 

the Japanese invasion of the island at Bantam Bay/

 

Merak

and Eretan Wetan (West Java) and at Kragan (East Java).

 

During the Battle of the Java Sea on 28 February 1942

The battle in the Pacific was taken up by the Americans, and the Allies, consisting of troops from NZ, Australia and Great Britain. Also the KNIL military who escaped from the Japanese to Australia played a part. In a painful struggle which cost many lives, island by island was conquered. The Dutch East Indies however was skipped because the target was Japan

 

Little boats used in the Battle of the Java Sea

 

 

 

 

That day the last two Qantas flying boats moored at Chilacap (Central Java) made their final flight, full of civilian refugees, to Broome in Western Australia.

 

Though the Dutch had concentrated their remaining ground forces in Java, mostly in the western portion of the island, the issue was never in doubt. The Japanese moved inland rapidly, splitting the Dutch Army on the island and isolating the defenders into small groups.

For the Allies the fall of Java marked the loss of the Malay Barrier,

 “the basic defensive position”

 in the Far East. The strategic significance of this loss was enormous. Not only did the Allies lose the resources of the Indies and their lines of communications northward, but they found themselves in a perilous position, split into two areas and threatened by invasion.

The gateway to the Indian Ocean lay open and Australia and India were in dire danger. And the Allies could ill afford to lose the ships, planes, and men that went down in the heroic defense of Malaya, Singapore, and the Indies.

The defeat of ABDACOM was, in a sense,

 the inevitable outcome of Allied weakness.

There was no time to assemble in an area so remote from the sources of supply sufficient aircraft to contest Japanese domination of the air.

Although reinforcements adequate for this task were allocated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, only a trickle, barely enough to replace losses, reached its destination.

The warships that might have challenged the invaders were engaged in other tasks, and when they were finally organized into a combined striking force it was already too late.

 In the six weeks of its existence

ABDACOM never had a chance to test the validity of General Marshall’s contention that a unified command would “solve nine-tenths of our troubles.”

But important lessons about Allied command could be learned from the disagreements and differences which marked the brief existence of ABDACOM and these were not lost when the time came to establish other commands later in the war.

While the campaign for Java was in progress,

 the Japanese had pushed on to take northern Sumatra and central Burma, thus consolidating their control of the southern area and cutting China off from its Allies.

 From Singapore, ten days after that fortress had fallen,

 came the troops to take northern Sumatra.

With their arrival the defenders of the island fled to Java in time to join the fight there, and eventually to surrender.

.

 

 

 

Read more

Amazing Australian: Beryl Stevenson (nee Beryl Spiers and later Beryl Daley) was a young shorthand writer from New South Wales who served as secretary to two British generals in Singapore and Java and later worked for General George Brett in Melbourne and General George Kenney in Brisbane, Port Moresby, Hollandia and the Philippines. She was commissioned as a lieutenant in the United States Army and rose to the rank of major

 

Burma Railway hero Major James ‘Jake’ Jacobs of the 2nd AIF; Lieutenant-Commander Mackenzie Gregory of the RAN (who was on the bridge of HMAS Canberra when she was attacked by the Japanese in the Battle of Savo Island), and Flight Lieutenant Rex T. Barber of the USAAF (the pilot who killed Admiral Yamamoto in mid-air)… just three of the dozens of vivid stories told in Pacific Fury

Next day, March,

 the Exeter was sunk off the coast of Borneo.

Meanwhile the Japanese convoys had come in for the landing. On the way the convoy was attacked by three submarines and the remaining planes of the Allied air force, about ten light bombers and fifteen fighters, and suffered some damage. But the landing was accomplished without serious difficulty, and by morning of the 1st the Japanese were consolidating their positions and rapidly expanding the beachheads

In the meantime were C and D Company split into three marching groups. The Staff Company arrived as first in Sampit on 1st March 1942.

 In March 1942

 the commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East was ordered to move to Australia by the President of the United States. Troops from the United States began arriving in Australia

 

 

---

\

The invasion of Java
(Click map to enlarge)

 

On March 1^st,1942

the Japanese landed at four points on the north coast of Java: Merak, Bantam Bay, Eretenwetan, and Kragan.

The invaders encountered occasionally heavy resistance as they advanced across the island, but wherever the Allies stood, the enemy smashed them, drove them back, or simply outflanked them. The colonial government fled the capital, Batavia, for the relative safety of Bandung. On March 8 the Dutch leadership, demoralized and fearful of possible Japanese reprisals against civilians, ordered the military forces to surrender. [12]

 

Soldiers of the Japanese 2nd Division celebrate their landing at Merak

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

 

48th Division landing trucks at Kragan

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

 

The Japanese Army enters Surabaya

Photo Source: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

 

Dutch soldiers surrender on Java

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

 

Read more

The Battle of Java (Invasion of Java, Operation J)

 was a battle of the Pacific theatre of World War II. It occurred on the island of Java from 28 February-12 March 1942.

It involved forces from the Empire of Japan, which invaded on 28 February 1942, and Allied personnel. Allied commanders signed a formal surrender at Japanese headquarters at Bandung on 12 March.

ABDA Order of battle

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (KNIL Army): Lieutenant-General Hein Ter Poorten

• 1st KNIL Infantry Division: Major-General Wijbrandus Schilling^[2]
• 2nd KNIL Infantry Division: Major-General Pierre A. Cox
• 3rd KNIL Infantry Division: Major-General Gustav A. Ilgen
• British troops (ca. 5,500 men): Major-General Sir Hervey D.W. Sitwell^[3]
• US troops (ca. 750 men:) Major-General J.F. Barnes
• Australian troops (ca. 3000 men): Brigadier Arthur S. Blackburn.^[4]

Forces

The Japanese forces were split into two groups:

 the Eastern Force,

with its headquarters at Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago, included the 48th Division and the 56th Regimental Group.

The Western Force,

 based at Cam Ranh Bay, French Indochina included the 2nd Division and the 230th Regiment (detached from the 38th Division).

The Allied forces were commanded by the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) commander, General Hein ter Poorten.^[5]

Although the KNIL forces had, on paper, 25,000 (mostly Indonesian) well-armed troops, many were poorly trained. The KNIL forces were deployed in four sub-commands: Batavia (Jakarta) area (two regiments); north central Java (one regiment); south Java (one regiment) and; east Java, one regiment.

The British, Australian and United States units were commanded by British Major General H. D. W. Sitwell.^[3]

The British forces were predominantly anti-aircraft units: the 77th Heavy AA Regiment, 21st Light AA Regiment and 48th Light AA Regiment. The only British armoured unit on Java was a squadron of light tanks from the British 3rd Hussars.^[6] Two British AA regiments without guns, the 6th Heavy AA Regt and the 35th Light AA Regiment were equipped as infantry to defend airfields. The British also had transport and administrative units.

The Australian formation — named “Blackforce” after its commander, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn V.C.^[7] —

 included the Australian 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, the Australian 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, a company from the Royal Australian Engineers, a platoon from the 2/1st Headquarters Guard Battalion,^[8]

about 100 reinforcements diverted on route to Singapore, a handful of soldiers who had escaped from Singapore following its fall to the Japanese, two transport companies, a casualty clearing station, and a company headquarters unit. Blackburn decided to re-organise his troops as an infantry brigade. They were well-equipped in terms of Bren guns, light armoured cars, and trucks, but they had few rifles, submachineguns, anti-tank rifles, mortars, grenades, radio equipment or Bren gun carriers. Blackburn managed to assemble an HQ staff and three infantry battalions based on the 2/3rd Machine Gun, the 2/2nd Pioneers, and a mixed “Reserve Group”. The only U.S. ground forces in Java, the 2nd Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery (a Texas National Guard unit) was also attached to Black Force.^[9]

 

West Java Campaign

West Java Campaign from Merak and Bantam Bay

After discussing the war preparation on 21 January with the commander of the 3rd Fleet and inspected the 48th Division at Manila, Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura received an order to attack Java on 30 January.

The convoy consisted of 56 transport ships with troops aboard from 16th Army Headquarters, 2nd Division and 230th Infantry Regiment. The convoy left Cam Ranh Bay at 10:00 on 18 February, and the commander-in-chief Lieutenant General Hitoshi Imamura was aboard on the transport ship Ryujo Maru. The convoy escort was under the command of Rear Admiral Kenzaburo Hara.^[12]

At 23:20 on 28 February, the transport ships carrying the Nasu and Fukushima detachments commenced landing operations at Merak. Ten minutes later they were joined by the other transport ships; the one carrying the Sato detachment dropped anchor at Bantam Bay. By 02:00 on 1 March, all ships had reached their designated positions. The KNIL Merak Coastal Detachment, made up of a section from the Captain F.A.M. Harterink’s 12th KNIL Infantry Battalion, machine-gunned the invaders but was quickly defeated.

On 1 March, the invaders set up new headquarters at Serang. The troops of the 2nd Division led by Lieutenant-General Masao Maruyama were divided into the following detachments:

• Nasu Detachment: Major-General Yumio Nasu
• Fukushima Detachment: Colonel Kyusaku Fukushima
• Sato Detachment: Colonel Hanshichi Sato

The Nasu detachment was ordered to capture Buitenzorg to cut the escape route from Batavia to Bandoeng. The Fukushima and Sato Detachments would in the meanwhile head for Batavia through Balaradja and Tangerang.

On 2 March, the Nasu detachment arrived at Rangkasbitung and continued to Leuwiliang, 15 mi (24 km) west of Buitenzorg. The Australian 2/2nd Pioneer and 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalions were positioned along a riverbank at Leuwiliang and put up a vigorous defence. Highly accurate volleys from “D” Battery, U.S. 2/131st Field Artillery, destroyed many Japanese tanks and trucks. Blackforce managed to hold up the Japanese advance for two full days before being forced to withdraw to Soekabumi, lest it become trapped by Japanese flanking manoeuvres, and was ordered to retreat to Soekabumi. Around the same time, the Fukushima and Sato units headed westwards to Madja (Maja) and Balaradja (Balaraja). They found many of the bridges already destroyed by the retreating Dutch and were forced to find other routes; some units took the opportunity to make for Buitenzorg.

On 4 March, Ter Poorten decided to withdraw his forces from Batavia and Buitenzorg to reinforce the defence of Bandoeng. The following evening Dutch troops in Batavia surrendered to the Sato Detachment. By dawn of 6 March, the Japanese troops had attacked Buitenzorg, which was guarded by the 10th Company, KNIL 2nd Infantry Regiment; 10th Company, 1st Infantry Regiment; Landstorm troops and a howitzer unit. In the morning Buitenzorg was occupied, while a large number of Allied soldiers had retreated to Bandoeng. The Nasu Detachment pursued them through Tjiandjoer and (Tjimahi), entering the city on 9 March. The Shoji Detachment also entered Bandoeng on the same day, arriving from the north, having travelled via Lembang.

West Java Campaign from Eretan Wetan

On 27 February, the unit 230th Infantry Regiment, led by Colonel Toshishige Shoji, separated from the main convoy and landed on 1 March, at Eretan Wetan, near Soebang on the northern coast of West Java. The unit’s objectives were to capture the important Kalidjati airfield and weaken the Allied air arm, while the 2nd Division attacked Batavia.

At dawn on 1 March, nine Brewster and three Glenn Martins from the KNIL Air Force, together with 12 Hurricanes from the 242nd and 605th RAF Squadrons, carried out attacks on Japanese troops at Eretan Wetan. Using motor vehicles, the Japanese rapidly advanced to Soebang. At noon, the Kalidjati airfield was finally occupied following a tenacious defence carried out by 350 British troops. Meanwhile, other Japanese units led by Major Masaru Egashira bypassed Allied defences and headed for Pamanoekan (Pamanukan), and from then on to (Tjikampek), where they were able to cut the road link between Batavia and Kalidjati.

The fall of Kalidjati airfield greatly alarmed the Dutch, who set about planning hasty and ill-prepared counterattacks. On 2 March, a KNIL armoured unit (the Mobiele Eenheid), commanded by Captain G.J. Wulfhorst with approximately 20 tanks, and supported by the 250 men of Major C.G.J. Teerink’s 5th KNIL Infantry Battalion, launched a counterattack against the Shoji unit outside Soebang. The attempt initially went well, but in the afternoon the attack was repulsed. Afterwards, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Air Brigade arrived at Kalidjati airfield.

By the night of 7 March, Japanese troops had arrived at the plateau of Lembang, which is only 5 mi (8.0 km) north from Bandoeng. At 10:00 on 8 March, Major-General Jacob J. Pesman, the commander of Stafgroep Bandoeng,^[13] met Colonel Toshishige Shoji at the Isola Hotel in Lembang and surrendered.

Japenese Order of battle

2nd Division: Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama^[14]

• Nasu Detachment: Maj. Gen. Yumio Nasu
  • 16th Infantry Regiment
  • 1st Battalion of 2nd Field Artillery Regiment
  • 1st Company of 2nd Engineer Regiment
  • Two motor transport companies
• Fukushima Detachment: Col. Kyusaku Fukushima
  • 4th Infantry Regiment
  • 2nd Battalion of 2nd Field Artillery Regiment
  • 5th Anti-Tank Battalion
  • 2nd Company of 2nd Engineer Regiment
• Sato Detachment: Col. Hanshichi Sato
  • 29th Infantry Regiment
  • 2nd Tank Regiment
  • 1st Company of 2nd Field Artillery Regiment
  • 2nd Engineer Regiment
• Shoji Detachment: Col. Toshishige Shoji^[15]
  • 230th Infantry Regiment
  • One mountain artillery battalion
  • One engineer company
  • One anti-tank battalion
  • One light tank company
  • One anti-aircraft battery
  • Two independent engineer companies
  • One platoon of the Bridge Material Company
  • One motor Transport Company
  • Part of the 40th Anchorage Headquarters
  • Part of the Airfield Battalion

East Java Campaign

Moving eastward

The East Java campaign was composed of the 48th Division from the Philippines. On 8 February, the 48th Division departed from Lingayen Gulf, Luzon Island (Philippines) protected by the 4th Destroyer Squadron. On 22 February, the convoy arrived at Balikpapan and the Sakaguchi Detachment joined the 48th Division aboard the ships.

On 25 February, the convoy left Balikpapan, and sailed southward to Java. On 27 February, the ABDA fleet under command of Rear-Admiral Karel Doorman was detected and attacked by the 5th Destroyer Squadron and other units of the 3rd Fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea. The Japanese won the battle and at 00:15 on 1 March, the fleet landed in Kragan, a small village in East Java, approximately 100 mi (160 km) west of Surabaya.

The 3rd (Motorised) Cavalry Squadron of the 1st Dutch KNIL Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Ritmeester C.W. de Iongh, resisted the landing force but was quickly subdued.^[16]

Meanwhile, the flying boat Dornier X-28 of the 6th GVT (Groep Vliegtuigen or Aircraft Group) from MLD, B-17 bombers of the U.S. 7th Bomber Group, A-24 dive bombers of the U.S. 27th Bomb Group and Vildebeest torpedo-bombers from the 36th RAF Squadron worked round the clock to harass the invaders.

After landing, the 48th Division was divided into:

• Imai Unit (Right Wing): Colonel Hifumi Imai
• Abe Unit (Left Wing): Major-General Koichi Abe
• Tanaka Unit (Tjepoe Raiding Unit): Colonel Tohru Tanaka
• Kitamura Unit (Bodjonegoro Raiding Unit): Lieutenant Colonel Kuro Kitamura

Moving southward

The Sakaguchi Detachment from Balikpapan joined the East Java Invasion fleet as well. After landing, they were divided into three units with one battalion each: Kaneuji Unit, Major Kaneuji commanding; Yamamoto Unit: Colonel Yamamoto commanding; and Matsumoto Unit, Lieutenant Colonel Matsumoto commanding; these units moved south with the objective to occupy Tjilatjap in order to capture the harbour and block the retreat to Australia. In one week, they advanced rapidly and overcame all Dutch army defence found in Blora, Soerakarta, Bojolali, Jogjakarta, Magelang, Salatiga, Ambarawa and Poerworedjo. The Kaneuji and Matsumoto Detachments moved through the mainland, captured Keboemen and Purwokerto, north of Tjilatjap on 8 March. The Yamamoto Unit fanned out along the beach and mounted a two-pronged attack, entering Tjilatjap on 8 March. By then, however, the Dutch had withdrawn to Wangon, a small town located between Purwokerto and Tjilatjap. On the following day, Major-General Pierre A. Cox — the Dutch Central Army District commander — surrendered his troops to the Japanese.

Any expectation of reinforcement from America was dashed

 on March 1

 by the news of Japanese landings on Java.

 

 

 

Japanese Order of battle

48th Division: Major-General Yuitsu Tsuchihashi^[17]

• Imai Unit (Right Wing): Colonel Hifumi Imai, commander of the 1st Formosan Infantry Regiment
  • 1st Formosan Infantry Regiment
  • One mountain artillery battalion
  • One engineer company
• Abe Unit (Left Wing): Major-General Koichi Abe
  • 48th Infantry Group Headquarters
  • 47th Infantry Regiment
  • One mountain artillery battalion
  • One engineer company
• Tanaka Unit (Tjepoe Raiding Unit): Colonel Tohru Tanaka
  • 2nd Formosan Infantry Regiment
  • One mountain artillery battalion
  • One engineer company
• Kitamura Unit (Bodjonegoro Raiding Unit): Lieutenant Colonel Kuro Kitamura
  • 48th Reconnaissance Regiment

Sakaguchi Detachment: Major-General Shizuo Sakaguchi^[18]

• Yamamoto Unit: Colonel Yamamoto
  • 1st Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment
• Kaneuji Unit: Major Kaneuji
  • 2nd Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regiment
• Matsumoto Unit: Lieutenant Colonel Matsumoto
  • 3rd Battalion of the 124th Infantry Regim

 

THE DAI NIPPON MILITARY OCCUPATION JAVA ISLAND

 1942

COLLECTION

 

officer of the special naval landing force, Major Uroku Hashimoto using his binoculars during the invasion of the dutch east indies (january 1942)

 

Japanese landings

 

The Japanese 2d Division celebrates landing at Merak, Java, 1 March 1942. (Sectie Militaire Geschiedenes Landmachstaf)

Japanese troops move through Java. (Sectie Militaire Geschiedenes Landmachstaf)

 

The Japanese 2nd Division landed at Merak, 1 March 1942

 

 

Japanese bicycle infantry moving through Java.

The Japanese troops landed at three points on Java on 1 March. The West Java invasion convoy landed on Bantam Bay near Merak and Eretan Wetan. The West Java convoy had previously fought in the Battle of Sunda Strait, a few hours prior to the landings.^[10]

Meanwhile, the East Java invasion convoy landed on Kragan after having successfully defeated the ABDA fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea.^[11]

(1)March,1th,1942

March 1st’1942 :”Dai Nippon Occupation Indonesia This Day”

 

1.MARCH. 1^st, 1942

(1) Early in the morning this day,

 

 

Dai Nippon forces landing in Java and succeeded without any struggle by DEI forces(KNIL) and Indonesia Native people accepted DN Frces with up the DN and Indnesian national flag because Dai Nippon propaganda before the war that Indonesia will Independent when they occupied Indonesia,

 

Soldiers of the Japanese 2nd Division celebrate their landing at Merak

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

 

 

 

At the same time, Three Dai Nippon Forces Landing  area in Java:

 

japanese destroyer bombarding allied forces during the invasion of the Dutch East Indies.

(a) Banten Beach at Merak

 

Type 96 25mm Gun crew observing the naval bombardment on the beach during the invasion of the dutch east indies

 

 

daihatsu landing craft transporting soldiers of the special naval landing force during the invasion of the ducht east indies

 

japanese navy troops firing inside a landing craft against dutch troops during the invasion od the dutch eats indies

 

type 95 ha-go light tanks in Merak

 

with route

 

Banten attack Map 1942

Merak-Serang-Rangkasbitung-Leuwiliang-Buitenzorg(Bogor)-Kragilan-Tanggerang-Batavia

 

special naval landing force infantryman marching (dutch east indies, december 1941)

 

 

soldiers of the SNLF landing in the dutch east indies (1942)

 

Japanese troops crossing a bridge during their advance towards Batavia, March 1942

 

under the command of

 

the commander-in-chief 16th Dai Nippon forces Lt.Gen.Hitoshi Immamura,

with

 

the 2nd Division under Commander May.Gen. Maruyama,

and

the 49th Division under Commander May.Gen Tsuchi Hashi ,

 also Brigade under commander

May. gen.Sakaguchi

and one Resiment under commander

 

Col, Shoji.

 

Let.Col. Noguchi

tank commander

 

Description

tank commander Lieutenant Colonel Noguchi of the 2nd Recon Regiment equipped with 16 Type 97 Tankettes during the Java Island Campaign, March 1942

 

 

 

 

 

tank crew

 

Description

japanese tank crew with their type 94 tankette

tankette

 

a japanese tank commander receiving his type 94 tankettes (dutch east indies 1942)

 

Commander of the japanese marines paratroopers colonel Toyoaki Horiuchi (dutch east indies, 1942)

 

 

 

japanese army officer Genjirou Inui, he fought in java, phillipines and guadalcanal, then he returned to japan for the rest of the war

 

 

Description

tyep 94 tankette passing through river

 

 

 

 

 

 

(b) Eretan Wetan near Indramajoe

 

(ill 4) The Vintage Dutch Map of Indramjoe Dai Nippon landing area 1942,caption Indramajoe map 1942

(c) Krangan Rembang middle Java,

 

48th Division landing trucks at Kragan

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

The fleet of Dai Nippon Naval Forces reach the Krangan coast ,a village between Rembang and Lasem, about 160 km west of Soerabaja.
The Sakaguchi detachment from Balikpapan joined this invasion fleet. After landing divided into 3 units with 1 battalion of 124th Infantry Regiment :
(c.1) Col.Yamamoto,1st Battalion unit.
(c.2) Mayor Kaneuji, 2nd Battalion unit.
(c.3) Let.Col.Matsimoto,3rd battalion unit.
In one week ,they advanced rapidly and overcome all Dutch army defended in Blora ,Solo ,Bojolali-Yogja ,Magelang and Ambarawa
the Map will illustrated

The Tanaka Unit was ordered to occupy Tjepoe (Cepu) to secure the oilfields there and the Kitamura Unit was to occupy Bodjonegoro, near Tjepoe. The whole unit planned a two-pronged attack on Surabaya from the west through Lamongan and from south through Djombang and Modjokerto.

The Tanaka Unit occupied Tjepoe on 2 March,

 

the 2nd March 1942

Information on KNILM evacuation flights via Broome & Derby from Richard Pflug

The following was sent some months ago by Richard Pflug, summarising information in Dutch language sources.

There is some good detail on the KNILM evacuation flights which took place

around 2nd March 1942.

This was at the peak of the USAAF evacuation and the Broome aerodrome was crowded to capacity, mainly with huge B-17s.

Some of the Dutch aircraft arrived right at this time, and were directed north to the small field at Derby. This was the only known use of Derby during the evacuations.

According to what I read the KNILM/KLM management was well prepared for the evacuation. For instance they asked Shell to direct an oil tanker with aviation fuel to the port of Broome.

They also ordered spare parts to be delivered in Australia (but these were impounded by the US Army).

Although the government was in charge of making the passenger lists some crew members were able to “smuggle” colleagues on board.

Captain Evert van Dijk for instance took KLM chief radio engineering C.R. Klooster on his second round trip with him as his “co-pilot”, while the man was not on the official evacuation list.

On the second group of planes, radio operator Hans Pool gets his friend Dick Sweitser (who got wounded when DC-3 PK-AFW was shot down over East Borneo on January 24th) on board DC-5 PK-ADC.

When Captain Van Messel arrives in Broome on March 2nd 1942 with DC-5 PK-ADB he asks if Japanese reconnaissance planes have been sighted over Broome recently.

 It is confirmed that an unidentified plane has passed at high altitude.

Based on earlier experiences with airfields on Java, he is pretty sure this means a Japanese attack is eminent within 48 hours and decides to leave Broome as soon as possible.

 B17s from the 7th and 19th group however get priority with refuelling. With much persuasion Van Messel and his colleague Reyers with the L14 PK- AFP manage to get refuelled and leave.

Captain Deenik with DC-5 PK-ADD has less luck. He is advised to go on to Derby and get refuelled there for the further flight to Daly Waters.

According to the book “De Douglas DC-5 – een kort maar bewogen bestaan” (translation: The Douglas DC-5 – a short but moving history) by Pieter C. Kok, Captain Dirk Rab with DC-5 PK-ADC, nearing the Australian coast heads for a course just few degrees more south of Broome, just after dawn on the morning of March 2nd he locates the small coral reefs “Rowley Shoals” and turns east to Broome.

When he arrives he also gets the advice to go on to Derby for refuelling for the flight to Daly Waters.

 Flying time will be some 40 to 45 minutes. The tanks of the DC-5 are nearly empty, but fearing a Japanese attack they decide to take the risk. About 30 minutes out, with Derby in sight, both engines begin to sputter and eventually stop.

Captain Rab manages to land the plane safely in a field with long alang-alang grass. They are stranded without fuel, water and food. And without power from the generators from the engines they are also unable to send an S.O.S.

According to the story mechanic John Gijzemijter thinks up a creative way to get out an S.O.S.

When they get the tail of DC-5 down, the last bit of remaining fuel flows to the lowest point in the tank. And with this they might be able to start up an engine for a few seconds, power up the radio equipment and send an S.O.S. The passengers and crew manage to carefully pull down the tail with their weight and muscle power. Gijzemijter manages to get an engine running and radio operator Lambrechtsen sends the S.O.S. and position of the plane. The signal is picked up in Broome.

DC-2 PK-AFL with Gerrit Jan Schippers arrives in Broome at about 10.00 AM, after a flying time of 7 hours 5 minutes.

They hear PK-ADC is missing but the radio transmission has been received. It takes 2 and half hours to get the plane checked and refuelled. With food and an open drum of water held in place by an American soldier, PK-AFL takes off to look for the stranded DC-5.

Seeing a DC-5 at Derby Schippers thinks PK-ADC managed to reach the destination and touches down at 13.35. He learns that the DC-5 is PK-ADD. 8 minutes later he is back in the air, sees a flare and then is able to spot the camouflaged PK-ADC.

He touches down gently not to spill the water in the open drum, but while taxiing he makes a sharp turn, the soldier loses his balance and the drum tips over.

After transferring fuel both planes head back to Broome. PK-AFL reaches Broome at 15.40 and the crew is instructed to go on to Port Hedland.

Schippers takes off again at 18.00 hours. PK-ADC stays at Broome for the night.

 

 

(2) All of the West Java Postal office were closed not opretated inculding Tjiandjoer.

 

Front Capitulation cover 1942

 

 

Back Capitulation cover 1942

(1ll.5) Postally free postally used Geadvisers (Registered) cover with Commander of the forces and the Departmen of War’s chief (Commandant Leger en hoofd departement van Oorlog ) official Headquaters Stamped send from The Dutch East Indie Forces Head Quaters Bandoeng CDS Bandoeng Riaow Str 27.2.42, arrival Cds Tjiandjoer 28.2.42 and after that the post office closed, open after capitulaition CDS Tjiandjoer 4.4.42 Onafgeh. and ret.afzd handwritten postmark (Cann’t delivered and return to sender) , arrived back CDS Bandoeng 6.4.42 (during dai nippon occupation0 to Dai Nippon Forces Headquaters in java .(The very rare Dai Nippon capitulation Postal History collection from the DEI forces headquaters back to Dai nippon forces Bandoeng Headquaters only one ever seen, if the collecters have the same collectins please send information via comment-Dr iwan S.)
Caption : capitulation cover 1942

 

Dai Nippon Army Landed at Merak, and other area

(3)March,3th.192

The latest used of DEI Imprint revenue 1942 on the document of money storting 2500 guiler at DEI Bank Wscompto Buitenzorg(now bogor), the owner told that after storting the money he left his house and all his belonging nothing left when he back in  May 1942 ,all his belonging were robbery . In the document there written at may ,5^th 1942 the money get back from the vabk and keep in his house, Same with postal service in May 1942 did not operated,sarting agai at May 1942. This collections belonging to my friend Mr Gunawan from Bogor,thank you Mr Gunawa for your informations

The same imprint DEI revenue 1942 used  in september 1942 used by the Japanese school look below.

 

while

the Kitamura Unit occupied Bodjonegoro on 3 March.

 The Japanese proceeded further and overwhelmed the Dutch defences at the Ngawi Regency, Tjaroeban (Caruban), Ngandjoek, Kertosono, Kediri and Djombang.

At Porong, near Surabaya, the Dutch infantry from 8th, 13th Battalion, 3rd Cavalry Unit and the American 131st (Texas) “E” Field Artillery Regiment gave fierce resistance to the incoming Japanese.

 Eventually the Allied troops under Major-General Gustav A. Ilgen had to retreat to the island of Madura upon the completion of demolition of the city’s infrastructure.

.

 

Wyndham raid photo received via WA historian Kevin Gomm

WA author / historian Kevin Gomm sent this fascinating photo of the burnt out DH-84 Dragon at Wyndham aerodrome.

 

 The damaged civil hangar is visible in the background.

This was all a result of the 3rd March strafing by a squadron of Zeroes, mirroring the attack on Broome.

Indeed a more well known series of photos was taken of the Broome raid wreckage and can be viewed via the Australian War Memorial online collection.

However this particular photo is not from that same series, although it must have been taken at a similar time, very soon after the raid and before the wreckage was cleared up. It actually appeared in a Sydney newspaper (The Daily Telegraph), just after Wyndham was raided for a second time, on 24th March 1942. Strangely the photo never featured in the West Australian newspaper, which would seem the obvious candidate.

Kevin Gomm has extensively researched all of the WWII attacks on WA, as well as maritime events.

He has visited all of the attack sites and has a detailed knowledge of anything surviving from the wartime years.

 His book Red Sun on the Kangaroo Paw documents each of the Japanese raids and attacks on WA during WWII.

 It is currently being re-released as a 70th Anniversary 1942-2012 Commemorative Edition.

The book is available from http://www.helveticapublishing.com – indeed the site is well worth a visit, concentrating solely on WA military history.

March.2^nd.1942.

 

At midnight March 3rd

the positions of the planes of the second group are:

• Lockheed L14 – PK-AFP – Captain A. Reyers – Alice Springs
• Douglas DC-5 PK-ADB – Captain G. van Messel – Alice Springs
• Douglas DC-5 PK-ADC – Captain M.S. Rab – Broome
• Douglas DC-5 PK-ADD – Captain P.A. Deenik – Daly Waters
• Douglas DC-2 PK-AFL – Captain G.J. Schippers – Port Hedland
• Douglas DC-2 PK-AFK – Captain F. van Breemen – emergency strip near Daly Waters (he can’t find Daly Waters after sunset. Using his landing lights and finds this strip with two crossed “runways” of mowed grass some 600 metres long. And after three attempts manages to make a precautionary landing)

In the early morning of March 3rd the crew and passengers of PK-ADC have breakfast on the airfield (where according to the story there are no more non-alcoholic drinks available. Just beer). Just before the attack begins PK-ADC is the first plane of the day to get take-off clearance. As they receive the air raid warning on the radio, they go down to treetop level, to escape attention

 

(3)March,4^th.1942

On 4 March,

 MacArthur split this command and created a separate Visayan Force under Brig. Gen. Bradford C. Chynoweth.

 

japanese soldiers observing smoke coming from a american position during the battle of bataan

 

 Sharp remained in command of Mindanao, the only island south of Luzon on which a major Japanese force had landed.⁵³ This move was probably designed to permit General Sharp to devote all his energies to the defense of Mindanao, the base from which MacArthur still hoped to mount a counteroffensive against the Japanese.

But careful as he had been in making

these arrangements (to go into effect the day after his departure), and briefing the force commanders and new deputy chief of staff, MacArthur neglected one thing — to inform the War Department. Whatever the reasons, the result was utter confusion.

 

type 95 ha-go tank of the japanese army 7th tank regiment using fouliage for camouflage (phillipines 1942)

 

 The War Department assumed that Wainwright, the senior officer in the islands, was in command of all forces in the Philippines as MacArthur had been, and addressed him as such.

 

japanese tank crew man posing with a knock out american tank (phillipines 1942)

 

But the messages, intended for Wainwright and marked for the commander in the Philippines came to Beebe who had no recourse but to refer them to MacArthur, then en route to Australia. Beebe’s position was an embarrassing one and he urged his chief repeatedly to clear up the matter with Washington. But to no avail. MacArthur remained silent and the War Department uninformed.⁵⁴.

Batavia have declared as the open city

The Dutch government at London ordered DEI Governor Tjarda military handed over power to General ter  Porten and DEI Govenor General Dr van Mook domiciled in Australia

 (4)March,5th.1942

Batavia(Jakarta) occupied by dai Nippon Army

lead by Let.General Immamura

 

A Japanese soldier outside oil tanks near Jakarta destroyed by Dutch forces in March,5th. 1942

 

Dai Nippon tanl entering Batavia(Jakarta) march.5^th.1942

Japanese tanks with infantry entering Batavia, March 1942

The other was Captain J.P. van Helsdingen, a fighter pilot of the KNIL airforce. He was killed in action on March 5, 1942

Batavia fell on the March,5^th 1942

without a struggle, after the government moved inland to Bandoeng. It was not safe even there, for the Japanese closed in on this mountain retreat and by the 8th were in position to attack the remnants of the Dutch Army defending it. The next morning the Dutch surrendered and the fight for Java was over.⁵⁷

For the Japanese, the conquest of the Indies was the crowning achievement of the war. It realized their long-cherished dream of empire. The rich resources of Southeast Asia, the oil, rubber, and manganese needed for war and for the control of Asia, were now in their possession. And all this had been won in three months.

On this day Ciater and the north area of Subang occupied by the Dai Nippon military army.

 

Read more

The Last day Of Batavia

(Setyawati Soelaiman,the private notes during Dai nippon Occupation)

Alpha

We will be very sorry if he would fall, he was a young adept, I still see it last time when batavia  would have been invaded by the armies of Dai Nippon d I still to  RH building (hoogeschool Recht, High School of Law)

 

 I saw some friends who are still busy studying, in a room that has been a faculty library literature “How Optimik” I thought, when I see my future keruang Prof.Soepomo dressed in cloth and blankon . He was assigned to lead the Faculty of Law and is to be received stamps of the Japanese at the time the building was occupied,

On the road a truck stop, look Prof Kemperts Bernet, Professor Werthiem and several other professors. they are held hands up has regards . Jakarta City Fall afternoon (8-3.42 not right, the right day 5-3.48).

All of the Netherlands, Britain and Australia are uniformed prison. The first days are still a lot of unrest so that we do not dare go home kerumahkarena we heard that when the army occupied Shanghai dai nippon been many robberies and rapes,

 

 in Batavia was not so.
When some soldiers looted warehouses Dai nippon act strongly against the leader of a robbery. Rape does not sound happen but the hosts dai nippon bring the Korean people as the troops advanced, they were assigned to take the vehicles to the invasion of Bandung.Mobil of my  father was also taken.

When the situation had died down, I dare to ride bicycles to visit Ida ross who lived not far from the factory Salemba Amfiun near the college of Medicine.

 

We talked about the situation at that time and we asked what would happen next before the surrender by the Japanese army, the head of the family have bought and keeping  rice at home, because there is no yangtahu whether the father will still be retained in office and whether his family and still be able to eat later .
On another day I saw a long line of white people. There is already a beard and did not seem clean. The legend says that the prisoners were told to walk away from Glodok  prison to prison struiswijk  (now Salemba prison)
I think that the professor and professor Bernet Kempers = other professors in the row.

Women of Europe and Australia was soon taken prisoner j8uga and finally put into special camps for their camp.
They are still able to prove themselves that they were Indo, so the descent was a native ditangkap.Karena not overrun the state archives of people who find evidence of it.
Mrs. Bernet Kempert and two sons captured as well, with the other ladies, they stay away from her husband.
Professor Bernet Kempert living in camps in Java, but there are some other scholars anaara Bok van de Casparis Neckeren and taken to Burma and Thailand to work to make a fire road Railway
. Thankfully they survived in captivity so that Prof. Bernet Kempert can gather with his family. They are still embedded in the Lord and perhaps prof Bernet Kampert, Bob van de Casparis Heekeren and retained this earth to be a teacher kita.karena archaeologists have not time for them to go and they who teach us how to protect and have our own cultural heritage.

We are very disappointed that the Government of Japan’s occupation would not hold the school to humanoris. Which may be passed is the school of law, medicine and dentistry and engineering,
At the Museum held courses in Javanese and Sanskrit and several other lectures by Professor Poerbatjeraka and some other figures. I heard from friends that read the room museum that is not a nice thing because it is often heard cries of people being tortured by Professor Kempetei dibekas room because of the high School of Law has become the headquarters Kenpetei.
I heard that when the building was occupied by some Japanese soldiers throwing a book from our library kempert prof sought out the window.
Mrs Dr de Jong our lecturers in Dutch seventeenth century to the present menyelamatkannya.Pak Prijono also said: “Lady, lady’s life remembered”

Original info

Kami akan sangat menyesal kalau ia akan gugur , ia masih muda cakap, Saya masih melihatnya terakhir kali m ketika batavia sudah akan diserbu oleh Balatentara dai Nippon . saya masih kegedung R.H(Recht hoogeschool,Sekolah tinggi Hukum) saya melihat beberapa  teman yang masih sibuk belajar , dalam ruangan yang telah menjadi Perpustakaan Fakultas sastra”Betapa Optimik”  pikir saya, ketika saya keruang depan saya melihat Prof.Soepomo  yang berpakaian  kain dan blankon.  Ia ditugaskan untuk memimpin Fakultas Hukum dan ialah yang akan menerima prang-orang Jepang pada saat gedung tersebut diduduki,

Di jalan sebuah truk berhenti ,nampak Prof Bernet Kemperts,Professor Werthiem  dan beberapa professor lainnya . mereka mengacungkan tanggan  sebagai salam . Sore itu Kota Jakarta Jatuh(8-3.42 not right,the right day 5-3.48) .

Semua orang belanda ,Inggris dan australia yang berseragam dipenjarakan. Hari-hari pertama masih banyak kerusuhan sehingga kami tidak berani pulang kerumahkarena kami dengar bahwa ketika Shanghai diduduki tentara dai nippon  terjadi banyak perampokan  dan perkosaan, ternyata di Batavia tidak begitu.

Ketika beberapa gudang dirampok tentara Dai nippon bertindak dengan keras terhadap pemimpin perampokan .Perkosaan tidak terdengar terjadi/ tetapi Balatentara dai nippon membawa orang Korea sebagai  pasukan terdepan , mereka ditugaskan mengambil kendaraan-kendaraan untuk penyerbuan ke Bandung.Mobil ayah juga dibawa.

Ketika keadaan sudah mereda , saya berani naik sepeda untuk mengunjungi Ida nasution yang tinggal di salemba tidak jauh dari pabrik  Amfiun dekat perguruan tinggi Kedokteran. Kami mengobrol tentang keadaan pada saat itu dan  kami bertanya apakah yang akan terjadi  nanti sebelum penyerahan oleh tentara Jepang , para kepala keluarga sudah membeli  dan menyoimpan  beras dirumah,karena tidak ada  yangtahu apakah  Ayah masih akan dipertahankan dalam jabatannya dan  dan apakah keluarganya masih dapat makan nanti.

Pada hari yang lain saya melihat suatu barisan panjang orang kulit putih,. Ada yang sudah berjenggot dan kelihatannya tidak bersih. Konon kabarnya  para tahanan  disuruh berjalan kaki dari penjara Glodok ke penjara struiswijk(sekarang Penjara salemba)

Saya pikir bahwa professor Bernet Kempers dan profesor=profesor lain berada dalam barisan itu.

Wanita-wanita eropa dan Australia tidak lama kemudian ditawan j8uga dan akhirnya dimasukkan kedalam Kamp kamp khusus untuk mereka .

Mereka yang masih dapat membuktikan dirinya  bahwa mereka orang Indo, jadi keturunan seorang pribumi tidak ditangkap.Karena itu arsip negara  diserbu orang-orang yang mencari bukti itu.

Nyonya Bernet Kempert  dan kedua putranya ditawan juga, dengan nyonya-nyonya lainnya ,mereka tinggal jauh dari suaminya.

Prof Bernet Kempert tinggal dalam kamp di Jawa tetapi ada beberapa orang sarjana  anaara lain Bok van Neckeren  dan de Casparis yang dibawa ke Burma dan Thailand untuk bekerja membuat jalan Kerata api

.Syukurlah mereka bertahan  dalam tawanan sehingga Prof Bernet Kempert dapat berkumpul lagi dengan keluarganya. Mereka masih dipayungi oleh Tuhan  dan mungkin prof Bernet Kampert, Bob van heekeren dan de Casparis  masih dipertahankan dibumi  ini untuk menjadi guru para arkeolog kita.karena belum waktunya mereka pergi dan merekalah yang mengajar kita bagaimana melindungi dan memiliki warisan budaya kita sendiri.

Kami sangat kecewa bahwa Pemerintah Pendudukan Jepang  tidak mau mengadakan sekolah untuk humanoris. Yang boleh diteruskan adalah sekolah hokum,Kedokteran dan kedokteran gigi serta tehnik,

Di Museum diadakan kursus-kursus dalam bahasa Jawa dan sansekerta dan beberapa kuliah lain oleh Profesor Poerbatjeraka dan beberapa tokoh lainnya. Saya dengar dari teman-teman bahwa bahwa membaca diruangan Museum bukan merupakan hal yang menyenangkan karena seringkali terdengar  teriakan orang yang sedang disiksa  oleh Kempetei dibekas ruangan Profesor karena Gedung Sekolah tinggi Hukum sudah menjadi  markas Kenpetei.

Saya dengar ketika gedung itu diduduki beberapa serdadu jepang melempar-lemparkan buku  dari perpustakaan kami  yang diusahakan prof kempert keluar jendela.

Ny Dr de Jong dosen kami dalam bahasa Belanda abad ke XVII ingin menyelamatkannya.Pak Prijono yang hadir juga mengatakan;”Nyonya, ingat nyawa nyonya”.

 

 

 

Netherlands East Indies

 

 

Lt. August Deibel of 2-VLG-V with his Buffalo (serial B-3110) at RAF Kallang, early 1942. He shot down two Nakajima Ki-27 fighters on 12 January before being wounded and having to bail out himself.^{[N 8][23]}

The Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (“Military Air Service of the Royal Netherlands East Indian Army”, ML-KNIL) had ordered 144 Brewster B-339C and 339D models, the former with rebuilt Wright G-105 engines supplied by the Dutch and the latter with new 1,200 hp (895 kW) Wright R-1820-40 engines Brewster purchased from Wright. At the outbreak of war, only 71 had arrived in the Dutch East Indies, and not all were in service. A small number served briefly at Singapore before being withdrawn for the defense of Java.

As the Brewster B-339 aircraft used by the ML-KNIL were lighter than the modified B-339E Brewster Mark Is used by British, Australian, and New Zealand air forces, they were able at times to successfully engage the Japanese Army Ki-43 “Oscar”, although both the “Oscar” and the Japanese Navy’s A6M Zero still out-climbed and out-turned the B-339 at combat altitudes (the Zero was faster as well).^[32]

 

 

Brewster Buffalos of the ML-KNIL

Apart from their role as fighters, the Brewster fighters were also used as dive bombers against Japanese troopships. Although reinforced by British Commonwealth Brewster Mk I (B-339E) aircraft retreating from Malaya, the Dutch squadrons faced superior numbers in the air, and were too few in number to stem the advance of Japanese ground forces.

In a major engagement above Semplak on 19 February 1942, eight Dutch Brewster fighters intercepted a formation of about 35 Japanese bombers with an escort of about 20 Zeros. The Brewster pilots destroyed 11 Japanese aircraft and lost four Brewsters; two Dutch pilots died.^[33]

The Brewsters flew their last sortie on 7 March. Altogether, 17 ML-KNIL pilots were killed, and 30 aircraft shot down; 15 were destroyed on the ground, and several were lost to misadventure. Dutch pilots claimed 55 enemy aircraft destroyed.^[30] Two Dutch pilots, Jacob van Helsdingen and August Deibel, scored highest with the Buffalo with three victories each.

Following the surrender of the Netherlands East Indies on 8 March 1942, 17 ML-KNIL Buffalos were transferred to the USAAF and RAAF in Australia (

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Fall of Java Island, March 1942

 

 

 

Bombardment of Soerabaja by the Japanese planes.
The naval establishment is seen on the left of the canalised
River Mas on the right is the Royal Dutch Naval Air Station Perak

Destruction of ammo stacks in Soerabaja, March 1942

 

 

 

Personnel of 211^th Squadron RAF, most probably at Tjilatjap, possibly on the railway station platform, in March 1942

 

 

Personnel of 211th Squadron RAF, most probably at Tjilatjap, possibly on the railway station platform, in March 1942The Fall of Java Island
Bombardment of Soerabaja by the Japanese planes. The naval establishment is seen on the left of the canalised River Mas on the right is the Royal Dutch Naval Air Station Perak	Australian troops of 2/3 Machine Gun Battalion at Arinem (Western Java) in January 1942

Personnel of 211th Squadron RAF, most probably at Tjilatjap, possibly on the railway station platform, in March 1942 Copyright © Jim Fryatt and Don Clark	Cadets and instructors of the ML-KNIL at Andir, Java Island

Dutch KNIL soldiers with their AA guns, Dutch East Indies 1941-1942	As soon as capitulation on Java became evident, destruction parties began their work. Here is a part of the naval yard in Soerabaja

In 1940, the so-called Stadswacht was erected to act against enemy paratroopers and “Vijdfe Colonne” (enemy spies) in areas unprotected by regular KNIL forces. These were normally old draftees and volunteers, including foreigners like British	Dutch soldiers of the 10th KNIL Battalion Palembang, February 14th, 1942

American bomber B-17 on fire after Japanese bombardment, Bandoeng airfield on Java, February 17th 1942	Japanese troops between Buitenzorg and Bandoeng, Java 1942

Japanese troops landing trucks at Kragan, Eastern Java 1942	Dutch Marines during an exercise, Java Island

HMS cruiser Exeter sinking in the Java Sea, March 1942	Japanese troops crossing a bridge during their advance towards Batavia, March 1942

Japanese bicycle troops entering in Batavia, March 8th 1942	Japanese troops entering Soerabaja, March 1942

Japanese tanks with infantry entering Batavia, March 1942	Japanese bicycle troops entering Batavia, March 1942

Recording of the signing of the capitulation agreement. On the left is Lt-General H. Ter Poorten. The man scratching his nose is Lt-Col P.G. Mantel Java, March 1942	After the signing of the capitulation. In the centre Lt-General Imamura, right Major-General Bakker and Lt-General Ter Poorten.

Japanese soldiers with a group of Dutch POWs, Java 1942	Japanese soldiers captured a group of Dutch soldiers, Java 1942

Allied POWs on their way to POW camps, Java Island 1942	1st Lieutenant J.G.M. Nass (Korps Mariniers) in conversation with an Indonesian native, Java Island, late 1941 Copyright © Mariniers Museum Rotterdam & Felix Bakker

 

March,6^th.1942

Batavia(Djakarta) Occupied by Dai Miltary Army

Japanese bicycle troops entering Batavia, March 1942

 

Enemy troops reached Surabaya

 on the March, 6^th.1942 ,

(hans semethini)

fighting their way into the suburbs in the Wonokromo district and advancing along the Surabaya River towards the Gunungsari golf course.

The Samethinis must have heard the artillery fire from American defensive positions, but this ceased on the 7th as Allied resistance crumbled.

 From the direction of the port and naval base came the sound of heavy explosions. Black smoke clouds billowed from burning oil stocks and war material, set ablaze to deny them to the invaders.

 

 

Japanese enter surabaya

 

From Sampit boats were sent to pick up C Company, while D Company was ordered to halt at Kotabesi. C and Staff Company marched from Sampit south but on March 7th 1942

they got word that the Japanese troops had landed 14 km south of them. A platoon of C Company was sent on a reconaissance mission but very soon they came under fire. As the British soldiers had very little ammunition, they broke off contact and returned back to Sampit.

On March,7^th.1942

Thhe Dai Nippon Miltary Order no 1 

Undang-undang balatentara Dai Nippon tentang Menjalankan Pemerintahan  di tetapkan di Djakarta (Alamsjah,1987)

On this day, the Dai Nippon army occupied Lembang and at this city there were a meeting between Dai Nippon army led by Shoji with the DEI army

 

 

 

at Isola Hotel(three photos)

The JDai Nippon ultimate Dutch east Indie Army, If they don’t surrender without condition ,in 24 housr, Bandung will attacked to dawn.

 

Cadets and instructors of the ML-KNIL at Andir, Java Island

At the same time, the last filght from Andir flight Field Buah Batu North Bandung city  to Australia by KNIL flight DC 3 Widevaal  DEI Governor General

 

 

Dr van Mook ,

Dr van der Plass  and commandant KNIL Maj.Gen.l.H.van Oyen.

the first Kalidjati Capitulations’s  meeting in 7^th at night night

 was also attended by

 

Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer

 the Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborg , the official starting date of March 4, 1942 no longer served as the highest pamnglima Armed Forces (also has awarded the Dutch East Indie  General governorship

 

 Dr. van Mook to

 and gave the position

 

 General Hein ter Poorten

the commander of the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger

at that meeting were considered by the Dutch as a mere military surrender,

It is increasingly becoming important due to  so many people think and believe that the events of the Dutch capitulation to the Japanese surrender were total military both civil and after March 8th, 1942 that is no longer the Government of the Netherlands East Indies and indeed  the fact like that

History thus shows that there is  Dutch East Indies government  in exile 

 

 March.7^th.1942

Capitulation Dai nippon at Kalidjati military airport, The Dutch Armed Forces surrender

(1) The House of capitulation’s Meeting now

 

 

 

(a) Interior still same meubeleur

 

(b)Exterior

 

(2)The Position of the capitulations meeting participant.

Painted by DR R.Hoesein,given to Dr Iwan.

 

Photographs from different angles on the Dutch capitulation to the Japanese in the House Kalidjati dated March 8, 1942 at 15,99-16.00 this picture without the governor present Tjarda9Tjarda General dated March 7, 1942 evening, no pictures, no paintings of the Japanese officer who looks light light-DrIwan notes)

A. Army Gen. Dai Nippon Edo
B. Jenderasl Immamura

C. Chief of staff Seikagura Okazari
D. Translator one
E. Translator  two
F. Army Chief of Staff of the Netherlands bekkers

G. Gen. H.T er Poorten
H. Colonel P.C.Manel
X Japan’s officers

 

 

 

 

1. Army Gen. Dai Nippon Edo
   B. Jenderasl Immamura

C. Chief of staff Seikagura Okazari
D. Translator one
E. Translator  two

X Japan’s officers

 

Original info

Foto dari sudut yang berbeda tentang kapitulasi Belanda kepada jepang  di Gedung Kalidjati  tanggal 8 Maret 1942 jam 15,99-16.00 gambar ini tanpa gubernur Jendral Tjarda9Tjarda hadir tanggal 7 Maret 1942 malam,tak ada foto,yang ada lukisan dari opsir Jepang yang kelihatan lampu yang menyala-DrIwan notes)

1. B.  Jenderal Edo Angkatan darat Dai Nippon
2. C.  Jenderasl Immamura
3. D.   Kepala staf  Seikagura Okazari
4. E.  Penterjemah satu
5. F.   Pertejemah dua
6. G.  Kepala Staf Tentara Belanda bekkers
7. H.  Jenderal H.Ter Poorten
8. I.     Colonel P.C.Manel

X Perwira-perwira Jepang

(c)The Original Photos

Let General Hitoshi Immamura the command of Dai nippon Army

 

 

had the cpitulation Meeting at kalidjati army port March 7th at night ,Immamura didnot want to meet with the ex DEI Govenorgeneral Tjarda

 

But the meeting was cancancelled because Gen. Yamashita did not want to tolk with ex Governor General who did not have the Military  power anymore. Let Gen Ter Poorten surrender without notice to Dai Nippon Army at Kalijati in first meeting 7^th 1942 and they went back and Let Gen Immamura asked Ter Poorten to announce about surrender in the morning 8^th 1942 and will back at 10.00 am to Kalidjati with bring the list of DEI army power.

On the March, 8^th 1942

(hans semethini),

 at 9:00 a.m.,

 General Ter Poorten, commander-in-chief of Dutch forces, surrendered all of Java to the Japanese.

(correction this info not true,please more info below-Driwan note)

At 11:00 p.m.,

(this was in surabaya and  in bandung 6.30 am Driwan note )

 NIROM, the radio network of the Netherlands East Indies, concluded its final broadcast:

“We are closing now. Farewell until better times. Long live the Queen!”

The night deepened and Surabaya passed into a shadow that was to prevail, even under the brightest noonday sun, for the next three and a half years.

 

Oil stocks torched by retreating Dutch forces in Surabaya
Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign

Read the study about this situation by DR Ong Hok Ham below.

DEI Army surrender which announced at the newpaper morning

 

March,8th,1942

 

AT 09:00 ON 8 MAR,

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Allied forces,

 

Ter Poorten, announced the surrender of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in Java. In news paper and radio.

and

the second meeting at Kalidjati 10,00 am

 with bring the list of DEI army powers. Immamura write in his memoir that they have sign the capitulation acta which never seen anymore (lost),

and at March 8^th 1941 at 13.00 am at Kalidjati airfield there was the second meeting t only with the command od DEI Army General Ter Porten and Kastaf Col Bakkers

 

 

after meeting they made a photo in the front of the meeting house which still exist now with the same meubelueur. look the photos below.

(c1) Interior

 

 

 

Recording of the signing of the capitulation agreement. On the left is Lt-General H. Ter Poorten. The man scratching his nose is Lt-Col P.G. Mantel Java, March 1942

 

 

 

Situation now

 

 

 

 

 

(c2) exterior

 

 

After the signing of the capitulation. In the centre Lt-General Imamura, right Major-General Bakker and Lt-General Ter Poorten.

 

very difficult to find the original clear photos of the kalidjati capitulation meeting, all the pictures were taken by Dr Huesein at the location now which given to me not so clear, who have the original clear photos please show us. I just found more clear picture above

 

situation now

 

 

 

Read more about Kalidjati Capitulation

(DR,Dr  Roesdy Hoesein, and DR Ong Hok Ham,thesis,)

8 March 1942 is the day of the Dutch East Indies government nai gray because it was the day the determination of the fate of who will rule later in Indonesia.
Housed in a non-commissioned at one home environment Kalidjati airfield (near the West Java Earring) has held a historic meeting between the Netherlands and Japan where it was agreed that the Dutch royal army led by Lieutenant General Hein ter Poorten Surrender unconditionally to the Dai Nippon army 16^th  under the leadership

 

 

 Let. Gen. Hitoshi Immamura.

March 8 meeting

(corrections the first meeting in 7^th night-Dr iwan notes)

 was also attended by

 

Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer

 the Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborg , the official starting date of March 4, 1942 no longer served as the highest pamnglima Armed Forces (also has awarded the Dutch East Indie  General governorship

 

 Dr. van Mook to-note Dr. Iwan)

 and gave the position

 

 General Hein ter Poorten

the commander of the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger

at that meeting were considered by the Dutch as a mere military surrender,

It is increasingly becoming important menginggat so many people think and believe that the events of the Dutch capitulation to the Japanese surrender adlah total meliter both civil and after March 6, 1942 that is no longer the Government of the Netherlands East Indies and indeed  the fact like that

History thus shows that there is  Dutch East Indies government  in exile  .

 (Dr Iwan has a collection of letters, documents KNIL troops from Java flee  to Australia through the following Hollandia, now Jayapura in Papua west to Brisbane Australia and settled in camp Casino, is one the evidence of the Dutch East Indies government in exile and also the commander of the KNIL also be in Australia when the military hand over power, notes Dr. Iwan)

How to actually sit up the issue of events, many experts who studied up to now but still can not answer completely, the problem is the lack of documents about the events ini.Berbeda owned by British capitulation to the Japanese in Singapore, where there are documents and photographs complete.

Events do not get caught missing Kalijati rimbanya documents and photographs of these events is very little left.

Many authors have revealed this incident from both the Dutch and the Japanese. For example, General Immamura never written much in the memory of this event. Of the Netherlands has recently written a book called “tot Vaarwel Tijden Battery” by JE Bijkerk, then the book “Indie Onder Japanasche” by WHdEllias Indonesia as well as from the DR Ong Hok Ham write a dissertation for the degree requirements of the 1968 literature, ie a book titled “The collapse of the Dutch East Indies”

However the summary it remains to clarify whether the event was just a military penuerahan or delivery of the Dutch East Indies government both de facto and de Jure.

This becomes important because one of the reasons why the Dutch are still felt to stay in power and returned by the Allies to re-colonize Indonesia.
From the writings of the chroniclers as an example of such can be described as follows:
Dr Ong Hok Ham Thesi
Page 264

 

Capitulasi meeting room now still same

General Imamura

 

Commander (Immamura) addressed: “What Toean surrender unconditionally”

Governor-General mengelengkan head to answer: “No.”

Immamura: “If the Lord does not speak as the Supreme Commander of the master dating why here”

(Since negotiations stalled Immamura considered leaving the Netherlands for 10 minutes)

 

(page 266)
After 10 minutes of finished Immamura told the governor General (EX) Tjarda: “I do not want to talk about civil government, the host did not seem to have the ultimate power to answer (my claims), I now forbid the master speak a word of the moment and I just speaking to  the Commander of the army “

When Immamura repeated his demand once again,

 

Ter Poorten

 accept to give up on behalf of all the Dutch East Indies.

Governor-General (ex) and then said: “Because of this decision (which is the submission Army), not including my power, then I will leave the room and go” and he stood

SOURCE
J.E. Bijkers
(The bridge has been translated by the publishers see page 316)

Ten minutes had passed, when Immamura with his entourage had to go back once more spatial GB (Governor General) tries to give the city of Bandung, but now looks at all the Japanese generals had lost his temper, although he remains respectful: ‘It seems the better I do not spoke again with diplomats and legal experts, but the next will deal with the military masters “.
(This is the fault of General Immamura, he just wanted to talk and seek military matters and submission of the Armed Forces. So he has achieved what he wanted. Immamura sejogyanya must survive on the surrender of the Indian total belanda.Jadi including “Country”, yet perhaps the time he did not realize, this is not de facto mean a lot, but in so doing the Governor General has received what the government desired in London / Prime Minister Gerbrandy)

 
Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy
(Ex governor general) Tjada van Stockenborogh feel so yugasmya has ended. She calmly said: “Because here will be dealt with purely military matters, I want to leave this chair. But if you still want to talk about the interests of Mr. People, I am willing for it “

Told later that, in principle, Ter Poorten took delivery of the Dutch East Indies Army unconditionally to Japan and will be broadcast via Nirom (Nederlansch Omroep Maatschapij Indie Radio) Radio Dutch East Indies on the news about the date of delivery of the next day 9 (correction dated 8) in March 1942. And then at 13:30 Ter Poorten have to come back to bring dafter Kalidjati Dutch East Indies Army forces, after which he signed a statement.

The next day’s broadcast at 6:30 Nirom what prompted the Japanese and at (h) one afternoon Ter Poorten and his staff were in Kalidjati back.

 
Recording of the signing of the capitulation agreement.
On the left is Lt-General H. Ter Poorten.
The man scratching his nose is Lt-Col P.G. Mantle
Java, March 8th 1942

In his memoirs General Immamura states that both parties signed the surrender documents are composed of two g-one in Japanese and Dutch about 13:20 hours time Java, from the Dutch Present-General and Chief of Staff H.Ter Poorten Maj.Jen. Bakkers, Let.Kol. Mantle and Captain JDThijn as an interpreter. Still not clear whether the date of 9 (correction  8) in March 1942 in Kalidjati dditanda indeed have such a protocol signed surrender of the Dutch to the Japanese?

 

A source of scientific history in the Netherlands believe that it never happened. Immamura own generals later (later) insisted that the document existed. Maybe when the recapitulation of Japan to the Netherlands in 1946, many documents were destroyed and burned so that the Japanese side can not prove it now.
(See photo outside the building after  th the signing of the capitulation agreement  from the Netherlands to Japan during the day, Dr Iwan Notes)

After the signing of the capitulation.
In the center Lt-General Imamura,
Major-General right Bakker and Lt-General Ter Poorten.

 

The historic building (in Kalidjati) still stand tall, well groomed with a neat (and tidy). This building was once used but now the Air Force Air Force and local government initiatives (local government) as a museum of local dimnfaatkan Dutch capitulation to the Japanese.

According to the Base Commander (Air) Mat. Let.Kol aviator Sadjad Hasan, now has many visitors who come there especially foreigners, especially the Japanese Veteran Kalidjati every year each perinagtan Kai Japanese invasion of Java ang bring their children and grandchildren. Merka will reminisce and tell to the generation of the event below. It seems that the Netherlands is less use of it.

There is a local government’s plans for more mengalang Local tourism potential of this sort of warning about the Second World War as Santosa Island of Singapore (English to Japanese capitulation of Bataan and Corregidor or in the Philippines)

 

 

 

Dr. Iwan’s Note
In the Books “Bandoeng”, I read that the incident was on March 7, 1942 night, Immamura ban photo taken, fortunately there is a painting made by a Japanese officer where the evening meeting looks a lamp lighting

Thank You Dr Roesjdi Hasan for your amazing Info of Kalidjati Capitu;lation and I hope the more info will informed you,also for another collectors and scholar historian please comment and send more info

Original info

8 maret 1942

adalah  hari kelabu bagi pemerintah Hindia belanda karena hari itu adalah hari penentuan tentang nasib siapa yang akan berkuasa kemudian di Indonesia.

Bertempat disebuah rumah bintara dalam lingkungan lapangan terbang Kalidjati(dekat subang Jawa barat)  telah diadakan pertemuan bersejarah antara pihak Belanda dan Jepang dimana telah disepakati bahwa tentara kerajaan belanda yang dipimpin oleh Letnan Jendral Hein ter Poorten Menyerah tanpa syarat kepada Balatentara dai Nippon ke 16 dibawah pimpinan Letenan Jenderal Hitoshi Immamura.

 

Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer

Pertemuan tanggal 8 Maret ini juga dihadiri oleh gubernur Jenderal Tjarda van starkenborgh yang resminya terhitung tanggal 4 Maret 1942 tidak lagi menjabat sebagai pamnglima tertinggi Angkatan Perang(juga telah menyerahkan jabatan gubernur Jenderal Hindia bdelanda kepada Dr van Mook-catatan dr Iwan)  dan telah menyerahkan jabatan tersebut pada Jendral ter Poorten  sehingga pertemuan ini dianggap oleh pihak belanda sebagai penyerahan militer semata,

Hal ini semakin menjadi begitu penting menginggat banyak orang menganggap  dan meyakini bahwa peristiwa kapitulasi belanda kepada jepang adlah penyerahan total baik meliter maupun sipil artinya setelah 6 Maret 1942 tidak ada lagi Pemerintah Hindia Belanda (di Indonesia yang ada pemerintahan pengasingan di australia)dan memang  kenyataannya.demikian.

Sejarah kemudian menunjukkan yang ada adalah Pemerintihan hindia belanda dalam pengansinga dibawan gubernur General Dr van Mook di Australia.(Dr Iwan memiliki koleksi dokumen surat jalan tentara KNIL menuju Brisbane Australia liwat Hollandia,sekarang Jayapura Papua barat menuju Australia dan bermukim di camp Casino, ini salah satu bukti adanya pemerintahan Hindia belanda dalam pengasingan dan juga komandan KNIl juga berada di Australia saat penyerah kekuasaan militer ini-catatan Dr Iwan)

Bagaimana sebenarnya duduk pesoalan kejadian, banyak ahli yang meneliti sampai sekarang namun tetap tidak dapat menjawab  dengan tuntas, masalahnya adalah kurangnya dokumen-dokumen dimiliki tentang peristiwa ini.Berbeda dengan kapitulasi Inggris kepada jepang di singapura ,dimana ada dokumen dan foto-foto lengkap .

Peristiwa kalijati dokumennya hilang tidak ketahuan rimbanya dan foto-foto peristiwa tersebut sangat sedikit yang tersisa.

Banyak penulis telah membeberkan peristiwa ini baik dari pihak Belanda maupun pihak Jepang. Misalnya Jenderal Immamura pernah menulis memorinya  dan banyak menyebut peristiwa ini . Dari pihak Belanda  baru-baru ini ditulis sebuah buku berjudul “Vaarwel tot Batere Tijden” oleh J.E. Bijkerk , kemudian buku “Indie Onder Japanasche” oleh W.H.d.Ellias demikian juga dari pihak Indonesia DR Ong Hok Ham menulis sebagai disertasinya untuk persyaratan gelar sarjana sastra tahun 1968, Yaitu buku berjudul “Runtuhnya Hindia Belanda”

Namum semuanya tetap sumir untuk menjelaskan apakah  peristiwa itu hanya sekedar penuerahan militer  atau penyerahan Pemerintah hindia Belanda baik de fakto dan de Jure.

Hal ini menjadi menjadi penting karena menjadi salah satu alas an kenapa pihak Belanda masih merasa tetap berkuasa dan kembali dengan pihak sekutu untuk menjajah kembali Indonesia.

Dari tulisan para penulis  sejarah sebagai contoh misalnya dapat diuraikan sebagai berikut :

Thesi DR Ong Hok Ham

Halaman 264

General Imamura

Panglima(Immamura) menyapa:”Apa toean menyerah tanpa syarat”

Gubernur Jenderal mengelengkan kepala untuk menjawab:”Tidak”

Immamura:”Jika Tuan tidak bicara selaku Panglima tertinggi mengapa tuan datang kesini”

(Karena perundingan dianggap macet Immamura meninggalkan pihak Belanda selama 10 menit)

(halaman 266)

Setelah 10 menit selesai Immamura mengatakan kepada gubernur Jendral(EX) Tjarda :” Saya tidak mau berbicara tentang pemerintahan sipil ,tuan rupanya tidak memiliki kekuasaan tertinggi untuk menjawab(tuntutan saya), Saya sekarang melarang tuan berbicara satu katapun dari saat ini dan saya hanya berbicara dengan Panglima tentara”

Ketika Immamura mengulangi tuntutannya sekali lagi, Ter Poorten menerima untuk menyerah atas nama seluruh Hindia Belanda.

Gubernur Jenderal(ex)  lalu mengatakan :” Karena pengambilan keputusan demikian(yang dimaksud penyerahan Tentara), tidak termasuk kekuasaan saya,maka saya akan meninggalkan ruangan dan pergi” lalu ia berdiri

SUMBER

J.E. Bijkers

(sudah diterjemahkan oleh penerbit Jembatan lihat halaman 316)

Sepuluh menit baru saja berlalu ,ketika Immamura dengan para pengiringnya telah masuk lagi keruangan  sekali lagi GB(Gubernur General)  mencoba untuk menyerahkan kota Bandung , tetapi sekarang tampak sekali jendral Jepang  itu telah kehilangan kesabarannya, walaupun ia tetap hormat:’ Tampaknya lebih baik saya tidak  berbicara  lagi dengan diplomat dan ahli hokum, tetapi selanjutnya akan berhubungan dengan pihak militer tuan-tuan”.

(ini merupakan kesalahan  dari Jenderal Immamura , dia hanya mau berbicara  dan mengusahakan soal –soal militer  dan penyerahan Angkatan Perang. Jadi dia telah mencapai apa yang diinginkannya . Immamura sejogyanya harus bertahan pada penyerahan total Hindia belanda.Jadi termasuk”Negeri” , namum mungkin pada saat itu dia tidak menyadari , Defacto hal ini tidak berarti banyak,tetapi dengan demikian Gubernur General telah mendapatkan apa yang dikehendaki pemerintah di London/Perdana Menteri Gerbrandy)

 

Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy

(Ex Gubernur general)Tjada van Stockenborogh  merasa dengan demikian yugasmya telah berakhir .Dengan tenang ia berkata:” Karena disini akan ditangani soal-soal militer murni , saya ingin meninggalkan  Kursi ini,. Namun jika Tuan masih ingin membicarakan kepentingan Penduduk , saya bersedia untuk itu”

 

Diceritakan kemudian  bahwa pada prinsipnya  Ter Poorten menerima penyerahan Tentara Hindia belanda tanpa syarat  kepada Jepang  dan akan menyiarkannya melalui NIROM(  Nederlansch Indie Radio Omroep Maatschapij) Radio hindia belanda tentang  berita tentang Penyerahan tersebut besok hari tanggal 9 (koreksi tanggal 8)  Maret 1942. Dan selanjutnya  pada pukul 13.30  Ter Poorten harus datang kembali  ke Kalidjati membawa dafter kekuatan Tentara Hindia Belanda , setelah itu ia menanda tangani  suatu keterangan.

 

Esok harinya  NIROM jam 6.30  memang menyiarkan  apa yang diminta  pihak Jepang dan pukul(jam) satu  siang Ter Poorten  beserta staf  sudah berada di Kalidjati kembali.

 

Recording of the signing of the capitulation agreement.
On the left is Lt-General H. Ter Poorten.
The man scratching his nose is Lt-Col P.G. Mantel
Java, March 8^th  1942

 

Dalam memoirnya Jenderal Immamura menyatakan bahwa kedua pihak menanda tangani dua dokumen  penyerahan yang disusun g-masing  dalam bahasa Jepang dan Belanda kurang lebih jam 13.20  waktu Jawa, Dari pihak Belanda Hadir  Jenderal H.Ter Poorten dan  Kepala Staf Maj.Jen. Bakkers, Let.Kol. Mantle  dan Kapten  J.D.Thijn  selaku penterjemah . Masih tidak  dapat dipastikan  apakah tanggal 9 (koresksi 8)  Maret 1942  di Kalidjati memang  benar telah dditanda tangani semacam protocol  penyerahan dari  Belanda kepada jepang ?

Suatu  sumber sejarah Ilmiah  di Negeri Belanda  yakin bahwa hal itu tidak pernah terjadi . Jenderal Immamura sendiri  belakangan (kemudian) bersikeras bahwa  dokumen itu pernah ada . Mungkin ketika  rekapitulasi Jepang  kepada belanda  pada tahun 1946  banyak dokumen  yang dihancurkan  dan dibakar  sehingga pihak  Jepang tidak  dapat membuktikannya sekarang.

( Lihat foto di luar gedung setelah enanda tanganan kalitulasi dari Belanda kepada jepang disiang hari-Dr Iwan Notes)

After the signing of the capitulation. In the centre Lt-General Imamura, right Major-General Bakker and Lt-General Ter Poorten.

 

Gedung bersejarah tersebut( di Kalidjati) masih berdiri tegak, terawat  dengan apik(baik dan rapi) . Gedung ini pernah dipakai  AURI  tetapi sekarang atas prakarsa AURI dan PEMDA(pemerintah daerah)  setempat dimnfaatkan sebagai museum kapitulasi belanda kepada Jepang.

 

 

 

Menurut komandan Pangkalan (Udara) Kalijati .Let.Kol penerbang Hasan Sadjad, sekarang sudah banyak pengunjung  yang dating kesana terutama orang asing , pihak Veteran Jepang  terutama Kalidjati Kai setiap tahun  tiap perinagtan invasi Jepang  ke Jawa ang membawa anak  dan cucu mereka . Merka akan bernostalgia  dan bercerita  pada generasi dibawahnya  tentang peristiwa tersebut .Nampaknya pihak Belanda kurang memanfaatkannya.

Ada rencana  pihak Pemerintah daerah Setempat  untuk lebih  mengalang potensi turisme ini kurang lebih  semacam tempat peringatan Perang dunia Kedua seperti dipulau santosa Singapore (kapitulasi Inggris  kepada jepang atau Bataan  dan Corregidor di Filipina)

 

Catatan dr Iwan

Dari Buku Bandung, saya membaca bahwa kejadian ini pada tanggal 7 Maret 1942 malam hari,Immamura melarang diambil photo, untung ada sebuah lukisan yang dibuat oleh opsir Jepang dimana rapat malam hari terlihat adanya penerangan  lampu

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dai Nippon Bicycle army troops  entering Batavia(now Jakarta)

Japanese bicycle troops entering Batavia, Java Island, Dutch East Indies, March 8th 1942

Japanese bicycle troops entering Batavia, March.8th, 1942

Bandung and Surabaya and all Java occupied by Dai Nippon army

 

(3).March,9^th.1942

After capitulation Kalijati, General h.Ter Porten became POW

Look his Identity Card below

 

The 9th of March,

when we were in the recreation-room from our boarding-school while all the girls were looking through the windows into the streets,

the Japanese entered Malang.

Henny and I stood there together.

They came on bicycles or were just walking. They looked terrible, all with some cloth attached at the back of their caps, they looked very strange to us. This was a type of Japanese we had never seen before. Much later I learnt that many Koreans also served as shock-troops in the Japanese Army.

The nuns went to the chapel to pray for all those living in the Dutch East Indies.  But the Dutch East Indies is lost forever.

Dutch a forbidden language

My father found it too dangerous for my mother and youngest sister Jansje to stay with him at Sumber Sewu, because there were still small groups of Australian, English and Dutch military fighting in the mountains in East Java against the Japanese troops, notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch East Indies government and Army had surrendered.

My mother and Jansje came to stay at our boarding school [at Malang], where there were small guest rooms. We all stayed inside the building, only the Indonesians working for the nuns went outside to do the shopping.

A few days later we received the order that all Dutch schools had to be closed down, so several parents came to take their daughters. The school looked empty and abandoned. We all felt very sad, our happy schooldays were over.

Dutch became a strictly forbidden language. Luckily we had a huge library at school so I had lots of books to read in those days.

A few weeks later my father phoned my mother and said that the four of us should return to Sumber Sewu as he had heard that Malang was no longer a safe place for us to stay.

I was really very happy to be back home. Rasmina, our cook, and Pa Min, our gardener, were happy to have my mother back again. There was absolutely nothing to fear on the plantation, the “Indonesians” (actually Javanese and Madurese) on the plantation were nice as ever and we didn’t see any Japanese soldiers around.

Indeed we were safer at Sumber Sewu. Life began to feel like a vacation,

I started walking with my father again and visited the local kampung (village) and since we had no more newspapers to read, I started reading several of my parent’s books.

We received a Japanese flag, together with the order that the flag had to be respected and had to hang in the garden in front of our house.

My father no longer received his salary, just like all the other Dutch, British, Americans and Australians, living in Indonesia. All our bank accounts were blocked; no one was even allowed to touch their own money.

We still had rabbits and eggs to eat, and several vegetables my mother and Pa Min had planted long before the war in the kitchen garden, and we had many fruit trees.

The thought that we might have to leave Sumber Sewu made me feel very sad. To me this plantation was a real paradise on earth, with its pond in front of the house with the two proud banyan trees, the lovely garden my mother and Pa Min had made, the kitchen where Rasmina made so many delicious meals. The sounds early in the morning, and the sounds in the evening were also very special, I can still remember them so well.

Of course we hoped that this Japanese occupation would soon be over. My father had broken the seal of the radio, hoping that he could get some more news from outside Java.

 

My mother and her three daughters.

The 8th of March 1942, the Dutch Army on Java surrendered to the Japanese Army

(info from Elizabeth Van Kampen)

Destination Railroad

 

Photo Source: The Dutch East Indies Campaign 1941-1942

Shortly afterwards the downtrodden, defeated and humiliated remnants of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and Allied Forces are bundled off to Batavia, for all we know to work in a large camp. A hastily scribbled note to Lisa, telling her of our moving and not to worry, is taken by a friendly Indonesian, bless him, who promises to deliver it. How am I to know that shortly after our departure, Lisa too will put put into a concentration camp with our little baby Mary-Em!

After arrival at Batavia, our heads are shaved and a number pinned on our uniforms. Sonei, the Jap commander, is confronted with a man who has refused to be shaved. Calmly he takes this man by the hand and leads him to a chair under a glaring electric globe. Guards pin the arms down. Then Sonei himself winds some hair locks round and between the scissor blades, their points resting on the scalp, and forcibly jerks them up. A scream of pain from the wriggling victim, a bloody patch where a bunch of hair is torn out by the roots. The operation is repeated until the head turns into a red pulp and the unconscious man is carried away. Naturally we all have to witness it. A creature like Sonei must have an audience watching, as a final touch to heighten the pleasure of inflicting pain. The most horrifying part of the ghastly performance is that Sonei’s face had not for a moment lost its expression of loving care while manipulating the instrument. How sweet it would be to slowly kill this gentleman, with similar meticulous care. But would we? Would we lower ourselves to his level?

 

Capt. Kenichi Sonei (postwar photo)

Photo Source: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

After everyone is shaven we fall in for roll-call. It is then that we finally hear what our lot is to be: transport to Singapore, then to Thailand to work on the construction of a railroad from Bangkok right through the jungle of Thailand to Moulmein in Burma. As work-slaves no doubt. The fall down the hill has truly begun.

We may have lost our hair, dignity, self-respect, but there is one thing we stubbornly hang on to – a firm belief in the ultimate superiority of the Allied Forces. They will win in the end, come what may. The Jap knows, feels this, and how he hates it. How he loathes this undefeatable belief which he reads in our eyes looking down on him. Most of us are taller than him, whatever his rank in the Imperial Army. Standing upright, we have to lower our eyes to look at the enemy when addressed by him. It stirs up an inferiority complex than can manifest itself only in a frenzy of kicking and punching. But all the time those eyes keep looking down on him, until they become glazed with pain and the victim of the day is brought down. To break that hated spirit, shatter that incredible, white man’s morale, is their daily aim. Very little is left untried by the cowards to achieve that end. Yes, cowards, no matter what has been said about the high fighting morale of the Japanese forces. Anyone among them who is capable of doing this to defenseless people is of the same base quality of which cowards are made. False rumours about landings or victorious operations by the Americans are spread among our men by the Japs themselves, by dropping a hint or casual remark. The object, of course, is to stimulate optimism, only to cut it down again by contrary evidence. A system adopted from the German Gestapo to drive us to frustration.

 

Image Source: eenlevenverloren.nl

There is the black day when two escapees, mere boys, are captured and brought before the closed ranks to die. Tied up to the barbed wire fence, they are blindfolded and then butchered with bayonets. Their pitiful groans are blotted out by the hoarse shrieks from the thrusting, lunging robots who do their work according to some weird ritual: two thrusts in the throat, two in the belly and finally two in the heart. At another time a captured soldier is tied to a post, condemned to perish at the hand of a one-man firing squad. The bespectacled Nip is unable to do his job properly whilst the doomed man possesses a horrifyingly strong constitution. Time after time the shots ring out, sending wood splinters flying through the air from the post he is strapped to. All the time the victim remains standing on his feet, crying for water, until suddenly his legs fold and he sags forward in the ropes, into merciful death.

Two days later, in the middle of the night, there is the sound of a rifle being fired. A shouting of men, lights are switched on and doors flung open. From the barbed wire fence between two sheds hangs a prisoner, dead, shot between the eyes. Nearby stands a Nip guard, rifle in the crook of his arm. He explains that he found the prisoner trying to escape over the wire, ignoring an order to stand back. We do not believe that. We think that the man, on his way to the latrines, had been forced at gunpoint to step close to the fence on the pretext of something or other, and then shot in cold blood. But who is to know? Even Sonei seems to have doubts, for he orders the guard to disarm himself and step into the office. Sonei closes the door with one hand, unbuckling his belt with the other. The sound of leather on skin and the moans are music to our ears. Sonei seems a man of principles. One may torture or kill a prisoner of war for a little or big thing he is guilty of, but first there must be legal proof of his “crime.”

 

The C.I.C.
Photo of Lt. General Hein ter Poorten in Japanese captivity
Image Source: Tropenmuseum Collection, via Wikipedia

On the day of departure to Singapore our former Governor-General and also our Chief-in-Command of the Dutch Forces, both with heads shaven, are placed on top of our gear piled in the lorry. The message of this reads, that’s all they are good for, only to look after the rank-and-files’ baggage. But we know that these top-ranking men had been offered a place in the last airplane to Australia, and that both had declined. That is good enough for us to regard them still as G.G. and C.I.C. [1]

 

Image Source: Geheugen van Nederland / The Museon

Like cattle for the meat market, we are loaded into the ‘ tween decks and the lower holds of a former Dutch freighter moored alongside the customs wharf of Batavia’s harbour. Packed like peas in a pod, with hardly room to turn around. The odour of sweating bodies is sickening. Fortunately when we are out on the open sea a number of our men are sent to the upper deck, bringing some relief to the others down below. The situation worsens when the vessel starts to roll and many become seasick, splattering vomit on their fellow prisoners.

Then, look, a man gets out an old, battered accordion and begins to play. Holy cow, can he play! Many turn to look at him and listen to evergreen tunes and airs known all over the world. First a few start to sing, faltering at the beginning. But then they catch on and others join in. The voices take on the beat of the accordion, feeling one another out. More follow, and more, into a massive choir of prisoners singing with heart and soul. Angry orders are yelled down from the bridge but for once they are ignored. To the men this is the one way to fight the fear of the unknown future, to hit back at the enemy. Hundreds of voices sing in praise of the green hills of England and Ireland, the white beaches of Australia, the fair dunes of Holland and the bonnie lads of Scotland. And this choir, this multiplied scream of hope and longing, this prayer rises from the bottom of the cattle ship, soaring upwards, high above the upper deck where bullet-heads gaze down in amazement. Rising higher yet, above the masts and gliding seagulls and the drifting clouds, into the blue sky. Is there Someone to hear us?

After two days we disembark at Singapore and are taken to the A.I.F. and Changi camps. Our group is assigned to the A.I.F. sector, mainly populated by Australian prisoners of war, in whose hands the entire management rests. The only time a Nip is seen is on a work detail outside the camp’s perimeter. Food, of course, is scarce but at least orders in hated Japanese are not being screamed at us. Instead there is the calm, friendly Australian tongue telling us the rules and do-nots of the camp. One may even ask questions. There is also a clean place to eat and sleep. There are benches under palm trees on the lawn where one may watch a game of cricket. A man strolls up to me, offering his hand to shake, a man wiry and deeply tanned, in his middle thirties with firm features and blue eyes. Jack, of the Australian Engineers Corps, welcomes me into the workshop to become a carpenter’s hand. No experience in the trade is required. Cutting axe-handles is all there is to be done. On the first day I am observed and assessed. The verdict seems favourable and, in typical Australian manner, I am taken into their midst with good humoured profanity. One of Jack’s mates is a short man with big hands, hands enormously strong, they say. In the months that follow Jack becomes a close friend. Evenings after supper we play cards in the workshop compound or listen to stories, tall and short, about the Outback, the fishing, the drinking and of course the horse races. It’s good to be with them, hearing them talk of their great love, Australia.

Christmas Eve, 1942. The garrison church, a weather-beaten shed with holes in the roof, is packed. The small, well-kept lawn in front is crowded with listeners. Visible through the open windows is the tree, adorned with tin stars and a few candles. “Silent Night, Holy Night” brings a knife through my heart. I want to run away from it all.

The name “Lisa” tattooed on my right arm brings me fully awake early on Christmas morning. What happened? I remember that we had a little celebration with my Aussie mates in the workshop after church, that each of us got a pint of fair dinkum Amontilado sherry, well matured all these months hidden in the soil under the flooring. I must have got drunk. Jack confirms it, adding that they felt that each of the guests should have a little memento of the gathering. Anyway I didn’t seem to have objections; I had already passed out when they started on me.

My brother Han is reported seen in the hospital area of Changi. On my way there, good care is taken to salute the Sikh guards in the correct manner. Calling themselves “Free Indians,” they have gone over to the enemy. A mean lot they are, worse than the Japs when it comes to finding an excuse for bashing us up. A chapel stands further down the road, its door open. Inside, an Aussie on a step ladder repairing the stained-glass window says “Howdy” without looking up from his work. On an impulse, I take a seat before the small altar and bow my head. But words will not come. Do I still believe? Then it all wells up, gushing forth into violent prayer. A moment later I am outside again, feeling much relieved. Han is not in the hospital and, thanks to the Lord, not in the ever growing plot of mounds of freshly dug soil. Back in my camp Han runs to meet me at the gate, and all is well.

 

“The wizard on the accordion”
Han Samethini (circa 1941)

Photo Source: Han Samethini Collection

Han, the wizard on the accordion as he is known, is craving to try his hand again on the keyboard of a piano. He hasn’t touched one in donkey years. We find the officer in charge of entertainment, sporting a fierce martial moustache, supervising a Shakespeare play performed in the open air theatre. First he attempts to ignore us, but we plant ourselves right in front of him.

“Yes?” with contempt in his eyes for the two foreigners who dare to interrupt his listening. We tell him.

“Yes, of course that’s a piano there on the stage – but not for amateurs, thank you. However, there’s another one in the church which could be made available at some time or other. But mind, none of this swing music. We do not permit jazz in church.”

The chappie is pathetic. Not wishing to waste another word on the empire builder, we return to our section, which happens to border on the entertainment grounds. Han takes the old “squeeze box” from the hook, accepting a tailor-made cigarette from one of the boys who anticipates what is coming. Bonnie Banks of Loch Lomond is followed by When Irish Eyes Are Smiling and Beautiful Dreamer. When he gets to Tipperary, everyone in the open air theatre has walked out on the Bard to join us in the great sing-song, led by the amateur.

A few days later Han is gone again, up north. Then, at bed time, the news is circulated about an American landing on Java, with not only the exact date also the details of the number of warships and aircraft. Could this be the real thing? The boys of the work shop have access to certain channels. A clandestine radio has been mentioned in a very roundabout way by Jack himself. Let’s check with him. It is pitch dark now, but I know the way blindfolded.

First, down the steps leading to the rear of the barracks. Here is the foot path to the latrines – yes, here they are, no need to see, they smell fitfully. And here now are the clotheslines. Careful, don’t bump your head on the posts (ouch! – here’s one). A few more strides, now turn sharply to the right to get by the garbage incinerators (a feeble glow of burning cinders, that’s it). Circle and up the hill path screened by a bamboo hedge. Yes, that’s the foliage, more darkly outlined in the night. From the summit of the hillock the silhouette of the workshop is easily made out in the distance against the brighter night sky. Going down, one is quickly absorbed in the blanket of darkness. Here is the foot of the hill. Now across the “little meadow”, as it’s called by the boys, where bullfrogs have their domain. Quickly sliding down, I step carefully through wet grass – goodness, what a racket the frogs are making tonight. Another hundred yards or so and the plank over the ditch should be reached, right in front of the workshop. Good grief, the grass in the darkness is so slippery….Blast it! A soft, clammy thing moves under my foot sole – damn frogs. My breathing goes too fast. Calm down. Wait, that plank must be here, or here. Let me feel with my foot. The ditch is pretty deep, Jack had said. Nothing. Must have gone in the wrong direction. Damn it, how to get back in such darkness?

A hand is pressed with great force on my mouth, the other pinning my arms down. My heart skips a beat or two before enough senses are recovered to throw my body weight over on one leg, kicking high with the other, backwards and upwards. A whispered four-letter word, and the hand is taken away from my hurting lips. Quickly I call his name, recognizing the big, strong hands. There is a pause. Then, bringing his mouth to my ear, he whispers, “Get the hell out of here. Go back to the Dutch sector as fast and as quiet as possible. Forget what happened tonight. Piss off, but for cripesake, don’t let anyone see you!” Without a sound he is swallowed up in the night. The frogs are clanging like gongs.

It is late when finally, after sneaking back to my sector, I slip under the blanket. For Pete’s sake, what has happened?

The following morning the Dutch section is put into trucks and we are on our way to Singapore. Passing Changi gaol, we notice numerous handkerchiefs waving through the barred window slots. They are white women and children. Women whose lot will be more hazardous because of their sex, but who still can find the time to bid us farewell and good luck.

After several hours waiting at the railway station in Singapore we are loaded, no, pressed, with force and rifle butt into a steel cargo van. So many that I feel every bone and knuckle of bodies pressed hard on my chest, face and back. Unbelief and then fear is taking possession of my mind. In a matter of seconds I am boxed in a great mass of damp, hot flesh. Perspiration bursting from all my pores trickles down my back and stomach in long rivulets. Beneath my feet the wheels start to roll: ding-dong, ding-dong, then faster, ding-dang, ding-dang, ding-dang. It is pitch dark save for a pinpoint of light through a nail hole in the roof. A am completely drenched in my own sweat and theirs. Pressed like sardines a can, it is utterly impossible to move an inch away from wide open mouths blowing stale air into my face. Oh my God, we’ll suffocate. My throat is parched and burning. All about me the stertorous breathing of men fighting for air. And the wheels clang and hammer their ding-dang, ding-dang. Somebody yells, “Open the door, you bloody bastards, murderers!”, his scream vibrating against the hot tin roof. It sets off a general pushing, twisting and kicking. My shoulder is bitten. Howling, loud cursing, blasphemous and foul. Beasts, beset with all the possessive drive to get out at any cost. But nobody can move an inch. The compressed mass of our bodies is our own straight-jacket, keeping us pinned down on the spot where we are. Ding-dang, ding-dang. At last the uncontrolled screaming wears itself out into a hoarse groaning and gasping. The sharp odour of urine and dung of stark fear fills the air. Instinct for self-preservation has silenced us while we try to breathe slowly and sparingly in an attempt to stay alive as long as possible.

Oh God, Lisa, is this the end? With my heart pumping like mad, a cold anger is rising inside me against the rancid smelling, tacky skin of others glued on my face and back. Ding-dang, ding-dang. A little later the pounding of the wheels seems to become slower, and then the train pulls to a halt. An eternity later the bolts rattle and the doors of our oven are pushed aside.

Out we tumble and fall, throwing ourselves into a wonderful wide world filled with sweet, delicious air, as much as we want, in long drawn, panting gulps. A Jap officer has us fall in for numbering. Afterwards he expresses his regrets for the hardship suffered by our group as a result of a misinterpretation of his instructions to use three vans for our group, not just one. He is oh so sorry, but from now on there will be enough room for us and, in the same breath – will four men step forward for a burial? One of our men has been found dead, probably through suffocation or heart failure, take your pick. He must have died standing, shored up by the men jammed in the van. His could have been the body pressed against mine. After the burial our group is divided into three wagon loads with buckets of food and water. First class treatment we call that, putting us in better spirits in spite of what has passed. We have grown hard. Death has become an everyday occurrence, and has lost its awe. The cynical thought crosses my mind that the dead man has followed up on that slogan of the courageous days before the invasion, that one about “better to die standing on our feet than to live further on our knees.”

For days more, all that we hear is the pounding of the wheels, blotting out conversation and even the mind. Only at night the wheels grow silent for an hour or so, while we step down for exercise and victualling. Most of the time is passed in sleeping, which is just as well, with a view of what is in store for us.

We awake to a loud silence. The train is stationary. A moment later the order to alight is given, then we are counted over and over again without giving us any reason for it. The word circulates among us that one of our men has jumped the train. Good luck to him, whoever he may be. He’ll need every bit of that

 

On 8 March,

 after the battle of Sittang Bridge where the Japanese destroyed two Indian brigades, they captured Rangoon, southern terminus of the supply line to China and the port of entry for lend-lease supplies.

Pushing on to the north, they had by mid-March reached the Toungoo-Prome line in central Burma, and though they did not finally gain victory there until early in May they had effectively blockaded China by the time the Indies had fallen.⁵⁸

 

 

 

Read More About DEI General

1940-1945

 Info

Nederlandse opper- en hoofdofficieren
van het
Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Leger (KNIL)
1940-1945

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Opperofficieren

 

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Generaal-Majoor R. (Rudolph) Bakkers
16.07.1894  Panteh Perak  –

(1940)	Luitenant-Kolonel, VIIe Afdeeling A (Hoofdkantoor van de Generale Staf), Departement van Oorlog, Bandoeng
(1941)	tevens lid van de Permanente Militaire Spoorwegcommissie, Bandoeng
13.10.1941-09.03.1942	Chef van de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger

 

Gen.-Maj. (13.10.1941?); Kol. (?); Lt.-Kol. (30.6.1937); Maj. (31.7.1935); Kapt. (28.8.1927); 1e Lt. (5.4.1917); 2e Lt. (28.7.1914)  [Infanterie]

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Luitenant-Generaal der Infanterie G.J. (Gerardus Johannes) Berenschot
24.07.1887  (Solok, Sumatra)  –  13.10.1941  (Batavia; vliegtuigongeluk)

HBS, Winterswijk; Cadettenschool, Alkmaar; Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda; Hogere Krijgsschool, ‘s-Gravenhage (1919-1922)

19.07.1907	aangesteld bij het Wapen der Infanterie
1908-1919	Indië (Magelang, 1910-1915 Atjeh)
1925-1931	leraar, Hogere Krijgsschool, ‘s-Gravenhage
1931-1934	Commandant, 6e Regiment Infanterie (Indië)
07.06.1934-26.07.1939	Chef van de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger
00.07.1939-13.10.1941	Commandant van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger en Hoofd van het Departement van Oorlog in Nederlandsch-Indië

 

Lt.-Gen. (26.7.1939); Gen.-Maj. (11.6.1935); Kol. (28.12.1932); Lt.-Kol. (3.2.1931); Maj. (17.9.1928); Kapt. (19.8.1919); 1e Lt. (19.6.1911); 2e Lt. (19.7.1907)  [Infanterie]

BWN; Pers

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie P.A. (Pierre Antoine) Cox
03.10.1888  (Arnhem)  –  ?

(1940)	Hoofd, IIe Afdeeling (Hoofdkantoor der Infanterie) van het Kabinet, Departement van Oorlog, NOI; tevens Inspecteur van het Wapen der Infanterie, KNIL
-00.03.1942	Commandant, [IIIe?] Divisie (Midden-Java)

 

Gen.-Maj. (23.2.1938); Kol. (31.5.1936); Lt.-Kol. (26.12.1933); Maj. (12.12.1931); Kapt. (10.1.1921); 1e Lt. (4.4.1913); 2e Lt. (6.8.1910)  [Infanterie]

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie G.A. (Gustav Adolf) Ilgen
03.07.1887 (Wiesbaden)  –  ?

1932	Commandant, Luchtvaartafdeling, Bandoeng
00.06.1936-00.03.1942	Commandant, 2e Militaire Afdeeling (tevens IIe Divisie) op Java (Magelang)

 

Gen.-Maj. (27.5.1936); Kol. (3.10.1934); Lt.-Kol. (28.2.1933); Maj. (2.6.1931); Kapt. (22.7.1920); 1e Lt. (21.6.1912); 2e Lt. (24.7.1909)  [Infanterie]

Pers

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie R.Th. (Roelof Theodorus) Overakker
09.01.1890  (Haarlem)  –  09.01.1945 (Fort de Kock)

Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda

20.07.1912	aangesteld bij het Wapen der Infanterie, KNIL
09.02.1942	Territoriaal Commandant Midden-Sumatra
09.01.1945	gefusilleerd door de Japanners

 

Gen.-Maj. (19.2.1942); Kol. (21.9.1938); Lt.-Kol. (25.11.1935); Maj. (16.9.1933); Kapt. (24.6.1926); 1e Lt. (8.4.1916); 2e Lt. (20.7.1912)  [Infanterie]

Ridder Militaire Willemsorde 4e Klasse (25.7.1951)

MWO

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18 mei 1942,Ottawa, Canada

Luitenant-Generaal der Militaire Luchtvaart L.H. (Ludolph Hendrik) van Oyen
25.4.1889  (‘s-Gravenhage)  –  28.7.1953  (‘s-Gravenhage)

Koninklijke Militaire Academie, Breda; Kogere Krijgsschool, Den Haag

	Adjudant in buitengewone dienst van HM de Koningin
-1942	Commandant & Inspecteur der Militaire Luchtvaart, KNIL; wnd. cdt. KNIL
22.2.1942-1942	Commandant, Geallieerde luchtstrijdkrachten Java
1942-1943	Commandant, Koninklijke Nederlandse Militaire Vliegschool, Jackson, Miss. (USA)
1943	Commandant, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger in Australië
1945-1946	Commandant, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger in Batavia

Ridder, Orde van de Nederlandse Leeuw; Officier, Orde van Oranje-Nassau; Companion of the Order of the Bath; Commander, Legion of Merit
 

Lt.-Gen. (?); Gen.-Maj. (1941?); Kol. (23.2.1938); Lt.-Kol. (31.7.1935); Maj. (29.7.1933); Kapt. (8.7.1921); 1e Lt. (12.8.1914); 2e Lt. (29.7.1911)  [Militaire Luchtvaart]

BWN; WB48

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie J.J. (Jacob Jan) Pesman
4.1.1888  (Thesinge)  –  2.1.1950 (Groningen, wonende te Rijswijk)

-00.00.1941	Commandant, 1e Militaire Afdeeling (tevens Ie Divisie) op Java (West-Java)

 

Gen.-Maj. (29.7.1939); Kol. (31.5.1936); Lt.-Kol. (25.5.1934); Maj. (6.8.1932); Kapt. (4.3.1921); 1e Lt. (10.5.1913); 2e Lt. (6.8.1910)  [Infanterie]

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Generaal-Majoor der Artillerie H. (Hein) ter Poorten
21.11.1887  (Buitenzorg)  – 15.01.1968

1911	aangesteld bij het Wapen der Artillerie, KNIL
1926-1931	bij de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger
1933-1936	bij de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger
1936-1939	Hoofd IIIe Afdeeling (Hoofdkantoor der Artillerie), tevens Inspecteur van het wapen, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger
26.07.1939-13.10.1941	Chef van de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger
14.10.1941-09.03.1942	Commandant van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger en Hoofd van het Departement van Oorlog in Nederlandsch-Indië
09.03.1942-00.00.1945	in Japanse krijgsgevangenschap

 

Gen.-Maj. (13.9.1937); Kol. (29.4.1936); Lt.-Kol. (28.7.1935); Maj. (25.7.1930); Kapt. (26.8.1919); 1e Lt. (29.4.1911); 2e Lt. (25.7.1908)  [Artillerie]

BWN

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Generaal-Majoor J. (Jacob) van Rees
09.12.1888  (Utrecht)  –  ?

in Japanse krijgsgevangenschap

Gen.-Maj. (12.3.1939); Kol. (12.3.1935); Dir.O.v.G. 1e kl. (31.10.1932); Dir.O.v.G. 2e kl. (20.11.1929); O.v.G. 1e kl. (9.9.1920); O.v.G. 2e kl. (15.7.1913)

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie W. (Wijbrandus) Schilling
26.01.1890  (Enschede)  –  1958
 

00.00.1941-00.03.1942	Commandant, 1e Militaire Afdeeling (tevens Ie Divisie) op Java (West-Java)
00.03.1942-15.08.1945	in Japanse krijgsgevangenschap

 

Gen.-Maj. (); Kol. (21.9.1938); Lt.-Kol. (25.11.1935); Maj. (13.9.1933); Kapt. (9.9.1921); 1e Lt. (13.9.1915); 2e Lt. (13.9.1911)  [Infanterie]

BWN

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Generaal-Majoor der Genie G.J.F. (Gustave Jacques Frederik) Statius Muller
23.04.1889  (Meester Cornelis)  –  26.10.1962  (‘s-Gravenhage)

03.1935-(1940)	Hoofd, IVe Afdeeling (Hoofdkantoor der Genie) van het Kabinet, Departement van Oorlog, NOI; tevens Inspecteur van het Wapen der Genie, KNIL

 

Gen.-Maj. (13.9.1937); Kol. (30.3.1935); Lt.-Kol. (27.12.1933); Maj. (13.8.1931); Kapt. (8.12.1919); 1e Lt. (27.7.1912); 2e Lt. (29.7.1911)

Pers

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Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie J.H. (Johan Hendrik) Uhl
08.10.1889  Nijmegen –
 

(1940)-?	Kolonel, IIe Afdeeling (Hoofdkantoor der Infanterie) van het Kabinet, Departement van Oorlog, Ned.-Indië
00.03.1942-00.08.1945	in Japanse krijgsgevangenschap
01.10.1945-31.01.1946	Chef van de Generale Staf, Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger

 

Gen.Maj. (1945?); Kol. (23.2.1938); Lt.-Kol. (31.7.1935); Maj. (29.7.1933); Kapt. (12.7.1921); 1e Lt. (18.9.1914); 2e Lt. (29.7.1911)  [Infanterie]

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Buiten dienst

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Luitenant-Generaal  b.d. Tj. (Tjalling) Bakker
07.10.1885  Menado  –
 

(1940)	Voorzitter Staatsmobilisatieraad te Bandoeng
1942-19.8.1945	in Japanse krijgsgevangenschap

 

Gen.-Maj. (); Kol. (); Lt.-Kol. (); Maj. (); Kapt. (); 1e Lt. (); 2e Lt. ()

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Groepsfoto’s

Links Gen.-Maj. P.A. Cox, rechts Gen.-Maj. J.J. Pesman. Bandoeng, juli 1939.

Gen.-Maj. H. ter Poorten en Luit.-Kol. P.G. Mantel bij de capitulatie te Kalidjati, 8 maart 1942.

Gen.-Maj. H. ter Poorten (rechts) met General Sir Archibald P. Wavell (midden), opperbevelhebber van Abdacom, te Batavia, 22 jan.1942

 

The 8th of March 1942,

the Dutch Army on Java surrendered to the Japanese Army

Exhaustion took its toll and 104 men had to be left during the retreat. From Sampit the remaining men went up to Kotabesi where they joined up with D Company and together they went to Pandau, where they were informed that the

Dutch East Indies Army had capitulated on Java Island. By boat they went to Kenamboi.

In the meantime a Japanese broadcast was calling on all Allied forces in the Netherlands East Indies to lay down their arms.

The broadcast was accompanied by a threat of reprisals if resistance continued.

The A and B Company tried to reach Kotawaringin airfield. They didn’t meet any Japanese soldiers and they arrived about

March,9^th.1942

On the evening of 9 March,

 

Major-General Ilgen, commander of the KNIL in East Java,

signed the instrument of surrender

read more info about Maj.Gen.Ilgen

Generaal-Majoor der Infanterie G.A. (Gustav Adolf) Ilgen
03.07.1887 (Wiesbaden)  –  ?

1932	Commandant, Luchtvaartafdeling, Bandoeng
00.06.1936-00.03.1942	Commandant, 2e Militaire Afdeeling (tevens IIe Divisie) op Java (Magelang

In the following campaign 18 were lost and on 9 March 1942 (surrender of Java), the last 6 remaining Hurricanes were set on fire by their crews at Ngoro. These Dutch Hurricanes are (unofficially) credited with destroying or damaging thirty Japanese aircraft.

* Jong A.P. de, Vlucht door de tijd; 75 jaar Nederlandse Luchtmacht, Unieboek B.V., 1988
* Hurricane, E. Bishop, Airlife Publishing Limited, 1986.

Read more info
Now I bet everyone can feel the question comming… where are they?? Seeing we can´t upgrade the Dutch untill july 1942 (*sniff*) having a few huricanes available in feb. wouldn´t be all that bad and I haven´t run into them yet… have I ´misplaced´ them?

And yes i know i am whining… and grasping for straws… (hey… I am Dutch and trying to defend the DEI, so what do you all expect… lol), but we are trying to get it as historically accurate as possible right?

Do you have the squadrons involved – were they existing squadrons getting new aircraft or special units – newly formed???

As far as a quick look at my sources shows (minimal) I can connect 6 pilot names with flying Hawker Hurricane IIB´s in feb/march 1942, and with some qiuck cross referencing got their original assignments:

Ensign Hamming, A.W. (2-VLG-IV)
Sergeant Hermans, R.M.H, (1-VGL-IV)
Sergeant Jacobs, J.C. (1-VLG-IV)
Lieutenant Bruinier, J.B.H (2-VLG-IV)
Lieutenant Marinus, A.J. (1-VLG-IV)
Vaandrig Vink, N. (2-VLG-IV)

1-VLG-IV flying the Curtiss Hawk 75A and 2-VLG-IV flying the Curtiss CW21 (originally)

Now i don´t know if VLG IV just had a surplus of pilots and added the hurricanes and were the only ones flying them (which i guess would make these two squadrons 4-VLG-IV and 5-VGL-IV as 3-VLG-IV was flying the buffallo 339D), or if they drew surplus pilots from wherever available and these 6 names all being from VLG IV is just a coincidence. After all it´s only 6 out of 24, but it´s a start.

Btw: Hamming and Hermans are both mentioned for crashing their Hurricanes during training (presumably between uncrating them and becomming operational on feb 16th) and as 1-VLG- IV and 2-VLG-IV still seem to be flying with their original aircraft at that time these 2 hurricane groups seem to be ´new´ groups… either that or everyone switched planes (which I hardly believe at that stage of the conflict).

These are the two original squadrons of the 4th Fighter Group. They are already in the game and, as you say, Dutch units can not upgrade until way too late. I don’t see a reasonable way to work them into the OOB

One way to upgrade to more modern aircraft is to disband some air units into others. The squadron returns with upgraded aircraft if the original aircraft assigned to it are no longer available in the pool. Hav e a number of

 

 

Dutch East Indie ‘s Beaufort

and

 

PBY squadrons training in May 42.

Need lots of training though…mid to high 20s for exp.

In order to get Hurricanes (and early in 42), the unit needs to have Hurricane as it’s upgrade (think they all upgrade to Kittyhawk…not sure) and no more of the original fighter (339D, Hawk or Demon) in the pool

I am shocked!!

I started up the game just to check… and the whole dutch airforce is a mess!! Actually the whole VLG-IV isn´t even it it!!… there´s VLG-III acting as a fighter group that VLG-IV should be… VLG-I has to many bomber groups… VLG-II has to many bomber groups… and I guess those would be the bombers of what VLG-III should be. And on a first glance I am sure the numbers are wrong too… dear oh dear how ever did I miss that for so long. *sigh* Starting to think a few missing hurricanes is peanuts now.

I am shocked!! I started up the game just to check… and the whole dutch airforce is a mess!!

 Actually the whole VLG-IV isn´t even it it!!… there´s VLG-III acting as a fighter group that VLG-IV should be… VLG-I has to many bomber groups… VLG-II has to many bomber groups… and i guess those would be the bombers of what VLG-III should be. And on a first glance I am sure the numbers are wrong too… dear oh dear how ever did I miss that for so long. *sigh* Starting to think a few missing hurricanes is peanuts now.

Our business in the field of fight, Is not to question, but to prove our might.

Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (ML-KNIL)
[“Military Aviation of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army”]

 

ML–KNIL Martin 166 bombers over Malaya in January 1942

ML-KNIL Headquarters at Soerabaja – Java
Commander of ML-KNIL  was Colonel E.T. Kengen, later replaced by Lt-General L. H. van Oyen

 

Air Vice-Marshal Conway Pulford

greeting pilots of the ML-KNIL in Singapore, January 1942.

• Ie Vliegtuiggroep (VLG-I) at Andir airfield, Bandoeng – Java
– 1e Afdeling (1-VLG-I) with 9 Martin 139 WH-3/3A (+2 reserve)
[Patrouille Butner deployed to Tarakan – Dutch Borneo]
– 2e Afdeling (2-VLG-I) with 9 Martin 139 WH-3/3A (+2 reserve)
[Patrouille Cooke deployed to Samarinda II – Dutch Borneo]

• IIe Vliegtuiggroep (VLG-II) at Singosari airfield, Malang – Java
– 1e Afdeling (1-VLG-II) [four patrouille]
with 3 Martin 139 WH-2 and 9 Martin 139 WH-3/3A (+3 reserve)
attached: WH-1 Patrouille with 3 Martin 139 WH-1 (+1 reserve)
[mobilized at Kalidjati airfield from flight school personnel on 10 December 1941 – under command of MLD]

• IIIe Vliegtuiggroep (VLG-III) at Tjililitan airfield, Batavia – Java
– 1e Afdeling (1-VLG-III) with 9 Martin 139 WH-3/3A (+2 reserve)
– 2e Afdeling (2-VLG-III) with 9 Martin 139 WH-2 (+2 reserve)
– 3e Afdeling (3-VLG-III) with 9 Martin 139 WH-3/3A (+2 reserve)
[formed 1 September 1939 by redesignation of 2-VLG-II]
attached: – 7e Afdeling Horizontale Bommenwerpers
with 1 Martin 139 WH-2, 2 Martin 139 WH-3, 6 Martin 139 WH-3A
[formed 1 August 1940 – mobilized 15 December 1941]

• IVe Vliegtuiggroep (VLG-IV) at Maospati airfield, Madioen – Java
– 1e Afdeling (1-VLG-IV) at Maospati airfield, Madioen – Java with 12 Hawk 75A-7
– 2e Afdeling (2-VLG-IV) at Maospati airfield, Madioen – Java with 16 CB-21B
[with four Patrouilles]
– 3e Afdeling (3-VLG-IV) at Maospati airfield, Madioen – Java
[formed upon mobilization with Brewster 339D from school personnel]

• Ve Vliegtuiggroep (VLG-V) based at Semplak airfield, Buitenzorg – Java
– 1e Afdeling (1-VLG-V) with Brewster 339D
– 1 and 2 Patrouilles at Samarinda II – Dutch Borneo
– 3 Patrouille at Singkawang II – Dutch Borneo
– 2e Afdeling (2-VLG-V) with Brewster 339D
– 3e Afdeling (3-VLG-V) with Brewster 339D

• Ambon Patrouille with Brewster 339D (4)
[formed upon mobilization at Maospati airfield, Madieon – Java designated as 4e Patrouille, 2-VLG IV? considered as a detachment from 1-VLG IV? transferred to Laha airfield, Ambon on 3 December 1941]

– Verkenningsafdeling 1 (VkA-1) at Tjikembar airfield – Java
with 12 CW-22 and 1 C.X assigned to ML-KNIL headquarters
– Verkenningsafdeling 2 (VkA-2) at [Djokjakarta – Java]
with 11 CW-22 and 2 C.X assigned to ML-KNIL headquarters
– Verkenningsafdeling 3 (VkA-3) at Kalidjati airfield – Java
with 12 FK-51 attached to First Military Department – formed on mobilization
– Verkenningsafdeling 4 (VkA-4) at Kalidjati airfield – Java
with 12 Lockheed 212 attached to Second Military Department – formed on mobilization
– Verkenningsafdeling 5 (VkA-5) at Kalidjati airfield – Java
with 12 FK-51 attached to Third Military Department – activated on mobilization

• ML-KNIL Depot at Maospati airfield, Madioen – Java
• ML-KNIL Technical Training School at Andir airfield, Bandoeng – Java
• ML-KNIL Flight School at Kalidjati airfield, near Soebang – Java
• ML-KNIL Flight School at Singosari airfield, Malang – Java (Martin 139)

Marine Luchtvaartdienst (MLD)
[“Royal Netherlands East Indies Naval Air Force”]

Headquarters at Soerabaja – Java
• Do24K-2 (1) assigned to Commander MLD

Groepen Vliegtuigen [“Aircraft Groups”]

• GVT-1 with 3 Do24K-1 in Pontianak – West Borneo
• GVT-2 with 3 Do24K-1 in Sorong – New Guinea
• GVT-3 with 3 Do24K-1 in Soerabaja – Java
• GVT-4 with 3 Do24K-1 in Sambas – West Borneo
• GVT-5 with 3 Do24K-1 in Ternate – Moluccas
• GVT-6 with 3 Do24K-1 in Morokrembangan – Java
• GVT-7 with 3 Do24K-1 in Tarakan – East Borneo
• GVT-8 with 3 Do24K-1 in Paeloe Samboe – Sumatra
• GVT-11 with 4 C-XIW – (shipboard – cruisers)
• GVT-12 with 6 T-IVa in Morokrembangan – Java
• GVT-13 with 4 C-XIW – (shipboard – destroyers)
• GVT-14 with 5 T-IVa in Morokrembangan – Java
• GVT-16 with 3 Catalina in Tanjong Priok – Java
• GVT-17 with 3 Catalina in Halong – Ambon

• MLD flying school at Soerabaja – Java
[includes aircraft in reserve or in transit]
– 6 Dornier Wal planes
– 10 Do 24K-1 planes
– 1 Fokker T-IVa plane
– 6 Fokker C-XIVW planes
– 40 Ryan STM planes
– 30 PBY Catalina planes
[includes aircraft in transit]

This is a little OT, but I’m 2/3rd of the way done with 1/72nd scale model of a Hurricane and am now intrigured by this and I am now contemplating finishing the model as an NEIAF example. Does anyone know if they were Mk Is or Mk IIAs or Bs, did they have the trop filter and did they have the orange triangle or tricolor national markings?

BTW, in my mod to Scen 15, and prior to reading this thread, I had already tweaked the data base editor and changed the upgrade path for a couple of the NEIAF Buffalo Squadrons to convert to Hurricanes, if they survive until 07/42.

WAR IN THE PACIFIC: Admiral’s Edition – Air Team Lead

IN PERPETUUM SINGULARIS SEDES

 

I think alot of this has been addressed in the CHS. When I have time tomorrow I’ll check

I see Mogami already came up with en extensive list closer to reality then is in the game now, but anyway… here´s my 5 cents worth:

As it is now:

B1-VIG-I 10 martin 139 (12) Batavia (Java)
B1-VIG-I 10 martin 139 (12) Batavia (Java)
B3-VIG-I 9 martin 139 (12) Batavia (Java)

B1-VIG-II 9 martin 139 (12) Singkawang (Borneo)
B2-VIG-II 6 martin 139 (12) Samarinda (Borneo)
B3-VIG-II 6 martin 139 (12) Madioen (Java)
B4-VIG-II 4 martin 139 (12) Tarakan (Borneo)
B5-VIG-II 4 martin 139 (12) Malang (Java)

F1-VIG-III 12 75A Hawk (12) Tjilitjap (Java)
F2-VIG-III 6 75A Hawk (8) Bandoeng (Java)
F3-VIG-III 12 CW-21B Demon (16) Bandoeng (Java)
F4-VIG-III 6 CW-21B Demon (8) Soerabaja (Java)
F5-VIG-III 6 Brewster 339D (16) Amboina (Ambon)

VIG-IV does not exist!!

F1-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (16) Batavia (Java)
F2-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Singkawang (Borneo)
F3-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Samarinda (Borneo)
F4-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Tarakan (Borneo)

F1-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (16) Batavia (Java)
F2-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Sinkawang (Borneo)
F3-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Samarinda (Borneo)
F4-VIG-V 6 Brewster 339D (8) Tarakan (Borneo)

R1-VIG-VI 9 CW-22 (12) Bandoeng (Java)
R2-VIG-VI 9 CW-22 (12) Djokjakarta (Java)
R3-VIG-VI 10 FK-51 (12) Bandoeng (Java)
R4-VIG-VI 5 FK-51 (8) Tjilitjap (Java)
R5-VIG-VI 8 FK-51 (8) Malang (Java)
R6-VIG-VI 4 FK-51 (8) Djokjakarta (Java)
T7-VIG-VI 8 Locheed 212 (8) Malang (Java)
T8-VIG-VI 8 C60 Loadstar (8) Djokjakarta (Java)

Should be:

B1-VLG-I 11 martin 139 (12) Samarinda (Borneo)
B2-VLG-I 11 martin 139 (12) Singkawan (Borneo)

B1-VLG-II 19 martin 139 (12?) Malang (Java) *7 older models so 12 would be ok
B2-VLG-II 11 martin 139 (8?) Malang (Java) *3 older models so 8 would be ok
B3-VLG-II does not exist
B4-VLG-II does not exist
B5-VLG-II does not exist

B1-VLG-III 11 martin 139 (12?) Singapore (Malay)
B2-VLG-III 11 martin 139 (12?) Bandoeng (Java)
B3-VLG-III 11 martin 139 (12?) Singapore (Malay)
B7(attached)-VLG-III 9 martin 139 (8) Madioeng (Java) *1 older model so 8 would be ok

F1-VLG-IV 12 75A Hawk (12) Batavia (Java)
F2-VLG-IV 16 CW-21B Demon (16?) Bandoeng (Java)
F3-VLG-IV 4 Brewster 339D (8?) Amboina (Ambon)

F1-VLG-V 12 Brewster 339D (12) Samarinda (Borneo)
F2-VLG-V 5 Brewster 339D (8?) Sinkawang (Borneo)
F3-VLG-V 12 Brewster 339D (12) Singapore (Malay)

R1-VLG-VI should be VKA-1 12 CW-22 (12) Djokjakarta (Java)
R2-VLG-VI should be VKA-2 11 CW-22 (12) Djokjakarta (Java)
R3-VLG-VI should be VKA-3 12 FK-51 (12) Bandoeng (Java)
R4-VLG-VI should be VKA-4 12 Lockheed 212 (12) Bandoeng (Java) (Transport in the game)
R5-VLG-VI should be VKA-5 10 FK-51 (12) Bandoeng (Java)
R6-VLG-VI does not exist

T7-VLG-VI should be D-VI-A 19 Lockheed L18-40 (18?) Madioen (Java)
T8-VLG-VI does not exist

Oh.. and might as well add the original point that started this:

F4-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942
F5-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942

I can see now why the pilots came from VLG-IV, All other fighter pilots were either in Borneo or Malay so it stands to reason these planes were attached to this flightgroup.

(I am assuming they put the ´experienced´ pilots in these planes and gave any other relacement pilots from flightschool or hanging around for whatever other reasons a seat in planes they might actually be fermilliar with)

Mk IIb´s without radio and oxygen equipment. No pictures seem to have been taken, but according to discriptions they were left painted in their original RAf colours, RAF markings painted over with camouflage paint and a handpainted Dutch (red, white, blue) flag added on the tail. Might have been numbered 1 to 24 on the fuselage but thats not completely clear.

Our business in the field of fight, Is not to question, but to prove our might.

Oh and to make it all really nice and confusing… here´s one for the MLD that doesn´t really square up with Mogami´s one:

Dec 1941-Jan 1942:

GVT 1 with 3 Do24 at Pontianak
GVT 2 with 3 Do24 at Sorong
GVT 3 with 3 Do24 at Ambon (later Soerabaja)
GVT 4 with 3 Do24 at Ambon (later Sambas)
GVT 5 with 3 Do24 at Tandjong Priok (later Tondano)
GVT 6 with 3 Do24 at Sedanau (later Morokrembangan)
GVT 7 with 3 Do24 at Morokrembangan
GVT 8 with 3 Do24 at Morokrembangan
GVT 11 with 3 Fokker T.IVa at Kwam (later Morokrembangan)
GVT 12 with 3 Fokker T.IVa at Tarakan (later Morokrembangan)
GVT 13 with 4 Fokker C.XI at Morokrembangan and ships
GVT 14 with 4 Fokker C.XI at Morokrembangan and ships
GVT 16 with 3 PBY at Tandjong Priok
GVT 17 with 3 PBY at Ambon
GVT 18 with 3 PBY at Soerabaja

Flying School at Soerabaja with 10 Dornier Wal, 1 Fokker T.IV, 6 Fokker C.VII-W, 10 Fokker C.XIV-W, 40 Ryan ST, 5 Tiger Moth.
Yes it has been addressed by CHS. We have one more squadron (of transports). We also considered but decided against the MLD Recon Flight with three WH-1.

Also the Flying schools closed on mobilization – personnel used to form the additional squadrons (3rd fighter squadron of each group, 7e Afdeling, some others).

There is a post in the OOB issues thread with the CHS Dutch Air OOB

Forgive me for questioning this – as I do not speak Dutch (and have more than my share of problems with English).

I have noted the two different abbreviations for “Vliegtuiggroep” (Airplane Group):
VIG is used by several references, including Dr. Niehorster’s site and the “Bloody Shambles” series of books
VLG is used by The Dutch East Indies Campaign Website.

I used VIG simply because it was used in the original Scenario 15 OOB.

Please do see the post in Scenario Design / Game Editor, 1.40 OOB Issues, Page 4

Thanks, must have missed that.

To answer the question. Originally the abbreviation would be Vl.G. (Capital V small l for Vliegtuig and G for Group. I think the plroblem arrises because in some print Vl.G (Capital v, small l) looks the same as VI.G (Capital V, capital I).

There is no rule in the Dutch language that would ever abbreviate vliegtuig as vig. instead of vlg.

Not completely true:

There was only one official Transport group (D-VL-A) with the Lockheed L18-40.
The Lockheed 212 was classified as reckon (and as a secundary task transport) and made up VKA-4, am I to understand now that there will be yet another Tranpost group making it 3 while there only was 1 or did I misuderstand?.

VLG I (bomber) and II (bomber) had 2 groups.
VLG III (bomber) had 4 groups of which only the 4th (7th attached) was an additional ad-hoc squadron formed from flightschool personell. (Because 2 groups were send to Singapore making it 2 available groups for Java again)
VLG-IV (fighter) had 3 groups, the 3rd in the proces of being formed as planned but not up to strenght, different then being added ad-hoc.
VLG-V (fighter) had 3 groups, the 3rd in the proces of being formed as planned, not added ad-hoc.

So these 3rd groups were not ´formed from personell from the flying schools when they closed´, these groups were already planned official groups with planes ordered and personell attached in the organisational charts. They were brought up to strenght by adding extra personell (and in the case of VLG-V stripping other brewster squadrons of their spare planes to fill up to strenght because their own ordered planes hadn´t all arrived yet).

Only bringing this up because I would hate to fly groups just formed as a stop gap measure for the next 4 years of the war without them ever being disbanded. (just as I would hate to fly seperate 4 plane ´flights´ for 4 years while irl they would have reunited with their parent squadrons.

I have seen a number of contradictory sources on the squadrons of 2 and 3 Group. Several specifically mention the movement of one of 2nd Group’s squadrons to 3rd Group for the purpose of building a three-squadron group for use in Singapore.

I note that the extra squadron formed at the outbreak of the war is named “7th Squadron” and have decided to go with a total of seven squadrons:
2 in 1st Group
1 in 2nd Group
3 in 3rd Group
7th Squadron

In addition to the Lockheed 212s of VkAfdeling-4 the Dutch operated a number of Lockheed Lodestar L18-40 pure transports. I do not know the source of these aircraft but they are in addition to the force of DC-3s taken over from the civilian air company (KNLM?). These are usually listed as being in “Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling of the ML-KNIL” but I have seen at least one reference placing them in a “6th” squadron and have used VkAfdeling-6 in our OOB. I would appreciate any suggestions for a better name for this unit. The Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling transferred to Australia in February, 1942 and many of these Lodestars ended up with US or Australian forces in Australia:

LT9-07 (c/n 18-2102), radio call sign VHCAA, went to the USAAF as 42-68347 and was operated by Qantas. It served in Australia and New Zealand after the war before going to the USA where it was current in 2004 as N796G.

LT9-08 (c/n 18-2103), radio call sign VHCAB, went to the USAAF as 42-68348 and was operated by Qantas. It was written off on 26 November 1943 at Port Moresby.

LT9-09 (c/n 18-2104), radio call sign VHCAC, went to the USAAF as 42-68349 and was operated by Guinea Airways. It served in Australia and New Zealand after the war and was written off on 10 February 1947 at Palmerston, New Zealand.

LT9-14 (c/n 18-2109), radio call sign VHCAD, went to the USAAF as 42-68350. It was written off either on 14 July 1942 or in January 1944 at Tennant Creek.

LT9-15 (c/n 18-2110) was withdrawn from use in Darwin in March 1942 whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-16 (c/n 18-2120), radio call sign VHCAE, went to the USAAF as 42-68351 and was operated by Ansett. It was written off on 11 October 1942 at Archerfield.

LT9-17 (c/n 18-2121), radio call sign VHCAF, went to the USAAF as 42-68352 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 23 February 1944 at Archerfield.

LT9-18 (c/n 18-2122) was written off on 3 March 1942 at Broome whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-19 (c/n 18-2123), radio call sign VHCAG, went to the USAAF as 42-68353 and was operated by ANA (?). It was written off on 18 August 1942 at Maple.

LT9-21 (c/n 18-2125), radio call sign VHCAH, went to the USAAF as 42-68354 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 30 November 1942 at Dobodura, New Guinea.

LT9-22 (c/n 18-2126) was written off on 15 February 1942 at Brisbane whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-23 (c/n 18-2127), radio call sign VHCAI, went to USAAF as 42-68355. It was written off on 18 August 1942 at Maple. Sometimes reported as current as N7001 but that aircraft is c/n 2427.

LT9-24 (c/n 18-2128), radio call sign VHCAJ, went to the USAAF as 42-68356 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 26 February 1943 at Garbutt.

LT9-25 (c/n 18-2129), radio call sign VHCAK, went to the USAAF as 42-68357 and was operated by Qantas. It was written off on 15 May 1944 at Bundaberg.

Also, the 212s are usually listed as “light transport – used for recon” and Matrix has listed them as transports (with an upgrade to Dakotas). I feel this is appropriate.

So yes, there were three transport groups in the NEI:
Light Transport/Recon 212s of VkAfdeling-4
Lockheed Lodestars of Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling
Impressed DC-3 Civilian aircraft (assignment not known).

Only the first two are included in our OOB.

There is no method to split groups in the scenario editor so the options are:
several small flights
ignore history and only use full squadrons

Matrix has chosen the former and I agree.

Although you did not mention it in your reply, I assume from the data in your post that I should rename the squadrons “VLG” without a period (NOT VL.G) – and I will do so.

I have seen a number of contradictory sources on the squadrons of 2 and 3 Group. Several specifically mention the movement of one of 2nd Group’s squadrons to 3rd Group for the purpose of building a three-squadron group for use in Singapore.

As far as I know there were indeed 3 squadrons send to Singapore: 1-VLG-III (bombers), 3-VLG-III (bombers) and 3-VLG-V (fighters).

3-VLG-III was originally the tranfered and renamed 2-VLG-II but that happened way before and had nothing to do with singapore, 2-VLG-II being rebuilt in the meantime to fill VLG-II as a 2 suadron group again.

I note that the extra squadron formed at the outbreak of the war is named “7th Squadron” and have decided to go with a total of seven squadrons:
2 in 1st Group
1 in 2nd Group
3 in 3rd Group
7th Squadron

In my opinion (but i might be wrong here) I, II and II were bombers, IV and V were fighters, VI was your later mentioned transport and that´s why the newly formed bomber ´squadron´ was named 7th (VII) before it was attached/merged with VLG-III to make up a 2 squadron group again.

In addition to the Lockheed 212s of VkAfdeling-4 the Dutch operated a number of Lockheed Lodestar L18-40 pure transports. I do not know the source of these aircraft but they are in addition to the force of DC-3s taken over from the civilian air company (KNLM?). These are usually listed as being in “Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling of the ML-KNIL” but I have seen at least one reference placing them in a “6th” squadron and have used VkAfdeling-6 in our OOB. I would appreciate any suggestions for a better name for this unit. The Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling transferred to Australia in February, 1942 and many of these Lodestars ended up with US or Australian forces in Australia:

The Lockheed L18-40´s were formed in D-VL-A (Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling), my guess would be the DC-3´s were added to these and thats why the number is sometimes given as 12 till as high as 19. According to ´official´ listings there were only 12 L18-40´s in depot and maybe another 2 pure training/flightschool which would leave some Dc-3´s to make up the numbers)

LT9-07 (c/n 18-2102), radio call sign VHCAA, went to the USAAF as 42-68347 and was operated by Qantas. It served in Australia and New Zealand after the war before going to the USA where it was current in 2004 as N796G.

LT9-08 (c/n 18-2103), radio call sign VHCAB, went to the USAAF as 42-68348 and was operated by Qantas. It was written off on 26 November 1943 at Port Moresby.

LT9-09 (c/n 18-2104), radio call sign VHCAC, went to the USAAF as 42-68349 and was operated by Guinea Airways. It served in Australia and New Zealand after the war and was written off on 10 February 1947 at Palmerston, New Zealand.

LT9-14 (c/n 18-2109), radio call sign VHCAD, went to the USAAF as 42-68350. It was written off either on 14 July 1942 or in January 1944 at Tennant Creek.

LT9-15 (c/n 18-2110) was withdrawn from use in Darwin in March 1942 whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-16 (c/n 18-2120), radio call sign VHCAE, went to the USAAF as 42-68351 and was operated by Ansett. It was written off on 11 October 1942 at Archerfield.

LT9-17 (c/n 18-2121), radio call sign VHCAF, went to the USAAF as 42-68352 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 23 February 1944 at Archerfield.

LT9-18 (c/n 18-2122) was written off on 3 March 1942 at Broome whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-19 (c/n 18-2123), radio call sign VHCAG, went to the USAAF as 42-68353 and was operated by ANA (?). It was written off on 18 August 1942 at Maple.

LT9-21 (c/n 18-2125), radio call sign VHCAH, went to the USAAF as 42-68354 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 30 November 1942 at Dobodura, New Guinea.

LT9-22 (c/n 18-2126) was written off on 15 February 1942 at Brisbane whilst still in ML-KNIL service.

LT9-23 (c/n 18-2127), radio call sign VHCAI, went to USAAF as 42-68355. It was written off on 18 August 1942 at Maple. Sometimes reported as current as N7001 but that aircraft is c/n 2427.

LT9-24 (c/n 18-2128), radio call sign VHCAJ, went to the USAAF as 42-68356 and was operated by ANA. It was written off on 26 February 1943 at Garbutt.

LT9-25 (c/n 18-2129), radio call sign VHCAK, went to the USAAF as 42-68357 and was operated by Qantas. It was written off on 15 May 1944 at Bundaberg.

Also, the 212s are usually listed as “light transport – used for recon” and Matrix has listed them as transports (with an upgrade to Dakotas). I feel this is appropriate.

Well in my Dutch sources they are usually listed as recon flight (VKA-4) but i aggree with their designation as transports and eventual upgrade.

So yes, there were three transport groups in the NEI:
Light Transport/Recon 212s of VkAfdeling-4
Lockheed Lodestars of Depot Vliegtuig Afdeling
Impressed DC-3 Civilian aircraft (assignment not known).

Well that´s a matter of symantics, officially VKA-4 is a recon flight and I still assume the DC-3´s and L18-40 together form D-VL-A so that would make it one transport group in name total.

Only the first two are included in our OOB.

There is no method to split groups in the scenario editor so the options are:
several small flights
ignore history and only use full squadrons

Matrix has chosen the former and I agree.

We will have to aggree to dissagree on this one then, the only detached flights I know of were meanth as a ´token´ resistance (show of force) and assumed to return to their squadrons as soon as hostillities broke out. So just for that we now have to fly useless 4 plane groups till 1945 while irl they would have returned to their parent squadrons and made up 12 plane groups again. (And don´t tell me people don´t bunch them together again anyway instead of leaving out 4 plane groups out in the cold alone). So as they were only inteneded to show token resistance, run and reform I would much prefer full strenght squadrons for the rest of the war (come on.. it´s 12 full strenght planes at most!)

Btw, technical question, why can´t they start out as /a /b parts that just reform later?

Although you did not mention it in your reply, I assume from the data in your post that I should rename the squadrons “VLG” without a period (NOT VL.G) – and I will do so.

Yes I think that might be most clear 1-VLG-IV for examle looks better to me then 1.Vl.G IV. which is still confusing as it looks like VI or a Roman numeral.

Thanks

edit:

oops.. forgot my usual whine and the reason this tread started..so here we go again:

quote:

Oh.. and might as well add the original point that started this:

F4-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942
F5-VLG-IV (??) 12 Hawker Hurricane II (12) Bandoeng (Java) … arriving 16 Feb. 1942

I can see now why the pilots came from VLG-IV, All other fighter pilots were either in Borneo or Malay so it stands to reason these planes were attached to this flightgroup.

If we have those squadrons we can hold the DEI at last

B.t.w. I think in patch 1.5 the update path for the Dutch should include the Hurricanes. Somehow I think this is already the case.

Oh yeah, they will really really really (not!) make the difference! lol, will add some flavour though. In aircombat reports instead of own losses 100%, Japanese losses nil, I might actually see, own losses 99%, Japanese losses: 1 damaged (lightly)

True about the updates, I am sure they would have gotten some… eventually… if we held on to some more of the DEI, if we had a few more escaped pilots, if we weren´t incorporated into the RAF or RAAF, and if we had beggedddddd for it long enough.. lol.. if… if… if. (hmm… we might even have gotten 320th squadron transfereed to the pacific… should i ask if they can……. naww… better not

Well then here is my wish list..

Fokker G1
Fokker Fokker DXXI

With these two we can start making plans to invade Japan

 I believe that a total of four squadrons were sent to Singapore/Malaya. An agreement had been reached pre-war between the Dutch and the British in Singapore under which Dutch units were to reinforce the defenses of Singapore (and Malaya). This agreement provided for the assignment of three squadrons of bombers and 1 squadron of fighters to British command, as well as the deployment of Dutch submarines along the coast of Malaya. The Dutch air units sent to Singapore/Malaya included all three squadrons of III-Group and the Brewster Fighters of 2-VLG-V. However, 2-VLG-III (with Martins) was withdrawn quite early for additional training in night bombing (about the 15th of December) and was not present when the remaining air units were withdrawn from the Malayan peninsula to Singapore.

Your statement on 2-VLG-II is very interesting. I have seen several comments on the conversion of 2-VLG-II into 3-VLG-III and also a few references to a 2-VLG-II during the war. This is the first direct statement that I have seen to a rebuilding of 2-VLG-II. Somewhat intrigued I decided to approach the question from a different angle.

The total “WH” strength of the ML-KNIL at the outbreak of the war was:
11 WH-1
16 WH-2
28 WH-3
40 WH-3A
Total: 95. I have no data for the operational status of these aircraft and some were undoubtably out of service.

In reviewing the initial strengths of our new scenario, I find:
1-VLG-I – 11 aircraft (9 operational and 2 damaged) in 2 formations
2-VLG-I – 11 aircraft (9 and 2) in 2 formations
1-VLG-II – 15 aircraft (12 and 3) in 1 formation
1-VLG-III – 11 aircraft (10 and 1) in 1 formation
2-VLG-III – 11 aircraft (10 and 1) in 1 formation
3-VLG-III – 11 aircraft (9 and 2) in 1 formation
7e Afdeling – 9 aircraft (all damaged) in 1 formation
Aircraft pool for aircraft Martin-139: 22
Total 92 aircraft

We previously had the WH-1 Patrouille with 3 additional WH-1 but removed it as “too small”. This accounts for the three missing aircraft and I will adjust the pool to 25 to compensate.

The total aircraft allocation in the scenario is correct and the remaining question is the existance of an additiion squadron (2-VLG-II). I have no conclusive data to support the existance or non-existance of this unit as of December 8, 1941. I can find statements that make me suspect that it is, including your reference above, but I can also find statements that make me think it is not. The one source I have that specifically states that it is in existance is Dr. Niehorster’s site at: http://www.orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/016_netherlands/41-12-08/army_air.html – which places it at Malang with 1-VLG-II.

This leaves me with two options and no conclusive evidence to select between them:
1: Include 2-VLG-II with 11 aircraft and reduce the pool to 14.
2: Exclude 2-VLG-II and leave the pool at 25.

Speaking purely from the perspective of game mechanics – losses will very quickly use up the aircraft in the pool and I doubt the value of an additional squadron. Squadrons will very soon have to be combined in order to maintain reasonable strength on surviving units.

This combination of conflicting data sources and questionable game mechanics leads me to leave out 2-VLG-II. I would welcome any additional data that would cause me to reconsider this decision.

quote:

In my opinion (but i might be wrong here) I, II and II were bombers, IV and V were fighters, VI was your later mentioned transport and that´s why the newly formed bomber ´squadron´ was named 7th (VII) before it was attached/merged with VLG-III to make up a 2 squadron group again.

I think there is some confusion between squadrons and groups. The ML-KNIL had five combat GROUPS:
I, II, and III were bomber groups
IV, and V were fighter groups.

Within the three bomber groups there were (I believe) six squadrons:
1-VLG-I
2-VLG-I
1-VLG-II
1-VLG-III
2-VLG-III
3-VLG-III

Thus, I believe, when an additional squadron was formed from reserve aircraft it was named 7th Squadron.

Agreed, I was going a bit quick around the bend I guess but that´s what i meanth. 3 in Singapore and 2-VLG-III back with the added 7th.

Interesting, several Dutch sources mention a number between 116 and 120, the best break up I can give is:
13 WH-1
26 WH-2
39 WH-3
39 WH-3A
Making it a total of 117, which seems exactly the difference to make up a second ´squadron´ for II group

I find it confusing that a 3 plane bomber patrol is to small, but in your previous posts you do aggree with independent 4 plane fighter patrols.

Dissagree (see above) that that is a correct total, think it should be 117 (Casius & Postma-40 jaar luchtvaart in Indie / P.C. Boer-De Luchtstrijd om Indie: Operaties van de Militaire Luchtvaart KNIL in de periode Dec. 1941-Mar. 1942 / J.W.T. Bosch-De Militaire Luchtvaart van het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger in oorlog 8 Dec. 1941-10 Mar. 1942 etc. etc.)

As I also come across different accounts I find it hard to believe all of them would be mistaken and mention a non existing unit.

I don´t really see the problem with withdrawing/combining, pretty much the same result as taking from the pool and much closer to what happened irl. (and atleast with the advantage that later in the war you might get the unit back upgraded and up to strenght.
The way it is now 25 planes will appear out of nowhere, it´s not like they had a bunch of them standing ready to fill up loses. And if they had, there would definately be a 2-VLG-II thereby avouding this whole discussion)

Well yes, that always gives some reason for confusion because of the differnce in language and oranisation. But in this case I think the confusion lies with you (if you don´t mind me saying). Aggree with your statement above, but then we get into the misunderstanding part. The basic unit in the KNIL (as opposed to in the MLD) was the GROEP, not the afdeling/squadron (notice the recon ´adelingen are all especially mentioned as ´ independent c.q. ´not belonging to a group´, something ya wouldn´t need to add if it was the basic unit) Now I aggree you can name the parts (afdelingen) of the group squadrons for clarity. This indeed means 3 bomber with you say 6 (I say 7) squadrons and 2 fighter groups with 6 squadrons. But then it get´s interesting… there is D-VI-A, what you call the (independent) transport squadron. But in Dutch sources it is the transportGROEP making it the 6th GROEP (Depot-Vliegtuiggroep VI-Adeling). However because this group is made up of one afdeling/squadron the names groep and afdeling are interchangeable. Now we come to the 7th ´afdeling´. As this is a ´thrown together´ bomber formation of one afdeling not attached to anything else, again the names are interchangable. So what in english you could call 7th squadron in Dutch would be the 7th afdeling/groep, making it GROEP VIII.
Now what has happened I summise however is that because it had no administrative organisation, and Groep III was only one afdeling, VII was atached to III making up a group with 2 afdelingen again. This however did not mean that a unit called 7th ´squadron´was added to goup III, but that VII was attached to II to form one unit.

lol… Iknow I made a mess of that explenation, so in short.. yes you are right, there were 5 COMBAT groups, but then add the 6th TRANSPORT group, which makes the 7th added bomber ´squadron´ actually the 7th GROUP seeing that it was unattached to any other group and the GROEP is the basic unit (notice it says it was attached to III group, not incorporated into it).

Wish i could explain it better but in Dutch there are different words for different situations which in English I only know how to discribe with one and the same word.

edit:

Just an adition about the B-10 Series “Martin Bombers”:

´The Dutch were the best customers, buying 120 planes in four different versions for the defense of their rich Indonesian colonie´s.´

*The Glenn L. Martin Maryland Aviation Museum*

< Message edited by Dutchgy2000 — 3/7/2005 4:52:38 AM >

The total Dutch purchase of Martin Model-139 was 120 units (in 4 sub-models). Of these 95 are reported operational as of December 8, 1942. You are very correct that my total of the operational units and the pool is incorrect. The difference is the 9 aircraft of 7e Afdeling that are apparently still in the “pool” at this time. I will reduce the pool to 16.

Yes, I do feel the 4-aircraft detachments on Borneo are worth including and I do not feel the 3 aircraft WH-1 Patrouille is worth including.

There are many good points in this discussion but I am not convinced that another bomber squadron named 2-VLG-II should be added. I remain convinced by  2-VLG-II was redesignated 3-VLG-III.

Source

Matrix Games Forums

Dutch hurricanes

__________

 (4) Japanese Capitulation Java Postal history Cover

Sent  from Bandung February 17^th, 1942 to Tjiandjoer arrived in february,28^th cannot bring to the address because situation one month this cover still in Tjiandjoer  and send to sender but cannot found  and the letter send back to sender April, 4th 1942 . this  very rare potal history cover , postally used cover from DEI Armed forces Headquater Bandung official free stamp covers and return back to Dai Nippon Occupation Military Headquater Bandung

In this month all the post office in Java not operational the letter send from Bandung February 17 1942 to Tjiandjoer arrived in february,28th, but cannot bring to sender because of the Dai nippon landed at Merak and marching to Jakarta (batavia) March,5th and capitulation Kalidjati Armyport March,8th 1942. this letter send to sender but cannot found  and the sletter send back to sender April, 4th 1942 .

Please look carefully this  very rare historic postal used cover from DEI Armed forces Headquater Bandung official free stamp covers and return back to Dai Nippon Occupation Military Headquater Bandung below

 

 

 

front

 

 

 

 

back

 

 

 

March 9^th,1942

At Fort Menari,

Frank Samethini and his comrades obeyed the command with heavy hearts:

In bitter silence they come, from the firing positions, from the big guns so perfectly camouflaged against air attack.

 

They come to pile arms and ammunition in one big heap before the commander’s bunker.

 

This has been ordered by the Imperial Japanese Army, which will arrive to take over tomorrow.

 

 We all go to the canteen to drink, and drink. “Here’s to victory, blast the Japs!” sounding hollow and desperate. [13]

Han heard the report of capitulation at a hospital in Malang.

By this time he’d recovered sufficiently from the malaria to get back on his feet.

He surrendered to the local Japanese occupation troops on March 9.

In his own words, “I marched straight from the hospital to the POW camp.”

 

Reflecting on the lopsided struggle that was the NEI Campaign over 40 years later, he commented sadly, “We had rifles, some machine guns, some artillery, and a few tanks.

They gave us a little bit of training. But we were not really an army. We were just a police force.” [14]

After more than three centuries of proud mastery in the East Indies, the Dutch had been overthrown in just three months

(ibid Elizabeth Van Kampen)

On 12 March 1942

 the senior British, Australian and American commanders were summoned to Bandung where the formal instrument of surrender was signed in the presence of the Japanese commander in the area,

 Lieutenant-General Masao Maruyama,

 who promised them the rights of the Geneva Convention for the protection of prisoners of war.

 

Other Australians captured on Timor (from 2/40th Infantry Battalion, a component of Sparrow Force) were transferred to Java and Singapore, and then to Thailand, Japan and elsewhere. Australian troops were imprisoned in several camps in Java, particularly Bandung camp, under Lieutenant Colonel E. E. “Weary” Dunlop. In October 1942 this group and others were moved to Makasura, near Batavia. In January 1943, as part of the 900-strong Dunlop Force (under Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop) the prisoners were transported from Java to Konyu, Thailand

Source

Beyond Wallacia

Wallacia denotes the overlapping of Asian and Australian bio-geographical areas. This ensures an interesting mix of species.

ANZAC Day in Indonesia 70 years after the Battle of Java

 

THERE IS AN EXTRA EFFORT

 this year to inform Australian residents in Indonesia of commemorations marking ANZAC Day –

 the memorial day shared by Australia and New Zealand. In Jakarta, the capital city, the Dawn Service is traditionally held in the picturesque Allied War Cemetery in Menteng Pulo.

Unlike Dawn Services in Australia conducted by the RSL, Jakarta’s for some reason continues a specific Christian reference; perhaps this is due to the sharing of management with the New Zealand Embassy. Regardless, as in the cities and towns in Australia and New Zealand, the event continues to grow in numbers, including, over recent years, a delegation from the Indonesian Legion. 

In East Kalimantan on Borneo island, the Indonesia Australia Business Council is publicising the Balikpapan Dawn Service alongside its special networking event the evening before.

 

 

This year’s commemoration should have special significance to Australians; it marking the 70^th anniversary of the Japanese Army’s occupation of Malaya and Singapore (and capture of six Australian battalions), their invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), their bombing of northern Australia and the Australian militia’s resistance to their attack along the Kokoda Track in New Guinea until relieved by regular army units.

 

IT WAS THE END OF A TIME WHEN AUSTRALIA

relied on British embassies and missions for its diplomatic representation – the first two embassies only being opened in Tokyo and Washington in 1940 – and when the Australian government’s only independent sources of economic and military intelligence in the region was from private business executives and the thin network of federal and state trade commissioners.

 

One such contributor was Gordon Bowden, an experienced Shanghai-based trader, who was recruited to establish an Australian Trade Office in that city in 1935, just 18 months before Japan’s declaration of war on China.

 Japan’s invasion caused the closure of the office in 1940 and Bowden was relocated to Singapore as Australian Commissioner. From there he warned the Australian government of the worsening military situation and the inadequacy of Singapore’s defences.

On 9 Feb 1942,

the day before the Japanese entered the island, he reported he could leave immediately on a cargo ship; however he was instructed to stay at his post as Australia’s most senior civilian official otherwise Canberra “would be deprived of independent information and effect on morale would be bad’. 

 

On 15 Feb,

after the British surrender, he and two colleagues escaped on a small boat to Sumatra where they were intercepted and forced to land on Bangka island.  At Muntock, Bowden tried to explain his diplomatic status but was then beaten by Japanese guards and taken outside. According to later reports, was shot after being forced to dig his own grave.

 

MEANTIME ON JAVA, AUSTRALIA’S TRADE COMMISSIONER to the Dutch-controlled East Indies, Herbert Anton Peterson, moved his office from Batavia (now Jakarta) to Bandung as the Japanese navy won sea battles in the Sunda Straits and Java Sea.

His wife was safely back in Australia but he had already lost one son in airborne operations and another was a POW in Italy.

In Bandung, Peterson visited Australian women who had decided to remain with their families and distributed cash to those who needed it. Austrade’s local staff hid Trade Commission documents, closed the office and disbursed until the end of the Japanese occupation.  

On 3 Mar,

 Paterson drove all-night from Bandung to Chilacap where he boarded a small, 1,200 t Dutch freighter with other diplomats (including the British Consul-General, staff and families) and 2,000 others. HMAS Ballarat was the very last vessel to leave Chilacap that day.

 

 

AT 09:00 ON 8 MAR,

 THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the Allied forces, Ter Poorten, announced the surrender of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army in Java. On 12 Mar, the senior British, Australian and American commanders were summoned to Bandung where the formal instrument of surrender was signed in the presence of the Japanese commander in the area, Lieutenant-General Masao Maruyama, who promised them the rights of the Geneva Convention for the protection of prisoners of war.

 

Other Australians captured on Timor (from 2/40th Infantry Battalion, a component of Sparrow Force) were transferred to Java and Singapore, and then to Thailand, Japan and elsewhere. Australian troops were imprisoned in several camps in Java, particularly Bandung camp, under Lieutenant Colonel E. E. “Weary” Dunlop. In October 1942 this group and others were moved to Makasura, near Batavia. In January 1943, as part of the 900-strong Dunlop Force (under Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop) the prisoners were transported from Java to Konyu, Thailand.

 

 

 

 

By the end of March,

the vast area of sea and land from New Guinea and northwest Australia to central Burma, which had formed ABDACOM, was under Japanese control. Only to the north, in the Philippines, where American and Filipino troops still stood fast, had the Japanese failed to meet their timetable of conquest.

On 31st March 1942

a Japanese ship arrived at Pangkalanboen (or Koemai).

Retreat into the jungle-covered mountains was considered, but the bitter experience of the past few weeks had made it clear that troops could not long survive the trying climatic conditions. The order to surrender was therefore given

2.April 1942

1) April,1^st 1942

a) on 1st April 1942

all arms were surrendered. At Kotawaringin airfield was stationed a small Dutch force (ca. 250 men).

This garrison was never engaged in any fighting and they probably laid down their arms on the same day the British did.

In the ten weeks since leaving Kuching 2/15th Punjab had fought many actions, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, and had traveled under most adverse conditions over 800 miles through extremely difficult country.

They had carried with them their light automatics, rifles and ammunition. As

 

 General Percival

 has said, it was ‘a feat of endurance which assuredly will rank high in the annals of warfare. It says much for the morale of this fine battalion that it remained a formed and disciplined body to the end.’

Read more

 

 

General Arthur Percival, ill-fated British commanding officer in Singapore, Olga and Maisie Prout, the brave sisters who defied the Japanese during the occupation of the island colony and Captain William ‘Bill’ Drower, the man the Japanese couldn’t kill. Their dramatic stories are told in The Battle for Singapore

 

b) April,1^st 1942

DEI Marine Defendwork Offive Letter during DN landing at west and Central Java.

 

 

DEI Marines 1942

Very rare Letter from Marine Defensiewerk (Defense Worl office) sign by the chief van Schooninveld.

the conduete latter of B Kasiman who work as opzichert (civilian official) at the Soerabaya Marine office from August 1941 to March 1942,

the letter date April 1st 1942.
(Ill.6) The DEI Marine Soerabaya letter during DN landing west java, caption DEI Marine letter 1942

except Surabaya the DEI Govement still operation :

(a)The DEI marine still issued the recomendations letter

 

(b)the PTT  still issued the telephone  bill for april 1942.look below at April collections

Soerabaia April.1st 1942 .(Surabaja.)

Ned.indie. 15 cent Revenue stamp .PTT Phone Bill.

 

 

 

a.Front

 

 

 

 

b. back

 

 

At back handwittten

The man had gone,later he pay himself

Original info

orangnya masih pergi nanti dibayar sendiri

 

(2) Soerabaia .April, 3^rd.1942,

The Chinese overseas shop  Oei Khong Hwa Surabaya Recieved Of Buying Breadpaper, DEI 15 cent Revenue stamped

 

 

 

 

 

(3) Malang April,14th 1942,

the DEI overtoon document (Surat hutang) handwritten surcharge to Indonesia Language ,the DEI change to Pemerintah Balatentara Dai Nippon(DN army Government) with DEI Revenue 15 cent

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(4) Bandung,27 april 1942

.source Dai Nippon club netherland

Off cover DEI Koninjnenberg 10 cent used CDS 27.4,42

Unusual used because the DEI Queen stamp forbidden to used in Java and never seen this stamps with Dai Nippon overprint(different from simatra and eastern area all the qoueeen stamps were overprint with different type of every area,looki e-book The Dai Nippon occupation Sumatra and eastre area)

All the Japanese second phase operations were to be completed by

the end of April,

 in time to meet possible attack from the Soviet Union, which, the Japanese believed, would come in the spring, if it came at all that year.

 

5.May 1942(1942)

(1) Koedeos May,3th.1942,

Koedoes,Recieved of Dai Nippon Postal saving bank(Chokin kyoku ) with the chokin  label and book

 

 

 

(2) Situbondo May,14th 1942 ,

Sitoebondo,Legalization of Radio Permit of DEI 1941 document with DEI revenue that time,no Dai Nippon special revenue (all the radio band were closed only open for Dai nippon channel only)

Inside

 

Frontside

 

Legalized DEI C7 Adress card with Kon stamp 10 cent issued at Batoe Malang east java ,by Dai nippon Dutch char change to  Indonesian language with handwritten

 

 

 

 

 

Beside the road in jakarta,dai nippon put their  propaganda radio on the pole,look the book illustration from magazine july 2602

 

6. June 2602

(1) June 11th 2602

DEI Postal stationer CDS Bandoeng send to Semarang.(all DEI postal issued without Queen Wilhelmina picture permit to used without overprint in Java.This is the earliest postal stationer card used during Dai Nippon Occupation Java.

 

 

7.July 2602

Beside the road in jakarta,dai nippon put their  propaganda radio on the pole,look the book illustration from magazine july 2602

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(1)  Soerakarta(solo) july,7th 2602

 

billing recieved, DEI Revenue,and Dai nippon Calender date 4 Juli 2602(1942)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2)July,11th 2602,

The Dai nippon Liscence to print a book at the front page

 

 

 

Lieutenant Colonel Hatsuo Tsukamoto leading his infantryman to assault Kokoda village and airfield (New Guinea july 1942)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.August 2602

info from other area

 

 

RESULTS OF AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT on Tanambogo, which the Marines requested in order to halt enemy fire hindering their progress on Gavutu. Gavutu Island, on left, is connected with Tanambogo by a stone causeway and is about a mile and three quarters to the east of Tulagi Island. These islands form the western side of Gavutu Harbour where the Japanese had developed a seaplane base. On 7 August 1942, concurrent with landings on Guadalcanal, marines landed on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Florida Islands.

 

TROOPS LANDING ON FLORIDA ISLAND. Occupation of the island group, Tulagi and its satellites, was accomplished in three days- The enemy garrisons were wiped out except for about 70 survivors who made their way to Florida Island. Mopping-up operations on Florida continued for a few weeks.

 

MORTAR CREW IN ACTION on Guadalcanal. The mortar is an 81-mm. Ml on mount Ml. On the evening of 8 August, the airfield on Guadalcanal was in U.S. hands. During the following weeks enemy attempts to retake the airfield were repulsed. On 7 October six Marine battalions attacked westward to prevent the enemy from establishing positions on the east bank of the Matanikau River.

.

 

info from Java

In august

Japanese news agency formed with the motto A Three Movements Nippon Light of Asia, Asia and Nippon Nippon Chief Patron Asia for determination to implement  residents to stand fully behind the government army Dai Nippon, because established officials supported Civil m Military did not   supporting.

Original info

Kantor berita  Jepang membentuk  Gerakan Tiga A dengan semboyan  Nippon Cahaya Asia, Nippon Pelindung Asia dan Nippon Pemimpin Asia untuk menanamkan tekad penduduk agar berdiri sepenuhnya dibelakang Pemerintah Balatentara Dai Nippon , karena didirikan pejabat Sipil tidak didukung Militer (Alamsyah,87)

August,1^st.1942

Bondowoso

Map

 

This route can be reached from Bondowoso

 

 

 

Picture

 

The green, terraced hills of Bondowoso Photo

 

The Samethini home at Bondowoso on the sugar plantation (circa 1920)

(119.MB,Martoadmodjo B. handwritten Diary about his work at Japanese logistic stations at Djoerang Koeda Village Bondowoso east Java which thrown away after his pass away in 1990 ,faound and became Dr Iwan collections, never publish)

a.Send to Soetedjo Pasoeroean  17 bags(karung) Rice Toeton( double type) ,the price  f 5,90(  discount f 4 per kwintal)

b.(Meeting with)Kentyo Djoerangsapi village(cow valley DS)about the gudang(store) near Djoerangsapi, Wates, Mogli and Rawatamioe

look the picture of East Java’s Map Below

c, Remboek(meeting) with Mr Kayama about Kacang Kedele(soya beans) and Rice Toeton  for “Balatentara Dai Nippon”(The Dai Nippon Army)

d. Telephone from Mr Kafrawi that “Tempe” (javanese native food which made from soya beans)not yet exist

 

August,2nd,1942

Sunday

August,6th,1942

Telephone from Mr Soerjadi that M.J. Formosa must sell”enceran” (grocier) and about Coconut oil  and soap he obey to received from another grocier(Pengencer).(118 MB)

August,8th,1942

Telp.from Mr Soerdjadi that all the rice  sending by IRA ship must have Izin(liscense)(119 MB)

on the 11th of August 1942

in that I read in the Dutch newspaper, De Telegraaf, that many more people had seen what my father and I witnessed that day in 1942.  Other people had seen many of these men transported in bamboo baskets not only in trucks but also in trains. The article said that the men had been pushed into the bamboo baskets, transported, and then, while still in those baskets, thrown into the Java Sea. Most of the men in the bamboo baskets were Australian military.

I have often wondered: Did my father learn what happened to those poor men we saw that day? Did   the local people see it as well? I shall never know.

Come! Let’s walk home

It was strange that we didn’t get Japanese military visitors at Sumber Sewu since they went to Wonokerto the head plantation and other plantations as well, and asked many questions there. My parents were of course more than pleased that the Japanese hadn’t visited Sumber Sewu yet(ibid Elizabeth Van Kampen

August,15th,1942

(121.NOB,the dai Nippon Occupation Java’s Order Book 1942-1944,Collections Dr Iwan)

Law No.27
About
Changes in Local Governance
Amended by Act No. 2602 19th year
08/15/1942

Article 1
Throughout Java except Kooti (vorstelanden) divided into Syuu, Si, Ken, Gun, and My Son ‘
Article 2
Syuu area equal to the “Residentie” first, concerned with the rules set preformance Syuu other legislation
Article 3
Area “Syuu” divided up “Si” and “Ken”.
Area “Si” is equal to the “Stadgemente” (City government) first
Area “Ken” sam with the ‘Regeantschaap “(District) first, unless the area is used as” Si “
Area “Ken” is divided into “Gun” and the “Gun” is divided into “Son”, while “Son” is divided into “my”
Daeran “Gun”, “Son” and “I” respectively as the “District”, “Underdistrict” and “Village” is made in advance unless the “Si”
Article 4
In the Si, Ken, Gun, My Son and each appointed a Si Tyoo (mayor), Ken Tyo, Guntyo, Sontyo and kutyo (village head)
Government rules that once defined for Stadgemnete (Mayor’s office), regentschaap, district, and village onderdistrict valid also for Si, Ken, My Son and unless there are special rules.
Article 5
“Si” named by Gunseikan (Dai Nippon armies Government Authorities) called “Tokubetu Si” (Stadtgemente Extraordinary)
For “Si Tokubetu” will be a special aturn
Rider
This Act came into force on 8 years 8 months Syowa 17 (2602).
Government affairs by Regeant, district officer, assistant district officer, village heads and village heads or Wijkmeester respectively in the Si region, starting at the time this law was announced in. Sityo power.
Create an incoming government affairs Sityo power according to the rules of paragraph 2 above shall also apply the rule set out paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Regulations Governing the first set for regeanstchap, District, and Wijk Onderdistrict and villages.
Sityo (mayor), Kentyo (district officer), and Kutyo (village head) of each appointed Chief of city government, Regeantschaap, and the village as agencies that take care of their own households and the government have their respective areas.

First regulations on local Governance is no longer valid except to the extent specified in Article 4 ayat2 in this Act and the regulations made Kooti
In addition to the above Supplementary Regulations, the Special Regulations will also set out the need to carry this legislation

Djakarta , date 4 years 5 months Syowa 17 (2602)
Commander of the army Dai Nippon

Original info

Undang-Undang No.27

Tentang

Perubahan Tata Pemerintahan Daerah

Diubah dengan Undang undang no 19^th tahun 2602

15.8.1942

Pasal 1

Seluruh Jawa kecuali KOOTI(vorstelanden) terbagi atas Syuu, Si, Ken,Gun,Son dan Ku’

Pasal 2

Daerah Syuu sama dengan daerah”Residentie” dahulu, aturan yang bersangkutan dengan Syuu ditetapkan dalm undang-undang lain

Pasal 3

Daerah “Syuu” dibagi atas “Si” dan “Ken”.

Daerah “Si” sama dengan daerah”Stadgemente”(pemerintah Kota) dahulu

Daerah “Ken” sam dengan daerah ‘Regeantschaap”(Kecamatan)  dahulu,kecuali daerah yang dijadikan “Si”

Daerah”Ken”  dibagi atas  “Gun” dan daerah “Gun”  terbagi atas  “Son” , sedangkan “Son” terbagi atas “Ku”

Daeran “Gun”,”Son” dan “Ku”  masing-masing sama dengan “District’,”Underdistrict” and ”Desa” dahulu kecuali daerah yang dijadikan”Si”

Pasal 4

Didalam Si,Ken,Gun,Son dan Ku masing-masing diangkat seorang Si Tyoo(walikota),Ken Tyo, Guntyo,Sontyo dan kutyo(Kepala desa)

Aturan pemerintah yang dulu ditetapkan untuk Stadgemnete(kantor Walikota) ,regentschaap, district,onderdistrict dan desa berlaku juga buat Si,Ken,Son dan Ku kecuali kalau ada aturan yang istimewa.

Pasal 5

“Si” yang ditunjuk[B1] [B2] [B3] [B4]  oleh Gunseikan(Pembesar Pemerintah Balatentara Dai Nippon) dinamakan “Tokubetu Si” (Stadtgemente Luar Biasa)

Untuk” Tokubetu Si” akan dibuat aturn yang istimewa

Pasal Tambahan

Undang-undang ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal 8 bulan 8 tahun syowa 17(2602).

Urusan Pemerintah oleh Regeant,Wedana,assisten Wedana,lurah dan kepala Kampung atau Wijkmeester yaitu masing-masing dalam daerah Si,mulai pada waktu undang-undang ini diumumkan masuk kekuasaan Sityo.

Buat urusan pemerintahan yang masuk kekuasaan Sityo menurut aturan ayat 2 diatas berlaku juga peraturan yang ditetapkan ayat 2 pasal 4 yaitu Peraturan Pemerintahan yang dulu ditetapkan untuk regeanstchap, District, Onderdistrict dan desa serta Wijk.

Sityo(walikota),Kentyo(Wedana),dan Kutyo(Kepala desa) masing-masing menunjuk Kepala Stadgementee,Regeantschaap, dan desa sebagai badan-badan yang mengurus Rumah tangga sendiri dan yang mempunyai daerah Pemerintahan  masing-masing.

Peraturan-peraturan dulu tentang Tata Pemerintahan daerah tidak berlaku lagi kecuali sepanjang ditetapkan pada ayat2 pasal 4 dalam Undang-undang ini serta peraturan buat KOOTI

Selain Peraturan Tambahan yang tersebut diatas ini, akan ditetapkan juga Peraturan Istimewa yang perlu untuk menjalankan undang-undang ini

Djakarta Tanggal 5 bulan 4 tahun Syowa 17(2602)

Panglima besar Balatentara Dai Nippon

 

 August,17th,1942

Conference with Guntyo Majong (village0) about the Dai Nippon;s  goods(barang-barang), hal yang sama dengan Mr Soeharto from Rambipoedji (Village)

The Train schedule from Djoerangsapi Village to

 Bondowoso

Depature 7.11 arrive  9.08

Depature  8.07 arrived  11.02

Departure 2.40 arrived 4.14

Depatured 4.25 arrived 5.50

(119,MB)

 

 

August,18th,1942

Telp. From Mr Soeparto that  all izin (liscence) of BTK(Bu Tai Kyo-the office of  Japanese Government headquarters) is postpone (ditunda)  for Asking permission from the Japanese  Civil employee at Bondowoso byinterlocal telp. And Old Permission liscence didn’t “Berlaku lagi” (expired)(119 MB)

The Conference(meeting) with all Basoeki Syuu members about many thing(119-MB)

August,20th,1942

Interlocal telp from Mr Kafrawi , and also Telp from Kho about  20 Blik(metal container) for BO , 15 Blik(Tin) for  Stb(Situbondo).

Meeting(conferentie) with  H.Moenir(Kapoer village) about Chinese Kapoer urus(manage) with Mr Patih.

PAPERI asking   beslahan(confiscated ) Shirt ”, soap 9 box for BO  and 5 for Djoerangkuda village(119 MB)

August,21st,1942

 The Bondowoso Nipponkonse There  are mistake  , the meeting starting 10.30 am   at  Mr Patih home (119 MB)

August,24 th ,1942

Telp from M rang sing about Soya beans(Kedelai) , coconut oil and soap (distribution) (119.MB)

9.September 1942

September,1^st, 1942

Telp from Nippon Kanse about 46 blik (Tin) coconut oil  for Mrs Formosa, Mr Soengkir also hear(that) (119 MB)

September 7th, 1942

Meeting with Mr Soehandi from Amboeloe village , Mr soemadi from Boloeng village ,Mr Soetrisno and Mr  soerjo from Tanggoel village. Also Mr Tjokro from Kentjong village(119 MB)

September 8th, 1942

Mr Patih promise to inspekcted (periksa) about the Soap favric, the date delayed one week for waiting Dr Oetomo coming .

In the afternoon with Mr Aw KOOTI

Telp from Jadiska  Kaliasin 117 Soerabaja number telp J 1273, about square Brankast(peti besi segiumpat-vierkand)  type AVB 55 x 35 x 30 cm  with money box(kas geldbakje)  and overrolling Mr Amer cylinder key(besloten) , the price without hangingkey(hangsloten) F 30.-  and with hanging key f 39.(119 MB)

September 11th, 1942

Telp from Mr Patih about Chinese soap Fabric this day will visit(besoek) , and this morning go to Mr Patih and I have tell his massage (to the soap fabric) about how many Boxes( production), when, sold to whom, with how much the price, and The Agent to be dealt with supervisor( controleur.)

(119 MB)

September 15th, 1942

 

Kempetei group

The Japanese Military Police (Kempeitai)

At 8.30 am  telp from

Bondowoso’s

 

 Kempetei

Bo

  about the situation/wealthy ‘s list of  Hai Kyu Kumiai Ima P.P.R.D and after that I do until 1.00 am night (jam satu malam) and send to The village Police(stadtpolitie)  Djoerangkoeda for deposited(dititipkan) at  morning  september 16^th to the  Police agent who will go to Bondowoso with Spoer(train) at 7.00 am.(119 MB)

 

Other kempetei images

 

 

 

 

 

The Kempeitai Office in the Semeru Street at Malang

Read more info about Kempetei

 

Kempeitai soldier Corporal Kawata,

 he participated in the evacuation of civilians from Iwo Jima in 1944. He decided to stay in the Iwo Jima after the evacuation of the civilians and died during the battle for the island

Is it the same kempeitai guy from Letters from Iwo Jima????

No, totally different.

This guy decided to stay and fight, while Shimizu was dishonorably dischgarged and sent to an island garrison.

 

Japanese Kempeitai officer, secret police.

 

Leden van de kempeitai verbinden een krijgsgevangene.

 

USS WASP

lists to starboard

, 15 September 1942,

 as smoke billows from the ship. Several men and a plane can be seen at the bow of the ship. This aircraft carrier, patrolling near Guadalcanal, was struck by three torpedoes from enemy submarines. Despite efforts of her crew, fires and explosions made such a shambles of the ship that she had to be sunk by her own men.

September 16th, 1942

September 18th, 1942

 

 

AUSTRALIA

 

 

 

AN AUSTRALIAN AIRFIELD,

18 September 1942.

 An Australian sentry is on guard near a Flying Fortress in right foreground as soldiers await planes to go to New Guinea (top) ; troops boarding a C-47 transport plane for New Guinea (bottom). During the last days of September 1942 the Allies launched a counterattack in Papua, New Guinea, thus starting the Papua Campaign- American troops for this action were sent to Port Moresby from Australia, partly by plane and partly by boat.

September 21th, 1942

September 26th, 1942

September 28th, 1942

NEW GUINEA

 

MEN WADING ACROSS THE SAMBOGA, near Doborlurn, New Cuinea. The enemy fell back under the weight of the

 28 September 1942

 attack. Australians laboriously made their way over steep mountain trails ol the Owen Stanley Range while most of the American troops, a total of about 4,900, were down overland to Jaure in C-47’s. This was the first large-scale airborne troop movement of the war. Troops from Milne Bay garrison occupied Goodenough Island early in November.

 

The imprint  revenue paper “2602  Zegel van Ned indie “ used Dai Nippon year but still used the same imprint zegel of DEI emblem, used at Magelang Polytechnic middle school certificate

 

 

 

 

 

 

10.October 1942

Info from other area

 

 

MARINES ON GUADALCANAL

 in October 1942 firing a 75-mm. pack howitzer MlAI mounted on carriage M8. Although this weapon was primarily used for operations in mountainous terrain, it was capable of engaging antitank targets.

 

FLYING FORTRESS ON A SORTIE

 over Japanese installations on Gizo Island in October 1942. Smoke from bomb strikes can be seen in the background. This ram was part of a series of air attacks on the enemy during the fight for Guadalcanal. Most of the B-17’s came from Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides. (Boeing Hying Fortress heavy bomber B-I7.)

 

 

NAVAL-AIR ACTION IN THE SOLOMONS,

 October 1942.

 The USS Hornet after a Japanese dive bomber hit the signal deck; note Japanese dive bomber over the ship and the Japanese torpedo bombing plane on left (top). The USS Enterprise, damaged during the one-day battle of Santa Cruz when a great Japanese task force advancing toward Guadalcanal was intercepted by a much weaker American task force (bottom). The American ships were forced to withdraw but the enemy turned and retired to the north instead of pursuing them.

 

 

DAMAGE AT HENDERSON FIELD

 following the bombardment of 13 and 14 October 1942 by enemy bombers and field artillery which severely damaged the runways and destroyed more than fifty planes. Japanese bombing at first was amazingly accurate. Smoking ruins are all that remain of an airplane hangar after a direct hit (top). Marines extinguish fire destroying a burning Grumman Wildcat fighter by the bucket brigade method (bottom). The raid also destroyed most of the ready ammunition available at the time.

 

 

ARMY TROOPS LANDING ON GUADALCANAL

 to reinforce the marines. B-17 giving protection to the landing forces; landing craft in left foreground is LCP(L), in the right foreground is LCP(R) (top). Four 37-mm. MS antitank guns on the beach (bottom).

On 13 October

 sorely needed reinforcements for the malaria-ridden marines started to arrive, and by the end of the year U.S. forces were strong enough to begin the final offensive on the island.

 

 

SURVIVORS OF THE SS PRESIDENT COOUDGE.

This transport struck an Allied mine in Pallikula Bay. Espiritu Santo Island, 26 October 1942. Of the 4,000 troops aboard, only two men were lost; however, vitally needed equipment and stores went to the bottom with the ship.

 

 

MUDDY TRAIL.

Trails such as this made the use of chains on wheeled vehicles imperative (top). Engineers, constructing a heavy-traffic bridge across the Matan-ikau River, lay planking over framework of palm tree logs (bottom), Advance on Guadalcanal was difficult and slow. Troops cleared the areas from which the final drive was to begin and pressure slowly increased against the enemy until the offensive was in full swing.

 

JEEPS ON NARROW TRAIL.

 This trail, having many grades approaching 40 degrees, was slick and dangerous after heavy rains and was of little use for heavier vehicles.

 

Info from Java

(1)one day at the end of October 1942,

when my father and I walked back home for lunch, we heard a lot of noise. It was the sound of trucks coming in our direction as we were walking on a main road. So we quickly walked off the road and hid behind some coffee bushes. We saw five trucks coming and we heard people screaming. When the trucks passed we could see and hear everything, especially since we were sitting higher than the road. What we saw came as a real shock to both of us.

We saw that the open truck platforms were loaded with bamboo baskets, a type of basket used to transport pigs. But the bamboo baskets we saw that day were not used for pigs but for men. They were lying crammed in those baskets, all piled up three to four layers of baskets high. This sight shocked us deeply, but the screaming of all those poor men, for help and for water, in English and Dutch, shocked us even more.

I heard my father softly saying; “Oh my God?”

We walked home without saying a word. We had just come out of a nightmare. Even today I can still hear the harsh voices of these poor men crying and screaming for help and for water.

At lunch time my father told my mother the whole story — she could hardly believe that people could do such things. She asked who were driving the trucks.

My father told her that in each truck he had seen a Japanese driver and another Japanese sitting next to them.

This tragedy that I saw together with my father happened in the mountains of East Java.

(ibid Elizabeth Van Kampen)

(2)October ,26th .2602(1942)

Tamanan Gun Cho(Tamanan was  an area  at East java -military Command),used DEI postal Stationer because this time  Dai Nippon Military Postalcard  not exist.

Nederland Indies Postal Stationer Karbouw 3 ½ cent without Dai Nippon Overprint postal used send from Tamanan )east Java) Gun Cho(Dai nippon military chief) black round dai Nippon army hand chop to vice agent Hasankansei (unidentified)Kyoku(office) at Bondowoso(East Java)

 

Tamanan.26 oktober ,2602(1942)

Dengan hormat

Membalas tuan punya surat tanggal 21 ini bulan

Saya hatur periksa bahwa isi rumahnya Kwan A Ko

Saya taksir semuanya  kurang lebih  ada f(guklden) 50.-

Barang took yang terdiri dari sarung, kain-kain dan songket

menurut taksiran saya ada f(gulden) 400,-

ini barang-barang (di)dapatnya (dari) hutang dari ia punya juragan(majikan)

Tamanan Guncho

Sato

 

English translate

With respect

Reply to a letter dated 21 this month
I check that the contents of  Kwan A Ko ‘s home
I estimate there are all less than f (guilders) 50. –
Took goods consisting of gloves, and songket fabrics
according to my estimates there are f (guilders) 400, –
This stuff he found  by debt from his boss
Tamanan Guncho
Sato

11.November 2602

Info from other area

 

 

JAPANESE TRANSPORTS AFIRE

 off the coast of Guadalcanal, 15 November 1942. A group of eleven transports proceeding to Guadalcanal were intercepted by aircraft from Henderson Field. Seven ships were sunk or gutted by fire. Four were damaged and were later destroyed near Tassafaronga Point where they had been beached

 

 

MEN CROSSING AN IMPROVISED FOOTBRIDGE, 15 November. From the 10tht troops advanced as rapidly as possible along the muddy trails and waded, often breast high, through streams to approach Buna. A surprise attack on Buna was not possible as Australian patrols had learned that “bush wireless” carried the news of the American airborne movement to the Japanese,

 

AERIAL VIEW OF THE TERRAIN NEAR DOBODURA. The rugged terrain of Papua includes the high Owen Stanley Range, jungles, and impassable, malaria-infected swampy areas as well as coconut plantations and open helds ot coarse, shoulder-high kunai grass encountered near Buna. Only one rough and steep trail existed over the range from the Port Moresby area to the front, taking from 18 to 28 days to traverse on foot; however, American troops and supplies flown over the range made the trip in about 45 minutes.

AUSTRALIA

 

MEN BOARDING THE ARMY TRANSPORT GEORGE TAYLOR

in Rrisbaine, Australia,

 for New Guinea on 15 November. The Papua Campaign and the almost simultaneous action on Guadalcanal were the first victorious operations of US ground forces against the Japanese.

 

Info from Java

(1)one day in November 1942

My parents received a phone call from the police in nearby

 

Ampelgading.

 

My father had to bring his car to the police station. It was summarily confiscated. Still, he was happy to have my company on this very difficult afternoon.

We went by car but– a real humiliation – we had to walk back home.

When my father came back from work, he said that he really hoped that the Americans and Aussies would come soon to rescue us all from this Japanese occupation of Indonesia.  Many Dutch civilian men were now interned all over Java, but not only men, as the Japanese had also started to open camps for women with their children as well.

We were still “free” but for how long?

(ibid  Elizabeth Van Kampen)

(2) November,9th 2602.Solo, the earliest Dai Nippon Plakzegel revenue Stamped.

 

12.December 2602

Info from other area

 

 

 

NEAR THE FRONT LINES,

 December 1942-

Natives of Guadalcanal, employed by the Army, carry supplies to the fighting lines (top) ; 37-mm, antitank gun MS in an emplacement guarding a bridge over the Matanikau River (bottom). The Japanese situation on the island had deteriorated rapidly by this time, partly because of the costly defeats suffered while attempting to bring in supplies and replacements.

 

BREX GUN CARRIERS, disabled in an attack on 5 December. These full-track, high-speed cargo carriers, designed to transport personnel, ammunition, and accessories, were produced for the British only. The presence of several Bren-gun carriers proved a surprise to the enemy. However, enemy soldiers picked off the exposed crews and tossed grenades over the sides of the carriers. In a short time they were all immobilized and infantry following behind them met with intense fire from the enemy’s defenses

 

NEW GUINEA

 

SOLDIERS CARRYING RATIONS ALONG A TRAIL for the troops at the front, 24 December. Only a few trails led from Allied positions to the enemy’s fortified areas at Buna and Sanananda. Food was so short during November and the early part of December that troops sometimes received only a small portion of a C ration each day. The rain, alternating with stifling jungle heat, and the insects seemed more determined than the enemy; disease inflicted more casualties than the Japanese.

 

FIRING A 60-MM. MORTAR M2 into the enemy lines at Buna Mission. Because of transportation difficulties which lasted until the end of November, only about one third of the mortars were brought with the troops- Allied attacks were made on both Sanananda and Buna with no material gains.

 

AMERICAN LIGHT TANKS MS, mounting 37-mm. guns, near the Duropa Plantation on 21 December 1942. During the latter part of December, tanks arrived by boat. Only one 105-mm. howitzer was used in the campaign and it was brought to the front by plane. After many set-backs, Buna Village was captured on 14 December. Although Allied attacks at various points were often unsuccessful, the Japanese, suffering from lack of supplies and reinforcements, finally capitulated on 2 January 1943 at Buna Mission.

 

U.S. SOLDIERS FIRING A 37-MM. GUN M3A1 into enemy positions. The 37-mm. gun was the lightest weapon of the field-gun type used by the U.S. Army. Japanese tactics during the Buna campaign were strictly defensive; for the most part the enemy dug himself in and waited for Allied troops to cross his final protective line.

 

A NATIVE DRAWING A MAP to show the positions of the enemy forces. In general, the islanders were very friendly to the Allies, their work throughout campaign, in moving supples over the treacherous trails and in rescuing Allied survivors of downed aircraft, was excellent.

 

 

INFANTRYMEN READY TO FIRE .30-CALIBER M1 RIFLES into an enemy dugout before entering it for inspection (top) ; looking at a captured Japanese antiaircraft gun found in a bombproof shelter in the Buna area (bottom). Enemy fortifications covered all the approaches to his bases except by sea, and were not easily discerned because of fast growing tropical vegetation which gave them a natural camouflage.

 

CONSTRUCTING A CORDUROY ROAD with the help of the natives in New Guinea. Constant work was maintained to make routes passable for jeeps. Construction of airstrips near Dobodura and Popondetta, underway by 18 November, was assigned the highest priority because of the lack of a harbor in the area. Some supplies were flown to the airstrips and some arrived by sea through reef-studded coastal waters near Ora Bay. The last vital transport link was formed by a few jeeps and native carriers who delivered the supplies to dumps just beyond the range of enemy small arms fire.

 

.

 

 

 

Info from Java

(1) December,25th.1942

Christmas 1942

My mother did her utmost in the kitchen to prepare a nice Christmas meal. And then at last it was the 25th of December, 1942. It must have been around 12 noon when we started our delicious Christmas meal, sitting there all six happy around the table.

All of a sudden we heard Pa Min calling; “Orang Nippon, orang Nippon.” (lit. Japanese).  My father stood up and went to the front door, my mother took little Jansje by her hand and they went to the living room. Cora went to our bedroom with a book; she was very scared.  Henny and I stood at the back of the house and so we could see that there were about six or seven Japanese military getting out of two cars. One of them was an officer. Directly approaching my father, he said that his men had received an order to search the house for weapons. My father told him that there were no weapons hidden in the house.

It was our last Christmas as a whole family together. I can still feel the special warmth of that gathering we had that day because, notwithstanding the Japanese military visit, we were still together(ibid Elizabeth Van Kampen)

 

(2)December,31th 2602.

the document of Dai Nippon lend the Car

1)original document

 

2) translate of the document

 

 

–

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Footnotes

1. Memos, Gerow for Marshall, 176 Dec 41, sub: Memo for President (not used); Stark for President, 3 Dec 41, no sub, both in WPD 4557.

2. Notes on mtg of newspaper correspondents with Gen Marshall, 15 Nov 41. The notes were made by the correspondents, one of whom supplied the author with his copy.

3. Hull, Memoirs, II, 1111; Mins, CofS Mtg, 10 Dec 41, WSCSA Conf II.

4. Telg, U.S. Ambassador, Chungking, 8 Dec 41, WPD 4389-42; Memo, Laughlin Currie for Pres, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4389-46; Rad, Magruder to Secy War, No. 95, 11 Dec 41, WPD Msg File. For full story of this incident, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), ch. II.

5. Rads, Roosevelt to Chiang, 12 and 14 Dec 41; to Stalin, 13 Dec 41; Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41; Stalin to Chiang, 12 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, pp. 50-52.

6. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Missions to China, p. 57; Rads, Marshall to Brett, no. 71, 15 Dec 41, and Brett to Marshall, 27 Dec 41, WPD 4389-54 and 58, and other related papers in this file.

7. Rads, Marshall to Brink, No. 59, 15 Dec 41; Marshall to MacArthur, same date, both in WPD 4544-31.

8. Rad, Brink to Marl, 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179; Ltr, Brink to Marshall, 25 Dec 41, sub: Singapore Conf, WPD 4544-31; Rad, Duff Cooper, British Chairman of the Conf, no addressee, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4402-137.

9. Rad, Brink to Marshall, 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179; comments by Brink on Singapore Conf, attached to Rpt of Conf, WPD 4544-31.

10. Memo, Maj Elmer J. Rogers, jr., for ACofS WPD, 22 Dec 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore Conf, WPD 4544-31.

11. The minutes of the ARCADIA conference are bound separately and, with the records of the conference, are filed in ABC 337, ARCADIA. For accounts of the work of the conference, see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planing 1941-42, ch. V; Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. I, pp. 45-72; Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), chs. 15-17; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, ch. XX.

12. ABC-4/CS1, 31 Dec 41. The original British version of the final phrase reads “must speedily follow.”

13. ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41; JPC Rpt, 28 Dec 41, sub: Supporting Measures for SWP, ABC-4.3; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 1 Jan 42, WPD 4639.

14. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 25 Dec 41; Memo for File by Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Noted of Chiefs of Staff Conf, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4639.

15. Gerow, notes on White House Conf, 26 Dec 41, OPD Exec Files; mins of White House Conf, 26 Dec 41, WDSCA Conf I; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 457.

16. Mins, ARCADIA, 27 Dec 41.

17. ABC-4/5, Directive to Supreme Comdr in ABDA Area, 10 Jan 42. An earlier version of the directive can be found in the 30 December meeting of the conference, and the directive actually issued to Wavell is dated 2 January, the day after the President and Prime Minister approved it.

18. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 12 Jan 42, WPD 4639-14. For additional papers on this subject, see WPD 4639-19.

19. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, pp. 61-63; Rads, Marshall to Barnes, Nos. 206 and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42, both in WPD 4628-25; CCS 8, 24 Jan 42, sub: Inclusion of Darwin in ABDA, ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42).

20. ABC-4/5, Directive for the Supreme Commander, 2 Jan 42. A copy is printed in general Wavell’s account entitled “ABDACOM,” app. A, copy in OCMH.

21. Notes on White House Mtg, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs.

22. Mins, ARCADIA, 11 and 12 Jan 42; ann. 1 to 10th Mtg, 12 Jan 42; CofS Conf, 12 Jan 42, ABC 3376 ARCADIA; White House Conf, same date, OPD Reg. Docs.

23. JB 325, ser 729. For a full discussion of this subject, see Vernon E. Davis, Origins of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, vol. I, Organizational Development, ch. V, History of the JCS in World War II.

24. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg. 13 Jan 42; Post ARCADIA Collaboration, 10 Jan 42, an. Mins, ARCADIA, 10 Jun 42.

25. Mins, ARCADIA Mtg. 13 Jan 42.

26. ABC-4/CS 4, 14 Jan 42, sub: Post-ARCADIA Collaboration; Mins, ARCADIA Mtg, 14 Jan 42, an. 2.

27. Davis, Origins of Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, I, p. 269.

28. 25th Army Opns in Malaya, Japanese Studies in World War II, 85; Despatch by Lt Gen A.E. Percival, Opns of Malaya Command, 8 Dec 41-15 Feb 42, Supplement to the London Gazette, February 20, 1948; Kirby, et.al., The Loss of Singapore, chs. XIV, XVII.

29. Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ (rev. ed.), Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, pp. 42-43.

30. Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies in World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in Invasion of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 17, pp. 18-20; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 280-281; Crave and Cate, AAF I, p. 380. The tenders were later converted into light carriers.

31. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 12 Jan 42; to Brereton, No. 52, same date, both in WPD Msg File; Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 1-2.

32. Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 16-18.

33. Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet, Leading up to War, 8 Dec 41 to 15 Feb 42, pp. 54-55, OCMH.

34. Rad, Wavell to British Chiefs of Staff, ABDA 48, 14 Jan 42; Memo, WPD for U.S. Secy CCS, 16 Jan 42, both in WPD 4619; Ltr, U.S. Secy CCS to Brig V. Dykes, 16 Jan 42, sub: Responsibility of Supreme Commander ABDA, ABC 381 SWPA (1-12-42).

35. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, 11 Jan 42, WPD 4639-14.

36. Rad, WD to Brereton, No. 52, 12 Jan 42, WPD 4628-20; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 930, same date, WPD 4639-14.

37. Rads, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 7 and 12, 15 and 16 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Wavell to Marshall, ABDA 71, 16 Jan 42; Marshall to Wavell, No. 25, same date; both in WPD 4639-19.

38. Rads, Barnes to Marshall, No. 130, 29 Jan 42; No. 138, 31 Jan 42, WPD Msg File; Marshall to Barnes, No. 206 and 223, 27 and 30 Jan 42; Marshall to Brett, No. 48, 27 Jan 42, all in WPD 4628-25.

39. Hart, Narrative of Events, Passim; Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), pp. 88-89; Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jan 42, sub: Comd in ABDA, WPD 4639-29; Rad, Brett to Marshall, ABDA 95, OPD Exec Files.

40. Hayes, The War Against Japan, ch. III, pp. 17-20.

41. Ibid., pp. 20-22; Hart, Narrative of Events; Mins, CCS Mtg, 10 Feb 42.

42. Rads, Marshall to Brett, No. 73, 4 Feb 42, WPD 4628-27; Brett to Marshall, 3 Feb 42, AB 371 (2-3-42).

43. Percival, Opns in Malaya; 25th Army Opns in Malaya, Japanese Studies in World War II, 85, pp. 58-110; Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 32-42; Kirby, et.al., The Loss of Singapore, ch. XXIV.

44. Rads, Wavell to CCS, 13 Feb 42, CCOS 7; Wavell to CCS, 15 Feb 42, CCOS 8, OPD ABDA Msg File.

45. For accounts of these operations, see Wavell, “ABDACOM,” pp. 52-67; Morison The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp.. 280-311; Craven and Cate, AAF, ch. I, ch X; Hist of Southern Army, Japanese Studies in World War II, 24, pp. 16, 19; Naval Opns in Invasion of NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 17, pp. 18-20, 22-23, 26-27; Ambon and Timor Invasions, Japanese Studies in World War II, 30, pp. 1-15.

46. Rad, Wavell to Prime Minister and Dill, 16 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

47. Mins, CCS Mtg, 17 Feb 42; Rads, CCS to ABDACOM, 17 and 21 Feb 42; ABDACOM to CCS, 19 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

48. For a full discussion of this matter, see Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, ser. I, vol. 4 “Australia in the War of 1939-1945” (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), pp. 442-65. Churchill’s account of this incident is somewhat different. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 155-66.

49. Rad, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 19, 20 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

50. Rads, CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 20 and 22, 21 and 22 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File; Marshall to Brett, No. 185, 21 Feb 42, WPD 4639-48; Mins, CCS Mtg, 21 Feb 42.

51. Rads, ABDACOM to CCS, COS 19 and 20, 22 and 23 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

52. Rad, H.J. Van Mook to Marshall, 22 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

53. Rad, Marshall to Van Mook, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4639-55; British COS to Joint Staff Mission, No. 76, 23 Feb 42, ABC 323.31 POA; Mins, CCS Mtg, 23 Feb 42; CCS to ABDACOM, DBA 23, 23 Feb 42, OPD ABDA Msg File.

54. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1083, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4639-54.

55. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 359-63; Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 396-98.

56. For an exciting account of the battle, see Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 342-59. An analysis of the battle is contained in Rear Adm William A. Glassford, Narrative of Events in the SW Pacific, 14 Feb-5 Apr 42, WDCSA 210.72 (5-20-42) SPA.

57. Invasion of the NEI, Japanese Studies in World War II, 16; Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 363-75; Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 397-98.

58. For an account of the campaign in Burma, see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, chs. III and IV.

59. 65th Brigade Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, p. 3; 14th Army Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 39, 60-62, 73-76. Most of the material covered in this chapter is treated at greater length in Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, chs. XV-XXII. For the convenience of the researcher, footnote references are to the original sources rather than to the author’s earlier volume.

60. USAFFE Field Orders 1 and 2, 6 and 7 Jan 42 and GO 3, 7 Jan 42, copies on OCMH.

61 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, apps. 3 and 20, p. 15.

62. 65th Brig Opns Rpt, Mt. Natib, pp. 33, 38.

63. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, N o. 108, 23 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East.

64. United States of America vs. Masaharu Homma, pp. 3062-63, testimony of Homma; pp. 2450, 2457, 2576, testimony of Lt. Gen. Takaji Wachi and Col. Yoshio Nakajima, National Archives; 14th Army Opns, Japanese Studies in World War II, 1, I, 116.

65. Rad, MacArthur to CG Bataan Service Comd, 6 Jan 42, AG 430 (25 Dec 41); Inventory of Rations, 3 Jan 42 AG 430.2 (3 Jan 42) both in Phil Rcds.

66 See Rpts of the QM Phil Dept in AG 319.1 (29 Jan 42) Phil Rcds.

67 Material on the prevalence of disease can be found in AG 440 (26 Jan 42) and AG 710 (24 Mar 42) Phil Rcds; Col Wibb E.W.. Cooper, Med Dept Activities in the Phil. ann. XIV or USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, copy in OCMH.

68 Cooper, Med Dept Activities, pp. 32-33, 55, 57-61.

69. Col Harry A Skerry, Comments on Engineer Hist, No. 18; Col Ray M. O’Day, Hist of 21st Div (PA), II, 39, both in OCMH.

70  Ltr Order, USAFFE to All Unit Comdrs, 15 Jan 42, sub: Msg from Gen MacArthur, copy in OCMH.

71. Ltr, MacArthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH. New York Times, December 21, 1941.

72. Col Richard C. Mallonée, Bataan Diary, II, 69, copy in OCMH.

73. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Gen) Far East. See also hi messages of 27 December and 1 January to the Chiefs of Staff, in same file and in WPD 4639-2.

74. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, Nos. 2 and 3, 1 Jan 42, WPD 4639-2.

75. Ibid.; Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 20, 7 Jan 42, AG 381 (17-41 Gen) Far East.

76. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 Jan 42, WPD 4639-2.

77 Memo, Gerow for CofS, 3 Jan 42, sub: Relief of Phil, WPD 4639-3. There is no record of formal approval of this s. Both Stimson and Marshall noted it, but made no comment.

78. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 9, 4 Jan 42; AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, No. 671, 5 Jan 42; COMINCH to CINCAF, same date; MacArthur to Marshall, No. 26; COMINCH to CINCAF; Brett to Marshall, No. 485, all dated 9 Jan 42 and in WPD Msg File.

79. Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 72, 17 Jan 42; Marshall to CG USAFIA, same date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East; Marshall to Brett, ABDA No. 26, same date, WPD 4560-9; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 949, same date, OCS 18136-196.

80. Rads, Brereton to TAG, 19 Jan 42; Marshall to Brereton, same date, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 1) Far East.

81. Rad, Brereton to Marshall, No. 88, 22 Jan 42; Barnes to TAG, No. 154, 2 Feb 42, both in AG 381 (11-27-41 sec 2A) Far East.

82. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 201, 4 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil. This message, as well as many others from MacArthur, was forwarded to the President.

83. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil.

84. Rads, Rt. Mills to Marshall, Nos. 226 and 227, 8 Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File. The first part of the message is addressed to Roosevelt and signed Quezon; the second to Marshall signed MacArthur. Ltr, MacArthur to Hoover, 21 Jul 59, OCMH.

85. Rad, Roosevelt to MacArthur for Quezon, No. 1029, 9 Feb 42, CofS Phil Sit File.

86. Rads, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb 42; Quezon to Roosevelt, No. 262, 12 Feb 42, both in OPD Exec Files.

87. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 297, 16 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 (2-17-42) Phil.

88. Rads, Hurley to Marshall, ABDACOM No. 2, 17 Feb 42, AG 381 (7-41 sec. 2B) Far East; 21 Feb 42, OPD 381 SWPA, sec. 1 case 21.

89. Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes, Rpt of Orgn of USAFIA; Maj Richard M. Leighton and Elizabeth Bingham, Development of U.S. Supply Base in Australia, both in OCMH.

90. Rpt of QM Opns in Phil Campaign, ann. of USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 29-40, 69-70, and app. A, Rpt of Opns, Cebu Depot, OCMH.

91. Rad, Hurley and Brett for Marshall, 483, 4 Mar 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 sec. 3) Far East.

92. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, 344, 22 Feb 42, WPD Ready Ref File, Phil.

93. Memos, Somervell for Marshall, 22 Feb 42, sub: Supply of U.S. Forces in Phil, OCS 18136-258; Marshall for Roosevelt, 24 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 4560-26, Marshall for Roosevelt, 28 Feb 42; sub: Blockade Runners, OCS (18136-268. Vice Adm. Bernhard H. Bieri (ret.), then one of the naval planners, recalled later that he never heard of this plan to use World War I destroyers and doubted that it had been submitted to the Navy. Anyone familiar with the steaming characteristics of these 1,000-ton destroyers and with the distances in the Pacific, he wrote, “would have crossed it out as a practical operations.” Ltr, Beiri to Hoover, 17 Jul 59, OCMH.

94. Messages dealing with these vessels can be found in AG 384.3 GHQ SWPA and in the Hist Br, OCT, SWPA, Phil Shipping.

95. Rpt, CTF 51 to CINCSWPA, 15 May 42; sub: Submarine Relief Activities, ser. FF6-4, A 16-3, copy in OCMH; Ltr, GHQ SWPA to CG US Air Service, 14 May 42, sub: Phil relief Shipments, AG4.3M.

96. Memo, Hurley for Marshall, 21 Feb 42, PD 381 SWPA, sec. 1, case 21.

97. Read Adm. Charles A. Moore, one of the Navy planners in February 1942, served on the panel that reviewed the present manuscript before publication. At that time, July 1959, he recalled that on several occasions he had mentioned to Secretary of State Cordell Hull the necessity for getting MacArthur out of the Philippines, and that it was Hull who finally went to the President with this suggestion. Notes of Panel meeting, 17 July 1959.

98. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, WDCSA 370.5 (3-17-42) Phil.

99. Rad, MacArthur to Roosevelt, No. 252, 11 Feb 42, OPD Exec Files.

100. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 14 Feb 42; MacArthur to Marshall, 15 Feb 42, both in WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil.

101. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) l; Eisenhower Personal Notebook entry of 23 Feb 42, copy in OCMH.

102. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1078, 22 Feb 42, CofS folder entitled MacArthur’s Move to Australia.

103. Frazier Hunt, MacArthur and the War Against Japan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944), p. 64. in this connection, se Jonathan m. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1945), pp. 1-5.

104 Rads, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 358, 24 Feb 42; Marshall to MacArthur, No. 1087, 25 Feb 42, both in WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Phil.

105. Rads, Marshall to MacArthur, 6 Mar 42, WDCSA 370.05 (2-17-42) Phil; Brett to Marshall, No. 760, 19 Mar 42, 371 (3-19-42); Rear Adm Francis W. Rockwell, Rpt on Gen MacArthur’s Evacuation, Office CNO, Naval Hist Div.

106 Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 482, 14 Mar 42, WDCSA 370.05 (2-17-42) Phil.

107. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 5, 21 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files.

108. Rpt of Harbor Defense of Manila Bay, ann. VIII of USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 42.

109. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story, p. 2.

110. Rpt of Harbor Defense, pp. 32, 42ff.

111. USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, p. 55.

112. Rad, Marshall to USAFIA, No. 740, 18 Mar 42, OPD 381, Phil, sec 1, case 13. The correspondence between Beebe and MacArthur is filed in AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA.

113. Rads, Roosevelt to CG USAFFE, No. 1198; Marshall to Wainwright, No. 1204, both dated 19 Mar 42, o. 1203, 20 Mar 42, OPD Exec Files.

114. MacArthur had acquired this control on 3 January 1942. Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Jan 42, WPD 3251-75.

115. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 3 Mar 42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA; Memo, Marshall for Pres, 22 Mar 42, sub: Comd in Phil; Rad, Marshall to MacArthur, No. 810, 22 Mar 42, both in OPD Exec Files.

116. Rad, MacArthur to Marshall, No. 19, 24 Mar 42, AG 311.23 (4 Feb 42) GHQ SWPA.

117 Jong A.P. de, Vlucht door de tijd; 75 jaar Nederlandse Luchtmacht, Unieboek B.V., 1988
118. Hurricane, E. Bishop, Airlife Publishing Limited, 1986.

119.MB(Martoatmodjo.B.)hand written Diary about his work at Djoerang Koeda Bondowoso East java  during Japanese Occupation Java from August 1942 until 1944 ,never publish,found in Jakarta 1990,never publish,Collections dr Iwan , this diary thrown away by the family after Mr Martoadmodjo pass away in 1990.

120 Frank The Sky Look Down,2010

 and Hans Semethini,2010,

The Shadow Under the Sun (March 1942 – November 1945)

In the hours following the Dutch collapse, mobs of Indonesian looters swept through the city, plundering factories, shops, offices, and homes. The Japanese soon imposed order, but this relief from anarchy meant neither law nor justice. It was merely the start of a more systematic robbery. Bank accounts were frozen and then confiscated. Ruinous levies, including a property tax 70 times higher than the prewar rate, bled off any remaining sound currency. When they scrupled to pay for what they took, the Japanese purchased goods with fiat paper money. Printed in vast quantities and forced upon sellers as legal tender, this depreciating scrip would cause severe price inflation and its attendant woes. [1]

 

Japanese occupation money for the Netherlands East Indies, issued in 1942
Wikipedia

The Japanese Army seized Dutch homes to provide living quarters for its officers, turning the former owners out into the streets. The hospitals were likewise commandeered. When Elisabeth went into labor on April 8, she could not be taken to a maternity ward:

I could not go to the hospital because the Japs had taken everything. So Mum [Emma] called the Indonesian doctor and Mary-em was born the next day, 7 lb. 950 grams. [2]

With equal vigor the conquerors began the extirpation of European culture, a policy implicit in their slogan, “Asia for the Asians.” Dutch schools were closed, the Dutch language banned from publication. Surviving newspapers had to print all articles in High Malay. Personal life became degrading and fraught with danger. Encounters with Japanese soldiers required a ritual servility which, if not instantly displayed, was exacted with military strictness. The Dutch learned to respond to the barked orders: “Kiotske!” (Stand to attention!) “Kerei!” (Bow!), “Naore!” (Return to attention!). Tardiness to show proper respect could be punished with face slapping or outright beatings. Harsher treatment awaited those who ran afoul of the Imperial Army’s security police, the Kempei-tai, whose province was the concentration camp and the torture chamber.

 

 

Indonesian bus conductress bows to a Japanese officer
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

 

 

Officers of the Kempei-tai
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation

 

Having locked up Dutch military personnel in POW camps, the occupiers meticulously registered all “enemy alien residents of the Japanese Empire.” Effectively this was a screening process to determine which Dutch civilians should be imprisoned immediately and which should be arrested later. The Samethinis reported for registration

 in May 1942.

 Anna stood in line holding 6-month-old Margie in her arms, trembling with fear, until she was called before the desk of a Kempei officer.

“What are you?” he demanded. “Are you Dutch or are you Indonesian?”

“Indonesian,” she stammered.

The officer bowed his head and placed his hands flat on the papers covering his desk. For a moment he sat motionless, as if in meditation. Gathering himself into a sudden rage, he shouted, “No!” He fixed Anna with an accusing stare and pointed to her green eyes, declaring, “You have traitor eyes!” Thinking quickly, Emma broke in:

“She’s German. Her maiden name is Gunthardt.”

Amazingly, the bluff worked and the Japanese relented, allowing Anna to complete the registration process and return home. Emma’s German surname, Wychgel, was of similar advantage. Elisabeth also successfully ran the gauntlet, but she was at greatest risk of receiving further attention. She was a white Dutchwoman, of the race most suspected and hated by the Japanese, and the daughter of a naval officer. [3]

Home was a place of relative safety, and the Samethinis were not poor according to the severe standards of the time. Anna’s diary records the employment of housemaids, purchases of children’s shoes, trips to the zoo and the ice cream parlor, and a visit to the Nikola Drakulic photography studio to have family pictures taken. There is no mention of hunger. Emma’s dance school continued to give classes, though this probably generated only a modest income.

 

The former Samethini home on Brantrasstraat, in Surabaya
A new veranda has been added in front
Today the street is called Jalan Irian Barat
Photo by Adi Hartono (August 2010)

 

 

Jean Muller (Jeannette Muller von Czernicki)
1939 driver’s license photo
Courtesy of Margie Samethini-Bellamy

 

 

Albert Emil Muller von Czernicki
Japanese ID photo, 1942
Courtesy of Margie Samethini-Bellamy

Added financial support came from Anna’s friends, Jean and Albert Muller, who lived on Altingstraat (where they had settled following the confiscation of their house on Koetaistraat). Albert, it seems, worked as an illustrator for the publisher H. Van Ingen. Jean was an accountant at the Suikersyndicaat (Sugar Association), a consortium of sugar producers. High ranking Japanese military officers also employed her as a tennis instructor for their daughters, because she had been a champion tennis player before the war. With thousands being deprived of their jobs and sent to concentration camps, the Mullers were fortunate to continue earning a livelihood. But Albert suffered from tuberculosis and grew weaker with each passing month.

 

Footnotes

[1] For details on Japanese taxes and confiscations, see: Annual Report 1942 from the Royal Swedish Consulate in Sourabaya, pp. 10-12. (External link to scanned documents in the Dutch archival web site Beeldbank Nationaal Archief. Page numbers according to the web page, not as printed on the original document. Use arrow buttons at bottom right of the page to navigate through the documents).

[2] The Sky Looked Down, Appendix A: Lisa’s Story. See also: Annual Report 1942, p. 53 concerning the seizure of Surabaya hospitals by the Japanese military.

[3] Recalled from a conversation with eyewitness Jeannette Muller von Czernicki, sometime in the early 1990s. Anna’s Japanese ID certificate has not been preserved, but she would have been classified as either Belanda (Dutch) or Belanda Indo (Dutch Eurasian). To be registered as a German national, one had to possess a Nazi German passport. See: Annual Report 1942, pp. 40-41. It seems that Emma’s comment simply distracted the Kempei inquisitor long enough for his wrath to cool.

As can be seen in this mid-1960s photo, Anna’s “traitor eyes” were noticeably green.

 

Courtesy of Margie Samethini-Bellamy

[4] Anna Samethini diary: June 3, 1943 entry. Translation by Margie Samethini-Bellamy. Han Samethini Collection.

[5] Ibid., August 7, 1943 entry.

[6] Ibid., September 25, 1943 entry. Ida Bowyes was a friend of Elisabeth’s mother.

[7] Ibid., September 28, 1943 entry.

[8] Translation by Mrs. Linda Santoso. Per Japanese Army regulations, all correspondence with internment camp inmates had to be submitted on postcards, written in Malay, and must express only a positive message. See the Dutch Wikipedia article: Jappenkamp.

[9] The Sky Looked Down, Appendix A: Lisa’s Story. Conditions in the NEI camps can be judged from these postwar photos of survivors, posted on the Dutch discussion forum Onze Plek (click on thumbnails to enlarge):

[10] Recalled from a conversation with Jeannette Muller von Czernicki, early 1990s. The former Suikersyndicaat building still stands in Surabaya, on Jalan Rajawali. Below is a photograph of the interior taken in 2010. Click on image to enlarge:

P

hoto by David Wurangian (August 2010)

[11] These were naval warplanes launched from the aircraft carriers HMS Illustrious and USS Saratoga. The attack was codenamed Operation Transom. See: Operation Cockpit and Operation Transom. Aircraft types deduced from the Wikipedia article: Operation Cockpit. Information on events at the Suikersyndicaat office recalled from a conversation with Jeannette Muller von Czernicki, early 1990s. The name of the Japanese company she worked for seems to have been Togyo Bengo-kai.

[12] Indonesian forces at Surabaya were greatly strengthened through an act of Dutch hubris. In September 1945, the top Dutch commanders in the Indies, Admiral Helfrich and General Van Oyen, permitted a lone naval officer, Captain Huijer, to take the surrender of the Japanese 16th Army in Surabaya. The Japanese dutifully paraded on the airfield and handed over their weapons before marching away to Semarang. This vast stockpile of arms, including tanks and artillery, was promptly seized by a division of Republican troops arriving on the scene. Richard McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 32. Other information gleaned from the Wikipedia article: Battle of Surabaya.

[13] Personal e-mail from Margie Samethini-Bellamy. Pelopor is an Indonesian word meaning “vanguard fighter,” i.e., a young revolutionary. It derives from the Dutch voorlooper (advance guard). Margie’s account suggests that she and Anna were evacuated in late October, during the first outbreak of fighting. Unlike their overconfident commanders, British soldiers on the streets were keenly aware of anti-Dutch agitation and the growing hostility of the revolutionaries. Thus they were able to give advance warning to the women in the Koetaistraat house.

From an article published on the UK web site Standpoint:

On the afternoon of October 28, the TKR and Pemuda struck all across the city, killing 11 British officers and 44 Indian other ranks in a matter of minutes. Numerous small outposts were overrun, and a lorry convoy with hundreds of Dutch and Eurasian women and children was attacked with great loss of life. Fighting resumed at first light next morning and the situation became desperate, as many detachments were short of ammunition. Survivors recalled the attackers’ reckless ferocity. “Death Knell of the British Empire” by Patrick Heren, Standpoint Magazine (November 2010).

[14] Information on the battle drawn from the Wikipedia article:

 Battle of Surabaya.

[15] The vessel that took Anna and Margie to Singapore was the Talma, an old freighter pressed into British military service. Dutch refugee H. Beers, who was in the same evacuation group, described it as a Gurkha hospital ship.

 

The Talma

The account of Dutch refugee H. Beers
Anna’s maiden name is misspelled “Gunthout”
(Click images to enlarge)
Moesson (June 15, 1995)

 

121.DNOB,the Dai Nippon Occupation Java’s Order Book 1942-1944,Collections Dr Iwan

 

Please read more info

The dai Nippon Occupation Java in 1943

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